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pdfDraft Regulatory Analysis for the Proposed Rule:
Alternative Physical Security Requirements for
Advanced Reactors
RIN No.: 3150-AK19; NRC Docket ID: NRC-2017-0227
July 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ML24178A372
Abstract
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) current physical security regulations and
guidance for power reactors are based on requirements that may not be appropriate for small
modular reactors (SMRs) and non-light water reactors (non-LWRs), hereafter referred to as
advanced reactors. In 2018, the Commission approved the NRC’s recommendation to initiate a
limited-scope rulemaking to revise physical security regulations and issue new guidance for
advanced reactors. The proposed rule and guidance could affect nuclear power advanced
reactors that are licensed after the effective date of the final rule. Eligible advanced reactor
applicants and licensees would have the option to implement certain alternative physical
security requirements in the proposed rule when developing their physical security programs in
accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 73, “Physical
Protection of Plants and Materials.” This document presents a regulatory analysis of the benefits
and costs of the proposed rule requirements and the associated regulatory guidance documents
relative to the baseline case (i.e., the no-action alternative).
ii
CONTENTS
Section
Page
Abstract................................................................................................................................. ii
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... v
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ v
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... vi
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ vii
1.
Introduction ...............................................................................................................1
2.
Statement of the Problem and Objective ................................................................... 2
3.
4.
5.
6.
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1
3.2
Background .................................................................................................................. 2
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................ 4
Objective ...................................................................................................................... 4
Identification and Preliminary Analysis of Alternative Approaches ............................. 4
Alternative 1—No Action .............................................................................................. 5
Alternative 2—Limited-Scope Rulemaking .................................................................. 5
Estimation and Evaluation of Costs and Benefits....................................................... 6
4.1
4.2
4.2.1
Identification of Affected Attributes .............................................................................. 6
Analytical Methodology ................................................................................................ 7
Regulatory Baseline ..................................................................................................... 8
4.2.2
Affected Entities ........................................................................................................... 8
4.2.3
Base Year .................................................................................................................... 8
4.2.4
Discount Rates ............................................................................................................. 8
4.2.5
Cost/Benefit Inflators .................................................................................................... 9
4.2.6
Labor Rates .................................................................................................................. 9
4.2.7
Sign Conventions ....................................................................................................... 10
4.2.8
Analysis Horizon ........................................................................................................ 10
4.2.9
Cost Estimation .......................................................................................................... 11
4.3
Data ............................................................................................................................ 11
Presentation of Results ........................................................................................... 11
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
5.7.
5.8.
5.8.1.
Industry Operation...................................................................................................... 13
Total Industry Costs ................................................................................................... 14
NRC Implementation .................................................................................................. 14
NRC Operation........................................................................................................... 15
Safeguards and Security Considerations .................................................................. 15
Total NRC Costs ........................................................................................................ 16
Total Costs ................................................................................................................. 16
Uncertainty Analysis................................................................................................... 16
Uncertainty Analysis Assumptions ............................................................................. 17
5.8.2.
Uncertainty Analysis Results ..................................................................................... 18
5.9.
5.10.
5.10.1.
Disaggregation ........................................................................................................... 21
Summary .................................................................................................................... 21
Quantified Net Benefit ................................................................................................ 21
5.10.2.
Qualitative Benefits .................................................................................................... 21
5.10.3.
Qualitative Costs ........................................................................................................ 22
5.11.
Safety Goal Evaluation .............................................................................................. 23
Decision Rationale................................................................................................... 23
iii
7.
Implementation Schedule ........................................................................................ 25
8.
References ..............................................................................................................25
APPENDIX A—MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS AND INPUT DATA ........................................... A-1
iv
List of Figures
Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Page
Total Industry Costs (7-Percent NPV)—Alternative 2 .................................................18
Total NRC Costs (7-Percent NPV)—Alternative 2 ......................................................19
Total Costs (7-percent NPV)—Alternative 2 ...............................................................19
Tornado Diagram—Total Averted Costs—7-percent NPV ..........................................20
List of Tables
Tables
Page
Table ES-1 Total Costs and Benefits for Alternative 2……………………………..………………viii
Table 1 CPI-U Inflator ............................................................................................................... 9
Table 2 Position Titles and Occupations ..................................................................................10
Table 3 Industry Operation: Averted Costs for Physical Security Exemption Requests ............14
Table 4 Total Industry Costs ....................................................................................................14
Table 5 NRC Implementation: Rulemaking Costs ....................................................................15
Table 6 NRC Operation: Exemption Request Reviews.............................................................15
Table 7 Total NRC Costs .........................................................................................................16
Table 8 Total Net Benefits (Costs) ...........................................................................................16
Table 9 Uncertainty Analysis ....................................................................................................17
Table 10 Uncertainty Results Descriptive Statistics—7-Percent NPV.......................................20
Table 11 Summary of Totals ....................................................................................................24
v
Abbreviations
10 CFR
ADAMS
BLS
CFR
CRGR
DBT
DG
FR
LWR
NEI
NEIMA
non-LWR
NPV
NRC
NUREG
OMB
PERT
SECY
SMR
SOC
SRM
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor)
Code of Federal Regulations
Committee to Review Generic Requirements
design-basis threat
draft regulatory guide
Federal Register
light-water reactor
Nuclear Energy Institute
Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act
non-light-water reactor (a nuclear power reactor using a coolant other than water)
net present value
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
an NRC technical report designation
Office of Management and Budget
program evaluation and review technique
Secretary of the Commission
small modular reactor
standard occupational classification (code)
staff requirements memorandum
vi
Executive Summary
This document provides the regulatory analysis for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
(NRC’s) proposed limited-scope physical security rule for advanced reactors, 1 which would
allow eligible advanced reactor applicants and licensees to implement certain alternative
physical security requirements set forth in the proposed rule. This regulatory analysis
summarizes the current physical security framework for nuclear power reactors, describes
regulatory issues that motivated rulemaking for advanced reactors, evaluates the alternative
physical security requirements for advanced reactors, and summarizes the results of this
analysis.
This limited-scope rule would propose voluntary, performance-based physical security
alternatives to meet the intended functions of the following prescriptive requirements in Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 73.55, “Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage”:
•
10 CFR 73.55(e)—physical barriers
•
10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(v)(D) and (e)(9)(vi)—vital areas
•
10 CFR 73.55(i)(2) and (i)(4)(iii)— secondary alarm stations
•
10 CFR 73.55(k)(3) through (k)(5)(ii) and 10 CFR 73.55(k)(8)(ii)—onsite armed response
personnel
The NRC’s assessment of quantitative cost considerations shows that the limited-scope
rulemaking is justified because the quantified benefits of the proposed rule exceed the costs to
licensees and the NRC. Furthermore, the NRC’s qualitative assessment of impact
considerations shows that the limited-scope rulemaking is justified because it provides
regulatory predictability and identifies a voluntary, performance-based alternative to the
prescriptive requirements mentioned above that efficiently addresses the potentially unique
security needs of advanced reactors. The NRC concludes there is sufficient justification to
proceed with the rule given the qualitative and quantitative cost and benefits.
This regulatory analysis discusses two alternatives—Alternative 1, the no-action alternative, and
Alternative 2, a limited scope rulemaking. For Alternative 2, the NRC analyzed the costs and
benefits of the rule requirements and development of the regulatory guidance documents, DG5072, “Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular Reactors
and Non-Light-Water Reactors,” and DG-5071, “Target Set Identification and Development for
Nuclear Power Reactors” (nonpublic). This regulatory analysis makes the key findings identified
below. Both alternatives provide a means for licensees to achieve substantial benefits in
avoided costs for a second onsite alarm station and personnel costs for armed responders
onsite at all times. However, the proposed rule alternative is shown to provide a more
predictable regulatory path for achieving this objective.
Proposed Rule Cost Analysis. The NRC estimates that the rule would result in net
(i.e., accounting for both costs and benefits) averted costs to industry of approximately
$340,000. Relative to the regulatory baseline, the net costs to the NRC are approximately
1
Within the context of this document, the term “advanced reactors” refers to non-light-water reactors
(non-LWRs) and light-water small modular reactors (SMRs).
vii
($260,000), with quantified costs due to rulemaking. Table ES-1 shows the total costs and
benefits to industry and the NRC of proceeding with the rule. The rule alternative would result in
net averted costs to industry and the NRC of approximately $80,000. Each of these totals
represent the net present values (NPVs) calculated using a 7-percent discount rate.
Table ES-1 Total Costs and Benefits for Alternative 2
Attribute
Total Industry Costs:
Total NRC Costs:
Total Costs:
Attribute
Total Industry Benefits:
Total NRC Benefits:
Total Benefits:
Attribute
Industry Net:
NRC Net:
Total Net:
Undiscounted
$0
($530,000)
($530,000)
Undiscounted
$450,000
$270,000
$720,000
Costs
7% NPV
$0
($460,000)
($460,000)
Benefits
7% NPV
$340,000
$200,000
$540,000
Net Benefits (Costs)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
$450,000
$340,000
($260,000)
($260,000)
$190,000
$80,000
3% NPV
$0
($500,000)
($500,000)
3% NPV
$390,000
$240,000
$630,000
3% NPV
$390,000
($260,000)
$130,000
Note: NPV is expressed in 2021 dollars. There may be differences among tables due to rounding.
