ITS 2021 Attachments

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Identity Theft Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey

ITS 2021 Attachments

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Attachment list
Attachment 1: 2021 ITS questionnaire
Attachment 2: Title 34, United States Code, Section 10132 of the Justice Systems Improvement
Act of 1979
Attachment 3: 60-day Federal Registry notice
Attachment 4: 30-day Federal Registry notice
Attachment 5: “Identity Theft: What to know, What to Do” brochure
Attachment 6: Assessment of State Identity Theft Laws
Attachment 7: Identity Theft Supplement Secondary Data Analysis, Recommendations, and Next
Steps
Attachment 8: Cognitive Interviewing for the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)
Identity Theft Supplement (ITS)
Attachment 9: Identity Theft Screener Online Testing: Final Report

2021 Identity Theft Supplement
SECTION A: SCREENER QUESTIONS
INTRO 1: Now, we are conducting a special supplement on identity theft and I would like to ask you
questions. Identity theft means someone else using your personal information without your
permission to buy something, get cash or services, pay bills, or avoid the law. We will not ask you for
any specific account information. We estimate these questions will take from 5 to 15 minutes
depending on your circumstances. The U.S. Census Bureau is required by law to keep your
information confidential.
First, I’d like to ask you some questions about the possible misuse of EXISTING ACCOUNTS, which
includes existing checking, savings, credit card, social media, and other types of accounts.
1. Have you ever had a checking or savings account in your name through a bank or financial
institution?
YES
NO (Skip to Q5)
2. Has anyone EVER used your checking or savings account to make a purchase or withdraw money
without your permission?
•
•
•

Include times when someone used your debit or ATM cards to make a purchase or
withdraw money without your permission.
ONLY include times when money was actually deducted from your checking or savings
account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later or not.
DO NOT include times when someone used your credit card or online pay accounts.

YES
NO (Skip to Q5)
3. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Q5)

4a. Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
4b. And in what month? ____________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
Next, I have some questions about the possible misuse of EXISTING CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTS.
5. Have you ever had a credit card account in your name? Include major credit cards such as a
MasterCard or Visa, and credit cards through retailers, such as Kohl’s, Walmart, or Amazon. Please
do not include debit cards or gift cards.
YES
NO (Skip to Q9)
6. Has anyone EVER used one or more of your credit card accounts without your permission? ONLY
include times when charges actually posted to your account, regardless of whether you were
reimbursed later.
YES
NO (Skip to Q9)
7. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Q9)
8a. Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
8b. And in what month? ____________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.

These next questions focus on the possible misuse of your existing EMAIL OR SOCIAL MEDIA
ACCOUNTS.
9a. Have you ever had at least one email account, such as Gmail or Outlook, or social media account
such as Facebook or Instagram?
YES
NO (Skip to Q11)
9b. Has anyone EVER used your email or social media account without your permission to pretend
to be you?
YES
NO (Skip to Q11)
10a. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1
YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Q11)
Which account was used without your permission…
10b. Email account, such as Gmail or Outlook? YES NO
10c. Social media account, such as Facebook or Instagram? YES NO
HARD EDIT CHECK: If Q10a is marked “yes” and BOTH Q10b and Q10c are marked “no”
You reported either your email or social media account was misused in Q10a, but didn't identify any
of these accounts in Q10b or Q10c. Either Q10a should be changed to reflect that no email or social
media accounts were misused in the past 12 months, or either email or social media account should
be identified by selecting '1' (yes) to one of the following questions in Q10b or Q10c.
10d. Please think about the most recent time someone misused [this/one of these] account(s).
Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
10e. And in what month? ____________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.

These next questions ask about the possible misuse of any of your other EXISTING ACCOUNTS aside
from your bank, credit card, email or social media accounts.
11. Has anyone EVER used any of your other existing accounts, without your permission, such as…
•
•
•
•
•
•

telephone or internet accounts;
utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric;
medical insurance accounts, such as Medicare or a health spending account;
entertainment accounts for music, movies, or games;
online payment accounts like PayPal or Venmo; or
some other accounts?

Only include times when someone successfully posted charges to, took money from, or otherwise
misused your account.
YES
NO (Skip to Q15)
12. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1
YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Q15)
13. Which of the following types of your EXISTING accounts, other than credit card, bank, email, or
social media accounts, did someone post charges to, take money from, or otherwise misuse? Did
they misuse one or more of your…
13a. Telephone or internet accounts? YES NO
13b. Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric accounts? YES NO
13c. Medical insurance accounts, such as Medicare or a health spending account? YES NO
13d. Entertainment accounts, such as for movies, music, or games? YES NO
13e. Online payment accounts, such as PayPal or Venmo? YES NO
13f. Some other type of account? YES NO
[If yes] What other types of accounts were misused? __________
(If any 13a-13f = yes, ask Q14a; else skip to Q15)
HARD EDIT CHECK: If Q12 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q13a through Q13f are marked “no”
You reported one or more of your existing accounts were misused in Q12, but didn't identify any of
these existing accounts in Q13a, Q13b, Q13c, Q13d, Q13e, or Q13f. Either Q12 should be changed to
reflect that no existing accounts were misused in the past 12 months or the type of existing account
should be identified by selecting '1' (yes) to one or more of the following questions in Q13a, Q13b,
Q13c, Q13d, Q13e, or Q13f.

14a. Please think about the most recent time someone misused [this/one of these] existing
accounts.
Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
14b. In what month? __________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
Next, I have some questions about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have opened using your
personal information.
15. Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your personal information to successfully open
any NEW accounts, such as…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

checking or savings account;
credit card accounts;
email accounts, such as Gmail or Outlook;
social media accounts, such as Facebook or Instagram;
telephone or internet accounts;
utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric;
entertainment accounts, such as for music, movies or games;
loans or mortgages;
insurance policies;
online payment accounts, such as PayPal or Venmo; or
some other type of new account?

Please include times when someone successfully opened a new account, even if you did not lose
any money or were reimbursed later.
YES
NO (Skip to Q19)
16. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1
YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Q19)

17. With this next question, I’m going to read a list of 11 NEW accounts someone may have
successfully opened using your personal information without your permission during the past 12
months. You can say yes to more than one account.
Did someone open…
17a. New checking or savings accounts? YES NO
17b. New credit card accounts? YES NO
17c. New email accounts such as Gmail or Outlook? YES NO
17d. New social media accounts, such as Facebook or Instagram? YES NO
17e. New telephone or internet accounts? YES NO
17f. New utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric? YES NO
17g. New entertainment accounts, such as for music, movies, or games? YES NO
17h. New loans or mortgages? YES NO
17i. New insurance policies? YES NO
17j. New online payment accounts, such as PayPal or Venmo? YES NO
17k. Some other type of new account? YES NO
[If yes] What other type of new account was opened? __________
(If any 17a-17k = yes, ask Q18a; else skip to Q19)
HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q16 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q17a through Q17k are marked “no”
Responses to questions Q17a, Q17b, Q17c, Q17d, Q17e, Q17f, Q17g, Q17h, Q17i, Q17j, and Q17k are
inconsistent with answer to Q16 = Yes. Either the response to Q16 is incorrect or one or more of the
following questions Q17a, Q17b, Q17c, Q17d, Q17e, Q17f, Q17g, Q17h, Q17i, Q17j, or Q17k should be
marked '1' (Yes).
18a. Please think about the most recent time someone successfully opened [this/one of these] new
accounts.
Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
18b. And in what month? ___________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.

The next set of questions are about any other misuses of your personal information.
19. Has anyone EVER used your personal information for some other fraudulent purpose such as…
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

filing a fraudulent tax return;
getting medical treatment;
applying for a job;
providing your information to the police to conceal their identity;
providing your information to some other government authority such as the Department of
Motor Vehicles;
applying for government benefits; or
something else?

Please consider only times when your information was actually used, even if the situation was later
resolved.
YES
NO (Skip to Check Item A)
20. Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1
YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (Skip to Check Item A)
21. In which of the following ways has someone used your personal information during the past 12
months? Was your personal information used…
21a. To file a fraudulent tax return? YES NO
21b. To get medical treatment? YES NO
21c. To apply for a job? YES NO
21d. To provide false information to the police to conceal their identity? YES NO
21e. To provide false information to some other government authority such as the Department of
Motor Vehicles? YES NO
21f. To apply for government benefits? YES NO
21g. In some other way not already mentioned? YES NO
[If yes] How else was your personal information misused? __________
(If any 21a-21g = yes, ask Q22a; else skip to Check Item A)
HARD EDIT CHECK: If Q20 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q21a through Q21g are marked “no”
Response to Q20 is inconsistent with responses to Q21a, Q21b, Q21c, Q21d, Q21e, Q21f, and Q21g.
Either the response to Q20 is incorrect or one or more of the questions Q21a, Q21b, Q21c, Q21d,
Q21e, Q21f, and Q21g should be answered '1' (Yes).

22a. Please think about the most recent time your personal information was misused in [this
way/one of these ways].
Did this most recently happen in 2021 or 2020?
1. 2021
2. 2020
22b. And in what month? ____________________________ Month (01-12)
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
CHECK ITEM A
Is “no,” “don’t know,” “refused,” or “blank” marked for Q2, Q6, Q9b, AND “no,” “don’t know,” or
“refused,” marked for Q11, Q15, and Q19?
YES – Skip to Section H
NO – Skip to Check Item B
CHECK ITEM B
Is “no,” “don’t know,” “refused,” or “out of universe” marked for Q3, Q7, Q10a, Q12, Q16, AND Q20?
YES – Skip to Section G
NO – Skip to Check Item C
CHECK ITEM C
Is only one response marked “yes” from questions Q3, Q7, Q10a, Q12, Q16, AND Q20?
YES – Skip to Q23
NO – Skip to Check Item D
CHECK ITEM D
Is the most recent Month/Year provided more than once in Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10d/e, Q14a/b, Q18a/b,
and Q22a/b (e.g. if respondent answered 2021, May in both Q4a/b and Q8a/b, select “yes.”)?
YES – Skip to Q24
NO – Ask Q23

23. You said that in someone . Was this the result of one related incident or was your personal information misused
multiple times in separate unrelated incidents? An incident of identity theft occurs when your
information is stolen. A stolen credit card or debit card may be used multiple times but this should
be considered a single incident.
1. Multiple Incidents (Skip to Section B, Intro 1)
2. One related incident (Skip to Section B, Intro 2)
If the respondent states, “I don’t know,” instruct the respondent to select what they believe to be
the best response.
24. You said that in someone . Were these the result of one related incident or was your personal information misused
multiple times in separate unrelated incidents? An incident of identity theft occurs when your
information is stolen. A stolen credit card or debit card may be used multiple times but this should
be considered a single incident.
1. Multiple Incidents (Ask Q25)
2. One related incident (Skip to Section B, Intro 2)
If the respondent states, “I don’t know,” instruct the respondent to select what they believe to be
the best response.
25. Which of these misuses of your personal information happened during the most recent
incident?
(Mark all that apply, and only read response items that match autofill “yes” responses from Q2, Q6,
Q9b, Q11, Q15, and Q19)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Misuse of an existing checking and/or savings account
Misuse of an existing credit card account
Misuse of an existing email or social media account
Misuse of other types of existing accounts
Misuse of personal information to open a NEW account
Misuse of personal information for other fraudulent purpose.

(Skip to Section B, Intro 1)

SECTION B. HOW/WHEN IDENTITY THEFT DISCOVERED
INTRO 1: For those with more than one incident: I will now ask you to consider only the most recent
incident of identity theft that you experienced during the past 12 months.
For the next series of questions, please think about the [autofill most recent type of ID theft from
Q25 or (“yes” response from Q2, Q6, Q9b, Q11, Q15, OR Q19)] you experienced in [autofill most
recent month/year from Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10d/e, Q14a/b, Q18a/b, or Q22a/b].
INTRO 2: For those with a single incident For the next series of questions, please think about the
[autofill “yes” responses from (Q2, Q6, Q9b, Q11, Q15, or Q19] you experienced in [autofill
month/year from Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10d/e, Q14a/b, Q18a/b, or Q22a/b].

26. How did you FIRST find out about the most recent incident of misuse of your personal
information?
(SELECT A SINGLE RESPONSE)
DISCOVERED BY RESPONDENT
1. I contacted the credit card company or bank to report a theft and was told that fraudulent
charges had already been made.
2. I noticed money missing from my account.
3. I noticed fraudulent charges on my account.
4. I received merchandise or a card that I did not order.
5. I had problems using my card or account because it was declined, closed, or had insufficient
funds.
6. I applied for credit, a bank account or loan, utilities such as cable service, employment, or
government benefits, etc. and had problems.
7. I checked my credit report.
8. I received a bill that I did not owe.
9. I had a problem filing my income taxes.
NOTIFIED BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
10. Credit card company or bank contacted me about suspicious activity on my account.
11. My credit monitoring service contacted me.
12. A collection agency, credit card company, credit bureau, or other financial institution
contacted me about late or unpaid bills.
NOTIFIED BY OTHER PARTY
13. A law enforcement agency notified me.
14. A company or agency notified me.
OTHER
15. Discovered in another way - (specify)

27. In what year and month did you first discover that someone had misused your personal
information?
Enter year: __________
1. 2021
2. 2020
3. 2019 or prior
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
SOFT EDIT CHECK: Respondent gave month/year in Q27 that is prior to the most recent month/year
of Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10d/e, Q14a/b, Q18a/b, or Q22a/b.
Respondent reported that they discovered the most recent incident identity theft prior to the
month/year that it occurred. Return to Q27 (WHEN_DISCOVERED_YEAR) to correct the date or accept
the inconsistency.
28. How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

One day or less (1-24 hours)
More than a day, but less than a week (more than 24 hours-6 days)
At least a week, but less than one month (7-30 days)
One month to less than three months
Three months to less than six months
Six months to less than one year
One year or more
Don’t know

29. Do you have any idea HOW your personal information was obtained, even if you are not
completely certain?
YES
NO (Skip to Q31)

30. How do you think your personal information was obtained?
(SELECT A SINGLE RESPONSE)
1. I lost an item that included my personal information.
2. My wallet, checkbook, or purse was stolen.
3. My personal information recorded on paper documents was stolen from a place where it was
stored or placed such as my office or trash.
4. It was accessed electronically from my work or home computer, cell phone, tablet, or other
electronic device.
5. It was stolen during an online purchase/transaction.
6. Someone stole it during an in-person purchase/transaction, including using a skimmer or card
reader.
7. I responded to a scam email/phone call.
8. My personal information was stolen from my personnel or human resources files at my place
of employment.
9. It was stolen from an office/company such as a financial institution, retailer, service provider,
or restaurant.
10. Obtained in another way (specify)____________
SECTION C. VICTIM RESPONSE
31. Were you in contact with anyone at a credit card company, bank, credit union, or other financial
institution about misuse of your personal information?
YES
NO (Skip to Q35)
32. Did you contact a credit bureau about the misuse of your personal information?
YES
NO (Skip to Q35)

33. At any credit bureau that you contacted, did you...
a. Request your credit report? YES NO
b. Request corrections to your credit report? YES NO
c. Place a fraud alert on your credit report? YES NO DON’T KNOW
Did you...
d. Place a freeze on your credit report, which prevents the credit bureaus from sending your credit
report to anyone without your permission? YES NO
e. Take some other action with the credit bureau? YES NO
[If yes] What else did you do when you contacted the credit bureau? __________

34. After you told a credit bureau that your personal information had been misused, how satisfied
were you with the credit bureau’s response? Were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied,
somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very satisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
Don’t know

35. Did you contact any law enforcement agencies, such as the local police, a sheriff’s office or a
federal law enforcement agency, to report misuse of your personal
information?
YES (Ask Q36)
NO (Skip to Q40)
36. Did the law enforcement agency take a police report from you about the misuse of your
personal information?
YES (Ask Q37)
NO (Skip to Q38)
37. Did you receive a copy of that police report?
YES (Skip to Check Item E)
NO (Skip to Q38)

CHECK ITEM E
Does Q32 = “Yes”?
YES – Ask Q37a
NO – Skip to Q38
37a. Did you send a copy of that police report to the credit bureau that you contacted?
YES

38. How satisfied were you with the law enforcement agency’s response when you reported the
misuse of your personal information? Were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (ENTER A SINGLE RESPONSE)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very satisfied (Skip to Q41)
Somewhat satisfied (Skip to Q41)
Somewhat dissatisfied (Ask Q39)
Very dissatisfied (Ask Q39)
Don’t know (Skip to Q41)

39. Why were you dissatisfied with the law enforcement agency’s response? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Police didn’t or couldn’t do anything
Police only filled out a report
Police said the crime did not fall in their jurisdiction
Police gave me no information on what I should do about the crime
Police never got back in contact with me/never learned outcome
Didn’t feel my concerns/complaints were taken seriously
Police unable to catch the
Other (specify) __________

40. We would like to learn more about why people who experience identity theft do not report it to
law enforcement. Why did you decide not to contact a law enforcement agency? (MARK ALL THAT
APPLY)
DIDN’T KNOW I COULD
1. Didn’t know that I could report it
2. Didn’t think about reporting it
3. Didn’t know what agency was responsible for identity theft crimes
NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH
4. I didn’t lose any money
5. Not important enough to report/small loss
HANDLED IT ANOTHER WAY
6. Took care of it myself
7. Credit card company/bank/other organization took care of problem
DIDN’T THINK THE POLICE COULD HELP
8. Didn’t think police would do anything
9. Didn’t want to bother police
10. Didn’t find out about the crime until long after it happened/too late for police to help
11. Couldn’t identify the offender or provide much information that would be helpful to the police
12. Occurred in another state or outside of the U.S.
PERSONAL REASONS
13. The person responsible was a friend or family member and I didn’t want to get them in
trouble
14. Too inconvenient/didn’t want to take the time
OTHER
15. Other (specify) __________

41. Next, I'm going to read you a list of other people and organizations that someone might contact
when their personal information is misused. Which of the following people or organizations, if any,
did you contact about misuse of your personal information? Did you...
a. Contact the business or organization associated with the misuse? YES NO
b. Hire a lawyer? YES NO
c. Contact a State or local government consumer affairs agency, such as the State Attorney
General's office? YES NO
d. Contact the Federal Trade Commission? YES NO
e. Contact a nongovernment consumer agency, such as the Better Business Bureau or the National
Consumer League? YES NO
f. Contact a government agency that issues documents like driver's licenses or Social Security
cards? YES NO
g. Contact a nongovernment agency that issues documents, such as insurance cards? YES NO
h. Contact a credit monitoring service or identity theft insurance company? YES NO
i. Contact an office or agency – other than the police – that deals with victims of crime? YES NO
j. Contact some other group or organization not already mentioned? YES NO
[If yes] What other group or organization did you contact?__________
SECTION D. VICTIM IMPACT
42. The misuse of personal information affects people in different ways. Next, I would like to ask you
some questions about how misuse of your personal information may have
affected you.
Did the misuse of your personal information lead you to have significant problems with your job or
schoolwork or trouble with your boss, co-workers, or peers?
YES
NO
43. Did the misuse of your personal information lead you to have significant problems with family
members or friends, including getting into more arguments or fights than you did before, not feeling
you could trust them as much, or not feeling as close to them as you did before?
YES
NO

44. How distressing was the misuse of your personal information to you? Was it not at all
distressing, mildly distressing, moderately distressing, or severely distressing?
(ENTER A SINGLE RESPONSE)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Not at all distressing (Skip to Section E)
Mildly distressing (Skip to Section E)
Moderately distressing (Skip to Check Item F)
Severely distressing (Skip to Check Item F)

CHECK ITEM F
Is “yes” marked in Q42 or Q43 or are categories ‘3' or ‘4' marked in Q44?
YES – Ask Q45
NO – Skip to Section E
45. Did you feel any of the following ways for A MONTH OR MORE because of
misuse of your personal information?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Worried or anxious? YES NO
Angry? YES NO
Sad or depressed? YES NO
Vulnerable? YES NO
Violated? YES NO
Like you couldn’t trust people? YES NO
Unsafe? YES NO
Some other way? YES NO
[If yes] What other way did the misuse of your personal information make you feel? ______

(If any 45a-45h = yes, ask Q46a; else skip to Q47)
46a. Did you seek any kind of professional help for the feelings you experienced as a result of
misuse of your personal information?
YES (Ask Q46b)
NO (Skip to Q47)
46b. What kind of professional help did you seek? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Counseling/therapy
Visited primary care or private physician’s office
Visited ER/hospital/walk-in clinic
Other specify __________

47. Did you experience any of the following physical problems caused by
misuse of your personal information for A MONTH OR MORE? Did you experience...
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Headaches? YES NO
Trouble sleeping? YES NO
Changes in your eating or drinking habits? YES NO
Upset stomach? YES NO
Fatigue? YES NO
High blood pressure? YES NO
Muscle tension or back pain? YES NO
Some other problem? YES NO
[If yes] What other physical problems did you experience for A MONTH OR MORE? ________

(If any 47a-47h = yes, ask Q48; else skip to Section E)
48. Did you seek any kind of professional or medical help for the physical problems you just
reported?
YES (Ask Q49)
NO (Skip to Section E)
49. What kind of professional or medical help did you seek? (MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Counseling/therapy
Visited primary care or private physician’s office
Visited ER/hospital/walk-in clinic
Other specify __________

SECTION E. OFFENDER
50. Do you know, or have you learned, anything at all about the person or persons who misused your personal information?
YES (Ask Q51)
NO (Skip to Section F)

51. How well did you know this person or these people at the time of the incident? For example,
was it a family member, friend, acquaintance, salesperson, or somebody else?
RELATIVE
1. Spouse (ex-spouse)
2. Parent or step-parent
3. Brother or sister or step-brother/step-sister
4. Child or step-child
5. Other relative (specify) __________
NONRELATIVE
6. Boyfriend or girlfriend (ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend)
7. Friend or ex-friend
8. Housemate or roommate
9. Neighbor
10. Co-worker (current or former, supervisor or other employee)
11. Someone working in my home (babysitter, housecleaner, etc.)
12. Casual acquaintance
13. Salesperson
14. Food service attendant such as a waiter/waitress, server, or barista
15. Other non-relative (specify) __________
STRANGER
16. Do not recall ever meeting or seeing the person before
SECTION F. FINANCIAL IMPACT
52. What is the approximate total dollar value of what someone obtained when they misused your
personal information ? Include the value of goods, services,
credit, loans, cash, and anything else the person may have obtained.
(IF THE RESPONDENT PROVIDES A RANGE, ASK THE RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE THEIR BEST TOTAL
DOLLAR VALUE ESTIMATE INSTEAD OF A RANGE)

RECORD THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT. $__________.00 (IF OVER $1,000, PROBE: I just want to verify
that the total amount is (INSERT AMOUNT RESPONDENT INDICATED)
If response = $0, skip to Q54b.
53. Of this that was obtained during
misuse of your personal information, how much of that money did you personally lose? That is, how
much did you lose that was not covered or reimbursed by insurance, bank, or credit card company?
RECORD ESTIMATED AMOUNT. $___________.00 (IF “NONE,” PROBE: Just to confirm, you didn’t
personally lose anything?)

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q53 > Q52
The respondent just reported their personal loss was greater than the total dollar amount obtained.
Return to PERSONAL_LOSS and fix the amount or reduce the amount of personal loss so that it
doesn't exceed the amount reported in TOTAL_LOSS.
CHECK ITEM G
Is answer to Q53 equal to $0 (the respondent did not lose anything or did not have to pay anything
personally)?
YES – Skip to Q54b
NO – Ask Q54a
54a. Other than the costs you already told me about, , how much, IF ANY,
additional costs did YOU incur as a result of misuse of your personal
information? Include costs for things such as legal fees, overdraft fees, and any miscellaneous
expenses, such as postage, phone calls, or notary fees. Do not include lost wages.
OR
54b. How much, IF ANY, costs did YOU incur during misuse of your personal
information? Include costs for things such as legal fees, overdraft fees, and any miscellaneous
expenses, such as postage, phone calls, or notary fees. Do not include lost wages.
RECORD ESTIMATED AMOUNT. $___________.00 SKIP to Q55
DO NOT INCLUDE COSTS WHICH WERE REIMBURSED.
(IF OVER $1,000, PROBE: I just want to verify that the total amount is (INSERT AMOUNT RESPONDENT
INDICATED).
55. Have you been successful in clearing up all of the financial and credit problems associated with
misuse of your personal information?
YES (Ask Q56)
NO (Skip to Q57)
DON’T KNOW (Skip to Q57)

56. How long did it take you to clear up all of the financial and credit problems associated with the
misuse after you discovered it? (ENTER A SINGLE RESPONSE.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

57. How many hours clearing up financial or credit problems
associated with misuse of your personal information? If you don’t know,
please provide your best estimate.
__________ Number of hours
58. Other than anything we have already talked about, have you experienced any of the following
problems as a result of misuse of your personal information? Have you…
a. Had credit related problems, such as having to repeatedly correct the same information on your
credit report, being turned down for credit or loans, changes in your credit score, or having to pay
higher rates? YES NO
b. Had banking problems, such as being turned down for a checking account or having checks
bounce? YES NO
c. Had debt collectors or collections departments contact you? YES NO
d. Had utilities cut off or been denied new service? YES NO
As a result of the misuse of your personal information, have you...
e.
f.
g.
h.

