REAL ID mDL PIA

Privacy Impact Assessment
for the

REAL ID Act
In conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification
Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes
March 1, 2007
Rulemaking Contact Point
Darrell Williams
REAL ID Program Office
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
(202) 282-9829
Reviewing Official
Hugo Teufel III
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(571) 227-3813
privacy@dhs.gov

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March 1, 2007
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Abstract
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office is conducting a Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA) on the rule proposed by DHS to implement the REAL ID Act. The authority for this PIA is Subsection
4 of Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, which calls for the Chief Privacy
Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct a “privacy impact assessment of
proposed rules of the Department.” This analysis reflects the framework of the Privacy Office’s Fair
Information Principles, which are: Transparency, Individual Participation, Purpose Specification,
Minimization, Use Limitation, Data Quality and Integrity, Security, and Accountability and Auditing. The
Privacy Office conducts PIAs, whether under Subsection 4 of Section 222 or under Section 208 of the EGovernment Act, to ensure that DHS is fully transparent about how its proposed rules, final rules, and
intended information technology systems may affect privacy and to review alternative approaches and
technologies that may minimize the privacy impact on individuals. This PIA examines the manner and
method by which the personal information of American drivers and identification (ID) holders will be
collected, used, disseminated, and maintained pursuant to the proposed rule issued under the REAL ID Act.
This PIA will be updated, as necessary, when the rule is final.

Introduction
This PIA is prepared pursuant to Subsection 4 of Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
amended, which calls for the Chief Privacy Officer of DHS to conduct a “privacy impact assessment of
proposed rules of the Department.” 1 Section 208 of the E-Government Act (Public Law 107-347) also
provides for PIAs for all new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or discloses
personal information. Distinct from the PIA required under Section 208, Subsection 4 of the Homeland
Security Act authorizes the Chief Privacy Officer to conduct a privacy impact assessment of proposed
departmental regulations, which may or may not involve a particular technology system. The authority
under Subsection 4 is significant since a proposed rule may raise privacy considerations regarding
information practices that do not involve technology or a proposed rule may address technology systems
that the Department does not own or control. Therefore, Subsection 4 provides the Chief Privacy Officer
with the broadest authority to identify and comment on privacy matters resulting from proposed
departmental regulations and to do so in a manner that is public.
This PIA examines the manner and method by which the personal information of American drivers and ID
holders will be collected, used, disseminated, and maintained pursuant to the proposed rule promulgated
under the REAL ID Act (the Act). 2 This analysis reflects the framework of the Privacy Office’s Fair
Information Principles, which are: Transparency, Individual Participation, Purpose Specification,
Minimization, Use Limitation, Data Quality and Integrity, Security, and Accountability and Auditing. This
PIA will be updated, as necessary, when the rule is final.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) establishes minimum standards for state-issued driver's
licenses and identification cards that federal agencies will accept for “official purposes” after May 11, 2008.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 142(4), Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155 (November 25, 2002), as amended
(“(4) conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department or that of the Department on the privacy of
personal information, including the type of personal information collected and the number of people affected”).
2 Division B—REAL ID Act of 2005, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 301 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301 note).
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Specifically, the Act mandates minimum document and information verification requirements, security
features, physical security standards for locations that issue driver's licenses and identification cards, and
background checks for Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) employees who have the ability to affect the
identity information that appears on the credentials, have access to the production process, or are involved
in the manufacturing of the credentials (covered employees). In addition, the NPRM provisions call for
security standards to ensure that the valuable information state DMVs collect will be protected and not used
as a source for identity fraud or theft.
The Act and its proposed implementing regulation will result in issuance of credentials that are tamperresistant and better identity documents than the current driver’s license and identification card issued by
the states. A better credential should help address the use of falsified credentials in perpetrating identity
theft. In addition, as a result of the Act, state databases will contain standardized photo images that will
allow law enforcement agencies to use facial-recognition technology to help apprehend criminals, and the
state DMVs will be able to use the images and application data to prevent drivers whose licenses have been
revoked in one state from obtaining them in another.
This PIA analyzes the major privacy concerns posed by the Act and addressed in the NPRM. The first and
overarching concern is whether the Act and the implementing regulations will result in the creation of a
national identity card or database. The second is whether and how the personal information associated
with implementation of the Act will be protected from unauthorized access or use. The third is whether
and how the personal information stored in digital format on the credentials will be protected against
unauthorized uses. This PIA discusses several additional privacy issues that were not raised in the Privacy
Considerations section of the NPRM, including the proposed requirements that a photograph and address
appear on the credential and that DMVs conduct a financial history check on covered employees.
The Privacy Office strongly supports the application of the privacy protections discussed in the NPRM to
protect the personal information associated with REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards stored in
state databases and encourages public comment on the privacy and security issues posed at the conclusion
of the Privacy Considerations section of the NPRM including: state comprehensive security plans; access to
information collected by states pursuant to the REAL ID Act and the protection of such information stored
in state databases; and the operation and governance of electronic verification by states of driver's license
application information.
The Privacy Office recommends that the final rule continue to address privacy issues clearly and that it
define sufficient privacy protections to ensure that DHS can audit and certify their implementation by the
states. Moreover, as discussed below in Section II.C. of this PIA, to the extent technically and operationally
feasible, the Privacy Office believes there is a strong privacy rationale for cryptographic protections to
safeguard the personal information stored digitally in the machine-readable zone (MRZ) on the credentials.

I. Legislative History
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, 2005 3 contained the provisions for the REAL ID Act of 2005, which repealed the driver’s licensing
section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). 4 While the REAL ID Act
does not contain an explicit requirement that DHS enact rules to protect the privacy rights of individuals
3
4

Pub. L. 109 -13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note).
Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3827 (December 17, 2004)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note).

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who apply for and hold driver's licenses and personal identification cards, the legislative history of the Act
supports the conclusion that Congress intended DHS to do so. The House Conference Report for the REAL
ID Act includes several key statements of Congressional intent regarding privacy. 5 For example, in its
discussion of section 202(d)(12) of the Act, which requires each state to provide electronic access to the
information in its motor vehicle databases to all of the other states, the Conference Report makes clear that
Congress recognized the need for the regulations to address privacy and security and that those protections
should be at least the equivalent of existing federal protections. The Conference Report reads in relevant
part:
DHS will be expected to establish regulations which adequately protect the privacy of the holders of licenses and ID
cards which meet the standards for federal identification and federal purposes. 6
In addition, the Conference Report discussion of Section 202(b)(9) of the Act, which calls for using “a
common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements,” clearly indicates that
Congress wanted privacy to be a consideration in implementing the technology. The Conference Report
states:
There has been little research on methods to secure the privacy of the data contained on the machine readable strip.
Improvements in the machine readable technology would allow for less data being present on the face of the card in
the future, with other data stored securely and only able to be read by law enforcement officials.” 7 (Underlining for
emphasis, not in the original)
This statement suggests that Congress wanted to secure the privacy of the data contained on the machine
readable zone (MRZ) of the credential and make it accessible only to law enforcement officials. The current
understanding is that a potential way to control access to the data on the 2D bar code by third parties,
which is the technology DHS has selected to be used in the REAL ID credentials, is encryption. The issue of
how to protect this information is discussed in Section II.C. of the PIA, below.
The Conference Report language described above, coupled with the requirement in Section 202(d)(7) of
the Act to “ensure the physical security of locations where driver’s licenses and identification cards are
produced and the security of document materials and papers from which driver’s licenses and identification
cards are produced,” provide the legislative basis to include privacy protections and safeguards for both the
personal information collected and used in connection with the issuance of REAL ID driver’s licenses and
identification cards and the personal information stored on these credentials.

