1625-New HSPD

THE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
RECOVERY PLAN
FOR
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY

APRIL 2006

FOREWORD
By signing National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 13 (NSPD 41/HSPD 13), President Bush underscored the importance of
securing the Maritime Domain, defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to,
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritimerelated activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”

NSPD 41/HSPD 13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee
(MSPCC)—the first coordinating committee specifically tasked to address this issue—to
oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and eight
supporting implementation plans:
•

•
•

•

•
•
•
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The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the
foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the
Maritime Domain and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores
as possible.
The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to
integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in
the Maritime Domain.
The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated U.S.
government response to threats against the U.S. and its interests in the Maritime
Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government
to respond quickly and decisively.
The International Outreach Strategy to Enhance Maritime Security provides
a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with
foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international
support for enhanced maritime security.
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends standardized
procedures for restoration of maritime transportation systems following an
incident of national significance.
The Maritime Transportation Systems Security Plan provides strategic
recommendations to holistically improve the security of maritime transportation
systems.
The Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to
secure the maritime supply chain.
The Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-federal input to assist with the
development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from
NSPD 41/HSPD 13.

Although these plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually
linked and reinforce each other. Together, NSMS and its supporting plans represent the
beginning of a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and
protect legitimate activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the Maritime
Domain.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................................. I
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ II
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN ............. 1
PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................... 3
OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................................... 4
APPLICABILITY.............................................................................................................................. 5
AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................................................ 6
FEDERALISM ................................................................................................................................. 6
DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT ................................................................................................... 7

II.

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS............................................................ 8

III.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.............................................................................................. 10
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT – FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RECOVERY ............................... 10
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENT .................................................................................. 16
PRIVATE SECTOR......................................................................................................................... 18
GOVERNMENT - PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHARING ........................................................ 19

IV.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................... 22
GENERAL .................................................................................................................................... 22
OVERALL COORDINATION OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES.................................................................... 22
CONCURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER PLANS ...............ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS AND COORDINATION .................................................................... 25
NATIONAL – REGIONAL COORDINATION AND PROCEDURES (USED BY IIMG/JFO) ....................... 32
RECOVERY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT BY NON-INCIDENT SITES (USED BY COTP/FMSCS).............. 40
RECOVERY MANAGEMENT AT THE NATIONAL TSI SITE (USED BY COTP/FMSCS) ....................... 42

V.

MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN EXERCISE PROGRAM................. 47
SCOPE ......................................................................................................................................... 47
OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................................. 47

VI.

NEXT STEPS/RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 49

APPENDIX A:

AREA MARITIME SECURITY (AMS) PLANNING (STAKEHOLDERS) .... A-1

APPENDIX B:

RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES................................................................. B-1

APPENDIX C:

ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................... C-1

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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MARITIME
INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN
“A nation as vital and thriving as ours cannot become hermetically sealed. Even less can
we afford to be overwhelmed by fear or paralyzed by the existence of threats. That’s why
we need to adopt a risk-based approach in both our operations and our philosophy. Risk
management is fundamental to managing the threat, while retaining our quality of life
and living in freedom. Risk management must guide our decision-making as we examine
how we can best organize to prevent, respond and recover from an attack…. We all live
with a certain amount of risk. That means that we tolerate that something bad can
happen; we adjust our lives based on probability; and we take reasonable precautions.”
DHS Secretary Chertoff
George Washington University
March 16, 2005
In addition to being an integral part of the HSPD-13 plans, the strategic guidance in the
MIRP is reflected in the provisions of the National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP). The
NMSP is a Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) plan that addresses the
restoration of domestic cargo flow following a security incident that occurs under, in, on,
or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan, and
the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan were developed in close coordination
under the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The Maritime Commerce Security
Plan contains recommendations to promote international maritime supply chain security
and the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan addresses security of the Maritime
Transportation System (MTS) as a system, including vessels, facilities, and ports. Both
support the recovery of maritime capabilities.

Figure 1.1 National Strategy for Maritime Security Policy Action Working Groups

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The MIRP contains procedures for recovery management and provides mechanisms for
national, regional, and local decision-makers to set priorities for redirecting commerce, a
primary means of restoring domestic cargo flow. This plan is employed when the
Secretary of Homeland Security declares an actual or threatened Transportation Security
Incident (TSI; 33 CFR 101.105) that occurs under, in, on, or adjacent to waters subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, to be an Incident of National Significance (INS), in
accordance with the criteria set out in the National Response Plan (NRP) and HSPD-5.
Any such TSI declared to be an INS accordingly is referred to as a "national TSI."
Additionally, the MIRP reflects the organizational constructs detailed in the NRP, as well
as the use of Incident Command System (ICS) and unified command procedures. As
such, the plan can be used for other similarly disruptive incidents requiring maritime
infrastructure recovery management.
Following an incident that triggers the implementation of this plan, the MIRP is used to
guide the designees of the Secretary of Homeland Security in the decision making
process to maintain the nation’s MTS operational capabilities, and if compromised, to
restore transportation capabilities.
In recognizing that recovery management takes place at several levels (i.e., national,
regional, and local), the MIRP describes recovery management considerations for the
incident site, non-incident support sites, as well as the national system-wide MTS.
Decision-making affecting the nation’s entire MTS draws on both domestic and
international resources for recovery. The operational decisions to facilitate the diversion
of cargo to alternate sites, including foreign ports, will be based on just-in-time
information; currently there is no recognized methodology or uniform standards for
measuring either domestic or foreign port cargo-handling capacity. Information of this
type is necessary to support recovery efforts; however, it is not currently available. The
need for port cargo-handling reserve capacity information is addressed in the Next Steps/
Recommendations Section of this plan.
Coincidental to operational considerations in recovery are those issues associated with
the security posture necessary to re-establish any affected port to pre-incident
equilibrium. Security postures are based on measured, targeted responses to ensure the
public’s well being and minimize disruption to the continuity of commerce. A basic
assumption of the plan is that the MTS should not shut down as an automatic response to
a maritime security incident.
Since this plan focuses on maritime transportation capabilities as a system, it only
addresses the restoration of individual physical assets to restore the MTS. The vast
majority of maritime transportation infrastructure assets are privately owned and
operated. The decision to repair, replace, or rebuild private physical assets is a private
sector decision. However, the federal government acknowledges that federal assistance
may be required to help private industry in restoring critical cargo-handling
infrastructure. Additionally, the plan recognizes that further study is needed to determine
how the federal government can provide assistance or create incentives to private
maritime stakeholders to establish sufficient critical cargo-handling infrastructure. (See
Next Steps/Recommendations Section).

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Since the MIRP provides recovery management procedures for decision makers at
various levels, the procedures are general in nature to provide flexibility for recovery
management. With over 2,100 possible threat scenarios in hundreds of ports, the
variables affecting MTS recovery are too myriad to provide detailed procedures.
Nevertheless, the procedures place emphasis on the importance of intelligence gathering
and the use of risk management principles to make the decision-making considerations
pertinent to any security-incident scenario. While the use of one particular riskmanagement model is not advocated, the plan strongly recommends that the recovery
decision-making process involve personnel who have been trained in risk
management/analysis so as to avoid uninformed decisions that would impose unnecessary
constraints on the MTS. (See Next Steps/Recommendation Section about the need for
risk management expertise.) The management of risk is also recognized in the Maritime
Commerce Security Plan as being essential to balancing security with the desire to
maintain the free flow of commerce. The Maritime Transportation System Security Plan
recommends improvement of MTS security through the development of risk assessment
methodologies. (See Appendix B for a description of Risk Management Principles).
In recognition that the federal government must work with private maritime stakeholders
to restore passenger and cargo flow in an efficient manner, the plan encourages planning
for recovery through development of private sector contingency/continuity of operations
plans. The private sector is encouraged to develop recovery operations plans (within
their business contingency plans) that include diversion of vessels to alternate ports and
to engage in voluntary exchange of information with other companies to avoid conflicts
in the use of alternate ports. (See the Roles and Responsibilities Section for the Private
Sector).
The 9/11 Commission’s report suggests the need for standards for private sector
emergency preparedness and business continuity. In light of that identified need, this
plan acknowledges that the federal government and the maritime private sector
stakeholders should work together to plan for all aspects of recovery of the MTS after a
security incident. The private sector is encouraged to collaborate with government and
other stakeholders using professional organizations and Area Maritime Security (AMS)
Committees. The Maritime Transportation System Security Plan suggests leveraging the
value of AMS Committees by establishing threat response and recovery subcommittees
and developing communications vehicles for use during normal and threat response/
recovery modes. There are many opportunities for communication and information
sharing between government and the private sector; however, the MIRP recommends
expanding the access to, and the capabilities of, one particular network in dealing with
recovery activities (i.e. the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). (See
Section IV – Concept of Operations as well as Next Steps/Recommendations about the
communications network).

PURPOSE
The purpose of the MIRP is to establish a comprehensive approach to recover from a
national TSI. As stated in the introductory portion of the plan, the focus of this plan is on
maritime transportation capabilities (i.e., restoration of passenger and cargo flow) and
minimizing impact of a security incident on the U.S. economy.

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Assuming the effect of a national TSI (or other similarly disruptive incident) impairs the
loading/offloading or movement of vessels, this plan provides a framework with clearly
defined roles to facilitate restoration of cargo flow, as well as passenger vessel activity.
Restoration of cargo flow and passenger vessel activity may include the redirecting/
diverting of vessels to ports with reserve or excess capacity.
To assist with the recovery/restoration of maritime transportation capabilities, the MIRP
accomplishes or considers the following:
•

•
•

•

•
•
•

Provides recovery management procedures for the Secretary of Homeland
Security and designated representatives (e.g., the Interagency Incident
Management Group (IIMG)) to make decisions affecting national maritime
recovery efforts;
Provides recovery management procedures for those making decisions at the
incident site and at non-incident sites that provide support;
Recognizes that, based on the nature and circumstances of the incident, a
transition in focus from homeland defense operations to recovery management
may occur between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security1;
Takes into consideration initial post-incident decisions made by senior officials
from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) regarding short-term, targeted operational actions to help maintain flow of
commerce through non-incident sites ;
Lists roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, tribal governments, and the
private sector. The listing is specific to the functional responsibilities related to
recovery of maritime transportation capabilities;
To evaluate the effectiveness of the plan, the MIRP subscribes to an exercise
program that includes periodic validation of the concepts of this recovery plan;
and
Identifies next steps and makes recommendations to improve recovery
management.

OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of the MIRP is to provide guidance for federal decision makers to
use in restoring maritime transportation capabilities if compromised, specifically the
restoration of cargo flow and passenger vessel activity after a national TSI. This
guidance includes recommended recovery management procedures to assist in the
development of viable strategies or Courses of Action (COA).
To meet the primary objective stated above, a federal inter-agency working group was
convened to develop a plan to satisfy the following functional planning objectives:
1

During and following any homeland defense operations event, the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security retains the lead for maritime infrastructure recovery management, and will ensure such
activities align with homeland defense operations. Nothing in this plan will be construed to take precedence
over homeland defense operations, including assignment of U.S. Coast Guard forces in accordance with
current directives.

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•
•

•

•
•

Identify pre-designated key national government/industry stakeholders
immediately available to advise the Secretary of Homeland Security on matters
pertaining to recovery from INS affecting the Maritime Domain;
Recommend national priorities for recovery of maritime transportation systems
after a national TSI:
o Define the criteria for identifying maritime critical infrastructure (MCI)
across various maritime transportation subsystems;
o Use Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection criteria for
screening cargo to assist maritime recovery efforts and manage risk;
Recommend federal policies and procedures for recovery of national maritime
transportation after a security incident (and support recovery of critical local and
regional transportation systems);
o Establish standard procedures for setting decision-making priorities for
recovery nationally, and for supporting recovery of critical local and
regional transportation systems;
o Set standard procedures for integrating national recovery priorities with
national military requirements;
o Maintain consistency with the National Response Plan (NRP);
o Conduct a review of all legal authorities to ensure effective federal
coordination of recovery and identify any recommend changes to
eliminate statutory and regulatory gaps;
o Establish standard procedures for assessing recovery requirements and
developing potential recovery options within the Maritime Transportation
System (MTS);
Describe a maritime infrastructure recovery exercise program consistent with the
National Exercise Program; and
Specify procedures for coordinating among federal, state, local and private sector
partners, and cooperation with foreign governments and international entities, as
appropriate.

