30 day FRN

1670-0029_CFATS PSP_30 day FRN published.pdf

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety Program

30 day FRN

OMB: 1670-0029

Document [pdf]
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Katherine M. Malinda,
Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4140,
MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435–
0912, Katherine_Malinda@csr.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member
Conflict: AIDS and AIDS Related Research.
Date: July 10, 2018.
Time: 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Shalanda A. Bynum,
Ph.D., MPH, Scientific Review Officer, Center
for Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3206,
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–755–4355,
bynumsa@csr.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Convergent
Neuroscience: From Genomic Association to
Causation.
Date: July 10, 2018.
Time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213,
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549,
jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Small
Business: Neuroscience Assay, Diagnostics
and Animal Model Development.
Date: July 12–13, 2018.
Time: 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: The Crown Plaza Seattle Hotel, 1113
6th Ave., Seattle, WA 98101.
Contact Person: Susan Gillmor, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, National Institutes
of Health, Center for Scientific Review, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–
435–1730, susan.gillmor@nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Center for
Neuroscience and Regenerative Medicine
Program.
Date: July 12, 2018.
Time: 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Chittari V. Shivakumar,
Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, National
Institutes of Health, Center for Scientific
Review, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD
20892, 301–408–9098, chittari.shivakumar@
nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; PAR

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Review: Understanding and Modifying
Temporal Dynamics of Coordinated Neural
Activity.
Date: July 12, 2018.
Time: 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213,
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549,
jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member
Conflict: Integrative Neuroscience.
Date: July 12, 2018.
Time: 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Telephone Conference Call).
Contact Person: Jasenka Borzan, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4214,
MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892–7814, 301–
435–1787, borzanj@csr.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Biology of
Development and Aging Integrated Review
Group; International and Cooperative
Projects—1 Study Section.
Date: July 13, 2018.
Time: 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892.
Contact Person: Seetha Bhagavan, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5194,
MSC 7846, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 237–
9838, bhagavas@csr.nih.gov.
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine;
93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333,
93.337, 93.393–93.396, 93.837–93.844,
93.846–93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National
Institutes of Health, HHS)
Dated: June 12, 2018.
Natasha M. Copeland,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory
Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018–12920 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program
National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD),
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).

AGENCY:

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30-Day notice and request for
comments; revision of information
collection request: 1670–0029.

ACTION:

The DHS NPPD Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP),
Infrastructure Security Compliance
Division (ISCD) will submit the
following information collection request
(ICR) to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review and clearance
in accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. NPPD
previously published this ICR, in the
Federal Register on December 27, 2017,
for a 60-day public comment period.
In this notice NPPD is responding to
seven commenters that submitted
comments in response to the 60-day
notice previously published for this ICR
and soliciting public comment
concerning this ICR for an additional 30
days.
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted until July 18, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, OMB. Comments should be
addressed to OMB Desk Officer,
Department of Homeland Security,
National Protection and Programs
Directorate and sent via electronic mail
to dhsdeskofficer@omb.eop.gov. All
submissions must include the words
‘‘Department of Homeland Security’’
and the OMB Control Number 1670–
0029.
Comments submitted in response to
this notice may be made available to the
public through relevant websites. For
this reason, please do not include in
your comments information of a
confidential nature, such as sensitive
personal information or proprietary
information. Please note that responses
to this public comment request
containing any routine notice about the
confidentiality of the communication
will be treated as public comments that
may be made available to the public
notwithstanding the inclusion of the
routine notice.
Comments that include trade secrets,
confidential commercial or financial
information, Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI),
Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or
Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) should not be
submitted to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments
separately from other comments in
response to this notice. Comments
containing trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information,
CVI, SSI, or PCII should be
appropriately marked and packaged in
SUMMARY:

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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices
accordance with applicable
requirements and submitted by mail to
the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS
Program Manager at the Department of
Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane
SW, Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA
20528–0610. Comments must be
identified by OMB Control Number
1670–0029. The Department will
forward all comments received by the
submission deadline to the OMB Desk
Officer.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Questions and requests for additional
information may be directed to Amy
Graydon or the CFATS Program
Manager via email at cfats@dhs.gov or
telephone at (866) 323–2957.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
December 18, 2014, the President signed
into law the Protecting and Securing
Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2014, Public Law 113–
254 (CFATS Act of 2014) providing
long-term authorization for the
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS) program. The
CFATS Act of 2014 codified the
Department’s authority to implement
the CFATS program into the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. 621
et. seq.
Section 550 of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act
of 2007, Public Law 109–295 (2006)
(‘‘Section 550’’), provided (and the
CFATS Act of 2014 continues to
provide) the Department with the
authority to identify and regulate the
security of high-risk chemical facilities
using a risk-based approach. On April 9,
2007, the Department issued the CFATS
Interim Final Rule (IFR), implementing
this statutory mandate. See 72 FR
17688.
Section 550 required (and the CFATS
Act of 2014 continues to require) that
the Department establish risk-based
performance standards (RBPS) for highrisk chemical facilities. Through the
CFATS regulations, the Department
promulgated 18 RBPS. Each chemical
facility that has been finally determined
by the Department to be high-risk must
submit, for Department approval, a Site
Security Plan (SSP) or an Alternative
Security Program (ASP), whichever the
high-risk chemical facility chooses, that
satisfies each applicable RBPS. RBPS 12
requires high-risk chemical facilities to
perform appropriate background checks
on and ensure appropriate credentials
for facility personnel, and, as
appropriate, unescorted visitors with
access to restricted areas or critical
assets. RBPS 12(iv) specifically requires
high-risk chemical facility to implement
measures designed to identify people