II. The Privacy Impact of the REAL ID Act and the NPRM
The public has long been accustomed to providing personal information for the purpose of obtaining
driver’s licenses and identification cards. This includes having this information printed on the face of these
credentials and, in most states, included in a machine readable technology (MRT), such as a bar code or
magnetic strip on the rear of the credential. The enactment of the REAL ID Act increases the attention on
the privacy ramifications of what information will appear on the driver’s licenses and identification cards
issued under the Act and the privacy of the information that will be exchanged. Some privacy advocates
and members of the public have raised concerns that the Act could create an increased risk of identity theft
H.R. Rep. No 109-72 (2005) (Conf. Rep.)
Id. at 184. .
7Id. at 179.
5
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and erode privacy or be a stepping-stone to a national identity card, because of the standardization of the
information that will be presented on the credential, the uniformity of the process for issuance of the
credentials, and potential federal access to the mandated information.
As described below, DHS has sought to address the privacy concerns within the limits of its authority under
the Act. 8 At the federal level, only the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) 9 addresses the
privacy of motor vehicle records, but as described below in Section II.B. of the PIA, its protections are
narrowly focused. It is therefore necessary to build federal protections into the REAL ID rulemaking to
augment existing state administrative and statutory privacy protections. This section of the PIA summarizes
the requirements of the Act that potentially have the greatest impact on privacy, the extent to which those
requirements change current state driver’s licensing practices, and how DHS intends to address concerns
that the Act will result in a national identity card or database and erode privacy. The privacy concerns
surrounding a national identity card stem from the REAL ID Act itself and not from DHS’s proposed
rulemaking, because DHS does not have authority to control third-party use or potential use of the REAL ID
credential or associated identifier.
The PIA addresses the key privacy issues posed by the Act: (1) Does the REAL ID Act create a national
identity card or database; (2) How will personal information required by the REAL ID Act be protected in
the state databases; (3) How will the personal information stored on the machine readable technology on
the driver’s licenses and identification cards be protected from unauthorized collection and use; and (4) Do
the requirements for a photograph and address on the credential and the DMV employee background check
erode privacy.

A. Does the REAL ID Act create a national ID or database?
The overarching privacy concern regarding the Act is that it will create a national ID or database on all
driver’s license and identification card holders. The Privacy Office is mindful of Congress’s views on
national identification cards, expressed in Section 1514 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 10 This PIA
discusses both the issue of a national identity card/number and the issue of a national database, as they are
related but not identical concerns. First, it is yet unclear whether a REAL ID compliant driver's license or
identification card will become any more of a national ID than the Social Security Number (SSN) or
existing state-issued driver's licenses and identification cards. An argument exists that both the SSN and
existing state credentials already create de facto national identifiers. Nevertheless, it is likely that given the
stringent verification process to obtain a REAL ID credential and the security features proposed in the NPRM
to prevent credential counterfeiting and tampering, the REAL ID credential may soon be considered the
most reliable credential to ascertain an individual’s identity.
Nonetheless, it is important to understand whether and how the Act may change the use of driver’s licenses
by the public and private sectors Although the REAL ID Act will make the driver’s license and number a
more reliable identifier, it is not yet clear to what extent it will expand the use of the license or number.
8 DHS has taken steps to protect privacy pursuant to its authority under Section 202(d)(7) to address the security of the
information DMVs will collect and use related to implementation of the Act and its authority to define the machine-readable
technology. This is consistent with the House Conference Report (See H.R. Rep. No 109-72 at 179, 184 discussing section
202(b)(9) [the machine-readable technology] and 202(d)(12) [the state data exchange] of the Act.
9 Pub. L. 103-322 as amended by Pub. L. 106-69, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.
10 Section 1514 states the following: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the development of a national
identification system or card.”

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The REAL ID Act, however, does not limit the ability of Congress or the states in the future to restrict the
use of the REAL ID or its unique number beyond the uses specified in the Act and the proposed regulations.
Although DHS is mindful of these issues, the future use of the new credential by third parties and not this
rulemaking will ultimately determine whether the REAL ID credential will become a national ID and
whether further protections from Congress may be warranted.

1. Use of a Unique Identifier
Third parties such as financial institutions, retailers, hotels, health-care providers, and others may consider
the REAL ID credential to be a more reliable identification card than existing credentials, including current
driver’s licenses, and may begin to request this credential in conjunction with a wide variety of
transactions, including applications for employment, opening credit or other accounts, making credit
purchases, or other transactions in which it is necessary to ascertain the identity of the individual involved
in the transaction. This could be helpful in reducing the incidence of fraudulent face-to-face transactions,
but only if the third party actually compares the information on or associated with the credential with the
individual presenting it, such as examining the signature or photograph of the individual. A REAL ID
credential, however, cannot provide assurance of identity for transactions that take place remotely on the
Internet or by phone.
The NPRM limits the scope of “official purposes” of the credential to the uses specified in the REAL ID Act:
(1) accessing federal facilities; (2) boarding federally-regulated aircraft; and (3) entering nuclear power
plants.
All identity systems trigger privacy concerns and extend not only to the use of a credential, but to the use of
any unique number associated with the credential. Section 202(b)(4) of the REAL ID Act requires that each
REAL ID driver’s license or identification card include the person’s unique “driver’s license or identification
card number.” For privacy reasons, federal law already prohibits the display of an individual’s SSN on a
driver’s license, 11 but the unique ID number on a REAL ID credential, if left unregulated, could be misused
in similar ways. This is a risk inherent to the law enacted by Congress and the proposed implementing
regulations cannot ameliorate this risk. Thus, for example, if retailers, healthcare providers, financial
institutions, insurers, and other private or government entities were to collect the credential and record the
ID number whenever individuals engaged in a transaction, the REAL ID’s unique number could pose the
same, if not greater, risks as experienced in the use of the SSN. 12 . As discussed in Section II.C. below, the
collection of personal information from the credential could be further facilitated by the skimming of the
digital information stored in the MRZ if it is not encrypted or such actions are not prohibited by law.
Our system of government with its checks and balances can prevent such an erosion of privacy and civil
liberties, if protections are built into the identity system from the very beginning. Of course, unlike a SSN,
a person’s driver’s license number may change over time if the person moves from one state to another.
Moreover, even under the REAL ID Act, Congress and state governments always retain the ability to restrict
the use of a REAL ID as a unique identifying number in the future if warranted.

