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pdfRegulatory Analysis for Enhanced Weapons,
Firearms Background Checks, and Security
Event Notifications Final Rule
10 CFR Parts 20, 21, 26, 50, 70, 72, 73, 74, and 76
NRC-2011-0014; NRC-2011-0015; NRC-2011-0017; NRC-2011-0018;
RIN 3150-AI49
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
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Contents
List of Tables................................................................................................................................ iv
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... v
Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... vi
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... vii
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. Background .................................................................................................................... 1
1.2. Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................. 2
1.3. Objective ........................................................................................................................ 3
2. Identification and Analysis of Alternative Approaches ............................................................ 3
2.1. Alternative 1: No Action to Implement Section 161A Authority by Rulemaking............. 4
2.2. Alternative 2: Issue the Final Rule................................................................................. 5
3. Identification of Affected Attributes and Analytical Method ..................................................... 7
3.1. Identification of Affected Attributes ................................................................................. 8
3.2. Analytical Method ......................................................................................................... 11
4. Evaluation of Benefits and Costs .......................................................................................... 33
4.1. Benefits and Costs of the Final Rule ............................................................................ 33
4.2. Uncertainty Analysis ..................................................................................................... 35
4.3. Disaggregation ............................................................................................................. 46
5. Decision Rationale for Selection of the Proposed Action ...................................................... 46
6. Implementation...................................................................................................................... 47
7. References ............................................................................................................................ 47
Appendix A – NRC Regulated Sites Affected by the Enhanced Weapons Final Rule .............. A-1
Appendix B – Uncertainty Analysis Variables ........................................................................... B-1
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List of Tables
Table 1 Regulated Entities that May Apply for Section 161A Authority .................................... 15
Table 2a Regulated Entities Affected by the Physical Security Event Notifications .................. 16
Table 2b Regulated Entities Affected by the Physical Security Event Recordkeeping ……….. 16
Table 2c Regulated Entities Affected by the Suspicious Activity Reporting .............................. 17
Table 3 Regulated Entities Affected by the Final Rule .............................................................. 19
Table 4 Industry Implementation Costs by Cost Category per Site .......................................... 25
Table 5 Industry Implementation Costs for Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition
Activities ................................................................................................................. 26
Table 6 Estimated NRC Implementation Costs by Cost Category per Site .............................. 27
Table 7 NRC Implementation Costs for Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities
............................................................................................................................... 27
Table 8 Industry Operations Recurring Costs by Cost Category and Type of Site for Section
161A Authority ........................................................................................................ 29
Table 9 Industry Operation Costs on a Per Site Basis for Representive Sites that May Elect
Section 161A Authority ........................................................................................... 30
Table 10 Industry Operation Costs for Physical Security Event Notifications ........................... 31
Table 11 Industry Operation Costs for Suspicious Activity Reporting ....................................... 32
Table 12 NRC Operation Costs as a Result of the Final Rule .................................................. 33
Table 13 Summary of Overall Benefits and Costs (Quantitative and Qualitative) .................... 34
Table A-1 NRC Regulated Sites Affected by the Enhanced Weapons Final Rule................ A-3
Table B-1 Uncertainty Analysis Variables ............................................................................. B-3
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Industry Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate) ..................................................................................................................... 37
Figure 2 NRC Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate) ..................................................................................................................... 37
Figure 3 Total Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate) ..................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 4 Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Cost Drivers ......................... 38
Figure 5
Industry Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate).. 39
Figure 6 NRC Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)........ 40
Figure 7 Total Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate) ....... 40
Figure 8 Physical Security Event Notification Cost Drivers ....................................................... 41
Figure 9 Industry Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)............. 42
Figure 10 NRC Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)................ 42
Figure 11 Total Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate) ............... 43
Figure 12
Suspicious Activity Reporting Cost Drivers .............................................................. 43
Figure 13 Final Rule Implementation Costs (7% Discount Rate) .............................................. 44
Figure 14 Final Rule Operations Costs (7% Discount Rate) ..................................................... 45
Figure 15 Final Rule Total Costs (7% Discount Rate) .............................................................. 45
Figure 16 Final Rule Cost Drivers ............................................................................................. 46
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ADAMS
AEA
AG
ATF
Agencywide Documents Access Management System
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
U.S. Attorney General
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
B&W
Babcock and Wilcox
CFR
COL
Code of Federal Regulations
combined license
FAA
FBI
FR
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Register
ISFSI
independent spent fuel storage installation
LLEA
local law enforcement agency
NICS
NRC
NUREG
National Instant Criminal Background Check System
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC technical report designation
PERT
program evaluation and review technique
RG
regulatory guide
SNF
SRM
SSNM
spent nuclear fuel
staff requirements memorandum
strategic special nuclear material
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Executive Summary
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) is amending its security
regulations to implement the Commission’s authority under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), to modify existing requirements for licensee physical security
event notifications, and to add new requirements for licensees to report suspicious activities.
Collectively, this rule is referred to as the “enhanced weapons rulemaking” (Ref. 1) and was
proposed on February 3, 2011 in the Federal Register (FR) (76 FR 6200, Ref. 2).
The first part of the rule would provide a process for NRC licensed entities to apply for
Section 161A authority, including stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority. Stand-alone preemption authority allows regulated
entities to possess and use weapons that would otherwise be prohibited by State, local, and
certain Federal firearms laws. Combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority allows a regulated entity to possess and use a certain category of weapon called an
“enhanced weapon.” All regulated entities that receive Section 161A authority would be required
to conduct firearms background checks, conduct training on the firearms background check
program, and conduct annual enhanced weapons inventories, if such weapons are approved.
The second part of the rule would reorganize existing physical security event notification
requirements into four categories of events based on the security significance of the event
(e.g., 15 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours). In addition, the rule would add two new
categories of physical security events, actual or imminent hostile actions and lost or stolen
enhanced weapons, for which NRC notification would be required.
The third part of the rule would add new requirements to report suspicious activities to local law
enforcement agencies (LLEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the NRC, and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (for suspicious activities involving aircraft). These
regulations would require licensees to provide information to the NRC and to law enforcement
agencies to potentially disrupt or dissuade terrorist attacks and permit the NRC to assess
threats against regulated entities.
Benefits and Costs
The benefits and costs of the final rule are presented relative to the status quo regulatory
baseline and represent the change in benefits and costs relative to the current regulations. The
key findings of the analysis are as follows:
•
1
Total Cost to Industry. The final rule is expected to result in a one-time implementation
cost of approximately ($2.55 million)1 using a 7-percent discount rate and ($2.63 million)
using a 3-percent discount rate. This includes costs for eight licensees at seven sites
covered under confirmatory orders (implementing stand-alone preemption authority
under Section 161A of the AEA) to transition to comply with the final rule requirements
(i.e., to read the final rule and guidance so as to understand how the final rule
requirements compare to the confirmatory orders, to review associated procedures and
plans, and to revise the procedures and plans, as necessary). This also includes costs
The sign convention used in this analysis is that all favorable consequences for the alternative are positive and all
adverse consequences for the alternative are negative. Negative values are shown using parentheses
(e.g., negative $500 is displayed as ($500)).
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for industry to implement the parts of the rule concerning physical security event
notifications and suspicious activity reporting.
The final rule is expected to result in an operation cost to industry of approximately
($133,000) using a 7-percent discount rate and approximately ($199,000) using a 3percent discount rate. These operation costs consist of future physical security event
notifications and suspicious activity reporting costs. The total net present value of these
costs is approximately ($2.68 million) using a 7-percent discount rate and approximately
($2.83 million) using a 3-percent discount rate.
The application for either stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority under Section 161A of the AEA is voluntary.
Therefore, a licensee incurring the costs from the Section 161A rule provisions is
conditioned on the licensee voluntarily electing and applying for either Section 161A
authority. The NRC has not been notified by any NRC licensees of plans to apply for
Section 161A authority beyond those covered under the confirmatory order. Therefore,
the NRC assumed that no eligible entity beyond those who are covered by existing
confirmatory orders will apply for stand-alone preemption authority or combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
•
Total Cost to the NRC. The final rule is expected to result in a total one-time cost of
($11,000) to the NRC to document the withdrawal of the confirmatory orders issued to
the eight licensees at seven sites granted stand-alone preemption authority. The NRC
total operation cost for both the physical security event notification and suspicious
activity reporting provisions will range between ($157,000) using a 7-percent discount
rate and ($235,000) using a 3-percent discount rate.
•
Benefits. The final rule implements the Commission’s stand-alone preemption authority
and its combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority under
Section 161A of the AEA. The final rule provides a cost-effective path to transition eight
licensees at seven sites receiving stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory
orders to the requirements under the final rule. The final rule also modifies mandatory
physical security event notification requirements and adds suspicious activity reporting
requirements; these provisions apply to all licensees subject to the physical security
requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 73. The
current regulations concerning physical security event notifications are complex and
require event notification on a timeline that does not necessarily align with the inherent
security significance. The revised requirements for event notifications allow the licensee
to assess an event and notify the NRC commensurate with the security significance of
the event. This approach will not impact the NRC’s oversight and response functions.
The final rule makes the structure of 10 CFR Part 73 physical security event notifications
align with that of 10 CFR 50.72 non-emergency notifications and makes the timeliness of
event notifications more risk-informed, performance-based, and less burdensome. The
final rule also makes generically applicable requirements to report suspicious activities to
LLEA, the FBI, the NRC, and the FAA (for suspicious activities involving aircraft).
Currently, licensees voluntarily report suspicious activities and reporting has been
inconsistent in terms of both the types of data reported and the timeliness of reports.
Timely and consistent reporting of suspicious activities offers law enforcement and
security personnel the greatest opportunity to disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts
against critical infrastructure.
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•
Uncertainty Analysis. The simulation analysis shows that the estimated cost for
transitioning seven sites from the stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory
orders to the requirements under the final rule and to withdraw these orders ranges
between ($0.58 million) and ($0.18 million) with a mean value of ($0.36 million). The
physical security event notification analysis shows that the estimated costs range
between ($1.80 million) and ($0.57 million) with a mean value of ($1.18 million). The
suspicious activity reporting analysis shows that the estimated costs range between
($1.81 million) and ($0.57 million) with a mean value of ($1.19 million). For the overall
final rule, the estimated costs range between ($4.35 million) and ($1.82 million) with a
mean estimate of ($2.90 million). Additionally, the regulatory analysis shows that the
uncertainty in the time required for licensees to revise their notification procedures, the
uncertainty in the industry labor rate, and the uncertainty in the time required for
licensees to prepare training materials have significant impact on the estimate.
•
Election of Section 161A authority: The costs per site to elect to have stand-alone
preemption authority or for combined preemption and enhanced weapons authority are
detailed in the following table at a 7-percent discount rate. These estimates are
provided for completeness only. In estimating the rule’s total costs, it is assumed that no
additional Section 161A authority is sought.
Cost Category
Stand-alone
Preemption Authority
Combined
Preemption and
Enhanced Weapons
Authority
Power Reactor Sites
Decommissioning
Power Reactor Sites
Category I Strategic
Special Nuclear
Material Sites
($174,000)
($121,000)
($194,000)
($576,000)
($381,000)
($650,000)
Decision Rationale
Overall, the benefits of the final regulation include the potential for enhanced public safety and
security resulting from increased defensive capability at regulated entities to interdict and
neutralize an attack or to deter an attack for those entities that opt to employ stand-alone
preemption authority or combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority. Also,
the draft final rule implements the mandates of Section 161A of the AEA, as described in the
Firearms Guidelines. Additionally, the physical security event notification regulations clarify the
regulatory requirements and provide in most instances additional time for licensees to notify the
NRC consistent with the security significance of the event. Finally, the suspicious activity
reporting regulations provide timely and consistent information to the NRC and to law
enforcement agencies to potentially disrupt or dissuade terrorist attacks. Based on the NRC’s
assessment of the costs and benefits of the final rule, including those benefits which are
unquantified, the NRC has concluded that the final rule provisions would be justified to protect
public health and safety and the common defense and security.
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1. Introduction
On February 3, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) proposed
new regulations to implement the NRC’s statutory authority of Section 161A of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA) (76 FR 6200). The NRC supplemented the 2011
proposed regulations on January 10, 2013 (78 FR 2218) and on September 22, 2015 (80 FR
57106). The NRC has published a final rule to implement the Section 161A authority, to modify
physical security event notification requirements, and to add suspicious activity reporting
requirements.
This document presents a regulatory analysis of the NRC’s final rule for the enhanced weapons
rule, the associated Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.86, “Enhanced-Weapons Authority, Preemption
Authority, and Firearms Background Checks” (Ref. 3), the associated RG 5.62, “Physical
Security Event Notifications, Reports, and Records” (Ref. 4), and the associated RG 5.87,
“Suspicious Activity Reports (U)” (Ref. 5).
The regulatory action adds or modifies regulations under multiple sections of Part 73 of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). The amended regulations implement authority
allowed under Section 161A of the AEA. This authority (also referred to as “Section 161A
authority”) includes stand-alone preemption authority and combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority. The amended regulations also modify requirements related to
physical security event notifications for those licensees subject to the various 10 CFR Part 73
security requirements. Finally, the amended regulations add requirements for reporting
suspicious activities to local law enforcement agencies (LLEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the NRC, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (for suspicious
activities involving aircraft).
1.1.
Background
On August 8, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(Pub. L. 109-58). Section 653 of the Energy Policy Act amended the AEA by adding
Section 161A which granted the Commission new regulatory authority. The NRC worked with
the U.S. Attorney General (AG) to publish the Firearms Guidelines on September 11, 2009
(74 FR 46800), and subsequently published Revision 1 to the Firearms Guidelines on June 25,
2014 (79 FR 36100). The Firearms Guidelines describe the NRC’s statutory authority and
obligations under Section 161A of the AEA.
Section 161A of the AEA specifies that the Commission may authorize the security personnel of
a licensee approved by the Commission to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use
guns, weapons, ammunition, and devices otherwise prohibited under Federal, State, or local law
(or implementing regulations). The Commission may designate the classes of facilities,
radioactive material, and other property appropriate for Section 161A authority. This includes
stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority. Stand-alone preemption authority allows regulated entities to possess and use
weapons that would otherwise be prohibited by State, local, and certain Federal firearms laws.
Enhanced weapons authority allows a regulated entity to possess and use a certain category of
weapon called an “enhanced weapon” in the Firearms Guidelines. Enhanced weapons include
machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles. Obtaining enhanced weapons
requires the prior written permission of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF). The statute requires firearms background checks for the security personnel
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of those licensees who apply for Section 161A authority. The enhanced weapons rulemaking
implements the statute. The final rule conforms to Revision 1 of the Firearms Guidelines.
The NRC staff prepared a regulatory analysis for the proposed rule, which was published on
February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6225). Within the regulatory analysis, the NRC staff analyzed the
benefits and costs of implementation of Section 161A of the AEA with the proposed
modifications to 10 CFR Part 73 and development of regulatory guidance. Subsequent to the
2011 proposed rule, the NRC supplemented the enhanced weapons rule in January 2013,
proposing additional classes of facilities as eligible to apply for Section 161A authority and thus
changing the scope and the number of licensees affected. The NRC staff updated the
regulatory analysis in the 2013 supplemental proposed rule to reflect the addition of at-reactor
independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) within the classes of facilities eligible to
apply for Section 161A authority. In 2015, the NRC further supplemented the rule to conform
the proposed regulations to the 2014 revised Firearms Guidelines. The NRC staff updated the
regulatory analysis in the 2015 supplemental proposed rule to reflect revised proposed
background check requirements.
In this regulatory analysis, the NRC staff provides an analysis of the change in benefits and
costs resulting from the final regulations with respect to current regulation. In preparing this
regulatory analysis, the NRC staff considered public comments from the 2011 proposed rule
and from the 2013 and 2015 supplemental proposed rules.
1.2.