Been turned down for a job or lost a job? YES NO
Had a lawsuit filed against you? YES NO
Been the subject of an arrest or criminal proceedings? YES NO
Had some other type of problems? YES NO
[If yes] What other type of problem did you experience? __________

CHECK ITEM H
Did respondent experience more than one incident of identity theft during the past 12 months (Q23=1
or Q24=1)?
YES – Ask Q59
NO – Skip to Section G

59. For the next few questions, please think about ALL of the misuses of your personal information
during the last year, that is, since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR]. Including every
incident that occurred over the past 12 months, not just the most recent, what is the approximate
total dollar value of what someone obtained while misusing your personal information? Include
the value of goods, services, credit, loans, cash, and anything else the person may have obtained.
(IF THE RESPONDENT PROVIDES A RANGE, ASK THE RESPONDENT TO PROVIDE THEIR BEST TOTAL
DOLLAR VALUE ESTIMATE INSTEAD OF A RANGE. THIS INCLUDES “WHAT SOMEONE OBTAINED”
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE RESPONDENT WAS REIMBURSED.)
RECORD THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT. $__________.00

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q59 < Q52
The respondent reported less than incident of misuse of their personal
information, PROBE:
I just want to verify that the total amount is .
The respondent just reported their total dollar value of what the offender obtained from the most
recent misuse of their personal information was greater than the total dollar value of what the
offender obtained from every incident that occurred over the past 12 months. Return to
TOTAL_EVERY_INCIDENT and fix the amount or reduce the amount of TOTAL_LOSS from the most
recent misuse of their personal information, so that it doesn't exceed the amount reported in
TOTAL_EVERY_INCIDENT.
60. Not counting the dollars that were obtained during ALL incidents of
identity theft in the past 12 months, what were the total additional costs, that YOU incurred as a
result of the misuses of your personal information? Include costs for things such as legal fees,
overdraft fees, and any miscellaneous expenses, such as postage, phone calls, or notary fees. Do
not include lost wages.
RECORD ESTIMATED AMOUNT. $___________.00 DO
NOT INCLUDE COSTS WHICH WERE REIMBURSED.
ANY RESPONSE – Skip to Section G after the following Hard Edits performed

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q60 < Q54a
The respondent reported less than value of additional costs incurred from
Incident of misuse of their personal information, PROBE:
I just want to verify that the total amount is .
The respondent just reported the additional costs incurred from the most recent misuse of their
personal information was greater than the additional costs incurred from every incident that occurred
over the past 12 months. Return to TOTAL_ADD_COSTS and fix the amount or reduce the amount of
ADD_COSTS_INCUR from the most recent misuse of their personal information, so that it doesn't
exceed the amount reported in TOTAL_ADD_COSTS.
HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q60 < Q54b
The respondent reported less than value of additional costs incurred from
Incident of misuse of their personal information, PROBE:
I just want to verify that the total amount is .
The respondent just reported the additional cost incurred from the most recent misuse of their
personal information was greater than the additional costs incurred from every incident that occurred
over the past 12 months. Return to TOTAL_ADD_COSTS and fix the amount or reduce the amount of
NO_PERSONAL_LOSS from the most recent misuse of their personal information, so that it doesn't
exceed the amount reported in TOTAL_ADD_COSTS.
SECTION G. LONG-TERM VICTIMIZATION AND CONSEQUENCES
INTRO: Now I’m going to ask you to think about any identity theft that may have occurred more
than 12 months ago, that is, any time before [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR].
Again, identity theft means someone else using your personal information without your permission
to buy something, get cash or services, pay bills, or avoid the law.

CHECK ITEM I
Is (“yes” marked for any of Q2, Q6, Q9b, Q11, Q15, or Q19) AND (“yes,” “don’t know,” “refused,” or
“out of universe” marked for Q3, Q7, Q10a, Q12, Q16, AND Q20)?
YES – Skip to Q61
NO – Skip to Q62

61. Not including the past 12 months, has anyone EVER, without your permission:
• misused one of your existing accounts,
• used your personal information to open a new account,
• or used your personal information for some other fraudulent purpose, such as
getting medical care, a job, government benefits or something else?
YES
NO (Skip to Section H)
62. At any point during the past 12 months did you experience credit or other financial problems,
legal problems, relationship problems with family or friends, problems at work or school, physical
problems, or emotional distress as a result of the identity theft that happened to you more than 12
months ago?
YES
NO (Skip to Section H)
63. During the past 12 months, have you experienced any of the following consequences as a result
of the identity theft that occurred more than 12 months ago? Have you had…
a. Significant problems with your job or schoolwork, or trouble with your boss, co-workers, or peers
during the past 12 months? YES NO
b. Significant problems during the past 12 months with family members or friends, including getting
into more arguments or fights than you did before, not feeling you could trust them as much, or
not feeling as close to them as you did before? YES NO
As a result of the identity theft that occurred more than 12 months ago, have you...
c. Experienced any of the following feelings for a month or more during the past 12 months:
worry, anger, sadness or depression, vulnerability, feeling violated like you couldn’t trust people,
or feeling that you were unsafe? YES NO
d. Had physical problems during the past 12 months resulting from the misuse of your personal
information, such as headaches, trouble sleeping, changes in your eating or drinking habits, an
upset stomach, high blood pressure or some other physical problem? YES NO
e. Had credit related problems during the past 12 months, such as having to repeatedly correct the
same information on your credit report, being turned down for credit, loans or having to pay
higher rates? YES NO
f. Had banking problems during the past 12 months, such as being turned down for a checking
account or having checks bounce? YES NO

As a result of the identity theft that occurred more than 12 months ago, have you...
g. Had debt collectors or collections departments contact you during the past 12 months? YES NO
h. Had utilities cut off or been denied new service during the past 12 months? YES NO
i. Been turned down for a job or lost a job during the past 12 months? YES NO
j. Had legal problems, such as having a lawsuit filed against you or being the subject of an arrest or
criminal proceedings, during the past 12 months? YES NO
k. Had some other type of problems during the past 12 months? YES NO
[If yes] What other types of problems have occurred during the past 12 months? _________

SECTION H. PREVENTATIVE BEHAVIORS
64. Now I’m going to ask you about any actions taken to prevent someone from obtaining your
personal information. In the past 12 months, that is since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR], have you:
a. Checked your credit report? YES NO
b. Changed passwords on any of your financial accounts? YES NO
c. Purchased identity theft protection from a company that offers protection services? YES NO
d. Purchased credit monitoring or identity theft insurance? YES NO
e. Shredded or destroyed documents containing your personal information? YES NO
f. Checked your banking or credit card statements for unfamiliar charges? YES NO
g. Used security software program on your computer to protect against loss of credit cards/card
theft? YES NO
CHECK ITEM J
If (“yes” for Q64a, Q64b, Q64c, Q64d, Q64e, Q64f, or Q64g) AND (“yes” for Q2, Q6, Q9b, Q11, Q15, or
Q19) continue to Q65.
Else, skip to Q67.
65. You said that during the past 12 months, you . Did you take any of these actions as a result of previous misuse of your personal
information?
YES (Ask Q66)

NO (Skip to Q67)
66. You said that during the past 12 months you: . Which actions did you take in direct response to any previous misuse of your
personal information?
(Mark all that apply, and only read response items that match autofill responses in this question)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Checked your credit report
Changed passwords on any of your financial accounts
Purchased identity theft protection from a company that offers protection services
Purchased credit monitoring or identity theft insurance
Shredded or destroyed documents containing your personal information
Checked your banking or credit card statements for unfamiliar charges
Used security software program on your computer to protect it against loss of credit
cards/card theft

SECTION I. DATA BREACHES
67. My final questions involve organizations that may have your personal information in their files.
During the past 12 months, did a company, government agency, or some other organization that
has your personal information:
a. Notify you or announce publicly that some or all of their files or data may have been stolen, lost,
or posted on a publicly available website?
YES (Ask Q67b)
NO (Skip to End of Survey)
b. Did they notify you directly that YOUR personal information may have been stolen, lost, or
posted on a publicly available website?
YES (Ask Q68)
NO (Skip to End of Survey)
68. Did this personal information include your Social Security number?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW

END OF SURVEY

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7880

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 20 / Tuesday, February 2, 2021 / Notices

Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted for 30 days until March
4, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent
within 30 days of publication of this
notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain. Find this particular
information collection by selecting
‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open
for Public Comments’’ or by using the
search function.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written
comments and suggestions from the
public and affected agencies concerning
the proposed collection of information
are encouraged. Your comments should
address one or more of the following
four points:
—Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
—Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Evaluate whether and if so how the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected can be
enhanced; and
—Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES

DATES:

Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Revision of a currently collection
approved collection. The 2020 survey
instrument is being revised to include
new questions and remove others.
(2) The Title of the Form/Collection:
2018–2020 Survey of State Criminal
History Information Systems (SSCHIS).
(3) The agency form number, if any,
and the applicable component of the
Department sponsoring the collection:
The form number is N/A. The
applicable component within the
Department of Justice is the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, in the Office of Justice
Programs.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Respondents are state
government agencies, primarily state
criminal history record repositories. The

VerDate Sep<11>2014

19:08 Feb 01, 2021

Jkt 253001

SSCHIS report, the most comprehensive
data available on the collection and
maintenance of information by state
criminal history record systems,
describes the status of such systems and
record repositories on a biennial basis.
Data collected from state record
repositories serves as the basis for
estimating the percentage of total state
records that are immediately available
through the FBI’s Interstate
Identification Index (III), and the
percentage of arrest records that include
dispositions. Other data presented
include the number of records
maintained by each state, the percentage
of automated records in the system, and
the number of states participating in the
National Fingerprint File and the
National Crime Prevention and Privacy
Compact which authorizes the interstate
exchange of criminal history records for
noncriminal justice purposes. The
SSCHIS also contains information
regarding the timeliness and
completeness of data in state record
systems and procedures employed to
improve data quality.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: The total number of
respondents is 56. The average length of
time per respondent is 6.5 hours. This
estimate is based on the average amount
of time reported by five states that
reviewed the survey.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: The total burden associated
with this collection is estimated to be
364 hours.
If additional information is required
contact: Melody Braswell, Department
Clearance Officer, United States
Department of Justice, Justice
Management Division, Policy and
Planning Staff, Two Constitution
Square, 145 N Street NE, 3E.405A,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: January 27, 2021.
Melody Braswell,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2021–02129 Filed 2–1–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

PO 00000

Frm 00041

Fmt 4703

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[OMB Number 1121–0317]

Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed eCollection
eComments Requested;
Reinstatement, With Change, of a
Previously Approved Collection for
Which Approval Has Expired: 2021
Identity Theft Supplement (ITS)
Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Department of Justice.
ACTION: 60-Day notice.
AGENCY:

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice
(DOJ), Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, will be
submitting the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted for 60 days until April
5, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have additional comments
especially on the estimated public
burden or associated response time,
suggestions, or need a copy of the
proposed information collection
instrument with instructions or
additional information, please contact
Erika Harrell, Statistician, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 810 Seventh Street
NW, Washington, DC 20531 (email:
Erika.Harrell@usdoj.gov; telephone:
202–307–0758).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written
comments and suggestions from the
public and affected agencies concerning
the proposed collection of information
are encouraged. Your comments should
address one or more of the following
four points:
—Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
—Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Evaluate whether and if so how the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected can be
enhanced; and
—Minimize the burden of the collection
of information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms
of information technology, e.g.,

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 20 / Tuesday, February 2, 2021 / Notices

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES

permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Reinstatement of the Identity Theft
Supplement, with changes, a previously
approved collection for which approval
has expired.
(2) The Title of the Form/Collection:
2021 Identity Theft Supplement.
(3) The agency form number, if any,
and the applicable component of the
Department sponsoring the collection:
The form number for the questionnaire
is ITS–1. The applicable component
within the Department of Justice is the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, in the Office
of Justice Programs.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Respondents will be persons
16 years or older living in households
located throughout the United States
sampled for the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS). The ITS
will be conducted as a supplement to
the NCVS in all sample households for
a six (6) month period. The ITS is
primarily an effort to measure the
prevalence of identity theft among
persons, the characteristics of identity
theft victims, and patterns of reporting
to the police, credit bureaus, and other
authorities. The ITS was also designed
to collect important characteristics of
identity theft such as how the victim’s
personal information was obtained; the
physical, emotional and financial
impact on victims; offender information;
and the measures people take to avoid
or minimize their risk of becoming an
identity theft victim. BJS plans to
publish this information in reports and
reference it when responding to queries
from the U.S. Congress, Executive Office
of the President, the U.S. Supreme
Court, state officials, international
organizations, researchers, students, the
media, and others interested in criminal
justice statistics.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: An estimate of the total
number of respondents is 104,910. An
estimated 90.2% of respondents
(94,630) will have no identity theft and
will complete the short interview with
an average burden of eight minutes.
Among the 9.8% of respondents
(10,280) who experience at least one
incident of identity theft, the time to ask
the detailed questions regarding the
aspects of the most recent incident of
identity theft is estimated to take an
average of fifteen minutes. Respondents
will be asked to respond to this survey

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only once during the six-month period.
The burden estimate is based on actual
interview times from the 2018 ITS, an
analysis of the 2021 ITS questionnaire
changes, and mock interviews done
with the 2021 questionnaire.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated
15,185 total burden hours associated
with this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Melody Braswell, Department
Clearance Officer, United States
Department of Justice, Justice
Management Division, Policy and
Planning Staff, Two Constitution
Square, 145 N Street NE, 3E.405A,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: January 27, 2021.
Melody Braswell,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2021–02125 Filed 2–1–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Submission for OMB
Review; Comment Request;
Apprenticeship Evidence-Building
Portfolio, New Collection
Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Policy, Chief Evaluation
Office, Department of Labor.
ACTION: Notice of information collection;
request for comment.
AGENCY:

SUMMARY: The Department of Labor
(DOL), as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, conducts a preclearance
consultation program to provide the
general public and federal agencies with
an opportunity to comment on proposed
and/or continuing collections of
information in accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA95). This program helps to ensure
that requested data can be provided in
the desired format, reporting burden
(time and financial resources) is
minimized, collection instruments are
clearly understood, and the impact of
collection requirements on respondents
is properly assessed. Currently, the
Department of Labor is soliciting
comments concerning the collection of
data about the Apprenticeship
Evidence-Building Portfolio. A copy of
the proposed Information Collection
Request (ICR) can be obtained by
contacting the office listed below in the
addressee section of this notice.
DATES: Written comments must be
submitted to the office listed in the

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addressee section below on or before
April 5, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by either one of the following methods:
Email: ChiefEvaluationOffice@
dol.gov; Mail or Courier: Janet Javar,
Chief Evaluation Office, OASP, U.S.
Department of Labor, Room S–2312, 200
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington,
DC 20210. Instructions: Please submit
one copy of your comments by only one
method. All submissions received must
include the agency name and OMB
Control Number identified above for
this information collection. Comments,
including any personal information
provided, become a matter of public
record. They will also be summarized
and/or included in the request for OMB
approval of the information collection
request.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Janet Javar by email at
ChiefEvaluationOffice@dol.gov or by
phone at (202) 693–5954.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background: The Chief Evaluation
Office (CEO) of the U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) intends to design and
conduct evaluations of DOL-funded
apprenticeship initiatives through the
Apprenticeship Evidence-Building
Portfolio. The portfolio of initiatives
includes the Scaling Apprenticeship
Through Sector-Based Strategies grants,
Closing the Skills Gap grants, Youth
Apprenticeship Readiness grants, and
other DOL investments. The goal of this
five-year study is to build evidence on
apprenticeship models, practices, and
partnership strategies in high-growth
occupations and industries. The overall
study is comprised of several
components: (1) An implementation
study of the Scaling Apprenticeship and
Closing the Skills Gap grants to develop
typologies of apprenticeship models and
practices, identify promising strategies
across the portfolio, and to better
understand the implementation of
models to help interpret impact
evaluation findings; (2) a study of
registered apprenticeship state systems
and partnerships to assess their capacity
to develop, design, modify, implement,
replicate, sustain, expand/scale up, and
evaluate apprenticeship strategies and
models; and (3) an implementation
evaluation of the Youth Apprenticeship
Readiness grant program to understand
service delivery design and
implementation, challenges, and
promising practices. DOL will submit
additional ICRs for future data
collection requests for this overall
study.
This Federal Register Notice provides
the opportunity to comment on nine

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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 78 / Monday, April 26, 2021 / Notices
Dated: April 21, 2021.
Melody Braswell,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2021–08587 Filed 4–23–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of Justice Programs
[OMB Number 1121–0317]

Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed eCollection
eComments Requested;
Reinstatement, With Change, of a
Previously Approved Collection for
Which Approval has Expired: 2021
Identity Theft Supplement (ITS)
Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Office of Justice Programs, Department
of Justice.
ACTION: 30-Day notice.
AGENCY:

The Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Justice Programs,
Department of Justice (DOJ), will be
submitting the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
The proposed information collection
was previously published in the Federal
Register. Following publication of the
60-day notice, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics received no requests for the
survey instrument and two
communications containing suggestions
for revisions to the collection of data
and regarding the administration of the
instrument, which are addressed in
Supporting Statement Part A.
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted for 30 days until May
26, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have additional comments
especially on the estimated public
burden or associated response time,
suggestions, or need a copy of the
proposed information collection
instrument with instructions or
additional information, please contact
Erika Harrell, Statistician, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 810 Seventh Street
NW, Washington, DC 20531 (email:
Erika.Harrell@usdoj.gov; telephone:
202–307–0758).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written
comments and recommendations for the
proposed information collection should
be sent within 30 days of publication of
this notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/
do/PRAMain. Find this particular
information collection by selecting
SUMMARY:

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‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open
for Public Comments’’ or by using the
search function. Your comments should
address one or more of the following
four points:
—Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
—Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Evaluate whether and if so how the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected can be
enhanced; and
—Minimize the burden of the collection
of information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms
of information technology, e.g.,
permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Reinstatement of the Identity Theft
Supplement, with changes, a previously
approved collection for which approval
has expired.
(2) The Title of the Form/Collection:
2021 Identity Theft Supplement.
(3) The agency form number, if any,
and the applicable component of the
Department sponsoring the collection:
The form number for the questionnaire
is ITS–1. The applicable component
within the Department of Justice is the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, in the Office
of Justice Programs.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Respondents will be persons
16 years or older living in households
located throughout the United States
sampled for the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS). The ITS
will be conducted as a supplement to
the NCVS in all sample households for
a six (6) month period. The ITS is
primarily an effort to measure the
prevalence of identity theft among
persons, the characteristics of identity
theft victims, and patterns of reporting
to the police, credit bureaus, and other
authorities. The ITS was also designed
to collect important characteristics of
identity theft such as how the victim’s
personal information was obtained; the
physical, emotional and financial
impact on victims; offender information;

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and the measures people take to avoid
or minimize their risk of becoming an
identity theft victim. BJS plans to
publish this information in reports and
reference it when responding to queries
from the U.S. Congress, Executive Office
of the President, the U.S. Supreme
Court, state officials, international
organizations, researchers, students, the
media, and others interested in criminal
justice statistics.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: An estimate of the total
number of respondents is 104,910. An
estimated 90.2% of respondents
(94,630) are estimated to report no
identity theft and will complete the ITS
screener and follow-up questions with
an average burden of about eight
minutes. Among the 9.8% of
respondents (10,280) who are expected
to experience at least one incident of
identity theft during the reference
period, the time to ask the screener,
incident, and follow-up questions of
identity theft is estimated to take an
average of fifteen minutes. Respondents
will be asked to respond to this survey
only once during the six-month period.
The burden estimate is based on data
from actual interview times from the
2018 ITS, an analysis of the 2021 ITS
questionnaire changes and mock
interviews done with the 2021
questionnaire.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated
15,185 total burden hours associated
with this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Melody Braswell, Department
Clearance Officer, United States
Department of Justice, Justice
Management Division, Policy and
Planning Staff, Two Constitution
Square, 145 N Street NE, 3E.405A,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: April 21, 2021.
Melody Braswell,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2021–08584 Filed 4–23–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–18–P

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
[Notice: (21–026)]

Notice of Intent To Grant an Exclusive,
Co-Exclusive or Partially Exclusive
Patent License
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.

AGENCY:

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26APN1

Identity Theft
What to know, What to do

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

IdentityTheft.gov

Is someone using your personal or financial information to
make purchases, get benefits, file taxes, or commit fraud?
That’s identity theft.

Visit IdentityTheft.gov to report identity
theft and get a personal recovery plan.
The site provides detailed advice to help you fix problems
caused by identity theft, along with the ability to:

• get a personal recovery plan that walks you through
each step

• update your plan and track your progress
• print pre-filled letters and forms to send to credit
bureaus, businesses, and debt collectors

Go to IdentityTheft.gov and click “Get Started.”
There’s detailed advice for tax, medical, and child identity
theft – plus over thirty other types of identity theft. No
matter what type of identity theft you’ve experienced, the
next page tells you what to do right away. You’ll find these
steps – and a whole lot more – at IdentityTheft.gov.

What To Do Right Away
Step 1: Call the companies where you know fraud occurred.
☐☐ Call the fraud department. Explain that someone stole your identity.
Ask them to close or freeze the accounts. Then, no one can add
new charges unless you agree.
☐☐ Change logins, passwords, and PINs for your accounts.

Step 2: Place a fraud alert and get your credit reports.
☐☐ To place a free fraud alert, contact one of the three credit bureaus.
That company must tell the other two.
A fraud alert lasts one
Experian.com/help
year. It will make it
888-EXPERIAN (888-397-3742)
harder for someone
to open new accounts
TransUnion.com/credit-help
in your name.
888-909-8872

•
•

• Equifax.com/personal/credit-report-services
1-800-685-1111

Get updates at IdentityTheft.gov/creditbureaucontacts.
☐☐ Get your free credit reports from Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion.
Go to annualcreditreport.com or call 1-877-322-8228.
☐☐ Review your reports. Make note of any account or transaction you
don’t recognize. This will help you report the theft to the FTC and
the police.

Step 3: Report identity theft to the FTC.
☐☐ Go to IdentityTheft.gov, and include as many details as possible.
Based on the information you enter, IdentityTheft.gov will
create your Identity Theft Report and recovery plan.

Go to IdentityTheft.gov for next steps.
Your next step might be closing accounts opened in
your name, or reporting fraudulent charges to your
credit card company.
IdentityTheft.gov can help – no matter what your
specific identity theft situation is.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

IdentityTheft.gov
September 2018

Assessment of State Identity Theft Laws
1. Introduction
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have criminalized the act of identity theft. For the purpose of
understanding how well the current definition of identity theft used in the Identity Theft Supplement
(ITS) aligns with these state laws, we examined similarities and variations in the legal elements of
identity theft across all 50 states and DC. The key elements of the laws that were examined were:
•
•
•
•

How personally identifiable information (PII) is defined – this directly impacts the breadth and
depth of the identity theft laws
How PII is misused – whether the law focuses on just financial gain or nonfinancial uses as well
The severity of punishments for identity theft – what are the thresholds for felony versus
misdemeanor acts of identity theft
The statute of limitations for charging identity theft offenders

This paper presents findings from the assessment, walking through each of the four key elements. The
findings show that any commonalities in the laws are at a high-level. For example, all states recognize
the misuse of PII for financial gain as a criminal offense. However, the laws vary widely in how explicitly
they define PII, whether nonfinancial misuses of PII are also considered identity theft, whether the level
of financial gain makes it a misdemeanor or felony offense, and how long the statute of limitations is.
Because of these variations, we do not recommend any changes to the ITS. The ITS screener is broad
enough to be aligned with the most expansive of state identity theft definitions, yet the elements
collected on the instrument allow the data to be restricted to align with the specific elements of each of
the state laws.

Determining which state statutes to include in the assessment
From one state to the next, a wide range of terminology is used in statutes related to identity theft. This
is demonstrated in the titles of the statutes. In Arkansas code, identity theft falls under the titles of
‘financial identity fraud’ and ‘nonfinancial identity fraud;’ in Wyoming, under ‘unauthorized use of
personal identifying information; in Kentucky, ‘theft of identity;’ and in Nevada, under “Obtaining and
using personal identifying information of another person to harm or impersonate person, to obtain
certain nonpublic records or for other unlawful purpose.” Other states simply use the terms ‘identity
theft’ or ‘identity fraud’ but these terms are also used differently across different states. In Rhode
Island, for example, the identity theft statute focuses largely on consumer fraud, whereas the identity
fraud statute prohibits the misuse of personally identifiable information (PII). To further add complexity
to the assessment of state identity theft laws, some states have a single statute that captures a broad
range of identity theft-related offenses, whereas others have a series of separate statutes for identity
theft, impersonation, trafficking in identifying information, possessing or manufacturing fraudulent
identifying documents, serving as an accomplice in the commission of identity theft, and giving false
information to a police officer. Because of this wide variation in how states label and classify identity
theft, it was necessary to set guidelines about which statutes to use to best enable across state
comparisons and to capture information most relevant to the Identity Theft Supplement.

A trained legal expert identified and compiled the state-level laws that are presented here by applying
Boolean search strings in the LexisNexis database for all 50 states and D.C. Primary legal research was
conducted in each state’s statutory and administrative code databases. Boolean search strings included
both keywords and searches based on the main numerical citations of each state’s current identity theft
laws. The laws included in the assessment specifically included the terms ‘identity theft,’ ‘identity fraud,’
‘theft of identity,’ or ‘misuse of identification’ and intentionally focused on acts of identity theft
committed against individuals. The assessment excluded laws related to identity theft that were focused
on businesses as the victim, such as hacking; statutes focused on the trafficking of identifying
information, since victims are unlikely to know that their information is being shopped around, until the
point that an offender purchases and uses it; and laws focused on the possession or manufacture of
false identifying information, which often encompass incidents in which the false information is entirely
fabricated, rather than belonging to a living person.
In addition to the identity theft laws that were the focus of this assessment, all 50 states and DC also
have independent credit card fraud statutes. Credit card fraud laws primarily focus on the unlawful
obtaining and misuse of a victim’s credit or debit card and the monetary harm that may occur from
making unauthorized purchases. For example, the Iowa credit card fraud statute uses similar language
as many of the other states:
“A person commits the offense of fraudulent use of a credit card or debit card, if
with purpose to defraud, he or she uses a credit card, credit card account
number, debit card, or debit card account number to obtain property or a
service with knowledge that:
(1) The credit card, credit card account number, debit card, or debit card
account number is stolen;
(2) The credit card, credit card account number, debit card, or debit card
account number has been revoked or cancelled;
(3) The credit card, credit card account number, debit card, or debit card
account number is forged; or
(4)For any other reason his or her use of the credit card, credit card account
number, debit card, or debit card account number is unauthorized by either the
issuer or the person to whom the credit card or debit card is issued” (AR 5-37207).
By contrast, states’ identity theft laws apply much more broadly to the unlawful
obtaining and use of a variety of different types of PII, including but not limited to, the
victim’s credit or debit card. Although the Iowa identity theft statute covers a broader
spectrum of PII and actions, the law also states that “A person commits the offense of
identity theft if the person fraudulently uses or attempts to fraudulently use
identification information of another person, with the intent to obtain credit, property,
services, or other benefit” (Iowa Code § 715A.8), which would include making charges
on a credit card that one is not authorized to use.