According to Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” dated
September 30, 1993, an economically significant regulatory action is one that would have an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. This proposed rulemaking does not reach
this threshold.
Qualitative Benefits. Alternative 2 would establish alternative physical security requirements in
10 CFR 73.55 for advanced reactors. By regulating physical security through rulemaking instead
of through a case-by-case 10 CFR 73.5 exemption or 10 CFR 73.55(r) alternative measures
processes, the NRC would provide greater regulatory predictability for industry stakeholders and
provide opportunities for stakeholder input into the alternative requirements. Additionally,
creating appropriate alternative security requirements within the regulatory framework, rather
than relying on the exemption or alternative measures processes, may increase public
confidence in the NRC’s role as an effective regulator adapting to new technology and new
regulatory needs. The analysis of both Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 shows that averted costs
result from reducing the number of armed responders, implementing physical barrier
alternatives and vital area designations, and changing requirements for a redundant secondary
alarm station on site. The averted costs (savings) of these physical security components could
be significant (greater than $200 million using a 7-percent discount rate to $400 million using a
3-percent discount rate), based largely on the personnel reductions in armed responders and
the moving of the secondary alarm station offsite. While this regulatory analysis presents these
savings, the cost estimate does not include them because licensees could use either alternative
to achieve these savings—there is no net difference.
viii
Uncertainty Analysis. The regulatory analysis contains an uncertainty analysis that shows that
the estimated mean averted cost for this rule is $80,000 with an 83.1-percent confidence that
the proposed rule is cost beneficial using a 7-percent discount rate.
Decision Rationale. Relative to the no-action baseline, the NRC has shown that the quantified
results indicate the rule alternative is likely to be cost beneficial. Additionally, from a qualitative
standpoint, the rule alternative would result in increased regulatory predictability and greater
public confidence in the NRC’s ability to adapt to new technologies. By taking into account
advanced reactor design features, the NRC provides a method that could allow an applicant or
licensee to justify a reduction in the number of armed responders, alternatives for physical
barriers, vital area redesignation, and an allowance for an offsite redundant secondary alarm
station, while maintaining high assurance of public health and safety and the common defense
and security. Alternative 2 creates a repeatable process for industry to consistently realize the
cost savings that are incurred during plant operations from each of these elements. The
resulting savings from the reduction of armed responders and the secondary alarm station, and
an efficient, repeatable process far exceed the implementation costs. The NRC has concluded
that the rule alternative is justified when considering the quantitative and qualitative factors.
ix
1. Introduction
This document presents the regulatory analysis for the proposed rule to provide alternative
physical security requirements for advanced reactors 2 and develop the new regulatory guidance
document DG-5072, “Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for
Non-Light-Water-Reactors and Small Modular Reactors,” and DG-5071, “Target Set
Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors” (nonpublic). This regulatory
analysis summarizes the current physical security framework for nuclear power reactors,
describes regulatory issues that have motivated the NRC to pursue rulemaking in this area,
evaluates various alternatives to address physical security for advanced reactors, and identifies
the background documents related to these issues.
The current fleet of nuclear power reactors is subject to the physical security requirements in 10
CFR 73.55. The NRC’s security regulatory framework applicable to these reactors requires the
development of a physical protection program that provides high assurance 3 that activities
involving special nuclear material would not be inimical to the common defense and security
and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. To achieve this
objective, a licensee’s physical protection program must protect against the design basis threat
of radiological sabotage. 4 The NRC staff anticipates that advanced reactor technologies,
including advances in designs and engineered safety features, may differ substantially from the
designs and operations of large LWRs. As a result of these anticipated technological advances,
certain of the physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 may not be appropriate for
advanced reactors. This proposed rule would establish a set of alternative physical security
requirements that may more appropriately meet the security needs of eligible advanced reactor
applicants and licensees commensurate with the risks associated with advanced reactors.
This regulatory analysis considers whether to provide a set of alternative physical security
requirements that eligible advanced reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” or 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications,
and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” could elect to use. This limited-scope rule would apply
the insights from advances in designs and safety research, retain the NRC’s overall security
regulatory framework, and provide acceptable alternatives to comply with physical security
requirements.
The NRC recognizes that the phrase “advanced reactors” is not consistently defined, including
in some references cited in this regulatory analysis. However, for the purposes of this regulatory
analysis, the term “advanced reactor” refers to power reactors that are either non-LWRs or
2
Ibid.
3
The Commission stated in staff requirements memorandum “SRM-SECY-16-0073 – Options and
Recommendations for the Force-On-Force Inspection Program in Response to SRM-SECY-14-0088,” dated
October 5, 2016, that “the concept of ‘high assurance’ of adequate protection found in the NRC security
regulations is equivalent to ‘reasonable assurance’ when it comes to determining what level of regulation is
appropriate.” The Commission re-iterated this point in “SRM-SECY-18-0076 – Options and
Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,” dated November 19, 2018.
4
Radiological sabotage as defined in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 73.2, “Definitions,”
“means any deliberate act directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the
regulations in this chapter [10 CFR Part 73, ‘Physical Protection of Plants and Materials’] is conducted, or
against a component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger public health
and safety by exposure to radiation.”
1
light-water SMRs. The non-LWRs comprise a variety of reactor types, including sodium-cooled
reactors, gas-cooled reactors, and molten-salt-cooled reactors. The term “SMR” used in this
document is as defined in 10 CFR 171.5, “Definitions,” as “the class of light-water power
reactors having a licensed thermal power rating less than or equal to 1,000 MWt per module.
This rating is based on the thermal power equivalent of a light-water SMR with an electrical
power generating capacity of 300 MWe or less per module.”
2. Statement of the Problem and Objective
The current physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 and associated guidance are based
on requirements that may not be appropriate for advances in reactor designs and safety
research and their application to the existing and future operation of advanced reactors.
Through this proposed rulemaking, the NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to create
alternative physical security requirements for advanced reactors under the current physical
security framework for nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part
52.
In December 2016, the NRC developed and published “NRC Vision and Strategy: Safely
Achieving Effective and Efficient Non-Light Water Reactor Mission Readiness” (NRC, 2016b),
with a goal to further develop the NRC’s advanced reactor regulatory, technical, and policy
infrastructure. This physical security rulemaking for advanced reactors represents an important
facet of the NRC’s plan to be ready to review potential licensing applications for advanced
reactors efficiently and effectively.
2.1
Background
The current physical protection program for nuclear power reactors is designed to protect
against the design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage. To achieve this, the physical
protection program must protect those plant features needed to provide fundamental safety
functions, such as maintaining reactor core cooling, in order to prevent significant core damage
and spent fuel sabotage that could potentially result in a release of radioactive materials. When
compared to operating large LWRs, many of the advanced reactor designs have smaller power
outputs and a correspondingly smaller inventory of fission products available for potential
release. In comparison to large LWRs, some advanced reactor designs may include attributes
that could result in smaller and slower releases of fission products following the loss of certain
safety functions. Accordingly, some designs may warrant different methods for meeting the
NRC’s physical security requirements, commensurate with the potential radiological
consequences resulting from radiological sabotage.
The NRC considered the need to modify the physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 in
SECY-18-0076, “Options and Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,”
dated August 1, 2018 (NRC, 2018a). This SECY paper discusses much of the historical basis
guiding the NRC’s physical security policies for advanced reactors, as well as the advanced
reactor attributes that result in smaller and slower releases of fission products that could justify
different physical security requirements.
Pursuant to Commission direction in the staff requirements memo (SRM)-SECY-18-0076, dated
November 19, 2018 (NRC, 2018b)—which predates the Nuclear Energy Innovation and
Modernization Act (NEIMA)—for the purposes of this regulatory analysis, the term “advanced
reactor” refers to non-LWRs and light-water SMRs. This usage is included in, but not equivalent
with, NEIMA’s definition of “advanced nuclear reactor.”
2
Current Physical Security Regulations
The NRC developed the existing security regulatory framework for at nuclear power reactors to
ensure that a licensee’s physical protection program provides high assurance of adequate
protection against the DBT of radiological sabotage. The Commission-approved DBT describes
the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary that a licensee can reasonably be
expected to defend against. Development of the DBT is based on threat assessments of the
tactics, techniques, and procedures used by international and domestic terrorist groups and
organizations. The physical security requirements for licensees of nuclear power reactors to
protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage are found in 10 CFR 73.55, “Requirements for
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage.” The NRC describes the DBT used to design safeguards systems to protect against
acts of radiological sabotage in 10 CFR 73.1, “Purpose and scope.”
The 10 CFR Part 73 requirements for physical security for nuclear power reactors and other
types of licensed facilities include performance-based and prescriptive requirements. The
performance-based requirements provide applicants and licensees with the flexibility to
determine how to meet the established objectives of the requirement. The physical security
requirements across different classes of licensees reflect a graded approach that applies the
level of physical security commensurate with the radiological risk presented by the material at
the facility. The physical security requirements for large LWRs, which use low enriched nuclear
fuel, are established to protect against the DBT for radiological sabotage. Prescriptive
requirements typically tell an applicant or licensee how to implement the requirement.