Statement of the Problem
This final enhanced weapons rule has three distinct parts. In Part 1 of the final rule, the NRC
would amend its regulations to implement the Commission’s authority under Section 161A of the
AEA. Without implementing regulations, the Commission has granted Section 161A authority
through confirmatory orders. This process is unnecessarily burdensome on licensees and the
NRC. Additionally, this process lacks the transparency and regulatory certainty provided by
regulations. With the experience gained from reviewing initial applications for stand-alone
preemption authority, the NRC is now codifying requirements for applications for Section 161A
authority. In so doing, the NRC increases clarity and efficiency for licensees submitting Section
161A applications and NRC Staff reviewing such applications. Additionally, the regulations
codify requirements to maintain Section 161A authority.
In Part 2, the NRC would amend its regulations to address a physical security event notification
timescale that may not reflect the event’s actual security significance. Currently, all physical
security event notifications must be submitted to the NRC within 1 hour. As a result, at times
licensees must provide notification more quickly than necessary, and in other instances
notifications are not provided soon enough. The revised regulations would provide a graded
approach that takes into account the security significance of the physical security event, which
in most cases would provide licensees more flexibility. Additionally, the NRC would add new
requirements to notify the NRC following actual or imminent hostile action as well as lost or
stolen enhanced weapons. This would ensure licensees provide notification to the NRC of all
appropriate physical security events.
In Part 3, the NRC would amend its regulations to address inconsistent reporting and insufficient
regulatory clarity concerning suspicious activities. Currently, licensees voluntarily report
suspicious activities. Licensee implementation of suspicious activity reporting has been
inconsistent in terms of both the types of data reported and the timeliness of reports. Because
licensees’ timely and consistent submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the NRC
2
and to law enforcement is an important part of the U.S. government’s efforts to disrupt or
dissuade malevolent acts against critical infrastructure, it is necessary to make suspicious
activity reporting mandatory. Attack planning and preparation generally proceed through
several predictable stages, including intelligence gathering and pre-attack surveillance.
Reporting suspicious activities that could be indicative of preattack surveillance or
reconnaissance efforts, challenges to security systems and protocols, or elicitation of sensitive
information, offer law enforcement and security personnel the greatest opportunity to disrupt or
dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur. Due to the potential importance of suspicious
activity reporting and the current inconsistencies in reporting, the NRC is revising its security
regulations to make suspicious activity reporting mandatory.
1.3.
Objective
One objective of the enhanced weapons rulemaking is to implement the statutory provisions of
Section 161A of the AEA. The enhanced weapons rulemaking adds 10 CFR 73 Subpart B,
“Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms Background Checks.” Only those licensees
who apply for Section 161A authority would be required to conduct firearms background checks
for their security personnel requiring access to covered weapons (weapons otherwise prohibited
by State, local, and other Federal firearms laws). Under the enhanced weapons rule, licensees
who receive approval for Section 161A authority would be required to develop a firearms
background check program, conduct firearms background checks and conduct firearms
background check training. Licensees applying for and receiving combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority would also be required to conduct inventories of
enhanced weapons.
A second objective of the rulemaking is to amend regulations related to physical security event
notifications and reporting of suspicious activities. The rulemaking would remove and reserve
the existing 10 CFR 73.71, “Reporting of safeguards events,” and Appendix G to Part 73,
“Reportable Safeguards Events,” and replace these regulations with 10 CFR 73 Subpart T,
“Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping.” The rulemaking modifies the timing and
process by which licensees would notify the NRC of imminent attacks or threats against power
reactors and Category I strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) facilities and would add
requirements for the reporting of lost or stolen enhanced weapons, which is currently being
reported voluntarily in response to generic communications and guidance.
A third objective of the rulemaking is to increase the flow of information to the law enforcement
and intelligence communities concerning suspicious activities at certain NRC licensed facilities
to potentially disrupt or dissuade potential terrorist attacks. The rulemaking adds requirements
for reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement agencies, the NRC, and FAA (for
suspicious activities involving aircraft) that could indicate adversaries conducting preattack
reconnaissance or surveillance, challenging licensee security systems, or attempting to elicit
sensitive security information.
2. Identification and Analysis of Alternative Approaches
This rulemaking responds to the provisions of Section 161A of the AEA and the direction
provided by the Firearms Guidelines. Application for stand-alone preemption or combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority under Section 161A of the AEA is
voluntary. In addition, licensee compliance with the firearms background checks is conditioned
on the application for Section 161A authority. Therefore, this is a voluntary provision for the
purposes of this regulatory analysis.
3
Changes to physical security event notification requirements would change the time period in
which licensees would be required to report events to the NRC ranging from 15 minutes to
24 hours. The no action alternative would retain the current time periods and types of events for
reporting to the NRC. For both alternatives, licensees would submit event reports and retain
event records. Changes concerning suspicious activity reporting would require the reporting of
certain events to law enforcement agencies, the NRC, and the FAA (for suspicious activities
involving aircraft), which are currently reported voluntarily. The no action alternative would not
establish these reporting requirements; consequently, licensee reporting of suspicious activities
would not be required but may continue to be reported voluntarily.
This section presents an analysis of the alternatives that the NRC staff considered in meeting
the regulatory objectives identified in Section 2. The NRC staff considered the incremental
benefits and costs between the status quo and the final rule alternatives.
2.1.
Alternative 1: No Action to Implement Section 161A Authority by
Rulemaking
Under Alternative 1, the “no action” alternative, the NRC would not implement the Section 161A
authority by rulemaking. Under this alternative, the NRC would comply with the mandated
obligations of Section 161A of the AEA by issuing confirmatory orders whenever a licensee
requests Section 161A authority. The confirmatory order would require those entities covered
under the order to perform firearms background checks for their security personnel requiring
access to covered weapons. These ordered entities also would be required to develop a
firearms background check program, conduct firearms background checks, conduct firearms
background check training, and conduct inventories of enhanced weapons, if access to such
weapons is sought and approved. Licensees who do not elect the Section 161A authority would
not receive the order and would not incur costs under this program.
Seven sites currently have stand-alone preemption authority which the NRC approved using
confirmatory orders. Under this alternative, there are no changes in requirements with their
existing orders.
Under this alternative, the NRC would not have a systematic, open, and transparent process in
place to designate regulated entities eligible to apply for Section 161A authority or for licensees
to apply for Section 161A authority. That is, the Commission would need to issue confirmatory
orders to designate individual licensees as part of an individual interim class of facilities eligible
to apply for Section 161A authority. Although few, if any, additional applicants are currently
expected to apply for this authority, if a number of licensees were to apply for Section 161A
authority then the development, review, and approval of individual orders by the Commission
would likely not be as effective or efficient as equivalent NRC actions via the rulemaking
process.
Existing regulations in 10 CFR 73.71, “Reporting of safeguards events,” and Appendix G to
Part 73, “Reportable Safeguards Events,” define categories of physical security events and
require regulated entities to notify the NRC within a specific time period after the occurrence of
the event. Regulated entities also are required to submit reports related to the event to the NRC
and maintain records about the events. These regulations also describe the use of NRC
Form 366, “Licensee Event Report,” for 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 licensees to provide written
follow-up reports to the NRC. Licensees under 10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 70, and 72 would continue
to submit letter reports for such written follow-up reports. Under this alternative, the existing
physical security event notification reporting requirements would not be revised.
4
Current regulations do not require the reporting of suspicious activities to law enforcement, the
FAA (for suspicious activities involving aircraft), and the NRC. Licensees currently voluntarily
report such suspicious activities consistent with guidance issued by the NRC following the
events of September 11, 2001. The NRC staff’s assessment of licensee voluntary reporting of
suspicious activities over the last decade is that licensee reporting is not consistent. Under this
alternative, new regulations would not be established.
2.2.
Alternative 2: Issue the Final Rule
Under this alternative, the NRC would implement the final enhanced weapons rule. This
change would add the provisions in 10 CFR 73.15, “Authorization for use of enhanced weapons
and preemption of firearms laws,” 10 CFR 73.17, “Firearms background checks for armed
security personnel,” and would alter certain provisions, including but not limited to,
10 CFR 73.46, “Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and
procedures”; 10 CFR 73.51, “Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste”; and 10 CFR 73.55, “Requirements for physical protection
of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.” Specifically,
under this alternative, the NRC would designate classes of facilities, activities, and other
property as eligible to apply for Section 161A authority. Licensees falling within these
designated classes could apply for Section 161A authority, and if approved, would conduct
firearms background checks on their security personnel. Licensees that apply for Section 161A
authority would incur incremental costs to establish and maintain firearms background check
programs and train staff on the firearms background check process. The NRC would also incur
incremental costs to process firearms background checks. In addition, periodic firearms
background checks for entities maintaining Section 161A authority would be required at least
once every 5 years.
The NRC would receive the NRC Form 754, “Armed Security Personnel Firearms Background
Check,” submittals and transmit them to the FBI to perform the National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) check. The NRC also would communicate the result of the
NICS checks on the individual security officers to the submitting licensee. On an ongoing basis,
the NRC would process the firearms background checks that include processing the 5-year
renewals of licensee firearms background checks. In addition, the NRC would review the
notifications by regulated entities of events that disqualify their security personnel from access
to covered weapons.
Eight licensees at seven sites currently have stand-alone preemption authority that the NRC
approved through confirmatory orders. The NRC wrote the final rule requirements with these
orders in mind to minimize the regulatory burden to these licensees as they transition to the
requirements of the final rule. The NRC staff anticipates that few, if any, eligible licensees will
seek Section 161A authority beyond those licensees approved by confirmatory orders.
However, because there is the potential for States to enact restricting firearms laws in the
future, the NRC staff acknowledges that there is uncertainty when estimating future utilization of
Section 161A authority. This regulatory analysis evaluates the costs and benefits for eligible
licensees in the designated classes that might seek Section 161A authority and incur costs to
comply with the associated requirements of this final rule.
For the seven sites covered under confirmatory orders, the staff calculated the incremental
costs and benefits associated with complying with the final rule. These requirements include
transition activities, such as reviewing the final rule, reviewing internal procedures, and
5
identifying any changes that must be made to comply with the final rule. This analysis assumes
sites would continue their Section 161A authority under the requirements of the final rule.
This alternative would obviate the need for the NRC to issue orders to designate classes of
regulated entities eligible to apply for Section 161A authority. This alternative would also
obviate the need for the NRC to issue orders approving Section 161A authority. This represents
an averted cost to the NRC for granting future Section 161A authority. In addition, the final rule
enhances regulatory efficiency because it provides a clear mechanism for regulated entities to
apply for and maintain their Section 161A authority, and a consistent basis for NRC staff to
review applications and oversee security programs using Section 161A authority. The final rule
also enhances openness and transparency to the public, licensees, and other stakeholders in
understanding the classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other property the NRC
considers appropriate for potential use of Section 161A authority.
Additionally, this alternative would enable several other regulatory revisions. The physical
security event notification requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.71 and Appendix G to Part 73
would be restructured to combine all the existing event notification requirements into three new
sections of the regulations (10 CFR 73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210).
This alternative restructures 10 CFR Part 73 to clarify and simplify the physical security event
notification requirements. Physical security events requiring NRC notification would be grouped
into several timeliness categories (e.g., 15-minute, 1-hour, 4-hour, and 8-hour notifications), with
greater security-significance events requiring quicker notifications. This simplified approach
was based on stakeholder comments received on the 2011 proposed rule.
This alternative would also require reporting of actual or imminent hostile actions, which are
currently voluntarily reported. Actual hostile acts are events that have an actual impact upon
security. Imminent hostile actions are events that could have had a potential impact upon
security, or security program failures. Events are also grouped into those affecting facilities and
materials, and those affecting shipping activities (i.e., the transportation of radioactive materials
and/or special nuclear material (SNM)). Also under this alternative, entities regulated under
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 would continue to use Form 366 for events requiring a written follow-up
report. This form has been updated to enable reporting of events related to enhanced weapons.
Regulated entities under this alternative would also continue to create and maintain records of
physical security events. Licensees under 10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 70, and 72 would continue to
use letter reports for events requiring a written follow-up report.
The physical security event notification portion of the rulemaking applies to all facilities and
activities that are subject to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73. This includes current licensees
such as production or utilization facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50.21(a), 10 CFR Part
50.21(c), or 10 CFR Part 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning power reactors
and non-power reactors); ISFSIs; hot cells; Category I, II, or III SSNM facilities; and Category II
or III SNM facilities. The final rule would increase the types of physical security events for which
notification to the NRC is required for non-power reactors. The final rule also applies to future
licensed facilities involving a monitored retrievable storage installation, a geologic repository
operations area, or production facilities. In addition, the final rule applies to physical security
events associated with transportation activities involving shipments of Category I, II, or III
SSNM; Category II or III SNM; spent nuclear fuel (SNF); and high-level radioactive waste
(HLW).
6
As mentioned above, this alternative would modify the required timeframes in which events are
reported to the NRC Operations Center from within 15 minutes to within 24 hours of discovery,
depending on the significance and impact of the event being reported or recorded. Significant
security events, such as actual or imminent hostile actions, warrant immediate NRC action and
dissemination of this information to other licensees and U.S. government agencies; therefore,
licensees would be required to report these events within 15 minutes of discovery. Upon
notification of an actual or imminent hostile act, the NRC would rapidly communicate this
information to enable licensees and government facilities to immediately increase the response
level of their security defenses. Other less serious (but still significant events) would require
reporting within 1-hour of discovery. Events involving potential tampering or unauthorized
operation of components would require reports within 8 hours of discovery.
Licensees that possess enhanced weapons would be required to notify the NRC within 1-hour
after the discovery of stolen or lost enhanced weapons within a licensee's protected area, vital
area, material access area, or controlled access area or within 4 hours from the discovery of a
stolen or lost enhanced weapon outside of these areas. Licensees would also be required to
notify their applicable LLEA of these lost or stolen enhanced weapons within 48 hours. This
48-hour reporting time matches the timeliness in ATF’s regulations in 27 CFR Part 478.
Licensees would also be required to notify the NRC within 24 hours of the receipt of an adverse
inspection or enforcement finding or other adverse notice from ATF regarding the licensee’s
possession, receipt, transfer, or storage of enhanced weapons. This change would allow the
NRC to receive event reports on a timescale that is more appropriate to the nature of the event
and thereby allow for more timely NRC response to the event and more timely NRC
coordination with other government agencies.
Finally, under this alternative, licensees would be required to report suspicious activities to their
LLEA, their local FBI field office, the NRC, and the FAA (for suspicious activities involving
aircraft). The rule does not specify the mechanism on how the notification is performed; rather it
requires licensees to establish points of contact with these agencies. This additional notification
will provide timely and consistent information to the NRC and to law enforcement agencies to
potentially disrupt or dissuade terrorist attacks.
Based on historical data, the NRC receives on average 30 physical security events per year.
The NRC does not anticipate that this number will change significantly as a result of this
rulemaking. The NRC estimates that a 15-minute imminent or actual hostile action event will
occur once every 15 years. Additionally, the NRC estimates an average of 2.5 suspicious
activity reports will be reported to the NRC per licensee annually based on past experience.
Because the rule does not change the threshold for reporting significant facility security
challenges to the security program or conditions adverse to security events, costs related to
those events are not included in this regulatory analysis. The costs analyzed are those related
to the new physical security event notifications for actual or imminent hostile actions, lost or
stolen enhanced weapons, and for reporting suspicious activities.
3. Identification of Affected Attributes and Analytical Method
This section evaluates the incremental benefits and costs expected to result from this
rulemaking when compared to the no action alternative. In accordance with NUREG/BR-0058,
“Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission” (Ref. 6), the
incremental costs due to any action taken by the licensee, including voluntary actions, which
result because of this rulemaking, should be accounted for in the regulatory analysis. The
7
analysis is presented in two subsections. Section 3.1 identifies attributes that would be affected
by the rulemaking. Section 3.2 describes how the benefits and costs are analyzed.
3.1.
Identification of Affected Attributes
This section identifies the factors within the public and private sectors that the rulemaking is
expected to affect. These factors are classified as attributes using the list of potential attributes
provided in Chapter 5 of NUREG/BR-0184, “Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation
Handbook” (Ref. 7). Each attribute is quantified where possible. An uncertainty analysis is
performed to report benefit and cost estimate confidence levels and to identify those variables
that most affect the variation in the results distribution. Security-related attributes are
considered qualitatively because estimates of occurrences of possible attacks and their
successful thwarting are unknown (e.g., the onsite/offsite impacts of accidental discharges from
enhanced weapons were qualitatively evaluated in the general public attribute).