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with terrorist ties. For the purposes of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
(PSP), ‘people’ in RBPS 12(iv) is in
reference to affected individuals (i.e.,
facility personnel or unescorted visitors
with or seeking access to restricted areas
or critical assets at high-risk chemical
facilities).
Identifying affected individuals who
have terrorist ties is an inherently
governmental function and requires the
use of information held in governmentmaintained databases that are
unavailable to high-risk chemical
facilities. See 72 FR 17688, 17709 (April
9, 2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the
Department and high-risk chemical
facilities must work together to satisfy
the ‘‘terrorist ties’’ aspect of the
Personnel Surety performance standard.
In accordance with the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended by the
CFATS Act of 2014, the following
options are available to enable high-risk
chemical facilities to facilitate the
vetting of affected individuals for
terrorist ties:
Option 1. High-risk chemical facilities
may submit certain information about
affected individuals, which the
Department will use to vet those
individuals for terrorist ties.
Specifically, the identifying information
about affected individuals will be
compared against identifying
information of known or suspected
terrorists contained in the Federal
Government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watch list, the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB),
which is maintained by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC).1
Option 2. High-risk chemical facilities
may submit information about affected
individuals who already possess certain
credentials or documentation that rely
on security threat assessments
conducted by the Department. This will
enable the Department to verify the
continuing validity of these credentials
or documentation.
Option 3. High-risk chemical facilities
may comply with RBPS 12(iv) without
submitting to the Department
information about affected individuals
who possess Transportation Worker
Identification Credentials (TWICs), if a
high-risk chemical facility electronically
verifies and validates the affected
individual’s TWICs through the use of
TWIC readers (or other technology that
is periodically updated using the
Canceled Card List).
1 For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/
FBI–019 Terrorist Screening Records System, last
published in full as 77 FR 26580 (May 25, 2017).

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Option 4. High-risk chemical facilities
may visually verify certain credentials
or documents that are issued by a
Federal screening program that
periodically vets enrolled individuals
against the TSDB. The Department
continues to believe that visual
verification has significant security
limitations and, accordingly, encourages
high-risk chemical facilities choosing
this option to identify in their SSPs the
means by which they plan to address
these limitations.
In addition to the options described
above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), a highrisk chemical facility is welcome to
propose alternative or supplemental
options in its SSP that are not described
in this document. The Department will
assess the adequacy of such alternative
or supplemental options on a facilityby-facility basis in the course of
evaluating each facility’s SSP.
Under Option 3 and Option 4, a highrisk chemical facility would not need to
submit information about an affected
individual to the Department. These
Options are only mentioned in this
notice for informational purposes, and
there will be no analysis of Option 3
and Option 4 in this information
collection request.
This information collection request
does not propose changes to who
qualifies as an affected individual.
There are certain groups of persons that
the Department does not consider to be
affected individuals, such as (1) Federal
officials that gain unescorted access to
restricted areas or critical assets as part
of their official duties; (2) state and local
law enforcement officials that gain
unescorted access to restricted areas or
critical assets as part of their official
duties; and (3) emergency responders at
the state or local level that gain
unescorted access to restricted areas or
critical assets during emergency
situations.
OMB is particularly interested in
comments that:
1. Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
2. Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
3. Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,

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electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
The current information collection for
the CFATS PSP (IC 1670–0029) will
expire on August 31, 2018.2
Summary of Proposed Revisions to the
Information Collection
The Department is seeking a revision
to the CFATS PSP Information
Collection to: (1) Obtain approval to
collect information about affected
individuals from all high-risk chemical
facilities rather than only Tier 1 and
Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities; (2)
update the estimated number of annual
respondents from 195,000 to 72,607
based on historical information
collected since the Department
implemented the CFATS PSP; and (3)
update the estimated time per
respondent from 0.58 hours to 0.1667
hours based upon historical data
collected by the Department since the
implantation of the CFATS PSP.
Collection at All High-Risk Chemical
Facilities
In response to multiple comments on
the current ICR, the Department agreed
to a ‘‘phased implementation’’ of the
CFATS PSP to Tier 1 and Tier 2 highrisk chemical facilities. Based on
lessons learned and the near completion
of the implementation at Tier 1 and Tier