Section 7214 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17,
2004) amended section 205(c)(2)(c)(vi) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(VI)).
12 The risks associated with the SSN are increasingly being addressed through legislation to limit its use, such as Section 7214 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, December 17, 2004, preventing its display on driver’s
licenses.
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Some of the public concern about the REAL ID stems from the history surrounding the expansive use of the
SSN beyond its original purpose of recording the information necessary to provide a public pension benefit.
One of the lessons learned from the use of SSNs is that once an identification number is issued, it is very
difficult to limit its use. 13 A National Academy of Sciences National Research Council study of
identification systems, IDs – Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems, 14 posed serious concerns
about the desirability and feasibility of a nationwide identity system. The study noted that any identity
system raises significant and challenging policy, procedural, and technological issues and urged
policymakers to consider a set of key questions when contemplating an identity system. This study
proposed the following questions, which are appropriate to consider at this early stage of addressing the
REAL ID Act: What is the purpose of the system? What is the scope of the population that would be issued
an ID and recorded in the system? What is the scope of the data? Who would be the users of the system?
What types of use would be allowed? Would participation be voluntary or mandatory? What legal
structures protect the system’s integrity as well as the data subject’s privacy and due process rights, and
determine the government and relying parties’ liability for system misuse or failure?
Even now, over 70 years after the SSN was first introduced, the federal government is grappling with how
to address the privacy and security interests surrounding the role of SSNs in facilitating identity theft.
While DHS believes the issuance of REAL ID credentials can help reduce the incidence of identity theft, it is
unclear whether a unique identifier associated with the REAL ID credential will over time suffer the same
problems as those associated with the SSN. The only way to prevent misuse of any identifier is to establish
enforceable restrictions at the time any REAL ID identifier is introduced. For a number of years, many bills
have been proposed in the Congress to address misuse of the SSN; however, none have been passed because
it is a challenge to limit the use of the SSN now that it has become such a common identifier in the
marketplace.
Although DHS cannot address all of these concerns about a national ID or the use of the unique
identification number because DHS can only act within the authority granted under the REAL ID Act, DHS
can play an important role in eliminating the concern that implementation of the Act would result in the
creation of a national database. The NPRM does not propose to create a national database. This concern
stems from the provisions in the Act requiring that the individual states: (1) electronically verify application
information against federal databases; and (2) provide state-to-state access to verify that the applicant only
holds a valid driver’s license or identification card in one jurisdiction. Furthermore, storing personal
information in a uniform and standardized manner, such as the information on individuals possessing REAL
ID credentials, poses a significant security risk given the value of this collection of information.
Consequently, the Privacy Office recommends that states, with participation of the affected federal agencies,
develop and implement a governing structure to devise the business rules and requirements that apply to
the operation of both the state-to-federal data query and the state-to-state data exchanges. This concept
would be substantially similar to current governance practice in the issuance and management of state
driver’s licenses and identification cards.
As discussed below, an architecture for implementing the mandated data verifications and exchanges can be
designed, governed, and operated to avoid the creation of a national database. The key will be to ensure
that the states administer and manage the systems built to implement the Act. In addition, with appropriate
See GAO Reports on SSNs: GAO-02-352, GAO-05-1016T,
Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett (Editors), IDs—Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems, National Academy of
Sciences (2002)

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and necessary participation from the affected federal agencies, including DHS, the Department of
Transportation, and the Social Security Administration, the states must be empowered to develop the
business rules surrounding the check of federal reference databases and the state-to-state data exchange
processes. State, rather than federal, operation and control of the systems not only minimizes the
appearance of a national database, but also fosters the system of federalism upon which our country is
based. 15 The language in the Preamble of the NPRM supports the important role of the states.

2. The State Query of Federal Reference Databases
Section 202(c)(3)(A) of the REAL ID Act requires a state before issuing a driver’s license or identification
card to verify with the issuing agency the issuance, validity, and completeness of each document required
to be presented. It is difficult to validate that source documents, such as a birth certificate, Permanent
Resident Card, and foreign passport with a valid unexpired U.S. visa, are genuine and have not been
altered. The proposed regulation contemplates that certain identifying data contained in source documents
will be checked electronically against federal reference databases. Specifically, states may be required to
verify the data within the source documents against the following federal databases:
•

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database operated by DHS U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS); 16

•

Social Security On-Line Verification (SSOLV) database operated by the Social Security Administration
(SSA);

•

Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) database, the birth certificate verification pilot operated
by the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS); and

•

Department of State systems for verifying data from U.S. Passports, Consular Reports of Birth, and
Certifications of Reports of Birth.

Many state DMVs already access one or more of these databases as part of their current licensing process;
however, the fact that this data verification will now be done by fifty-six jurisdictions – the fifty states plus
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands -- heightens privacy concerns about how the data checks will be
performed, who will administer and operate the state query of federal reference databases, how the query
or queries will be structured, who will have access to the data, and what will be the business rules
surrounding the check to protect the privacy of the applicants’ data. The NPRM addresses many of these
issues by leaving the control and operation of this data check, including the development of the business
rules, to the states. Additionally, the NPRM proposes that individual states document their business rules for
reconciling data quality and formatting issues and urges states to develop best practices and common
business rules by means of a collective governance structure. 17

Note that the database connectivity mandated by the REAL ID Act is in addition to the database connectivity/functionality
required to implement the Department of Transportation’s existing control over commercial driver’s licensing. In addition, law
enforcement already have access directly to a state’s driver history via NLETS, which is the International Justice & Public Safety
Information Sharing Network, a message switching system serving the criminal justice community.
16 The DHS Privacy Office is conducting a Privacy Impact Assessment for the SAVE program. It will be published on its website at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.
17 “Privacy Considerations,” Section II.C.1(a) of the NPRM.
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A very important example of how administration of the data check will be left to the states is the
commitment by DHS in the NPRM to support the development of a “federated querying service” enabling
the states access to federal reference databases in a timely, secure, and cost-effective manner. 18 Most states
query some of these federal reference databases either directly or indirectly today through a portal provided
by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). 19 DHS indicates in the NPRM its
commitment to expediting the development and deployment of a common querying service to facilitate the
state DMV queries for REAL ID data verification. Since certain databases will be connected, it will be critical
from a privacy perspective to clarify which parties control the data systems and which parties have access to
the data systems.
To address the privacy concerns posed by such a federated querying service, the Preamble to the NPRM
contains a number of important statements. First, it sets forth the narrow purpose of the service: “The
purpose of this federated querying service will be to minimize the impact of data verification on State DMV
business processes and reduce the costs of data access.” 20 Second the Preamble goes on to make the
following commitment: “DHS will support the development of [a] querying service but will not operate or
control this service.” And third, it states: “A frequently-heard concern relates to the amount of additional
information the Federal Government will have about driver’s license holders and what the Federal
Government will do with that data. In fact, however, neither the Real ID Act nor these proposed
regulations gives the Federal Government any greater access to information than it had before. Moreover,
there is no information about a licensee that the Federal Government will store that it is not already
required to store.” 21
The commitments made in the NPRM demonstrate that DHS does not intend to expand the purpose for
which the querying service will be built and will seek to mitigate the privacy concerns. In addition, the
NPRM states that use of this federated querying service will be voluntary and that states may choose to:
maintain or establish direct access to the reference databases; combine direct access with partial use of a
common service; or verify applicant data against the reference databases in some other manner. Leaving
the control and operation of the licensing verification with the states helps mitigate the fears expressed by
some that the REAL ID Act will result in a national database operated by the federal government.
Furthermore, as part of the state certification mandated by Section 202(a)(2) of the REAL ID Act, the NPRM
proposes that each state prepare a Comprehensive Security Plan for its DMV facilities and the driver’s license
information storage and production facilities, databases and systems. (See Proposed Rule § 37.41 and
Preamble section II.K.) As part of this, each state will submit a privacy policy regarding the personal
information collected and maintained by the DMV and will demonstrate how it will protect the information
collected, stored, or disseminated for purposes of complying with the REAL ID Act, including procedures to
prevent unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of applicant information and images of source
documents, and standards and procedures for document retention and destruction. Also, the Privacy
Considerations section of the NPRM notes that DHS expects that a state’s certification should demonstrate
“Connectivity to Systems and Databases Required for Verification,” section II.E.6 (a)(ii) of the NPRM.
Founded in 1933, AAMVA is a nonprofit voluntary association representing the State and provincial officials in the United States
and Canada who administer and enforce the laws that govern motor vehicle operation, the driver credentialing process, and
highway safety enforcement. DMV administrators are appointed by their State governors and serve on the AAMVA Board of
Directors and its committees. AAMVA has played an integral role in the development, deployment, and monitoring of both the
commercial driver’s license (CDL) and motor carrier safety programs throughout the United States, and its members are responsible
for administering these programs at the State level.
20 “Privacy Considerations,” Section II.E.6 (a)(ii) of the NPRM.
21 “Privacy Considerations,” Section II.C of the NPRM.
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that it has implemented best practices to protect the privacy of the license holder as guided by the fair
information principles that underlie the federal, state, and international law and codes of practice. (See
further discussion of the Comprehensive Security Plan in section II.B of the PIA, below.)