The following attributes were evaluated in this regulatory analysis:
•
Industry Implementation —
o
o
For Section 161A authority, if requested, licensees would be required to:
Read and understand the regulation;
Apply for Section 161A stand-alone preemption authority or combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority, including submittal of
supporting materials;
Develop a Firearms Background Check Plan;
Submit an NRC Form 754 information and the fingerprints for each security staff
member assigned to duties requiring access to covered weapons and incur
associated fees from NICS submittals;
Develop and deliver initial training on the firearms background check process;
Purchase enhanced weapons (if applicable);
Conduct initial weapons qualification and proficiency training on enhanced
weapons (if applicable); and
Revise physical security event notification procedures for lost or stolen enhanced
weapons (if applicable).
For physical security event notifications, reports, and recordkeeping, licensees are
required to perform the following actions to comply with the new regulations:
Read and understand the regulation; and
Develop, approve, and train the appropriate security and operations personal on
the new procedures, concerning actual or imminent hostile actions.
8
o
•
For suspicious activity reporting, licensees are required to perform the following
actions to comply with the new regulations:
Read and understand the regulation; and
Develop, approve, and train the appropriate security and operations personal on
the new procedures.
Industry Operation — Operational costs to licensees include:
o
o
For Section 161A authority, if requested, licensees would be required to:
Resubmit their security personnel for periodic firearms background checks every
5 years;
Submit information regarding new security staff for firearms background checks
on an ongoing basis;
Update and provide recurring training on the firearms background check process;
Maintain records of staff removed from access to covered weapons;
Notify the NRC of events that disqualify their staff from access to covered
weapons;
Conduct monthly and annual inventories of enhanced weapons and maintain
records of these inventories (if applicable);
Maintain records relating to the receipt, possession, use, and transportation, and
transfer of enhanced weapons (if applicable);
Conduct periodic enhanced weapons qualification and proficiency training (if
applicable);
Submit event reports for physical security events related to enhanced weapons
(if applicable); and
Maintain records of physical security events related to enhanced weapons (if
applicable).
For physical security event notifications, reports, and recordkeeping, licensees are
required to perform the following actions to comply with the new regulations:
Maintain and train new security and operations personal on the new procedures;
Submit event reports for physical security events related to actual or imminent
hostile actions; and
Maintain records of physical security events related to actual or imminent hostile
actions.
9
o
•
•
For suspicious activity reports, licensees are required to perform the following
actions to comply with the new regulations:
Maintain and train new security and operations personal on the new procedures;
and
Make telephone reports for suspicious activities.
NRC Implementation—NRC implementation actions for all three parts of the final rule
would include:
o
Document the withdrawal of the confirmatory orders; and
o
Review and approve new applications for Section 161A authority.
NRC Operation—The NRC would incur operational costs under the final rule to:
o
Process NRC Form 754 submittals on an ongoing basis for new security
personnel or for 5-year renewed firearms background checks;
o
Review notifications of security personnel disqualified from access to covered
weapons;
o
Review the written report for notification of a physical security events; and
o
Receive telephone notification of physical security events and suspicious activity
reporting.
•
Other Government Agencies—The FBI would incur costs as a result of this final rule to
process firearms background checks. The FBI would charge fees to regulated entities
for the processing of fingerprints. The ATF would incur additional costs to process
applications to transfer enhanced weapons to authorized NRC licensees.
•
Safeguards and Security Considerations—The final rule complies with Section 161A
statutory requirements and provides assurance that public health and safety, and the
common defense and security, will be enhanced because of licensees’ increased
defensive capability to interdict, neutralize, or potentially deter an attack. The benefit of
the final rule related to safeguards and security considerations is evaluated qualitatively.
The 15-minute notification for actual or imminent hostile actions provide the NRC the
ability to rapidly disseminate this information to other NRC licensees and government
facilities, military facilities, and critical infrastructure facilities. Such information may
permit these entities to increase their defensive security posture in the case of
miss-timed or miss-coordinated multi-target terrorist attacks.
The benefit of the licensees’ timely and consistent submission of suspicious activity
reports to the NRC and to law enforcement is also an important part of the U.S.
government’s efforts to disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts against critical infrastructure.
Attack planning and preparation generally proceed through several predictable stages,
including intelligence gathering and pre-attack surveillance. These stages, in particular,
offer law enforcement and security personnel the greatest opportunity to disrupt or
10
dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur. Additionally, licensees’ timely and
consistent submission of suspicious activity reports to the NRC supports one of the
agency’s primary mission essential functions of threat assessment for licensed facilities,
materials, and shipping activities.
•
Regulatory Efficiency—The final rule would enhance regulatory efficiency of the physical
security event notification requirements by clarifying the process and the types of events
to be reported to the NRC. The final rule would enhance regulatory efficiency through
the issuance of generically applicable regulations, rather than addressing licensees’
application for Section 161A authority via individual NRC orders.
•
General Public—The use of weapons safety assessment evaluations would minimize the
likelihood of an unacceptable human or physical impact arising from the accidental or
deliberate discharge of an enhanced weapon. The costs or benefits related to the
general public attribute were not analyzed in detail in this analysis because this attribute
is not expected to have a significant impact on the results of the regulatory analysis.
Attributes that are not expected to be affected by this rulemaking include: public health
(accident and routine); occupational health (accident and routine); offsite property; onsite
property; general public; environmental considerations; and other considerations.
3.2.
Analytical Method
This section describes the process used to evaluate benefits and costs associated with the final
rule. The benefits of the final rule include any desirable changes in affected attributes
(e.g., monetary savings, improved safety, improved security) while the costs include any
undesirable changes in affected attributes (e.g., monetary costs, increased exposures to
radiation, or physical hazards). This regulatory analysis was developed following the guidance
contained in NUREG/BR-0058 and NUREG/BR-0053, “United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Regulations Handbook” (Ref. 8).
The analysis evaluates four attributes⎯industry implementation, industry operation, NRC
implementation, and NRC operation⎯on a quantitative basis. Quantitative analysis requires a
baseline characterization of the affected universe, including characterization of factors such as
the number of affected entities and the application process that licensees would use as a result
of the final rule. Non-quantitative techniques are used because monetizing the full impact of
each attribute is not possible or practical. Monetizing the impact of these attributes would
require estimation of factors such as the frequency of accidents and other safety- and
security-related events and the consequences of such events. Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.4
describe the analytical method and assumptions used in the quantitative and non-quantitative
analysis of these attributes. Appendices A and B present the analysis calculations, data
sources, and assumptions utilized.
To estimate the costs associated with the final rule, the NRC staff used a work breakdown
approach to deconstruct the activities for each requirement. For each required activity, the NRC
further subdivided the work across labor categories. The NRC staff estimated the required level
of effort for each required activity and labor rates for personnel performing these activities to
develop cost estimates.
11
The NRC staff gathered data from a number of sources to develop levels of effort and unit cost
estimates. The NRC staff applied several cost estimation methods in this analysis. The
professional knowledge and judgment of the NRC staff were used to estimate some of the costs
and benefits. Additionally, an engineering build-up method, solicitation of licensee input, and
extrapolation techniques were used to estimate costs and benefits.
The NRC staff estimated some of the activities using the engineering build-up method, which
used a step-by-step, bottom-up description of task requirements and estimated resources for
labor, materials, and other direct costs to estimate a total cost. For example, the NRC staff
collected industry wage data and staffing levels based on licensee submittals and weapon and
weapon-related costs from vendors.
The NRC staff extrapolated to estimate some cost activities, which rely on past or current costs
to estimate the future cost of similar activities. For example, one of the key factors in the
estimate of the cost of firearms background checks to a site is how many security personnel
would undergo NICS checks. When eight licensees at seven sites received stand-alone
preemption authority via confirmatory order, they submitted security personnel information for
NICS checks. The staff used that experience to inform the number of security personnel that
would undergo NICS checks for different types of sites. For steps in the current and proposed
alternative, the NRC staff estimated the level of effort based on similar steps in the process for
which data are available.
To evaluate the effect of uncertainty in the model, the NRC staff employed a Monte Carlo
simulation, which is an approach to uncertainty analysis where input variables are expressed as
distributions. The simulation was run 10,000 times and values were chosen at random from the
distributions of the input variables provided in Section 4.2, “Uncertainty Analysis.” The result is
a distribution of values for the output variable of interest. With a Monte Carlo simulation, it is
also possible to determine the input variables that have the greatest effect on the value of the
output variable. See Section 4.2 for a detailed description of the Monte Carlo simulation
methods and a presentation of the results.
3.2.1.
Baseline for Analysis
This regulatory analysis measures the incremental costs of the final rule relative to a “baseline”
that reflects anticipated behavior in the event the NRC undertakes no additional regulatory
action (Alternative 1, the “no action” alternative). As part of the regulatory baseline used in this
analysis, the NRC staff assumes full licensee compliance with existing NRC regulations. This
alternative is equivalent to the status quo and serves as a baseline against which other
alternatives may be measured. Section 4.1, “Benefits and Costs of the Final Rule,” presents the
estimated incremental benefits and costs of the final rule relative to this baseline.
3.2.2.
Affected Entities
The Section 161A authority portion of the final rule would apply to sites with:
•
Operating power reactors;
•
New power reactors for which a combined license (COL) already has been issued under
10 CFR Part 52 (e.g., Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4);
•
Decommissioning power reactors;
12
•
Category I SSNM facilities (e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group Inc.
(BWXT) and Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS));
•
All ISFSI licensees; and
•
Licensees shipping SNF (e.g., to a consolidated ISFSI facility).
The NRC staff estimates that licensees at 84 sites would be eligible to apply for Section 161A
authority under the final rule. Licensees that do not apply for Section 161A authority would not
incur additional benefits or costs as compared to the baseline. This analysis evaluates the
benefits and costs that would be incurred by licensees that apply for Section 161A authority.
However, in estimating the total costs of the final rule, the analysis assumes no additional
Section 161A authority is sought.
For the eight licensees at seven sites covered under confirmatory orders, the staff calculated
the incremental costs and benefits associated with complying with the final rule requirements.
Activities to comply include transition activities such as reviewing the final rule and their
procedures to ensure no changes were necessary to comply with the final rule and notifying the
NRC after the transition activities are completed. Thereafter the NRC would withdrawal the
orders and the sites would continue their Section 161A authority under the final rule.
The physical security event notifications portion and the suspicious activity reporting portion of
the final rule would apply to:
•
Production or utilization facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50.21(a), 10 CFR Part
50.21(c), or 10 CFR Part 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning power
reactors and non-power reactors);
•
New power reactors for which a COL already has been issued under 10 CFR Part 52;
•
Category I or II SSNM facilities;
•
Category III SSNM facilities (physical security event notifications only);
•
Category II SNM facilities;
•
Category III SNM facilities (physical security event notifications only);
•
Category II or III SNM enrichment facilities using Restricted Data materials, technology,
and information in the enrichment process;
•
All ISFSI licensees;
•
Licensees shipping Category I, II, or III quantities of SSNM, SNF, and HLW;
•
Licensees shipping Category II or III SNM (physical security event notifications only);
•
Hot cells;
•
Monitored retrievable storage installations; and
•
Geologic repository operations areas.
13
NRC and Agreement State licensees subject to 10 CFR Part 73.67, “Licensee fixed site and
in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and
low strategic significance,” possessing Category III quantities of SSNM and licensees
possessing SSNM or SNM in a form that has been encapsulated into sealed sources that are
used for research, development, and testing purposes, have not been included in the cost
analysis since they are exempt from reporting suspicious activities. Additionally, licensees who
are transporting Category II and III quantities of SSNM or SNM under 10 CFR 73.67 are also
exempt from reporting suspicious activities.
Appendix A, “NRC Regulated Sites Affected by the Enhanced Weapons Final Rule,” to this
analysis presents more information on the sites affected by the final rule, including information
on the categorization of the individual sites.
Assumptions Related to Affected Entities
A multiunit site uses the facility’s security personnel to protect each unit in a fungible manner.
This also applies to sites with a mixed set of regulated entities. That is, the facility’s staff will
use the same weapons to protect an operating power reactor and to protect a decommissioning
power reactor co-located at the same site. In particular, at-reactor ISFSIs are by definition
associated with a power reactor site, so at-reactor ISFSIs are not treated as separate entities in
this regulatory analysis. The regulatory analysis evaluates the incremental costs of the final rule
on a site basis rather than on a regulated entity basis. This is because it is typical for each
licensee co-located at a site to request Section 161A authority at the same time, since security
personnel are typically fungible between facilities at a site. For each type of site included in the
analysis, Table 3, “Regulated Entities Affected by the Final Rule,” presents the number of sites
and the average number of years that sites are expected to be subject to the final rule (i.e.,
applicability period).
In estimating benefits and costs, the NRC staff grouped eligible sites with more than one type of
reactor under the site category with the longest applicability period. For example, a site with
one operating power reactor and one or more decommissioning power reactor(s) is categorized
as a “site with only reactors that are in commercial operation” because the applicability period
for an operating power reactor exceeds the applicability period for a reactor that is
decommissioning. See the discussion titled “Applicability Period of the Final Rule” in
Section 3.2.2 for more information.
Eligible Regulated Entities that May Apply for Section 161A Authority
The NRC staff grouped regulated entities eligible to apply for Section 161A authority into the
following five groups for this analysis. This is presented in Table 1, “Eligible Regulated Entities
that May Apply for Section 161A Authority.”
•
Operating power reactor sites—In this category, five sites have requested and received
stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory order. None of the remaining
operating power reactor sites in this category has formally expressed interest in applying
for Section 161A authority.
•
New power reactors proposed or under construction—As of August 2017, none of the
sites in this category sought Section 161A authority via confirmatory order nor have they
formally expressed interest in applying for Section 161A authority.
14
•
Decommissioning power reactors—As of August 2017, one out of eleven
decommissioning sites requested and received stand-alone preemption authority via
confirmatory order. None of the remaining decommissioning sites has expressed
interest in applying for Section 161A authority.
•
Away-from-reactor ISFSIs—As of August 2017, none of the sites in this category sought
Section 161A authority via confirmatory order nor have they formally expressed interest
in applying for Section 161A authority.
•
Category I SSNM facilities—The two sites in this category are fuel fabrication facilities
for the U.S. Navy. BWXT applied for and received stand-alone preemption authority via
confirmatory order. The remaining Category I SSNM site has not formally expressed
interest in applying for Section 161A authority.
Table 1 Regulated Entities that May Apply for Section 161A Authority
Category
a
b
c
Number of
Sites
Number of sites that received
stand-alone preemption authority via
confirmatory order
Power reactor sites (operating &
60
5
under construction) a b
Decommissioning power reactor
18
1
sitesb c
Away-from-reactor ISFSIs
4
0
Category I SSNM facilities
2
1
Total
84
7
Power reactor sites include those sites with units under construction or in operating status.
Licensees that have not begun construction are not included.
Onsite ISFSIs (at-reactor ISFSIs) are included in these categories.
All units on a decommissioning power reactor site are in decommissioning or have been
decommissioned.
Regulated Entities Impacted by the Physical Security Event Notifications and Suspicious
Activity Reporting Portions of the Final Rule
Multiple categories of regulated entities are subject to the physical security event notification
and suspicious activity reporting requirements and would be impacted by the final rule. The
staff grouped the affected regulated entities into seven groupings shown in Tables 2a, 2b, and
2c for this analysis.
15
Table 2a Regulated Entities Affected by the Physical Security Event Notifications
Site Description
No. of sites
Power reactor sites (operating & under construction)a,b
60
Decommissioning power reactor sitesb,c
18
Away-from-reactor ISFSIs
Non-power reactors
Hot cell facilities
Category I, II, or III SSNM facilitiesd
Category II or III SNM facilities
a
b
c
d
4
31
1
16
4
Total
134
Power reactor sites include those sites with units under construction or in operating status.
Licensees that have not begun construction are not included.