APPLICABILITY
Prior to declaration by the Secretary of Homeland Security that a TSI is an INS, response
and recovery efforts are conducted under the purview and authority of Area Maritime
Security (AMS) Plans in force for the affected geographic area, or Area of Responsibility
(AOR), in which an incident has taken place.
When the Secretary of Homeland Security declares the TSI to be an Incident of National
Significance (“national TSI”), decision-makers at the national level, as well as other
levels, will address implications to the maritime industry nationwide, and will provide
oversight to local and regional recovery operations utilizing the MIRP in conjunction
with the National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP). The shift from local and regional to
national incident management involves the activation of many plans. See the diagram in
Section IV. Concept of Operations, for a graphic representation of the relationship of
these plans.

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AUTHORITIES
Various federal statutory authorities and policies provide the basis for federal actions and
activities in the context of maritime infrastructure recovery. As described in the Foreword
of this plan, the MIRP uses the foundation provided by the National Strategy for
Maritime Security (NSMS) pursuant to the National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) in conjunction
with the National Maritime Security Plan to provide guidance for the restoration and
recovery of cargo flow.
The MIRP does not in any way alter the existing authorities of individual federal
departments and agencies. The MIRP does not convey new authorities upon the Secretary
of Homeland Security or any other federal official. Rather, this plan establishes the
coordinating structures, processes and protocols required to integrate specific statutory
and policy authorities of various federal departments and agencies in a collective
framework for action and activities to recover from a national TSI. All questions
concerning specific authority and jurisdiction must be referred to competent counsel.

FEDERALISM
In regard to authority to preempt state action, when a Coast Guard official takes action
pursuant to this plan, and that action implements or enforces an existing federal legal
requirement for maritime security, it would be inconsistent with the Federalism principles
set out in the Executive Order 13132 to construe that action as not preempting state laws
or regulations that conflict with the existing federal legal requirement. This is because
owners or operators of facilities or vessels, including those owned and operated by states,
that may be subject to federal legal requirements for maritime security for both
performance and operating standards, must have one uniform national standard that they
must meet. Vessels and shipping companies, particularly, would be confronted with an
unreasonable burden if they had to comply with varying requirements as they moved
from state to state. Therefore, the Federalism principles enumerated by the Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) regarding field preemption of certain state
vessel safety, equipment, and operating requirements extends to actions taken pursuant to
this plan which implement or enforce an existing federal legal requirement for maritime
security, especially regarding the longstanding history of significant Coast Guard
maritime security regulation and control of vessels for security purposes. The same
considerations apply to facilities, at least insofar as a state law or regulation applicable to
the same subject for the purpose of protecting the security of the facility would conflict
with a federal legal requirement; in other words, it would either actually conflict or would
frustrate an overriding federal need for uniformity.
Finally, it is important to note that actions taken by the Coast Guard pursuant to this plan
which implement or enforce an existing federal legal requirement for maritime security
bear on national and international commerce, where there is no constitutional
presumption of concurrent State regulation. Many aspects of federal legal requirements
for maritime security are based on the U.S. international treaty obligations regarding
vessel and port facility security contained in the International Convention for the Safety
or Life at Sea, 1974, TIAS 9700; Rectification (1982), TIAS 10626, as amended, and the

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complementary International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. These international
obligations reinforce the need for uniformity regarding maritime commerce.
The authorities of federal agencies, other than the Coast Guard, may also preempt state
action due a need to maintain national uniformity, to satisfy international obligations, to
carry out express Congressional intent, to comply with specific case law, or due to a
history of longstanding regulation. All questions concerning specific agency authority to
preempt state action must be referred to competent counsel.
Notwithstanding the foregoing position, the federal government intends to consult with
appropriate state officials and the private sector as set out in the plan.

DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT
Following an incident that triggers the implementation of this plan, the MIRP anticipates
that the private sector and appropriate federal government agencies will take actions that
will result in large scale re-routing of vessel and cargo traffic. This re-routing will result
in, among many other things, private sector requests for vessel, crew, and cargo
clearances outside of normal lead times currently required by law. Further, re-routing of
traffic and the need to move high priority cargo may result in the use of foreign registered
platforms to carry cargo on coastwise voyages, and use of U.S. registered platforms to
carry cargo on foreign voyages, or both, depending on the circumstances.
This plan does not change any authorities applicable to the aforementioned clearance
processes or voyage routes. Federal agencies must be prepared to balance the continued
need for security against the need to recover cargo flow to support the national economy.
Accordingly, agencies should ease enforcement of laws regulating notices of arrival,
crew and cargo manifests, and the coastwise trade, when such actions would enhance
restoration of cargo flow without compromising security. Specifically, when re-routing of
cargo results in changes only to destination and lead time of notice, and not to other
required information such as cargo, vessel description and crew composition, agencies
should be favorably disposed to approve such changes as soon as possible on an
individual or company fleet-wide basis.
Agencies also must recognize that strict enforcement of coastwise trade regulations that
results in a bar to employment of otherwise capable and secure platforms (U.S. or foreign
registered) to move cargo to, from, or within the United States from foreign or domestic
ports, may not be in the national interest. Accordingly, agencies should ease enforcement
of coastwise trade regulations to ensure that all available platforms are readily available
to move cargo to, from, or within the United States, from foreign or domestic ports, in the
weeks following the incident, so that adverse economic impact is mitigated as soon as
possible.

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II. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
THE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN (MIRP) IS BASED ON
THE FOLLOWING PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS:
•
•

•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•

The MIRP is a guidance document used by incident managers, advisors, and
decision makers;
Implementation of the MIRP is based on the occurrence of a national TSI, which
has been declared an INS by the Secretary of DHS, that has impaired or threatens
to impair the loading/offloading or movement of vessels and disrupts the flow of
commerce;
This plan assumes that a national TSI has been declared, the National Response
Plan (NRP), and its Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) has
convened and is available to make national-level recommendations regarding the
restoration of cargo flow and maritime infrastructure recovery;
Recovery operations are based on risk management principles—100% security of
the MTS cannot be guaranteed before or following an incident;
The goals of decision makers utilizing the MIRP are:
o Facilitate achieving the optimum balance between ports and waterways
security and the recovery of maritime transportation capabilities,
o Maximize the Maritime Transportation System’s (MTS) continued
operational equilibrium,
o Minimize disruption to the U. S. economy from unnecessarily constrained
cargo flow;
Infrastructure refers to the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) and those
facilities, structures, and assets vital to the Nation’s ports (33 CFR 101.105);
Use of the phrase “recovery or restoration of cargo flow” refers to recovery of
goods, wares, and merchandise (33CFR 101.105) and restoration of maritime
transportation capabilities in the MTS. Additionally, when referring to either
recovery or restoration of cargo flow, the phrase includes recovery management
associated with passenger vessel activity;
The MIRP will be implemented with awareness of the initial measured and
targeted response and recovery actions exercised by senior U.S. Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection officials;
A basic assumption of the plan is that the MTS should not be shut down as an
automatic response to a maritime security incident;
The plan includes next steps/recommendations to assess reserve or excess porthandling capacity at ports in North America (including both Canada and Mexico)
and at other ports outside of North America. The capacity of a port is the level at
which the port can move cargo and passengers through the Maritime
Transportation System, including the ability to safely and securely load and
unload cargo and passengers and accommodate inter-modal operations;
“Minimizing damage (i.e., physical infrastructure damage) from attacks within the
Maritime Domain” is covered under separate preparedness and incident response
plans and, therefore, is not addressed in the MIRP;

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•
•
•

Key public and private maritime sector stakeholder inputs were considered in the
development of the MIRP;
Planners will consult with the private sector to update the MIRP to ensure
meaningful, up-to-date decision-making information for federal officials; and
Periodically, the MIRP will be updated as required to incorporate new
Presidential Directives, legislative changes, and procedural changes based on
lessons learned from exercises and actual events.

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III. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) provides a list of Functional
Responsibilities, as related to maritime transportation, that various agencies and private
sector entities may perform to recover from a national TSI, which has been declared an INS.
Decision makers at the incident site, the non-incident site, and the national levels may find
this information useful in expanding their knowledge about recovery-specific responsibilities
for federal, state, and local governments as well as the private sector. Descriptions of general
roles and responsibilities of various organizations can be found in the National Response
Plan (NRP).

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT – FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RECOVERY
Functional responsibilities for the recovery of maritime transportation infrastructure systems
are listed below for federal departments/agencies identified with recovery responsibilities:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
•
•
•

Act as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic incident management.
Coordinate federal maritime infrastructure recovery operations within the U.S.
Coordinate federal government resources.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Provide on-scene resources to assist in assessments;
Act as the PFO when directed by the Secretary of DHS or as the Senior Federal
Official (SFO);
Participate in recovery planning by developing Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans
and collaborate with maritime stakeholders, especially local harbor safety
committees;
As the COTP/FMSC:
o Develop and implement AMS Plans;
o Control vessel traffic, movement and anchorage;
o Establish and enforce safety and security zones;
o Control access to and operations of facilities under, in, or adjacent to waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.;
o Control the movement of vessels carrying Certain Dangerous Cargos (CDC);
Furnish available personnel, equipment or other resource support as requested;
Provide port security measures to reduce potential, future threats and to ensure
integrity of the existing infrastructure system;
Track Notice of Arrival (NOA) information from ships entering U.S waters and
ensure changes to NOA are provided to the appropriate Coast Guard and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) officials at alternate ports of entry;
As part of AMS Plans, in coordination with appropriate stakeholders and other
government agencies, be aware of maximum vessel, cargo and inter-modal
throughput within the respective area of responsibility;

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•
•
•
•
•
•

Consider temporary easement of enforcement of regulations to facilitate re-routing of
cargo, including NOA lead times;
Support CBP in the screening and evaluating of cargo movement into and out of the
U.S.;
In support of ESF #3 of the NRP, coordinate with the U.S Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) to mark and remove obstructions declared to be hazards to navigation;
Ensure safety of navigation and security of AOR prior to reopening of any waterway;
Assist in debris and contaminated debris management activities;
Provide support as outlined in ESFs 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13 of the National Response
Plan (NRP) and any other tasking as directed by the Secretary of DHS.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
•

Provide on-scene resources to assist in assessments;
In coordination with appropriate stakeholders and other government agencies, be
aware of maximum available vessel, cargo and inter-modal throughput within the
respective area of responsibility;
Screen and evaluate cargo, crew, and passenger movement into and out of the U.S;
Conduct hands-on physical boardings of vessels with highest-risk cargo;
Inspect and search vessels, conveyances, persons, and cargo within the Customs
territory of the U.S.;
Detain and seize vessels, cargo, and contraband;
Authorize lading and unlading of cargo;
Determine the admissibility of persons arriving in the U.S.;
Collect, integrate and analyze maritime intelligence concerning cargo and inter-modal
shipments;
Identify and mitigate security risks within the supply chain through the CustomsTrade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program;
Authorize the redirection of conveyances to other ports;
Be aware of NOA changes provided by the Coast Guard;
Ensure changes to the Trade Act of 2002 cargo manifest and Advance Passenger
Information System (APIS) manifest for passenger and crewmembers are provided to
the appropriate Coast Guard and CBP officials at alternate ports of entry;
Consider temporary easement of enforcement of coastwise trade regulations to
facilitate commerce;
In coordination with DOS, approach the governments of Canada, Mexico, and
Panama to make arrangements for diversion of U.S. bound cargo and passengers;
Detect and identify chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials through
the employment of detection technology and coordination with CBP Weapons of
Mass Destruction Teleforensics Center;
Inspect cargo containers and review cargo information in advance of loading in
foreign ports, through the Container Security Initiative (CSI);
When requested, in accordance with agency authority and the availability of
resources, redeploy appropriate personnel, equipment, air and marine assets and other
resources in support;

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•
•
•
•

Participate in recovery activities of Area Maritime Security Committees;
Support the Coast Guard so as to ensure compatibility, as appropriate, between the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and requirements
promulgated by the Coast Guard;
Support the Coast Guard in planning Transportation Security Incident (TSI) recovery,
as appropriate; and
Provide support as outlined in ESFs 9, 10, 11, 13 of the NRP and any other tasking as
directed by the Secretary of DHS.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
•
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Develop policies on the identification of critical assets and infrastructure;
Coordinate with USCG, CBP, DOT, and private industry to facilitate redirection of
conveyances to other ports;
Following a TSI, in coordination with other appropriate stakeholders and government
agencies, be aware of maximum available vessel, cargo and inter-modal capacity, to
take steps to ensure the continuity of cargo flow;
Monitor investigations of TSI’s to obtain lessons learned to improve risk mitigation
plans and programs.
Support the Coast Guard in maritime security planning;
Support the Coast Guard and participate as a member of the Area Maritime Security
Advisory Committees;
Coordinate intelligence functions with other entities of the DHS through the
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC);
Provide support as outlined in NRP and accompanying ESFs.

Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency
(EP&R/FEMA)
•

Provide disaster relief resources in accordance with the NRP.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
•
•
•

Identify and assess a broad range of intelligence information concerning current and
future threats against the United States;
Issue timely warnings and advisories for the full spectrum of terrorist threats against
the homeland, including physical and cyber events; and
Review threats to the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) and marine critical
infrastructure and key assets.

Directorate for Preparedness
•
•

Consolidates preparedness assets across the Department:
Facilitates grants and oversees nationwide preparedness efforts by supporting first
responder training, citizen awareness, public health, infrastructure and cyber security
and ensures proper steps are taken to protect high-risk targets:

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•
•
•

Focuses on cyber security and telecommunications:
Addresses threats to our nation’s public health through the Chief Medical Officer,
who coordinates preparedness efforts against biological attacks: and
Is responsible for infrastructure protection, training and exercises, the U.S. Fire
Administration, and the Office of National Capitol Region Coordination.

Office of Operations Coordination
•
•
•
•

Conducts joint operations across all organizational elements.
Coordinates activities related to incident management.
Employs all Department resources to translate intelligence and policy into action; and
Oversees the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) which collects and fuses
information from more than 35 Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local, and private
sector agencies.

Department of Defense (DoD)
•
•
•
•
•

Provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with the NRP;
Support recovery activities with federal, state, local, and tribal elements as requested
and approved by the Secretary of Defense;
When requested and approved by the Secretary of Defense, provide military
personnel, DoD civilians and contract personnel, as appropriate in support of
domestic incidents; and
Provide support under Immediate Response Authority by DoD directive and prior
approval of the Secretary of Defense; and
Take necessary “Immediate action” to respond to requests of civil authorities
consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provide rapid dredging capability through contracting or from Federal Dredging
Fleet;
Conduct high tech channel surveys;
Conduct pre- and post-incident assessments of public works and infrastructure;
Provide technical assistance to include engineering expertise, construction
management and contracting, and real estate services;
Provide emergency repair of damaged public critical infrastructure and facilities;
Remove and dispose of contaminated and uncontaminated debris from public
property;
Provide appropriate representation to the IIMG and/or HSOC when requested by
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense;
Restoration and operation of inland waterways, ports and harbors to include assisting
in restoring the transportation infrastructure;
Obtain heavy equipment and/or demolition services;
Support mass care operations by providing ice, water and temporary housing;

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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Temporary restoration of damaged public utilities by providing equipment, supplies
and technical assistance;
Recovery assistance to radiological and nuclear incidents to include radiological
surveys, gross decontamination, site characterization, contaminated water
management and site remediation;
Assist with incident environmental impact assessments by providing technical
environmental expertise;
Deploy emergency power teams for power-system restoration;
Provide long-term community recovery through community planning, civil
engineering and hazard risk assessment expertise;
Support development of national strategies and plans for the restoration of public
facilities and infrastructure;
Operational support for mobilization centers (including mobile command centers),
staging areas, and distribution sites for all infrastructure and engineering service
commodities; and
Support the USCG and participate as an advisory member of the AMS Committees.

Department of State (DOS)
•
•
•
•
•
•

Coordinate requests for, and offers of, transportation assistance from foreign
governments;
Provide support to the various ESFs, when activated, as outlined in the NRP;
Notify foreign governments as appropriate of impacts on commerce ;
In coordination with CBP, approach the governments of Canada, Mexico, and
Panama to make arrangements for diversion and facilitation of U.S. bound cargo and
passengers;
Provide support of DHS Maritime and Cargo Security Programs; and
Provide awareness and monitoring of cargo subject to export control.

Department of Transportation (DOT)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Prioritize and/or allocate civil transportation capacity;
Manage hazardous material containment response and movement;
Assess damage to the nation’s rail, pipeline and highway systems;
Provide technical expertise and assistance for repair and restoration of transportation
infrastructure;
Provide advice and assistance on the transportation of contaminated materials;
Provide engineering personnel and support to assist in damage and structural
assessments, structural inspections and debris; and
Provide support to the various ESFs, when activated, as outlined in the NRP.

Maritime Administration (MARAD)
•

Provide transport of critical supplies, bulk goods, or heavy equipment/supplies to
ports adjacent to disaster areas through the use of the National Defense Reserve Fleet;

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•
•
•
•
•
•

Obtain priority use and allocation of port facilities and services, shipping services,
containers and chassis under the Defense Production Act;
Maintain personnel readiness services needed to operate active and reserve vessels;
Assist the USCG in development of recovery assessments and plans;
Participate in activities of the Area Maritime Security Committees;
Coordinate with CBP to determine if it is appropriate to waive provisions of the Jones
Act; and
Consider temporary easement of enforcement of coastwise trade regulations to
facilitate commerce.

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
•

Provide emergency funds or loans for repair or reconstruction of highways.

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
•

Provide direct loans and guarantees to rehabilitate inter-modal or rail equipment or
facilities.

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC)
•
•

Establish, operate, and maintain vessel traffic services; and
Control or supervise vessel traffic.

Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
•
•
•

Provide emergency funds or loans for repair or reconstruction of pipelines; and
Coordinate recovery operations at the federal level for cross-modal aspects of a TSI;
Respond to requests for waivers of restrictions to meet emergency requirements for
pipeline operation.

Department of Interior (DOI)
•

Provide tribal nation liaisons per ESF#3 of the NRP.

Department of Commerce (DOC)
•
•

Provide economic impact data and analysis; and
Provide to appropriate government agencies awareness and monitoring of cargo
subject to export controls.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
•
•

Assess port and regional level maritime, seafloor, weather and infrastructure
conditions; and
Provide awareness and monitoring information on maritime, seafloor weather and
infrastructure conditions to appropriate incident management officials.

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Department of Energy (DOE)
•
•

Assist in the economic assessment of damage to energy infrastructure; and
Consider use of Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Department of Justice (DOJ)
•
•
•

Through the FBI, conduct and coordinate all federal law enforcement and criminal
investigation activities during a terrorist incident;
Coordinate the activities of members of the law enforcement community; and
Consult with other federal agencies with regard to the temporary easement of
enforcement regulations to facilitate the reconstruction of critical infrastructure and
resumption of commerce.

STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
The MIRP recognizes that state, local and tribal governments using National Incident
Management System principles have responsibility for incident management response and
recovery efforts immediately after an incident. To manage their responsibilities, many of
these government agencies currently have pre-established emergency response plans in place.
However, recovery plans, especially for maritime infrastructure recovery and restoration of
cargo flow, are not as prevalent. Many states engage individual task force groups to manage
a myriad of disaster scenarios and response situations.
Due to the fact that the responsibilities, capabilities and organizational structures vary from
agency to agency, it is difficult to establish specific functional responsibilities that each may
be able to provide for recovery after a national TSI (or similarly disruptive incident).
However, to coordinate the federal, state, local and tribal government relationship, the MIRP
has identified a generic list of functional responsibilities for recovery that state, local, and
tribal governmental agencies may perform.
State
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Coordinate state resources to address recovery;
Make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations under certain emergency conditions
in support of recovery efforts as appropriate;
Communicate to the public recovery aspects of an emergency within state
jurisdiction;
Assist people, businesses, and organizations of the state cope with the consequences
of recovery;
Encourage participation in mutual aid and implement authorities for the state to enter
into mutual aid agreements with other states, tribes, and territories to facilitate
resource-sharing;
Coordinate requests for federal assistance when it becomes clear that state or tribal
capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted;
Engage in voluntary exchange of information with other federal, state, local and tribal
government agencies;

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•
•
•
•

Participate in various advisory committees and task forces regarding recovery
management;
Assist in the assessment of the economic impact created by a security incident;
Assist in the identification of recovery resources and assets; and
Provide resources as requested and as appropriate.

Local
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Perform emergency first-responder activities as appropriate;
Coordinate local resources to address recovery;
Suspend local laws and ordinances, (dependent upon state and local law), under
certain emergency conditions in support of recovery efforts as appropriate;
Communicate to the public any type of declared emergency within local jurisdiction;
Assist people, businesses, and organizations in the local area to cope with the
consequences of any type of declared emergency and its recovery considerations;
Negotiate and enter into mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to facilitate
resource-sharing;
Request state and, if necessary, federal assistance through the Governor of the State
when the jurisdiction’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted, or otherwise as
appropriate;
Engage in voluntary exchange of information with other federal, state local and tribal
government agencies;
Participate in various advisory committees and task forces regarding recovery
management;
Assist in the assessment of the economic impact created by a security incident;
Assist in the identification of recovery resources and assets; and
Provide resources as requested and as appropriate.

Tribal
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Coordinate local resources to address recovery;
Suspend tribal laws and ordinances as appropriate;
Communicate any type of declared emergency within tribal jurisdiction;
Assist people, businesses, and organizations to cope with the consequences of any
type of declared emergency;
Negotiate and enter into mutual aid agreements with other tribes/jurisdictions to
facilitate resource-sharing;
Request state and federal assistance through the Governor of the State when the
tribe’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted;
Deal directly with the federal government. (Although a state Governor must request a
Presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act, federal
agencies can work directly with tribes within existing authorities and resources.)
Engage in voluntary exchange of information with federal, state local and other tribal
government agencies;
Participate in various advisory committees and task forces regarding recovery
management;

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•
•
•

Assist in the assessment of the economic impact created by a national TSI;
Assist in the identification of recovery resources and assets; and
Provide resources as requested and as appropriate.

PRIVATE SECTOR
The MIRP recognizes that the private sector/private industry plays a key role in the
successful operation and management of the MTS. As the owner of the vast majority of the
infrastructure assets, private sector entities have an important role in planning, operations,
and advisory aspects relating to maritime infrastructure recovery and the restoration of
passenger and cargo flow.
Following an incident that triggers implementation of this plan, the federal government will
facilitate the restoration of commerce and recovery of the marine transportation infrastructure
systems in concert with private sector contingency planning. To better prepare for this role,
the MIRP advocates the following:
•

•

•
•

Private sector owners and operators of vessels and facilities subject to U.S.
government regulation are encouraged to expand their continuity of operations plans
to include recovery operations as part of required planning pursuant to federal
regulations, if such planning has not already been completed;
Owners and operators of vessels and facilities not subject to U.S. government
regulation are encouraged to establish recovery operations plans and submit them to
their local Area Maritime Security Committee and the National Infrastructure
Coordination Center’s (NICC) Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
Program;
All private sector recovery operations plans should include (1) a plan for evacuation,
(2) adequate communications capabilities, and (3) a plan for continuity of operations;
All private sector recovery operations plans should consider the existing American
National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs (NFPA 1600), which contains minimum criteria for disaster management
and guidance in the development of a program for effective disaster preparedness
response and recovery.

To assist in the development of recovery operations plans and other contingency planning,
the following Business Roundtable guidance documents are recommended for private sector
continuity of operations plan development:
•
•

Committed to Protecting America: A Private-Sector Crisis Preparedness Guide,
March 2005
Committed to Protecting America: CEO Guide to Security Challenges, February
2005

It is anticipated that the private sector will implement continuity of operations plans/recovery
operations plans on their own accord, based on incident information provided by the federal
government. Information that may influence their decision to implement contingency plans
and divert or redirect cargo and/or their conveyances are: national priorities; military
requirements; MTS restrictions; and the expected duration of those restrictions.