2 high-risk chemical facilities, the
Department now seeks to close a
security gap by implementing CFATS
PSP at all high-risk chemical facilities.
As implemented at Tier 1 and Tier 2
high-risk chemical facilities, the
Department will roll out the CFATS PSP
in a ‘‘phased implementation’’ to Tier 3
and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities.
Updates to Burden Estimate Based on
Historical Information
The Department implemented the
CFATS PSP in December 2015. Since
implementation, the Department has
evaluated many of the assumptions it
used when estimating the burden
estimate of this Information Collection.
As a result, several of the assumptions
can be revised using actual data rather
than assumptions. The burden
methodology and revised estimates are
described in, ‘‘The Department’s
Methodology in Estimating the Burden
for CFATS PSP Information Collection.’’
Information Collected About Affected
Individuals
This information collection request
does not propose changes to the
information collected on affected
individuals.
Option 1: Collecting Information To
Conduct Direct Vetting
If high-risk chemical facilities select
Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for an
affected individual, the following
information about the affected

individual would be submitted to the
Department:
• For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and
nationals, as well as U.S. lawful
permanent residents):
Æ Full Name;
Æ Date of Birth; and
Æ Citizenship or Gender.
• For Non-U.S. Persons:
Æ Full Name;
Æ Date of Birth;
Æ Citizenship; and
Æ Passport information and/or alien
registration number.
To reduce the likelihood of false
positives in matching against records in
the Federal Government’s consolidated
and integrated terrorist watchlist, highrisk chemical facilities would also be
able to submit the following optional
information about an affected individual
to the Department:
• Aliases;
• Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons);
• Place of Birth; and/or
• Redress Number.3
High-risk chemical facilities have the
option to create and use the following
field(s) to collect and store additional
information to assist with the
management of an affected individual’s
records. Any information collected in
this field will not be used to support
vetting activities.
• User Defined Field(s)
Table 1 summarizes the biographic
data that would be submitted to the
Department under Option 1.

TABLE 1—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 1
Data elements submitted to the department

For a U.S. person

Full Name ....................................................................................
Date of Birth ................................................................................
Gender .........................................................................................
Citizenship ...................................................................................
Passport Information and/or Alien Registration Number .............
Aliases .........................................................................................
Place of Birth ...............................................................................
Redress number ..........................................................................
User Defined Field(s) ..................................................................

Required.
Required.
Must provide ...............................................................................
Citizenship or Gender .................................................................
N/A ..............................................................................................
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional (Not used for vetting purposes).

In lieu of submitting information to
the Department under Option 1 for
vetting of terrorist ties, high-risk
chemical facilities also have the option,
where appropriate, to submit
information to the Department to
electronically verify that an affected

individual is currently enrolled in
another DHS program that vets for
terrorist ties.
To verify an affected individual’s
enrollment in one of these programs
under Option 2, the Department would
collect the following information about
the affected individual:
• Full Name;
• Date of Birth; and

2 The current information collection for CFATS
Personnel Surety Program may be found at https://

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_
nbr=201312-1670-001.

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Option 2: Collecting Information To Use
Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS
Programs

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For a nonU.S. person

Optional.
Required.
Required.

• Program-specific information or
credential information, such as unique
number or issuing entity (e.g., state for
Commercial Driver’s License [CDL]
associated with an Hazardous Material
Endorsement [HME]).
To reduce the likelihood of false
positives, high-risk chemical facilities
may also submit the following optional

3 For more information about Redress Numbers,
please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelersredress-process#1.

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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices
information about an affected individual
to the Department:
• Aliases;
• Gender;
• Place of Birth; and/or
• Citizenship.

High-risk chemical facilities have the
option to create and use the following
field(s) to collect and store additional
information to assist with the
management of an affected individual’s
records. Any information collected in

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this field will not be used to support
vetting activities.
• User Defined Field(s)
Table 2 summarizes the biographic
data that would be submitted to the
Department under Option 2.

TABLE 2—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 2
Data Elements Submitted to the Department
Full Name .............................................................................................................................................
Date of Birth .........................................................................................................................................
Program-specific information or credential information, such as expiration date, unique number, or
issuing entity.
Aliases ..................................................................................................................................................
Gender ..................................................................................................................................................
Place of Birth ........................................................................................................................................
Citizenship ............................................................................................................................................
User Defined Field(s) ...........................................................................................................................

Other Information Collected
The Department may also contact a
high-risk chemical facility or its
designees to request additional
information (e.g., visa information)
pertaining to an affected individual in
order to clarify suspected data errors or
resolve potential matches (e.g., an
affected individual has a common
name). Such requests will not imply,
and should not be construed to indicate,
that an affected individual’s information
has been confirmed as a match to a
record of an individual with terrorist
ties.
The Department may also collect
information provided by individuals or
high-risk chemical facilities in support
of any adjudication requests under
Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,4 or
in support of any other redress
requests.5
Responses to Comments Submitted
During 60-Day Comment Period

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The Department solicited comments
on four questions:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
4 See

6 CFR 27.300–345.
information about access, correction, and
redress requests under the Freedom of Information
Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section
7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and
available at http://www.dhs.gov/privacydocuments-national-protection-and-programsdirectorate-nppd.
5 More