3. The State-to-State Data Exchange
Section 202(d)(12) of the Act mandates that states provide electronic access to information contained in
the motor vehicle database of the state to all other states, and Section 202(d)(13) requires that the state
motor vehicle database contain, at a minimum, all data fields printed on driver’s licenses and identification
cards and motor vehicle driver’s histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on
licenses. 22 (See Proposed Rule § 37.33.) These two provisions mandate a state-to-state data exchange.
The NPRM contemplates that the states will work collectively to determine the business process and data
access rules necessary to implement these provisions prior to May 11, 2008. 23
As described in Section II.E of the NPRM, although the REAL ID Act poses a requirement for this state-tostate data exchange, this exchange is already required and implemented under the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) existing rules and regulations governing commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs). 24
The DOT requires that states connect to the National Driver Register (NDR)/Problem Driver Pointer System
(PDPS) 25 and the Commercial Driver's License Information System (CDLIS) in order to exchange
information about commercial motor vehicle drivers, traffic convictions, and disqualifications. A state
must use both the NDR/PDPS and CDLIS to check a driver's record, and also check CDLIS to make certain
that the applicant does not already have a CDL. 26 Under these programs, as well as under the REAL ID Act,
the primary purpose of the state-to-state data exchange is to determine if the applicant is unqualified and if
the application is fraudulent rather than specifically verifying the applicant’s identity.

The information available in each jurisdiction’s database varies, but generally they already store what is required by the Act.
See the Privacy Considerations section of the NPRM.
24 Commercial drivers licenses (CDL) are governed by the National Driver Register Act of 1982 and the Commercial Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1986 (CMVSA), both implemented by DOT. (49 U.S.C 31311(a)) as amended.) The CMVSA requires that a
commercial driver license (CDL) holder have one and only one driver license and driver record, meaning that a CDL license holder
cannot hold a non-CDL from another jurisdiction. The Commercial Driver’s License Information System (CDLIS) was consequently
developed to enable the record checks of the nation’s professional truck and bus drivers, including drivers of HAZMAT vehicles. It
is an enhanced, pointer system that requires the states to update records and exchange data. CDLIS maintains nine data elements on
all CDL holders: name and aliases, date of birth, SSN, driver’s license number, state of record, gender, height, weight, and eye
color. All other information is retained by the licensing state.
When CDLIS was first built, states were required to check CDLIS before issuing a CDL to make sure someone did not have a CDL in
a previous state. That requirement was not enough, however, to prevent someone from obtaining a non-CDL license in a different
state and using that license when driving his own car. As a result, the DOT’s Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
developed new regulations under the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act (MCSIA) of 1999 to require that ALL license applicants
be run against CDLIS to address this loophole. (23 CFR § 1327.5) CDLIS is operated by AAMVA on behalf of DOT and is accessed
through AAMVAnet, a network service operated by AAMVA.
25 The NDR/PDPS was established by the National Driver Register Act of 1982 and is administered by National Highway
Transportation Security Administration (NHTSA) but accessed through AAMVAnet.
The PDPS is used to search the NDR and will “point” the inquiring jurisdiction to the State of Record, where an individual’s driver
status and history information is stored. The NDR contains identification data for individuals under suspension or revocation,
and/or who have committed serious motor vehicle-related violations. By compact or convention, every state respects every others
state’s suspensions/revocations. The PDPS record contains five data elements: name and aliases, date of birth, driver’s license
number, and State of Record. Jurisdictions have the option of also sending SSN, height, weight, and eye color. The 2003 Privacy
Impact Assessment for the NDR is posted at http://www.dot.gov/pia/nhtsa_ndr.htm
26 A state may also send a query to another state for the full history of a driver without going to the CDLIS or PDPS pointer files.
Only certain highway-safety related offenses are transmitted on a driver’s history obtained from PDPS.
22
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The existing state-to-state data exchange among DMVs, while focused on commercial driver’s licensing,
also impacts non-commercial license applicants, as states are required currently to run all license applicants
against the PDPS and CDLIS, which are both pointer systems that collect limited information from each state
in order to match against the incoming inquiries. Both systems offer certain mandatory privacy
protections.
The PDPS is subject to federal regulations 23 CFR Sections 1327.1 et seq., which adopts the Privacy Act of
1974 27 principles of individual participation and collection, use, and disclosure limitation. On the other
hand, CDLIS may be subject to more limited privacy protections, because DOT’s policy states that CDLIS is
not a federal “system of records,” as defined by the Privacy Act since the records in CDLIS are not
controlled by DOT’s Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). 28 Under DOT policy, drivers
who wish to review and, if necessary, correct information about them in CDLIS must contact the state
agency that issued their license. Access to CDLIS is limited to DOT, the states, an employer or prospective
employer of a person who operates a commercial motor vehicle, and to federal agencies upon written
request where there is a legal basis and need. 29 DHS is not aware of any privacy issues with the CDLIS
implementation.
The NPRM states that DHS intends to work closely with the DOT, AAMVA, and the states to fulfill the
requirements for the state-to-state data exchange under the REAL ID Act, while also supporting privacy
protections for this exchange. It has not been determined whether CDLIS or some other service will be the
platform for the state-to-state exchange, but regardless of the platform, it will be necessary for the states,
working with DHS and DOT, to define the privacy protections for any state-to-state data exchange,
including how it will be operated and controlled and who will have access.
For example, with support from DHS staff, representatives of the DMVs of California, Iowa, Massachusetts,
and New York formed a “Federation” in July 2006 to identify a collective governance structure for the
state-to-state data exchange and to begin to develop business rules, including privacy protections. This
Federation recently joined with the AAMVA REAL ID Steering Committee to develop an independent
governance structure for the state-to-state data exchange. The development of privacy protective business
rules and standards and a governance mechanism will be central to ensuring that the privacy of license
holders is protected.

B. How will personal information required by the REAL ID Act be protected
in the state databases?
At the federal level, only the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) 30 addresses the privacy of
motor vehicle records, but its protections are narrowly focused. The DPPA addresses the use and disclosure
of personal information stored in state motor vehicle records, but it does not prescribe privacy protections
for the personal information stored on the credentials themselves nor does it set any security requirements
for the motor vehicle databases. Rather, the DPPA simply prohibits DMVs from disclosing “personal

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a.
FMCSA’s Policy on Availability of Information From the Commercial Driver’s License Information System, 70 Fed. Reg. 2454,
January 13, 2005.
29 Id. A federal agency is required to execute a Memorandum of Understanding with DOT and/or FMCSA before access to CDLIS
data will be provided.
30 Pub. L. 103-322 as amended by Pub. L. 106-69, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq.
27
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information” contained in a DMV “motor vehicle record,” 31 unless the disclosure falls within fourteen
permissible uses, 32 including disclosure to any federal, state or local government agency to carry out that
agency’s legitimate functions. In effect, the DPPA serves only as a prohibition on the sale of the personal
information found in motor vehicle records for marketing purposes. 33 Consequently, the personal
information found in motor vehicle records is widely available through information brokers for the
enumerated uses including fraud prevention and insurance purposes. Moreover, the DPPA authorizes resale
or redisclosure of the information so long as it is for one of the fourteen permissible uses, making abuses of
the DPPA very difficult to monitor or, even, to trace. 34 Therefore, DHS cannot rely on the DPPA to protect
the privacy of the personal information required under the REAL ID Act.
Section 202(d)(7) of the REAL ID Act requires states to “ensure the physical security of locations where
driver’s licenses and identification cards are produced and the security of document materials and papers
from which driver’s licenses and identification cards are produced.” The NPRM relies on this provision as
authority for DHS to define basic security program requirements to ensure the integrity of the REAL ID
driver’s licenses and identification cards and to protect the security of the personal information stored in
DMV databases associated with these driver’s licenses and identification cards. 35 The NPRM notes that the
House Conference Report discussion of this section of the Act expressed concern with the “growing
problem of identity thieves and document purveyors breaking into state facilities and stealing driver’s
license or identification card stock blanks, printing machines, and sometimes actual computer hard drives
in which current driver’s license or identification card holder data is stored.” 36 Also the NPRM cites to the
number of state DMVs that experienced incidents of theft of personal information from their databases 37