As described in SECY-18-0076, the NRC intends that this limited-scope rule provide advanced
reactors with alternatives to specific requirements and develop associated guidance related to
physical security, while providing high assurance of adequate protection that is commensurate
with the potential consequences to public health and safety and the common defense and
security from the possession and use of special nuclear material at these facilities. Based on
stakeholder interactions, this rulemaking focuses on the existing regulatory requirements in:
•
•
•
•
10 CFR 73.55(b), requiring that the physical protection program for advanced reactors
prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage;
10 CFR 73.55(i)(4)(iii), requiring a central alarm station and a redundant secondary
alarm station on site;
10 CFR 73.55(e), containing requirements related to physical barriers and vital area
designation; and
10 CFR 73.55(k)(1), (3) through (7), and (8)(ii) and Section VI of Appendix B and Section
II.B.3.c.(iv) of Appendix C, relating to armed response personnel, interdiction, and
neutralization.
The NRC has prepared draft guidance (DG-5071 (nonpublic) and DG-5072) to address
implementation of the proposed rule’s alternative physical security requirements and propose a
methodology for assessing plant designs and source terms for comparison to the proposed
consequence-oriented performance criteria.
3
2.2
Statement of the Problem
This section describes the regulatory issues stemming from the fact that advanced reactors are
expected to differ substantially from and vary more than the existing reactor fleet. Differences
may include the adoption of security by design through enhanced safety and security features,
core size, fuel form, coolant type, source terms, and offsite dose consequences. These
attributes, among others, potentially permit applicants and licensees to use security methods or
approaches that differ from those for current large LWR operating reactors. However, the
current security regulatory framework in 10 CFR 73.55 and associated guidance does not
address these differing security methods or approaches, leading to a lack of regulatory certainty
for advanced reactor applicants.
Given the anticipated differences between currently operating large LWRs and potential new
advanced reactor designs, the NRC defined screening criteria to determine eligibility to use the
alternative physical security requirements for advanced reactors that are technology inclusive.
The NRC, with input from external stakeholders, further determined alternative measures that,
without this rulemaking, would otherwise require use of the exemption or alternative measures
processes to realize averted costs associated with scaling these requirements from a large
LWR to an advanced reactor platform.
2.3
Objective
The objective of this regulatory action is to enhance predictability in the regulatory framework for
advanced reactor applicants and licensees by enacting an alternative physical security
framework that could provide flexibility in certain areas, such as the number of onsite armed
responders and the need for a second onsite alarm station, while continuing to provide high
assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and
security. Specifically, the NRC’s objective for this rule is to create alternative physical security
requirements that will (1) enhance regulatory effectiveness by providing greater stability,
predictability, and clarity in the licensing process for implementing physical security for
advanced reactors; (2) reduce requests for exemptions from certain physical security
requirements; (3) consider technological advancements in reactor designs and their associated
design features impacting the possible loss of safety functions from malicious acts and any
resulting consequences; and (4) provide alternatives for meeting certain physical security
requirements under § 73.55 commensurate with the potentially lower risks posed by advanced
reactors.
3. Identification and Preliminary Analysis of Alternative Approaches
This section analyzes the alternatives that the NRC considered with regard to the objective of
enhancing the regulatory framework for applicants and licensees of advanced reactors and the
NRC. The NRC identified two alternatives:
(1)
Alternative 1 uses the existing regulatory framework with no changes to the current
physical security requirements and no NRC efforts to develop guidance to support
requests for proposed alternative measures or exemptions. The NRC would address
requests for exemptions or alternative measures on a case-by-case basis.
(2)
Alternative 2 amends the regulations through a limited-scope rule that keeps the current
physical security framework while allowing eligible advanced reactors to elect to
4
implement alternatives to certain existing physical security requirements in 10 CFR
73.55.
3.1
Alternative 1—No Action
Alternative 1 is to maintain the status quo with no changes to the current physical security
regulations. Applicants and licensees for operating or combined licenses may propose
innovative methods or approaches for providing security for advanced reactor designs.
For example, applicants could request alternative measures in accordance with
10 CFR 73.55(r), “Alternative measures,” or seek an exemption in accordance with 10 CFR
73.5, “Specific exemptions.” Additionally, an advanced reactor developer or other entity could
submit a topical report justifying specific alternative measures or exemptions for a specific
design. This alternative would continue to address exemption and alternative measures
requests for physical security on a case-by-case basis, along with the supporting analyses,
training, contingency plans, etc.
The NRC estimates that 50 armed responders would be required to provide the minimum
number of 10 responders per shift with an estimated annual cost of $100,000 per responder. An
onsite secondary alarm station is estimated to cost at least $1 million to build and tens of
thousands of dollars per year to maintain. Staffing the secondary alarm station would require
approximately five full-time equivalents at a similar rate of $100,000 annually. An offsite
secondary alarm station could serve multiple sites and avert some of these costs to each
covered site. Therefore, a licensee that receives NRC approval for an exemption or
implementation of an alternative measure under 10 CFR 73.55(r) that reduces the required
number of onsite armed responders or alarm station staff or that changes the onsite secondary
alarm station would benefit from substantial averted costs. Additional savings could be realized
in areas such as training programs, weapons, and administrative costs.
3.2
Alternative 2—Limited-Scope Rulemaking
Alternative 2 is a limited-scope rulemaking that retains the current physical security
requirements framework but provides advanced reactors with alternatives to specific physical
security-related regulations and guidance. Alternative 2 would relieve applicants, licensees, and
the NRC of the costs imposed by the case-by-case exemption and alternative measures
processes and promote regulatory predictability in the NRC’s licensing processes.
The proposed rule establishes a consequence-based eligibility criterion for advanced reactors
and a performance-based approach to address alternatives to the requirements for the
minimum number of onsite armed responders, onsite armed responders performing interdiction
and neutralization functions, physical barriers, secondary alarm station location, and vital area
designations for secondary alarm stations.
Under Alternative 2, an advanced reactor applicant would prepare a consequence analysis as
part of the application process under 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52. The NRC would
require applicants proposing physical security alternatives to demonstrate in their applications
that implementation of the alternative physical security requirement would still enable the
applicant’s physical protection program to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage.
Under Alternative 1, an equivalent analysis would need to be submitted to justify the exemption
and alternative measures requests.
5
As discussed, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 include significant averted costs related to the
reduction in the number of armed responders, physical barrier alternatives, vital area
redesignation, and changes to the onsite secondary alarm station as described in Alternative 1.
Because the NRC assumed that these savings could be achieved by both alternatives, the
averted costs resulting from these physical security alternatives are not included in the
incremental net benefits when comparing the two alternatives. If, in fact, this assumption is
wrong and greater averted costs would result under the proposed rule, the rule becomes more
cost beneficial. Furthermore, the rule approach would outline the approach needed for
applicants to have their application approved with fewer requests for additional information to
achieve these averted costs.
4. Estimation and Evaluation of Costs and Benefits
This section presents the process for evaluating the costs and benefits that are expected to
result from each proposed alternative relative to the regulatory baseline (Alternative 1). All costs
and benefits are monetized, when possible. The total costs and benefits are then summed to
determine whether the difference between the costs and benefits results in a positive benefit. In
some cases, costs and benefits are not monetized because meaningful quantification is not
possible. Instead, Section 5.9.2 of this regulatory analysis addresses these costs and benefits
qualitatively, in accordance with Appendix A, “Qualitative Factors Assessment Tools,” to
NUREG/BR-0058, “Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,” draft final Revision 5, issued January 2020 (NRC, 2020).
4.1
Identification of Affected Attributes
This section identifies the components of the public and private sectors, commonly referred to
as attributes, that the alternatives identified in Section 3 are expected to affect. The alternatives
would apply to licensees and applicants for advanced reactors, so advanced reactor licensees
and applicants are the primary beneficiaries of this rule. The NRC developed an inventory of the
impacted attributes using the list in NUREG/BR-0058, Chapter 5, “Details of a Cost-Benefit
Analysis.”
The rule would affect five attributes:
(1)
Industry Operation. This attribute accounts for the projected net economic effect on all
affected entities caused by routine and recurring activities required by the proposed
alternative. These activities include the reduction of exemption or alternative measures
requests, or the requirement for applicants and licensees to prepare and maintain a
consequence analysis.
(2)
NRC Implementation. This attribute accounts for the projected net economic effect on the
NRC to place the proposed alternative into operation. The NRC’s implementation of the
proposed alternative includes the agency’s cost to develop and issue the rule and any
regulatory guides that support the rule.
(3)
NRC Operation. This attribute accounts for the projected net economic effect caused by
routine and recurring NRC activities required by the proposed alternative after
implementation of the proposed rule. These activities include the review of consequence
analyses, reviews of license submittals containing exemption or alternative measures
requests, case-by-case alternative requests, and supporting materials.
6
(4)
Safeguards and Security Considerations. This attribute accounts for whether the existing
level of physical security is adequate and what effects the proposed action has on achieving
an adequate level of security. These activities include the review of whether the technical
justification provided in Alternative 1 or the risk-informed framework provided in Alternative 2
that is used to reduce the minimum number of onsite armed responders for
interdiction/neutralization or to change an onsite secondary alarm station, physical barriers,
or vital areas, achieve adequate levels of security.
(5)
Regulatory Certainty. This attribute accounts for regulatory and compliance improvements
resulting from the implementation of Alternative 2 relative to the regulatory baseline.