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(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses.
In response to the 60-Day Notice that
solicited comments about the CFATS
PSP ICR, the Department received
twenty-seven comments from seven
commenters. The seven commenters
were all industry association.
Comments Related to Whether the
Proposed Collection of Information Is
Necessary for the Proper Performance of
the Function of the Agency, Including
Whether the Information Will Have
Practical Utility
Comment: Four commenters
suggested that the Department conduct
further assessments on the PSP:
One commenter suggested that the
Department ‘‘should not expand the program
until it can see the successes and failures it
has with Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities.’’ Further,
the commenter suggested a ‘‘formal
assessment, in conjunction with the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, on the benefits and positive
outcomes of running PSP-gained information
through the TSDB [Terrorist Screening
Database]’’ be conducted. The commenter
also suggested that such a review could
evaluate the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP
and opportunities ‘‘to make it more
effective.’’
A second commenter encouraged the
Department to ‘‘examine the effectiveness of
such screening before proceeding to subject
the bulk of CFATS regulated facilities to
these additional measures.’’ The second
commenter suggested the Department

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Required.
Required.
Required.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional.
Optional (Not used for vetting purposes).

conduct a comprehensive evaluation, similar
to the comprehensive evaluation the
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) is conducting with respect to the
Transportation Worker Identification
Credentials (TWIC) Program,6 before
determining whether to expand the CFATS
PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical
facilities.
A third commenter referenced an ongoing
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
assessment of the CFATS program and
speculated that the GAO assessment might
review the implementation of the CFATS
PSP. The commenter suggested that the
Department could benefit from considering
the results of the GAO assessment with
respect ‘‘to tailoring implementation of PSP
for Tier 3 and 4 facilities.’’ The commenter
also suggested that if the GAO assessment
does not include a review of the CFATS PSP,
the Department should undertake such an
analysis. In conclusion, the same commenter
suggested that the Department not expand
the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered
chemical facilities until such an analysis has
been conducted and the results used to
inform the CFATS PSP ICR.
A fourth commenter requested that the
Department allow a third-party review of the
CFATS PSP after a suitable period of time
has passed to determine if the program adds
value to the security of the nation.

Response: The Department does not
believe that additional analysis is
needed prior to OMB approving the
collection of information concerning
affected individuals from all covered
chemical facilities. The Department has
closely reviewed how Tier 1 and Tier 2
covered chemicals facilities have
implemented the check for terrorist ties.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered chemical
facilities have varied by size,
complexity, security issue, and location.
6 See Section 1(b)(3) of Public Law 114–278,
which may be viewed at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/house-bill/710/text/pl?overview
=closed.

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Additionally, vetting for terrorist ties
for all four tiers of covered facilities is
required by CFATS. Members of the
public commented on the CFATS
rulemaking in 2007 before the
regulation was finalized, and DHS
considered all public comments
(including comments about terrorist ties
vetting and background checks) in
coming to the reasoned decision to vet
affected individuals for terrorist ties at
all tiered facilities as part of the
program. DHS disagrees that a
modification to the program to eliminate
this requirement for Tiers 3 and 4 or to
indefinitely delay its rollout in order to
conduct additional analysis would be
appropriate. Preventing terrorist access
to high-risk chemical facilities’
restricted areas and critical assets is a
core purpose of CFATS, and failure to
conduct terrorist ties checks may allow
terrorist to gain access.
Comment: One commenter reiterated
its continued objection to the inclusion
of railroad employees is within the
scope of CFATS because the commenter
claims that inclusion of railroad
employees lacks a risk-based
justification.
Response: Under CFATS, the
Department regulates covered chemical
facilities that present a high risk from
terrorist attack. Effectively regulating
chemical facility security involves
assessing whether terrorists have access
to facilities, and terrorists seeking access
might not be limited to facility
employees. To help reduce risk to highrisk facilities, the Department requires
covered chemical facilities to conduct a
check for terrorist ties on affected
individuals (e.g., facility personnel and
unescorted visitors) with or seeking
access to restricted areas and critical
assets. A covered chemical facility has
the discretion to decide if they want to
escort railroad employees as visitors,
identify railroad employees as affected
individuals, or treat them in some other
way consistent with CFATS
requirements. Identifying railroad
employees as affected individuals
would require a covered chemical
facility to ensure that those personnel
are screened for terrorist ties pursuant to
6 CFR 27.230(a)(12).
In ensuring affected individuals are
screened for terrorist ties, the facility
has the discretion to choose from four
options for vetting affected individuals
or propose alternatives or supplemental
options in its SSP or ASP (See 82 FR
61312, 61316).7
7 The Department described the options for
screening for terrorist ties on page 82 FR 61313 of
its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61313.