The DPPA authorizes 14 permissible uses for “personal information,” which it defines to include “an individual’s photograph,
social security number, driver identification number, name, address (except the five-digit zip code), telephone number, and
medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status.”
18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). It defines a “motor vehicle record” as “any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor
vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(1).
32 The permissible uses are: (1) use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its
functions; (2) use in connection with motor vehicle-related matters (motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle
emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; performance monitoring of motor vehicles, parts and dealers
by motor vehicle manufacturers, motor vehicle market research activities, and removal of non-owner records from the original
owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers); (3) use in the normal course of business by legitimate businesses, but only to
verify accuracy of personal information submitted by an individual to the business and if no longer correct to obtain correct
information but only for purposes of preventing fraud by pursuing legal remedies against or recovering on a debt or security
interest against the individual; (4) use in connection with a civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; (5) use in
research activities so long as the personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals; (6) for use by
any insurer; (7) use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles; (8) use by any licensed private
investigative agency for a permissible purpose; (9) use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify information of a
holder of a commercial driver’s license; (10) use in connection with operation of private toll transportation facilities; (11) any
other use in response to requests for a record if the State has obtained express consent of the person; (12) for bulk distribution of
surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has express consent of the person,; (13) use by any requester, if the requester
demonstrates it has obtained written consent of the individual; and (14) for any other use specifically authorized under the law of
the State holder of the record, if such used is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety.
33 Originally the DPPA permitted sale of record information for use in marketing activities if the individual was given an
opportunity to opt out. In 1999, Congress amended the law to require that DMVs obtain express consent for sale of record
information for marketing purposes.
34 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c)
35 See discussion in NPRM Preamble Sections II.K.4 and 5 and Proposed Rule § 37.41.
36 H.R. Rep. 109-72, at 183 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
37 http://www.cdt.org/testimony/020805schwartz.shtml
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and that federal and state governmental agencies have made security of personal information a high
priority. 38
Specifically, the NPRM proposes that each state submit, as part of the REAL ID Act certification process, a
written document to be known as the Comprehensive Security Plan. This certification requirement
provides an important safeguard for the personal information collected, used, and maintained by state
motor vehicles offices and assures the public that the state handles personal information appropriately. As
part of the Comprehensive Security Plan, states will provide a privacy policy; 39 describe “reasonable
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
the physical location and the personal information stored and maintained in DMV records and information
systems”; 40 and describe the state’s “standards and procedures for safeguarding information collected,
stored or disseminated for purposes of complying with the REAL ID Act, including procedures to prevent
unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of applicant information and images of source documents
retained pursuant to the Act and standards and procedures for document retention and destruction.” 41 In
addition, Section II.K.5 of the NPRM encourages states to draft collective standards and best practices for the
management of both documents and data proposed under the provisions of the rule.
The NPRM proposal for the Comprehensive Security Plan provides an important privacy protection, because
the Plan will assist the states to address most, if not all, of the Privacy Office Fair Information Principles as
described at the outset of this PIA. The Privacy Considerations section of the Preamble to the NPRM states
that the plan “should demonstrate that it has implemented best practices to protect the privacy of the
license holder as guided by the fair information principles, which call for openness, individual participation
(access, correction, and redress), purpose specification, data minimization, use and disclosure limitation,
data quality and integrity, security safeguards, and accountability and auditing, and that these principles are
widely recognized and embodied in numerous federal, state, and international law and codes of
practice.” 42 DHS is requesting comments on recommended best practices for protecting the privacy of the
personal information stored in the various state motor vehicle databases pertaining to the requirements
under the REAL ID Act. The Privacy Office supports appropriate privacy protections and procedures to
protect the personal information associated with implementation of the Act that are consistent to the
greatest extent possible with the Fair Information Principles.

C. How will the personal information stored on the machine readable
technology on the licenses and IDs be protected from unauthorized
collection and use?
The implementation of any digitized collection of information increases the efficiency by which that
information can be accessed. Records, which were once accessible only in human-readable format, in
digital form can be readily accessed and then used in ways beyond the original purpose of the records.
This inherent capacity of digital records requires closer scrutiny of which records and what information is
accessible in digital form, because efficiency in access and availability for additional uses raises important
privacy issues.
See Office of Management and Budget Memoranda, M-06-15, M-06-16, and M-06-19.
Proposed Rule § 37.41(b)(5)
40 Proposed Rule § 37.41(b)(1)(iii)
41 Proposed Rule § 37.41 (b)(8)
42 See NPRM section II.C.2.
38
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Sections II.H.7-9 of the NPRM review the issues surrounding the personal information stored on the
machine readable technology (MRT) on the REAL ID licenses and IDs. The REAL ID Act standardizes the
minimum personal information on the ID and mandates the use of a MRT. The NPRM proposes that states
use the PDF-417 2D bar code and indicates that DHS leans toward recommending that states protect the
personal information stored in this 2D bar code by requiring encryption, if the operational complexity of
deploying a nationwide encryption infrastructure to provide access to law enforcement can be addressed.
The issue of encryption of the 2D bar code is one of software and infrastructure costs and not hardware
cost, since the widely used 2D bar code reader can also be used to read the encrypted data.
The NPRM discusses the privacy concerns raised by the potential for unauthorized third parties to collect
and use the personal information on REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards via a machine
readable zone (MRZ). Although DHS lacks authority to prohibit third-party access to the information in the
MRZ, DHS can determine to require technological protections to the MRZ, because the REAL ID Act gives
DHS authority to select the technology and its implementation.
As discussed earlier in this PIA, the DPPA has not been interpreted to provide any privacy protections for
the personal information stored on the driver’s licenses. Currently, most states use the 2D bar code
recommended in the NPRM, exposing the information stored on the credential to unauthorized collection
or “skimming,” the term often used to describe this sort of information capture by unauthorized third
parties. Readers for the 2D bar code are readily available for purchase on the Internet and at a very low
cost, which permits unauthorized third parties to skim the information for their own business needs or to
sell to other third parties.
With skimming an existing problem, the REAL ID Act does not contain any statutory language to address
the downloading, access, and storage by third parties of the information in the MRZ. Third parties, such as
retailers, hotels, bars, and convenience stores, could invest in economical skimming devices to access
information on any individual’s credential for unauthorized uses. Furthermore, the Act’s requirement that
each REAL ID credential contain a unique identifier provides an opportunity for third parties to normalize
data stored about individuals within large data warehouses. Like the situation with SSNs, this normalization
would provide links between the identifier and the individual. Thus, if a retail entity were to collect just
the unique identifier from the REAL ID credential and associate it with the transactional information related
to the interactions the individual has with the retailer, this information could be useful to any third party.
The REAL ID Act presents two risks in this situation. One, greater amounts of data about transactions could
be linked to an individual. Two, third parties may assume that the credential holder was in fact the
credential owner and so may not verify sufficiently the picture and/or signature on the credential, as often
occurs today with credit cards. This could lead to the possibility of incorrect information being linked to
an individual because of an incorrect recording of the unique identifier.
As usual, individuals will likely be unaware that their personal information on the credential has been
retained by the third party, since individuals assume the third party to whom they gave the ID merely
checked the information against a database for a valid purpose, such as validating an individual’s age.
Moreover, when a third party appropriates the personal information, individuals are often unaware, and
therefore do not associate the use of their ID with unsolicited marketing or identity theft or fraud.