Onsite ISFSIs (at-reactor ISFSIs) are included in these categories.
All units on a decommissioning power reactor site are in decommissioning or have been
decommissioned.
Category III SSNM facilities include 9 Agreement State licensees.
Table 2b Regulated Entities Affected by the Physical Security Event Recordkeeping
Site Description
Power reactor sites (operating & under construction)a,b
Decommissioning power reactor sites
b,c
Away-from-reactor ISFSIs
Non-power reactors
Hot cell facilities
Category I or II SSNM facilities
Category II or III SNM facilities
a
b
c
No. of sites
60
18
4
6
1
2
0
Total
91
Power reactor sites include those sites with units under construction or in operating status.
Licensees that have not begun construction are not included.
Onsite ISFSIs (at-reactor ISFSIs) are included in these categories.
All units on a decommissioning power reactor site are in decommissioning or have been
decommissioned.
16
Table 2c Regulated Entities Affected by the Suspicious Activity Reporting
Site Description
No. of sites
Power reactor sites (operating & under construction)a,b
60
Decommissioning power reactor sitesb,c
18
Away-from-reactor ISFSIs
Non-power reactors
Hot cell facilities
Category I or II SSNM facilities
Category II or III SNM enrichment facilities
a
b
c
4
31
1
2
1
Total
117
Power reactor sites include those sites with units under construction or in operating status.
Licensees that have not begun construction are not included.
Onsite ISFSIs (at-reactor ISFSIs) are included in these categories.
All units on a decommissioning power reactor site are in decommissioning or have been
decommissioned.
Applicability Period of the Final Rule
The applicability period was derived as follows:
•
Power Reactor Licensees—The staff estimates that the average applicability period for
this type of site is 37 years. This estimate is based on the average remaining operating
license term across sites of this type and then adding a 15-year decommissioning
period. For each site, the NRC staff identified the operating power reactor unit with the
latest license expiration date.2 The NRC staff then used that license expiration date to
calculate the remaining operating life for the site. For example, for a site where the last
unit license expiration date will occur in 2019, the calculated remaining operating life
would be two years (i.e., 2018, and 2019). The NRC staff assumed (1) that all operating
licenses go to the term of the operating license with the exception of announced early
terminations3 and (2) assumed that all license renewal applications already under
consideration will be granted. Using the calculated remaining operating license term for
each site, the average remaining operating license term across all sites was calculated.
Finally, a 15-year decommissioning period was added following cessation of commercial
operation. For this analysis, the staff assumed that two sites, Peach Bottom and Surry,
would apply for and receive a second license renewal for an additional 20-year operating
period.
2
Based on information obtained from NRC, NUREG-1350, Volume 29, “2017-2018 Information Digest,
“Appendix H: U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licenses - Expiration by Year, 2013-2049"
(Ref. 12).
3
As of May 2017, early terminations have been announced for Pilgrim in 2018, Palisades in 2018, Three Mile
Island Unit 1 in 2019, Oyster Creek in 2019, Indian Point Unit 2 in 2020, Indian Point Unit 3 in 2021, Diablo
Canyon Unit 1 in 2024, and Diablo Canyon Unit 2 in 2025. If the licensees for Pilgrim and Oyster Creek carry
through with their plans, one or both of these plants may cease commercial operation during the final rule’s
300-day event notification reporting implementation period. Crystal River Unit 3, Fort Calhoun, Kewaunee, San
Onofre Units 2 and 3, and Vermont Yankee have already terminated operations. Several other licensees have
stated in the press the possibility of early closures; however, for the purpose of this analysis, the staff assumes
that these licensees will resolve their financial difficulties and their plants will continue to operate for the
remaining term of their license.
17
•
New Power Reactor at Existing Sites—The applicability period for this type of site is
estimated to average 75 years. This estimate is based on the average remaining
operating license term of the existing reactor(s) at these sites and then adding a 40-year
operating life to account for the new reactor(s). An additional 15 years is added for the
decommissioning period. For this analysis, the staff did not assume that these licensees
would apply for and receive a second license renewal for the new reactors for an
additional 20-year operating period.
•
Sites with Only Reactors that Are Decommissioning—The applicability period for this
type of site is estimated to average 15 years from date of cessation of operations. This
estimate is based on information on time periods contained in Irradiated Fuel Transfer
Plans submitted, under 10 CFR 50.54(bb), by licensees that shutdown their reactor units
earlier than the expiration of their license terms. Kewaunee permanently ceased
commercial operation on May 7, 2013 (Ref. 9). The licensee completed transfer of all
spent fuel from the spent fuel pool to the ISFSI in June 2017 (Ref. 10). Crystal River
permanently ceased commercial operation on February 20, 2013, and transferred fuel
from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool. The site expects to have all spent fuel
transferred from the spent fuel pool to the ISFSI by the end of year 2019 (e.g., transfer
within 6 years of ceasing commercial operation) (Ref. 11). Based on these
representative plans, it is reasonable to estimate that licensees will transfer all spent fuel
to ISFSIs (e.g., dry cask storage) within 15 years of ceasing commercial operation. After
spent fuel is transferred out of the spent fuel pool, the provisions of 10 CFR Part 73
related to stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority for decommissioning power reactors still apply.
•
Away-from-reactor ISFSI Facility— The NRC decided on a 40-year time horizon for
away from reactor ISFSI facilities based on the current, standard 40-year license
renewal term for these facilities. The 40-year analysis period runs from 2018 (the
anticipated effective date of the final rule) through 2058.
•
Non-Power Reactors— The NRC decided on a 20-year time horizon based on the
current, standard 20-year license renewal term. The 20-year analysis period runs from
2018 (the anticipated effective date of the final rule) through 2038.
•
Category I SSNM Facilities—The applicability period for this type of site is estimated to
be 16 years. This estimate is based on the average of the remaining license periods for
NFS (Ref. 13) and BWXT (Ref. 14) and adding 2 years for the decommissioning period
(Ref. 15). This is a conservative assumption because the fuel fabrication facilities are
smaller in size and use isotopes with shorter half-lives than operating power reactors.
Therefore, it is likely that the decommissioning periods for these facilities may be shorter
than for operating power reactors.
18
Table 3 Regulated Entities Affected by the Final Rule
Number of
Sites that
applied for
Section 161A
Authority
Average
Applicability
Period (years)
Power reactor licensees
5
37
New power reactor sites
0
75
Sites with only reactors that are in
decommissioning
1
15
Away-from-reactor ISFSI facilities
0
20
Non-power reactors
0
20
Category I SSNM facilities
1
16
7
Not applicable
Type of Facility
Total
Sign Conventions
The sign convention used in this analysis is that all favorable consequences for the alternative
are positive and all adverse consequences for the alternative are negative. Negative values are
shown using parentheses (e.g., negative $500 is displayed as ($500)).
Labor Rates
For regulatory analysis purposes, labor rates are developed wherein only variable costs that are
directly related to the implementation and operation and maintenance of the proposed
requirement are included. This approach is consistent with guidance set forth in
NUREG/CR-4627, “Generic Cost Estimates” (Ref. 16), and general cost-benefit methodology.
The NRC incremental labor rate is $131 per hour (2018 dollars).4
The estimated mean industry incremental loaded labor rate is $106 per hour. The NRC staff
derived these labor rates based on data developed from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Ref. 17)
for “Security Guards” (Standard Occupational Code 33-9032), “Power Plant Operators,
Distributors, and Dispatchers” (Standard Occupational Code 51-8010) and for “Nuclear Power
Reactor Operators” (Standard Occupational Code 51-8011). In addition, the NRC staff
performed an uncertainty analysis, which is discussed in Section 4.2.
Base Year
The assumed date of implementation of the final rule is year 2018, so the monetized benefits
and costs in this analysis are expressed in year 2018 dollars. One-time implementation costs
are assumed to be incurred in year 2018. Ongoing and annual costs of operation related to the
alternatives are assumed to begin in year 2019 unless otherwise stated and are then discounted
into year 2018 dollars.
4
The NRC labor rates presented here differ from those developed under the NRC’s license fee recovery program
(10 CFR Part 170). The NRC labor rates for fee recovery purposes are set for cost recovery of the services
rendered and as such include nonincremental costs (e.g., overhead, administrative, and logistical support costs).
19
3.2.3.
Assumptions
This subsection discusses the analysis of the costs associated with the implementation of the
final rule. The analysis employs the following assumptions and considerations:
•
All licensees are assumed to be in full compliance with the existing baseline
requirements. The costs to comply with the baseline requirements are not expected to
change with the final rule. Therefore, this analysis only presents the costs associated
with the final rule changes.
•
Implementation costs are assumed to be incurred in year 2018.
•
Licensees will incur costs over the applicability period, as presented in Table 3,
“Regulated Entities Affected by the Final Rule.” The actual time period that each site will
be operated will depend on the term of the operating license and on whether the
licensee chooses to operate the site for the duration of the licensed period.
•
The costs incurred in each year of the analysis are discounted to the present using a
7-percent and 3-percent discount rate, in accordance with NUREG/BR-0058. (See
Section 5 for these results.)
•
Based on the firearms background check submittals from the seven sites that received
Section 161A authority via confirmatory orders, the NRC staff made the following
estimates of the number of security personnel at each category of site:
o
On average, each power reactor site employs 320 security personnel. This is
based on averaging the number of firearms background check submittals over
the five sites that requested Section 161A authority via confirmatory orders.
o
On average, each Category I SSNM site employs 375 security personnel. This is
based on the 320 personnel on average estimate at operating power reactor
sites plus 50 additional personnel for tactical response teams.
o
On average, each decommissioning site employs 175 security personnel, which
is based on the number of firearms background check submittals that requested
Section 161A authority via confirmatory orders and the lower staffing levels
following cessation of commercial operation. An away-from-reactor ISFSI is
assumed to employ the same number of personnel.
o
For the purposes of this analysis, the seven sites that currently have stand-alone
preemption authority are treated as a separate cost group. These seven sites
have already completed the application process and the initial set of firearms
background checks under the confirmatory order. Once the final rule is issued,
the eight licensees associated with the seven sites would need to review the final
rule and their procedures and make any changes necessary to meet the
requirements of the final rule. The NRC would withdrawal the orders 300 days
after the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register; thereafter, the sites
would continue their Section 161A authority under the final rule.
20
3.2.4.
Per Site Costs by Cost Category
For purposes of this analysis, the costs incurred under the final rule were categorized as
follows:
•
Implementation (one-time) costs for the industry;
•
Implementation (one-time) costs for the NRC;
•
Recurring and annual costs for the industry;
•
Recurring and annual costs for the NRC.
The application for stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority under Section 161A of the AEA is voluntary. Therefore, any
incurred costs due to these Section 161A authority (i.e., voluntary costs) are conditioned on the
licensees voluntarily electing and applying for these authority. The following subsections
describe the derivation of the estimated per site costs for each of the above cost categories.
3.2.4.1.
Industry Implementation Costs
As a result of the final rule, regulated entities who apply for Section 161A authority would be
required to take the following one-time actions: (1) read and understand the final rule,
(2) develop and submit a Firearms Background Check Plan, (3) conduct firearms background
checks on security personnel using NRC Form 754, and (4) train security personnel on the
firearms background check process. To estimate costs, the NRC staff made the following
assumptions that reflect labor and costs a regulated entity would incur as a result of the final
rule:
Firearms Background Check Plan
•
On average, a site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would incur 32 hours of
licensee staff time to read and understand the final rule. This reflects two staff members
spending 16 hours each reading the final rule and associated guidance.
•
A site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would incur labor costs to develop and
submit a Firearms Background Check Plan. The NRC estimates that site personnel
would spend on average 1,560 hours to develop, review, and approve for NRC
submission a Firearms Background Check Plan. This estimate is informed by public
comments on the proposed rule that stated that 9 months would be reasonable to revise
and submit a Firearms Background Check once the rule became final.
Firearms Background Check Processing
•
A site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would incur labor costs to complete and
submit security personnel for firearms background checks using NRC Form 754. The
NRC staff estimates that each NRC Form 754 submittal would require 2 hours of
licensee staff time.
•
A site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would incur a fee for each NRC Form 754
submitted. A $70 administrative processing fee is charged to the licensee for each FBI
21
Form FD-258 fingerprint card submitted to the NRC for the completion of the required
firearms background checks.
•
Based on the experience with the NRC Form 754 submittals related to the confirmatory
orders, the NRC estimates that 0.3 percent of the submittals would receive a delayed or
denied response, which would result in additional site processing labor of 8 hours per
form on average.
Firearms Background Check Training
•
On average, a site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would require 60 hours of
site staff labor to develop the initial training for the firearms background checks. The
training would address the firearms background check process including actions security
personnel can take in the event of a delayed or denied NICS result. The NRC staff
estimates that the training would last about 45 minutes.
•
A site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would deliver initial firearms background
check training to all of their security personnel.
Additional Costs for Combined Preemption Authority and Enhanced Weapons Authority
•
The NRC staff estimates that site personnel would need to read and understand the rule
requirements and the supporting guidance in order to prepare the necessary documents
for requesting combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
Documents that would need to be prepared, reviewed, or revised as appropriate are:
(1) an enhanced weapons training and qualification plan, (2) the site physical security
plan, (3) the safeguards contingency plan, and (4) the weapons safety assessment.
•
Review rule requirements and supporting guidance. The NRC staff estimates that site
personnel would require 160 hours to read and understand the rule requirements and
the supporting guidance in order to prepare the required enhanced weapons authority
documents.
•
Enhanced weapons training and qualification plan. The NRC staff estimates that site
personnel would require 160 hours to prepare and issue this training and qualification
plan. The activities that contribute to this estimate are as follows:
o
Site personnel would require 24 hours to research information developed by
nationally recognized firearms organizations, standard setting bodies, or from
standards developed by Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the
U.S. Department of Energy’s National Training Center, and the U.S. Department
of Defense; State law-enforcement training centers; or State Division (or
Department) of Criminal Justice Services Training Academies.
o
Site personnel would require 120 hours to prepare an initial draft of the enhanced
weapons training and qualification plan using information collected.
o
Site personnel would require 16 hours for operations and management review,
comment resolution, and concurrence.
22
•
Site physical security plan. The NRC estimates that site personnel would require
132 hours to review, revise, and reissue this plan. The activities that contribute to this
estimate consists of 104 hours to review and revise the plan, 20 hours for operations
and management review, and 8 hours for comment resolution and concurrence.
•
Safeguards contingency plan. The NRC estimates that site personnel would require
160 hours to review, revise, and reissue this plan. The activities that contribute to this
estimate consist of 120 hours to review and revise the plan, 20 hours for operations and
management review, and 20 hours for comment resolution and concurrence.
•
Weapons safety assessment. The NRC estimates that site personnel would require
480 hours to prepare and issue this assessment. The activities that contribute to this
estimate are as follows:
o
Site personnel would require 80 hours to collect and develop information
necessary to perform the assessment.
o
Site personnel would require 320 hours to perform and document an initial draft
of the weapons safety assessment.
o
Site personnel would require 56 hours for operations and management review.
o
Site personnel would require 24 hours for comment resolution and concurrence.
•
Sites that receive enhanced weapons authority are assumed to purchase enhanced
weapons and ammunition in the first year the final rule is effective (2018). The analysis
assumes that the site purchases sufficient weapons for each security staff member on
shift plus five spares. Each weapon costs between $1,164 and $2,935, with a best
estimate of $2,314. The NRC estimates that the site will buy 1,000 rounds of
ammunition with each weapon. A round of ammunition costs between $0.46 and $0.51,
with a best estimate of $0.48.
•
Initial personnel proficiency training and qualification in use of the enhanced weapons.
The NRC estimates that security personnel would become proficient with the weapons
following 4 hours of classroom training and fifteen 2-hour firing range sessions. During
each firing range session, each person will fire 100 rounds of ammunition and use $68 of
other consumables.
Section 161A Submittal
•
A site electing to adopt Section 161A authority would incur costs to assemble and submit
the application under oath or affirmation with existing (for stand-alone preemption
authority) or modified (for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority) physical security and safeguards contingency plans.