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Comment: One commenter
highlighted the Department of
Transportation (DOT) requirement at 49
CFR 172.802(a)(1) which states,
‘‘Personnel security. Measures to
confirm information provided by job
applicants hired for positions that
involve access to and handling of the
hazardous materials covered by the
security plan. . . .’’ The commenter
suggested that railroad employees
having undergone such a background
check and demonstrated their reliability
by being stewards of the chemical
during transit, should ‘‘not suddenly
seem suspect simply by crossing a fence
line at a covered chemical facility.’’
Response: It is the Department’s
understanding that the sort of
background checks discussed by the
commenter do not include checks for
terrorist ties. Checks for terrorist ties are
required under CFATS (6 CFR
27.230(a)(12)).
Comments Related to the Accuracy of
the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of
the Proposed Collection of Information,
Including the Validity of the
Methodology and Assumptions Used
Comment: One commenter recognizes
the assumptions that release facilities
may have more affected individuals
than theft and diversion facilities, that
there are an average of 106 employees
per facility, and that the time it takes to
vet an affected individual may be valid,
but states, ‘‘it is not clear upon what
information they [the assumptions] are
based.’’
Response: The Department based the
assumptions on historical data collected
by the Department since the
implementation of the CFATS PSP.
Specifically, for the difference between
release and theft and diversion facilities,
the Department recognizes that high-risk
chemical facilities for release security
issues may take a facility-wide approach
rather than an asset-based approach in
defining their restricted areas, which
may result in a higher number of
affected individuals than theft and
diversion facilities. Therefore, the
Department reviewed the number of
release sites to ensure the estimated
number of respondents for the Tier 3
and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities
were comparable to the historical data
received by the Department since the
implementation of the CFATS PSP. The
Department found that the release
security issues for Tier 1 and Tier 2
high-risk chemical facilities made up 38
percent of the total Tier 1 and Tier 2
high-risk chemical facility population.
For Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical
facilities, the release security issue
made up 25 percent of the total Tier 3

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and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facility
population. Based on these findings, the
Department is satisfied that the Tier 1
and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facility
historical data provided a valid
representation of what the Department
can expect from Tier 3 and Tier 4 highrisk chemical facilities.
Specifically for the 106 employees,
the Department estimates that under
this collection there are (a) 200 Tier 1
and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities
that did submit or will have to submit
information about affected individuals
under the current ICR, and (b) 3,700
Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical
facilities that will submit for the first
time under this new collection.
Historically, each Authorizer submitted,
on average, 180 initial respondents,
with each Authorizer responsible for 1.7
high-risk chemical facilities. Dividing
180 affected individuals per Authorizer
by 1.7 high-risk chemical facilities
results in an average of 106 initial
respondents submitted per high-risk
chemical facility.
The Department’s estimate per
respondent (affected individual) is
based on industry feedback and
historical data collected on their use of
the CFATS PSP application. The
Department has estimated the time per
respondent to be 5 minutes per
submission of a record about an affected
individual. Since this estimate is based
on current submissions from Tier 1 and
Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the
Department has chosen an estimate of
10 minutes per record to provide a more
conservative estimate.
Comment: Two commenters
expressed concern that the ICR did not
appear to account for the burden
associated with part-time or seasonal
employees or contractors that qualify as
affected individuals.
Response: The Department’s estimate
of the number of affected individuals in
the 60-day notice was based on actual
data submitted by covered chemical
facilities at which seasonal and parttime employees (to include contractors)
are considered affected individuals.
Thus, the Department concludes that
the historical data relied upon in the 60day notice incorporates seasonal and
part-time employees.
Comment: Three commenters felt the
personal identifiable information
collection is not ‘‘usual and customary’’:
One commenter disagreed with the
Department’s decision to invoke 5 CFR
1320.3(b)(2) to exclude ‘‘certain activities and
costs related to the PSP data collection
process.’’ The commenter suggested that two
assumptions made by the Department are not
accurate. Specifically, that (a) the
Department’s assumption that facilities

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already possess the information necessary to
submit under Option 1 or Option 2 of the
CFATS PSP; and (b) the Department’s
assumption that additional data collection is
not required and there is no further burden
imposed by this Information Collection
beyond submitting the information to the
Department under Option 1 or Option 2.
A second commenter also objected to the
exclusion of ‘‘the time needed for a site
security officer to manage data collection,
submissions, and tracking’’ under 5 CFR
1320.3(b)(2) which is similar to some of the
examples provided by the first commenter.
A third commenter expressed concern
similar in nature that the estimated time per
respondent does not appear to account for
acquiring the necessary personal information
to compare against the TSDB.

Response: The Department evaluated
each of the examples provided by the
commenters. The Department’s
evaluation of the examples provided by
the commenters are below:

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i. The Department considered whether the
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account
for the burden associated with coordinating
with CFATS-facility stakeholders, including
Human Resources, Procurement, and/or
Contract Administration to explain the PSP
requirements and determine how best to
gather the data from different populations
(e.g., employees and resident and nonresident contractors). One commenter
clarified elsewhere in its comments that the
coordination included creating separate
groups 8 and ‘‘PSP Submitter [user] accounts
for each contract company, which may
include hundreds of different contract
companies in cases where a large facility is
tiered for a release security issue.’’ After
considering the comment, the Department
did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because
this burden is properly accounted for under
a separate and different ICR. The
establishment of Chemical Security
Assessment Tool (CSAT) accounts, such as a
PSP Submitter, and the assignment of such
accounts to ‘‘groups’’ is covered under
Information Collection 1670–0007.9
ii. The Department considered whether the
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account
for the burden associated with ‘‘developing
and providing communications, Privacy Act
notices, and data collection forms to affected
individuals.’’ After considering the comment,
the Department did not revise the CFATS
PSP ICR because, as described earlier in this
notice, this burden is already accounted for
in the 10 minutes per respondent burden
estimate.
8 The term ‘‘groups’’ is a technical term used by
the Department to describe how a covered chemical
facility may manage the access to records about
affected individuals in the CSAT Personnel Surety
application. The Department describes ‘‘groups’’
and provides additional information about how to
create and manage ‘‘groups in section 9.5 of the
CSAT User Manual which may be viewed at https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/csatportal-user-manual-508-2.pdf.
9 Information Collection 1670–0007 was approved
by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of Action and
Information Collection 1670–0007 may be viewed at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR
?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001.