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To facilitate restoration of the flow of commerce and passenger vessel activity, the MIRP has
identified a list of functional responsibilities that the private sector may perform:
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Engage in voluntary exchange of information about recovery operations plans with
other potentially affected private sector entities and the federal government to
mitigate potential congestion at non-incident site ports following the diversion of
vessel traffic;
Participate in various maritime industry stakeholder professional organizations and
advisory committees such as the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees
regarding recovery management and contingency planning (See Appendix A for
AMS Planning Stakeholders);
Assist in the assessment of economic impact;
Assist in the identification of recovery resources and assets;
Provide resources to assist in recovery, as appropriate;
When requested by the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC),
provide SMEs for advising on recovery management, especially regarding maritime
salvage capability. (See Next Steps/Recommendations);
Participate in pilot programs to test the effectiveness of the federal government to
communicate recovery activities to the private sector (see Next
Steps/Recommendations);
Using existing information-sharing mechanisms such as the National Infrastructure
Coordinating Center (NICC), Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees,
Transportation Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers (ISAC), communicate situational and operational information as
well as physical asset capabilities to the IIMG for mitigation management.

Government – Private Sector Information Sharing
In addition to performing various roles in recovery management, the private sector should be
knowledgeable about information sharing and government-to-private sector coordinating
mechanisms. Below is a list of several coordinating entities:
•

•

DHS is enhancing sector-specific information sharing and coordinating mechanisms
for all of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors, incorporating both Information Sharing
and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs). These
entities have dual roles in that they serve as central points of information sharing
within each of the sectors and also act as the liaison to the federal government. One
of the primary functions is to funnel threat information to facilities and receive and
collect information from facilities.
The Homeland Security Information Network - Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI)
Pilot Program is an unclassified network that immediately provides the Department's
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) with one-stop, 24/7 access to a broad
spectrum of industries, agencies and critical infrastructure across both the public and
private sectors. This conduit for two-way information sharing provides the
Department with an expanding base of locally knowledgeable experts and delivers
real-time access to critical information. The HSIN-CI initiative was expanded to
include critical infrastructure owners, operators and the private sector in all 50 states,

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•

•

centered regionally around the cities of Dallas, Seattle, Indianapolis and Atlanta. To
date, HSIN-CI communicates with nearly 40,000 members.
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC): The mission of the NICC is to
maintain operational awareness of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key
resources, and provide a mechanism and process for information sharing and
coordination between and among government and industry partners. The NICC is the
two-way communication flow point between DHS and private industry for reporting
threats, events or crises that can potentially affect the successful operation of the
nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources. DHS use the NICC to provide
private industry information about threats, warnings and defensive measures. Private
industry uses the NICC to formally submit information that could affect or impede
their continuous operations.
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees: Established under the direction of the
Captain of the Port (COTP) to provide advice and assist the development of the AMS
Plan. Among other specified duties, the AMS Committee “shall serve as a link for
communicating threats and changes in MARSEC Levels and disseminating
appropriate security information to port stakeholders.

Using the flow chart below, the members of the private sector can see the organizations
involved in the communications network for information flow between government and the
private sector. (For further information, see Section IV – Concept of Operations and Next
Steps/Recommendations about the communications network).

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Figure 3.1 – DHS-Private Sector Communication Flow Chart

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IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
GENERAL
When an incident is of such severity, magnitude, and/or complexity that it is considered a
national TSI and has been declared an Incident of National Significance (INS) according to
the criteria established in the National Response Plan (NRP), the Secretary of Homeland
Security (SecDHS), in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, initiates
actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the incident. These actions are
taken in conjunction with state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private-sector entities as
appropriate to the threat or incident. (Any TSI that is declared an Incident of National
Significance accordingly is referred to as a “national TSI.”)
This section describes the federal coordinating structures, processes, and protocols employed
to recover from a national TSI in the Maritime Transportation System (MTS). These
coordinating structures and processes are aligned with the NRP, and enable execution of the
responsibilities of the President through the appropriate federal departments and agencies,
and to integrate federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and
private-sector efforts into a comprehensive national approach to provide for public safety, the
security of the MTS and to maintain and/or restore the flow of maritime commerce.
When faced with MTS restrictions, national-level decision-makers will facilitate scalable
recovery activities concerning national maritime transportation infrastructure systems,
specifically expediting the restoration of passenger and cargo flow to ports with capacity to
accommodate cargo and inter-modal operations. The processes provided herein allow for
MTS recovery activities to occur simultaneously with response activities at the incident site.
If restricted from MTS participation during response operations, the incident site will be reintegrated into the MTS as part of its recovery operations.

OVERALL COORDINATION OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES
During a national TSI, the overall coordination of federal incident management activities is
executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other federal departments and
agencies carry out their incident management, emergency response, and recovery authorities,
and responsibilities within this plan’s overarching coordinating framework.
The Secretary of Homeland Security utilizes multi-agency structures at the headquarters,
regional, and field levels to coordinate efforts, and provides appropriate support to the
incident command structure.
At the federal headquarters level, incident information-sharing, operational planning,
recovery, and deployment of federal resources are coordinated by the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC), and its component elements. Strategic-level interagency incident
management coordination and Course of Action (COA) development are facilitated by the
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), which also serves as an advisory body to
the Secretary of Homeland Security. Issues beyond the Secretary's authority to resolve are
referred to the appropriate White House entity for resolution.
In the field, the Principal Federal Official (PFO) or the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO),
as appropriate, represents the Secretary of Homeland Security. Overall Federal support to the

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incident command structure on scene is coordinated through the Joint Field Office (JFO). For
terrorist incidents, the Attorney General, acting through the FBI, executes the primary
responsibilities for coordinating and conducting all federal law enforcement and criminal
investigation activities. During a terrorist incident, the local FBI Special Agent-in-Charge
(SAC), or FBI Headquarters designee, coordinates these activities with other members of the
law enforcement community, and works in conjunction with the PFO, who coordinates
overall federal incident management activities. The framework created by these coordinating
structures is designed to accommodate the various roles of the federal government during and
after an incident.
In the event of multiple incidents, a Unified Area Command may be established to oversee
the management of multiple ICS organizations or to oversee the management of a very large
or complex incident that has multiple incident management teams engaged. The
simultaneous conduct of incident response and recovery operations, the restoration of
passenger and cargo flow, add a new dimension for federal decision makers. Therefore, a
JFO, separate from the JFO supporting response operations at the incident site, may be
established to support the coordination of recovery operations with federal, state, local,
tribal, nongovernmental and private sector organizations. This is consistent with the
potential for the scope and complexity of an incident to create a demand for multiple JFO’s.
This need has been anticipated and is permitted by the NRP. (See page 28 of the NRP).
At the local level, on-scene incident command and management organization is located at the
Incident Command Post (ICP). Designated incident management officials and responders
from federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as private-sector and nongovernmental
organizations are typically onsite at the ICP. When multiple command authorities are
involved in a response or recovery effort, the ICP may be led by a Unified Command, which
is comprised of officials who have jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for the
incident under an appropriate law, ordinance, or agreement. The ICP will be located within
the immediate vicinity of the incident site, the location having been selected by the primary
jurisdictional authority. Each incident will generally have a unique ICP.

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CONCURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER PLANS

NRP

NATIONAL

NIPP

MARSEC

TSSP

NATIONAL

Relevant Plans

INS/
NATIONAL
TSI

NMTSP
MIRP

National Plans

TSSP - Transportation Sector Specific Plan

Area Level Plans

NMTSP - National Maritime Transportation
Security Plan

Facility
Security
Plans

MIRP - Maritime Infrastructure
Recovery Plan

LOCAL

TSI
AMS
PLAN

BREACH OF
SECURITY

MARSEC

MARSEC - Maritime Security
TSI - Transportation Security Incident
AMS - Area Maritime Security

SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY

INS - Incident of National Significance
NRP - National Response Plan
N IPP - National Infrastructure Protection Plan

LOCAL

Vessel
Security
Plans

Diagram Acronym Key

State &
Local

Incident
Significance

Other
Federal

Threat

Figure 4.1 – MIRP Relationship to Relevant Plans

The MIRP is used as a post-incident recovery tool and details the federal coordinating
guidelines during a national TSI. Many other plans work in concert with the MIRP to
promote economic stability and protect continuity of commerce. Several examples of these
plans follow:
•

•

•

National Response Plan (NRP) – Recovery is the development, coordination, and
execution of service and site restoration plans and the reconstitution of government
operations and services through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and
public assistance programs.
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) - A consistent, unifying structure for
integrating critical infrastructure protection efforts into a national program. The NIPP
outlines how DHS and its stakeholders will develop and implement the national effort
to protect infrastructures across all sectors.
Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP) –To facilitate recovery and restoration
activities following a TSI, the TSSP states the Sector Specific Responsibility (SSR)
will work closely with DOT and other federal, state, and local agencies to remove
regulatory impediments, reestablish supporting infrastructure, restore transportation
service, and rebuild public confidence.

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•

•

National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP) – The NMSP functions as the capstone of
the three-tiered system of domestic maritime security plans required under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), comprised of: The National Maritime
Security Plan; Area Maritime Security Plans prepared by Federal Maritime Security
Coordinators; and Vessel and Facility Security Plans prepared by owners and
operators. The NMSP serves also as the maritime sub-modal plan for the
Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP). The TSSP is one of 17 Sector and Key
Asset plans required under the HSPD-7 National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP).
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans – The AMS Plans provide guidance for
recovery of the Maritime Transportation System and reopening of the affected
infrastructure, port(s) and/or waterways in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
following a transportation security incident. In the context of a national TSI, these
AMS Plans may be implemented concurrently with other plans. In comporting with
the NRP, the department or agency with primary responsibility for execution of AMS
Plans is also responsible for ensuring that all ongoing activities conform to the
processes and protocols prescribed in the NRP in responding to Transportation
Security Incidents. This enables effective and coordinated federal incident
management recovery with state, and local agencies, and relevant portions of the
private sector authorities and responsibilities.

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS AND COORDINATION
The NRP, reflecting the National Incident Management System (NIMS), establishes a
national structure for incident management: a clear progression of coordination and
communication from the local level to regional to national headquarters level. The MIRP
takes advantage of the organization in place under the NRP to conduct recovery operations.
The following is a graphic representation of the information flow between local level
activities and national recovery management:

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Figure 4.2 – DHS Communication Flow Chart

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26

Principal Organizational Elements
This section describes the major organizational elements involved in federal recovery
coordination. Further description of each of these elements can be found in Section IV of the
National Response Plan.
Homeland Security Council/National Security Council
As stated in HSPD-5, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs are responsible for interagency policy
coordination regarding domestic and international incident management, respectively, as
directed by the President. Following an assessment by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
those issues outside the authority of the Secretary, as defined in the Homeland Security Act,
Stafford Act, and other relevant statutes, Executive orders, and directives, are elevated for
resolution through the Homeland Security Council/National Security Council (HSC/NSC)
system.
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs work together to ensure that domestic and international incident
management efforts are seamlessly integrated.
Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs)
PCCs coordinate policy issues as part of the White House policy development process.
NSPD-41/HSPD-13 established a Maritime Security PCC. PCCs may be convened at the
request of any agency on an emergency basis based on a threat, a national TSI, or a policy
issue of urgent nature.
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG)
The IIMG provides strategic situational awareness, synthesizes key intelligence and
operational information, frames operational courses of action/policy, makes
recommendations, anticipates evolving requirements, provides decision support to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and other national authorities (including the White House)
during select periods of heightened alert and national-level domestic incidents.
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)
The HSOC is the primary national hub for domestic incident-management coordination and
situational awareness. The HSOC is a standing 24/7 interagency organization integrating law
enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response, and private sector reporting. The
HSOC facilitates homeland security information-sharing and operational coordination with
other federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental Emergency Operations Centers
(EOCs).
The HSOC integrates elements of the DHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis (I&A) and DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency
Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA). These elements work in close coordination to
address information/ intelligence analysis and response coordination.