Physical Security Event Notifications
Alternative 2 revises requirements related to physical security event notifications. This
alternative also proposes to add new event notification requirements on the theft or loss of
enhanced weapons, and actual or imminent hostile actions. The NRC staff made the following
23
assumptions to estimate the implementation costs associated with the physical security event
notification rule changes, which is applicable to all sites listed in Table 2a, “Regulated Entities
Affected by the Physical Security Event Notifications”:
•
Each site would update their internal procedures to reflect the final rule and would
conduct one-time training of senior reactor operators and supervisors regarding the
revised physical security event notifications procedures. The NRC estimates site
personnel will require between 8 to 20 hours to familiarize themselves with the rule
changes and will require between 8 and 40 hours to revise the procedures and between
4 and 18 hours to review, resolve comments, and issue the revised procedure.
•
Each site would require between 10 and 30 hours preparing training materials on the
revised event notification procedure and between 10 and 30 hours to train senior reactor
operators and supervisors responsible for performing this notification function.
Suspicious Activity Reporting
Alternative 2 introduces a new requirement related to suspicious activity reporting. The NRC
staff made the following assumptions to estimate the implementation costs associated with the
reporting of suspicious activities, which is applicable to all sites listed in Table 2c, “Regulated
Entities Affected by the Suspicious Activity Reporting”:
•
Each site would update their internal procedures to reflect the final rule and would
conduct one-time training of senior reactor operators and supervisors regarding the
revised suspicious activity reporting procedures. The NRC estimates site personnel will
require between 8 to 20 hours to familiarize themselves with the rule changes and will
require between 8 and 40 hours to revise the procedures and between 4 and 18 hours to
review, resolve comments, and issue the revised procedure.
•
Each site would require between 10 and 30 hours preparing training materials on the
suspicious activity reporting procedure and between 10 and 30 hours to train senior
reactor operators and supervisors responsible for performing this reporting function.
Table 4, “Industry Implementation Costs by Cost Category per Site,” shows the estimated
Industry implementation costs for each site for the requirements regarding Section 161A
authority, physical security event notifications, and suspicious activity reporting.
24
Table 4 Industry Implementation Costs by Cost Category per Site
Type of Site
Operating and
New Reactor
Sites
Cost Category
Section 161A Submittal
Assemble and submit the Section 161A application under
oath or affirmation
Applications to terminate Section 161A authorities
Establish procedures for quality finger print card
submission
Section 161A submittal subtotal
Stand-alone Preemption Authority
Read the final rule and guidance to understand regulatory
requirements
Develop and issue Firearms Background Check Plan
Develop training module for Section 161A background
check process
Train Personnel on Firearms Background Checks
Complete, collect, and submit firearm background check
forms (NRC Form 754)
Resolve issues with submitted firearms background check
forms
Firearms background check form processing fee
Covered weapons subtotal
Combined Premption Authority and Enhanced Weapons
Read the final rule and guidance to understand regulatory
requirements
Develop and issue the Enhanced Weapons Training and
Qualification Plan
Review, revise, and reissue the Site Physical Security
Plan
Review, revise, and reissue the Safeguards Contingency
Plan
Develop and issue the Weapons Safety Assessment
Initial purchase of enhanced weapons
Initial purchase of enhanced weapon ammunition
Enhanced weapons qualification (labor cost)
Enhanced weapons qualification (consumables)
Enhanced weapons subtotal
Physical Security Event Notifications
Review, revise, and reissue the site physical security
event notification procedure
Develop the physical security event notification training
module
Conduct physical security event notification training
Physical security event notification subtotal
$
$
Decommissioning
Plant Sites
(25,000) $
(42,000) $
Category I
SSNM Sites
(25,000) $
(42,000) $
(25,000)
(42,000)
$
(8,000)
$
(68,000) $
(68,000) $
(76,000)
$
$
(3,000) $
(37,000) $
(3,000) $
(37,000) $
(3,000)
(37,000)
$
$
(17,000) $
(25,000) $
(17,000) $
(14,000) $
(17,000)
(30,000)
$
(68,000) $
(37,000) $
(80,000)
$
$
$
(1,000) $
(22,000) $
(174,000) $
(,000) $
(12,000) $
(121,000) $
(1,000)
(26,000)
(194,000)
$
(17,000) $
(17,000) $
(17,000)
$
(17,000) $
(17,000) $
(17,000)
$
(14,000) $
(14,000) $
(14,000)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
(17,000)
(51,000)
(338,000)
(66,000)
(34,000)
(22,000)
(576,000)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
(17,000)
(51,000)
(196,000)
(38,000)
(19,000)
(12,000)
(381,000)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
(17,000)
(51,000)
(391,000)
(77,000)
(40,000)
(26,000)
(650,000)
$
(4,000) $
(4,000) $
(4,000)
$
$
$
(2,000) $
(2,000) $
(9,000) $
(2,000) $
(2,000) $
(9,000) $
(2,000)
(2,000)
(9,000)
Suspicious Activity Reporting
Review, revise, and reissue the site suspicious activity
event notification procedure
Develop the suspicious activity event notification training
module
$
(4,000) $
(4,000) $
(4,000)
$
(2,000) $
(2,000) $
(2,000)
Conduct suspicious activity event event notification
training
$
(2,000) $
(2,000) $
(2,000)
Suspicious activity event notification subtotal
$
(9,000) $
(9,000) $
(9,000)
Site total
$
(834,000) $
(587,000) $
(937,000)
25
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities
Eight licensees at seven sites received stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory
orders. No licensees applied for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority via orders. If the final rule is promulgated, these seven sites would be required to
transition from the stand-alone preemption authority under the confirmatory orders to the
requirements of the published regulation. To estimate costs, the NRC staff made the following
assumptions that reflect labor and costs these licensees would incur to conform to the
requirements of the final rule.
•
Each site that received stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory orders would
incur 60 hours of licensee staff time to read and understand the final rule. This reflects
two staff members spending 30 hours each reading the final rule and associated
guidance.
•
Each site that received stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory orders would
incur 120 hours of licensee staff time to review the licensee’s procedures and plans to
identify whether any changes are necessary to comply with the final rule.
•
On average, site personnel would incur 240 hours of licensee staff time to revise the
licensee’s procedures and plans to conform to the requirements of the final rule and
issue the revised documents.
Table 5 shows the estimated industry implementation costs for these seven sites to transition to
the final rule requirements.
Table 5 Industry Implementation Costs for Stand-Alone
Preemption Authority Transition Activities
Activity
No. of
Transition
Sites
Hours
per Site
Unit
Cost
Transition from Orders to Rule Requirements
Read the final rule and guidance to understand
Section 161A requirements as compared to the
7
60
$106
confirmatory orders
Review associated procedures and plans
7
120
$106
Revise and reissue affected procedures and
7
240
$106
plans
Establish procedures for quality fingerprint card
1
80
$106
submission (Category I SSNM facility)
Transition costs
3.2.4.2.
Transition
Costs for all
Sites with
Stand-Alone
Preemption
Authority
($45,000)
($89,000)
($178,000)
($8,000)
($320,000)
NRC Implementation Costs Incurred
Because of the final rule, the NRC would incur costs to review and approve applications for
Section 161A authority submitted by licensees who voluntarily elect to apply for stand-alone
preemption authority or combined preemption authority and stand-alone preemption authority.
The NRC is unaware of any eligible site not currently covered under a confirmatory order that
26
plans to elect Section 161A authority under this rule. Therefore, the rule’s total costs do not
assume any new Section 161A authority is sought. However, for completeness this regulatory
analysis estimates the costs the NRC would incur under the final rule were a licensee to apply
for Section 161A authority:
•
The NRC would incur labor costs to review and approve applications for Section 161A
authority. Based on the NRC’s experience processing the seven stand-alone
preemption authority orders, the NRC expects that NRC staff would expend 1,040 hours
performing the application review and issuing a safety evaluation.
•
For sites electing combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority, the
licensee would submit additional documentation (e.g., a weapons safety assessment) for
the use of enhanced weapons on site. The NRC expects to expend an additional
160 hours to review this information and provide input into the safety evaluation.
•
When the final rule is effective, any new applications for Section 161A authority will allow
the NRC to avert costs related to issuing confirmatory orders. Based on previous NRC
experience issuing confirmatory orders, the NRC staff estimates it would save about 400
hours per application. Since the NRC assumed that there will be no new Section 161A
authority applications, this averted cost was not included as a calculated benefit in this
regulatory analysis.
Table 6 shows the estimated NRC implementation costs incurred per site, by type of site.
Table 6 Estimated NRC Implementation Costs by Cost Category per Site
Implementing Costs by Type of Site (per site)
Decommissioning
Category I
Power Reactor
Power Reactor
SSNM Sites
Sites
Sites
Cost Category
Time for NRC to review the stand-alone preemption
authority submittals and issue a safety evaluation
Time for NRC to review combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority submittal
($137,000)
($137,000)
($137,000)
($21,000)
($21,000)
($21,000)
Transition Activities
The NRC would incur 12 hours of labor to document the withdrawal of the orders for each
licensee. The estimated costs to perform these transition activities are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 NRC Implementation Costs for Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities
No. of
Transition
Sites
Activity
Hours per
Site
Unit Cost
Transition
Costs for all
Sites with
Stand-Alone
Preemption
Authority
Transition from Orders to Rule Requirements
NRC documents the withdrawal of the
order for each licensee
7
12
$132
Transition costs
27
($11,000)
($11,000)
3.2.4.3.
Industry Operation Costs
As a result of the final rule, a licensee would incur costs associated with Section 161A authority,
if elected, and physical security event notifications and suspicious activity reporting.
The NRC made the following assumptions, which reflect labor and fees a regulated entity who
elects Section 161A authority would incur as a result of the final rule:
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority
•
•
Annual activities
o
A site would average 30 hours of staff time each year to update the initial
firearms background check training. The update would address changes to the
firearms background check process.
o
Site security personnel would receive 0.75 hours of background check training
annually.
o
Based on NRC staff experience with security staffing at regulated entities, there
is a 5-percent turnover or break in service for security personnel on average
each year. Sites would incur costs related to completing, checking, and
submitting firearms background checks for replacement staff hired each year to
fill vacancies.
o
A licensee would incur fees related to conducting firearms background checks for
new employees each year.
Five-year recurring activities
o
A licensee would incur labor costs for resubmitting security personnel for firearms
background checks using NRC Form 754 and fingerprints at least every 5 years.
The NRC staff assumes that the facility’s security staffing level remains constant.
o
A licensee would pay a fee for each firearms background check (NRC Form 754
and fingerprints) submitted for the 5-year resubmittals. The fee charged for each
firearms background check is $70.
Combined Preemption Authority and Enhanced Weapons Authority
•
Annual activities
o
Sites that receive combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority would periodically replace weapons and purchase replacement parts
each year to maintain the weapons. The NRC estimated that the average cost
for these replacements parts are 1.5 percent of initial cost.
o
Sites that receive combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority would be required to conduct monthly and annual inventories of
enhanced weapons. The annual check (i.e., the 12th monthly check) requires
the checking of the gun’s serial number. The NRC estimates that site personnel
28
will require an average of 5 minutes per weapon to perform the monthly check
and 10 minutes per weapon for the annual check.
•
o
Maintaining personnel qualification in use of weapons. The NRC estimates that
security personnel would maintain their proficiency with the weapons by
practicing at the firing range throughout the year. The NRC estimates that each
site security personnel would average 1,500 practice rounds annually. The NRC
assumes that security personnel will shoot 100 rounds during each firing range
practice session, which includes fifteen 2-hour firing range sessions per year.
o
In addition, licensees will incur costs for annual activities for stand-alone
preemption authority listed above (e.g., background check training and the
completion of background checks).
Five-year recurring activities
o
The recurring activities for combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority are the same as those listed above for stand-alone
preemption authority listed above.
Table 8 shows the estimated industry operations recurring costs by cost category and type of
site for Section 161A authority.
Table 8 Industry Operations Recurring Costs by Cost Category and
Type of Site for Section 161A Authority
Type of Site
Annual Cost
(per site)
5 Year Interval
Incremental Cost
(per site)
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority
Power Reactor Sites (includes atreactor ISFSIs)
Decommissioning Power Sites
and Away-from-Reactor ISFSI
Sites
Category I SSNM Sites
($38,000)
($91,000)
($25,000)
($49,000)
($44,000)
($106,000)
Combined Preemption Authority and Enhanced Weapons Authority
Power Reactor Sites (includes atreactor ISFSIs)
Decommissioning Power Reactor
Sites and Away-from-Reactor
ISFSI Sites
Category I SSNM Sites
($77,000)
$0
($43,000)
$0
($89,000)
$0
Table 9 shows the total industry operations costs for representative sites that may elect
Section 161A authority based on the recurring costs presented in Table 8. Because these
elections are voluntary, a site can avoid these costs by not electing this authority. The costs in
Table 9 are derived by performing a discounted cash flow analysis of the annual operation costs
on a per site basis that is aggregated over the applicability period.
29
Table 9 Industry Operation Costs on a Per Site Basis for
Representative Sites that May Elect Section 161A Authority
Site Description
Representative
Power Reactor
Site (includes atreactor ISFSIs)
Cost Category
Stand-Alone
Preemption
Authority
Combined
Preemption and
Enhanced
Weapons
Authority
Average
Applicability
Period
(Years)
Representative
Decommissioning
Power Reactor
Site and Awayfrom-Reactor
ISFSI Sites
Representative
Category I SSNM
Site
3% NPV
($2,017,000)
($754,000)
($1,242,000)
($2,757,000)
($1,068,000) ($1,722,000)
($4,774,000)
($1,822,000) ($2,964,000)
($521,000)
($326,000)
($420,000)
($639,000)
($415,000)
($523,000)
($1,160,000)
($741,000)
($943,000)
($828,000)
($482,000)
($643,000)
($1,700,000)
($990,000)
($1,320,000)
18
Total
Stand-Alone
Preemption
Authority
Combined
Preemption and
Enhanced
Weapons
Authority
7% NPV
37
Total
Stand-Alone
Preemption
Authority
Combined
Preemption and
Enhanced
Weapons
Authority
Undiscounted
16
Total
($2,528,000)
($1,472,000) ($1,963,000)
Physical Security Event Notifications and Suspicious Activity Reporting
The physical security event notification requirements that are new as part of this rule are two
types–(1) imminent or actual hostile actions and (2) lost or stolen enhanced weapons. For
imminent or actual hostile actions, the NRC staff estimates one such event per 15 years.
Additionally, non-power reactors are now subject to additional physical security event
notification requirements. As a result, the following number of reported events per site annually
are assumed:
o
5.88x10-4 actual or imminent hostile action notifications
o
0 enhanced weapons related notifications5
o
1.3x10-1 additional non-power reactor physical security notifications.
5
This is based on the assumption that no additional licensees would apply for combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority.
30
Under new section 10 CFR 73.1200, “Notification of physical security events,” the licensee
would notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone of various physical security
events (e.g., actual or imminent hostile actions, significant facility or transportation security
events, facility or transportation security challenges, or facility or transportation security program
failures). For these events, a written follow-up report is also required within 60 days in
accordance with new section 10 CFR 73.1205, “Written follow-up reports of physical security
events.” Parts 50 and 52 licensees submit written follow-up reports to the NRC using NRC
Form 366, “Licensee Event Report.” All other classes of licensees submit written follow-up
reports by letter format. The NRC estimates that the licensee would require 15 minutes to make
the telephone notifications and 80 hours to complete and submit the written follow-up reports.
For physical security events that do not require a NRC notification and follow-up report,
licensees are required to document the event in accordance with new section 10 CFR 73.1210,
“Recordkeeping of physical security events.” The NRC estimates that the licensee would
require 12 minutes to record the event in either a safeguards event log or the licensee’s
corrective action program. These physical security event estimates are based on current
licensee and NRC experience.
Table 10, “Industry Operation Costs for Physical Security Event Notifications,” shows the
estimated industry operations recurring costs for the reporting of physical security event
notifications.