Most states appear to have similar overlap in their statutes. A handful of states (less
than 10) do not explicitly include credit or debit card numbers as a form of PII,
presumably to make a clearer distinction between identity theft and credit card theft
offenses. Kentucky is the only state for which the identity theft statute specifically
notes, “This section does not apply to credit or debit card fraud under KRS 434.550 to
434.730” ((KRS § 514.160).
The identity theft laws often carry a higher maximum sentencing classification, but in 48
states, credit card fraud can also be a felony offense. Among these states, the monetary
threshold for when an incident rises from a misdemeanor to felony offense is typically
the same for both identity theft and credit card fraud.
The remainder of the assessment focuses only on those identity theft statutes that met
the criteria for inclusion.

2. The Key Elements of States’ Identity Theft Laws
In all states, identity theft is legally defined by two key components 1) what constitutes PII; and 2) the
types of illegal activities involving a victim’s PII that constitute identity theft. In addition to these key
definitional components, identity theft laws specify the severity of the crime in that state - in terms of
the level punishment assessed against an individual who has committed identity theft - and how long an
offender can be charged with identity theft after the commission or discovery of the crime.
To examine the details of these four key elements, the assessment relied on Boolean search strings to
capture and code explicit mentions to different types of PII and identity theft activities. Other details,
such as the length of the statute of limitations were captured through manual text review. It should be
noted that although a state statute may not specifically identify a particular activity or type of PII as
constituting the misuse of identifying information, that activity may still be prosecutable under the
general terms of the statute. For this assessment, however, we focused on explicit references to the
legal details described below.

Specific Types of Information Defined as PII
One of the key factors determining the breadth of an identity theft statute is the range of information
included under the umbrella of PII. Table 1 presents the states that utilize a broader definition of PII and
those that are more specific about the pieces of information that constitute PII. About 35% of states use
a specific PII definition, meaning that the statute provides an explicit and finite list of discrete items that
can be classified as PII. These statutes do not reference broad categories of PII, such as ‘biometric data’
or ‘financial data,’ and do not include language allowing for the inclusion of other items not specified in
the list. Delaware’s definition of “personal identifying information” is representative of this type of
explicit definition:
"(c) For the purposes of this section, “personal identifying information” includes name, address,
birth date, Social Security number, driver’s license number, telephone number, financial services
account number, savings account number, checking account number, payment card number,
identification document or false identification document, electronic identification number,
educational record, health care record, financial record, credit record, employment record, e-

mail address, computer system password, mother’s maiden name or similar personal number,
record or information" (emphasis added). (11 Del. C. § 854).
The majority of states (65%) more broadly define PII, presenting examples of the types of information
that are classified as PII, as well as a broader “catch-all” category that covers other types of information
not specified in the list. The District of Columbia’s law is representative of this broader definition:
"DC Code § 22-3227.01. (3) “Personal identifying information” includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
(A) Name, address, telephone number, date of birth, or mother’s maiden name;
(B) Driver’s license or driver’s license number, or non-driver’s license or non-driver’s license
number;
(C) Savings, checking, or other financial account number;
(D) Social security number or tax identification number;
(E) Passport or passport number;
(F) Citizenship status, visa, or alien registration card or number;
(G) Birth certificate or a facsimile of a birth certificate;
(H) Credit or debit card, or credit or debit card number;
(I) Credit history or credit rating;
(J) Signature;
(K) Personal identification number, electronic identification number, password, access code or
device, electronic address, electronic identification number, routing information or code, digital
signature, or telecommunication identifying information;
(L) Biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical
representation;
(M) Place of employment, employment history, or employee identification number; and
(N) Any other numbers or information that can be used to access a person’s financial
resources, access medical information, obtain identification, act as identification, or obtain
property (emphasis added)"
Table 1. List of states with a broad legal definition of PII and those with an explicit definition, 2020
Broader PII Explicit PII
Definition
Definition
AL
AZ
CO
CT
DC
FL
HI
IA
ID
IL

AK
AR
CA
DE
GA
KY
LA
MA
MI
MN

IN
KS
MD
ME
MO
MT
NC
ND
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OK
RI
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI
WY

MS
NE
OH
OR
PA
SC
VT
WV

In terms of the specific types of PII that are covered by the state statutes, over 90% of states specifically
identify a victim’s name as PII. Over 80% of states consider a victim’s payment card (i.e. credit, debit,
Electronic Benefit Transfer) number to be PII. Three of the states that do not identify payment card
numbers as PII in the identity theft statute, use a broad definition of PII that would include payment
card numbers but does not specifically list them (e.g. Missouri - “’Means of identification’, anything used
by a person as a means to uniquely distinguish himself or herself" (§ 570.010 R.S.Mo.). Half (50%) of all
states specifically include a payment card number’s PIN number as PII and about 40% of states include
the victim’s e-mail address and account passwords as types of PII. However, it should be noted that
some states also have separate crimes pertaining to unlawfully obtaining personal information through
a computer.

Specific Types of Activities that Constitute Identity Theft
A victim’s PII could be misused for the purpose of financial gain or for a host of nonfinancial reasons. All
state identity theft statutes specify that the use of someone’s PII for financial gain - to obtain property
or services or engage in a financial transaction - constitutes identity theft. However, a smaller
proportion of state statutes identify nonfinancial misuses of information. The most common type of
nonfinancial misuse identified in the statutes is the misuse of PII to obtain or maintain employment.
About a quarter of states explicitly include language related to using a person’s PII to obtain

employment. Less than 10 state statutes specify that identity theft occurs when someone uses a victim’s
PII to A. obtain false documents, B. open accounts, C. get or maintain employment, D. conceal the
commission of a crime, or E. to avoid arrest or prosecution. This does not necessarily mean that these
acts would not be prosecutable identity theft offenses, but simply that the law does not explicitly
identity these activities as forms of identity theft.
The vast majority (about 75%) of states’ identity theft statutes also explicitly make it a crime to
unlawfully possess a victim’s PII, even if the offender took no further action and the victim did not suffer
any actual harm. Over 60% of states make it a crime to attempt to use a victim’s PII or to give, sell or
transfer a victim’s PII to someone else.

Classifying the Severity of Identity Theft
Just over half of states classify identity theft as a felony-level offense only (i.e., identity theft is never a
misdemeanor). 1 The other half of the states have both felony- and misdemeanor-level identity theft
offenses. This includes states such as Louisiana and New Jersey that do not formally use the terms
“felony” or “misdemeanor” but have state-level criminal codes that assess more severe penalties for
certain types of identity theft acts. 2 State laws establish the severity of different types of identity theft
by either presenting a tiered classification of offenses or by specifying punishment enhancements for
offenses with certain characteristics. There is a great deal of variation in terms of how the 50 states and
the District of Columbia assess whether an act of identity theft is a felony- or misdemeanor-level
offense. 3 About a quarter of states utilize a grading system of offenses. These states specifically assign
certain acts of identity theft involving a specific dollar amount or that involve other specific factors as a
1st degree, 2nd degree, or 3rd degree offense, or as a “Class [B, C, D, E] felony or misdemeanor.”
Among the states that have both misdemeanor and felony offense, the thresholds for when an incident
rises from the level of a misdemeanor to a felony are primarily based on financial losses or monetary
gains. The monetary threshold for when the incident rises from a misdemeanor to a felony ranges from
$75 in Alaska up to $2,000 in Pennsylvania. Some identity theft laws additionally consider the number of
identity theft victims or pieces of identifying information misused, or the specific type of PII that was
unlawfully used. Several of the states with misdemeanor offenses specifically note that PII used for a
purpose other than financial gain, including to commit a crime or avoid arrest or prosecution, is a
1

It should be noted that although credit card fraud laws were not specifically included in this assessment, in 48 states, credit card fraud can be
classified as a felony offense.
2 Louisiana classifies a crime that carries a sentence of “hard labor” as a felony-level penalty (La. R.S. § 14:67.16). “’Felony” is any crime for
which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor." (La. R.S. § 14:2). New Jersey classifies misdemeanor-level crimes
as acts that constitute a "disorderly conduct-level offense:" "A person who violates subsection a. of this section is guilty of a crime as follows:
(1) If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in an amount less than $500 and the offense involves the identity of one
victim, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree except that a second or subsequent conviction for such an offense constitutes a
crime of the third degree; or (2) If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in an amount of at least $500 but less than
$75,000, or the offense involves the identity of at least two but less than five victims, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree; or
(3) If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in the amount of $75,000 or more, or the offense involves the identity of five
or more victims, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree. (N.J. Stat. § 2C:21-17).

3 For example, Pennsylvania classifies an act of identity theft involving property with a value of $2000 or less as a misdemeanor of the first
degree, while an offense involving property worth $2000 or more is classified as a felony of the third degree. (18 Pa.C.S. § 4120). In Alaska,
fraudulent use of an identification document is a class B felony if the value of the property or services obtained is $25,000 or more; a class C
felony if the value of the property or services obtained is $75 or more but less than $25,000; and a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property or services obtained is less than $75."

misdemeanor offense. Less than five state statutes include language that the length of time a victim’s PII
is used or the type of PII used have bearing on the severity of the offense. About 30% of the statutes
include punishment enhancements if the offense involves an elder victim and about 15% include
punishment enhancements if the offense involves a child victim.
Beyond financial losses, in about half of states, the identity theft laws take into consideration the
damage that has been done to the victim’s credit rating or financial reputation. These harms do not
directly impact the classification of offense severity. Rather, states have articulated the laws provide
specific remedies that are available to help the victim mitigate or offset this damage, separately and
apart from the consideration of the severity of penalties.

Statute of Limitations
Just as the particular elements of identity theft crimes vary widely across the states, so too do the
statute of limitations that establish the time limit in which the criminal punishment of an act of identity
theft can be initiated. The states of Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, and
Wyoming do not place any time constraints on when the prosecution of identity theft must be initiated.
This means that a prosecutor in these states could bring charges of identity theft against a suspected
offender 5 months, 5 years, or even 50 years after the commission of identity theft. In all other states,
the statute of limitations ranges from 1 year (Idaho only) to 7 years.
About 70% of states start the clock for the purposes of the statute of limitations time period from the
date on which the act of identity theft was committed. The other 30% of states establish the beginning
of the statute of limitations as the date on which the act of identity theft was first discovered. For
example, in Connecticut, legal action may occur up to 3 years after the victim has discovered the identity
theft (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571h), North Dakota grants up to 6 years “after discovery by the victim” (ND
Cent Code 12.1-23-11.), and New Mexico allows for up to 5 years after the time of discovery. (N.M. Stat.
30-1-8).
The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction that starts the clock after the act(s) of identity theft “has
been completed or terminated” (DC Code § 22-3227.07). This formula recognizes that an individual may
be victimized multiple times. Some states offer two different statutes of limitations: one-time frame that
dates back to the commission of the offense, and a different timeframe that first applies from the date
of discovery that identity theft has occurred. For example, Florida requires a criminal prosecution of
identity theft to occur within 3 years after the commission of the act, or “within 1 year after discovery of
the offense by an aggrieved party, or by a person who has a legal duty to represent the aggrieved party
and who is not a party to the offense, if such prosecution is commenced within 5 years after the
violation occurred" (Fla Stat § 817.568). Virginia similarly allows a criminal action to be initiated within 5
years of the commission of the offense, or within 1 year “after the existence of the illegal act and the
identity of the offender are discovered by the Commonwealth, by the owner, or by anyone else who is
damaged by such violation" (VA Code Section 19.2-8).

3. Methodology and Limitations
State-level identity theft laws in all 50 states and D.C. were identified through primary legal research
conducted by a legal researcher. First, identity theft laws were identified using two secondary sources:

1) The National Conference of State Legislature’s “Identity Theft” database:
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/identity-theft-state-statutes.aspx; and
2) Identity Theft and Credit Card Fraud Laws available on FindLaw’s website:
https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/identity-theft.html;
https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/credit-debit-card-fraud.html. Once the main identity
theft laws in each state were identified, targeted Boolean search strings were created and applied
within the subscription-based LexisNexis legal database to identify any additional, relevant state identity
theft laws.
The Boolean search strings were created and laws were intentionally included or excluded based on 2
main criteria: 1) whether a state’s law explicitly mentioned the word “identity” within five words of
“fraud” or “theft.”; or 2) whether a state law specifically referenced and included the numerical citation
of the main identity theft law. For example, California’s main identity theft law is Penal Code 530.5 and
California laws that referenced this statute were eligible for inclusion.
This task did not include the following types of state-level laws: identity theft involving a business or
organizational entity; general consumer fraud law; general theft offenses, such as burglary; laws that
focus on cyber-hacking, or the infiltration of information housed within a computer network; the crime
of producing or using a fake identification for the purposes of enabling a minor to obtain tobacco,
alcohol, or other substances; laws that criminalize fraudulent access or use of access device
Some states have enacted additional laws that specifically criminalize certain aspects of identity fraud. In
order to maintain internal consistency within each of the categories for the purposes of meaningful
comparison, these narrow examples were not systematically captured. The following types of narrower
state law examples were not captured: the crime of “vital records identity fraud” (e.g., Ala. Code § 3113-14); the crime of impersonation of a police officer (e.g., NH Rev Stat 381:12); the crime of extortion,
in which identifying information or property of specific value is threatened (e.g., VA Code Section 18.259); or the crime of committing identity theft in the context of an “immigration matter” (e.g., (S.C. Code
Ann. § 14-7-1630).
Once a state’s relevant identity theft laws were identified, these laws were then analyzed to determine
if a state explicitly mentioned and regulated certain key elements, based on the established inclusion
criteria of each key element. For example, the following keyword-based Boolean search strings was
applied to determine if a state’s crime of identity theft includes or requires that an individual suffered
monetary loss:
•

unanno(offense or felony or crime /50 (identity or "identifying information" or fraud! /9
misrepresent! or fraud! or identi! or decept!) or (theft /9 financial! or information! or identif!))

Similarly, the following Boolean search string was applied in LexisNexis to determine if a state separately
criminalized the sole act of unlawfully possessing an individual’s PII, even if no further action was taken
to obtain the individual’s property, or anything of value.
•

unanno(“identity theft” or “theft of identity” or “identity fraud” or “misuse of identification” or
(misappropriation or taking or personal! or obtain! Or theft /7 identity or identifying /4 another
or information or person or individual)) /30 (possess! /9 unlawful! or identify! or obtain! or
personal! or information! /5 identity or identify! or information or document))

4. Recommendations
The ITS uses a screener that is broad enough to capture the full range of identity theft incidents
reflected in state statutes and sufficient incident-level data that allows for further restriction of the
incidents examined based on criteria of interest. For example, a data user in Kentucky interested in
benchmarking Kentucky data to the nation, could exclude data on debit and credit card misuse from any
analysis to be more aligned with their identity theft statute. Likewise, a data user in Nebraska who
wanted to focus on incidents that would be felonies in Nebraska could limit the data to examine the
consequences of identity theft incidents resulting in a loss of $1,500 or more.
Further narrowing the screener would eliminate incidents that could be classified as identity theft based
on at least some of the state statutes. Making the screener broader to capture other offenses related to
identity theft, such as possession or trafficking of stolen PII, would also be problematic because victims
may not be aware that these activities are going on and the data would lack reliability. Therefore, based
on this analysis, we do not recommend any changes to the BJS definition of identity theft currently
operationalized in the ITS.

Identity Theft Supplement Secondary Data Analysis, Recommendations, and Next Steps
Introduction
In keeping with the Assessing the Measurement of Identity Theft Proposal, agreed upon by RTI and BJS
in December 2019, this document presents findings and recommendations from the secondary analysis
of Identity Theft Supplement (ITS) data. Using existing ITS data, RTI proposed to examine several key
measurement issues that impact the definition and prevalence of identity theft: 1. The reference point
used for determining whether an incident is within the survey reference period; 2. the unbounded
nature of the ITS and the potential for respondents to ‘telescope’ incidents into the reference period;
and 3. the inclusion of attempted incidents in the definition of identity theft. This document walks
through these three measurement issues and presents the analysis and resulting recommendations. Key
recommendations are as follows:
•

•

Continue to use most recent occurrence 1 of misuse as the reference point in an identity
theft incident that determines whether the incident is in scope; ask respondents to
provide a month and year of most recent known occurrence to ensure that incidents are
within the 12-month survey reference period.
Consider using a duel reference period in the screener to reduce the likelihood of
respondents telescoping incidents into the 12-month reference period. The first
question would ask about experiences with a particular type of identity during an
extended period of time (TBD), with a follow up question asking the respondent to date
the most recent occurrence of that misuse. As noted above, the date of most recent
occurrence would be used to determine whether the incident was within the reference
period.
Ask respondents to focus on successfully completed incidents of identity theft when
answering detailed follow-up questions about the most recent incident. This will create
more consistency in the incidents that are described in detail without impacting trends
in overall prevalence rates.

The last section of the document proposes next steps that incorporate all three sets of
recommendations.

Reference points
Measurement challenges: Most crimes are discrete events that can be pinpointed to a particular date
on which the incident occurred. Because identity theft is episodic and often occurs without the victim’s
immediate, direct knowledge, dating an identity theft incident and determining whether it falls within
the reference period of the survey is more complicated. There are several key points in an identity theft
incident that could be used for the purpose of dating and determining whether the incident is within the
reference period, including:

The word ‘occurrence’ is used rather than ‘incident’ because we’re talking about reference points within an incident – when it
started, when it was discovered and the most recent time it happened/occurred (since an incident could be episodic with
multiple occurrences of misuse happening in one incident). In many instances, there is only one occurrence of misuse in an
incident so these terms refer to the same thing, but there are situations where the offender misuses the victim’s information
multiple times and we want to make sure we’re capturing that as well.

1.
2.
3.
4.

When the offender first started misusing the victim’s information (start); 2
When the victim discovered that his or her information was being misused (discovery);
The last occurrence of misuse (occurrence); and
When the victim resolved all financial and credit problems related to the identity theft
(resolution).

Although number 4 is critical for understanding the severity and harms of identity theft, using it to date
an incident is akin to dating an assault based on when the victim was released from the hospital.
Additionally, for the purpose of determining whether an incident is in the reference period, dating an
incident based on when all financial and credit problems were resolved would mean that victims with
unresolved problems at the time of the interview would technically not be eligible for inclusion. For
these reasons, we focus on points 1 through 3 for the purpose of understanding dating and when an
incident is within the reference period.
Current approach: The reference period for the current instrument is loosely framed around
occurrences of misuse, with the screener asking if personal information has been misused in the prior 12
months. However, there is an inherent assumption in the current ITS instrument that reference points 2
and 3 (discovery and most recent occurrence of misuse) are one in the same. The survey asks victims the
month and year they first discovered the misuse and how long the offender had been using their
information when they discovered it, but there is no question about the date of the last occasion in
which the offender used their information.
Part of the rational for not asking about the most recent or last occurrence of misuse was due to the
challenge in defining an occurrence of misuse. For incidents involving the misuse of an existing account,
an occurrence is easily defined as a charge made on the account without the victim’s permission. With
the use of personal information to open a new account or engage in other acts of misuse, occurrence is
a more difficult concept. The last occurrence may not be the most recent time an offender made a
financial charge to an account in the victim’s name, but rather the date on which an account (that the
offender opened using the victim’s information) was closed or the victim’s social security number was
frozen to prevent the offender from using it.
Logically, it also makes sense to assume that as soon as a victim discovers the identity theft, he or she
will take immediate steps to stop the offender, assuming the misuse has not already stopped. This logic
was demonstrated in the 2008 ITS, which had a two-year reference period and asked victims both about
the date of discovery and the date of the most recent misuse. Despite the fact that victims were not
asked to focus on a single incident and could have been reporting on different episodes when offering
the date of discovery and the date of occurrence, the large majority of victims (83%) who were able to
provide dates for both points, offered the same month and year for discovery and most recent
occurrence, as shown in figure 1. About 12% of victims provided a discovery date that was earlier than
the date of the most recent occurrence, with less than 1% providing a discovery date that was outside of
the two-year reference period. About 5% of victims provided a discovery date that was later than the
date of the most recent occurrence, suggesting that they discovered the identity theft after it appeared
to have stopped. It is important to note, however, that these percentages are based on the
2

When the offender obtained the victim’s personal information is not considered here because in some instances the act of
taking the information could be considered a theft and would be measured separately. In other cases, the victim’s information
may be something that the offender legally has access to as a friend, family member, employer, etc.

approximately 60% of respondents who were able to provide month and year information for both the
date of discovery and the date of most recent occurrence. About 40% of victims could not provide one
or more of these pieces of information. Unfortunately, because the 2008 instrument did not ask the
respondent to focus on a specific incident of identity theft when completing the questions about dates,
it is not possible to determine whether these percentages differ by type of identity theft.
Figure 1. Date identity theft was discovered and date of most recent identity theft occurrence, 2008
date of most recent incident
JAN
06
Date identity theft was
discovered

same month/year
later discovery
earlier discovery

PRE-REF PERIOD
JAN 06
FEB 06
MAR 06
APR 06
MAY 06
JUN 06
JUL 06
AUG 06
SEP 06
OCT 06
NOV 06
DEC 06
JAN 07
FEB 07
MAR 07
APR 07
MAY 07
JUN 07
JUL 07
AUG 07
SEP 07
OCT 07
NOV 07
DEC 07
JAN 08
FEB 08
MAR 08
APR 08
MAY 08
JUN 08

Total
Percent with same month/year
Percent with earlier discovery date
Percent with later discovery date

2
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
50%
20%
30%

FEB MAR
06
06
1
0
11
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
73%
7%
20%

0
1
1
13
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
76%
12%
12%

APR MAY JUN
06
06
06
0
0
0
1
18
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
82%
5%
14%

0
0
0
1
1
26
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
29
90%
7%
3%

JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
07
07
07
07 07
07
07
07
07 07
07 08
08
08
08
08 08 Total
06
06
06
06 06
06
07

1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
37
0
1
1
1
0
0
3
35
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
10
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
21
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
25
6
1
0
0
0
0
3
30
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
24
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
45
36
16
27
35
39
29
82% 97% 63% 78% 71% 77% 83%
4% 3% 31% 22% 20% 18% 14%
13% 0% 6% 0% 9% 5% 3%

0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
3
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
39
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
41
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
50
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
48
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
80
7
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
64
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
63
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
55
52
57
56
50
93
74
76
71% 79% 88% 86% 80% 86% 86% 83%
16% 12% 11% 13% 12% 13% 12% 13%
13% 10% 2% 2% 8% 1% 1% 4%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
1
54
2
2
5 101
4
1
0
99
0
0
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
69 110 113
78% 92% 88%
12% 7% 9%
10% 1% 4%

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
0
1
2
8
108
8
1
0
0
0
0
133
81%
12%
7%

0
1
1
0
0
0
15
1
0
0
0
0
0
12
1
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
1
0
0
0
0
0
45
1
1
0
0
0
0
49
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
0
0
0
0
0
1
34
0
0
0
0
0
1
42
1
0
2
0
0
0
31
2
0
0
0
0
0
46
0
1
0
0
0
0
49
1
0
1
0
0
0
58
0
0
0
0
0
0
56
0
0
0
0
0
0
47
0
0
0
0
0
0
94
2
2
0
0
0
0
73
1
1
0
0
0
0
70
2
1
1
0
0
0
65
0
3
0
0
0
0
120
5
0
2
0
1
0
118
5
0
1
0
1
0
120
104
7
1
0
0
0
124
3
82
1
1
2
0
96
2
2
67
1
0
0
73
2
0
1
55
1
0
61
0
0
0
1
32
0
33
0
0
0
0
1
6
7
134 101
78
58
38
8 1675
78% 81% 86% 95% 84% 75%
83%
17% 17% 13% 3% 13% 0%
12%
5% 2% 1% 2% 3% 0%
5%

Figure 2, which is based on 2018 data, shows the passage of time (number of months) from the month
and year when the victim discovered the most recent incident of identity theft to the date of the ITS
interview. Overall, less than 5% of victims provided a discovery date that was more than 12 months prior
to the interview date and that held true across almost all types of identity theft. The exception was the
misuse of personal information for purposes besides opening a new account. About 14% of these
victims provided a date of discovery that was outside of the 12-month reference period. This may
suggest that these victims are telescoping their experiences into the reference period or that this type of
identity theft is more difficult to stop, and that, after the discovery, occurrences of the misuse continued
into the reference period. Since the instrument does not ask when the actual misuse stopped, it is
difficult to ascertain which explanation is more likely or prevalent.
For all types of identity theft, except for personal information misuse, about 90% of victims provided a
discovery date that was within the 12-month reference period.