Alternative 2 would continue the best practice of regulation through rulemaking instead of
exemption requests, where practical. This rulemaking would reduce the effort that industry
expends generating exemption requests and considering alternative means to accomplish
the goals of the current regulation. In addition, this rule reduces the complexities resulting
from a case-by-case evaluation of physical security alternative measures and exemptions.
Additionally, applicants and licensees gain efficiencies in developing licensing applications,
security plans, and other supporting documentation. The NRC will gain efficiencies in the
review of these applications and security plans because of the improved regulatory
framework, predictability, and clarity established by the rule.
(6)
Public Confidence. This attribute accounts for the increase in public confidence in the NRC’s
ability to adapt to new technology and new regulatory needs, the opportunities for
stakeholder input into the alternative physical security requirements, and maintenance of the
NRC’s role as an effective industry regulator.
Attributes that are not expected to be affected under any of the alternatives include public health
(accident), public health (routine), occupational health (accident), occupational health (routine),
offsite property, onsite property, industry implementation, other government, general public, and
environmental considerations.
4.2
Analytical Methodology
This section describes the process used to evaluate costs and benefits associated with the
proposed alternatives. The benefits include any desirable changes in affected attributes
(e.g., monetary savings, improved safety, and improved security). The costs include any
undesirable changes in affected attributes (e.g., monetary costs, increased exposures).
Of the six affected attributes, the analysis evaluates three of the attributes—(1) industry
operation, (2) NRC implementation, and (3) NRC operation—on a quantitative basis.
Quantitative analysis requires a baseline characterization of the affected society, including
factors such as the number of affected entities, the nature of the activities currently performed,
and the types of systems and procedures that applicants or licensees would consider or would
no longer implement because of the proposed alternatives. Where possible, the NRC calculated
costs for these attributes are modeled using cost distributions to quantify the uncertainty in
these estimates. The NRC evaluated the remaining three attributes—(1) safeguards and
security considerations, (2) regulatory certainty, and (3) public confidence— on a qualitative
basis because the benefits related to consistent policy application are not quantifiable or
because the data necessary to quantify and monetize the impacts on these attributes are not
available.
7
The NRC documents its assumptions throughout this regulatory analysis. Appendix A to this
regulatory analysis summarizes the key quantitative assumptions and inputs.
4.2.1
Regulatory Baseline
This regulatory analysis provides the incremental impacts of the proposed rule relative to the
regulatory baseline that reflects anticipated behavior if the NRC does not undertake regulatory
action. The regulatory baseline assumes compliance with existing NRC requirements, including
current regulations and relevant orders, and the submission of exemption and alternative
measure request processes. Section 5 of this regulatory analysis presents the estimated costs
and benefits of the alternatives relative to this baseline.
4.2.2
Affected Entities
The NRC is aware of 13 planned advanced reactors that would be affected by the proposed
rule. The names, companies, technologies, locations, and other identifying information is
considered proprietary at this time and is not being provided. Currently, the NRC anticipates that
license applications for 11 of these 13 advanced reactors will be submitted between 2024 and
2027, which will be after the rule goes into effect in 2024. These 11 reactors are the drivers of
the averted exemption or alternative measures request processes in this regulatory analysis.
Due to uncertainty regarding how the other two applicants will act, the staff chose not to model
the remaining two applicants. The NRC considered the incremental impact of the proposed rule
for other entities, including Tribal, State, and local government organizations, but it does not
expect such entities to be affected.
4.2.3
Base Year
All monetized costs are expressed in 2021 dollars, and the analysis assumes publication of the
final rule in 2024. The analysis assumes that ongoing costs of operation related to the
alternative being analyzed will begin no earlier than 30 days after publication of the final rule in
the NRC’s regulations unless otherwise stated.
The NRC assumes that the agency will incur one-time implementation costs for the
development of the rule and supporting guidance documents unless otherwise noted. The NRC
has estimated recurring annual operating expenses. The values for annual operating expenses
are modeled as a constant expense for each year of the analysis horizon.
4.2.4
Discount Rates
In accordance with NUREG/BR-0058, net present value (NPV) calculations are used to
determine how much society would need to invest today to ensure that the designated dollar
amount is available in a given year in the future. By using NPVs, costs and benefits are valued
to a reference year for comparison regardless of when the cost or benefit is incurred in time.
The choice of a discount rate and its associated conceptual basis is a topic of ongoing
discussion within the Federal Government. Based on Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular No. A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” dated October 9, 2003 (OMB, 2003), and consistent
with NRC past practice and guidance, present-worth calculations in this analysis use 3-percent
and 7-percent real discount rates. A 3-percent discount rate approximates the real rate of return
on long-term Government debt, which serves as a proxy for the real rate of return on savings to
8
reflect reliance on a social rate of time preference discounting concept. 5 A 7-percent discount
rate approximates the marginal pretax real rate of return on an average investment in the
private sector and is the appropriate discount rate whenever the main effect of a regulation is to
displace or alter the use of capital in the private sector. A 7-percent rate is consistent with an
opportunity cost 6 of capital concept to reflect the time value of resources directed to meet
regulatory requirements.
4.2.5
Cost/Benefit Inflators
The NRC estimated the analysis inputs from sources as referenced in Appendix A, which are
provided in 2021 dollars.
The NRC estimated the analysis inputs using the CPI-U and labor rates reported by the BLS. To
evaluate the costs and benefits consistently, the NRC converted these inputs into base-year
(2021) dollars using the CPI-U, where appropriate. Using the CPI-U, the NRC converted
prior-year dollars to 2021 dollars using the following formula:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑈𝑈2021
𝑥𝑥 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉2021
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
Table 1 summarizes the values of CPI-U used in this regulatory analysis.
Table 1 CPI-U Inflator
a
4.2.6
Base Year
CPI-U Annual
Averagea
2020
258.81
2021
270.97
BLS, 2021a
Labor Rates
For the purposes of this regulatory analysis, the NRC developed labor rates that include only
labor and material costs that are directly related to the implementation and operation and
maintenance of the proposed rule requirements. This approach is consistent with the guidance
in NUREG/CR-3568, “A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment,” issued December 1983
(NRC, 1983), and general cost-benefit methodology. The current NRC labor rate for analyses is
$143 per hour.
The regulatory analysis used data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “SOC Code:
Standard Occupational Classification Code” (BLS, 2021b), which provides labor categories and
the mean hourly wage rate by job type. The labor rates used in the analysis reflect total hourly
5
The “social rate of time preference discounting concept” refers to the rate at which society is willing to
postpone a marginal unit of current consumption in exchange for more future consumption.
6
“Opportunity cost” represents what is foregone by undertaking a given action. If the applicant or licensee
personnel were not engaged in producing exemption requests, they would be engaged in other work
activities. Throughout the analysis, the NRC estimates the opportunity cost of performing these incremental
tasks as the industry personnel’s pay for the designated unit of time.
9
compensation, including wages and nonwage benefits (using a burden factor of 2.4, which is
applicable for contract labor and conservative for regular utility employees). The NRC used the
BLS data tables to select appropriate hourly labor rates for performing the estimated procedural,
licensing, and utility-related work necessary during and following implementation of the
proposed alternative, calculating a mean wage based on the average wage and the 25th and
75th percentile wages from BLS. This labor rate includes wages paid for the individuals
performing the work plus the associated fringe benefit component of labor cost (i.e., the time for
plant management over and above those directly expensed).
Table 2 summarizes the BLS labor categories the NRC used to estimate industry labor costs to
implement this proposed rule, and Appendix A lists the industry labor rates and other supporting
input data used in the analysis. This analysis assumes industry personnel, not contractors, will
perform the modeled activities. The NRC performed an uncertainty analysis, which is discussed
in Section 5.7.
Table 2 Position Titles and Occupations
Position Title (in This
Regulatory Analysis)
Executive
Managers
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC Code)
Top Executives (111000)
Management Occupations (110000)
Supervisors of Protective Service Workers (331000)
General and Operations Managers (111021)
First-Line Supervisors of Mechanics Installers and Repairers (491011)
First-Line Supervisors of Production and Operating Workers (511011)
Technical Staff
Nuclear Engineers (172161)
Nuclear Technicians (194051)
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers (492000)
Administrative Staff
Licensing Staff
Nuclear Power Reactor Operators (518011)
Office Clerks, General (439061)
Lawyers (231011)
Paralegals and Legal Assistants (232011)
Security Staff
Security Guards (339032)
Source: BLS Statistics (BLS, 2021b).
4.2.7
Sign Conventions
In this analysis, all favorable consequences for the alternative are positive and all adverse
consequences for the alternative are negative. Negative values are shown using parentheses
(e.g., negative $500 is displayed as ($500)).
4.2.8
Analysis Horizon
The NRC did not use an analysis horizon in this regulatory analysis because no operating costs
require an analysis horizon for the cost estimation. The NRC expects the submittal of
applications for 11 of the 13 advanced reactors in the 2024–2027 period, with three applications
in 2024, three applications in 2025, four applications in 2026, and one in 2027. These applicants
are the drivers for the 11 averted exemption or alternative measures request processes in the
cost model. This regulatory analysis does not model the applications that are expected before
the issuance of the final rule.