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1. Statutory Protections
A few states have laws that expressly protect the privacy and security of the personal information encoded
on driver’s licenses and identification cards. For example, California, 43 Nebraska, 44 New Hampshire, 45 and
Texas 46 have enacted laws to limit the skimming of driver’s license or identification card information. In
addition, AAMVA has drafted a “Model Act to Prohibit the Capture and Storage of Personal Information
Obtained from a Driver’s License or Identification Card,” which allows third party users to use a transaction
scan device, like a 2D bar code scanner, on the driver’s license or identification card for the limited purpose
of age verification. The Model Act, which prohibits any other non-governmental use of the information
without the express written consent of the card holder, 47 would provide legal authorities creating privacy
protections. The Privacy Office strongly encourages that all 56 jurisdictions consider and enact laws that
expressly protect the privacy and security of information contained on their driver’s licenses and
identification cards, because this will also help address the growth of the unique REAL ID identification
number becoming a de facto national ID by limiting its uses.

2. Ensuring Law Enforcement Access
Nonetheless, as described above in the Legislative History section of this PIA, the House Conference Report
states that the overall purpose of Section 202(b)(1) is to “improve the ability of law enforcement officers at
all levels to confirm the identity of the individuals presenting state issued driver’s licenses or identification
cards.” The House Conference Report recognizes that financial institutions and even retail establishments
may wish to use the credential to verify an individual; however, the Report indicates that such verification
would be done using the person’s signature on the credential and not the MRZ. (See House Conference
Report discussion of Section 202(b)(7)) regarding the requirement for a signature.) Neither the Act nor
the House Conference Report support harvesting the information from the MRZ on the credentials.
For these reasons, to the extent permitted under the Act, the use of the personal information on the REAL
ID credentials should be limited to identity verification and law enforcement purposes. 48 Although there is
no language in the REAL ID Act that limits how retailers, bars, banks or other third parties may use the
personal information on the REAL ID driver’s licenses or identification cards, the NPRM invites comment

Confidentiality of Driver’s License Information, California Civil Code 1798.90.1 (Effective January 1, 2004).
Storage or Compilation of Information, Revised Statutes of Nebraska 60-4,111.01 (2001). The Nebraska law limits storage or
compilation of information from the license or State identification card to the statutorily authorized purposes of the DMV, the
courts, or law enforcement agencies. Violation of the law is a felony.
45 Drivers’ Licenses Prohibitions, New Hampshire Revised Statutes, Title XXI, Motor Vehicles, Chapter 263, Section 263:12
(Effective January 1, 2003). The law prohibits scanning, recording, or storing of the personal obtained from the license unless
authorized by the department. Non-electronic transfer of the information on the face of the license is prohibited without the
consent of the license holder, except to law enforcement.
46 Electronically Readable Information, Texas Statutes, Transportation Code, Title 7 Vehicles and Traffic, Chapter 521 Driver’s
Licenses and Certificates, Section 521.126 (Effective September 1, 2005). The law limits access to law enforcement, to identify a
voter, to financial institutions for identification purposes and only with express consent, and upon authorization of a maritime
facility to secure the facility or port.
47 AAMVA 26-8.2-03, 2003. If the commercial user has a reasonable basis to believe that the identification card has been tampered
with, or has been fraudulently issued or produced, the user may record and maintain the encoded information but only for the
purpose of reporting it to appropriate administrative or law enforcement officials.
48 Although businesses and non-governmental entities may use the credentials for the purpose of identity verification, express
prohibitions from collecting and storing the information help mitigate privacy risks. Retailers and financial institutions can
continue to examine the name, signature, and photo on the credentials for purposes of identity verification and the date of birth to
verify age.
43
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on ways to enable law enforcement officials to have access, while limiting access to unauthorized third
parties for inappropriate uses.

3. Technological Protections
Further, in order to address both privacy issues and law enforcement needs, the NPRM asks for comments
on means and methods to limit unauthorized third parties access to the digital information 49 on the
credential. As noted above, the mandatory data elements to be included within the bar code are, as
proposed by the NPRM: expiration date, holder’s name, issue date, date of birth, gender, address, unique
identification number, revision date (indicating the most recent change or modification to the visible
format of the license or ID), and the inventory control number of the physical document. Because 2D bar
code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver’s licenses and
identification cards and accessed by unauthorized third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the
credential. For example, a bar that required a license could quickly scan the 2D bar code to prove that a
person was 21 or over to enter the bar, but at the same time conceivably obtain the person’s name and
address and compile a list of names and addresses of its patrons, along with the other encoded data,
including the unique identification number, which the bar could subsequently sell or use.
Encryption can help mitigate this privacy risk because it would prevent the downloading of the information
on the MRZ into a database. Of course the encoded data remains available and accessible on the face of the
card in human-readable form; however, encryption lessens the likelihood of the collection, because it
would reduce the efficiency of the digital information on the credential by limiting access to only those
parties, such as law enforcement, that require the information, but retains efficiency for parties permitted
to access the information. Even if a third party compromises or breaks the encryption, which would be
difficult, the encryption would still protect against most skimming, as most third parties would not have
access to the compromised key. Further, at that point, the cryptographic key could be modified to protect
credentials issued after the compromise of the encryption.
Because encryption of the data necessitates access to the cryptographic key required to decrypt the data,
employing encryption in the 2D bar code would require having a key infrastructure allowing permitted
parties access to the secured key information. The need for a key infrastructure to support access to
encrypted 2D bar code data raises an important challenge for implementation of encryption.
In the NPRM, DHS asks for comment to determine (1) if implementing encryption is feasible from an
operational and cost perspective and (2) if encryption can be deployed in a manner ensuring access to the
information by law enforcement. It is recognized that implementing encryption would likely require a
complex and comprehensive exchange of encryption keys among all fifty-six jurisdictions involved in
issuing and accessing REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards. Building such an infrastructure
would have certain complexities that, if not addressed appropriately, could reduce the utility of creating
such standards for encoding data into the 2D bar code. 50

For the machine-readable portion of the card, the proposed machine-readable technology standard is the PDF-417 2D bar code,
although a State may use any other technology in addition to a PDF-417 bar code as long as the driver’s license or identification
card complies with the PDF-417 2D bar code standard.
50 With 2D bar codes, a symmetric cryptographic key system would need to be implemented. With a symmetric system, a multikey or single key implementation could be used. In a multi-key implementation, although a larger the number of keys creates a
more secure the system, because a single key compromise does not compromise the entire system, this large number of
cryptographic keys would need to be accessible to the law enforcement personnel wherever they would be reading the driver’s
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Encryption is increasingly being used in the private sector to protect against unlawful access and possible
identity theft. In the public sector, encryption will be used to protect the personal information stored on
the HSPD 12 federal identification cards as well as on the DHS Transportation Workers Identification
Credential (TWIC) IDs. While there are costs to encryption, the DHS Privacy Office believes the benefits of
protecting the personal information could outweigh these costs, if it is feasible to use encryption within the
necessary operational context.