Figure 2. Months from discovery of identity theft to interview, by type of identity theft, 2018

For about half of identity theft victims, reference points 1 and 2 (start and discovery of the misuse) also
occurred on the same date. In 2018, 53% of victims discovered the most recent incident of identity theft
one day or less after the misuse started. 3 When the analysis is limiting to just those victims who were
not missing data about when the misuse started, that percentage increases to 58%.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between when the incident was discovered and whether the start of the
incident is within the 12-month reference period. The determination on whether the start was within
the reference period is based on the number of months from discovery to interview, plus the length of
misuse prior to discovery. If the victim provided a date of discovery that was three months prior to the
interview and then he or she responded that the start of misuse was three to six months prior to
discovery, both the discovery date and the start date are within the reference period since we know that
the start date was no more than nine months prior to the interview. For this analysis, we erred on the
side of classifying incidents as outside the reference period rather than inside. In other words, if the
victim said the start of misuse was three to six months prior to discovery, we assumed six months rather
than three months.

Includes victims who stated that their information was not actually misused.

Figure 3. Relationship between number of months from discovery to interview and whether the misuse
started inside or outside of the reference period, 2018
Length of misuse prior to discovery
Months since
discovery
<1 month
1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months
10 months
11 months
12 months
>12 months
Missing
Total

One day 1 day - 1 week 1-3
3-6
6 month- 1 year or
or less
1 week
1 month months
months
1 year
more
241
74
37
13
1
4
4
598
219
123
42
21
5
4
495
192
142
51
13
6
7
540
213
134
47
6
4
6
466
178
111
55
16
7
6
384
168
98
35
11
2
6
424
167
84
34
12
2
4
321
149
75
39
9
8
3
269
94
70
25
6
3
6
259
116
54
15
14
6
3
247
119
59
28
2
7
6
259
82
66
22
5
2
1
195
79
39
23
6
2
7
135
51
23
30
6
7
12
340
128
76
44
6
7
6
5173
2029
1191
503
134
72
81

N/A
36
73
69
61
50
50
57
39
26
22
31
26
26
42
126
734

Residue

8
19
16
18
17
9
7
6
7
7
1
3
2
8
12
140

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6

Refused

Total

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
5

418
1104
991
1029
906
763
791
649
506
496
500
466
379
314
756
10068

Inside ref period
Attempt
Unknown
Outside

Based on the classification in the above figure, table 1 shows the relationship between whether the
discovery was inside the reference period and whether the start of misuse was inside the reference
period, based on weighted data. Overall, 79% of victims reported that the incident started and was
discovered within the 12-month reference period. Another 14% did not know how long the misuse had
been happening before it was discovered, and 2% said their information was not actually misused
(attempted misuse). This leaves about 6% of victims for whom the start of the misuse was known to be
outside of the reference period.
Table 1. Incidents for which the start of misuse was inside or outside the 12-month reference period, by number of months
from discovery to interview, 2018
Start of misuse
Number of
months since
first discovery

Total

Inside reference
period

Outside reference
period

No actual misuse
(attempt)

Unknown

Number
Percent
Number
Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total
23,901,317
100.00 18,767,613
78.52 1,498,363
6.27 364,437
1.52 3,270,904
13.69
Four or fewer
10,655,320
100.00 9,612,513
90.21 110,410
1.04 209,123
1.96 723,274
6.79
5-8
6,490,174
100.00 5,859,084
90.28 117,851
1.82
76,814
1.18 436,425
6.72
9-12
4,118,240
100.00 3,296,016
80.03 522,903
12.70
37,095
0.90 262,226
6.37
More than 12
759,213
100.00
0
0.00 739,053
97.34
20,160
2.66
0
0.00
Missing
1,878,370
100.00
0
0.00
8,147
0.43
21,244
1.13 1,848,979
98.44
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

Looking by type of identity theft, the percentage of misuse that started outside the reference period
was less than 10% for victims of existing account misuse, 17% for the use of personal information to
open a new account, and 24% for the use of personal information for other purposes (table 2). About
30% of victims of new account misuse and 40% of victims of personal information misuse did not know
when the misuse started.
5

Table 2. Incidents for which the start of misuse was inside or outside the 12-month reference period, by type of identity
theft, 2018
Inside reference
period

Start of misuse
Outside reference
period
Attempt

Unknown

Number Percent
Number Percent
Type of identity theft
Number
Percent
Number Percent
6.27
364,437
1.52
3,270,904
13.69
78.52 % 1,498,363
18,767,613
Total
133,645
1.53
973,254
11.15
81.96 % 467,355
5.36
Existing credit
7,151,350
4.00
100,822
1.02
1,297,134
13.14
81.84 % 394,585
Existing bank
8,079,130
47,579
2.96
201,475
12.54
75.85 % 139,052
8.65
Existing other
1,218,654
New account
512,505
49.64 % 172,061
16.67
42,396
4.11
305,442
29.59
Personal information
237,028
33.06 % 172,320
24.03
23,895
3.33
283,813
39.58
Multiple types
1,568,946
80.55 % 152,991
7.85
16,100
0.83
209,787
10.77
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

Table 3 shows the impact on prevalence rates of excluding victims for whom the either the discovery or
start of the most recent incident were unknown or outside the reference period. Not surprisingly, the
shift in reference point appears to have the greatest impact on the misuse of personal information for
other purposes, reducing the number of victims by about 45%.
Table 3. Change in identity theft prevalence rate if reference period was based on incident discovery date or start
date, 2018
Prevalence based on
Prevalence based on
Prevalence
discovery date/a
start of misuse/b
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Percent
Type of most recent incident Count
Total
23,901,317
9.26 % 21,973,099
8.51 % 20,366,053
7.89
Existing credit
9,871,671
3.82
9,169,064
3.55
8,795,433
3.41
Existing bank
8,725,603
3.38
7,906,740
3.06
7,439,153
2.88
Existing other
1,606,759
0.62
1,514,020
0.59
1,393,279
0.54
New account
1,032,405
0.40
965,748
0.37
707,301
0.27
Other personal
717,056
0.28
616,813
0.24
393,586
0.15
Multiple
1,947,824
0.75
1,800,715
0.70
1,637,302
0.63
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.
a/Excludes victims who experienced a single incident during the reference period and for whom the discovery date
of that incident was unknown or more than 12 months prior to the interview.
b/Excludes victims who experienced a single incident during the refernece period and for whom the start of the
misuse was unknown or more than 12 months prior to the interview.

Recommendations: In order to maintain trends in the prevalence of identity theft and not make major
changes to the screener questions, BJS should continue to use date of occurrence – the last time the
misuse happened - as the reference point for determining whether an incident is within the reference
period. For the vast majority of victims, the date of occurrence and discovery will be one in the same or
within a month of each other. Similarly, for the vast majority of victims, the start of the incident will also
be within the one-year reference period.
In order to ensure that victims are not mixing up actual occurrences of misuse and unresolved financial
and credit problems and reporting incidents that should be included in the long-term consequences
6

section (misuse ended prior to the reference period but associated problems were still being resolved
during the reference period), BJS should consider adding a question to capture the date of the most
recent known occurrence of misuse, in addition to date of discovery. If a respondent provides a date of
most recent occurrence that is outside of the reference period, he or she would be skipped to questions
asking about long-term consequences, rather than going through all of the questions about the nature
and characteristics of the most recent incident.
We propose that the new question would be asked in the screener section of the instrument (see more
detailed recommendations under Respondent Telescoping). Cognitive testing will be needed to ensure
that respondents are able to understand the distinctions between start, discovery, most recent
occurrence, and resolving all associated financial and credit problems, and to ensure the proper
ordering of these questions for maximum clarity. Additionally, because the concept of an occurrence
differs among the different types of identity theft, cognitive testing will also be important for
determining whether additional clarifying language is needed to help respondents understand the
concept of the most recent occurrence of misuse.
The benefit to this approach is improved data reliability. Forcing respondents to think about the date of
the most recent occurrence should reduce the likelihood that respondents will accidentally report
incidents that should have been out of scope and should reduce potential respondent confusion about
how to place episode in time. The drawback to this change is that it could impact the comparability of
findings to the prior years. However, evidence from this assessment suggests that, putting aside
potential issues with telescoping, the vast majority of victims do not have challenges with identifying
incidents that occurred within the reference period, even without asking more specific dating questions.

Respondent telescoping
Measurement challenges: Unlike the core NCVS for which interviews 2-7 are bounded by the prior
interview, the ITS and other NCVS supplements are completely unbounded. Because the ITS is
administered every two years, in any given ITS administration, the majority of respondents are receiving
the survey for the first time. For the relatively small portion of respondents who are receiving it for the
second time, it will have been two years since they last took it and the reference period of the survey
goes back one year from the time of the interview. This means that respondents could be telescoping
identity theft incidents into the reference periods without survey administrators having any way of
recognizing it.
Telescoping could occur for several different reasons: 1. It could be intentional, which occurs in
situations where the respondent wants to talk about his or her experiences even though they are
outside of the reference period; 2. It could occur because of recall issues if the respondent is not sure
about the date of the incident and places it more recently in time than it actually occurred; and 3. It
could be related to aforementioned issues around the various reference points associated with an
incident. Specifically, if the misuse has stopped but the respondent is still resolving problems related to
the incident, he or she may think of that incident as ongoing and being within the reference period;
particularly, if the survey questions do not provide clear guidance about the relevant reference point.
Unless the respondent provides a date for the incident that is outside of the reference period, is difficult
to determine concretely whether a respondent has telescoped. As discussed previously, the ITS does not
7

currently ask respondents to date the most recent occurrence of misuse. It asks about date of discovery,
but based on data from 2008, it is possible that some incidents are discovered well before the misuse
can be stopped, so the available survey dates cannot alone be used to make this determination. There
are two other potential ways to identify telescoped incidents: 1. If a respondent who completes two
iterations of the ITS reports the same incident the second time completing the survey, and 2. If a
respondent appears to report the same incident in the long-term consequences section of the survey
instrument that he or she reported as being within the reference period. This might be evidence that the
respondent was confused about the survey reference period; reported an incident in the main body of
the survey that should have been out of scope; and then rereported it in the long-term consequences
section after realizing that it should have been reported there in the first place.
Reports of the same incident across two survey waves. About 10% (19,687) of eligible respondents to the
2014 ITS were also eligible to complete the 2016 ITS. Of these, 66% (13,117) completed both of their ITS
interviews. Among those who completed both interviews, 1,220 were victims of identity theft in 2014;
1,153 were victims in 2016; and 212 were victims in both years. Although it is possible that victims who
experienced identity theft in one year or the other engaged in telescoping, there is no way to determine
whether it actually occurred. Thus, we examine the 212 victims who experienced identity theft in both
years in order to determine whether the incidents reported in 2016 were similar to the incidents
reported in 2014.
Of the 212 victims who reported identity theft in both periods, 120 (57%) reported experiencing the
same type of incident in 2016 as in 2014. The majority experienced the misuse of an existing account,
with 80 victims experiencing existing credit card misuse in both periods and 34 experiencing the misuse
of an existing bank account in both periods. Six victims experienced multiple types of identity theft
during the same incident in both periods, but none reported the use of personal information to open a
new account or for other purposes across both periods.
Table 4 shows a comparison of the characteristics of the most recent incident among victims who
reported the same type of incident during both interviews. It presents unweighted counts since 2014
and 2016 use different weights, which would impact the comparability. For most questions, very few
respondents provided substantive responses that were consistent across both interview waves. One
exception is reporting to police where most respondents said ‘no’ across both interview waves. This
cannot be taken as indication of telescoping, however, since reporting identity theft to police is
relatively rare in the first place. None of the victims provided the same responses to all the questions
examined in table 4 (not shown), which suggests that they are not likely reporting on the same incident
across both waves.

Table 4. Characteristics of identity theft incidents among victims
who experienced the same type of identity theft in 2014 and 2016
Existing
bank
Existing
credit card account
Total
34
80
How personal information was obtained
Same reason given
2
3
Both unknown
17
51
Different reason given
15
26
Reported to law enforcement
Both yes
1
1
Both no
28
75
Different responses
5
4
How distressing was the incident
Same response
8
28
Different responses
26
52
Amount of direct loss
Both $0
3
6
Both unknown
1
1
Same $ amount
2
4
Different $ amount
28
69
Amount of out-of-pocket loss
Both $0
15
40
Both unknown
4
10
Same $ amount
0
0
Different $ amount
15
30
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization
Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2014 and 2016.

It should be noted that the lack of evidence of telescoping across the two interview waves does not
mean that respondents are not telescoping; just that we did not identify telescoping through this
analysis. It could be that respondents tend to telescope in incidents that happened less than a year
outside of the reference period and that the amount of time between the two incidents is too long to
effectively identify telescoping.
Reports of the same incident within the same interview. The Long-Term Consequences section of the ITS
asks respondents whether, outside of the past 12 months, they have EVER experienced identity theft. To
examine whether any of the incidents reported in the long-term consequences section of instrument
appear to be the same as those reported as in scope, we start by examining whether victims whose
most recent incident was discovered outside of the reference period are more likely to report long-term
identity theft, particular long-term incidents for which they are still experiencing problems. For this
analysis we use 2018 data because of the more specific dating of when the incident was discovered.
Table 4 shows that overall about 1.3% of respondents were still experiencing problems at the time of
the interview from an identity theft that occurred outside of the 12-month reference period. Among
respondents who reported in their most recent incident as having been discovered more than 12
months prior to the interview, that percentage increased to 4.2%. This apparent increased propensity
among these respondents may suggest that at least some of them are reporting the incident again in the
long-term consequences section, recognizing that it is applicable.

Table 4. Number of months since discovery of most recent incident by whether victim reported
experiences with identity theft outside of the prior 12 months, 2018
ID theft outside of prior 12 months
Yes
Still
Experienced
experiencing
problems during
Number of months
problems
past 12 months
since first discovery
No
Total
Total
88.3 %
11.5 %
0.49 %
0.61 %
No identity theft
89.5
10.3
0.40
0.51
Four or fewer
77.2
22.3
1.30
1.65
5-8
76.9
22.6
1.10
1.30
9-12
74.8
24.8
1.30
1.54
more than 12
78.0
20.7
4.20
4.86
missing
78.0
18.8
0.90
1.00
Note: Details may not sum to 100% due to missing data.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft
Supplement, 2018.

Similarly, table 5 shows that the percentage of victims still experiencing problems from an incident that
occurred outside of the 12-month reference period appears higher among those for whom the most
recent incident started outside the reference period compared to inside the reference period.
Table 5. Whether most recent incident started inside or outside the reference period by whether
victim reported experiences with identity theft outside of the prior 12 months, 2018
Id theft outside of prior 12 months
Yes
Start of most recent ID theft and
type
Total
No identity theft

No
88.3 %
89.5

Still
experiencing
problems

Total
11.5 %
10.3

Experienced
problems during
past 12 months

0.49 %
0.40

Started inside reference period
76.2
23.3
1.1
Started outside reference period
75.8
22.8
2.9
Attempt
83.6
15.3
0.0
Unknown
79.4
18.3
2.0
Note: Details may not sum to 100% due to missing data.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft
Supplement, 2018.

0.61 %
0.51
1.3
3.6
1.1
2.1

To assess whether victims may be reporting the same incident in both the most recent and long-term
consequences sections of the instrument, we examine the type of identity theft reported in both
sections, among those victims whose most recent incident either started or was discovered outside the
reference period. Table 6 shows that there does appear to be a relationship in the types of identity theft
that these victims reported in each section. For example, among those who experienced existing credit
card misuse as the most recent incident, 18% reported also experiencing existing credit card misuse in
the long-term consequences section of the instrument, while only 5% reported existing bank account
misuse in the long-term consequences section, and less than 1% reported other types of identity theft in
the long-term consequences section. Among those whose most recent incident was the misuse of
10

personal information to open a new account, which was dated outside of the reference period, 15% also
reported the misuse of personal information to open a new account in the long-term consequences
section. In comparison, less than 5% of victims who experienced other types of identity theft during the
most recent incident and dated them outside of the reference period, reported the misuse of personal
information to open a new account in the long-term consequences section.
Table 6. Types of identity theft reported inside and outside the reference period, among those for whom the start or
discovery of the most recent incident was outside the reference period, 2018
Identity theft experienced outside of prior 12 months
Most recent identity theft that
Other
No identity
started or was discovered
Existing
Existing
Other
New
fraudulent
outside of reference period
purpose
theft
credit
bank
existing
account
Existing credit card
18.1 %
4.9
0.0
0.7
0.9
75.7
Existing bank account
2.6 %
11.2
0.5
3.0
0.4
82.3
Other existing
7.6 %
5.8
6.2
3.3
6.4
74.8
New account
12.0 %
10.1
5.5
15.5
8.8
73.0
Other fraudulent purpose
8.7 %
2.0
0.0
4.4
9.0
81.1
22.5 %
5.9
2.5
8.6
12.0
59.6
Multiple types
Note: Details may not sum to 100% due to missing data and victims who reported multiple types of identity theft
experienced outside of the prior 12 months.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

Despite this apparent relationship, of the 81 unweighted victims whose most recent incident was the
same type as the identity theft experienced outside of the prior 12 months, none of the victims reported
the same amount of indirect loss (the only question about monetary losses asked in both sections). 4 Part
of this may be due to differences in how the questions about indirect losses are presented in the two
sections (in the long-term consequences section, the question does not follow the questions about
direct and out-of-pocket losses, as it does in the main body of the instrument).
Both sections of the instrument also asked victims a series of questions about problems they
experienced as a result of the identity theft. Table 7 shows the congruity in responses among the 81
unweighted victims whose most recent incident was the same type as that experienced outside of the
reference period. Of the 81 victims, 69 of the respondents screened out of the long-term consequences
section because they said they had not experienced problems during the year, and for the purpose of
analysis, these victims are treated as though they gave ‘no’ responses to the individual questions. The
vast majority of victims also gave ‘no’ responses to these questions when asked about the most recent
incident. Therefore, there is a high degree of congruity in the responses in that most victims said they
did not experience the different types of problems for either of the incidents. Unfortunately, because
the problems are relatively rare in the first place, this cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that the
victims were reporting on the same incident in both sections.

The response options to the long-term consequences indirect loss question are categorical, presenting different
ranges of monetary loss. In contrast, the indirect loss question in the most recent incident section allows the victim
to provide a specific monetary value. For this analysis we compared whether the monetary value provided in the
most recent incident section was within the range selected in the long-term consequences section.

Table 7. Types of problems experienced as a result of
most recent and long-term identity theft incidents, 2018
Unweighted
Types of problems
count
Total
81
Problems with job or school
Both yes
0
Both no
76
Problem with family or friends
Both yes
3
Both no
74
Credit problems
Both yes
4
Both no
69
Banking problems
Both yes
1
Both no
75
Dealing with debt collectors
Both yes
2
Both no
69
Utilities cut off
Both yes
0
Both no
78
Turned down for job
Both yes
0
Both no
79
Legal problems
Both yes
1
Both no
77
Note: Includes victims who reported the same type of
incident in both section of the instrument and for whom
the start date or discovery date were outside of the
reference period.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime
Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

Recommendations: Using existing variables on the ITS survey instrument, it is difficult to find conclusive
evidence that respondents are telescoping identity theft incidents into the one-year reference period.
However, given evidence of telescoping on the core NCVS and the potential for respondent confusion
regarding the different reference points in an identity theft incident, we recommend further analysis. As
noted in the original proposal, we recommend building on the findings from prior research that a dual
reference period can be useful at controlling telescoping (see for example, Loftus et al., 1990). Prohaska
and colleagues (1998) additionally found that asking people to provide a specific date for when an
incident occurred rather than answer a yes/no question about whether something happened during a
particular period can help to control telescoping. Thus, we propose testing two different approaches to
controlling telescoping in the ITS (which could potentially be applied to other supplements as well). The
approaches would differ in the length of the initially presented reference period (lifetime vs. five years),
but would otherwise flow like this:
1. Do you currently have or have you ever had at least one active checking or savings account through
a bank or financial institution?
YES
NO (skip to credit_lifetime)
2. Has someone EVER, without your permission, used your existing checking or savings account,
including any debit or ATM cards?
12

YES
NO (skip to credit_lifetime)
3. In what year, did this misuse most recently occur? _______________
EARLIER THAN 2020 (skip to credit_lifetime)
DON’T KNOW (ask 3a)
3a. Do you think the misuse happened in the past 12 months, that is since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR]?
YES
NO
(all responses, skip to credit_lifetime)
4. In what month did this misuse most recently occur? ________________
DON’T KNOW (ask 4a)
4a. Do you think the misuse happened in the past 12 months, that is since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR]?
YES
NO
The survey would continue asking this sequence of questions for the other types of identity theft. If
respondents did not report any identity theft incidents in the screener, the survey would end. If the only
incidents reported were outside of the 12-month reference period, the respondents would be skipped
immediately into the long-term consequences section, which would ask whether the respondent was
still experiencing credit and financial problems as a result of the experience. As with the current
instrument, if respondents reported incidents occurring during the prior 12 months, they would be
asked the detailed follow-up questions about the most recent incident.
Research has shown that asking about a longer reference period, followed by the shorter period of
interest, reduces forward telescoping by conveying to respondents that the dates of the events are
important and forcing them to think about dating in more detail. Additionally, respondents’ social
desirability concerns can lead them to want to provide useful information in response to survey
questions. A dual reference period enables events outside of the reference period to still be reported
(Loftus et al., 1990; Sudman et al. 1984), while not impacting estimates from the period of interest.
Although researchers have found that natural sequence is key for internal bounding and that asking a
shorter or more recent reference period followed by a longer or later period is not effective at
controlling telescoping, there is no research to suggest the optimal length of reference periods, since
this is largely contingent on the phenomenon of interest. The studies that have tested the effectiveness
of the dual reference period used considerably shorter reference periods than the ITS. For instance,
Loftus and colleagues (1990) experimented with reference periods of two months followed by six
months; six months followed by two months; and the prior month followed by the prior two months.
13

Several federal data collections ask about multiple reference periods within the same reference period,
yet methodological descriptions and articles about these collections are largely void of discussion
related to bounding and telescoping. Surveys, such as the National Survey of Family Growth and the
National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) ask questions about both lifetime experiences and
experiences and experiences in the prior 12-months. For instance, many of the sections of NSDUH on
substance use begin with questions about whether the respondent used the drug in their lifetime,
including age at first use, followed by questions about use in the prior 12-months and use in the prior
month, if they answer the lifetime question affirmatively. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMSHA) reports NSDUH estimates based on each of these reference periods
when possible. Although several studies (see, for example, Johnson et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2005)
have examined the potential for forward telescoping in NSDUH and its predecessor survey, particularly
in reference to the age-at -first-use questions, the role of the dual reference period in reducing
telescoping has received limited attention. In 2004, however, SAMSHA discontinued the long-term
measures of pain reliever use in NSDUH because of the discovery of underestimation bias in the lifetime
measures (Gfroerer, 2018).
One federal study, the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS), asks respondents
questions about lifetime, three-year, and one-year experiences with a range of different types of
victimizations. However, we are unaware of any research assessing whether the use of multiple
reference periods helps to control telescoping. This may be due to the fact that the multiple reference
periods are not intended to identify incidents that occurred within a certain reference period, but rather
to help cue respondents to think about all of the things that different offenders may have done to them.
Given the limited available guidance on the most effective use of dual reference periods for internal
bounding, we propose testing the effectiveness of a lifetime reference period followed by the 12-month
reference period, as well as a five-year reference period followed by the 12-month reference period.
The benefit of starting with a lifetime reference period is that the ITS already asks questions about
lifetime experiences with identity theft and these estimates can be useful for understanding the stock of
victims. Although asking lifetime questions first should serve to reduce any forward telescoping due to
respondent desires to participate in the survey and talk about their experiences, it may not be as
effective at getting them to focus on the exercise of dating. Thus, we propose to test whether a five-year
reference period is more effective for reducing telescoping by forcing respondents to think about more
concrete periods of time.
If the testing were done using an online survey panel, we could efficiently and affordably recruit a
sufficient number of respondents to determine statistically significant differences in one-year
prevalence estimates generated through the two experimental approaches and the control group
(current approach). We propose in-person cognitive testing of the proposed changes prior to web-based
testing to ensure that the added reference period is not overly complicated or challenging for
respondents to follow

Attempts
Measurement challenges: Current screener questions ask respondents to think about the ‘use or
attempted use’ of their identifying information without permission. Recent BJS reports have not
distinguished between attempted and completed incidents, in part because of challenges with defining
attempted versus completed incidents. There are three possible ways of identifying an attempted
14

incident with the current survey instrument: 1. The distinction could be based on whether the offender
was able to obtain something of value (money, products, services, benefits) from the victim. 5 If the
offender was not able to obtain anything from the misuse, we assume it was an attempt that was
stopped through third party intervention. However, this distinction works for existing account misuse
but is more challenging when a victim’s personal information is used to open a new account or for other
fraudulent purposes. For instance, if the offender opens a new account in the victim’s name, whether he
or she makes any charges on the account, it would still be considered a completed incident of identity
theft. Likewise, if the offender falsely provided the victim’s information to law enforcement or the
courts, this would be a completed incident of identity theft, but would not necessarily have a monetary
value attached to it; 2. The survey asks respondents (Q10) how long their information was misused
before they discovered it and one of the response options is ‘not applicable – it was not actually
misused.’ A potential issue with this definition is that respondents are not given guidance on what it
means for their information to be ‘not actually misused;’ 3. If a victim did not report the incident to law
enforcement, one reason he or she could give for not reporting was that ‘I did not lose any money/it
was an attempt.’ An obvious challenge with using this item to make the distinction is that attempted
identity theft could be reported to police or not reported to police for a separate reason and would not
be identifiable.
Figure 4 uses data from 2014 and 2016 to show the relationship between incidents that would be
defined as attempts based on at least one of the three measurement approaches. As the figure shows,
about 72 of 6,542 potential attempts (1.1%) met all three definitions.
Figure 4. Venn diagram of identity theft incidents that met at least one of three potential definitions of
an attempt, 2014 and 2016.