10
4.2.9
Cost Estimation
To estimate the costs associated with the evaluated alternatives, the NRC used an
engineering-buildup estimating method to deconstruct each requirement down to its mandated
activities. For each required activity, the NRC further subdivided the work across labor
categories (i.e., executives, managers, technical staff, administrative staff, and licensing staff).
The NRC estimated the level of effort for each required activity and used a blended labor rate to
develop bottom-up cost estimates.
The NRC gathered data from several sources and consulted members of the staff working
group that drafted the proposed rule to develop level of effort and unit cost estimates. The NRC
applied several cost estimation methods in this analysis. Additionally, the NRC used its
collective professional knowledge and judgment to estimate many of the costs and benefits. For
example, to calculate the costs for preparation of the final rule and accompanying regulatory
guidance, the NRC used data from past rulemaking efforts. To calculate the estimated averted
costs of exemption or alternative measures request processes, the NRC used data from
previous exemption request submittals to determine the labor categories of the staff who would
perform the work and to estimate the amount of time required under each category to complete
the work. If data were not available, the NRC used the level of effort method to estimate future
costs based on similar steps in the process for which data were available. Additionally, the NRC
used the expert-opinion method to fill data gaps when one or more experts were the only
available sources of information. The NRC accounted for a total of 11 advanced reactors in the
cost estimate, with the remaining two applicants expected to apply before the final rule is issued
excluded due to uncertainty in how they would act.
To evaluate the effect of uncertainty in the model, the NRC used a Monte Carlo simulation,
which is an approach to uncertainty analysis that expresses input variables as distributions.
Section 5.7 describes the Monte Carlo simulation methods in more detail and presents the
results.
4.3
Data
This analysis discusses the data and assumptions used in evaluating the quantifiable impacts
associated with the proposed alternative. The NRC has no ongoing review of license
applications or preapplication submittals of topical reports for advanced reactors related to
physical security, so the NRC does not have a specific example of a proposed alternative to or
exemption from the 10 CFR 73.55 requirements to base its estimates. As a substitute, the NRC
used input from subject-matter experts, knowledge gained from past rulemakings, and
information obtained during public meetings and from correspondence to collect data for this
analysis. Quantitative and qualitative information were obtained from the NRC and from
comments on the regulatory basis. The NRC considered the potential differences between the
new requirements and the current requirements and incorporated the proposed incremental
changes into this regulatory analysis.
5. Presentation of Results
This section presents the quantitative and qualitative results by attribute for Alternative 2,
relative to the regulatory baseline (Alternative 1). As described in the previous sections, costs
and benefits are quantified where possible and are shown to be either positive or negative
depending on whether the proposed alternative has a favorable or adverse effect relative to
11
Alternative 1. Those attributes that are not easily represented in monetary values are discussed
in qualitative terms. This “ex ante cost-benefit analysis” 7 provides useful information that the
NRC can use to decide whether to select an alternative, even if the analysis is based on
estimates of the future costs and benefits.
The potential benefits and costs of the alternatives are analyzed for (1) advanced reactor
applicants and licensees and (2) the NRC. The analyses in this section are based on the NRC’s
assessment and input from stakeholders.
This section presents the incremental benefits and costs that the NRC, applicants, and
licensees would incur from the rulemaking action. Incremental benefits and costs are calculated
values and impacts that are above the baseline condition. The baseline condition for this
rulemaking action includes the benefits and costs to comply with the current security regulation
in 10 CFR Part 73 and particularly 10 CFR 73.55 (as applicable), or an alternative approved by
the NRC through an exemption or 10 CFR 73.55(r) alternative measures request. Based on the
NRC’s assessment, the incremental benefits and costs for this rulemaking action include the
following:
•
incremental averted costs to reduce the need for certain applicants to request and the
NRC to review exemption or 10 CFR 73.55(r) alternative measures requests from
physical security regulations and develop the accompanying technical justification
•
incremental costs to the NRC to prepare and issue the final rule and associated
guidance documents
This cost estimate compares Alternative 1 (exemption or 10 CFR 73.55(r) alternative measures
requests associated with the current regulatory baseline) to Alternative 2 (rulemaking). Both
alternatives have considerable averted costs when compared to compliance with the current
physical security regulations because both alternatives allow licensees to provide a measure for
protection against radiological sabotage other than the one required, such as the reduction in
the number of onsite armed responders, and potentially impact the onsite secondary alarm
station.
Alternative 1 (regulatory baseline) allows applicants and licensees to request alternative security
measures through current regulations. The regulatory baseline would continue to require the
use of exemptions and alternative measures requests to realize some averted costs (such as
reduction to the minimum number of armed responders for interdiction/neutralization and
changes to a second alarm station on site, physical barriers, and vital areas). Alternative 2
(proposed limited-scope rule) identifies five current physical security requirements that could
play a diminished role in providing physical security for advanced reactors while at the same
time contributing significantly to capital and/or operating costs.
Of the five alternative physical security requirements proposed through this limited-scope
rulemaking, the greatest averted costs (savings) are related to the reduction in the number of
armed responders required to implement a licensee’s physical protection program. The NRC
estimated that advanced reactor applicants and licensees could reduce their staffing by 1 to 50
7
An “ex ante cost-benefit analysis” is prepared before the implementation of a policy, program, or alternative
and can assist in the decision about whether resources should be allocated to that alternative.
12
armed responders through the use of certain proposed alternative physical security
requirements. Assuming one full-time equivalent spends 1,510 hours per year, the NRC
determined the savings per advanced reactor to be approximately 22,000 hours per year or
approximately 15 full-time equivalents. Over the initial 40-year license term of an advanced
reactor under both Alternatives 1 and 2, this alternative security requirement is estimated to
result in net averted costs to industry that range from $203 million (7-percent NPV) to $377
million (3-percent NPV), based on the expected future applicants used in this analysis. The
other four alternative security measures also result in further savings, but when compared to the
magnitude of savings associated with the reduction in the number of armed responders, their
savings are not statistically significant. The NRC notes that because these savings are realized
under both alternatives, this analysis does not use these averted costs further, particularly not in
the net costs and benefits calculations.
The NRC expects that public comment and feedback on the proposed rule and related guidance
would allow further refinement of the benefits and costs described in this analysis.
5.1.
Industry Operation
Alternative 2 would provide eligible advanced reactor applicants and licensees an alternative to
certain of the current physical security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55. As mentioned above,
certain existing regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 that may not be appropriate for
advanced reactors result in significant costs to advanced reactor applicants and licensees that
may be averted through this rulemaking.
For example, the proposed physical security alternative requirements that could allow a licensee
to have fewer onsite armed responders and alter the onsite secondary alarm station represent
significant averted costs, which under the status quo applicants and licensees cannot attain
without NRC approval of either an alternative measures request under 10 CFR 73.55(r) or an
exemption request. In Alternative 2, these applicants and licensees would not incur the
incremental costs associated with the exemption request or the 10 CFR 73.55(r) process under
the current regulations. Costs that are averted are the costs of preparing the exemption
requests or the 10 CFR 73.55(r) requests and responding to the NRC’s requests for additional
information through multifaceted interactions, such as correspondence, teleconferences, and
meetings.
The data on future license applications are based on the NRC’s current knowledge of the
affected entities’ plans and the expected timing of the license applications. Table 3 shows these
averted costs, using the NRC forecasts for the timing and number of exemption or the
10 CFR 73.55(r) requests supplemented with proprietary information provided to the NRC. The
NRC estimates that each applicant would need on average of 345 person-hours to prepare and
submit one of the aforementioned requests, and that the weighted hourly labor rate for
personnel preparing these documents is $118 per hour. The NRC anticipates that 11 advanced
reactors would take advantage of these changes to the regulations, and therefore 11 requests
are averted in the cost estimate for the proposed rule. Table 3 shows that industry will see
averted costs of approximately $336,000 (7-percent NPV) and $395,000 (3-percent NPV).
Appendix A provides a detailed table showing all the input values that the NRC used in this
regulatory analysis.
13
Table 3 Industry Operation: Averted Costs for Exemption or Alternative Measures
Requests
Per Entity
Net Benefit (Cost)
Number of
Affected
Entities
Labor
Hours
Weighted Hourly
Rate
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
3
345
$118
$122,000
$100,000
$112,000
3
345
$118
$122,000
$93,000
$108,000
4
345
$118
$163,000
$116,000
$140,000
1
345
$118
$41,000
$27,000
$34,000
Total:
$448,000
Note: Values are in base year 2021 dollars, rounded to the nearest $10,000.
$336,000
$395,000
Year
Activity
2024
Exemption /
Alternative
Measures
Requests for
Physical Security
2025
2026
2027
The process for developing a physical security program involves the identification of target sets
and a determination of how to protect these target sets. Certain analyses are necessary to
complete these steps. The proposed rule requirements result in the reactor developer or
licensee performing a similar analysis to the status quo for the safety analysis that determines
the target sets (if applicable) and the security analysis that demonstrates how the target sets will
be protected under the proposed security posture. In addition, for any achievable target set that
is compromised by an adversary, a licensee or applicant would perform a consequence analysis
to demonstrate that the dose reference values in the eligibility criterion are not exceeded. The
NRC did not quantify this optional analysis because the NRC’s position is that a licensee or
applicant would only opt to perform the analysis if the business case indicated savings from the
proposed security alternatives exceeded the cost of the analysis.