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iii. The Department considered whether
the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to
account for the burden associated with
‘‘ensuring that all affected individuals
provide the necessary [personally identifiable
information] PII—and following up with
those that do not.’’ After considering the
comment, the Department did not revise the
CFATS PSP ICR. The collection of data from
affected individuals by a covered chemical
facility or its designees is excluded under 5
CFR 1320.3(b)(2).
iv. The Department considered whether the
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account
for the burden associated with ‘‘training
personnel to use the CSAT PSP application.’’
After considering the comment, the
Department did not revise the CFATS PSP
ICR because the burden is properly
accounted for under Information Collection
1670–0007.
v. The Department considered whether the
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account
for the burden associated with ‘‘ensuring
change management (e.g., once the initial
data is gathered and uploaded, the facility
still must account for new hires and new
contractors—and further incorporate this into
the facility access process).’’ After
considering the comment, the Department
did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because
the burden is already accounted for in this
ICR (See 82 FR 61312, 61316).10 The
Department laid out the expectations to
submit both existing affected individuals as
well as new affected individuals in the ICR
notices associated with the current
Information Collection and in the CFATS
PSP Implementation Notice. The clear
expectation for covered chemical facilities to
submit new affected individuals is therefore
inherently a part of the actual historical data
upon which the Department relied in the 60day notice.

Comment: One commenter suggested
that the CFATS PSP is being
implemented on a facility-by-facility
basis rather than a company-wide basis,
which encourages duplicative processes
for information collection and vetting
and dramatically increases the burdens
on railroads serving more than one
company location.
Response: The Department has
designed the CFATS Program as a
whole, and the CFATS PSP in
particular, to allow for a company-wide
approach. This has been mentioned in
previous notices 11 and can be found in
current program guidance and
10 The Department described its assumptions, to
include updates and corrections, about the
estimated time per respondent on page 82 FR 61316
of its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61316.
11 The possibility of a company-wide approach is
mentioned in: (1) The CFATS PSP 30-Day notice
and request for comments published on February 3,
2014 at 79 FR 6422 that may be viewed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2014-02082/page-6422,
and (2) the CFATS PSP 60-Day notice and request
for comments published on March 22, 2013 at 78
FR 17684 that may be viewed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2013-06184/page-17684.

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resources.12 Some companies have
opted to implement a company-wide
approach to the PSP while others have
not. The design of the CFATS PSP and
this ICR allows each company with
multiple covered chemical facilities to
choose for itself whether or not, or to
what degree, to adopt a company-wide
approach under CFATS.
Comment: One commenter expressed
concern that the estimated time per
respondent of five minutes ‘‘does not
appear to include the additional time
necessary to notify employees of the
PSP requirement, obtain consent . . .’’
Response: As previously discussed,
the Department did not revise the
CFATS PSP ICR because this burden is
already accounted for in the 10 minutes
per respondent burden estimate.
Comment: One commenter is
concerned with the time it takes
Authorizer to create CSAT accounts for
contractors.
Response: The Department accounts
for the burden related to the creation of
CSAT accounts for contractors under
Information Collection 1670–0007.13
Comments Related to the Quality,
Utility, and Clarity of the Information
To Be Collected
The Department did not receive any
comments related to the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be
collected.
Comments Related To Minimizing the
Burden of the Collection of the
Information on Those Who Are To
Respond, Including Through the Use of
Appropriate Automated, Electronic
Mechanical, or Other Technological
Collection Techniques or Other Forms of
Information Technology, e.g., Permitting
Electronic Submissions of Responses
Comment: Two commenters suggested
that the Department use a flexible
approach in the rollout:
One commenter requested a phased
roll out of the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and
Tier 4 covered chemical facilities.
A second commenter ‘‘appreciate[d]
that DHS is proposing to roll out these
requirements in a phased method . . .’’
The same commenter also encouraged
the Department to consider a ‘‘site’s
various risk factors, including location,
number of employees, types and
12 The Department describes the potential for a
company-wide approach in CFATS
PSPImplementation Notice published on December
18, 2015 at 80 FR 79064 that may be viewed at
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page79064.
13 Information Collection 1670–0007 was
approved by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of
Action and Information Collection 1670–0007 may
be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001.