Focusing just on incidents involving the misuse of an existing account further demonstrates the
complexities of defining attempts. In 2014 and 2016 combined, there were 4,335 incidents of existing
account identity theft with $0 in direct loss, suggesting that the offender was prevented from actually
making a charge on the account. One would assume that among these types of identity theft, this would
This analysis focuses on whether the offender successfully obtained products or services regardless of whether
the victim was reimbursed for any financial losses. A victim may be reimbursed by a financial institution but that
does not change whether the offender successfully carried out the identity theft.

be the most straightforward measure. However, examination of the responses to the questions aligning
with the other two indicators of an attempt, demonstrates the lack of consistency in responses (table 8.
About 23% of victims who experienced $0 in losses from existing account misuse said that they did not
report to police because it was an attempt, and 4% said their information was not actually misused. It
makes sense that some victims who experienced attempted identity theft may report to police or have
other reasons for not reporting, and that there would not be perfect overlap between these two
categories. However, it is harder to reconcile that a respondent who experienced an attempt would say
that their information was used for more than a day or even a day before they discovered it.
In 2014 and 2016, there were 2,029 incidents of existing account misuse that were not reported to
police because the victim did not suffer a loss or because the incident was an attempt. However, nearly
half of these victims reported direct losses of $1 or more, suggesting that respondents may be selecting
this reason for not reporting when their direct losses have been reimbursed by a financial institution in
addition to when there were no direct losses.
Table 8. Potential incidents of attempt identity theft, by type of theft, 2014 and 2016
Other personal
Existing account
information
Unweighted
Unweighted
Attempt indicators
counts
Percent
Percent
counts
$0 direct loss
Reporting to police
not reported because it was an attempt
not reported for other reasons
reported to police
unknown whether reported
Length of misuse prior to discovery
not actually misused
one day or less
more than one day
unknown
Not reported because it was an attempt
Amount of direct loss
$0
$1 or more
unknown
Length of misuse prior to discovery
not actually misused
one day or less

4,335
1,002
3,067
254
12
4,335
169
2,312
1,471
383

100.0
23.1
70.7
5.9
0.3

1,077
148
698
228
3

100.0
13.7
64.8
21.2
0.3

100.0
3.9
53.3
33.9
8.8

1,077
53
305
494
225

100.0
4.9
28.3
45.9
20.9

2,029
1,002
909
118
2,029
64
1,180

100.0
49.4
44.8
5.8
100.0
3.2
58.2

225
148
66
11
225
11
89

100.0
65.8
29.3
4.9
100.0
4.9

662
more than one day
32.6
90
unknown
123
6.1
35
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft
Supplement, 2014 and 2016.

40.0
15.6

39.6

Other Potential Issues with Measuring Attempts: Although virtually impossible to measure, it is also
possible that victims may fail to report attempts to the survey due to:
•
•

Recall failure – victims may be less likely to remember attempted incidents, meaning a higher
risk of false negative error due when attempts are included.
Lack of awareness – if an offender is not successful in using the victim’s information, the victim
may never be aware that an attempt occurred.

Table 9 compares the nature of incidents and victim experiences across successful incidents and
attempts. Attempts are measured in three ways, reflecting a more to less conservative approach: 1.
Victims who answered Q10 (how long was your information misused before you discovered it) with the
response ‘not applicable – it was not actually misused;’ 2. Victims of any type of identity theft who
experienced $0 in direct losses AND either did not report to police because it was an attempt OR
responded to Q10 that it was not actually misused (meets 2 of 3 criteria); 3. All victims of existing
account misuse who experienced $0 in direct losses and for victims of new account or other personal
information misuse, those who met any 2 of the 3 criteria. On the flip side, the completed incident
counts associated with attempts 1 include any victims who did not select response option 9 in Q10. The
completed incident counts associated with attempts 2 include a. victims who lost $1 or more and b.
victims who lost $0 AND did not select either option 9 in Q10 OR ‘it was an attempt’ as a reason for not
reporting to police (includes those who did report to police). Finally, the completed incident counts
associated with attempts 3 include a. victims of existing account misuse with losses of $1 or more; b.
victims of new account or personal information misuse with losses of $1 or more and c. victims of new
account or personal information misuse with losses of $0 who did not select response option 9 in Q10
AND did not select ‘it was an attempt’ as a reason for not reporting to police.
Table 9. Harms associated with attempted ID theft incidents compared to successfully completed incidents, 2014 and 2016
Attempts 1
Attempts 2
Completed incidents/a
Completed incidents
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent Number
Percent
Total ID theft
736,881
100.00
39,245,363
100.00
4,026,180
100.00
39,502,438 100.00
Indirect financial loss >$0
26,472
3.59
1,634,226
4.16
83,919
2.08
1,709,804
4.33
Reported to police
32,107
4.36
2,776,591
7.07
32,107
0.80
3,143,772
7.96
Problems with school/work
0!
0.00
435,928
1.11
23,106 !
0.57
439,825
1.11
Problems with family/friends
6,308 !
0.86
1,017,784
2.59 *
48,801
1.21
1,069,776
2.71
Moderate to severe distress
180,373
24.48
13,458,338
34.29 *
798,326
19.83
14,049,483
35.57
*Denotes statistically significant different at 95% confidence between successful and attempt
a/excludes incidents for which the victim did not respond or gave a 'do not know' response.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2014 and 2016.

*
*
*
*
*

Attempts 3
Completed incidents
Number
Percent Number
Percent
13,215,894
100.00
30,312,724
100.00
285,678
2.16
1,508,045
4.97 *
776,511
5.88
2,399,368
7.92
139,383
1.05
323,549
1.07
451,249
3.41
667,327
2.20
3,943,830
29.84
10,903,980
35.97 *

Even with the most inclusive definition of attempts (attempt 3), these incidents account for less than
half of the most recent incidents experienced by victims. There is no way of knowing what the actual
percentage of attempts is, but with the technology put in place by the financial institutions alone, one
would expect that more identity theft is prevented than what successfully occurs. As noted previously, it
may be the case that victims are not made aware of or do not remember these attempted incidents, or
it may be that victims report about attempts in the screener questions, but choose to report about a
different incident when they’re asked to think about the most recent incident of identity theft. Either
way, the relatively low number of attempts compared to completed incidents likely suggests that
attempts are not being fully enumerated through the NCVS.
Differences in victim experiences: When attempted incidents are reported by victims, combining these
with completed incidents may serve to dilute the negative impact of completed identity theft. Although
victims of attempted identity theft may experience negative impacts, one would expect those harms to
be less prevalence and less severe than for victims of completed identity theft.
Table 9 (above) also shows that based on all three definitions, a smaller proportion of attempted victims
experience harms than victims of completed identity theft. Using the attempt 2 definition, all of the
differences between the victims of completed and attempted incidents were statistically significant. It is
important to note though, regardless of how attempts are defined, there are still victims of attempted
17

incidents of identity theft who experience negative consequences, including indirect financial losses and
moderate to severe distress, and some of these incidents are reported to police.
Impact of excluding attempts on prevalence estimates. Using the three definitions of an attempt, we
computed the prevalence of identity theft if attempts were removed (table 10). A victim whose most
recent incident was an attempt could have experienced a completed incident earlier in the reference
period, so those victims who experienced multiple incidents were not excluded from the prevalence
rate, regardless of whether they experienced an attempt during the most recent incident. Regardless of
the definition or year, about three-fourths of victims who experienced an attempt during the most
recent incident had only that one incident.
Table 10. Change in identity theft prevalence rate with removal of attempted incidents, 2014 and 2016
2014
Prevalence minus
Prevalence minus
Prevalence minus
Original prevalence attempts (definition 1) attempts (definition 2) attempts (definition 3)
Most recent ID theft
Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent
Any
17,576,205
7.05
17,276,940
6.93 15,959,215
6.40 13,184,329
5.29 *
Existing credit card account
7,329,114
2.94
7,241,245
2.90
6,651,886
2.67
5,530,828
2.22 *
Existing bank account
6,735,809
2.70
6,629,041
2.66
6,151,199
2.47
6,285,591
2.52
Other existing account
980,281
0.39
927,518
0.37
831,895
0.33
530,063
0.21
New account
683,309
0.27
661,262
0.27
578,782
0.23
578,782
0.23
Personal information
546,424
0.22
534,478
0.21
519,270
0.21
519,270
0.21
Multiple types
1,301,268
0.52
1,283,396
0.51
1,226,183
0.49
1,226,183
0.49

Original prevalence
Most recent ID theft
Number
Percent
Any
25,952,409
10.18
Existing credit card account
11,077,632
4.35
Existing bank account
9,828,567
3.86
Other existing account
1,272,948
0.50
New account
873,366
0.34
Personal information
838,602
0.33
Multiple types
2,061,294
0.81

2016
Prevalence minus
Prevalence minus
Prevalence minus
attempts (definition 1) attempts (definition 2) attempts (definition 3)
Number
Percent Number
Percent Number
Percent
25,637,514
10.06 24,413,614
9.58 20,495,285
8.04
10,979,806
4.31 10,533,100
4.13
8,840,147
3.47
9,732,318
3.82
9,280,199
3.64
7,462,653
2.93
1,232,193
0.48
1,098,327
0.43
690,497
0.27
831,618
0.33
760,931
0.30
760,931
0.30
815,053
0.32
785,452
0.31
785,452
0.31
2,046,526
0.80
1,955,605
0.77
1,955,605
0.77

*
*
*
*

Note: Victims who experienced an attempt during their most recent incident, but experienced other incidents of identity theft
during the reference period are not subtracted from the prevalence rate.
*New prevalence rate was significantly different from original prevalence rate at 95% confidence level.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2014 and 2016.

Based on data from both 2014 and 2016, removing attempts based on definitions 1 and 2 would not
have a statistically significant impact on the prevalence rates for any of the types of identity theft. The
removal of attempts based on the attempt 3 definition would significantly reduce the prevalence of
identity theft. However, based on findings from table 2, it appears likely that attempt 2 is a more
accurate reflection of attempts captured in the survey than attempt 3.
Though not statistically significant, the removal of attempts based on any of the three definitions
appears to have a larger impact on the prevalence of existing account misuse than on the misuse of
personal information to open a new account or for other fraudulent purposes.
Recommendations: Based on the likelihood that attempts are underestimated in the NCVS and the
current inability to confidently separate attempts from completed incidents, which may result in an
18

underestimation of the harms associated with completed identity theft, we suggest one of the following
options for improving measurement.
1. Exclude attempts completely.
• Change the language of the screener questions to remove the phrase ‘attempted to use.’
The questions would then read, for example, “Has someone, without your permission, made
charges on or deducted money from your existing checking or savings account, including any
debit or ATM cards?
• In addition, for those who respond affirmatively to any of the three screener questions
about existing account misuse, add a question after the screener to ask ‘at any point was
someone successful in making charges on your account, regardless of whether you were
reimbursed.’ If the respondent says ‘no’ he or she would be treated the same way as a
respondent who said ‘no’ to the initial screener. In other words, if he or she does not report
any other types of identity theft, they would be treated as a nonvictim, with the survey
ending after the screener. If the respondent says ‘yes,’ when he or she is prompted to think
about the most recent incident, there would also be an instruction to exclude any incidents
in which the offender was not successful in obtaining money, goods, or services.
2. Ask respondents to provide detailed information about successful incidents only.
• Screener questions remain the same as they are currently, with respondents asked to think
about both the use and attempted use of personal information.
• For those who respond affirmatively to any of the three screener questions about existing
account misuse, add a question after the screener to ask ‘at any point was someone
successful in making charges on your account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed.’
If the respondent says ‘no’ he or she would be treated the same way as a respondent who
said ‘no’ to the initial screener. In other words, if he or she does not report any other types
of identity theft, they would be treated as a nonvictim, with the survey ending after the
screener. If the respondent says ‘yes,’ when he or she is prompted to think about the most
recent incident, there would also be an instruction to exclude any incidents in which the
offender was not successful in obtaining money, goods, or services.
Given BJS’s interest in maintaining high-level trends over time, we recommend approach number 2.
Under this approach, respondents would be screened in as victims if they experienced existing account
misuse AND said that the offender had successfully made charges on their account OR if they answered
affirmatively to the screener questions about the misuse of personal information to open a new account
or for other fraudulent purposes. This approach would allow BJS to maintain continuity in terms of
reporting overall prevalence rates by type of identity theft. It would also allow BJS the flexibility to
exclude attempted incidents of existing account misuse, the type of identity theft for which attempts
are easiest to identify and most commonly reported. Finally, it would create more consistency in the
types of incidents that are described when respondents report on the nature of and harms associated
with the most recent incident. The drawback to this approach is that about 1% of victims who would
have previously answered questions about their most recent incident, would be skipped out of these
questions. 6 This might impact BJS’ ability to compare trends over time in the nature of and victim
6

The 1% estimate is based on the reduction in cases when attempt definition 2 was used.

responses to identity and would slightly limit the sample sizes available for analysis of the characteristics
of the most recent incident. For context, in 2018, there were 10,068 unweighted persons who
experienced identity theft. Losing about 1% would still leave a sample size of just under 10,000.
Cognitive testing would be needed to ensure that respondents are consistently interpreting and
correctly understanding the screener follow-up questions and the language used to focus respondents
on the most recent completed incident.

Time in Sample
In a panel design survey like the NCVS, respondent fatigue can impact survey estimates and data
quality. 7 Fatigue may result in sample members not participating in later interview waves, thus creating
the potential for a biased sample. Fatigue could also cause respondents to break off prior to the
administration of the supplement if they have already spent considerable time on the core NCVS.
BJS is interested in understanding whether ITS response rates and prevalence rates are impacted by how
many NCVS interviews the respondent has participated in. For the purpose of understanding the
potential impact of respondent fatigue, this analysis is focused on person time-in-sample (TIS) (1-7) and
person interview number (1-7), rather than household or address TIS. Table 10 examines 2018 ITS
response and prevalence rates, dividing up respondents by whether they reported an incident in the
core NCVS.
Among eligible ITS respondents - those age 16 or older who completed the NCVS interview themselves
(non-proxy) – there was not much variation in response rates by TIS or interview number. Regardless of
whether an NCVS incident was reported, the vast majority of eligible respondents who completed the
core survey, also completed the supplement. Across TIS, for instance, the overall response rates ranged
from 91% among those in TIS 3 to 94% among those in TIS 6 and TIS 7.
Prevalence rates in the ITS were significantly higher among respondents who had reported an NCVS
incident (17.3%) compared to those who had not (8.9%). With the exception of respondents in TIS 7, this
was true across all TIS groups.
Among respondents who did not report an NCVS victimization, identity theft prevalence rates were
significantly higher for persons in TIS 1 compared to persons in TIS 2-7. However, this pattern did not
hold true among persons who had reported an NCVS victimization. Research suggests that social
desirability concerns may lead respondents to want to provide useful responses to surveys, which can
result in telescoping. These findings may suggest that in TIS 1 respondents are more likely to engage in
forward telescoping in the ITS if they did not have anything to report in the core survey. In later
interview waves, these social desirability concerns are no longer present because they have participated
in the core survey multiple times.
Table 11 shows 2018 prevalence rates by most recent type identity theft and TIS. Rates of existing bank
account misuse were higher in TIS 1 than TIS 2-7 and rates of persons experiencing multiple types of
identity theft during the same incident were higher in TIS 1 than TIS 3-7. Otherwise there were no clear
patterns in prevalence rates by TIS.

Additional information about the NCVS panel design is available in the survey’s technical documentation:
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvstd16.pdf.

Table 10. Identity Theft Supplement response and prevalence rates, by person TIS and interview number, 2018
Response rate (unweighted- eligible
persons )
Eligible
NCVS
No NCVS
unweighted
Overall
Incident
Incident
persons*
110,946
92.3 %
92.3 %
92.3 %
28,329
92.5
92.5
92.5
23,074
92.0
91.0
92.0
17,832
91.3
92.3
91.3
15,168
91.9
94.8
91.8
16,559
93.0
91.0
93.1
5,722
93.8
94.3
93.8
4,262
93.9
92.0
93.9

ITS rate (weighted)

ITS rate (standard errors)

No NCVS
NCVS
Incident
Incident
%
17.3 % **
8.9 %
18.8
**
11.5
13.8
**
8.8
16.0
**
8.3
16.6
**
7.9
16.6
**
7.0
26.4
**
8.1
13.2
8.0

NCVS
Overall Incident
Overall
TIS
Person TIS
0.2656
0.7882
9.3
1
12.0
0.2656
1.1929
2
9.0
0.2587
1.7965
3
8.5
0.2795
1.996
4
8.1
0.2946
1.9159
5
7.2
0.2643
2.4742
6
8.6
0.418
4.1191
7
8.1
0.5657
3.9384
Person
17.3 % **
Interview No. 110,946
92.3 %
8.9 %
0.131
0.7882
92.3 %
92.3 %
9.3 %
1
30,491
92.1
92.0
92.1
11.8
18.6
**
11.3
0.2548
1.1727
2
23,952
91.8
92.1
91.8
8.7
14.3
**
8.5
0.2597
1.7485
3
18,215
91.6
92.4
91.6
8.5
15.7
**
8.3
0.2657
1.8941
4
14,849
92.2
93.2
92.2
8.1
16.4
**
7.9
0.2615
2.0395
5
14,852
93.6
92.0
93.6
7.3
18.3
**
7.0
0.2754
2.7953
6
5,160
94.1
95.7
94.0
8.8
25.4
**
8.3
0.5159
4.1195
7
3,427
94.3
91.9
94.3
8.4
10.1
8.3
0.6237
3.4815
*Excludes persons under age 16, who did not complete the NCVS interview or completed the NCVS interview via proxy respondent.
**'NCVS incident' rate is significantly different from the 'no NCVS incident' rate at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

No NCVS
Incident
0.13091
0.26957
0.24927
0.28399
0.29765
0.26347
0.40975
0.56103
0.13091
0.25922
0.25419
0.26855
0.27107
0.27559
0.50849
0.6191

Table 11. Identity Theft Supplement prevalence rates, by type of identity theft and person TIS number, 2018
ITS rate (weighted)

Other
Existing
Existing
Other
fraudulent
TIS
Overall credit
bank
existing
New account purpose
Multiple types
Person TIS
9.26 %
3.82 %
3.38 %
0.62 %
0.40 %
0.28
0.75 %
1
12.00
4.19
4.88
0.80
0.45
0.38
1.09
2
8.99
3.37 *
3.27 *
0.61
0.37
0.24
0.82
3
8.52
3.98
2.79 *
0.54
0.43
0.23
0.51 *
4
8.15
3.62
2.65 *
0.52 *
0.30
0.30
0.71 *
5
7.19
3.59
2.24 *
0.44 *
0.41
0.15 *
0.41 *
6
8.60
3.95
2.76 *
0.76
0.36
0.38
0.55 *
7
8.06
4.45
2.45 *
0.45
0.44
0.08 *
0.48 *
*Significantly different from TIS 1 at 95% confidence level.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018.

Next steps
If BJS agrees with the findings and resulting recommendations provided in this document, the next step
is for RTI to develop several versions of a revised instrument screener and a testing plan Following BJS
review of the drafts, we propose to conduct approximately 30 in-person interviews with respondents
who experienced each of the three major types of identity theft (existing account misuse, use of
personal information to open a new account, and use of personal information for other purposes). Once
21

changes to the instrument have been agreed upon, we propose 2 online tests to compare the ability of
the different versions of the instrument to control telescoping and to assess the impact of changing the
ordering of the screener on the types of incidents reported. Using an online platform would enable
responses to be collected from thousands of victims in a relatively short period of time and would
ensure sufficient sample sizes for a robust comparison of the impact of the changes on prevalence rates.
Additional details on the testing plan are included in the supplementary document titled ITS testing
plan.

References
Gfroerer, J. 2018. War stories from the drug survey: How culture, politics, and statistics shared the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, E.O. and Schultz, L. 2005. Forward telescoping bias in reported age of onset: An example from
cigarette smoking. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 14(3): 119-129.
Johnson, R.A., Gerstein, D.R., Rasiniski, K.A. 1997. Recall decay and telescoping in self-reports of alcohol
and marijuana use: Results from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA). In Proceedings
of the 1997 Joint Statistical Meetings, 52nd annual conference of the American Association for Public
Opinion Research, Norfolk, VA (pp. 964-969). Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association.
Loftus, E.F., Klinger, M.R., Smith, K.D., and Fiedler, J. 1990. A tale of two questions: Benefits of asking
more than one question. Public Opinion Quarterly 54: 330-345.
Prohaska, V., Brown, N.R. and Belli, R.F. 1998. Forward Telescoping: The Question Matters. Memory
6(4): 455-465.
Sudman, S., Finn, A., and Lannom, L. 1984. The use of bounded recall procedures in single interviews.
The Public Opinion Quarterly 48(2): 520-524.

Cognitive Interviewing for the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) Identity Theft
Supplement (ITS)
Prepared by RTI International
June 5, 2020
Sarah Cook, Jeanne Snodgrass, Lynn Langton

INTRODUCTION
This report provides a summary of RTI findings from 27 adult cognitive interviews on the redesigned version of
the BJS Identity Theft Supplement (ITS) screener. Interviews took place virtually via Zoom with participants in the
Eastern, Central and Pacific time zones in May and early June 2020. Cognitive interviews were conducted virtually
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These preliminary findings may be of use to BJS when incorporating the next
round of changes to the NCVS ITS instrument.

RECRUITMENT
All recruitment was done through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform where workers can complete
nominal tasks for small payments. For our purposes, we posted a MTurk
task (known as a “HIT”) for participants to complete an online screener
survey to participate in a virtual interview.
Once participants completed the online web screener, our recruiter
contacted those who were eligible for the study via email to schedule
interviews. Eligibility was based on our need for demographic diversity as
well as type of identity theft experienced. An informed consent form was
sent via email to the participant for them to review. At the beginning of
each virtual interview, the interviewer verified that the respondent had
received the informed consent form, asked if they had questions, and
received verbal consent to conduct the interview and be recorded.
Table 1 shows the cumulative demographics of participants. Though
already a diverse group of participants, some diversity was lost to
participants who changed their mind or did not attend their interview.
Table 2 shows this same information distributed by participants and
includes the type of identity theft as indicated in the online screener and
as reported during the actual interview. The online screener was a
condensed version of the revised ITS screener that included four
questions about identity theft experiences:

Table 1. Participant Demographics
Time Zone
EDT
CDT
MDT
PDT
Age Range
18-25
26-34
35-49
50 or older
Education
High school/GED
Some college
College grad
Post-grad degree
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black/African American
Asian
American Indian/Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
Hispanic
Yes

13
8
0
6
2
13
9
3
2
4
16
8
20
7
20
4
5
2
0
1

1. During the past 12 months, that is, since [AUTOFILL DATE A YEAR AGO FROM SURVEY DATE], has someone,
without your permission used your existing checking account, savings account, or credit card account?
2. During the past 12 months, has someone misused another type of existing account such as your
telephone, cable, gas or electric accounts, online payment account like Paypal, insurance policies,
entertainment account like ITunes, or something else?
3. During the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today, has
someone, without your permission, used your personal information to open any NEW accounts such as
wireless telephone accounts, credit card accounts, loans, bank accounts, online payment accounts, or
something else?
4. During the past 12 months, has someone used your personal information for some other fraudulent
purpose, such as filing a fraudulent tax return, getting medical care, applying for a job or government
benefits; giving your information to the police when they were charged with a crime or traffic violation,
or something else?
Endorsement of these questions is represented in the table below consecutively as: Existing (bank), Existing
(other), New account, and Personal info. Three of the recruited ‘non-victims’ of identity theft ended up as ‘victims’
once the participants heard the full survey questions and self-reported their experience, and three of our recruited
‘victims’ ended up as nonvictims during the interview.
Table 2. Participant Demographic, Recruitment, and Final Identity Theft Type Data (n=27)
P#

Age Range

Education

Gender

Time
Zone
EDT

35-49

Post-Graduate degree

Female

PDT

26-34

College Graduate

Male

Asian

3
4

CDT
CDT

26-34
26-34

Post-Graduate degree
High School
Graduate/GED

Female
Female

White
Black and
AI/AN

PDT

35-49

College Graduate

Male

White

PDT

18-25

College Graduate

Male

Black

7
8

EDT
EDT

26-34
35-49

College Graduate
Some College

Male
Male

Asian
White

CDT

35-49

College Graduate

Male

White

PDT

26-34

College Graduate

Male

White

PDT

26-34

College Graduate

Male

Black

EDT

35-49

Post-Graduate degree

Male

Asian

15
16

EDT
EDT

26-34
50 or older

Post-Graduate degree
Post-Graduate degree

Male
Male

Asian
White

Race
White

Recruited IT
Type
None

Final IT Type

Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (bank)
Existing (bank);
Existing (other);
New account
Existing (bank);
Existing (other);
Personal info
None

Existing (bank)

All
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (bank)
Existing (bank);
New account
All

Existing (bank);
Existing (other);
New account
None
None

None

Existing (bank)
Existing (bank)

New account;
Personal info
Existing (bank);
Existing (other);
Personal info
None
Existing (other)
Existing (bank); New
account
Existing (bank); New
account
Existing (bank);
Existing (other); New
account
Existing (bank)

Existing (other)
Existing (bank)

Table 2. Participant Demographic, Recruitment, and Final Identity Theft Type Data (n=27)
P#