5.2.
Total Industry Costs
The rulemaking alternative (Alternative 2) results in estimated net averted costs to industry that
range from $340,000 using a 7-percent NPV to $390,000 using a 3-percent NPV, when
compared to Alternative 1, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4 Total Industry Costs
Net Benefits (Costs)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
Industry Implementation Totals:
$0
$0
$0
Industry Operation Totals:
$450,000
$340,000
$390,000
Industry Net:
$450,000
$340,000
$390,000
Attribute
Note: Values are in 2021 dollars, rounded to the nearest $1,000.
5.3.
NRC Implementation
The NRC’s development and implementation of physical security regulations for advanced
reactors through a final rulemaking stage would result in incremental costs to the NRC. After
publishing the proposed rule, the NRC would incur costs associated with public comment
resolution, preparation of the final rule, finalizing the regulatory guidance document, and
preparing other supporting documentation for the rulemaking (e.g., the Federal Register notice).
NRC costs to develop the regulatory basis, proposed rule, and draft guidance are sunk costs
that are not taken into consideration for decision making and therefore are not included.
14
Table 5 estimates the costs for each action at a labor rate of $143 per hour. There will be some
costs incurred in 2024, the year the final rule is expected to be issued, but for simplicity this
table shows all costs are incurred in 2023.
Table 5 NRC Implementation: Rulemaking Costs
Net Benefits (Costs)
Number of
Actions
Hours
Weighted
Hourly
Rate
Undiscounted
2023 Finalize/Issue Regulatory Guide
1
805
$143
($115,000)
($101,000) ($109,000)
2023 Develop/Issue Final Rule
1
2,875
$143
($411,000)
($359,000) ($388,000)
($526,000)
($460,000) ($496,000)
Year
Activity
Total:
Note: Values are in 2021 dollars, rounded to the nearest $10,000.
5.4.
7% NPV
3% NPV
NRC Operation
The NRC will realize averted costs (benefit) from the expected 11 exemption requests that
industry will not submit (under Alternative 2 when compared to Alternative 1) and, therefore, the
NRC will not review. Table 6 shows these averted costs, assuming 173 hours of effort for each
request, and a labor rate of $143 per hour.
Table 6 NRC Operation: Exemption Request Reviews
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
173
Weighted
Hourly
Rate
$143
$74,000
$60,000
$68,000
173
$143
$74,000
$56,456
$66,000
4
173
$143
$99,000
$70,350
$85,000
1
173
$143
$25,000
$16,437
$21,000
$271,000
$204,000
$239,000
Number of
Hours
Requests
Year
Activity
2024
Review exemption request
3
2025
Review exemption request
3
2026
Review exemption request
2027
Review exemption request
Total:
Net Benefits (Costs)
Note: Values are in 2021 dollars, rounded to the nearest $10,000.
5.5.
Safeguards and Security Considerations
This attribute accounts for whether the existing level of safeguards and security is adequate and
what effects the proposed action has on achieving an adequate level of security. The NRC
reviewed the technical approach of the regulatory baseline and the risk informed framework
provided in Alternative 2 that could be used to reduce the number of onsite armed responders,
allow reliance on law enforcement or offsite armed responders to fulfill interdiction and
neutralization functions if there are no armed response personnel onsite, use means other than
physical barriers to accomplish delay and access control functions, and change the location and
designation of the secondary alarm station to achieve a level of security commensurate with the
risks associated with advanced reactor designs that meet the proposed rule’s eligibility criterion.
The staff concludes that Alternative 2 provides an equivalent level of security to what could be
achieved by the use of exemptions and requests for alternative measures under the regulatory
baseline. The key difference is that the proposed rule and associated guidance will provide
eligible advanced reactor applicants and licensees with a clear and defined set of alternative
physical security requirements they can elect to implement. The NRC’s proposed framework to
allow an applicant or a licensee to elect to use one or more of the alternative physical security
requirements is based on the NRC’s determination that these alternative requirements will
15
provide a level of protection equivalent to the current security requirements they replace. The
NRC has concluded that the alternative requirements in the proposed rule will continue to
provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health
and safety.
5.6.
Total NRC Costs
Combined, these costs and averted costs show estimated net costs to the NRC as a result of
this rulemaking of ($260,000) using a 7-percent NPV and a 3-percent NPV, as shown in Table
7.
Table 7 Total NRC Costs
Attribute
NRC Implementation Total
NRC Operation Total
NRC Net
NRC Net Benefits (Costs)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
($530,000)
($460,000)
($500,000)
$270,000
$200,000
$240,000
($250,000)
($260,000)
($260,000)
Note: Values are in base year 2021 dollars, rounded to the nearest $10,000.
5.7.
Total Costs
Relative to Alternative 1, the NRC concludes that the averted incremental costs to the
applicants and licensees do not justify the incremental costs for this rulemaking action
(Alternative 2), based on the quantitative cost estimate. Table 8 shows a net averted cost for the
quantitative factors discussed above.
Table 8 Total Net Benefits (Costs)
Total Net Benefits (Costs)
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
Industry Implementation
$0
$0
$0
Industry Operation
$450,000
$340,000
$390,000
Industry Total
$450,000
$340,000
$390,000
NRC Implementation
($530,000)
($460,000)
($500,000)
NRC Operation
$270,000
$200,000
$240,000
NRC Total
($250,000)
($260,000)
($260,000)
Total Net
$190,000
$80,000
$140,000
Attribute
Note: There may be small differences between tables and in totals as a result of rounding.
The net averted costs to industry and the NRC if the rulemaking alternative is pursued range
from $80,000 using a 7-percent NPV to $140,000 using a 3-percent NPV, with costs due to
rulemaking. The rulemaking alternative would apply to any future advanced reactor applicants
and licensees and would result in averted costs for reductions in exemption requests.
5.8.
Uncertainty Analysis
16
The NRC completed a Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis for this regulatory analysis. The Monte
Carlo approach answers the question, “What distribution of net benefits and costs results from
multiple draws of the probability distribution assigned to key variables?”
5.8.1.
Uncertainty Analysis Assumptions
Because this regulatory analysis is based on estimates of values that are sensitive to
plant-specific cost drivers and plant dissimilarities, the NRC provides the following analysis of
the variables that have the greatest amount of uncertainty. To perform this analysis, the NRC
conducted a Monte Carlo simulation analysis using the @Risk software program. 8
Monte Carlo simulations involve introducing uncertainty into the analysis by replacing the point
estimates of the variables used to estimate base case costs and benefits with probability
distributions. By defining input variables as probability distributions instead of point estimates,
the influence of uncertainty on the results of the analysis (i.e., the net benefits) can be modeled
effectively.
The probability distributions chosen to represent the different variables in the analysis were
bounded by the range-referenced input and the NRC’s professional judgment. When defining
the probability distributions for use in a Monte Carlo simulation, summary statistics are needed
to characterize the distributions. These summary statistics include the (1) minimum, most likely,
and maximum values of a program evaluation and review technique (PERT) distribution, 9 (2) the
minimum and maximum values of a uniform distribution, and (3) the specified integer values of a
discrete population. The NRC used the PERT distribution to reflect the relative spread and
skewness of the distribution defined by the three estimates.
Table 9 identifies the data elements, the distribution and summary statistic, and the mean value
of the distribution that were used in the uncertainty analysis.
Table 9 Uncertainty Analysis
Data Element
Mean
Estimate
Distribution
Low
Estimate
Best
Estimate
High
Estimate
PERT
PERT
$95
270
$119
300
$138
600
PERT
135
150
250
Licensee Submittal of Exemption Request
Hourly rate
$118
Hours to generate and submit
345
Review Exemption Request (NRC)
NRC Hourly rate
$143
Hours to review
173
Final Rule Stage
Finalize/Issue Regulatory Guide (NRC)
8
Information about the @Risk software is available at https://www.palisade.com.
9
A PERT distribution is a special form of the beta distribution with specified minimum and maximum values.
The shape parameter is calculated from the defined “most likely” value. The PERT distribution is similar to a
triangular distribution in that it has the same set of three parameters. Technically, it is a special case of a
scaled beta (or beta general) distribution. The PERT distribution is generally considered superior to the
triangular distribution when the parameters result in a skewed distribution because the smooth shape of the
curve places less emphasis in the direction of skew. Similar to the triangular distribution, the PERT
distribution is bounded on both sides and, therefore, may not be adequate for some modeling purposes if
the capture of the tails or extreme events is desired.
17
Data Element
Hours to finalize
Develop/Issue Final Rule (NRC)
Hours to finalize
5.8.2.
Mean
Estimate
805
Distribution
PERT
Low
Estimate
630
Best
Estimate
700
High
Estimate
1,400
2,875
PERT
2,250
2,500
5,000
Uncertainty Analysis Results
The NRC performed the Monte Carlo simulation by recalculating the results 10,000 times. For
each iteration, the cost model chose the values identified in Table 9 randomly from the
probability distributions that define the input variables. The model recorded the values of the
output variables for each iteration and used these resulting output variable values to define the
resultant probability distribution, in terms of costs and benefits.