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HSOC (DHS Headquarters Facility Elements)
The HSOC convenes representatives from DHS and other federal departments and agencies
to support steady-state threat-monitoring requirements and situational awareness and
operational incident management coordination. The organizational structure of the HSOC is
designed to integrate a full spectrum of interagency and private sector subject-matter
expertise to meet the demands of a wide range of potential incident scenarios.
Intelligence/Information Analysis
In partnership with other elements of the HSOC, DHS/I&A/OIA is responsible for
interagency intelligence collection requirements, analysis, production, and product
dissemination for the DHS.
National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC)
The HSOC maintains communications and coordinates with critical infrastructure managers
and key resources information-sharing entities through the National Infrastructure
Coordination Center (NICC). The NICC monitors the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key
resources on an ongoing basis, and conducts daily polling of standing information-sharing
entities for incidents and abnormalities. During an incident, the NICC is a coordinating
vehicle for sharing information across infrastructure and key resource sectors through
appropriate information-sharing channels. Associated with the NICC, the Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program is designed to encourage the private industry to
share sensitive and proprietary business information with the government. PCII enables
members of the private sector to voluntarily submit sensitive information regarding critical
infrastructure with the assurance that the information will be protected from public
disclosure.
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
TSA’s TSOC monitors security-related developments around the clock. Information from
intelligence organizations, open sources, and transportation industry sources is analyzed to
provide real-time information to decision-makers, to determine changing threat conditions,
and for decision-making for response and recovery. This information is coordinated with the
HSOC, and shared with defense, law enforcement, and first-responder officials at all levels of
government, as well as industry partners.
Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC)
The FBI SIOC is the focal point and operational control center for all federal intelligence,
law enforcement, and investigative law enforcement activities related to domestic terrorist
incidents or credible threats, including leading attribution investigations. The SIOC serves as
an information clearinghouse to help collect, process, vet, and disseminate information
relevant to law enforcement and criminal investigation efforts in a timely manner. The SIOC
maintains direct connectivity with the HSOC and IIMG. The SIOC, located at FBI
Headquarters, supports the FBI’s mission in leading efforts of the law enforcement
community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.
The SIOC houses the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF). The mission of the
NJTTF is to enhance communications, coordination, and cooperation among federal, state,

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local, and tribal agencies representing intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic,
public safety, and homeland security communities by providing a point of fusion for
terrorism intelligence and by supporting Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the
United States. Recovery of damaged infrastructure cannot begin until investigative law
activities have been completed by the SIOC.
National Response Center (NRC)
The NRC serves a very important role in the National Response System for the preservation,
security and restoration of the environment and public safety as the conduit through which
initial notification of response actions for various federal, state and local organizations takes
place. The NRC’s multi-disciplinary mission is to disseminate time critical information to
first responders and government organizations about any reportable releases of oil and
hazardous materials (HAZMAT) or potential releases (including chemical, biological,
radiological agents and maritime terrorism related events) so as to ensure coordinated and
appropriate incident response.
National Targeting Center (NTC)
The NTC is the centralized coordination point to provide tactical targeting and analytical
research in support of CBP anti-terrorism efforts.
DOT Crisis Management Center (CMC)
The DOT CMC continually monitors the national transportation system across all modes for
threats, incidents, or events involving safety, mobility and security. This includes accidents,
hazardous materials incidents and transportation impacts resulting from weather, natural
disasters or security threats or events. The CMC monitors international events where DOT
either has a presence or there is a potential nexus for the domestic transportation system.
This information is provided to and coordinated with the HSOC, and security-related reports
are shared with TSA through the TSOC or the TSA representative to the HSOC.
Department of Defense (DoD) Coordination
The Department of Defense has significant resources that may be available to support any
federal response to a national TSI. The Secretary of Defense authorizes Defense Support of
Civilian Authorities (DSCA) for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when
consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the
law. The Secretary of Defense retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all
other situations and operations. DoD provides DSCA in accordance with the National
Response Plan (NRP).
International Coordination
The Department of State (DOS) conducts international coordination between the U.S.
government, foreign nations, and international and regional organizations in support of the
MIRP.

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Regional Organizational Elements and Coordination
Some national TSIs may be managed primarily using regional resources, with national-level
monitoring. In large-magnitude, high-visibility, and/or sensitive situations, the Joint Field
Office (JFO) is activated to coordinate directly with the national-level HSOC and IIMG. The
JFO is a multi-agency coordination center established locally. It provides a central location
for coordination of federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental, and private sector
organizations with primary responsibility for threat response and incident recovery support.
The JFO enables the effective and efficient coordination of federal incident-related
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions.
Headquarters/national-level elements must closely monitor regional recovery operations
planning and remain prepared to assist if the required resources exceed those available
through the JFO.
Joint Field Office (JFO) Organization Components
JFO Coordination Group
Utilizing the NIMS principle of Unified Command, JFO activities are directed by a JFO
Coordination Group, which may include the Principal Federal Officer, Federal Coordinating
Officer, Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, and/or other Senior Federal Officials with
primary jurisdictional responsibility or functional authority for incident management. The
JFO Coordination Group also includes a limited number of principal state, local, and tribal
officials (such as the State Coordinating Officer (SCO)), as well as non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and private-sector representatives. The JFO Coordination Group
functions as a multi-agency coordination entity and works jointly to establish priorities,
allocate resources, resolve interagency policy issues, and provide strategic guidance to
support federal incident management activities. The JFO Coordination Group develops
strategic guidance and facilitates resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical
federal resources. If policy issue resolution cannot be achieved between JFO Coordination
Group members, issues may be raised to the IIMG or through appropriate agency chains of
command for consideration by higher authorities. It should be noted that a JFO, separate
from the JFO supporting response operations for an incident site, may be established to
coordinate recovery operations with federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental and private
sector organizations.
Principal Federal Officer (PFO)
The PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate federal
support to the established Incident Command System (ICS)/Unified Command structure
(UCS) and to coordinate overall federal incident management and assistance activities across
the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
The FCO manages and coordinates federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act
disasters and emergencies. In Stafford Act situations where a PFO has not been assigned, the
FCO provides overall coordination for the Federal components of the JFO and works in

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partnership with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to determine and satisfy state, and
local assistance requirements.
Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO)
The SFLEO is the senior law enforcement official from the agency with primary
jurisdictional responsibility, as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing federal
policies, and/or the Attorney General. The SFLEO directs intelligence/investigative law
enforcement operations related to the incident and supports law enforcement components of
the Unified Command on-scene. In the event of a terrorist incident, this official will normally
be the FBI Special Agent-in-Charge.
State/Local/Tribal Official(s)
The JFO Coordination Group also includes state representatives, such as the SCO, who
serves as the state counterpart to the FCO in managing the state’s incident management
programs and activities, and the Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR), who
represents the Governor of the affected state. The JFO Coordination Group may also include
tribal and/or local area representatives with primary statutory authority for incident
management.
Senior Federal Officials (SFO)
The JFO Coordination Group may also include officials representing other federal
departments or agencies with primary statutory responsibility for certain aspects of incident
management. SFOs utilize existing authorities, expertise, and capabilities to assist in
management of the incident working in coordination with the PFO, FCO, SFLEO, and other
members of the JFO Coordination Group. When appropriate, the JFO Coordination Group
may also include U.S. attorneys or other senior officials, or their designees, from the DOJ to
provide expert legal counsel.
Infrastructure Liaison
Designated by the DHS Directorate for Preparedness Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP),
and assigned to the JFO Coordination Staff, the Infrastructure Liaison serves as the principal
advisor to the JFO regarding all Critical Infrastructure/Key Asset (CI/KA) incident related
issues, communicating with the IP representative at the IIMG, NRCC and NICC, and
coordinating with the private sector.
Area Organization Components
Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSCs)
FMSCs are the U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) who serve as local officers
exercising authority for COTP zones described in 33 CFR Part 3. The COTP is the FMSC
described in 46 U.S.C 70103(a) (2) (G). COTP/FMSCs are charged with the responsibility
of establishing AMS Committees and developing Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans.
This security responsibility is in addition to key responsibilities for traditional Coast Guard
missions and is fundamental to the success of the Maritime Homeland Security program.
COTP/FMSCs rely on federal, state, and local agencies, and other maritime area partners to
assist in planning and implementation of security plans. COTP/FMSCs are authorized to
establish, convene, and direct the AMS Committees, appoint members to AMS Committees;

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develop and maintain, in coordination with AMS Committees, the AMS Plans; and
implement and exercise AMS Plans.
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees
AMS Committees, established under 33 CFR Part 103, assist in the development, review, and
updating of AMS Plans. The AMS Committees bring together appropriate experienced
government/industry representatives from a variety of sources in their region to continually
assess security risks to the ports, determine appropriate risk mitigation strategies, and
develop, revise, and implement AMS plans. AMS Committees also serve as mechanisms by
which security threats and changes in MARSEC and DHS Threat Levels are communicated
to maritime stakeholders.

NATIONAL – REGIONAL COORDINATION AND PROCEDURES
A basic concept of NIMS, and therefore the MIRP, is that incidents are generally handled at
the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In instances regarding maritime transportation
infrastructure, a federal agency may act as a first-responder and may provide direction or
assistance specific to its statutory authorities and responsibilities. In the vast majority of
maritime incidents, Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans provide incident prevention,
response, and recovery guidance. During a national TSI, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, initiates actions to deal
with incident management at the national level. At the national level, the Coast Guard
Commandant and the Customs and Border Protection Commissioner will determine
appropriate initial measures for response (prevention and protection) and recovery activities
at ports, other than the incident site(s), throughout the country.
Recovery operations will normally follow initial tactical and short-term, targeted operational
actions taken by senior Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection leadership to direct
a security posture immediately following a maritime TSI in one or more ports, waterways, or
coastal approaches. A prudent and measured response will be taken based on an assessment,
including available intelligence, of the specific incident. The MTS should not be shut down
as an automatic response to a maritime incident. Their decisions may transcend Coast Guard
AORs, significantly impact maritime industry, change the Maritime Security (MARSEC)
Level, and perhaps affect/involve other DHS agencies and departments, prevent further
attacks, protect CI/KA, and maintain the flow of commerce through non-incident sites.
This section complements the concepts of the National Maritime Security Plan (NMSP) by
providing procedures for managing recovery operations on a long-term basis. The
procedures are general in nature; specific guidance is impractical. With over 2,100 possible
threat scenarios in hundreds of ports, the variables affecting maritime infrastructure recovery
are too myriad to provide detailed procedures.
National and Regional level Recovery Management Procedures
The general procedures herein assist the Joint Field Office (JFO) and the Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG), or other delegated representatives of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in addressing the most important recovery factors to maintain the flow of
maritime commerce and mitigate the effects of terrorist incidents on the economy of the
United States.

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First Step: Receive up-to-date Current Common Operating Picture (COP).
Once formed, the JFO and/or IIMG must make a quick assessment of the economic
sensitivities and ramifications of the incident. Early recovery of maritime commerce will be
essential to protect the economic health of the nation. Recovery operations must be addressed
by the IIMG if the impact at the incident site requires resources beyond the scope of the
responding JFO and COTP/FMSCs. The following topics represent information needed by
the JFO or the IIMG to assist in early assessment of recovery needs:
•

•

•

Incident information
o Type event
o Location (where, when)
o Size: extent of damage
Initial government targeted response actions
o Initial and current Control Actions
o Current MARSEC Level
o DHS Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) Threat Condition Alert Level
o Current Deny-Entry status (have any maritime conveyances/cargo been
diverted?)
Incident site:
o Current Status
o Affected Infrastructure (include inter-modal connections)
o Expected duration of conveyance restriction(s) (if applicable)

Second Step:

Review personnel and adjust JFO/IIMG membership as

appropriate.
•
•

JFO Operations Section reviews the makeup of the Recovery Branch Personnel.
In accordance with the NRP, a core group of agencies and departments are
represented when the IIMG is convened. The IIMG is a scalable organization and
would be augmented with SMEs to assist with the recovery of a national TSI. The
SME component should be sufficient to assist the IIMG to define the incident impact,
identify required recovery resources and to identify private industry members to
participate in restoration of passenger and cargo flow operations. All of the federal
departments along with many of the agencies listed in Section III of this plan are
represented in the IIMG Core Group.

Third Step:

Assess impact on the National Maritime Transportation System

(MTS).
Use Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from various sources -- government, maritime industry
(trade) associations or advisory committees -- to assess the extent of damage to the MTS and
estimate the duration of the impact (i.e., short term to long term) on recovery activities. The
duration of the restriction is the key element to assessing the scale of the impact to the MTS
and in deciding to initiate recovery of commerce operations at alternate sites while the
national TSI site is still in the response phase. The following topics should be considered to
assess the impact on the MTS:
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•

•
•

What types of conveyances/cargoes have been restricted?
o Container Vessels
o Dry Bulk Vessels
o Liquid Bulk Vessels
o Break Bulk Vessels
o Barges
o Lash Barges
o Passenger Vessels
o Roll On / Roll Off Vessels
o Other vessels
What is the extent of conveyance/cargo restriction at the national TSI site?
o Full
o Partial (may be expressed in %)
What is the relevance of the national TSI site to the MTS?
o Port
ƒ Large % of regional or national cargo throughput.
(The combined ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, handle
32% of the nation’s container throughput.)
ƒ

ƒ

ƒ

Large % of regional or national reserve cargo-handling capacity.
(The port of New Orleans, while totaling 1% of the nation’s container
throughput, accounts for 14% of the nation’s container reserve
capacity.)
Sole source of supply to geographic isolated area.
(Hawaii and Puerto Rico are dependent upon the ports of Honolulu
and San Juan, respectively, though they account for a small
percentage of national trade.)
Large % of key commodity throughput.
(The United States holds less than 4% of the world’s Liquid Natural
Gas (LNG) resources. The United States operates only four LNG
terminals; the largest is in Cove Point, MD.)