Age Range

Education

Gender

Race

Time
Zone
EDT

26-34

Post-Graduate degree

Female

18
19

EDT
CDT

50 or older
26-34

Some College
College Graduate

Female
Male

Asian
and AI/AN
White
Asian

PDT

50 or older

College Graduate

Female

White

22
23

CDT
CDT

35-49
26-34

Post-Graduate degree
College Graduate

Female
Male

White
White

EDT

35-49

Some College

Male

White

Recruited IT
Type
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (bank)
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (bank);
Personal info
Existing (bank)
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (other)

EDT

35-49

College Graduate

Male

White

Existing (other)

CDT

26-34

College Graduate

Male

White

Existing (bank)

30
31

CDT
EDT

26-34
26-34

College Graduate
College Graduate

Male
Female

White
White

Existing (bank)
Existing (other)

32
34

EDT
EDT

35-49
18-25

College Graduate
College Graduate

Female
Male

Black
White

Existing (bank)
Existing (other)

Final IT Type
Existing (bank)
None
Existing (bank);
Existing (bank);
Existing (bank)
Existing (bank)
Existing (other)
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
None
Existing (bank);
Existing (other);
Personal Info
Existing (bank)
Existing (other)

METHODS
Once MTurk respondents completed the online screener, were determined to be eligible to participate in the
cognitive interview, and expressed interest in participating in a virtual interview, the RTI recruiter scheduled an
interview time with the participant. The recruiter then sent the participant a link to a private Zoom meeting set
up for their specific interview. RTI interviewers were trained to stop the interview if anyone else joined the
meeting. In many cases, the “waiting room” feature was turned on so no one could join the meeting without being
allowed in by the interviewer.
Prior to conducting any interviews, all interviewers completed training on the cognitive interview protocol and
project logistics. All interviews were conducted using a cognitive interview protocol that was based on the most
recent version of the supplement provided by BJS. The protocol included probes developed to elicit an
understanding of how respondents interpreted specific terms or questions. Along with the pre-determined
probes, interviewers were encouraged to use spontaneous probing when needed to further understand the
participant’s thinking. The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.
Prior to the start of the interview, the interviewer obtained verbal participant consent. After the interview,
participants were emailed an Amazon.com Gift Card code with a value of $40 to help cover data and technology
costs associated with participating in the interview.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes key findings and recommended changes to specific survey items for which any problems
or issues were identified. Overall, the survey performed very well. There are many questions where none of the
27 participants had difficulty understanding and answering them as intended. These items not discussed below
did not appear to be problematic and have no recommended changes.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
3

Q2 – Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your checking or savings account, including any
debit or ATM cards, to make a purchase or withdraw money? Please consider only times when money was
actually deducted from your account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q5)
Although all respondents were able to answer this question in relation to bank accounts only, a few mentioned
that they also thought about their credit card accounts in this question, not knowing that we were going to ask
about credit card accounts separately. Three respondents had credit cards through their bank, which made it more
difficult to separate the two. One participant answered “Yes” to this question and, through probing, shared that
the theft actually happened in their Google Pay account, which is connected to their bank account. They later said
that the incident should be counted in Q9, not Q2, after hearing the response options provided. If they had known
there would be an option to report identity theft of an account like Google Pay, they never would have answered
“Yes” to Q2.
Recommendation: Suggest changing the last sentence to “Please consider only times when money was actually
deducted from your checking or savings account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later.” or adding
"Please do not include times when anyone used your credit card or online pay accounts without permission.”
Alternatively, to be consistent with Q6, start the question with “Thinking only of checking and savings accounts,”.
It may still be helpful to conclude with "Please do not include times when anyone used your credit card or online
pay accounts without permission.”
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q5 – Now I’d like to ask you about the possible misuse of EXISTING CREDIT CARDS OR CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTS.
Have you ever had a credit card in your name? Include major credit cards such as a Mastercard or Visa, and
store credit cards such as a Macy’s card. Please do not include debit cards.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q9)
Most respondents suggested including American Express and Discover as examples of major credit cards, and “big
box” retailer cards such as Target, Walmart and Amazon as examples of store cards. However, the current
examples still provided enough information for participants to know what they should be thinking about. One
person suggested saying “retail” instead of “store” credit cards because you can have credit cards for things that
do not have physical stores (such as Amazon).
Recommendation: Consider replacing “Macy’s” with “Target or Amazon” and changing “store credit cards” to
“retail credit cards” to encompass more possibilities.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q6 – Thinking only of credit cards, has anyone EVER used one or more of your credit cards without your
permission? Please consider only times when charges actually posted to your account, regardless of whether
you were reimbursed later.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q9)

One respondent mentioned he would answer this question as ‘No’ because he interprets this question to be about
the misuse of physical credit cards only. If the question were more specific about including the misuse of credit
card numbers as well, he would answer this question as “Yes”.
Recommendation: Consider adding “accounts” after the second mention of ‘credit card’ in the question text.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q9 – Now I’d like to ask you about the possible misuse of any of your EXISTIING ACCOUNTS other than credit
card or bank accounts.
Has anyone EVER, without your permission used another of your accounts, such as your telephone, internet or
utilities accounts, online payment accounts like Paypal, medical insurance accounts, entertainment accounts,
such as for music or games, email or social media accounts, or some other accounts? Please include only times
when charges were actually made on the account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q13)
Respondents overwhelmingly said listing the types of accounts was very helpful in helping them to think about
the types of accounts we are asking about, but mentioned that they focused in on specific service provider names
and then forgot things said after that. Keeping the proper names at the end of the list might help with that.
Another person mentioned that we should add “movies” so they would think of streaming accounts. Some
participants mentioned thinking about failed log-in attempts they were alerted to on their accounts, but they all
knew not to include those. (INTERVIEWER NOTE: We noticed movies are included below in Q11e.)
We have had several respondents who had their Facebook or Instagram accounts taken over, but because the
language at the end of the question focuses on charges made to the account, they were not sure whether to
actually include them. Two respondents said they did not include times their accounts were compromised for that
very reason. It is possible to misuse entertainment, email, and social media accounts without any financial
transaction. In the case of entertainment accounts, the theft is the service they are using and not paying for, not
a financial theft. Using another person’s social media accounts is often used for phishing, in which case the
infiltration is a means to an end. Email accounts, however, carry more weight because passwords can be sent or
reset to an email account. Theft of an email account has many more implications than that of entertainment or
social media.
Recommendation: Move ‘online payment accounts’ to the end of the list and include Venmo with the Paypal
example. Revise example of entertainment accounts to, “entertainment accounts, such as for music, games, or
movies” so participants consider popular streaming services.
Consider the appropriate placement for accessing social media accounts. Does the misuse of email and social
media account fit better under the category of ‘misuse of personal information for other fraudulent purposes?’
or should they be in their own either combined or separate categories?
If the intent of the question is to capture account access regardless of financial loss, replace the last sentence with
“Please include only times when someone actually got into your account. Do not include failed login attempts”.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

YES NO

11b. Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas or electric accounts?

YES NO

11c. Online payment accounts, such as Paypal?

YES NO

11d. Medical insurance accounts?

YES NO

11e. Entertainment accounts, such as for movies, music, or games?

YES NO

11f. Email or social media accounts?

YES NO

11g. Some other type of accounts?

YES NO

[If yes] What other type of accounts were misused? __________
(If any 11a-11g = yes, ask Q12a; else skip to Q13)
Recommendation: To remain consistent with Q10, move “Online payment accounts”, such as Paypal to the end
of the list above “other” and include Venmo as an example.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q13 – Next, I have some questions about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have opened using your personal
information.
Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your personal information to successfully open any NEW
accounts, such as telephone or internet accounts, credit card or bank accounts, loans or mortgages, insurance
accounts, online payment accounts, entertainment accounts, such as for music or games, email or social media
accounts, utilities accounts or some other type of account?

1
2

Yes
No (skip to Q17)

A few participants said “No” to this question because they assumed it required a financial loss, even though the
question does not specify monetary loss. This is due to priming effects from all of the previous questions referring
to losing money.
Recommendation: Consider adding, “Include times even when you did not lose any money.” Revise the example
of entertainment accounts to, “entertainment accounts, such as for music, games, or movies” so participants
consider streaming services and to be consistent with Question 9.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Q17 - Next, I have some questions about any other misuses of your personal information.
Has anyone EVER used your personal information for some other fraudulent purpose, such as filing a fraudulent
tax return, getting medical treatment, applying for a job; giving your information to the police when they were
charged with a crime or traffic violation; applying for government benefits or something else? Please consider
only times when your information was actually used, even if the situation was later resolved.

1
2

Yes
No (LOOK AT ANSWER SHEET TO FIND NEXT QUESTION)

Some may find the word ‘actually’ from the final sentence as confusing. As one participant said “If you use it, you
actually use it. How do you not actually use it?”
Recommendation: Only one participant had concerns with this question and since “actually” is an adverb that is
often used to emphasize something in fact happening, we recommend leaving the questions as written.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q25 – Thinking about the most recent time your personal information was misused, in what month and year
did you first discover that someone had misused your personal information? This may be the same month and
year as the most recent occurrence, or the discovery may have happened before or after the most recent
occurrence.
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2021)
Some participants found the last sentence to be confusing, especially remarking on not understanding how
discovery ‘before’ an occurrence happened. One participants was particularly confused and apologized multiple
times. When the interviewer read them the question without the second sentence, they said that question was
clear and had not realized it was the same question.
Recommendation: Remove the last sentence to avoid unnecessary confusion. Alternatively, it could be left in if it
is made clear to only be read if a respondent is having difficulty answering the question. Consider simplifying it to
“You could have first discovered the incident before, during, or after the month and year of the most recent
occurrence.”
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Q26 - How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

One day or less (1-24 hours)
More than a day, but less than a week (25 hours-6 days)
At least a week, but less than one month (7-30 days)
One month to less than three months
Three months to less than six months
Six months to less than one year
One year or more
Don’t know

not need response option 7. However, due to the possibility of reoccurring incidents of identity theft, we see
this response option as necessary.
Recommendation: Leave question as is.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
General Findings
There are questions in this instrument about timelines that could be confusing for some or hard to follow. The
two sets of questions we focused on were questions about whether an incident occurred “Ever” or “in the past
12 months, and Q25 and Q26 when we try to identify the date of discovery and length of misuse (compared to
the date of the most recent incident). For the questions on whether someone had ever experienced identity theft,
respondents were probed on how far back they were thinking when answering those questions. Two respondents
mentioned ‘lifetime’ or ’30 years, since I had my account,’ but the majority of respondents reported remembering
back to when their most recent incident or incidents occurred, whether that was 3 months ago or 5 years ago.
This makes sense though because once they recalled an event, they had their answer and did not need to think
further. Table 3 provides the responses for each type of identity theft and whether it “Ever” happened and
whether it happened “in the past 12 months.” Many participants recognized that they had been victimized in the
past, but that in many cases their incidents occurred outside of the 12-month time frame.
Table 3. Responses to “Ever” and “12 months” Questions
Ever 12 mos Ever 12 mos Ever 12 mos Existing Existing
P# Existing Existing
Existing Existing
credit
credit
bank
bank
other
other
card
card
1 No
No
No
2 Yes

12
mos New
accout

Ever Personal
info

Yes

3 No

Yes

4 No

Yes

5 Yes

Yes

Ever New
account

Yes

7 No

Yes

6 No
8 Yes

Yes

10 No

Yes

11 No

Yes

12 Yes

Yes

13 Yes

Yes

15 No
16 Yes

No
Yes

17 No

Yes

18 No

19 Yes

Yes.

Yes

12 mos Personal
info

20 Yes

Yes

Ever Existing
credit
card
No

22 Yes

Yes

23 Yes

Yes

Ever 12 mos P# Existing Existing
bank
bank

12 mos Existing
credit
card

Ever Existing
other

12 mos Existing
other

Ever New
account

12
mos New
accout

Ever Personal
info

Yes

24 No

Yes

26 No

Yes

27 No

Yes

30 No

Yes

31 Yes

Yes

32 Yes

Yes

34 No

Yes

Yes
Yes

12 mos Personal
info

Yes

Another concern is whether respondents were able to distinguish among the concepts of when the incident
started, was discovered, and most recently occurred an whether they were able to provide dates for each of those
reference points. Respondents were asked to describe in their own words what these different reference points
meant in light of their own experience and all appeared to understand the concepts. With the exception of one
respondent, all of the participants were able to stop the identity theft relatively quickly after they discovered it.
Table 4. Key Dates in Incident Timeline
P#

Most Recent

Discovered (Q25)

Length of use (Q26)

2
3
4
5
6
10
11
12
13
17
19
20
22
24
26
27
31
32
34

February 2020
August 2019
October 2019
July 2019
February 2020
September 2019
July 2019
June 2019
November 2019
September 2019
November 2019
March 2020
February 2020
March 2020
October 2019
January 2020
March 2020
August 2019
March 2020

February 2020
August 2019
October 2019
July 2019
January 2020
September 2019
July 2019
June 2019
December 2019
September 2019
November 2019
March 2020
February 2020
March 2020
October 2019
January 2020
March 2020
August 2019
March 2020

1 day-1 week
<1 day
<1 day
1-3 months
1-3 months
1 day-1 week
<1 day
<1 day
1 day-1 week
1 week–1 month
1 week–1 month
1 day-1 week
<1 day
<1 day
<1 day
<1 day
1 day-1 week
1 week–1 month
<1 day

September 15, 2020

National Victimization Statistical
Support Program (NVSSP-2)
Cooperative Agreement (COA)
2011-NV-CX-K068
Identity Theft Screener Online Testing
Final Report

Prepared for
Bureau of Justice Statistics
810 7th Street Northwest
Washington, DC 20001

Prepared by
RTI International
3040 E. Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

RTI Project Number 0216100.000.001.015

RTI Project Number
0216100.000.001.015

National Victimization Statistical
Support Program (NVSSP-2)
Cooperative Agreement (COA)
2011-NV-CX-K068
Identity Theft Screener Online Testing
Final Report

September 2020
Prepared for
Bureau of Justice Statistics
810 7th Street Northwest
Washington, DC 20001

Prepared by
RTI International
3040 E. Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
_________________________________
RTI International is a trade name of Research Triangle Institute.
RTI and the RTI logo are U.S. registered trademarks of Research Triangle Institute.

Contents

Section

Page

Executive Summary

Introduction
1.1

Background ................................................................................................ 1

1.2

The Need for Online Testing ......................................................................... 3

1.3

Online Testing Approach .............................................................................. 4

1.4

Data Collection ........................................................................................... 5

1.5

Strengths and Limitations of the Use of Online Panels for Testing the ITS
Screeners .................................................................................................. 8

Key Findings

2.1

Comparison of 12-month Prevalence Estimates Across Versions 1, 2,
and 3 ...................................................................................................... 10

2.2

Use of the Dual Reference Period and Patterns Across Demographic
Groups .................................................................................................... 13

2.3

Impact of Exclusion of Attempts on Prevalence Estimates .............................. 18

2.4

Respondents’ Ability to Date Incidents and the Impact of Dating on
Telescoping .............................................................................................. 19

2.5

Comparison to the ITS Estimates ................................................................ 25

Recommendations for the 2021 ITS Based on Key Findings

Methodology

4.1

Sampling ................................................................................................. 29
4.1.1 AmeriSpeak .................................................................................... 29
4.1.2 MTurk ............................................................................................ 29

4.2

Fielding.................................................................................................... 30
4.2.1 AmeriSpeak .................................................................................... 30
4.2.2 MTurk ............................................................................................ 31
4.2.3 Tables Presenting Sample Sizes by Mode and Platform ......................... 32

4.3

Statistical Weighting .................................................................................. 34

4.4

Weighting ................................................................................................ 36
4.4.1 AmeriSpeak Sample ........................................................................ 37

iii

4.4.2 TrueNorth Calibration for Nonprobability Sample ................................. 37
4.4.3 Design Effect and Sampling Margin of Error Calculations ...................... 38

4.5

Assessment of Item Nonresponse, Speeders, and Skippers ............................ 38

4.6

Feedback from MTurk Workers.................................................................... 42

References

Appendices

Three Versions of ITS Screener Used in Testing ...........................................A-1

Findings from ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing .............................................B-1

Standard Error Tables ...............................................................................C-1

Figures

Number
1.

Page

Relationship Between Date of Most Recent Occurrence and Date of Discovery
of Identity Theft (Version 2) ............................................................................ 22

Tables

Number

Page

Unweighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Mode ............................. 6

Unweighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Platform ........................ 7

Weighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Instrument Version............. 8

Prevalence of Identity Theft in Past 12 Months, by Type of Identity Theft and
Instrument Version......................................................................................... 11

Persons Aged 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More Incidents of Identity
Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim Characteristics and Instrument
Version ......................................................................................................... 11

Most Recent Incident of Identity Theft, by Type of Identity Theft and
Instrument Version......................................................................................... 13

Prevalence of Identity Theft, by Type of Identity Theft, Instrument Version,
and Reference Period ...................................................................................... 14

Persons Ages 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More Incidents of Identity
Theft, by Victim Characteristics, Instrument Version, and Reference Period ........... 15

Relationship Between Lifetime Prevalence and 12-month Prevalence, by Type
of Identity Theft (Version 2) ............................................................................ 16

10.

Relationship Between Lifetime Prevalence and 12-month Prevalence of
Identity Theft, by Victim Characteristics (Version 2) ........................................... 17

11.

Prevalence of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Type of Identity
Theft and Instrument Version and With Exclusion of Attempts ............................. 18

12.

Percentage of Victims Providing a Date of Occurrence Prior to or Outside the
12-month Reference Period or Providing a “Don't Know” Response, by Type of
Identity Theft (Version 2) ................................................................................ 20

13.

Percentage of Victims Providing a Date of Occurrence Prior to or Outside the
12-Month Reference Period or Providing a “Don't Know” Response, by Victim
Characteristics and Select Types of Identity Theft (Version 2) .............................. 21

14.

Relationship Between Date of Most Recent Occurrence and Date of Discovery,
by Type of Identity Theft ................................................................................. 22

15.

Relationship Between Date of Most Recent Occurrence and Date of Discovery,
by Victim Characteristics ................................................................................. 23

16.

Time From Discovery of Most Recent Incident to Interview, by Questionnaire
Version and Type of Identity Theft .................................................................... 24

17.

Relationship Between Time of Most Recent Occurrence and How Long Identity
Theft Had Been Happening When It Was Discovered ........................................... 24

18.

Prevalence of Identity Theft in Past 12 Months, by Type of Identity Theft,
Survey Administrator, and Mode ...................................................................... 26

19.

Persons Who Experienced One or More Incidents of Identity Theft During the
Past 12 Months, by Victim Characteristics, Survey Administrator, and Mode .......... 26

20.

Prevalence of Identity Theft in Past 12 Months Accounting for Version 2
Victims Who Failed to Provide Dates of Occurrence or Provided Dates of
Occurrence Outside the Reference Period, by Type of Identity Theft and
Instrument Version......................................................................................... 27

21.

Average and Median Number of Minutes Spent on the Survey, by Platform,
Survey Mode, and Instrument Version (unweighted) .......................................... 28

22.

Detailed Breakdown of the Survey Recruitment HITs .......................................... 31

23.

Unweighted Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by Type of
Identity Theft and Mode .................................................................................. 32

24.

Unweighted Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by Type of
Identity Theft and Platform.............................................................................. 32

25.

Unweighted Persons Ages 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More
Incidents of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim
Characteristics and Mode ................................................................................ 33

26.

Unweighted Persons Age 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More Incidents
of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim Characteristics and
Platform ........................................................................................................ 34

27.

Census Current Population Survey Feb 2020 was Used for Benchmarking .............. 36

28.

Instrument Version 1 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey Platform ......... 39

29.

Instrument Version 2 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey Platform ......... 39

30.

Instrument Version 3 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey Platform ......... 40

31.

Instrument Version 1 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode ........................ 40

32.

Instrument Version 2 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode ........................ 41

33.

Instrument Version 3 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode ........................ 41

34.

Average Number of Missing or “Don't Know” Responses, by Respondent
Demographics and Instrument Version (unweighted) .......................................... 42

vii

Executive Summary
From July 16, 2020, to August 4, 2020, RTI International and NORC successfully
administered a randomized test of three versions of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
Identity Theft Supplement (ITS) screener to more than 31,000 respondents. The
respondents were recruited through three online survey platforms: AmeriSpeak, a
probability-based panel; and Lucid and Mechanical Turk (MTurk), two nonprobability panels.
The goal of the test was to determine which of the three versions of the ITS screener
produced the most accurate estimates of the prevalence of identity theft with the highest
degree of data quality. The current ITS instrument, which is fielded as part of the National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), was Version 1. Version 2 was a revised instrument
designed to control for telescoping through the use of a dual reference period, upfront
dating of the most recent occurrence, and the exclusion of attempted incidents. Version 3
was similar Version 1; however, it excluded attempted incidents.
Comparisons across the three versions revealed that Version 2 resulted in the lowest
prevalence of identity theft and appeared to best control for telescoping. Respondents
appeared to understand the distinctions in the dating questions and the majority were able
to identify the month and year of occurrence. Based on the findings, Version 2 is
recommended for the 2021 ITS. However, use of this version would require additional
changes to the ITS questionnaire, result in a change to the definition of identity theft, and
cause a break-in series for trend analyses.
Across all three versions and all three platforms, there were low levels of item missingness
and the response times were within the expected range. The project and findings serve to
demonstrate that online testing platforms are an efficient and effective means for collecting
data from a large number of respondents, using a consistent approach, in a relatively short
period of time. The use of online platforms is a cost-effective and efficient way to quickly
obtain a magnitude of responses and is useful for testing how well different versions of
survey questions perform in the field.

1. Introduction
1.1

Background

The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) developed the Identity Theft Supplement (ITS) to the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) in 2006 and 2007 in conjunction with the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bureau of Justice
Assistance (BJA), and Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). The survey was designed to fill key
data needs for each of the agencies and to respond to a recommendation from the 2007

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

President’s Task Force on Identity Theft 1 that BJS should periodically administer identity
theft survey supplements to collect detailed individual-level data on the prevalence and
consequences of identity theft.
Since its inception, the survey has been administered five times (in 2008, 2012, 2014,
2016, and 2018) to all NCVS respondents age 16 or older during a 6-month field period
following the administration of the core NCVS. It is used to generate estimates of the
prevalence and nature of identity theft victimizations nationwide, collecting data on victim
experiences with a broad range of identity theft incidents, from the misuse of an existing
credit card—which typically results in no or low out-of-pocket losses, takes little time to
resolve, and tends to cause low levels of distress—to the misuse of someone’s Social
Security number, which can result in much greater losses, distress, and time spent resolving
related issues. The survey also captures known incidents in which an offender attempts to
use a person’s identifying information but is unsuccessful at obtaining goods or services.
Given the changes in technology and the scope of crimes since the ITS was first introduced
(more than a decade ago), BJS was interested in reexamining persistent measurement
challenges for the ITS and other NCVS supplements and reevaluating the nature of crimes
included in its definition of identity theft. After conducting a series of analyses internally,
BJS asked RTI International to conduct a secondary data analysis to examine several key
issues in the ITS that impact how identity theft is measured and described in reports and
the resulting prevalence estimates, including (1) the unbounded nature of the estimates and
the potential for telescoping 2; (2) the ongoing, episodic nature of many incidents and
specific dating of incidents to determine whether they should be included within the survey
reference period; and (3) the inclusion of attempted incidents. Findings suggested that BJS
should do the following:

▪

Consider using a dual reference period in the screener to reduce the likelihood of
respondents telescoping incidents into the 12-month reference period. With this
approach, respondents are first asked about lifetime experiences with identity theft,
with a follow-up question asking about their experiences with identity theft in the
past 12 months.

▪

Ask respondents to provide a date of the most recent known occurrence of identity
theft to ensure that the incidents reported in the screener occurred within the 12month survey reference period for the ITS.

▪

Ask respondents to focus only on successfully completed incidents of identity theft
because there are challenges with correctly collecting and identifying attempted
incidents, and the grouping of attempted and completed incidents muddles
understanding of and appreciation for the severity of completed incidents.

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/presidents-identity-theft-task-forcereport/081021taskforcereport.pdf
2 Unlike in the core NCVS in which Interviews 2–7 are bounded by the prior interview, the ITS and
other NCVS supplements are completely unbounded.
1

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Based on findings from the secondary data analysis, BJS and RTI created two revised
versions of the ITS screener (see Appendix A). One revised version (identified as Version
2) incorporates all of the recommended changes, including the use of a dual reference
period, dating of the most recent incident following an affirmative screener, and revised
language instructing respondents to only include successfully completed incidents of identity
theft (i.e., to not include attempted incidents). Version 2 is substantially different from the
ITS currently in the field (identified as Version 1) and using it would likely result in
estimates that are not comparable to those from prior years. The second revised screener
(identified as Version 3) is closer to Version 1 but incorporates language instructing
respondents to only include successfully completed incidents of identity theft in their
responses to the questions.
Using the Version 2 questionnaire, BJS and RTI conducted cognitive interviews with 27
adults in May of 2020 (see Appendix B). Overall, the respondents found the survey to be
straightforward and the questions easy to answer, and their feedback and comments
resulted in several recommended revisions and clarifications to the screener items. The
biggest change was separating the act of accessing and misusing someone’s social media
accounts, which may not result in a direct financial loss, from the misuse of other existing
accounts (e.g., utilities accounts) which often result in direct financial loss. In Versions 1
and 3, the misuse of social media accounts continued to be grouped under the category of
misuse of other existing accounts rather than be separated as an independent screener
question.

1.2

The Need for Online Testing

The cognitive interviews were useful for improving the wording and structure of Version 2.
However, the team also wanted to determine whether Version 2 would perform better than
Version 1 or Version 3 in terms of reducing telescoping and false positive responses. Several
key research questions needed to be addressed to determine which version of the screener
should be fielded with the NCVS in 2021, including the following:

▪

Which version of the screener results in lower prevalence rates suggesting less
telescoping of incidents from outside the reference period?