4. Data Minimization Protections
The NPRM mandates that the bar code include a significant number of data elements: the expiration date,
holder’s name, issue date, date of birth, gender, address, unique identification number, revision date
(indicating the most recent change or modification to the visible format of the license or ID), and the
inventory control number of the physical document. If the operational and cost hurdles of implementing
encryption prove too high, DHS could request states to leave the proposed federally-required elements
unencrypted, while permitting encryption of only the “state-specific” elements. For example, if a state
wished to include a digital photograph in the MRZ, it would be free to do so and encrypt it, as the
photograph is not currently one of the mandatory REAL ID data elements. Another option would be for
DHS to omit the address information from the MRZ, making skimming less attractive to third parties. In
this regard, the NPRM seeks comments on whether a demonstrable law enforcement need exists to include
the address on the MRZ portion of the REAL ID driver’s license, such that address should be included as a
mandatory data element on the MRZ. One specific option to preventing not only the efficient use of the
skimmed information, but also preventing the establishment of a national ID, would be not to place the
unique identification number in the MRZ. The number could still be on the face of the credential for use by
law enforcement, but not including it in the MRZ may lessen its attractiveness for collection by
unauthorized parties. These options would limit the type and amount of information available in digital
form.
Further, if it is determined that the data elements cannot be encrypted, it will be critical to inform driver’s
license and identification card holders about their need to monitor carefully the handling of the REAL ID
credentials when physically providing them to third parties. The more sensitive the personal information
elements maintained on the REAL ID credential, the more likely unauthorized third parties will target this
information to engage in data aggregation, marketing, fraud, theft, or other illegal activities.
Good privacy policy supports limiting the data in the MRZ to the minimum personal data elements
necessary for the intended purpose of providing access to law enforcement personnel. This minimizes but
does not eliminate the opportunity for unauthorized third parties to use personal information for unrelated,
secondary purposes. Thus an unencrypted MRZ should have fewer data elements and more limited personal
information, especially the credential holder’s address. In its discussion of section 202(b)(9) of the Act,
which calls for using “a common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements,”
the House Conference Report clearly indicates that Congress wanted to address privacy by minimizing
license. A single key implementation would avoid the complexities of needing a key infrastructure, but this greatly increases the
risk that this single key could be compromised. Although employing a single key greatly simplifies the procedure to make available
the cryptographic key to law enforcement personnel, the compromise of this single cryptographic key would compromise all
driver’s licenses created with it. In this case, encryption could create a false sense of security if a license holder thought his or her
information was truly secure and it was not, because an unauthorized third party compromised the key. Not only do these
implementation operations present operational and security risks, they also factor into the privacy risks with the selection of an
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exposure of the information: “There has been little research on methods to secure the privacy of the data
contained on the machine readable strip. Improvements in the machine readable technology would allow
for less data being present on the face of the card in the future, with other data stored securely and only able to be read
by law enforcement officials.” 51 This statement suggests that Congress wanted to secure the privacy of the data
contained on the MRT and make it accessible only to law enforcement officials. The only way currently
available to control access to the data on the MRT is to encrypt it. Strong privacy and security concerns
exist regarding the selection of a MRT because, if not done right, the MRT could facilitate identity theft and
unauthorized collection of the personal information on the REAL ID credential. Therefore, encryption
standards can control and limit who has access to the information encoded in the 2D bar code in the MRZ
to prevent unauthorized parties from harvesting the information and reselling it.
Lastly, to reiterate an earlier point, the DHS Privacy Office is hopeful that the states will take action similar
to that of California, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas to prohibit non-governmental entities and
individuals from harvesting the information on driver’s licenses or identification cards for any purpose
whatsoever. Retailers and financial institutions should be able to continue to examine the Real IDs for
purposes of identity and age verification, but should be barred from downloading the information from the
machine-readable zone.

D. How do the requirements for a photograph and address on the ID and
the DMV employee background check impact privacy?
1. Requirement for a Photograph on the REAL ID
Section 202(b)(5) of the Act requires that the state-issued REAL ID driver’s license or identification card
include a digital photograph of the individual. In addition, Section 202(d)(3) provides that the state shall
require that each individual applying for a driver’s license or identification card be subject to mandatory
facial image capture. 52 These provisions form the basis for the photograph requirements set forth in
Proposed Rule § 37.11(a). This statutory requirement applies whether or not the person ultimately
receives a driver’s license or identification card, since the Act refers to “each person applying” for a driver’s
license or identification card. If a driver’s license or identification card is not issued, the NPRM proposes
that states dispose of the photograph after one (1) year. In addition, the NPRM proposes that DMVs update
the photograph in the event the applicant reapplies and to discard prior photos. If the DMV does not issue
the driver’s license or identification card because of suspected fraud, the DMV would be required to
maintain the record for ten (10) years and reflect that a driver’s license or identification card was not issued
for that purpose. 53
The NPRM acknowledges that some individuals who apply for a REAL ID driver’s license or identification
card may oppose having their photograph taken based on their religious beliefs; 54 however, the REAL ID
Act requires a facial photograph to enhance security. DHS therefore has no option other than to propose
Italics for emphasis, not in the original. H.R. Rep. 109-72, at 179.
DHS is proposing that digital photographs comply with current ICAO standard 9303 Part 1 Vol. 2, specifically ISO/IEC 19794-5
- Information technology - Biometric data interchange formats - Part 5: Face image data, which is incorporated into ICAO 9303.
This calls for a full face image from the crown to the base of the chin and from ear-to-ear (unless the State chooses to use profiles
for licensees under 21), and images with no veils, scarves or headdresses to obscure facial features, or eyewear that obscures the iris
or pupil of the eyes.
53 See Proposed Rule § 37.11(a)
54 See NPRM section II.H.3.
51
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that states that issue non-photo driver’s licenses or identification cards based on an individual’s religious
beliefs do so as long as those driver’s licenses or identification cards are issued in accordance with the rules
for non-compliant driver’s licenses and identification cards.
Prior to issuing the NPRM, the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties facilitated a meeting with civil
rights and citizen representatives at which DHS staff heard specifically about the concerns of the Amish and
Muslim faith with regard to requiring a photograph on a REAL ID Act credential. These groups argued that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, states that “Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability” unless the application of the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” Since the
REAL ID Act mandates the photograph, DHS has no flexibility to address the legitimate concerns of such
groups, other than to permit states to provide individuals with non-photo driver’s license and identification
card as long as the states issue such credentials in accordance with the rules for non-compliant driver’s
licenses and identification cards.

2. Requirement for Address of Principal Residence
Section 202(b)(6) of the Act requires that the driver’s license or identification card include the individual’s
address of principal residence. The NPRM proposes to exempt certain individuals from this requirement
consistent with (1) existing state laws and current exceptions processes by states to protect victims of
domestic violence, judges, protected witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and (2) Section 827 of the
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 55 which amended the
REAL ID Act 2005 (49 U.S.C. 30301 note) to protect against disclosure of addresses of individuals who
have been subjected to battery, extreme cruelty, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking,
or trafficking. Consequently, the NPRM proposes to exempt the following from the address requirement:
(1) an individual enrolled in a state address confidentiality program; (2) an individual who’s address is
entitled to be suppressed under state or federal law or suppressed by a court order; or (3) an individual
protected from disclosure of information pursuant to Section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
Most states retain the “actual” address in their database, but often protect it so that only authorized
personnel have access to the “actual” address. In addition, most states do not have the “actual” address in
the MRZ on the credential. Rather, the MRZ contains only what is on the face of the driver’s license or
identification card. Therefore, the NPRM proposes to exempt individuals who are entitled to enroll in state
address confidentiality programs, whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed under state or federal law
or by a court order, or who are protected from disclosure of information pursuant to Section 384 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 from the requirement to have their
address displayed on REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards. The NPRM also notes that other
categories of individuals, such as federal judges, may also require that their addresses remain confidential to
protect their safety and invites comment on how these categories of individuals can be protected, while
remaining consistent with requirements of the Act.

Title VIII, Subtitle C, Sec. 827 (Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 3066, Jan. 5, 2006)(Protection of domestic violence and crime
victims from certain disclosures of information).

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In addition, the NPRM acknowledges that some people do not have a fixed address and that states have
exceptions processes in place to address this situation. For example, in some states homeless people may
use addresses of accredited organizations. The NPRM provides a mechanism by which states may continue
to address these situations through a written and documented exceptions process. Exceptions processing is
referenced in Proposed Rule § 37.11(h) and discussed further in section II.F of the NPRM.
The approach provided in the NPRM addresses the legitimate privacy concerns associated with disclosing
addresses of these individuals. The Privacy Office believes the disclosure of addresses in the MRZ of all
other REAL ID driver’s license and identification card holders is better addressed by encryption as discussed
above in Section II.C of the PIA.