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volumes of chemicals of interest, and
likely offsite incident consequences’’
when planning the phased-in approach.
Response: The Department agrees that
a flexible approach is appropriate for
the rollout of the PSP to Tier 3 and Tier
4 covered chemical facilities. If
approved, the Department plans to
implement the CFATS PSP in a phased
manner to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered
chemical facilities over a three year
period. Similar to the successful and
recent retiering effort, the Department
plans to consider the number of
facilities assigned to a single Authorizer
when notifying facilities to implement
the PSP, as not to overwhelm a single
Authorizer. The Department will also
allow the flexibility for Authorizers, if
desired, to complete the process for
their facilities before notification by the
Department.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department has downplayed
the use of ‘‘existing options’’ that could
lessen the burdens on third-party
service providers, such as railroads, that
employ affected individuals as defined
by the covered chemical facility. The
commenter suggested that one such
‘‘existing option’’ is real-time video
monitoring as a means of escort.
Response: The Department has
explicitly mentioned in multiple notices
associated with this Information
Collection (see 79 FR 6418, 6420) and in
CFATS PSP resources the possibility of
innovative escorting alternatives such as
video monitoring. The Department has
also worked with facilities to identify
other alternatives for a covered chemical
facility to limit who is an affected
individual. Furthermore, the
Department provided the following
guidance to covered chemical facilities
in the CFATS PSP Implementation
Notice: 14
‘‘A high-risk chemical facility will
have flexibility to tailor its
implementation of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program to fit its individual
circumstances and, in this regard, to
best balance who qualifies as an affected
individual, unique security issues,
costs, and burden. For example, a highrisk chemical facility may, in its Site
Security Plan:
• Restrict the numbers and types of
persons allowed to access its restricted
areas and critical assets, thus limiting
the number of persons who will need to
be checked for terrorist ties.
• Define its restricted areas and
critical assets, thus potentially limiting
14 This specific text from the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program Implementation Notice may be
found on 80 FR 79060 and can be viewed at https://
www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-79060.

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the number of persons who will need to
be checked for terrorist ties.
• Choose to escort visitors accessing
restricted areas and critical assets in lieu
of performing terrorist ties background
checks under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program. The high-risk chemical
facility may propose in its SSP
traditional escorting solutions and/or
innovative escorting alternatives such as
video monitoring (which may reduce
facility security costs), as appropriate, to
address the unique security risks
present at the facility [emphasis
added].’’
Comment: One commenter urged the
Department to not include additional
pre-conditions to the CFATS PSP that
would preclude covered chemical
facilities from leveraging the
background checks performed in
compliance with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) Employee Possessor Program
under Option 4.
Response: The Department has not
modified the CFATS PSP to preclude a
covered chemical facility from the
potential of leveraging the vetting
conducted by ATF under Option 4 for
affected individuals who possess a
Federal explosives license/permit.
Comment: One commenter requested
that the Department modify CSAT to
allow designated employees such as
human resource professionals the ability
to upload and edit information about
affected individuals without having to
access CVI.
Response: The Department currently
provides the ability to restrict human
resource professionals from accessing
CVI in CSAT. If a user is designated as
only a Personnel Surety Submitter and
is not assigned any other facility roles,
they are not able to access the CVI
documentation.
Other Comments Submitted in Response
to the Information Collection Request
Comment: One commenter suggested
that compliance with the CFATS PSP
exposes railroad employee PII and
exacerbates cyber-security risk.
Response: The Department disagrees
with the commenter that the CFATS
PSP exposes PII and exacerbates cyber
security risk. If (1) a covered chemical
facility opts to identify the employee of
a third-party service provider as an
affected individual, and (2) a covered
chemical facility opts to implement
Option 1 or Option 2 in their SSP or
ASP then the Department has designed
the CSAT Personnel Surety Program
Application to allow third-party
companies, such as a railroad, to be
granted access to the CSAT Personnel
Surety Application for the express

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purpose of submitting information about
affected individuals directly to the
Department.
If a covered chemical facility opts to
implement Option 3 or Option 4,
information about affected individuals
is not submitted to the Department.
Option 3 allows high-risk chemical
facilities to comply with the PSP by
electronically verifying and validating
the affected individual’s TWICs through
the use of TWIC readers. Option 4
provides high-risk chemical facilities
with the option to visually verify certain
credentials or documents that are issued
by a Federal screening program that
periodically vets enrolled individuals
against the TSDB.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department ‘‘has encouraged
covered chemical facilities to collect
information that exceeds the legal
requirements.’’
Response: The Department outlined
in the ICR all data elements and
identified the ones that are required for
a submission under Option 1 or Option
2. While the minimum data is sufficient,
it is the considered judgement of the
Department that additional information
reduces the likelihood of false positives
in matching against records in the
federal government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist. Although
helpful in reducing false positives, this
additional information is optional.
Comment: Two commenters made
suggestions as it relates to the
consistency of inspections:
One commenter requested that the
Department ‘‘work with facilities that
have already been inspected to make
sure inspections are being handled in a
consistent fashion.’’
A second commenter reported that
there are ‘‘many regional
inconsistencies in how inspectors
conduct inspections within a region.’’
Response: Although this comment is
outside the scope of the information
collect request, DHS agrees and
continues to work to ensure inspection
consistency across the country.
Comment: One industry association
commented that any updates to the
CFATS regulation should be flexible
and tangible for facility compliance.
Response: This information collection
request does not modify existing
regulations.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that a contradiction exists between the
CFATS PSP and the railroads
compliance with DOT regulations.
Response: The Department disagrees
with the commenter. If a covered
chemical facility opts to identify a
railroad employee as an affected
individual, the performance of railroads