▪

Are respondents able to date identity theft episodes in terms of when they started,
were discovered, and most recently occurred? Do respondents appear to make a
distinction between these three episode reference points?

▪

Does the use of the dual reference period appear to control telescoping in affirmative
responses about victimization in the previous 12 months? In other words, are the
dates provided for the most recent occurrence more likely to fall within the 12-month
reference period?

▪

Which instrument performs better on data quality measures, such as missing or
“don’t know” responses or breakoff rates?

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Examining these types of issues required a large sample across which the three versions of
the screener could be randomized and administered consistently to quantitatively test for
differences in prevalence rates and data quality measures. A power analysis suggested that
assuming a base identity theft prevalence of 9% and 70% power, a sample size of 31,500
(divided across the three screener versions) was needed to detect a 1% change in the
prevalence of identity theft.
Based on the need to administer the screeners to a large sample in a short period, it was
determined that using an online platform—preferably one with a mixed-mode option to
collect data from respondents who may not have access to the web—was the best approach
for data collection. NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel was the only known U.S. panel that would
enable the collection of more than 30,000 responses in less than 2 months using both web
and telephone survey modes. Thus, RTI entered into a subcontract with NORC to utilize
their AmeriSpeak panel and TrueNorth Calibration approach for testing.

1.3

Online Testing Approach

RTI primarily used NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel to conduct the online testing. AmeriSpeak is a
probability-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. household population. The
panel is composed of nearly 50,000 panel members from more than 40,000 households and
provides sample coverage of approximately 97% of the household population. 3 The
panelists are pre-registered members, who are selected using area probability and addressbased sampling and complete small surveys for minimal compensation. Data are collected
through a mixed-mode survey approach via online and telephone interviews. Approximately
15% of completed interviews are conducted via the telephone, ensuring that no groups are
left out of the sample (e.g., non-internet users who may be more likely to be elderly, live in
rural areas, or earn lower incomes).
Given the time allotted for the ITS screener testing, the AmeriSpeak probability panel was
expected to provide a maximum of 10,000 interviews; the balance of the sample (~21,500)
was expected to come from nonprobability online panels. NORC’s TrueNorth Calibration
Approach 4 enables a blending of probability and nonprobability samples using calibration
weights to ensure that the final sample of respondents represents the U.S. household
population.
Typically, NORC works with one nonprobability panel to supplement the AmeriSpeak
sample. However, for the ITS testing, RTI and NORC developed an approach to also utilize
sample from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) nonprobability panel. RTI has considerable
Additional information about AmeriSpeak panel sample selection is available through NORC’s
technical overview of the panel, which can be accessed at
http://amerispeak.norc.org/Documents/Research/AmeriSpeak%20Technical%20Overview%202019%
2002%2018.pdf.
4 Additional information about the TrueNorth Calibration is available at
http://amerispeak.norc.org/our-capabilities/Pages/TrueNorth.aspx.
3

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

experience working with MTurk and has previously found that that MTurk workers tend to
produce data with better quality compared to other nonprobability panelists when they
participate in scientific research (Hsieh et al., 2018). The anticipated distribution of sample
across the three panels was as follows: AmeriSpeak—10,000; Lucid (NORC’s nonprobability
panel)—11,500 to 16,500; and MTurk—5,000 to 10,000. The distributions were estimates
given unknowns based on the limited past efforts to collect data from such large samples of
respondents.
Potential respondents were screened for being residents of the United States, English
speaking, and 18 years of age or older. 5 Respondents were deduplicated across the three
panels to the greatest degree possible. Those who agreed to participate were randomly
assigned to one of the three versions of the ITS screener. They were informed that the
survey was about identity theft, would take between 5 and 15 minutes to complete, and
that participation was voluntary and were asked to check a box stating that they understood
the terms and consented to participate in the survey. Panelists were offered the cash
equivalent of $2 for completing the survey.

1.4

Data Collection

Data collection officially began on July 16, 2020, and ended on August 4, 2020, with a total
of 32,177 interviews in the final sample (excluding respondents with major data quality
issues who did not meet the threshold for inclusion); 30,901 were completed via the web
and 1,276 (12% of the AmeriSpeak sample) via telephone interview. Approximately 34%
(10,962) of the sample came from the AmeriSpeak probability-based panel; 35% (11,210)
from the Lucid nonprobability panel; and 31% (10,005) from the MTurk nonprobability
panel. Tables 1 and 2 show the demographic distribution of respondents across the
different survey modes and panels.

Although the ITS is administered to persons ages 16 or older, the minimum age was increased to 18
years for online testing due to challenges in recruiting juvenile participants for online surveys.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 1.

Unweighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Mode

Total

Sex

Total

Number Percent
32,177 100.00 %

Web
Number Percent
30,901 100.00 %

Phone
Number Percent
1276 100.00 %

Male
15,632
48.58 %
15,180
49.12 %
452 35.42 %
Female
16,545
51.42
15,721
50.88
824 64.58
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
20,518
63.77 %
19,685
63.70 %
833 65.28 %
Black
3,614
11.23
3,353
10.85
261 20.45
Other
347
1.08
309
1.00
38 2.98
Hispanic
5,457
16.96
5,388
17.44
69 5.41
Two or more races
899
2.79
834
2.70
65 5.09
Asian
1,342
4.17
1,332
4.31
10 0.78
Age
18–24
2,855
8.87 %
2,850
9.22 %
5 0.39 %
25–34
7,465
23.20
7,450
24.11
15 1.18
35–49
8,354
25.96
8,308
26.89
46 3.61
50–64
7,406
23.02
7,102
22.98
304 23.82
65 or older
6,097
18.95
5,191
16.80
906 71.00
Household income
$24,999 or less
6,294
19.56 %
5,767
18.66 %
527 41.30 %
$25,000–$49,999
8,487
26.38
8,107
26.24
380 29.78
$50,000–$74,999
6,742
20.95
6,584
21.31
158 12.38
$75,000 or more
10,654
33.11
10,443
33.80
211 16.54
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix.
*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons
of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 2.

Unweighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Platform
Total

Sex

Total

Number Percent
32,177 100.00 %

AmeriSpeak
Number Percent
10,962
100.00 %

Lucid
Number Percent
11,210 100.00 %

MTurk
Number Percent
10,005 100.00 %

Male
15,632
48.58 %
5,221
47.63 %
5,222 46.58 %
5,189 51.86 %
Female
16,545
51.42
5,741
52.37
5,988 53.42
4,816 48.14
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
20,518
63.77 %
7,446
67.93 %
6,884 61.41 %
6,188 61.85 %
Black
3,614
11.23
1,469
13.40
1,322 11.79
823 8.23
Other
347
1.08
184
1.68
99 0.88
64 0.64
Hispanic
5,457
16.96
1,117
10.19
2,367 21.12
1,973 19.72
Two or more races
899
2.79
396
3.61
204 1.82
299 2.99
Asian
1,342
4.17
350
3.19
334 2.98
658 6.58
Age
18–24
2,855
8.87 %
465
4.24 %
1,561 13.93 %
829 8.29 %
25–34
7,465
23.20
1,843
16.81
1,748 15.59
3,874 38.72
35–49
8,354
25.96
1,812
16.53
3,089 27.56
3,453 34.51
50–64
7,406
23.02
3,169
28.91
2,784 24.83
1,453 14.52
65 or older
6,097
18.95
3,673
33.51
2,028 18.09
396 3.96
Household income
$24,999 or less
6,294
19.56 %
2,118
19.32 %
2,816 25.12 %
1,360 13.59 %
$25,000–$49,999
8,487
26.38
2,759
25.17
3,036 27.08
2,692 26.91
$50,000–$74,999
6,742
20.95
2,120
19.34
2,114 18.86
2,508 25.07
$75,000 or more
10,654
33.11
3,965
36.17
3,244 28.94
3,445 34.43
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix.
*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

The final sample was weighted using NORC’s TrueNorth Calibration approach to benchmark
to known population distributions from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey
(CPS). Three weights were developed to correspond with the three versions of the
instrument. In other words, the respondents who completed Versions 1, 2, and 3 were
independently calibrated to the benchmarks. Table 3 shows the weighted count and
distribution of respondents across each version. The benchmarking distributions are
included in the Methodology section of this report because they do not align perfectly with
the demographic categories provided on the file and used in BJS reports. For example, the
Census categories used for benchmarking the race/ethnicity of respondents include NonHispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic Other. The demographic
categories provided for analysis include Non-Hispanic white, Non-Hispanic black, Hispanic,
Non-Hispanic other, Non-Hispanic Asian, and Non-Hispanic persons of two or more races.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 3.

Weighted Sample, by Demographic Characteristics and Instrument
Version
Version 1

Sex

Total

Number

10,609

Percent
100.00

Version 2

Version 3

Number Percent
10,926
100.00

Number Percent
10,642
100.00

Male
5,123
48.29
5,277
48.30
5,140
48.30
Female
5,486
51.71
5,649
51.70
5,502
51.70
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
6,662
62.79
6,861
62.79
6,683
62.79
Black
1,265
11.93
1,303
11.93
1,269
11.93
Asian
491
4.63
458
4.19
485
4.56
Hispanic
1,768
16.66
1,821
16.66
1,773
16.66
Other
121
1.14
120
1.09
144
1.35
Two or more races
302
2.85
364
3.33
288
2.71
Age
18–24
1,218
11.48
1,254
11.48
1,222
11.48
25–34
1,854
17.48
1,950
17.85
1,889
17.75
35–49
2,619
24.68
2,656
24.31
2,597
24.41
50–64
2,639
24.87
2,718
24.87
2,647
24.87
65 or older
2,280
21.49
2,348
21.49
2,287
21.49
Household income
$24,999 or less
2,465
23.23
2,512
22.99
2,488
23.38
$25,000–$49,999
2,763
26.04
2,917
26.70
2,787
26.19
$50,000–$74,999
2,023
19.07
2,117
19.37
2,055
19.31
$75,000 or more
3,358
31.65
3,380
30.93
3,312
31.12
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

1.5

Strengths and Limitations of the Use of Online Panels for
Testing the ITS Screeners

For the purpose of comparing how well different versions of questions perform in the field,
online platforms offer considerable advantages. In less than 4 weeks, it was possible to
collect more than 30,000 completed surveys. This likely would not be possible with an inperson or telephone survey. Additionally, although the collection relied on three different
panels, the survey looked and functioned the same. This ensures that any findings of
differences across the questionnaire versions can be attributed to differences in the
questions rather than differences in methodology or the samples.
In terms of data quality (see Section 4.5) the online panels performed well. About 7%
(2,350) of the initial pool of 34,527 respondents were removed from the final sample
because of data quality issues; primarily short completion times or high numbers of skipped
questions. Among those in the final sample, levels of item missingness were less than 1%
for most items even though most items did not have any soft or hard prompts built in to
encourage or force responses. For Versions 1 and 3, the items with the highest percent

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

missing included the question about whether the respondent currently had a credit card in
their name, the questions about month and year of discovery for the most recent incident,
and the question about how long their personal information was misused before the identity
theft was discovered. For Version 2, the questions about month and year of discovery and
how long their information had been misused before the identity theft was discovered were
also among the more problematic. Even among these items, the level of missingness was
generally lower than 5% (see Tables 26, 27, and 28). Additionally, respondents spent an
average of 6 minutes completing the survey, which suggests that they were taking the time
to read the questions; however, it is not possible to track the speed at which respondents
were completing questions or to know whether they had the browser open to look at
something else.
Although the panels provided a significant amount of high-quality data in a short period,
there were also some limitations. Despite the calibration weighting, there could still be
considerable bias in the samples and the estimates. The weighted cumulative response rate
(based on the American Association for Public Opinion Research [AAPOR] Response Rate 3
[RR3] calculation) 6 was less than 6%, increasing the potential or likelihood of systematic
nonresponse. Additionally, though it is possible to obtain participation from respondents as
young as 13 using AmeriSpeak, the sample of juveniles is considerably more limited than
the sample of adults. Although the ITS includes respondents 16 and older, this testing was
restricted to those age 18 or older.
As anticipated and discussed further in the context of Tables 16 and 17, the prevalence
estimates generated through the online testing environment are considerably higher than
those generated by the NCVS. This could suggest that the presence of an interviewer has a
suppression effect, that respondents become fatigued after completing the core NCVS and
do not answer ITS questions accurately, that the interviewer serves to clarify the questions
and there are more false positives with online testing, 7 or that topic saliency bias results in
an online sample of respondents that is more likely to have experienced identity theft than
the general population. If online platforms were used to generate national estimates of
identity theft, additional research would be needed to better understand differences in the
magnitude of estimates generated through different modes. However, the focus of this
testing was not on comparing the findings to the NCVS, but on understanding differences
across the three instrument versions, which were all subject to the same factors that result
in higher estimates than generated through in-person interviews. The next section of the
report describes these findings.

See https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/Standard-Definitions2015_8thEd.pdf
for AAPOR response rate definitions.
7 Although the issue of false positive responses was not examined directly in this study, other studies
have found relatively low rates of false positives in online surveys. See, for example,
https://rvap.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/2898aa5950/Campus-Climate-Survey-2016.pdf (pp 130-136).
6

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

2. Key Findings
Across the tables presented in this section, findings are examined by the following
categories:

▪

Instrument version
–

Version 1 – current ITS

–

Version 2 – fully revised ITS

–

Version 3 – ITS with attempts removed

Survey platform
–

AmeriSpeak

–

Lucid

–

MTurk

Mode
–

Web

–

Phone

The types of identity theft and demographic characteristics of respondents and victims
presented in the tables in the following section are consistent with the categories used and
reported by BJS from the ITS.

2.1

Comparison of 12-month Prevalence Estimates Across
Versions 1, 2, and 3

▪

Versions 2 (31.98%) and 3 (30.2%) generated a significantly lower prevalence (90%
Confidence Interval [CI]) of identity theft than Version 1 (37.11%). This was
anticipated because both Versions 2 and 3 excluded attempted incidents, whereas
Version 1 did not (see Table 4).

▪

Although the prevalence estimate for Version 2 appeared higher than the estimate
for Version 3, the difference was not statistically significant for overall identity theft
(see Table 4; testing not shown).

▪

The apparent higher rate of overall identity theft for Version 2 compared to Version 3
may be because social media accounts are asked about separately in Version 2. The
reported prevalence of social media account misuse in Version 2 was 12.25%,
whereas the prevalence of other existing account misuse (which could include social
media) in Version 3 was 10.27% (see Table 4).

▪

The significantly lower identity theft prevalence rates in Versions 2 and 3 compared
to Version 1 were consistent across most demographic groups. However, there were
no significant differences in the prevalence rates for the following race categories:
black, other, or persons of two or more races (see Table 5).

▪

In Version 2 compared to Version 1, a significantly higher percentage of respondents
experienced banking account misuse (90% CI) and new account misuse (95% CI) as
the most recent incident, whereas a significantly lower percentage experienced other

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

existing account misuse and multiple types in the same incident as their most recent
incident (see Table 6).

▪

In Version 3 compared to Version 1, a significantly higher percentage of respondents
experienced credit card and banking account misuse as their most recent incident
(90% CI), whereas a significantly lower percentage experienced the misuse of other
existing accounts and multiple types as their most recent incident (90% CI; see
Table 6).

Table 4.

Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by Type of Identity
Theft and Instrument Version

Version 1*
Number of Percent of all
victims
respondents/a
3,937
37.11 %

Version 2
Number of Percent of all
victims
respondents/a
3,494 31.98 %++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
1,703
16.05
1,349 12.35
Bank
2,148
20.25
1,641 15.02
Social media
~
~
1,338 12.25
Other
1,675
15.79
962
8.81
New account
779
7.35
570
5.21
Personal information
507
4.78
333
3.05
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.
Table 5.

++
++
++
++
++

Version 3
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,213 30.20 %++
1,484
1,724
~
1,093
455
400

13.94
16.20
~
10.27
4.27
3.75

++
++
++
++
++

Persons Age 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More Incidents of
Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim Characteristics and
Instrument Version

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Sex

Total

Version 1
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,937
37.11 %

Version 2
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,494
31.98 %++

Version 3
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,213
30.20

Male*
1,931
37.69
1,638
31.05 ++
1,564
30.43 ++
Female
2,006
36.56
1,855
32.84 ++
1,650
29.98 ++
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White*
2,329
34.97
1,987
28.96 ++
1,808
27.06 ++
Black
460
36.40
506
38.85
432
34.01
Asian
178
36.21
123
26.79 ++
123
25.42 ++
Hispanic
816
46.14
721
39.61 ++
696
39.27 ++
Other
42
34.49
28
23.55
38
26.21
Two or more races
112
36.95
129
35.31
116
40.38
Age
18–24
532
43.64
446
35.58 ++
437
35.74 ++
25–34
801
43.22
735
37.69 ++
649
34.35 ++
35–49*
1,051
40.15
969
36.50 ++
831
32.00 ++
50–64
954
36.17
795
29.24 ++
781
29.49 ++
65 or older
598
26.23
548
23.35 +
516
22.57 ++
Household income
$24,999 or less
867
35.16
758
30.15 ++
740
29.74 ++
$25,000–$49,999
1,000
36.19
910
31.20 ++
830
29.77 ++
$50,000–$74,999
748
36.98
673
31.79 ++
606
29.51 ++
$75,000 or more*
1,322
39.36
1,153
34.12 ++
1,038
31.33 ++
Urbanicity
Urban
3,430
37.62
3,047
32.36 ++
2,784
30.33 ++
Non-urban
487
33.33
425
28.94 ++
404
28.57 ++
Unknown
20
65.07
22
51.90
26
51.96
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables. Percentages are based on the number of persons in each
category.
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 6.

Most Recent Incident of Identity Theft, by Type of Identity Theft and
Instrument Version
Version 1*
Number Percent of all Percent of
of victims respondents/a all victims
3,937
37.11 %
100.00 %

Total
Only one type of existing account
Credit card
794
7.49
20.18
Bank
976
9.20
24.80
Social media
~
~
~
Other
612
5.77
15.54
Opened new account only
141
1.33
3.57
Misused personal information only
90
0.85
2.28
Multiple types
1,324
12.48
33.63
Note. Standard errors provided in appendix tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

2.2

Version 2
Number Percent of all Percent of
of victims respondents/a all victims
3,494 31.98 %++
100.00 %
697
965
782
424
162
88
375

6.38 ++
8.83
7.16
3.88 ++
1.49
0.80
3.44 ++

19.95
27.62
22.40
12.13
4.65
2.51
10.75

++
++
+
++

Version 3
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,213 30.20 %++
814
933
~
356
95
92
924

7.65
8.77
~
3.35 ++
0.90 ++
0.86
8.68 ++

Percent of
all victims
100.00 %
25.32
29.03
~
11.09
2.97
2.85
28.74

++
++
++

Use of the Dual Reference Period and Patterns Across
Demographic Groups

▪

A key distinction between Version 2 and Versions 1 and 3 is that Version 2 uses a
dual reference period in which respondents were first asked about their experiences
with identity theft in their lifetime, followed by a question about their experiences in
the past 12 months if they answered the lifetime question affirmatively. As
anticipated, for all types of identity theft, the percentage of respondents
experiencing identity theft in their lifetime was significant higher (90% CI) than the
12-month prevalence estimates for all three versions. This suggests that respondents
were able to clearly see the distinction between the two reference periods and did
not have problems thinking about the two different periods (see Table 7).

▪

Across demographic groups, there were some variations in patterns of identity theft
in the previous 12 months across the three versions. In Versions 2 and 3,
respondents who are blacks or two or more races were more likely than those who
are white to experience identity theft in the prior 12 months than whites, but this
was not true of Version 1. In Version 1, persons ages 25 to 34 were more likely than
those ages 35 to 49 to experience identity theft, whereas this was not true in
Versions 2 and 3. In Versions 1 and 2, persons in the two lowest income categories
had lower prevalence rates than persons in the top income categories; these
differences did not test in Version 3 (see Table 8).

▪

Otherwise, the comparisons among demographic groups were consistent across the
instruments. For example, across all three versions, there were no differences in the
rates of identity theft for male and female respondents or persons who live in urban
versus non-urban areas. Additionally, across all three versions, persons age 65 or
older had lower rates of identity theft than those ages 35 to 49 (see Table 8).

▪

Although the patterns of lifetime prevalence rates were fairly similar to those of the
12-month rates, the lifetime prevalence rates revealed additional differences in the
likelihood of experiencing identity theft that were not present in the 12-month rates.
This is likely a product of the increased sample sizes of lifetime prevalence victims
and the ability to better detect differences among groups (see Table 8).

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

▪

Focusing solely on Version 2, more than half (53%) of all victims who experienced
identity theft in their lifetime had also experienced it during the past 12 months (see
Table 9).

▪

Across most demographic characteristics, the majority of lifetime victims also
experienced identity theft during the past 12 months. Blacks, Hispanics, and persons
ages 18 to 49 were the exceptions. Among these groups, 40% to 49% of lifetime
victims experienced identity theft during the past 12 months (see Table 10).

Table 7.

Prevalence of Identity Theft, by Type of Identity Theft, Instrument
Version, and Reference Period
Version 1 - 12-month
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,937
37.11 %++

Version 2 - 12-month
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,494
31.98 %++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
1,703
16.05 ++
1,349
12.35
Bank
2,148
20.25 ++
1,641
15.02
Social media
~
~
1,338
12.25
Other
1,675
15.79 ++
962
8.81
New account
779
7.35 ++
570
5.21
Personal information
507
4.78 ++
333
3.05
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

++
++
++
++
++
++

Version 3 - 12-month
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,213
30.20 %++
1,484
1,724
~
1,093
455
400

13.94
16.20
~
10.27
4.27
3.75

++
++
++
++
++

Version 2 - Lifetime*
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/
7,449 68.18 %
3,843
4,093
3,009
2,055
1,381
867

35.18
37.46
27.54
18.81
12.64
7.94

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 8.

Sex

Total

Persons Age 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More Incidents of
Identity Theft, by Victim Characteristics, Instrument Version, and
Reference Period
Version 1: 12-month
Version 2: 12-month
Version 3: 12-month
Version 2: Lifetime
Number Percent of all Number Percent of all Number of Percent of all Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a of victims respondents/a victims
respondents/a of victims respondents/a
3,937
37.11 %
3,494
31.98 %
3,213
30.20
7,449
68.18 %

Male*
1,931
37.69 %
1,638
31.05 %
1,564
30.43
3,510
2,006
Female
36.56
1,855
32.84
1,650
29.98
3,939
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White*
2,329
34.97 %
1,987
28.96 %
1,808
27.06
4,652
Black
460
36.40
506
38.85 ++
432
34.01 ++
858
Asian
178
36.21
123
26.79
123
25.42
282
Hispanic
816
46.14 ++
721
39.61 ++
696
39.27 ++
1,294
Other
42
34.49
28
23.55
38
26.21
87
Two or more races
112
36.95
129
35.31 +
116
40.38 ++
276
Age
18–24
532
43.64 %
446
35.58 %
437
35.74
797
25–34
801
43.22 +
735
37.69
649
34.35
1,409
35–49*
1,051
40.15
969
36.50
831
32.00
1,898
50–64
954
36.17 ++
795
29.24 ++
781
29.49
1,863
65 or older
598
26.23 ++
548
23.35 ++
516
22.57 ++
1,482
Household income
758
30.15 %++
740
29.74
1,523
$24,999 or less
867
35.16 %++
$25,000–$49,999
1,000
36.19 ++
910
31.20 ++
830
29.77
1,907
$50,000–$74,999
748
36.98
673
31.79
606
29.51
1,492
$75,000 or more*
1,322
39.36
1,153
34.12
1,038
31.33
2,527
Urbanicity
Urban
3,430
37.62 %
3,047
32.36 %
2,784
30.33
6,444
Non-urban
487
33.33
425
28.94
404
28.57
973
Unknown
20
65.07
22
51.90
26
51.96
31
Note: Percentages are based on the number of persons in each category. Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

66.52 %
69.72 ++
67.80
65.81
61.71
71.06
73.00
75.75

%
++
++
++

63.51 %++
72.22
71.48
68.54 +
63.15 ++
60.61 %++
65.37 ++
70.49 ++
74.77
68.45 %
66.26
74.03

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 9.

Relationship Between Lifetime Prevalence and 12-month Prevalence,
by Type of Identity Theft (Version 2)

Lifetime prevalence

Percent of
lifetime victims

12-month prevalence

Number of Percent of all
Number of Percent of all
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
victims
7,449
68.18 %++
3,494
31.98 %++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
3,843
35.18 ++
1,349
Bank
4,093
37.46 ++
1,641
Social media
3,009
27.54 ++
1,338
Other
2,055
18.81 ++
962
New account
1,381
12.64 ++
570
Personal information*
867
7.94
333
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

12.35
15.02
12.25
8.81
5.21
3.05

++
++
++
++
++

No past year ID
theft
53.10 %++
64.61 +
59.74
54.50 ++
52.60 ++
58.47
61.26

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 10.