Table 10 Industry Operation Costs for Physical Security Event Notifications
Site Description
Cost Category
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
All Applicable
Sites
Physical
Security Event
Notifications
($27,000)
($13,000)
($19,000)
The net present value of the new physical security event notification costs for all sites over their
applicability period will range between ($13,000) using a 7-percent discount rate and ($19,000)
using a 3-percent discount rate. Additionally, the time spent by the licensees to write a report or
record the physical security event is factored into these operation costs.
To estimate the incremental recurring and annual costs associated with suspicious activity
reporting requirements, the analysis relies on the following assumptions:
o
The suspicious activity reporting requirements are currently reported voluntarily by
the licensees. Per the NRC staff, the average number of suspicious activities
reported by a site is 2.5 per year.
o
Under new section 10 CFR 73.1215, “Suspicious activity reports,” if suspicious
activities are detected, it is estimated that the licensee would take 30 minutes to
report the suspicious activity. No written follow-up report is required for these
notifications.
As shown in Table 11, “Industry Operation Costs for Suspicious Activity Reporting,” the net
present value of suspicious activity reporting costs for all sites over their applicability period will
range between ($120,000) using a 7-percent discount rate and ($180,000) using a 3-percent
discount rate. Currently, these events are voluntarily reported by the industry in response to
generic communications and guidance from the FBI. The NRC staff has used the voluntary
industry suspicious activity reporting initiative to estimate the costs and benefits.
31
Table 11 Industry Operation Costs for Suspicious Activity Reporting
Site Description
Cost Category
All Applicable
Sites
Suspicious
Activity
Reporting
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
($272,000)
($120,000)
($180,000)
All consequences of a regulatory change are measured relative to a regulatory baseline, which
is how things would be if the proposed alternative were not imposed. Because voluntary
reporting for the proposed regulatory action exists, the future role of whether this voluntary
reporting will continue indefinitely must be determined. This determination would affect the
baseline, which in turn would affect the calculation of incremental costs and benefits. For
example, if “full credit” is given to these voluntary actions (i.e., it is assumed that the voluntary
reporting will continue in the future), the incremental benefits attributable to these provisions in
the final regulation are diminished. Alternatively, if “no credit” is given, the incremental values
assigned to the rule are increased. For the purposes of this regulatory analysis, the costs and
benefit results are calculated based on giving “no credit” for this voluntary reporting.
3.2.4.4.
NRC Operation Costs
The NRC would incur costs to review and receive physical security event notifications, review
and receive suspicious activity reports and process background checks. To assess these costs,
the analysis relies on the following assumptions:
•
On average, the NRC will require 1 hour to review the written report for notification of a
physical security event. The NRC estimates for physical security events that there
would be 5.88x10-4 actual or imminent hostile actions reported per site each year (siteyear) and 1.3x10-1 additional physical security events reported per non-power reactor
site each year.
•
On average, the NRC estimates it will require 15 minutes of NRC staff time to receive a
telephone notification of a suspicious activity. As discussed in Section 3.2.4.3, the NRC
estimates on average, the number of suspicious activities reported by a site is 2.5 per
year.
•
On average, the NRC estimates that it will require 15 minutes of NRC staff time to
process a background check. There are a total of 550 background checks per year that
the NRC will process.
Table 12 provides the net present value of the NRC operation costs aggregated over the
applicability period for all sites.
32
Table 12 NRC Operation Costs as a Result of the Final Rule
Site Description
All Applicable
Sites (Physical
Security Event
Notifications)
All Applicable
Sites (Suspicious
Activity
Reporting)
Process
background
checks
Total
Undiscounted
7% NPV
3% NPV
($13,000)
($8,000)
($10,000)
($339,000)
($149,000)
($224,000)
($523,000)
($225,000)
($340,000)
($352,000)
($157,000)
($235,000)
4. Evaluation of Benefits and Costs
This section organizes the analytical results into four sections. Section 4.1 presents results on
the benefits and costs of the final rule as a whole, as well as disaggregated results for each of
the regulatory requirements that comprise the final rule. Section 4.2 evaluates the uncertainties
and identifies those uncertain variables that most affect the variation in the results. Section 4.3
discusses disaggregation of the requirements in the final rule. Section 4.4 addresses the
applicability of a safety goal evaluation to the final rule.
4.1.
Benefits and Costs of the Final Rule
This section discusses the incremental benefit and cost estimates for the final rule.
4.1.1.
Summary of Benefits and Costs
Table 13 summarizes the incremental benefits and costs of the final rule as compared to the
baseline.
The final rule as a whole (Alternative 2) would result in an estimated cost of between
($2.85) million at a 7-percent discount rate and ($3.07) million at a 3-percent discount rate.
These costs are associated with four affected attributes⎯industry implementation and operation
and NRC implementation and operation. Section 4.2 provides detail on the incremental
activities under the final rule, and estimates the one-time, recurring, and annual costs
associated with these activities.
Overall, the benefits of the final regulation include enhanced public safety and security resulting
from increased defensive capability to interdict and neutralize an attack or potentially to deter an
attack for those entities that opt to employ the voluntary Section 161A authority. Also, the final
rule implements the mandates of Section 161A of the AEA, as described in the Firearms
Guidelines. The final rule also increases regulatory efficiency as it obviates the need for
confirmatory orders if any new Section 161A authority is sought. Additionally, the physical
security event notification regulations clarify the regulatory requirements for reporting physical
security events by grouping these events into several timeliness categories (e.g., 15-minute,
1-hour, 4-hour, and 8-hour notifications). The suspicious activity reporting requirements also
clarify the process and type of events to report to the NRC and other law enforcement agencies.
33
In so doing, the NRC’s primary mission essential function of threat assessment for licensed
facilities, materials, and shipping activities is supported.
Table 13 Summary of Overall Benefits and Costs (Quantitative and Qualitative)
Benefits
Costs
Alternative 2:
Final Rule
Summary
Implementation Costs:
($2.56 million) using a 7% discount rate
($2.64 million) using a 3% discount rate
Operation Costs:
($0.29 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.43 million) using a 3% discount rate
Total Costs:
($2.85 million) using a 7% discount rate
($3.07 million) using a 3% discount rate
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities
Statute Requirement – Section 161A of the AEA provides
that the Commission shall, with the approval of the AG,
develop and promulgate guidelines for the implementation of
this statute. This includes stand-alone preemption authority
and combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority. The statute also includes provisions for firearms
background checks for the security personnel of those
licensees who apply for Section 161A authority. The final
rule is necessary to implement Section 161A of the AEA.
Safeguards and Security Considerations – The regulations
in the enhanced weapons rulemaking will comply with
statutory requirements and provide assurance that public
health and safety and the common defense and security will
be enhanced because of licensees’ increased defensive
capability to interdict and neutralize an attack, or potentially
deter an attack.
Regulatory Efficiency – The final rule would result in
qualitative enhancements to regulatory efficiency. Publishing
the rule would obviate the need for additional enhanced
weapons designation and confirmatory orders.
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority
Transition Activities
Industry Implementation Costs:
($0.37 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.44 million) using a 3% discount rate
Industry Operation Costs: No incremental
operation costs
NRC Implementation Costs:
($0.01 million)
NRC Operation Costs: No incremental
operation costs
Total Implementation Costs:
($0.38 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.46 million) using a 3% discount rate
Total Operation Costs: No incremental
operation costs
Total Stand-Alone Preemption Authority
Transition Activities Cost:
($0.38 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.46 million) using a 3% discount rate
Physical Security Event Notifications and Suspicious
Activity Reporting
Safeguards and Security Considerations – The changes to
both physical security event notification and suspicious
activity reporting requirements support the NRC’s primary
mission essential functions of threat assessment for licensed
facilities, materials, and shipping activities.
Regulatory Efficiency – The final rule would result in
qualitative enhancements to regulatory efficiency. The
changes to the physical security event notification and
suspicious activity reporting requirements would clarify the
process and types of events reported to the NRC.
Other Government Agencies – Reporting suspicious
activities to the local FBI and FAA (for suspicious activities
34
Physical Security Event Notifications
Industry Implementation Costs:
($1.16 million)
Industry Operation Costs:
($0.013 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.019 million) using a 3% discount rate
NRC Implementation Costs:
No incremental implementation costs
NRC Operation Costs:
($0.008 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.010 million) using a 3% discount rate
Benefits
Costs
involving aircraft) field offices will add to the information
available about security trends.
Total Implementation Costs:
($1.16 million)
Other Considerations – Currently, the two types of security
event notifications that the rule alternative would require are
reported voluntarily by industry in response to generic
communications and guidance from the FBI. As a result, the
benefits that would be attributed to this provision in the final
regulation are diminished. Similarly, the costs calculated in
this analysis based on giving “no credit” to the current
reporting may be overstated because the existing licensee
procedures and processes may already meet the intended
regulatory standard.
Total Operation Costs:
($0.021 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.029 million) using a 3% discount rate
Total Physical Security Event
Notifications Cost:
($1.19 million) using a 7% discount rate
($1.19 million) using a 3% discount rate
Suspicious Activity Reporting
Industry Implementation Costs:
($1.02 million)
Industry Operation Costs:
($0.12 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.18 million) using a 3% discount rate
NRC Implementation Costs: No
incremental implementation costs
NRC Operation Costs:
($0.15 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.22 million) using a 3% discount rate
Total Implementation Costs:
($1.02 million)
Total Operation Costs:
($0.27 million) using a 7% discount rate
($0.40 million) using a 3% discount rate
Total Suspicious Activity Reporting Cost:
($1.29 million) using a 7% discount rate
($1.42 million) using a 3% discount rate
4.2.
Uncertainty Analysis
To determine the robustness of the costs and net benefits of the final rule, the NRC staff
examined how the industry and the NRC costs change due to uncertainties associated with the
NRC staff’s analytical assumptions and input data. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the NRC used
Monte Carlo simulations to examine the impact of uncertainty on the estimated net benefits of
the proposed rule. These Monte Carlo simulations were performed using the @RISK® software
program.6
Monte Carlo simulations forecast uncertainty by replacing the point estimates of the variables
used to estimate base case costs and benefits with probability distributions. By defining input
variables as probability distributions as opposed to point estimates, the effect of uncertainty on
the results of the analysis (i.e., the net benefits) can be effectively modeled.
The probability distributions chosen to represent the different variables in the analysis were
bounded by the range referenced input, historical data, and the NRC staff’s professional
judgment. When defining the probability distributions in the Monte Carlo simulation, summary
6
Information about this software is available online at www.palisade.com.
35
statistics are needed to characterize the distributions. These summary statistics include the
minimum, most likely, and maximum values of a program evaluation and review technique
(PERT) distribution.7 The PERT distribution was used to reflect the relative spread and
skewness of the distribution defined by the three estimates.
Appendix B identifies the data elements, the distribution, and the summary statistics used in the
uncertainty analysis.
4.2.1.
Uncertainty Analysis Results
The Monte Carlo simulation was performed by repeatedly recalculating the results 10,000 times.
For each analysis iteration, the values identified in Appendix C were chosen randomly from the
probability distributions that define the input variables. The value of the output variables was
recorded for each iteration, and these resulting output variable values were used to define the
resultant probability distribution.
For each figure below, 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations were run in which the key variables were
changed to assess the effect on costs. The cost distributions illustrated in the following
subsections represent the incremental costs from the regulatory baseline (Alternative 1) and
provide descriptive statistics concerning the uncertainty distribution. The 5-percent and the
95-percent values that appear as vertical lines with a numerical value at the top, as shown in
Figure 1, illustrate the 5-percent and 95-percent values, respectively.
7
A PERT distribution is a special form of the beta distribution with a minimum and maximum value specified. The
shape parameter is calculated from the defined most likely value. The PERT distribution is similar to a triangular
distribution, in that it has the same set of three parameters. Technically, it is a special case of a scaled beta (or
beta general) distribution. It can generally be considered to be superior to the triangular distribution when the
parameters result in a skewed distribution, as the smooth shape of the curve places less emphasis in the
direction of skew. Similar to the triangular distribution, the PERT distribution is bounded on both sides, and
therefore may not be adequate for some modeling purposes where it is desired to capture tail or extreme events.
36
4.2.1.1.
Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities
Figure 1 Industry Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate)
-460.41
-264.57
5.0%
90.0%
5.0%
Industry transition
activities
implementation - 7%
NPV
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
5%
95%
-600
-550
-500
-450
-400
-350
Values in Thousands ($)
-300
-250
-200
-$583,824
-$184,868
-$359,496
-$460,407
-$264,567
-150
Figure 2 NRC Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate)
-13.38
-8.79
5.0%
90.0%
5.0%
NRC transition activities
implementation - 7% NPV
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
5%
95%
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
Values in Thousands ($)
37
-9
-8
-7
-$14,683
-$7,521
-$11,085
-$13,382
-$8,789
Figure 3 Total Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Implementation Costs
(7% Discount Rate)
-471.81
5.0%
-275.51
90.0%
5.0%
Total transition
activities
implementation - 7%
NPV
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
5%
95%
-600
-550
-500
-450
-400
-350
Values in Thousands ($)
-300
-250
-200
-$595,317
-$197,543
-$370,582
-$471,811
-$275,515
-150
Figure 4 Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Transition Activities Cost Drivers
(7% Discount Rate)
38
To estimate the effect of each uncertain variable on the net benefits, a regression was
performed with the net benefits modeled as the dependent variable and the inputs as the
independent variables. The result of this regression is called a tornado diagram and it
represents in vertical order the variables with the greatest influence on the net benefits. The
tornado diagram also displays the resulting impact on the calculated mean value for each of the
input variables.
Figure 4 presents the tornado diagram for the total cost of the final rule using a 7-percent
discount rate. As shown in this figure, the cost drivers that have the greatest influence on the
total costs are the costs for licensees to review and revise their procedures and plans to
conform to the regulation. These variables, which are shown to have a large effect on the
resulting net benefits, may deserve more attention and scrutiny than other variables shown to
have a smaller or minimal effect.
From an examination of Figures 1 through 4, the simulation analysis shows that the estimated
cost for transitioning seven sites from the stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory
orders to the requirements under the final rule and to sunset these orders range between
($595,000) and ($198,000) with a mean value of ($371,000). Examining the range of the
resulting output distribution provided in these figures provides confidence in the estimated costs
of this final rule provision.
4.2.1.2.
Physical Security Event Notification Activities
This section presents the total operating costs over the applicability period.
Figure 5
Industry Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
39
Figure 6 NRC Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
Figure 7 Total Physical Security Event Notification Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
40
Figure 8 Physical Security Event Notification Cost Drivers
Industry labor rate
-1,381,321.27
Industry time to revise reporting procedures for physical security events
-951,048.58
-1,332,116.90
Industry conduct reporting procedure training for physical security events
-1,048,502.42
-1,282,009.67
Industry time to prepare training materials for physical security events
-1,275,094.19
Industry review and issue reporting procedures
-1,093,456.85
-1,092,911.68
-1,254,672.91
Industry evaluation of requirements changes
-1,126,016.36
-1,239,095.37
Input High
Input Low
-1,131,850.08
NPUF licensee time to complete notification of additional physical security event
-1,197,812.20
-1,174,556.30
Number of additional events reported by NPUF licensees per site year
-1,198,602.76
-1,176,364.02
Licensee time to prepare follow-up report for physical security event
-1,193,947.94
Number hostile events reported by the licensees per site year
-1,193,764.13
-1,174,266.41
-1,180,639.69
Baseline = -1,185,340.15
-1.40
-1.35
-1.30
-1.25
-1.20
-1.15
-1.10
-1.05
-1.00
-0.95
Total event notification costs - 7% NPV
Values in Millions
From an examination of Figures 5 through 7, the physical security event notification activities
will result in total costs that range between ($1.81 million) and ($0.57 million) with a mean value
of ($1.19 million) based on a 7-percent discount rate. Figure 8 presents the most significant
cost drivers. The cost drivers that have the greatest influence on these costs are the industry
labor cost and industry time to revise reporting procedures for physical security event
notifications.
41
4.2.1.3.
Suspicious Activity Event Notification Activities
This section presents the total operating costs over the applicability period.