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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices
with respect to complying with DOT
regulations, does not materially alter the
fact that a railroad employee is an
affected individual. Covered chemical
facilities must ensure that affected
individuals have appropriate
background checks performed, to
include a check for terrorist ties. This
ICR allows covered chemical facilities,
and their service providers that employ
affected individuals, an opportunity to
enable a check for terrorist ties to be
performed against the TSDB.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the CFATS PSP, as currently designed,
‘‘does not take into consideration that
Tier 3 and 4 facilities present a
comparatively lower risk profile than
Tier 1 and 2 sites.’’ The commenter
suggested that the Department
acknowledge the lower risk profile of
Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical
facilities and not require them to
comply with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv).
The commenter requested that Tier 3
and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities
still be allowed to voluntarily
participate.
Response: The Department believes
that 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv) mitigates
the risk of an individual with terrorist
ties having insider access. Terrorist
insiders could cause significant harm to
the United States through access to any
tiered chemical facility. To achieve the
anti-terrorism objective of CFATS, it is
necessary to mitigate this risk by
conducting terrorist ties checks at all
covered facilities. RBPS 12 accordingly
requires terrorist ties checks for
facilities of all four tiers.
Comment: One commenter questioned
the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP if
‘‘absent a clear national security,
homeland security, or law enforcement
rationale . . . DHS does not follow-up
with the company to alert it of the
possible threat.’’ The commenter further
stated that the ‘‘value of conducting
TSDB screening is questionable if an
identified bad actor is permitted
continued access to [chemicals of
interest] unbeknownst to the facility,
which is in the best position to ensure
that the person is not afforded that
opportunity.’’
Response: The Department’s design of
the CFATS Program is intended to
promote and enhance the security of
high-risk chemical facilities; the PSP is
one element of the larger CFATS
Program. To prevent a significant threat
to a facility or loss of life, a high-risk
chemical facility will be contacted
where appropriate and in accordance
with federal law and policy, and per law
enforcement and intelligence
requirements.

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The Department’s Methodology in
Estimating the Burden for the CFATS
PSP
This 30-day notice relies on the
analysis and resulting burden estimates
in the 60-day notice for this instrument.
Analysis
Title: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety
Program.
OMB Number: 1670–0029.
Instrument: CFATS Personnel Surety
Program.
Frequency: ‘‘Other.’’
Affected Public: Business or other forprofit.
Number of Annual Respondents: 72,607
respondents (estimate).
Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.1667
hours (10 minutes).
Total Annual Burden Hours: 12,101
hours.
Total Annual Burden Cost (capital/
startup): $1,719,409.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $955,191.
Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0.
David Epperson,
Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 2018–12523 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Fish and Wildlife Service
[FWS–R8–ES–2018–N009;
FXES11130800000–189–FF08E00000]

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants; Initiation of 5-Year Status
Reviews of 50 Species in California,
Nevada, and the Klamath Basin of
Oregon
Fish and Wildlife Service,
Interior.
ACTION: Notice of initiation of reviews;
request for information.
AGENCY:

We, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service), are initiating
5-year status reviews of 50 species in
California, Nevada, and the Klamath
Basin of Oregon under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act).
A 5-year review is based on the best
scientific and commercial data available
at the time of the review; therefore, we
are requesting submission of any new
information on these species that has
become available since the last review.
DATES: To ensure consideration in our
reviews, we are requesting submission
of new information no later than August
17, 2018. However, we will continue to
accept new information about any
species at any time.
SUMMARY:

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28251

For how and where to send
information, see Request for New
Information.

ADDRESSES:

For
whom to contact for species-specific
information, see Request for New
Information. Individuals who are
hearing impaired or speech impaired
may call the Federal Relay Service at
800–877–8337 for TTY assistance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Why do we conduct 5-year reviews?
Under the Endangered Species Act of
1973, as amended (Act; 16 U.S.C. 1531
et seq.), we maintain lists of endangered
and threatened wildlife and plant
species (referred to as the List) in the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) at 50
CFR 17.11 (for wildlife) and 17.12 (for
plants). Section 4(c)(2)(A) of the Act
requires us to review each listed
species’ status at least once every 5
years. For additional information about
5-year reviews, refer to our factsheet at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/whatwe-do/recovery-overview.html.
What information do we consider in
our review?
A 5-year review considers all new
information available at the time of the
review. In conducting these reviews, we
consider the best scientific and
commercial data that have become
available since the listing determination
or most recent status review, such as:
(A) Species biology, including but not
limited to population trends,
distribution, abundance, demographics,
and genetics;
(B) Habitat conditions, including but
not limited to amount, distribution, and
suitability;
(C) Conservation measures that have
been implemented to benefit the
species;
(D) Threat status and trends in
relation to the five listing factors (as
defined in section 4(a)(1) of the Act);
and
(E) Other new information, data, or
corrections, including but not limited to
taxonomic or nomenclatural changes,
identification of erroneous information
contained in the List, and improved
analytical methods.
Any new information will be
considered during the 5-year review and
will also be useful in evaluating the
ongoing recovery programs for the
species.
Which species are under review?
This notice announces our active
review of the species listed in the table
below.

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