ƒ Port is militarily strategic.
o Is there a Critical Infrastructure/Key Asset (CI/KA) (other than port)
involved?
ƒ Key waterway.
(The Houston Ship Channel provides sole maritime access to the Port
of Houston.)
ƒ

•

Key facility (sole/major commodity source).
(The Louisiana Offshore Crude Oil Port (LOOP) takes in 13% of U.S.
crude oil imports.)

What is the duration of the conveyance/cargo restriction(s)?
o Duration is not a finite factor; the acceptable duration of conveyance/cargo
restriction will vary with each national TSI. Diversion of conveyance/cargo
for energy supply or perishable foods will have relatively shorter acceptable
restriction durations than a barge moving dry bulk goods on the inland

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waterways. Each national TSI impact must be assessed individually to
determine what constitutes an acceptable duration of conveyance/cargo
restriction prior to diverting conveyances within the MTS.
Fourth Step:

Determine scale of the national TSI impact on the National

Maritime Transportation System (MTS).
•

•

The scale of the national TSI impact is defined as escalating degrees of severity, each
requiring increasing resources to conduct recovery operations. A hierarchy of
increasing impact scale is provided below:
o Local: The national TSI impact is contained within an AOR. The
COTP/FMSC has sufficient resources to manage recovery operations within
sufficient time to avoid the diversion of conveyances/cargo to an alternate
port. In the case of local recovery, the JFO will monitor recovery efforts, be
prepared to assist with out-of-area resources if requested by the COTP/FMSC
and monitor the MTS and private sector infrastructure through the National
Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC).
o Regional: Recovery from a national TSI impact can be addressed within the
resources of the five major maritime regions: West Coast, East Coast, Gulf
Coast, Great Lakes and Inland Rivers. In the case of local or regional
recovery, the IIMG will monitor recovery efforts, be prepared to assist with
out-of-area resources if requested by the JFO and monitor the MTS and
private sector infrastructure through the National Infrastructure Coordinating
Center (NICC).
o National: Recovery from national TSI impact can be addressed domestically
from two or more of the five major maritime regions.
o International: Recovery requirements of the national TSI impact exceed
domestic resources. Some examples of International assistance are:
ƒ Use of Canadian (Vancouver and/or Halifax) port reserve
capacity/cargo-handling capacity and inter-modal connections to
reestablish the flow of maritime commerce.
ƒ Use of Mexican ports for temporary storage of goods or transfer of
cargo to vessels capable of passage through the Panama Canal.
Mexican port inter-modal connections are inadequate for use in lieu of
US port(s)2.
ƒ A substantial restriction and loss of MTS capacity may require DOS to
inform conveyance originating nation(s) of impending MTS
restrictions.
Facilitate government assistance if the impact to the MTS at the incident site exceeds
the resources of the FMSC/AMS Committees, state, local, and other local federal
response resources. (See Section III – Roles and Responsibilities for functional
responsibilities of various organizations involved in recovery. Refer to the NRP for
capabilities of federal agencies under NRP ESFs). If the impact is contained within

2

Coast Guard Intelligence Report CG-FPT-054-03, West Coast Containerized Cargo Alternate Ports Analysis
dated July 2003, page 9.

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•

Fifth

the geographic boundaries of a COTP zone, the cognizant COTP/FMSC will
implement recovery operations using the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plan.
The JFO will perform incident support functions if the scale of recovery exceeds the
resources of the cognizant COTP(s). If recovery operations exceed the JFO
resources, the PFO requests assistance through the HSOC. Consult the Department of
State (DOS) anytime the impact requires recovery resources that exceed national
capabilities. Include the DOS in recovery planning as soon as the need arises or is
anticipated.
Step:

Determine

incident-based

National/Regional

priorities,

as

appropriate.
•

Decision makers must recognize that import/export priorities may need to be set to
facilitate recovery and other government, public and private activities. Maritime
commerce should be prioritized and communicated to meet identified needs, to
facilitate incident management activities and support military operations. COTPs
should be given authority for minor deviations from these priorities in order to
maximize port efficiencies, providing for the best match of conveyance, cargo and
port resources. Priorities may cover, but are not exclusive to:
o Emergency Needs: those goods necessary for the saving and continuation of
life. Examples include personnel and supplies for: medical response,
restoration of power and potable water.
o Response Needs: Personnel and equipment necessary to conduct response
operations at the incident site (i.e. fire boats).
o Commodity Needs: The incident may create immediate shortages of
necessary commodities that must be addressed. Examples are: crude oil,
heating oil and chemicals necessary for production and drinking water.
Commodity needs may also have a delayed time component based upon “onhand” stocks. COTPs and national Advisory Committees must be queried to
identify these commodities.
o Military Requirements.

Sixth Step: Determine Maritime Trade restrictions resulting from the national
TSI.
These limitations are a combination of conveyance restrictions, government actions and
priorities. These restrictions will need to be communicated to the private sector for
appropriate and timely execution of their continuity of operations/contingency plans.
MTS information provided to the private sector is presented as restrictions to trade to make
the information easily manageable and understandable. Also, the authorities of DHS
agencies to control all access to territorial waters of the United States are normally
exclusionary in nature. Sources of maritime trade restrictions are:
•
•
•

Damage to MTS Infrastructure
Port State Control
Military Out Load

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•
•
•
•
•

MARSEC level (security requirements)
DHS HSAS threat levels
National/Regional priorities
Defense Production Act (DPA) priorities
Restrictions/priorities resulting from implementation of National Emergencies Act

Seventh Step: Communicate with the Private Sector.
Due to the nature of the MTS, with a variety of commerce and conveyances operating
through hundreds of ports located on inland waterways and coasts, this plan recognizes that
private sector interests will be specific to each incident. The IIMG and/or JFO should use
participating SMEs (see Second Step) to identify those affected in the maritime community
by the national TSI. Additional key industry members may be identified by AMS
Committees in the affected region(s) and invited to participate as SMEs. The identified
private sector/industry members should have the authority to share information and resolve
conflicting business continuity plans with other industry members. The IIMG and/or the JFO
should provide the private sector with information on the national TSI situation, impact, and
MTS restrictions with emphasis on impact to maritime commerce. To gather information at
the incident site, the responsible COTP/FMSCs may be queried through the HSOC. The
following are key issues regarding communication:
•

Communicate information, as necessary, regarding what MTS infrastructure is
available to accommodate movement of vessels and loading and offloading of cargo
and/or passengers.
• To avoid exceeding throughput capacity at a recovery location, encourage voluntary
exchange of information about specific recovery operations/continuity plans among
private sector companies, and facilitate close coordination with federal decision
makers.
This plan recognizes that a need may exist to engage the private sector for two-way
information sharing. The following organizations provide conduits for information from
government to the private sector (and vice versa):

3

•

Transportation Sector Coordinating Council (SCC): The February 2005 Interim NIPP
established private sector SCCs for the Nation’s CI/KA sectors. The purpose of the
SCCs is to provide the framework for private-sector owners and operators to engage
DHS and the Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and to collaborate with them to (1)
identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of CI/KA, and (2) facilitate sharing
of information about threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures,
and best practices.

•

Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committee: Established under the direction of the
Captain of the Port (COTP) to provide advice and assist the development of the AMS
Plan. Among other specified duties, the AMS Committee “shall serve as a link for
communicating threats and changes in MARSEC Levels and disseminating
appropriate security information to port stakeholders.” 3

33 CFR Navigation and Navigable Waters, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 103, Section 103.310(b)

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Eighth Step: The IIMG and /or JFO develop Recovery strategies and COAs for
submission to the Secretary of Homeland Security or Principal Federal Official, as
appropriate. Include:
•
•

Scale of recovery resources.
Recommended changes for the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Threat
Condition (IIMG recommendation only).
• Recommended Maritime Security (MARSEC) Level. Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard sets the MARSEC Level consistent with the equivalent Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS) Threat Condition and that Threat Condition’s scope of
application. Notwithstanding the HSAS, the Commandant retains the discretion to
adjust the MARSEC Level when necessary to address any particular security
concerns or circumstances related to maritime elements of the national transportation
system.4
Recommended changes to the MARSEC level, and therefore security posture, should be
informed by threat-based, consequence-driven risk analysis as described in Appendix B.
Risk management must be applied to ensure public safety and supply chain security before
maritime cargo flow can be resumed. Risk will never be eliminated but can be managed to
an acceptable level, which must be established for each incident. The MARSEC Level will
define the vulnerability of the MTS and must be at a level to maintain the minimal acceptable
risk. Decision makers must remain cognizant that private industry security measures are
linked to the MARSEC Level. Potential strategic and COAs are listed below:
•
•

4

Temporary easements of enforcement of appropriate regulatory requirements.
Recommended use of CBP programs to assist screening efforts. CBP has developed
and deployed a number of initiatives to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. The initiatives can assist the maritime
recovery screening process to maximize limited resources without increasing risk.
o Personnel:
ƒ Advance Passenger Information System (APIS): APIS is an automated
system capable of performing database queries on passengers and
crewmembers prior to their arrival in or departure from the United States.
ƒ Electronic Notice of Arrival/Departure System (NOAD): Joint USCG –
CBP program provides the maritime industry with one avenue to submit
required vessel, crew, and passenger information.
o Container Cargo
ƒ 24-Hour Rule/Trade Act of 2002: Cargo information must be received by
CBP 24 hours prior to lading at a foreign port.
ƒ Container Security Initiative: Bilateral, reciprocal agreements that position
CBP personnel at selected foreign ports to pre-screen United States bound
containers.
ƒ Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): A partnership
between CBP and industry built on trust and a demonstrated commitment
to supply chain security. Program acceptance is based upon a broad range

33 CFR Navigation and Navigable Waters, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 101, Section 101.405

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ƒ

of security topics including personnel; physical and procedural security;
access controls; education, training and awareness; manifest procedures;
conveyance security; threat awareness; and documentation processing.
Automated Targeting System (ATS): The premier enforcement targeting
tool utilized by CBP to screen inbound cargo shipments to the United
States. ATS is an evolving, flexible system; targeting rules can be
adjusted to include the latest intelligence such as post-incident forensics.

Ninth Step: Implement chosen Strategy/COA.
Tenth Step: Measure outcomes and effectiveness of implemented Strategy/COA;
adjust actions as necessary.
Eleventh Step:

Monitor local recovery efforts at the national TSI site and

facilitate reintegration of the incident site into the MTS as applicable.
Twelfth Step:

Facilitate restoration of the MTS functional capacity to pre-

national TSI levels.