For each figure below, the NRC ran Monte Carlo simulations in which the key variables were
changed to assess the resulting effect on costs. The cost distributions illustrated in Figures 1
through 3 represent the incremental costs from the regulatory baseline of Alternative 1
(no-action alternative).
261.28
442.53
5.0%
90.0%
5.0%
Total Industry Cost - 7%
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std Dev
5%
95%
200
\
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
Values in Thousands ($)
Figure 1 Total Industry Costs (7-Percent NPV)—Alternative 2
18
$222,334
$593,852
$336,063
$56,017
$261,283
$442,529
-372.09
-159.96
5.0%
90.0%
5.0%
Total NRC Cost - 7%
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std Dev
5%
95%
-550
-500
-450
-400
-350
-300
Values in Thousands ($)
-250
-200
-150
-100
-$518,036
-$56,327
-$255,986
$64,316
-$372,088
-$159,957
-50
Figure 2 Total NRC Costs (7-Percent NPV)—Alternative 2
0
16.9%
222
78.1%
5.0%
Total Cost - 7%
Minimum-$227,658
Maximum
$397,384
Mean
$80,077
Std Dev
$85,405
5%
-$61,153
95%
$221,512
-300
-200
-100
0
100
Values in Thousands ($)
200
300
400
500
Figure 3 Total Costs (7-percent NPV)—Alternative 2
19
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics on the uncertainty analysis. Table 10 reflects the
5-percent and 95-percent values (below or above which 5 percent of the analysis results fall,
respectively) that appear as numerical values on the top of the vertical lines in Figures 1 and 2
as the 0.05 and 0.95 values, respectively.
Table 10 Uncertainty Results Descriptive Statistics—7-Percent NPV
Uncertainty
Result
Total Industry Cost
Total NRC Cost
Total Cost
Minimum
$0.22
($0.52)
($0.23)
Incremental Cost Benefit (2021 million dollars)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Maximum
5%
$0.34
$0.06
$0.59
$0.26
($0.26)
$0.06
($0.06)
($0.37)
$0.08
$0.09
$0.40
($0.06)
95%
$0.44
($0.16)
$0.22
Note: There may be small differences between tables as a result of rounding.
Examining the range of the resulting output distribution provided in Table 10 makes it possible
to discuss the potential incremental costs and benefits of the regulatory basis more confidently.
Figure 4 shows a tornado diagram that identifies the key variables whose uncertainty has the
largest impact on total costs (and averted costs) for this proposed rule. This figure ranks the
variables based on their contribution to cost uncertainty. Two variables—(1) the hours for the
NRC to develop and issue the final rule and (2) the hours for industry to prepare and submit
exemption requests—drive the most uncertainty in the costs. The remaining key variables show
diminishing variation.
s to develop/issue final rule
-$32,664
$146,601
stry Exemption Request hours
$16,282
review exemption request
$186,426
$38,267
for exemption requests
$40,205
Regulatory Guide Hours
$144,941
Input High
Input Low
$118,563
$47,125
$98,552
Baseline = $80,077
-$50,000
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
Figure 4 Tornado Diagram—Total Averted Costs—7-percent NPV
The net averted cost for industry and the NRC for this proposed rule has a mean value of
$80,000 at a 7-percent discount rate (totals differ in the analysis due to rounding). Figure 3
shows an 83.1-percent likelihood that the rule will be cost beneficial.
20
5.9.
Disaggregation
To comply with the guidance in NUREG/BR-0058, Section 4.3.2, “Criteria for the Treatment of
Individual Requirements,” the NRC performed a screening review to determine whether any
elements of the proposed rule would be unnecessary to achieve the objectives of the
rulemaking. The objective of this regulatory action is to enhance predictability in the regulatory
framework for advanced reactor applicants and licensees and the NRC by enacting an
alternative physical security framework that has flexible options for implementing physical
security aspects, such as the number of onsite armed responders and the need for a second
onsite alarm station, while continuing to provide adequate protection of public health and safety.
Specifically, the NRC’s objective for this rule is to create alternative physical security
requirements that will (1) enhance regulatory effectiveness by providing greater stability,
predictability, and clarity in the licensing process for implementing physical security for
advanced reactors; (2) reduce requests for exemptions from certain physical security
requirements; (3) consider technological advancements in reactor designs and their associated
design features impacting the possible loss of safety functions from malicious acts and any
resulting consequences; and (4) provide alternatives for meeting certain physical security
requirements under § 73.55 commensurate with the potentially lower risks posed by advanced
reactors.
If the proposed rule did not include any of these alternative requirements, the NRC expects
advanced reactor applicants would still seek exemptions from certain existing physical security
requirements in 10 CFR 73.55. Therefore, the NRC concludes that all elements of the proposed
rule would be necessary to achieve the objective of the rulemaking.
5.10.
Summary
This regulatory analysis identified both quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs and benefits that
would result from conducting rulemaking to address physical security requirements for
advanced reactors. Although quantifiable costs and benefits appear to be more tangible, the
NRC urges decisionmakers not to discount costs and benefits that are unquantifiable. Such
benefits or costs can be just as important as, or even more important than, benefits or costs that
can be quantified and monetized.
5.10.1.
Quantified Net Benefit
As shown in Table 8, the estimated incremental net benefit for Alternative 2 relative to the
regulatory baseline (Alternative 1) range from approximately $80,000 using a 7-percent NPV to
$140,000 using a 3-percent NPV.
5.10.2.
Qualitative Benefits
In addition to the quantified net benefits, the following attributes would produce qualitative
benefits for industry and the NRC, as summarized below.
5.10.2.1.
Regulatory Certainty
A rule would establish a performance-based regulatory framework that would result in greater
regulatory predictability in the licensing process by decreasing reliance on exemption requests.
Addressing new security policy and technical issues that are broadly applicable to advanced
reactors through exemptions, alternative measures, or license conditions would not be efficient
21
or predictable. Relying on these processes would result in the NRC making important security
decisions without the benefit of hearing the views of interested stakeholders. Therefore,
rulemaking is the preferred alternative because it provides stability by establishing an alternative
physical security framework rather than allowing the regulatory approach to vary from
application to application.
The NRC attempts to avoid regulating by exemption when an issue can be addressed through
generic actions such as rulemaking. The estimated benefits of the proposed rulemaking action
include fewer exemption requests as compared to those under current regulations, and the
availability of a more flexible, risk-informed, and performance-based physical security
framework. This proposed rulemaking framework (1) enhances regulatory effectiveness by
providing greater stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process for advanced
reactors; 2) considers technological advancements in reactor designs and their associated
design features; and 3) provides alternatives for meeting physical security requirements
commensurate with the potentially lower risks posed by advanced reactors.
Absent a change to existing regulations, advanced reactor technologies will be subject to the
existing physical security requirements delineated in 10 CFR 73.55, which would impose
unnecessary regulatory costs on applicants and licensees that are not commensurate with the
potentially lower risks posed by advanced reactors.
5.10.2.2.
Increased Public Confidence
In addition to regulatory certainty, modifying the security requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 to
address the unique technological features and security needs of advanced reactor designs,
rather than relying on the exemption process, would increase public confidence in the NRC’s
ability to adapt to new technology and new regulatory needs, provide opportunities for
stakeholders to comment on novel approaches to achieve physical security requirements, and
maintain the NRC’s role as an effective industry regulator. Public notice and comment during
rulemaking provides the widest range of viewpoints for Commission consideration in the
development of the final rule.
5.10.2.3.
Consistency with Advanced Reactor Policy Statement
Promulgating new physical security regulations that are aligned with the potentially lower risk
profiles of advanced reactor technologies supports the objective discussed in the Commission’s
“Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors” (73 FR 60612, October 14, 2008).
The proposed rule would encourage reactor designers to incorporate safety and security
requirements in the design process such that security issues can be effectively resolved through
facility design and engineered security features, and the formulation of mitigation measures,
with reduced reliance on human actions. Without rulemaking, advanced reactor developers and
potential licensees would need to address regulatory uncertainties of resolving these matters on
a case-by-case basis. These uncertainties complicate the ability of reactor developers and
potential licensees to make design and business decisions. Case-by-case decision making
through exemptions, alternative measures, or license conditions may not support the goals
described in the Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors.
5.10.3.
Qualitative Costs
22
The following attributes would produce qualitative costs for industry and the NRC, as
summarized below.
5.10.3.1.
Lack of a Broadly Focused Rule
Neither of the analyzed regulatory analysis alternatives defines a broad-scope rulemaking to
assess and define physical security requirements for advanced reactor designs. Such an
approach would likely require a performance-based approach defined in terms of different
design features, including inherent design characteristics. Also, such an approach would better
integrate performance-based requirements and incorporate the best available knowledge of
security considerations into the reactor design process and could further reduce licensee
submittal and NRC review costs. In the meantime, this proposed rule was developed to support
current reactor developers making critical design decisions.
5.10.3.2.