3. Requirement for DMV Employee Background Check
Section 202(d)(8) of the REAL ID Act requires that “all persons authorized to manufacture or produce
driver’s licenses and identification cards” must be required to undergo “appropriate security clearance
requirements.” Proposed Rule § 37.45 addresses the requirements of Section 202(d)(8) of the Act by
identifying which categories of DMV employees must undergo “background checks” 56 and the nature of
the background checks. The NPRM discussion of the mandated background check states that Congress
made it clear that Section 202(d)(8) was intended to address cases of insider corruption, 57 and therefore,
the NPRM proposes that background checks be required for “DMV employees or DMV contractors who
have the ability to affect the recording of any information required to be verified, or who are involved in
the manufacture or production of driver’s licenses and identification cards, or who have the ability to affect
the identity information that appears on the driver’s license or identification card.” 58
The NPRM recognizes that each state’s DMV has a unique organization and structure, and leaves it to each
state to identify the “covered positions” that would fall under this definition. Also, the NPRM proposes
that the state DMVs provide employees and prospective employees selected for placement in a covered
position with notice that a background check is required for employment in a covered position and what
that background check will include. Such notice is consistent with federal Privacy Act notice
requirements. 59
With respect to the type of background check required, the NPRM proposes that states collect fingerprints
for individuals who seek employment in a covered position, in order to conduct a “criminal history record
check” (CHRC) on those individuals through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state
repositories. It also specifies a list of disqualifying offenses, based on current federal requirements, that
mirrors requirements for DHS Transportation Security Administration’s Hazardous Materials Endorsement
program (HAZMAT program) and Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) program. 60

The NPRM defines a background check as an investigation into someone’s past history to permit them to either gain a security
clearance or pass a suitability screening. It notes that a security clearance is the end result of a background investigation whereby
the government makes a determination that someone may be trusted with specified levels of information, such as “classified”
information. While section 202(d)(8) of the Act uses the term “security clearance,” DHS concludes that the intent was to conduct
background checks, as DMV employees do not need clearance to handle “classified” information.
57 H.R. Rep. at 183.
58 See definition of “covered employees” in the Proposed Rule Definition § 37.03 and the discussion of this provision in NPRM
Section II.K.1.
59 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3).
60 See 49 CFR 1572.103 and the final rule on TWIC (72 Fed. Reg. 3492 (Jan. 25, 2007).
Section 37.45 of the NPRM defines the offenses as follows:
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The NPRM states that this list of crimes is sufficient as a federal minimum; but that states may add
additional disqualifying offenses to this list for their covered employees and invites comment on whether
the proposed list of disqualifying offenses is appropriate, too large, or insufficient as it concerns REAL ID.
In addition to the criminal history record check, the NPRM proposes that states perform a “financial history
check” on individuals seeking employment in covered positions in a manner consistent with the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. Although a number of states already collect fingerprints of their employees and run
criminal history record checks, it is not clear how many currently perform financial history checks.
Although many employers, including many DMVs, already conduct financial history checks as one
indicator that an individual may warrant additional scrutiny or supervision before assuming responsibilities
that raise security risks, concerns exist about how such a check may be applied by the states under this
regulation. The NPRM states that while questionable financial history would not be considered a federal
disqualifier, the information should be used by the states in making their own determinations on how or
whether particular individuals should be employed at the DMV.
The NPRM acknowledges that the proposed requirement for a financial history check is not a feature of the
TWIC or HAZMAT programs, but states that DHS believes that it is warranted in this case, due to the
sensitivity of the personal information that will routinely be handled by employees at state DMVs and the
fact that a driver’s license or identification card serves as a key source document in securing other forms of
state and federal identification. The NPRM persuasively states that “[i]f the DMV personnel issuing and
authenticating the driver’s license or identification card are compromised and issue genuine REAL ID
driver’s licenses and identification cards to individuals who are seeking to mask their true identity, those
individuals can obtain additional identification using that false identity and thwart the Government’s and
law enforcement’s ability to identify accurately individuals lawfully stopped and screened.”
Employees who are susceptible to corruption should not be hired for covered positions, but it will be
critical that DMVs assess the financial history information fairly and take extenuating circumstances into
consideration when making this determination. It is not clear what financial difficulties a state would use
to disqualify an individual from employment.
Although the NPRM does not propose to preclude a DMV from hiring any individual based on the results of
the financial history check and does not propose to preclude the DMV from placing the individual in a
covered position based on that check, because financial history records can include inaccurate or out-dated
information, it is not clear that DMVs will be able to evaluate the information appropriately. From a
privacy and security perspective, the criminal background check provides the best understood indication of
whether or not an employee may pose a security risk. Importantly, the NPRM states that individuals denied
(i)Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses. An applicant has a permanent disqualifying offense if convicted, or found
not guilty by reason of insanity, in a civilian or military jurisdiction, of any of the felonies set forth in 49 CFR 1572.103(a).
(ii) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses. The criminal offenses referenced in 49 CFR 1572.103(b) are disqualifying,
if the applicant was either convicted of those offenses in a civilian or military jurisdiction, or admits having committed acts which
constitute the essential elements of any of those criminal offenses within the seven years preceding the date of application; or the
applicant was released from incarceration for the crime within the five years preceding the date of application.
(iii) Under want or warrant. An applicant who is wanted or under indictment in any civilian or military jurisdiction for
a felony referenced in this section is disqualified until the want or warrant is released.
(iv) Determination of arrest status. When a fingerprint-based check discloses an arrest for a disqualifying crime
referenced in this section without indicating a disposition, the State must determine the disposition of the arrest.
(v) Waiver. The State may establish procedures to allow for a waiver of the requirements of (b)(1)(ii) of this section
under circumstances determined by the State.

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employment based on the background check must be given notice and an opportunity to appeal to the
state.
The NPRM also proposes that states conduct a lawful status check on covered employees through the
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program run by DHS U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to verify that the individual has lawful status in the United States.
States may grant waivers allowing individuals to maintain their positions under particular circumstances as
authorized by the states, for example, where an individual has made full disclosure of his or her criminal
history to the state DMV. Appeals based on the lawful status check will be appealed to DHS.

III. Conclusion
The REAL ID Act implicates a number of significant privacy concerns for the American public. This PIA
seeks to identify the concerns and describe how the Department’s NPRM has addressed them. In the key
areas, the NPRM proposes important privacy protections in furtherance of the authority provided to DHS
under the REAL ID Act and further clarification in the final rule will ensure their implementation and
enforceability. These privacy protections should include: (1) providing for state control and operation of
the state query of federal reference databases and the state-to-state data exchange; (2) requiring states to
submit a Comprehensive Security Plan, including a privacy policy and plan to protect the personal
information associated with implementation of the Act; and (3) employing encryption to protect the
personal information stored on REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards, while ensuring
appropriate law enforcement access.
These protections serve as a floor and do not prevent the states from using their own statutory or executive
authority to provide additional privacy protections for the personal information stored on the REAL ID
credentials and in the state databases. The Privacy Office believes that protecting the privacy of the personal
information associated with implementation of the REAL ID Act is critical to maintaining the public trust
that government can provide basic services to its citizens and residents while preserving their privacy. The
public is encouraged to comment on the NPRM and on the privacy issues associated with implementation
of the Act in order to ensure that the final rule reflects robust public input on these important issues.

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Rulemaking Contact
Darrell Williams, REAL ID Program Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528
(202) 282-9829

Reviewing Official
Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security, (571) 227-3813.

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Approval Signature Page

________________________________
Hugo Teufel III
Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security