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RECOVERY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT BY NON-INCIDENT SITES

Figure 4.3 - Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Sample Organization Chart for Non-Incident Site

This section describes considerations for recovery at sites other than the incident site.
These considerations are intended for use by COTP/ FMSCs at non-incident sites.
Proactive development of information and capabilities at these sites may significantly
reduce commerce recovery time and minimize damage to the economy of the United
States. It is important that actions taken by the COTP/FMSCs at non-incident sites be
communicated to decisions makers at the regional and national levels to ensure that
COAs are coordinated. The following should be included in non-incident site recovery
considerations:
•

•

COTP/FMSCs should anticipate and prepare for requests for information,
assistance and/or resources from the JFO or the IIMG. When the MTS has been
damaged to the extent that cargo flow needs to be redirected, COTP/FMSCs
should work with all levels of government as well as the private sector to identify
and increase port and waterway maximum capacities. In the extreme case where
the flow of passengers and cargo has been interrupted, COTPs must develop AOR
specific impact information. Federal decision makers must be informed of the
risk resulting from the interruption of commerce to accurately balance security
measures and damage to the economy.
Immediately following a national TSI, ports at sites other than the incident site
may be significantly affected due to the re-direction of maritime traffic and
cargos. COTP’s may need to be responsive to regional and/or national needs that
the IIMG or the PFO may establish through prioritization criteria for ports other
than the incident site.
o To manage incident-specific risk, “the COTP may temporarily raise the
MARSEC Level for the port, a specific marine operation within the port,

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•

3

or a specific industry within the port, when necessary to address an
exigent circumstance immediately affecting the security of the maritime
elements of the transportation system in his/her area of responsibility.”3
o The COTP/FMSC should consider establishing a Unified Command (see
sample above) using the principles contained in the National Incident
Management System (NIMS). The Unified Command (UC) will provide
needed SMEs and mobilize appropriate federal, state, local and tribal
governments and private sector organizations to support larger scale MTS
recovery operations. Representatives from other transportation sectors,
such as highway and rail, and the private sector should be included in the
UC as appropriate. Potential UC members should be identified in advance
and be provided training in the principles of NIMS.
COTP/FMSCs, in close cooperation with port authorities and maritime industry
stakeholders, should determine the maximum conveyance, cargo and passenger
capacities for their areas of responsibilities. Determining maximum capacities
(and capabilities) is not a simple task. It will require participation from all levels
of the MTS and will include inter-modal connections and capacities.
o Several variables of maximum capacity to consider are general to
maritime commerce:
ƒ Port Centric
• Anchorage capacity.
• Barge fleet facilities.
• Approach channels and berthing access: width and depth.
• Vessel-to-Apron Capacity: technology, equipment and
compatibility.
• Apron to Storage: equipment, distances and capacities.
• Storage to Rail or Gate: distances, rail yard and gate capacities,
number of drivers.
• Labor constraints: physical and contractual.
ƒ Waterways
• Function: Who normally uses the waterway?
• Depth and width.
• Chokepoints: natural and manmade.
• Inter-modal connections.
• Barge fleet facilities.
• Number of barges and operators.
o Certain forms of maritime commerce will have variables of maximum
capacity that are specific to that commerce:
ƒ Passenger
• Facility for disembarkation.
• Passenger holding area.
• Transportation to inter-modal transportation connections.
• Capacities of rail, bus and airlines.

33 CFR Navigation and Navigable Waters, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 101, Section 101.200(d).

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• CBP inspection resources.
ƒ Liquid bulk: crude oil.
• Storage capacity.
• Pipeline capacity.
• Refinery capacity.
ƒ Containers.
• Storage: stacking.
• Exports: full and empty containers.
• Labor: labor intensive, maximum capacity must avoid surge
burnout.
• CBP inspection resources.
o Intermodal considerations: once the maritime maximum capacities have
been identified, COTPs must ensure that the intermodal connections and
systems are capable of equivalent capacities.

RECOVERY MANAGEMENT AT THE NATIONAL TSI SITE

Figure 4.4 - Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Sample Organization Chart for Incident Site

Introduction
This section describes planning considerations and general recovery procedures to
complement incident management procedures addressed in Area Maritime Security
(AMS) Plans and used at the incident site. AMS Plans are developed and used by
Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSCs) in conjunction with Area Maritime
Security (AMS) Committees in each AOR.

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The actions described below assist the responsible COTP and are presented in three
categories: public safety/security, security of the MTS, and safe/secure restoration of
maritime commerce operations.
Recovery operations at the security incident site will incorporate considerations to protect
the economy of the United States as discussed earlier. The COTP at the incident site
must evaluate the cumulative restrictive effects of terrorist activities and balance them
with response management activities. The projected impact and duration of these
restrictions should be reported to the HSOC as soon as possible to aid federal decision
makers regarding their responsibilities for the restoration of maritime commerce capacity
and capabilities.
If the incident restricts maritime commerce at the incident site, the COTP must consider
options to continue limited commerce activities to mitigate effects on the economy. All
decisions to restrict or allow maritime commerce activities must be determined using
threat-based, consequence-driven risk-management protocols. Once the threat has been
eliminated or controlled, recovery operations should begin as soon as possible. Rapid
recovery of the incident site’s ability to participate in commerce and reintegrate into MTS
operations is essential to mitigating the debilitating effects upon the U.S. economy.
The COTP/FMSC should consider establishing a Unified Command using the principles
contained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The Unified Command
(UC) will provide needed SMEs and mobilize appropriate federal, state, local and tribal
governments and private sector organizations to support larger scale MTS recovery
operations. It is recommended that the UC Operations and Planning Sections include a
Recovery Branch, separate from the Response Branch, to facilitate concurrent recovery
and response activities. Representatives from other transportation sectors, such as
highway and rail, and the private sector should be included in the UC as appropriate.
Potential Recovery Branch members should be identified in advance and be provided
training in the principles of NIMS.
A national TSI site response and recovery considerations
To guide COTP/FMSCs in planning both response and recovery activities in AMS Plans,
COTP/FMSCs use Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC)
instructions and planning elements in 33 CFR 103, which are limited in scope. There is a
need for additional guidance to develop further recovery aspects of AMS Plans. This
guidance will be found in the NMSP. The information in this section of the MIRP is
being recommended for use in developing AMS Plans. (See Next Steps/
Recommendations Section). COTP/FMSCs should consider the following topics, as well
as port stakeholders’ continuity of operations plans, in planning for both response and
recovery:
Planning for Response and Recovery
•
•

Major transportation routes needed for emergency services, including evacuation
tunnels, bridges, and key waterways
Main shipping channels critical for homeland security and homeland defense
operations

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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anchorage capacity—evaluate capacity and identify a quarantine/isolation
anchorage
Barge fleet facilities—evaluate capacity and identify a quarantine/isolation area
Port areas and channels critical for military traffic or out-loads
Secondary bridges and tunnels
Main shipping channels critical to major commercial operations;
Secondary commercial waterways
Environmental protection/response
Manpower issues: coordinate with federal, state, and local government agencies;
Public/recreational waterways
Key infrastructure according to its importance in maintaining continuity of
operations at each port and the procedures for restoring maritime transportation
infrastructure integrity

Response Activities
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Conduct Safety of Life and Health/ Search and Rescue
Set appropriate MARSEC and Force Protection levels
Take risk mitigation measures IAW Operation Neptune Shield
Establish Security Zones
Coordinate with key agencies and marine stakeholders
Assess damage
Survey channels and waterways
Remove debris
Conduct dredging and/or salvage operations

Recovery Considerations
Eliminate/control threat.
•
•

Provide for public safety
Abate hazards

Establish site security: Security decisions should be soundly based on the risk
management principles outlined in Appendix B.
•
•
•
•
•

Establish MARSEC and Force Protection Condition
Ensure adequate numbers of escort vessels are available
Confirm enforcement of facility and vessel security plans
Establish and enforce security zones
Determine vessel movement restrictions (e.g., recreational boating)

Assess and restore functionality to essential MTS infrastructure.
•
•

Survey channels and waterways
o Dredging and salvage operations, as appropriate
o Remove debris
Verify or reposition Aids to Navigation

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•

•
•

Verify pier conditions
o Pier equipment
o Storage areas
o Avenues for intermodal connections
Verify pipeline integrity, as appropriate
In consultation with industry (especially importers), evaluate which vessels
awaiting inbound transit could divert cargo to another port.

Establish passenger and cargo priorities.
•
•
•

National priorities
Regional priorities
Local priorities: The COTP may establish a stakeholder team to analyze vessel
specific information and needs.
o Identify and consider vessels awaiting inbound transit (this is not a
prioritization scheme, but a planning consideration).
ƒ Winter (specific to the cold weather ports):
Vessels carrying fuel oil (specific to cold weather ports);
Vessels carrying gas and diesel;
Vessels with perishable cargo;
Vessels with assembly line components; and
Other vessels (based on other factors evaluated by the
COTP/FMSC).
ƒ Summer:
Vessels carrying gas and diesel;
Vessels with perishable cargo;
Vessels with assembly line components; and
Other vessels (based on other priorities evaluated by the
COTP/FMSC).

Queue Management.
•
•

•
•
•
•

In cooperation with CBP, establish screening and inspection criteria for inbound
passengers and cargo. CBP programs are described in this plan’s NationalRegional Coordination and Procedures;
Identify and consider vessels currently in the port for outbound transit;
o Reopen anchorages on a limited basis for vessels requiring service prior to
inbound transit;
o Allow for limited refueling, lightering, and bunkering operations;
o Identify and stage vessels of low interest;
Identify and stage vessels requiring inspection;
Establish/verify anchorages/barge fleet facilities;
Establish isolation/quarantine anchorage; and
Confirm adequate numbers of escort vessels are available.

Work Force Issues.
•
•

Organized labor
Pilots, tug and barge operators

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•
•
•
•

Industry specific (i.e. brokers)
Boarding teams
Security forces
CBP inspection teams

Intermodal connections
•
•
•
•

Facilities’ status
Capacities and capabilities
Equipment
Personnel

Re-Integration into the Maritime Transportation System (MTS)
USCG COTPs have lead responsibility for determining re-opening of port facilities and
movement of vessels following an emergency affecting a port community. Using port
decision criteria and considerations from the applicable Area Maritime Security Plan(s)
as a starting point, the COTP will work with other members of the private sector and the
port community to refine and apply them to the specific incident. Participants in the
decision-making process may include the U.S. Coast Guard, local Port Authority, Pilot’s
Association, facility representatives, and Marine Exchange or Mariner’s Advisory
Committees as well as certain members of the AMS Committee and OPA 90 Area
Committee as determined appropriate by the COTP. While the maritime community will
inform and advise the COTP on re-opening considerations and priorities, the COTP
retains final decision authority for planning and executing port re-opening priorities.
If a port community is affected by a national TSI that has an appointed Primary Federal
Official (PFO), the COTP will inform the PFO of the plans for port re-opening and vessel
traffic movement control. In the event of significant national or regional needs, the IIMG
or the PFO may establish prioritization criteria to assist affected COTPs in the planning
of port re-opening prioritizations and/or reserve/surge operations at other ports.
.

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V.

MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY PLAN
EXERCISE PROGRAM

The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) is one of a number of interconnected
plans that supports the nation’s goal of optimizing preparedness, prevention, response,
and recovery from Incidents of National Significance or a national TSI.
To maintain preparedness and continuous improvement, the MIRP is subject to periodic
evaluation along with the other plans. The primary means to evaluate the effectiveness of
various plans is to participate in periodic exercises (e.g., table-top exercises (TTX) and
field training exercises (FTX)).
The MIRP Exercise Program reaches across the spectrum of the maritime community and
may involve participation of federal, state, and local government and private
sector/maritime industry stakeholders. The exercise program aligns with various plans
and programs, including:
•
•
•

National Response Plan (NRP);
National Maritime Security Plan’s National Maritime Exercise Program; and
Top Official (TOPOFF) Program.

SCOPE
The MIRP Exercise Program lays the foundation to validate the ability of the maritime
community to effectively plan, respond (prevent and protect), and recover from Incidents
of National Significance or a national TSI. Particular to recovery, the program conducts
the following:
•
•
•
•

Execute and attain MARSEC level changes during the exercise.
Implement risk reduction and mitigation strategies.
Implement linkages with federal, state, port and local recovery plans.
Identify, prioritize, and implement short- and long-term infrastructure recovery
strategies.

OBJECTIVE
One objective of the MIRP Exercise Program is to assess the MIRP’s adequacy to
support federal, state, local government, and private sector efforts to recover from
Incidents of National Significance or a national TSI and evaluate the following:
•
•
•

Roles, responsibilities, and authorities for recovery management.
Overall risk mitigation strategies.
Procedures and tools for recovery and reconstitution of the Maritime
Transportation Systems (MTS).
The MIRP Exercise Program is described further in the National Maritime Security Plan
(NMSP). The program recognizes practicable limits to the number and scale of exercises
that can be conducted effectively. The federal agencies responsible for sustaining the
MIRP and the NMSP will work closely with key stakeholders to ensure that the

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overarching MIRP Exercise Program is compatible with, and to the extent practical,
integrated into other existing national and local port area exercise programs.
It is anticipated that full exercise of the MIRP will take place in each of the five broad
geographic areas once every ten years. Elements of the NMSP/MIRP will be exercised in
every port area around the country at least once every 3 years as part of the AMS Plan
exercises held at the port level. Additionally, various aspects of recovery are included in
exercise event scenarios in other types of exercises more frequently held. Most recently,
some aspects of maritime infrastructure recovery were evaluated in TOPOFF 2005.
Refer to the NMSP National Maritime Exercise Program for further information about
the MIRP Exercise Program and its protocol.