Figure 9 Industry Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
Figure 10 NRC Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
42
Figure 11 Total Suspicious Activity Reporting Operating Costs (7% Discount Rate)
Figure 12
Suspicious Activity Reporting Cost Drivers
Industry labor rate
Licensee time to report suspicious events
-1,533,364.82
-1,117,488.36
-1,555,285.85
Number of suspicious events reported by the licensees per site-year
-1,193,063.32
-1,482,427.84
Industry time to revise reporting procedures for suspicious events
-1,196,968.11
-1,459,496.81
Industry time to prepare training materials for suspicious events
-1,235,966.79
-1,417,323.33
Industry conduct reporting procedure training for suspicious events
-1,266,362.91
-1,393,648.68
Industry evaluation of requirements changes
Input Low
-1,254,222.73
-1,424,397.99
Industry review and issue reporting procedures
Input High
-1,289,864.99
-1,389,193.02
-1,301,974.44
Baseline = -1,339,140.52
-1.60
-1.55
-1.50
-1.45
-1.40
-1.35
-1.30
-1.25
-1.20
-1.15
-1.10
Total event notification costs - 7% NPV
Values in Millions
From an examination of Figures 9 through 11, the suspicious activity reporting will result in total
costs that range between ($2.26 million) and ($737,000) with a mean value of ($1.34 million)
based on a 7-percent discount rate. Figure 12 presents the most significant cost drivers. The
cost drivers that have the greatest influence on these costs are the industry labor cost and the
time for licensees to report suspicious activities.
43
4.2.1.4.
Final Rule Net Benefits
The following figures provide a consolidated view of the uncertainty analysis for the entire rule.
This view combines the costs and benefits for Section 161A authority, the physical security
event notification, and suspicious activity reporting.
Figure 13 Final Rule Implementation Costs (7% Discount Rate)
44
Figure 14 Final Rule Operations Costs (7% Discount Rate)
Figure 15 Final Rule Total Costs (7% Discount Rate)
From an examination of Figures 13 through 15, the analysis indicates that the final rule results
in a net cost of between ($4.35 million) and ($1.82 million) with a mean estimate of
($2.90 million) based on a 7-percent discount rate.
45
Figure 16 Final Rule Cost Drivers
Industry labor rate
Licensee time to report suspicious events
-3,349,243.18
-2,367,627.79
-3,114,015.74
-2,765,167.93
Industry time to revise reporting procedures for physical security events
-3,041,903.42
Number of suspicious events reported by the licensees per site-year
-3,041,373.94
-2,755,020.69
-2,767,616.84
Industry time to revise reporting procedures for suspicious events
-3,012,525.46
-2,793,693.40
Input High
Industry conduct reporting procedure training for physical security events
-3,013,258.19
-2,799,837.77
Input Low
Industry time to prepare training materials for physical security events
-2,987,527.25
-2,809,703.91
Industry time to prepare training materials for suspicious events
-2,981,791.90
-2,806,156.90
Industry conduct reporting procedure training for suspicious events
-2,985,296.79
Industry review and issue reporting procedures
-2,816,653.15
-2,967,705.06
-2,838,083.74
Baseline = -2,895,062.33
-3.4
-3.3
-3.2
-3.1
-3.0
-2.9
-2.8
-2.7
-2.6
-2.5
-2.4
-2.3
Final Rule Total Costs - 7% NPV
Values in Millions
Figure 16 presents the most significant cost drivers. The cost drivers that have the greatest
influence on the final rule consist of the industry labor rate and the time for licensees to report
suspicious activity events.
4.3.
Disaggregation
The final rule has three distinct parts: (1) the portion of the rule related to Section 161A
authority, (2) the portion of the rule related to physical security event notification requirements,
and (3) the portion of the rule related to suspicious activity reporting requirements. The costs
for each are presented separately throughout this analysis. The NRC is unaware of any eligible
site not currently covered under a confirmatory order that plans to elect the Section 161A
authority under this rule. The costs were estimated for representative sites that are eligible for
this authority and are presented separately throughout this analysis.
5. Decision Rationale for Selection of the Proposed Action
This analysis is based on the quantification of costs and averted costs, where possible, and
relies on qualitative consideration of the costs and benefits for complying with the statutory
requirements of Section 161A of the AEA; the safeguards and security considerations; and the
regulatory efficiency considerations. A qualitative analysis is necessary because of the
difficulties associated with monetizing: (1) licensees’ increased defensive capability to interdict,
neutralize, or potentially deter an attack and (2) the impacts of the physical security event
notification requirements and suspicious activity reporting.
Two compelling benefits are not quantified, which makes a net cost-beneficial determination
based solely on quantitative results not meaningful. The first benefit is that the final rule
implements the provisions of Section 161A of the AEA. The staff has concluded that this
analysis demonstrates that the final rule implements the Commission’s Section 161A authority
in a cost-effective manner. Secondly, the final rule provides the potential to enhance public
health and safety and the common defense and security because of licensees’ increased
defensive capability to interdict and neutralize an attack, or to deter an attack through approved
46
weapons and enhanced physical security event and suspicious activity event notification
requirements. Based on the NRC’s assessment of the costs and benefits of the final rule,
including those benefits which are unquantified, the NRC has concluded that the final rule
provisions would be justified to protect public health and safety and the common defense and
security.
6. Implementation
The NRC staff proposes to make the final rule effective 30 days after publication in the Federal
Register with no compliance date for licensees who do not intend to apply for Section 161A
authority, since application for Section 161A authority is voluntary. However, licensees who
have been issued a confirmatory order for Section 161A authority would have 300 days after the
date of publication of the final rule in the Federal Register to comply (e.g., transition from the
requirements of their orders to the requirements of the final rule). Regulated entities affected by
the physical security event notifications portion and the suspicious activity reporting portion of
the rule also would have a compliance date of 300 days after the date of publication of the final
rule.
The proposed implementation schedule is not expected to result in a cumulative impact on
affected entities. This is because: (1) no other pending 10 CFR Part 73 regulatory actions exist
that would impact the site security professionals responsible for implementing the final rule
requirements; (2) the changes to policy, procedures, contracts, and training for those sites that
have received stand-alone preemption authority via confirmatory order are minimal; and
(3) because application for Section 161A is voluntary, licensees can choose their own schedule
to moderate any cumulative effects of regulatory impact.
7. References
1.
NRC, Draft Final Rule “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and
Security Event Notifications,” Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16264A000.
2.
76 FR 6200, “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications, Proposed Rule” (amending 10 CFR Part 73), Washington, DC, February
3, 2011. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-03/pdf/2011-1766.pdf, last
accessed on July 7, 2014.
3.
NRC, RG 5.86, “Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption Authority, and Firearms
Background Checks,” ADAMS Accession No. ML17131A296.
4.
NRC, RG 5.62, Revision 2, “Physical Security Event Notifications, Reports, and
Records,” ADAMS Accession No. ML17131A285.
5.
NRC, RG Guide 5.87, “Suspicious Activity Reports (U),” ADAMS Accession
No. ML17138A384 (redacted publicly-available); ML17132A163 (non-publicly
available).
6.
NRC, NUREG/BR-0058, “Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,” Revision 4, issued September 2004. ADAMS Accession No.
ML042820192.
47
7.
NRC, NUREG/BR-0184, “Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook,”
“Section 5.7: Quantification of Attributes,” Washington, DC, January 1997. ADAMS
Accession No. ML050190193.
8.
NRC, NUREG/BR-0053, Revision 6, “United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regulations Handbook,” 2005. ADAMS Accession No. ML052720461.
9.
“Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., Kewaunee Power Station, Certification of
Permanent Cessation of Power Operations,” February 25, 2013. ADAMS Accession
No. ML13058A065.
10.
NRC, “NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000305/2017001(DNMS) and
07200064/2017001 – Kewaunee Power Station,” July 21, 2017. ADAMS Accession No.
ML17202G453.
11.
Duke Energy, “Crystal River Unit 3—Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power
Operations and That Fuel Has Been Permanently Removed from Reactor,” Crystal
River, FL, February 20, 2013. ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A005.
12.
NRC, 2017-2018 Information Digest (NUREG-1350, Volume 29), Appendix H “U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licenses - Expiration by Year, 2013–
2049.” Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/.
13.
NRC public website for information related to the NFS license:
https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/fc/nuclear-fuel-services.html?panel=0#panel0
14.
NRC public website for information related to the BWXT license:
https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/fc/bwxt-nuclear-lc.html
15.
NRC, “Compliance Evaluation Report for Part 76 Certificate Termination for the United
States Enrichment Corporation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant,” October 17, 2014.
ADAMS Accession No. ML14268A555.
16.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “Generic Cost Estimates,” NUREG/CR-4627,
February 1992. ADAMS Accession No. ML13137A259.
17.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “May 2015 National IndustrySpecific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS 221113 – Nuclear
Electric Power Generation,” United States, Washington, DC.
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics5_221113.htm, last modified March 30, 2016.
48
Appendix A – NRC Regulated Sites
Affected by the Enhanced Weapons Final Rule
A-1
[Page intentionally left blank.]
A-2
Table A-1
Facility Name
Power
Reactor
NRC Regulated Sites Affected by the Enhanced Weapons Final Rule
General
ISFSI
license
SiteSpecific
ISFSI
license
Decommissioning Power
Reactors
Non-power
Reactor
Sites with no
operating
reactors
Operating or Under Construction (includes decommissioning units & at-reactor ISFSIs)
Arkansas Nuclear One,
X
X
Units 1 & 2
Beaver Valley Power
X
X
Station, Units 1 & 2
Braidwood Station, Units
X
X
1&2
Browns Ferry Nuclear
X
X
Plant, Units 1, 2 & 3
Brunswick Steam Electric
X
X
Plant, Units 1 & 2
Byron Station, Units 1 &
X
X
2
Callaway Plant
X
X
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
X
X
Power Plant, Units 1 & 2
Catawba Nuclear Station,
X
X
Units 1 & 2
Clinton Power Station,
X
Unit 1
Columbia Generating
X
X
Station
Comanche Peak Nuclear
X
X
Power Plant, Units 1 & 2
Cooper Nuclear Station
X
X
Davis-Besse Nuclear
X
X
Power Station, Unit 1
Diablo Canyon Nuclear
X
X
Power Plant, Units 1 & 2
Donald C. Cook Nuclear
X
X
Plant, Units 1 & 2
Dresden Nuclear Power
X
X
Station, Units 1, 2 & 3
Duane Arnold Energy
X
X
Center
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear
X
X
Plant, Units 1 & 2
Fermi, Units 1 & 2
X
X
Grand Gulf Nuclear
X
X
Station, Unit 1
H. B. Robinson Steam
X
X
X
Electric Plant, Unit 2
Hope Creek Generating
X
X
Station, Unit 1
Indian Point Nuclear
Generating, Units 1, 2 &
X
X
3
James A. FitzPatrick
X
X
Nuclear Power Plant
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear
X
X
Plant, Units 1 & 2
A-3
Sites with
operating
reactors
X
X
X
Fuel
Cycle
Facility
Awayfromreactor
ISFSIs
Materials
Facility
Facility Name
LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 & 2
Limerick Generating
Station, Units 1 & 2
McGuire Nuclear Station,
Units 1 & 2
Millstone Power Station,
Units 1, 2 & 3
Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Unit 1
Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Station, Units 1 & 2
North Anna Power
Station, Units 1 & 2
Oconee Nuclear Station,
Units 1, 2 & 3
Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station
Palisades Nuclear Plant
Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station, Units
1, 2 & 3
Peach Bottom Atomic
Power Station, Units 1, 2
&3
Perry Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit 1
Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station
Point Beach Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 & 2
Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant, Units 1
&2
Quad Cities Nuclear
Power Station, Units 1 &
2
R.E. Ginna Nuclear
Power Plant
River Bend Station, Unit
1
St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 &
2
Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Units
1&2
Seabrook Station, Unit 1
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 & 2
Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit 1
South Texas Project,
Units 1 & 2
SiteSpecific
ISFSI
license
Power
Reactor
General
ISFSI
license
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Decommissioning Power
Reactors
Non-power
Reactor
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Sites with
operating
reactors
X
X
X
X
Sites with no
operating
reactors
X
X
A-4
Fuel
Cycle
Facility
Awayfromreactor
ISFSIs
Materials
Facility
Facility Name
Power
Reactor
Surry Power Station,
X
Units 1 & 2
Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 &
X
2
Three Mile Island Nuclear
X
Station, Units 1 & 2
Turkey Point Nuclear
Generating Unit No. 3 &
X
4
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear
X
Station, Units 1, 2 & 3
Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Units
X
1, 2, 3, & 4
Waterford Steam Electric
X
Station, Unit 3
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,
X
Units 1 & 2
Wolf Creek Generating
X
Station, Unit 1
Decommissioning Power Reactors
Big Rock Point
General
ISFSI
license
SiteSpecific
ISFSI
license
X
X
Decommissioning Power
Reactors
Non-power
Reactor
Sites with no
operating
reactors
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
GE EVESR
X
GE VBWR
Fort Calhoun Station,
Unit 1
Ft. Saint Vrain
X
X
Haddam Neck
X
X
X
Humboldt Bay 3
X
X
X
X
Kewaunee
X
X
La Crosse
X
X
Maine Yankee
X
Rancho Seco
X
X
X
X
X
Savannah, N.S.
X
Trojan
X
X
Vermont Yankee
X
X
Yankee Rowe
X
X
Zion 1 & 2
X
X
ISFSI only
GE-Hitachi Morris (wet
storage)
Idaho National Lab TMI-2
Fuel Debris
Awayfromreactor
ISFSIs
X
Crystal River 3
San Onofre 1, 2, & 3
Sites with
operating
reactors
Fuel
Cycle
Facility
X
X
X
X
A-5
Materials
Facility
Facility Name
Idaho Spent Fuel Facility
Private Fuel Storage
Facility
Non-power Reactors
Power
Reactor
General
ISFSI
license
SiteSpecific
ISFSI
license
Decommissioning Power
Reactors
Non-power
Reactor
Sites with no
operating
reactors
Sites with
operating
reactors
Fuel
Cycle
Facility
Awayfromreactor
ISFSIs
X
X
X
X
Aerotest
Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research
Institute
Dow Chemical Company
X
GE-Hitachi Vallecitos
X
Idaho State University
X
Kansas State University
Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
Missouri University of
Science and Technology
National Institute of
Standards & Technology
North Carolina State
University
Ohio State University
X
Oregon State University
Pennsylvania State
University
Purdue University
X
Reed College
Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute
Rhode Island Atomic
Energy Commission
Texas A&M University
(AGN)e
Texas A&M University
(TRIGA)f
U.S. Geological Survey
University of
California/Davis
University of
California/Irvine
University of Florida
X
University of Maryland
University of
Massachusetts/Lowell
University of
Missouri/Columbia
University of New Mexico
X
University of Texas
X
University of Utah
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A-6
Materials
Facility
Facility Name
Power
Reactor
General
ISFSI
license
SiteSpecific
ISFSI
license
University of Wisconsin
Washington State
University
Operating Fuel Cycle Facilitiesd
Decommissioning Power
Reactors
Non-power
Reactor
Sites with no
operating
reactors
Sites with
operating
reactors
Fuel
Cycle
Facility
X
X
BWXT (Category I)
X
GNF-A
X
NFS (Category I)
X
Westinghouse
Louisiana Energy
Services
Hot Cell Facilities
GE-Hitachi Vallecitos
Nuclear Center
NRC Part 70 Material Facilities and Agreement State Material Facilities
X
Table Notes:
a
b
c
d
Materials
Facility
X
AREVA
Energy Solutions, Inc.
Lockheed Martin Space
System Co.
Teledyne Brown
Engineering
California Institute of
Technology
Georgia Institute of
Technology
John Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory
Mississippi State
University
University of
California/Berkeley
University of Nevada/Las
Vegas
Mirion Technologies
Corporation
Reuter-Stokes, LLC
U.S. Department of
Defense, Air Force
U.S. Department of
Defense, Navy
U.S. Department of
Defense, DTRA
Facility-type Total
Awayfromreactor
ISFSIs
X
X
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
Xg
X
X
X
X
X
60
63
15
31
18
6
7
4
14
Site has operating reactor(s) and decommissioning reactor(s). Because the applicability period for an operating reactor
exceeds the period for a reactor that already is decommissioning, the site is categorized as a “site with only reactors that are
in commercial operation” for purposes of this analysis.