Impact of Potentially Nonvalid Analysis Assumptions
The NRC used three key assumptions in this regulatory analysis that might impact the cost
beneficial nature of the proposed rule if not valid. The first assumption is that a similar analysis
and supporting work would be required under the regulatory baseline to support the security
alternatives for an advanced reactor applicant as the consequence analysis in the proposed
rule. If this first assumption is not valid, the proposed rule would not be cost beneficial, because
the consequence analysis would be a considerable additional cost not quantified in this
regulatory analysis. The second assumption is that the same level of averted security
requirements (number of armed responders, second alarm station, etc.) can be achieved under
the regulatory baseline using the exemption and alternative measures request processes in the
existing regulatory requirements as under the proposed rule language. If this second
assumption is not valid, the likely difference is that a more cost beneficial security posture can
be achieved under the proposed rule, making the proposed rule more cost beneficial. And the
third assumption is that an applicant would only seek to use the consequence analysis to
achieve a reduction in prescriptive security requirements if it would be cost beneficial to the
applicant, which would make the rule less cost beneficial if not valid.
5.11.
Safety Goal Evaluation
The proposed rule alternative would allow advanced reactor designers, licensees, and
applicants to apply for licenses without including exemption requests to implement alternative
physical security requirements. The NRC’s safety goal evaluation only applies to regulatory
initiatives that the agency considers to be a generic safety enhancement backfit subject to the
substantial additional protection standard at 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3). This proposed rule for
advanced reactors would not constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of an approval
issued under 10 CFR Part 52 because the rule would not be imposed upon applicants and
licensees and would not prohibit applicants and licensees from following existing requirements.
For these reasons, a safety goal evaluation is not appropriate for this regulatory analysis.
6. Decision Rationale
Table 11 provides the quantified and qualified costs and benefits for Alternative 2. The
quantitative analysis used best estimate values.
23
Table 11 Summary of Totals
Net Monetary Savings or (Costs)—
Total Present Value
Alternative 1: No Action—$0
Alternative 2: Conduct rulemaking to
provide alternative physical security
requirements for advanced reactors
Industry:
$340,000 using a 7% discount rate
$390,000 using a 3% discount rate
NRC:
$250,000 at all discount rates
Net Benefit (Cost):
$80,000 using a 7% discount rate
$140,000 using a 3% discount rate
Qualitative Benefits or (Costs)
None
Benefits:
• Regulatory Certainty: By providing
alternative physical security requirements
for advanced reactors through rulemaking
instead of through the exemption process,
the NRC will establish a
performance-based regulatory framework
that would result in greater regulatory
stability, predictability, and clarity in the
licensing process.
•
Increased Public Confidence: In
addition to regulatory certainty,
addressing the potential differences
between advanced reactors and large
LWRs through rulemaking instead of the
exemption request or alternative
measures processes will increase public
confidence in the NRC’s ability to adapt to
new technology and new regulatory
needs, provide opportunities for
stakeholder input into the alternative
physical security requirements, and
maintain the NRC’s role as an effective
regulator.
•
Consistency with Advanced Reactor
Policy Statement: The rule would
encourage reactor designers to
incorporate safety and security
requirements in the design process such
that security issues can be effectively
resolved through facility design and
engineered security features, and
formulation of mitigation measures.
Costs
• Lack of a Broadly Focused Rule:
Neither regulatory analysis alternative
defines comprehensive physical security
requirements for the variety of advanced
reactor designs that would likely require a
performance-based approach. This
proposed rule was developed to support
current reactor developers making critical
24
Net Monetary Savings or (Costs)—
Total Present Value
Qualitative Benefits or (Costs)
•
design decisions while the NRC works on
a broader rule for advanced reactors.
Impact of Potentially Nonvalid Analysis
Assumptions: The NRC made three
assumptions that if not valid could impact
the cost beneficial conclusions for this
rule.
Industry and the NRC would benefit from the proposed rulemaking (Alternative 2) primarily
because of the averted costs resulting from applicants and licensees submitting fewer
exemption requests, and the averted costs resulting from the NRC reviewing and processing
fewer exemption requests. Table 11 shows that, relative to the regulatory baseline, Alternative 2
would result in net averted costs to industry that range from $340,000 using a 7-percent NPV to
$390,000 using a 3-percent NPV. The NRC’s net costs are approximately $260,000 at all
discount rates. Thus, the total quantitative net averted cost of the rulemaking ranges from
$80,000 using a 7-percent NPV to $140,000 using a 3-percent NPV.
In addition, Alternative 2 has several qualitative benefits that outweigh the identified qualitative
costs and further support Alternative 2.
Based on the consideration of both quantified and qualitative costs and benefits, the regulatory
analysis shows that the rulemaking is cost justified. In addition, industry has indicated a desire
for a performance-based rule to allow alternative security measures, and the qualitative benefits
outweighing the qualitative costs further justify the value of the rulemaking alternative’s
approach.
7. Implementation Schedule
The NRC assumes that the final rule would become effective 30 days after its publication in the
Federal Register in 2024.
8. References
10 CFR Part 50. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities,” Part 50, Chapter I, Title 10, “Energy.”
10 CFR Part 52. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for
Nuclear Power Plants,” Part 52, Chapter I, Title 10, “Energy.”
10 CFR Part 73. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials,” Part 73, Chapter I, Title 10, “Energy.”
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “Historical CPI-U, December 2021” U.S. Department of Labor,
April 2021a. Available at https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplemental-files/home.htm, last
accessed on January 22, 2021.
BLS, “May 2020 National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates,
NAICS 221113—Nuclear Electric Power Generation,” U.S. Department of Labor, May 2021b.
25
Available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/2020/may/naics5_221113.htm; last accessed on
August 9, 2021.
Office of Management and Budget, “Regulatory Analysis,” Circular A-4, October 9, 2003.
Available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2003/10/09/03-25606/circular-a-4regulatory-analysis.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “A Handbook for Value-Impact Assessment,”
NUREG/CR-3568 (PNL-4646), December 1983, ADAMS Accession No. ML062830096.
NRC, “Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors,” Final Policy Statement,
73 FR 60612, October 14, 2008.
NRC, “Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors,” Regulatory
Guide 5.81, November 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML102720056 (nonpublic).
NRC, “Rulemaking Plan on Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and Other
New Technologies,” SECY160069, May 31, 2016a, ADAMS Accession No. ML16020A388.
NRC, “NRC Vision and Strategy: Safely Achieving Effective and Efficient Non-Light Water
Reactor Mission Readiness,” December 2016b, ADAMS Accession No. ML16356A670.
NRC, “Options and Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,”
SECY-18-0076, August 1, 2018a, ADAMS Package Accession No. ML18170A051.
NRC, “Staff Requirements—SECY-18-0076—Options and Recommendation for Physical
Security for Advanced Reactors,” SRM-SECY-18-0076, November 19, 2018b, ADAMS
Accession No. ML18324A478.
NRC, NUREG/BR-0058, draft final Revision 5, “Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” January 2020, ADAMS Package Accession
No. ML19261A277.
NRC, Draft Regulatory Guide (DG)-5071, “Target Set Identification and Development for
Nuclear Power Reactors,” April 2022, ADAMS Accession No. ML22021B529 (nonpublic).
NRC, Draft Regulatory Guide (DG)-5072, “Guidance for Alternative Physical Security
Requirements for Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water-Reactors,” July 2024, ADAMS
Accession No. ML20041E037.
26
APPENDIX A—MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS AND INPUT DATA
Data Element
Best
Estimate
Unit
2024
2021
year
year
NRC input
NRC input
11
units
Assumption by the NRC, based on proprietary information from
industry
Labor Rates
Technical staff
Managers
Administrative staff
Licensing staff
Security guards
Contractors
$126
$142
$59
$141
$64
$217
Dollars per hour
Dollars per hour
Dollars per hour
Dollars per hour
Dollars per hour
Dollars per hour
NRC staff
$143
Dollars per hour
Using labor rates from the “SOC Code: Standard Occupational
Classification Code” data set (BLS, 2021b), with application of a
multiplier of 2.4, which included fringe and indirect management
costs, and application of the consumer price index for all urban
consumers for 2021 (BLS, 2021a), and inflated using the CPI-U
calculation in this regulatory analysis, resulting in the displayed
labor rates; some of these labor rates are aggregates of multiple
standard occupational classification codes.
NRC calculation
Key Analysis Dates
Final rule effective date
Analysis base year
Number of Entities
Number of small modular reactor
and nonlight-water reactors
Source or Basis of Estimate
A-1
SUBJECT: REGULATORY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED RULE: ALTERNATIVE
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVANCED REACTORS (RIN
3150-AK19) DATED:JULY 2024
ADAMS Accession Nos.: PKG: ML21334A003; SECY: ML21334A004; Draft Regulatory Analysis:
ML21334A007
*concurred via e-mail
OFFICE
NAME
DATE
OFFICE
NAME
DATE
NMSS/REFS/RASB
ASanders
2/1/22
NSIR/D
MGavrilas
3/31/22
QTE*
NMSS/REFS/RASB/RAT
JDougherty
FSchofer
12/13/21
3/23/22
NMSS/REFS/RASB/BC
OGC
CBladey
NSt. Amour
4/25/22
5/27/22
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
NMSS/REFS/RRPB/BC
IBerrios
3/22/22
NRR/D
AVeil (RTaylor for)
6/9/22
NMSS/REFS/D
JTappert
3/22/22
| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Title | Regulatory Analysis for the Alternate Physical Security Requirments for Advanced Reactors Proposed Rule |
| Author | Sanders, Aaron |
| File Modified | 2024-08-09 |
| File Created | 2024-08-08 |