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VI. NEXT STEPS/RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the accelerated timeline established for the development of HSPD-13 plans, the
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) could not fully address the planning
Objectives as originally laid out. Additionally, a number of issues of concern have been
identified which, although not immediately falling under the direct purview of the MIRP,
warrant further evaluation with regard to efficacy and appropriateness for
implementation.
•

Issue #1: The recovery decision-making process must be informed from its very
outset by risk management/analysis expertise to avoid unnecessary imposition of
constraints on the Maritime Transportation System (MTS).
Recommendation: Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) should have
permanently assigned, appropriately trained risk-management personnel to
support the Inter-agency Incident Management Group’s (IIMG) Subject Matter
Experts (SME) in formulation of recommended courses of action pertaining to
recovery and restoration of cargo flow.

•

Issue #2: Port cargo-handling capacity information at both the national and
individual port levels is not readily available for use in deliberations regarding
recovery of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) following a national TSI.
Recommendations:
o Establish a uniform measurement standard for port cargo-handling
capacity for individual ports as well as for capacity of the MTS.
o Establish the requirement for individual port facility operators to provide
port cargo-handling information to the Federal Maritime Security
Coordinator (FMSC).
o Create a baseline for port cargo-handling capacity.
o Maintain data in a form that can be used to support recovery efforts.
o Create incentives to establish sufficient cargo-handling capacity to satisfy
the requirements for the worst-case scenario.

•

Issue #3: Recovery decision makers are not aware of the availability of
international port cargo-handling capacity for diversion and facilitation of U.S.bound cargo and passengers.
Recommendations:
o Initiate foreign port cargo-handling capacity studies.
o Develop international agreements designed to ease enforcement of cargo
clearance requirements for the purpose of facilitating redistribution of
cargo through Canada and Central America following a national TSI.

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•

Issue #4: There is an absence of an agreed upon maritime sector communications
network which facilitates information sharing between government and the
private sector marine industry stakeholders.
Recommendations:
o Expand access to and capabilities of the web-based Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) to facilitate sharing of information
pertaining to recovery activities with the private sector.
o To facilitate sharing of pertinent information, encourage members of the
maritime commerce community to file business continuity plans (or
relevant information from them) with the NICC’s Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program. Continuity plans should be
accessible by multiple criteria, i.e. business name, region, type
conveyance.
o Widely publicize the Transportation Sector Coordinating Council (SCC)
membership and procedures for sharing information with government..

•

Issue #5: FMSC Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans required under the
provisions of 33CFR 103 do not adequately and uniformly address the critical
MTS recovery management planning elements.
Recommendation: Establish requirements for AMS Plans to implement MIRP
recovery management procedures informed by port stakeholders’ continuity of
operations plans.

•

Issue #6: Information regarding the status of the salvage capability specific to
national and regional capacity is poorly understood. Currently, recovery
management at the national level does not include salvage expertise in critical
decision making to recover the MTS.
Recommendations:
o Include a marine salvage expert as part of the cadre of IIMG SMEs
assembled in response to a national TSI.
o * Include a representative of the professional marine salvage community
as a designated member of the National Maritime Security Advisory
Council (NMSAC).
o **Establish an inventory of salvage and firefighting assets maintained by
the U.S. Navy Supervisor Salvage (SupSal) in consultation with the U.S.
Coast Guard.
o * Conduct a thorough gap analysis, comparing available assets to those
assets needed to respond effectively to a range of potential terrorist
activities. The analysis should consider all critical salvage response
measures including: rescue towing; harbor and channel clearing;
emergency dredging; search and recovery; patching and re-floating of

*

*Recommendations taken from the August 2003 Transportation Research Board Marine Salvage Response
Capability Workshop

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vessels; and maritime firefighting. The adequacy of anticipated response
times on a regional basis should be included along with identification of
optimal geographic locations for the pre-staging of salvage equipment.
•

Issue # 7: Private Sector expertise is not uniformly available to senior decision
makers at the national and regional levels when developing strategies for dealing
with the restoration of passenger and cargo flow and recovery of maritime
infrastructure in response to an INS.
Recommendation: The Policy Directorate Office of the Private Sector should
utilize the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) to identify
maritime SMEs to participate in the IIMG. SMEs are key to further identifying
members of the private sector who are essential to implementing the National and
Regional Recovery Management Procedures recommended in the MIRP.

.

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APPENDIX A: AREA MARITIME SECURITY (AMS)
PLANNING (STAKEHOLDERS)
ORGANIZATION OF AREA MARITIME SECURITY (AMS) COMMITTEES
The local membership and organization of the Area Maritime Security (AMS)
Committees will take into account all aspects of the MTS in each port area and its
adjacent waterways and coastal areas. The AMS Committees are comprised of federal,
state, and local agencies, law enforcement and security agencies, and port stakeholders.
Representatives for each aspect of the MTS and those charged with its regulation or
enforcement should be encouraged to participate.
AMS Committee membership could include, but is not limited to, representatives
from the following agencies and organizations:
Federal Agencies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

U.S. Coast Guard (e.g., Groups, Air Stations, Small Boat Stations, VTS, MSSTs,
Auxiliaries);
Department of Defense (DoD);
Department of State (DOS);
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC);
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM);
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM);
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA);
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA);
United States Attorney;
Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP);
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE);
Transportation Security Administration (TSA);
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE);
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM);
Military Sealift Command (MSC);
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC);
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS);
Maritime Administration (MARAD);
Federal Railway Administration (FRA);
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA);
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration;

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Appendix A: Page 1

•
•

Federal Transit Administration (FTA); and
Other government representatives, where appropriate.

State and Local agencies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

National Guard;
Marine Police;
Port Authority Police and/or security forces;
Fire Departments;
Civil Defense;
City Government officials;
Transportation agencies;
Fish and Wildlife marine units;
Health agencies;
Occupational safety agencies;
Terminal/facility security forces;
Pilot associations;
Other State, local and City Government representatives;
State Department of Natural or Environmental Resources marine units;
Other environmental agencies;
Regional development agencies/metropolitan planning organizations; and
Tribal authorities and tribal organizations.

Industry related organizations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facility owners/operators;
Terminal owners/operators;
Trade organizations;
Recreational boating organizations (yacht clubs, rowing clubs);
Railroad companies;
Trucking companies;
Shipyards;
Tow-boat operators;
Marine exchanges;
Vessel operators;
Organized labor;
Commercial fishing industry;
Waterborne vendors & service providers (harbor tugs, launch services, line
handlers, small ferry operators, water taxis); and
Other facilities within the port having waterside access (refineries, chemical
plants, power plants, etc.).

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APPENDIX B: RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
Risk management is a systematic process to analyze the threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences (or relative importance) of assets in a program to better support key
decisions, linking resources and program results. Risk management is used by many
organizations in both government and the private sector. In recent years, we have
consistently advocated the use of a risk management approach to help implement and
assess responses to various national security and terrorism issues. Without a risk
management approach that provides insights about the present threat, consequences and
vulnerabilities, as well as the organizational and technical requirements necessary to
achieve specified goals and objectives, there is little assurance that MTS recovery
strategies will be prioritized and properly focused. Risk management helps to more
effectively and efficiently prepare defenses against future post-national TSI acts of
terrorism and unnecessary disruptions to the flow of cargo and maintenance of overall
equilibrium within the MTS. Key elements of a risk management approach are listed
below:
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Threat assessment: A threat assessment identifies adverse events that can affect an
entity, and may be present at the global, national, or local level. The threat
assessment considers the intent of the terrorist agent, capability of the terrorist
agents to implement the action, the overall simplicity of the attack;
Consequence assessment: A consequence assessment identifies and evaluates the
importance of an asset based on the potential for loss of life, economic impact,
adverse impact on the environment, strategic military considerations and national
iconic value;
Vulnerability assessment: A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses in
physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes, general availability
of the target or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists;
Risk assessment: A risk assessment qualitatively and/or quantitatively determines
the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the severity, or impact, of its
consequences;
Risk characterization: Risk characterization involves designating risk on a scale,
for example, low, medium, or high. Risk characterization forms the basis for
deciding which actions are best suited to mitigate risk;
Mitigation evaluation: Mitigation evaluation is the identification of mitigating
alternatives to assess the effectiveness of the alternatives. The alternatives should
be evaluated for their likely effect on the risk and their cost;
Mitigation selection: Mitigation selection involves a management decision on
which mitigation alternatives should be implemented. Selection among
alternatives should be based on pre-considered criteria;
Systems approach: An integrated systems approach to risk management
encompasses taking action in all organizational areas, including personnel,
processes, technology, infrastructure, and governance; and

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Appendix B, Page 1

•

Monitoring and evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation is a continuous repetitive
assessment process to keep risk management current and relevant.

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APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS
AMS - Area Maritime Security
AOR - Area of Responsibility
APIS – Advance Passenger Information System
ATS – Automated Targeting System
ATSA - Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CBP - Customs and Border Protection
CI - Critical Infrastructure
COA - Courses of Action
COCOM – Combatant Commander
COP - Common Operating Picture
COTP - Captain of the Port
CSI - Container Security Initiative
C-TPAT – Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
DHS - Department of Homeland Security
DOC - Department of Commerce
DoD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
DOI - Department of Interior
DOJ - Department of Justice
DOS - Department of State
DOT - Department of Transportation
DPA - Defense Production Act
DSCA - Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EOC - Emergency Operations Center
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
EPR - Emergency Preparedness and Response
ESFs - Emergency Support Functions
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO - Federal Coordination Officer
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

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FHWA - Federal Highway Administration
FMSC - Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
FRA - Federal Railroad Administration
FTX - Field Training Exercises
GAR - Governor's Authorized Representative
HSAS - Homeland Security Alert System
HSC - Homeland Security Council
HSOC - Homeland Security Operations Center
HSPD - Homeland Security Presidential Directive
I&A – Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICS - Incident Command System
ICE - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICP - Incident Command Post
IIMG - Interagency Incident Management Group
IMO - International Maritime Organization
INS - Incident of National Significance
IO - Bureau of International Organization Affairs
IP – Infrastructure Protection
ISAC - Information Sharing and Analysis Center
ISPS - International Ship and Port Facility Security
JFO - Joint Field Office
JTTF - Joint Terrorism Task Forces
KA - Key Asset
LFA - Lead Federal Agency
MARAD - Maritime Administration
MARSEC - Maritime Security
MCI - Maritime Critical Infrastructure
MIRP - Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan
MOL - Military Out Load
MOTR - Maritime Operation Threat Response
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
MSP - Maritime Security Plans

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Appendix C, Page 2

MSWG - Maritime Security Work Group
MTS - Maritime Transportation System
MTSA - Maritime Transportation Security Act
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NICC - National Infrastructure Coordination Center
NIMS - National Incident Management System
NIPP - National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NJTTF - National Joint Terrorism Task Force
NMSAC - National Maritime Security Advisory Committees
NMSP - National Maritime Security Plan
MSC - Military Sealift Command
NOA - Notice of Arrival
NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRCC - National Response and Coordination Center
NRP - National Response Plan
NSC - National Security Council
NSMS - National Strategy for Maritime Security
NSSE - National Special Security Events
NTC - National Targeting Center
National TSI - National Transportation Security Incident
NVIC - Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
OES - Office of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific
Affairs
OGA - Other Governmental Agencies
OIA - Office of the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
PCC - Policy Coordination Committees
PCII – Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
PFO – Principal Federal Official
S/CT - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
SAC - Special Agent In Charge
SCC - Sector Coordinating Council
SCO - State Coordinating Officer
SDDC - Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

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SECDOT - Secretary of Transportation
SFLEO - Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official
SFO - Senior Federal Officials
SIOC - Strategic Information Operations Center
SLSDC - St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
SMEs - Subject Matter Experts
SSP - Sector Specific Plans
SSR - Sector Specific Responsibility
TOPOFF - Top Official
TSA - Transportation Security Administration
SCC - Sector Coordinating Council
TSI - Transportation Security Incident
TSOP - Transportation Security Operations Plans
TSSP - Transportation Sector Specific Plan
TTX – Table-Top Exercise
TWIC - Transportation Worker ID Credential
UCS - Unified Command Structure
UN - United Nations
USACE - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USCG - U.S. Coast Guard
USTRANSCOM - US Transportation Command

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