The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station terminated commercial operation in December 2014; it is categorized as “site
with only reactors that are in decommissioning.”
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station plans to terminate commercial operation in 2019.
Global Laser Enrichment and Centrus have operating licenses but have no operation activity.
A-7
e
f
g
Aerojet-General Nucleonics (AGN) reactor.
Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor.
Agreement State licensee.
Table Sources:
1.
NRC, “Operating Nuclear Power Reactors (by Location or Name)” Web page, www.nrc.gov. Data current as of
August 10, 2017. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/.
2.
NRC, “Locations of Power Reactor Sites Undergoing Decommissioning” Web page, www.nrc.gov. Data current
as of August 10, 2017. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/.
3.
NRC, “NRC Maps of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI)” Web page, www.nrc.gov. Data
current as of November 14, 2017. Available at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/maps/isfsi.html.
4.
NRC, 2017-2018 Information Digest (NUREG-1350, Volume 29), Appendix H “U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power
Reactor Operating Licenses - Expiration by Year, 2013–2049.” Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/
5.
NRC, “Combined License Applications for New Reactors” Web page, www.nrc.gov. Data current as of August
10, 2017. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html.
A-8
Appendix B – Uncertainty Analysis Variables
[Page intentionally left blank.]
Table B-1
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
Source or Basis of
Estimate
Number of Security Personnel Requiring NICS Background Checks Per Site
Power reactor sites
Decommissioning
power reactor sites
Category I Special
Nuclear Material
Licensees
320
PERT
250
320
400
175
PERT
125
175
200
375
PERT
275
375
450
NRC estimate based on
experience with Orders.
(2148 total NICS checks
processed) Cat I SSNM
sites are similar to
operating power reactors
but also have tactical
teams (50 staff).
Industry (one-time, per site)
Section 161A Submittal
Assemble and submit
the application under
oath or affirmation for
stand-alone preemption
authority, and physical
security and safeguards
contingency plans
Assemble and submit
the application under
oath or affirmation for
combined preemption
and enhanced weapons
authority, and physical
security and safeguards
contingency plans
Applications to
terminate 161A
authority
NRC estimate
240 hours
PERT
200 hours
240 hours
360 hours
NRC estimate
280 hours
PERT
240
hours
280 hours
400 hours
NRC estimate
400 hours
PERT
350 hours
400 hours
450 hours
Firearms Background Checks
Understand the
regulations regarding
the firearms
background checks
32 hours
PERT
16 hours
32 hours
80 hours
347 hours
PERT
173 hours
347 hours
520 hours
Develop Firearms
Background Check
Plan
NRC estimate. Two staff
members per site using
16 hours to read and
understand the rule and
applicable guidance.
NRC best estimate based
on 2 staff months
supplemented by
professional judgement.
Expert opinion estimated
1 to 3 staff-months, which
are used for the low and
high estimate.
Background Check Training
Develop training
module for Section
161A background
check process
Initial and recurring
background check
training to site security
personnel
NRC estimate.
160 hours
0.75
PERT
PERT
140 hours
0.50
160 hours
0.75
180 hours
1.00
NRC estimate. Each
training session would
entail notifying security
personnel about what to
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
Source or Basis of
Estimate
do with the NICS
response (denied,
delayed, or accepted)
Conducting Firearms Background Checks
Time for NRC to
process background
checks.
15 minutes
Number of background
checks the NRC will
process annually.
550
Based on OMB
supporting statement.
NONE
Based on OMB
supporting statement.
NONE
Staff and Licensee Time to Prepare Notifications to Licensee Requesting Additional Time for Background Checks
Fraction of security
personnel that receive a
delayed or denied
response from NICS
(initial checks)
Hours of licensee staff
time for additional time
requests
0.3%
PERT
0.1%
0.3%
1.0%
8 hours
PERT
6 hours
8 hours
16 hours
NRC estimate based on
experience from the
confirmatory orders.
Estimate based on
experience from the
confirmatory orders.
Enhanced Weapons Authority
Enhanced Weapons Submittal
Review final rule
requirements and
supporting guidance
160 hours
PERT
80 hours
160 hours
240 hours
160 hours
PERT
144 hours
160 hours
240 hours
132 hours
PERT
80 hours
132 hours
200 hours
160 hours
PERT
136 hours
160 hours
240 hours
Enhanced weapons
training and
qualification plan
Site physical security
plan
Safeguards
contingency plan
NRC estimate. Time for
assigned security staff to
read and understand the
rule and applicable
guidance necessary to
prepare and revise
enhanced weapons
documents needed for
the licensing submittal.
NRC estimate. Time for
assigned security staff to
research information from
applicable firearms
standards and prepare
an enhanced weapons
training and qualification
plan.
NRC estimate. Time for
assigned security staff to
consider enhanced
weapons information,
make minor to moderate
revisions to the plan,
perform operations and
management review,
resolve comments, and
issue the revised plan.
NRC estimate. Time for
assigned security staff to
consider enhanced
weapons information,
make minor to moderate
revisions to the plan,
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
Weapons safety
assessment
480 hours
PERT
456 hours
480 hours
600 hours
Source or Basis of
Estimate
perform operations and
management review,
resolve comments, and
issue the revised plan.
NRC estimate. Time for
assigned security staff to
consider enhanced
weapons information to
perform this assessment,
perform operations and
management review,
resolve comments, and
issue the weapons safety
assessment.
Enhanced Weapons and Accessories Cost (per site)
Number of enhanced
weapons purchased by
a new or operating
power reactor site
Number of enhanced
weapons purchased by
a decommissioning
power reactor site
Number of enhanced
weapons purchased by
a Category I SSNM site
138
PERT
128
138
202
80
PERT
70
80
115
160
PERT
150
160
235
$2,314
PERT
$1,164
$2,446
$2935
$0.48
PERT
$0.46
$0.48
$0.51
1.5%
PERT
1.0%
1.5%
5.0%
Enhanced weapons
price
5.56x45mm NATO 62
grain S5109 penetrator
full metal jacket
ammunition (cost per
round)
Percentage of initial
cost for periodic
replacement of
weapons including
replacement parts (per
site)
Enhanced Weapons Training
NRC estimate. Each site
uses rotating 5 shifts,
with 2 shifts onsite (e.g.,
on duty and training
shifts). The staff used
the costs of procuring M4 enhanced weapons for
2 shifts with no spares for
the low estimate. The
staff used the costs of
procuring M-4 enhanced
weapons for 2 shifts with
10 spares for the best
estimate. The high
estimate is based on
procuring M-4 enhanced
weapons for 3 shifts with
10 spares.
Vendor data based on
bulk buys. Low estimate
– Colt M4 Flattop Carbine
5.56MM. Best estimate –
Colt .308 Modular
Carbine. High cost is
20% more than the Colt
.308 Modular Carbine.
Vendor data based on
bulk buys. Low estimate
- Federal Lake City
Ammunition at $0.46 per
round. Best estimate Winchester at $0.48 per
round. High estimate IMI at $0.51 per round.
NRC estimate. NRC
estimates that 0.3 to 1.0
percent of the firearm
inventory will need
replacement or
replacement parts. Best
estimate is 1.5 percent of
initial cost.
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
40
PERT
20
40
80
Initial qualification
classroom training in
the use and
maintenance of the
weapon (hours per
individual)
Initial firing range
qualification training in
the use of the weapon
(number of firing range
sessions per individual)
10
PERT
8
10
20
$20
PERT
$15
$20
$25
$68
PERT
$68
$68
$92
Firing range lane cost
Initial qualification
training ammunition,
firing range, and other
consumables (per firing
range session)
Annual firing range
practice to maintain
weapon proficiency
(number of firing range
sessions per individual)
15
PERT
4
15
20
Source or Basis of
Estimate
NRC estimate. Assumes
a range of twenty to
eighty hours of classroom
training with a best
estimate of forty hours.
NRC estimate. Assumes
a range of eight to twenty
2-hour firing range
sessions with a best
estimate of ten 2-hour
firing range sessions.
NRC estimate based on
vendor data. NRA range
fees are $15 - $20 per
hour per lane.
Commercial public range
fees are $25 per hour per
lane. NRA official
silhouette targets B-29
50-foot paper pack of 100
is $9.99.
NRC estimate. Low
estimate assumes the
firing of 100 rounds of
ammunition. Best
estimates assumes the
firing of 100 rounds of
ammunition. High
estimate assumes the
firing of 150 rounds of
ammunition. All
estimates include firing
range lane costs and
consumables cost.
NRC estimate. Assumes
a range of four to twenty
2 hour firing range
sessions with a best
estimate of fifteen 2 hour
firing range sessions.
Enhanced Weapons Inventory
Time required to
perform monthly
weapons inventory (per
weapon)
Time required to
perform annual
weapons inventory (per
weapon)
5 min
PERT
4 min
5 min
6 min
10 min
PERT
8 min
10 min
12 min
PERT
32 hours
60 hours
80 hours
NRC estimate. Monthly
inventory check may be
performed by using a bar
code scanner. Estimate
5 min per weapon for
monthly check.
NRC estimate. Annual
inventory check (i.e., the
12th monthly check)
requires the checking of
the gun's serial number.
Estimate 10 minutes per
weapon for annual check.
Transition Activities to Final Rule
Read and understand
the final rule and
associated guidance to
60 hours
NRC estimate.
Estimates between 32
and 80 hours to evaluate
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
perform transition
activities
Review procedures and
plans, issued under the
confirmatory orders, for
required revisions
120 hours
Revise and reissue
procedures and plans in
order to conform with
the final rule
requirements
240 hours
PERT
PERT
72 hours
80 hours
120 hours
240 hours
240 hours
360 hours
Establish procedures
for quality finger print
card submission
80
PERT
75
80
85
Source or Basis of
Estimate
the changes in reporting
requirements.
NRC estimate. The
estimate is for a relatively
simple procedures and
plans revision based on
the fact that the final rule
generally follows the
confirmatory order
requirements.
NRC estimate. The
estimate is for a relatively
simple procedures and
plans revision based on
the final rule generally
follows the confirmatory
order requirements.
Reactor licensee security
personnel are already
subject to fingerprinting
under access
authorization; and
§ 73.57(d)(1) has
language on quality of
fingerprints, so no new
procedures are expected.
However, CAT I SSNM
licensees do not have
similar language in §
25.17(d). Therefore, 1
licensee is impacted.
Physical Security Event Notifications and Suspicious Activity Reporting (affects all sites)
Revise Reporting Procedures (one-time, on a site basis)
Evaluate change in
reporting requirements
12 hours
PERT
8 hours
Revise reporting
procedures
Review and issue
revised reporting
procedures
Prepare training
materials for revised
reporting procedure
Conduct revised
reporting procedure
training
12 hours
20 hours
20 hours
PERT
8 hours
20 hours
40 hours
10 hours
PERT
4 hours
10 hours
18 hours
20 hours
PERT
10 hours
20 hours
30 hours
20 hours
PERT
10 hours
20 hours
30 hours
Industry (recurring, per site)
NRC estimate.
Estimates between 12
and 20 hours to evaluate
the changes in reporting
requirements.
NRC estimate. The
estimate is for a routine
to a moderately complex
procedure revision.
NRC estimate. The
estimate assumes
multiple levels of review
and provides time for the
resolution of comments.
NRC estimate.
Preparation time for a
1-hour course on revised
procedure requirements.
NRC estimate. Assumes
a 1-hour classroom
training sessions
attended by 20 trainees.
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
Source or Basis of
Estimate
Physical Security Event Notifications
Average number of
actual or imminent
hostile action events
reported per site-year
5.88E-04
PERT
4.64E-04
5.88E-04
8.75E-04
0.13
PERT
0.06
0.13
0.19
1.0 hours
PERT
0.75
hours
1.0 hours
1.25 hours
Average number of
additional physical
security events reported
by non-power reactor
licensees per site year
Non-power reactor
licensee time to
complete notification of
additional physical
security events
Licensee time to
prepare a follow-up
written report following
an actual or imminent
hostile actions event
80 hours
Average number of
additional physical
security events
recorded in their event
log or corrective action
program per site year
Licensee time to record
a physical security
event in their event log
or corrective action
program.
PERT
60 hours
80 hours
120 hours
For imminent hostile
action events, NRC
estimated that this event
would occur once per 20
years for the low
estimate, once in 15
years for the best
estimate, and once in ten
years for the high
estimate.
NRC estimate of a
minimum of 2 additional
non-power reactor
physical security events
per year, average 4 and
high of 6.
NRC estimate.
NRC estimate. Best
estimate is based on
similar event reporting
using NRC Form 366.
NRC estimate.
1
PERT
0
1
3
NRC estimate.
0.20 hours
PERT
0.10
hours
0.20 hours
0.30 hours
Suspicious Activity Reporting
Average number of
suspicious activities
reported per site-year
Licensee time to make
the telephone
notifications to report
2.5
PERT
0.5
2.5
4.0
18 min
PERT
10 min
18 min
54 min
Estimated average of 2.5
reports per site per year
based upon ILTAT review
of SIDS data. Low is
estimated at average of
0.5 reports per year
related to shipment of
SSNM, SNF, and HLW.
High is estimated as sum
of 2.5 reports per siteyear, 0.5 reports per year
for shipment of SSNM,
SNF, and HLW and 2
reports per year that are
related to Restricted Data
at enrichment facilities.
This is based on
notifications for 117 sites,
shipping activities for 10
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
suspicious activities to
LLEA, the FBI, the
NRC, and the FAA (for
suspicious activities
involving aircraft).
Source or Basis of
Estimate
of the 117 sites and
notification for one
enrichment facility for
which it is part of the 117.
Best estimate is 18 per
NRC staff, high estimate
is 18 x 3 = 54 minutes
since a notification can
happen simultaneously
for a site, a shipping
activity and an
enrichment facility. Low
estimate from expert
opinion.
NRC (one-time)
NRC Submittal Review (per site)
Time for NRC to review
the stand-alone
preemption authority
submittals and issue a
safety evaluation
Time for NRC to review
enhanced weapons
submittals
1,040 hours
PERT
780 hours
1,040 hours
3,120 hours
160 hours
PERT
120 hours
160 hours
400 hours
400 hours
PERT
360 hours
400 hours
600 hours
Averted NRC labor for
not needing to issue a
confirmatory order
NRC estimate based on
experience in reviewing
and processing the
confirmatory order
submittals.
NRC estimate based on
experience in reviewing
and processing the
confirmatory order and
other security-related
submittals.
NRC estimate based on
experience issuing the
confirmatory orders.
Labor to issue a sitespecific order to an
eligible site who elects to
receive Section 161A
authority is not required if
the rule alternative is
selected.
NRC Transition Activities
Time for the NRC to
document the
withdrawal of the orders
issued to the licensees
NRC estimate.
12 hours
PERT
8 hours
12 hours
16 hours
Enhanced Weapons Application (per site)
NRC time to review
combined preemption
and enhanced weapons
application
NRC estimate.
240 hours
PERT
200 hours
240 hours
360 hours
NRC (recurring, per site)
Physical Security Event Notifications and Suspicious Activity Reporting
Read the physical
security event
notifications written
report following an
actual or imminent
hostile action (hrs per
report)
NRC estimate.
1.0 hours
PERT
0.8 hours
1.0 hours
4.0 hours
Uncertainty Analysis Variables
Data Element
Receive suspicious
activity reports via
telephone (hrs per
report)
Value
Distribution
Low
Best
High
PERT
$67/hr
$106/hr
$127/hr
0.30 hours
Source or Basis of
Estimate
NRC estimate. Based on
experience in the
operations center
receiving telephone
notifications; In
agreement with industry
notification estimate.
Labor Rates
Industry
NRC
$106/hr
$132/hr
Based on the low,
average and high of the
2018 loaded labor rates.
NRC labor rates for use
in 2017 regulatory
analyses inflated to 2018
dollars.
| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Modified | 2022-03-22 |
| File Created | 2020-02-21 |