Relationship Between Lifetime Prevalence and 12-month Prevalence of
Identity Theft, by Victim Characteristics (Version 2)

12-month prevalence (any
identity theft)

Percent of
lifetime victims

Number of Percent of all Number of Percent of all
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
victims
7,449
68.18 %
3,494
31.98 %

No past year ID
theft
53.09 %

Lifetime prevalence (any
identity theft)*

Sex

Total

Male
3,510
32.13 %
1,638
14.99 %
53.33
Female
3,938
36.04 ++
1,855
16.98
52.89
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White
4,652
42.58 %
1,987
18.19 %
57.29
Black
857
7.84
506
4.63 ++
40.96
Other/b
87
0.80
28
0.26
67.82
Hispanic
1,294
11.84 ++
721
6.60 ++
44.28
Two or more races
276
2.53 ++
129
1.18
53.26
Asian
283
2.59 ++
123
1.13
56.54
Age
18–24
796
7.29 %+
446
4.08 %
43.97
25–34
1,409
12.90
735
6.73
47.84
35–49
1,898
17.37
969
8.87
48.95
50–64
1,863
17.05
795
7.28 ++
57.33
65 or older
1,482
13.56 ++
548
5.02 ++
63.02
Household income
$24,999 or less
1,523
13.94 %+
50.23
758
6.94 %++
$25,000–$49,999
1,907
17.45 ++
910
8.33 ++
52.28
$50,000–$74,999
1,492
13.66 ++
673
6.16
54.89
$75,000 or more
2,527
23.13
1,153
10.55
54.37
Urbanicity
Urban
6,445
58.99 %
425
27.89 %
52.72
Non-urban
973
8.91
3,047
3.89 ++
56.32
Unknown
31
0.28
22
0.20 ++
29.89
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

%
++
++

++
++
%++

%
++

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

2.3

Impact of Exclusion of Attempts on Prevalence Estimates

▪

Another distinction between Versions 2 and 3 and Version 1 is that Versions 2 and 3
exclude attempts. Based the questions included in Version 1, it is possible to identify
attempted incidents through Question 10, which asks how long the most recent
incident of identity theft had been occurring before it was discovered and provides
the following response option: “Not applicable, it was not actually misused.” Even
with the attempts excluded, the prevalence rate for Version 1 was significantly
higher than for Version 2 for overall identity theft. The fact that the prevalence rate
for Version 2 is lower than the rate for Version 1 after controlling for attempted
incidents and with the inclusion of separate questions on social media misuse may
suggest that Version 2 is better at controlling for telescoping than Version 1 (see
Table 11).

▪

Although the only difference between Versions 1 and 3 is the exclusion of attempts,
the overall prevalence rate for Version 3 was significantly lower (90% CI) than the
rate for Version 1 with the attempts excluded. This may be due to an issue that was
identified in cognitive testing; the language used to exclude attempts, which focuses
on financial losses, may serve to exclude victims who experienced the completed
misuse of existing social media accounts but did not experience a financial loss. This
issue was addressed in Version 2 by separating the misuse of social media accounts
into a separate identity theft category (see Table 11).

Table 11.

Prevalence of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Type of
Identity Theft, Instrument Version, and Exclusion of Attempts
Version 1 - attempts
excluded*/a
Version 1 - all
Version 2
Version 3
Number Percent of all
Number Percent of all
Number Percent of all Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/a
3,937
37.11 ++
3,766 35.50
3,494
31.98 ++
3,213 30.20 ++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
794
7.49
775 7.31
697
6.38 ++
Bank
976
9.20
929 8.76
965
8.83
Social media
-100
-100
-100 -100
782
7.16
Other
612
5.77
564 5.32
424
3.88 ++
New account
141
1.33
122 1.15
162
1.49 +
Personal information
90
0.85
80 0.76
88
0.80
Multiple types
1,324
12.48
1,294 12.20
375
3.44 ++
Note: Standard errors provided in appendix tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Excludes victims who selected response option 9 ('not applicable, it was not actually misused) for Q10
(how long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it.')
b/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

814
933
-100
356
95
92
924

7.65
8.77
-100
3.35 ++
0.90
0.86
8.68 ++

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

2.4

Respondents’ Ability to Date Incidents and the Impact of
Dating on Telescoping

▪

One of the biggest changes to the Version 2 instrument was that questions about the
month and year of most recent occurrence were asked for each type of identity theft
that the victim reported experiencing in the past 12 months. Across all type of
identity theft, the majority of victims provided a month and year that were within the
12-month reference period. This varied slightly by the type of identity theft with just
under 70% of victims of new account and other personal information misuse
reporting a date within the reference period, and about 80% of victims of existing
account misuse providing a date within the reference period. This finding may
suggest that victims of more serious types of identity theft are more likely to
telescope incidents into the reference period and that the inclusion of dating
questions screens them out (see Table 12).

▪

Across victim demographic characteristics, the significant differences in the
percentage of victims who provided a date of most recent occurrence within the
reference period varied by the type of identity theft. However, there were no
differences between males and females in the percentage providing a date within the
reference period, regardless of the type of identity theft (see Table 13).

▪

With Version 2, it was possible to examine the relationship between the month and
year of the most recent occurrence (among all types of identity theft) and the month
and year of discovery of the most recent incident. Of the 2,933 victims (84%) who
provided a date within the reference period, about 60% (1,767) provided the same
month and year for the most recent occurrence and the discovery of the most recent
incident, 31% provided a discovery date prior to the most recent occurrence, and
9% provided a discovery date that was later than the most recent occurrence (see
Figure 1).

▪

For context, the patterns seen in the Version 2 data in the relationship between most
recent occurrence and discovery date were generally consistent with those seen in a
prior examination of ITS data from 2008. 8

▪

A higher percentage of victims of existing account misuse provided the same month
and year for the most recent occurrence and discovery compared to victims of new
account and other personal information misuse (see Table 14). This finding is
consistent with findings in prior BJS reports on identity theft showing that most
incidents of existing account misuse are resolved within 1 day.

▪

About 60% of victims of the misuse of other personal information provided a
different month and year for the discovery of the incident and the most recent
occurrence, suggesting that victims recognized a distinction between the two
reference points in an episode of identity theft. The percentages were lower for other
types of identity theft, but as noted, it is not unexpected that the dates would be the
same for the majority of victims (see Table 14).

▪

There were variations across demographic characteristics in the percentage of
victims who provided dates of most recent occurrence and discovery that were the
same (nearly 60% white vs. about 40% black and Hispanic). Similarly, about 60% of
victims age 65 or older provided the same date, compared to less than 45% of
victims under age 35. However, these differences may be a product of difference in

Findings from the secondary data analysis of ITS data conducted by RTI in early 2020.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

the types of identity theft experienced by different subpopulations (see Table 15).
For example, if nonwhite victims are less likely to experience existing account misuse
(which tends to be discovered quickly) compared to white victims, this could account
for why a higher proportion of white victims gave the same occurrence and discovery
month and year.

▪

There were not significant differences across demographic groups in the percentage
of victims with missing, unknown, or out-of-reference period dates (see Table 15).

▪

All three versions of the questionnaire ask victims to provide the month and year of
when they first discovered the most recent incident of identity theft. Across all three
versions, the vast majority of incidents (about 95% or more) were discovered within
12 months of the time of the interview. The percentage of incidents discovered more
than 12 months from the time of the interview was higher for Version 1 compared to
that for Versions 2 and 3. This may suggest that respondents were more likely to
telescope incidents into the reference period in Version 1; however, it is difficult to
determine this conclusively because it is possible for the discovery to precede the
most recent occurrence. In other words, the most recent occurrence could have been
within the reference period, although the date of discovery was not (see Table 16).

▪

There were no major differences among the three versions in terms of how long the
identity theft had been occurring at the time of discovery. Across all three versions,
less than 3% of victims said it had been happening for 1 year or more. This
percentage was highest among those in Version 2 who provided a date of most
recent occurrence outside of the 12-month reference period, but the difference was
not statistically significant. This may provide some evidence that these victims
engaged in telescoping because they were more likely to recall or wanted to discuss
a serious episode that lasted for a long time (see Table 17).

Table 12.

Percentage of Victims Providing a Date of Occurrence Prior to or
Outside the 12-month Reference Period or Providing a “Don't Know”
Response, by Type of Identity Theft (Version 2)
Percentage
Number of victims

Out of reference
period/a

Dating
error/b

Don't
know/missing

Within reference
period

Existing account
Credit card
1,349
16.32 %++
0.96
2.07 +
Bank
1,641
19.46 %++
1.27
1.78 ++
Social media
1,338
15.57 %++
0.71
2.34
Other
962
18.44 %++
1.20
3.47
New account
570
26.11 %
2.51
2.06
Personal information*
333
25.57 %
2.68
4.31
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date of June 2019 or earlier.
b/Includes victims who erroneously provided a date in the future (August/September 2020 or beyond).
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

80.63
77.49
81.38
76.89
69.32
67.45

++
++
++
++

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 13.

Sex

Total

Percentage of Victims Providing a Date of Occurrence Prior to or Outside the 12-Month Reference
Period or Providing a “Don't Know” Response, by Victim Characteristics and Select Types of Identity
Theft (Version 2)
Number
of
victims
1,349

Credit card misuse
Out of
Don't
Within
reference Dating
know/
reference
period/a error/b
missing period
16.32 %
0.99 %
2.07 %
80.63 %

Number
of
victims
1,641

Banking account misuse
Don't
Out of
know/
reference Dating
missing
period/a error/b
19.46 %
1.27 % 1.78 %

Male*
697 17.34
1.14
1.50
80.02
791 20.92
1.80
1.66
Female
652 15.23
0.82
2.67
81.28
850 18.10
0.77
1.88
Race/Hispanic origin/c
White*
762 14.32
0.53
2.70
82.45
800 15.44
0.10
2.12
Black
168 24.21 ++
1.81
1.35
72.63 ++
280 22.01 +
1.64
2.43
Asian
59 17.11
0.00 ++ 0.00 ++
82.89
46 19.76
4.10
0.00 ++
Hispanic
313 17.27
1.99
1.48
79.26
443 27.02 ++
3.06 ++ 1.12
Other/b
16 6.28 +
0.00 ++ 0.00 ++
93.72 ++
15 24.19
0.00 +
0.00 ++
Two or more races
32 16.80
0.00 ++ 1.27
81.94
56 2.72 ++
0.00 +
0.72
Age
18–24
122 28.50
0.00 +
0.50
71.00
221 23.45
2.41
2.01
25–34
269 22.18
1.00
1.35
75.47
398 21.93
0.53
1.77
35–49*
359 18.84
0.93
0.94
79.29
496 21.28
1.88
0.58
50–64
330 12.58 +
1.74
3.42 +
82.26
352 16.94
1.16
1.51
65 or older
270 6.19 ++
0.58
3.33 +
89.91 ++
174 8.62 ++
0.00 ++ 5.48 ++
Household income
$24,999 or less
227 25.22 ++
0.28 +
1.99
72.51 ++
388 24.08 ++
2.69
2.87
$25,000–$49,999
330 12.02
1.54
2.21
84.23
451 16.76
1.45
0.84
$50,000–$74,999
268 21.73 ++
0.88
2.11
75.28 ++
328 22.82 ++
0.25
2.05
$75,000 or more*
524 12.41
0.99
1.99
84.61
474 15.91
0.64
1.59
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date of June 2019 or earlier.
b/Includes victims who provided a date prior to when the interview occurred (August/September 2020 or later).
c/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

New account
Within
reference
period
77.49 %

Number
of
victims
570

Out of
reference
period/a
26.11 %

Within
Dating
Don't know/ reference
error/b missing
period
2.51 %
2.06 %
69.32 %

75.61
79.25

299 28.97
271 22.95

3.74
1.15

0.67
3.61 +

82.33
73.91 ++
76.14
68.80 ++
75.81
96.55 ++

231
119
15
189
2
14

24.49
24.73
11.14 +
30.78
0.00 ++
21.73

1.26
1.90
0.00
4.84
0.00
0.00

0.47
6.85 +
0.00
1.34
0.00
0.00

72.14
75.77
76.27
80.40
85.89 ++

66
150
194
114
45

35.58
21.94 ++
32.81
17.03 ++
20.07

3.21
3.27
1.77
3.37
0.00

70.36 ++
80.95
74.88 ++
81.86

168
162
102
138

27.51
23.99
34.98 ++
20.36

1.57
2.46
4.75
2.07

66.62
72.30

Number
of
victims
333

Personal information
Out of
Don't
Within
reference Dating
know/
reference
period/a
error/b
missing period
25.57 %
2.68 % 4.31 % 67.45 %

184 25.54
150 25.60

3.16
2.09

4.58
3.97

73.78
66.51
88.86 ++
63.04 +
100.00 ++
78.27

139
54
9
124
2
5

24.47
31.72
10.19 +
25.67
36.99
9.45

2.10
0.00
0.00
4.87
0.00
0.00

0.52
0.15
1.27
3.21
11.25

60.69
74.64 +
64.16
76.39 +
68.69

37
97
102
73
25

36.21
27.60
24.09
25.56
7.63 ++

0.00
4.40 +
0.37
5.92
0.00

5.11
0.84
0.41
1.01

65.81 +
72.72
59.86 ++
76.56

96
92
67
78

28.81
20.42
26.44
26.86

0.41
4.17
2.88
3.56

+
+
+
+

66.72
68.34

2.67
70.76
9.91
58.37
0.00 ++ 89.81 ++
4.26
65.20
0.00 ++ 63.01
0.00 ++ 90.55 +
5.68
2.03
3.18
5.21
13.11

58.11
65.97
72.37
63.31
79.26

4.59
4.61
4.67
3.28

66.19
70.80
66.02
66.29

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Figure 1.

Relationship Between the Date of Most Recent Occurrence and the
Date of Discovery of Identity Theft (Version 2)
Month and year of most recent occurrence
JAN
19

Month and year of discovery of most recent incident

Pre-19
JAN 19
FEB 19
MAR 19
APR 19
MAY 19
JUN 19
JUL 19
AUG 19
SEP 19
OCT 19
NOV 19
DEC 19
JAN 20
FEB 20
MAR 20
APR 20
MAY 20
JUN 20
JUL 20
Future

Total

FEB
19

15
19
3
1
1
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
47

16
0
29
4
1
0
1
0
4
1
0
0
0
1
1
2
8
0
0
0
0
68

MAR
19

26
2
2
32
10
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
79

APR
19

19
1
0
6
26
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
65

MAY
19

17
4
1
0
5
22
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53

JUN
19

24
1
1
4
2
2
33
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
77

JUL 19

11
1
1
1
1
1
5
53
5
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
83

AUG
19

23
2
0
5
2
1
2
2
75
14
7
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
137

SEP
19

26
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
7
110
12
7
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
171

OCT
19

25
0
1
1
0
1
6
1
2
6
136
16
8
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
206

NOV
19

20
0
0
1
3
0
1
1
2
3
2
93
9
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
140

DEC
19

30
1
0
2
0
0
3
0
3
2
1
2
86
15
3
3
0
2
0
1
0
154

Note: Includes victims who provided a month and year of most recent occurrence and discovery.

JAN
20

24
3
3
6
2
0
1
0
1
1
1
2
2
121
17
9
0
0
0
1
0
194

FEB
20

48
1
6
1
0
1
0
1
3
2
5
3
6
9
163
22
4
3
0
1
0
279

MAR
20

40
0
6
5
1
1
1
0
0
3
1
2
2
5
6
156
12
5
3
1
1
251

APR
20

40
1
0
4
5
6
2
1
3
1
0
1
0
3
6
6
129
24
6
1
0
239

MAY
20

40
0
5
5
1
1
2
1
2
4
0
0
1
5
4
4
10
163
25
4
0
277

JUN
20

64
0
3
4
6
4
3
0
0
4
7
2
5
5
3
14
5
12
213
23
0
377

Future
JUL 20 Date Total

66
3
4
1
1
7
4
4
0
0
0
1
3
6
8
7
3
4
26
262
1
411

25
599
0
41
0
65
5
88
0
67
0
56
0
68
1
73
1
109
0
154
0
175
0
130
2
126
0
181
0
216
0
231
0
173
0
216
0
276
0
296
7
9
41 3349

Within reference period, discovery prior to most recent occurrence (n=908)
Same month/year of most recent occurrence and discovery (in reference period) (n=1,767)
Within reference period, discovery later than most recent occurrence (n=258)
Most recent occurrence outside reference period (n=389)
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Table 14.

Relationship Between the Date of Most Recent Occurrence and Date of
Discovery, by Type of Identity Theft

Percentage of victims
Total
Number

Same month/
year

Different month/ Missing/don't know/out
year
of reference period

Existing account
Credit card
965
58.68 %++
28.69 %++
Bank
697
49.02 ++
33.25 ++
Social media
782
54.48 ++
32.02 ++
Other
424
49.29 ++
36.01 ++
New account
162
29.63
43.20 ++
Personal information*
88
23.86
60.29
Multiple types
365
46.46 ++
29.07 ++
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

12.63 %
17.62
13.49
14.69
27.19 +
16.04
24.46 +

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 15.

Sex

Total

Relationship Between the Date of Most Recent Occurrence and the Date
of Discovery, by Victim Characteristics

Same
month/
Total
number year
3,495
50.39 %

Percentage of victims
Different Missing/don't
month/
know/out of
year
reference period
33.25
16.37

Male*
1,639
46.98 %
35.81
17.21
Female
1,856
53.39 % ++ 30.98 ++
15.63
Race/Hispanic origin/a
White*
1,987
57.02 %
29.49
13.49
Black
506
41.11 % ++ 37.15 ++
21.74 ++
Other/b
29
34.48 % ++ 34.48
31.03
Hispanic
722
38.37 % ++ 41.14 ++
20.50 ++
Two or more races
129
58.14 %
31.78
10.08
Asian
123
47.15 % ++ 33.33
19.51
Age
21.48
18–24
447
43.85 %
34.68
736
44.57 %
38.86
16.58
25–34
35–49*
970
45.36 %
37.11
17.53
794
58.44 % ++ 28.84 ++
12.72 ++
50–64
65 or older
548
60.58 % ++ 24.09 ++
15.33
Household income
$24,999 or less
758
40.63 % ++ 35.75 ++
23.61 ++
910
47.69 % ++ 37.36 ++
14.95
$25,000–$49,999
$50,000–$74,999
673
52.75 % + 30.76
16.49 ++
$75,000 or more*
1,153
57.50 %
29.84
12.66
Urbanicity
Urban*
425
51.53 %
32.47
16.00
3,046
50.36 %
33.13
16.51
Non-urban
3.76 ++
Unknown
24
31.72 % + 64.52 ++
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude
persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 16.

Time From Discovery of the Most Recent Incident to Interview, by
Questionnaire Version and Type of Identity Theft
Percentage of victims
7-12
13-24
months
1-6 months months

Total number Less than 1
of victims
month

25-36
months

More than
36 months

Version 1
Total
3790
66.39 %
25.66
2.70
2.55
1.11
1.58
Existing account
3619
66.84 % ++
25.37
2.49
2.56
1.08
1.66
New account
746
42.63 %
39.02 ++
4.99
5.72 ++
2.84 +
4.88
Personal information
494
37.45 %
39.44 ++
5.42
6.31 ++
4.03 ++
7.37
Version 2
Total
3350
68.45 %
25.78
3.32
1.97
0.22
0.26
Existing account
3256
68.86 %
25.50
3.20
1.97
0.20
0.27
New account
326
52.80 %
36.79
5.93
3.02
0.31
1.07
Personal information
570
48.16 %
40.16
6.37
3.04
0.34
1.82
Version 3
Total
3058
69.20 %
26.58
1.77
1.79
0.39
0.25
Existing account
2922
69.23 % ++
26.57
1.69
1.85
0.40
0.26
New account
433
47.11 % ++
43.53
5.00
3.11
0.84
0.39 +
Personal information
380
47.89 % ++
40.58 ++
4.53
5.67 +
1.09
0.38 ++
Note: Based on unweighted data. Includes victims who provided a month and year of discovery. For version 1 about 2%
of victims were missing the date; version 2 about 1.5%; and version 3 about 4%.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Table 17.

Relationship Between the Time of Most Recent Occurrence and How
Long the Identity Theft Had Been Happening When It Was Discovered
Length of time from interview to most recent occurrence - Version 2

How long ID theft had been
happening when discovered
One day or less (1-24 hours)
More than a day, but less than a
week (25 hours-6 days)
At least a week, but less than one
month (7-30 days)
One month to less than three
months
Three months to less than six
h
Six months
to less than one year
One year or more
Not applicable, not actually
misued
Unknown

Same
month

1 to 6
months

7 to 12
months

Out of reference
period

42.76 % 35.00 %++

35.94 %++

29.73 %++

20.57

25.14 ++

26.59 ++

18.39

10.66

14.45 ++

13.33 +

14.19

7.44

9.83 ++

9.67 ++

12.39 ++

Dating
error/a
10.24 %++

Total

Version 1* Version 3

35.23 %++

42.30 %

36.90 %++

8.91 ++

23.96 ++

21.59

23.76 +

9.81

13.61 ++

10.83

13.46 ++

21.23 +

9.95 ++

6.49

9.66 ++

6.10 +

3.85

3.86

5.45 +

24.02 ++

4.58 ++

2.89

3.37

3.25

2.37

3.10

2.74

15.41

2.89

2.26

1.74

1.52

2.30

1.65

4.65 ++

2.29

1.78

1.63

4.36

9.68

7.49

9.48 ++

7.71

7.05

5.87

~
12.46 ++

0.70 ++

Total Count
412
1668
900
404
45
3429
3,920
3,197
Note: Standard errors available in Appendix Tables. Includes victims who provided a month and year of most recent occurrence. The percentage of
victims not providing a month or year varied depending on the type of identity theft but was generally less than 1%.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date in the future from when the interview occurred (August/September
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

2.5

Comparison to the ITS Estimates

▪

The identity theft prevalence rates generated through the AmeriSpeak collection
were significantly higher across all types of identity theft than the estimates
generated through the ITS. Although the rates for respondents interviewed via
telephone were lower than the rates for respondents who completed the online
survey, both were significantly higher than the 2018 ITS prevalence rates (see
Table 18).

▪

The differences in prevalence estimates between the AmeriSpeak collection and the
ITS likely are due to the numerous methodological differences between the two
collections. For example, if the presence of an interviewer has a suppression effect,
this could account for, at least in part, higher estimates of identity theft in the online
panel. The presentation of the surveys also varied between the two collections. The
NCVS is presented as a crime survey and questions about identity theft follow
questions about other experiences with crime; this could result in respondent fatigue
or could condition the respondents to better understand the types of experiences of
interest in the survey. In contrast, the AmeriSpeak collection was a standalone
survey focused solely on identity theft. Another possible explanation for the
differences in the magnitude of prevalence estimates is that the interviewer serves to
clarify the questions and reduce the likelihood of false positive responses. Finally, the
response rates for the ITS and the AmeriSpeak collection varied dramatically, with
the ITS having considerably higher response rates. Lower response rates tend to be
correlated with bias, meaning that the AmeriSpeak collection could suffer from topic
saliency or other nonresponse bias resulting in an online sample of respondents that
is more likely to have experienced identity theft than the general population.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine which of the methodological differences
contribute the greatest degree to the differences in estimates.

▪

Across all demographic groups, the online AmeriSpeak collection generated higher
identity theft prevalence rates than the ITS (see Table 19).

▪

This was also true across most demographics for AmeriSpeak respondents who
participated via telephone interview. Among Hispanics, persons of other races, and
person of two or more races, as well as persons younger than age 25, the differences
with the ITS were not statistically significant. However, this is largely a product of
small sample sizes and large standard errors.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 18.

Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by Type of Identity
Theft, Survey Administrator, and Mode
2018 Census ITS*
Number of Percent of all
victims
persons 16+
23,901,317
9.26 %

NORC Version 1
Phone
Total
Web
Number Percent of all
Number Percent of all
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/b
3,937
37.11 %+
3,813
37.97 %+
124
21.88 %+

Total
Existing account
Credit card
12,038,327
4.66
1,703
16.05 +
1,646
16.39 +
Bank
10,747,859
4.16
2,148
20.25 +
2,090
20.81 +
Other
2,496,609
0.97
1,675
15.79 +
1,635
16.28 +
New account
1,744,494
0.68
779
7.35 +
760
7.57 +
Personal information
957,039
0.37
507
4.78 +
487
4.85 +
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on the population of US residents age 16 or older.
b/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018; 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Table 19.

Total

Number of
victims
Percent of all
(weighted)
persons 16+
23,102,762
9.26 %

Total

NORC Version 1
Web

+
+
+
+
+

Phone

Number of
victims
Percent of all Number Percent of all Number Percent of all Number Percent of all
(unweighted) respondents of victims respondents/a of victims respondents/a of victims respondents/a
10,068
9.83 %
3,937
37.11 %+
3,813
37.97 %+
124
21.88 %+

Male
11,536,820
9.22 %
4,703
9.81 %
1,931
37.69 %+
1,891
Female
12,364,497
9.30
5,365
9.85
2,006
36.56 +
1,922
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White
17,077,303
10.44 %
7,773
10.78 %
2,329
34.97 %+
2,254
Black
2,163,284
7.01
788
7.17
460
36.40 +
434
Asian
1,298,128
8.05
428
8.56
178
36.21 +
177
Hispanic
2,803,187
6.59
876
6.97
816
46.14 +
804
Other
119,536
8.22
44
8.56
42
34.49 +
37
Two or more races
439,880
12.21
159
12.49
112
36.95 +
107
Age
16-17
99,312
14.93 %
22
1.21
~
~ %+
~
18–24
1,798,299
6.01
530
6.81
532
43.64 +
532
25–34
4,539,644
10.11
1,626
10.39
801
43.22 +
800
35–49
6,997,598
11.35
2,933
11.95
1,051
40.15 +
1,044
50–64
6,658,645
10.57
3,037
11.00
954
36.17 +
913
65 or older
3,807,820
7.50
1,920
7.68
598
26.23 +
524
Household income
$24,999 or less
2,954,294
6.22 %
1,137
6.19 %
867
35.16 %+
815
$25,000–$49,999
4,470,915
6.74
1,850
7.11
1,000
36.19 +
956
$50,000–$74,999
4,319,302
9.04
1,836
9.68
748
36.98 +
731
$75,000 or more
12,156,807
12.60
5,245
13.43
1,322
39.36 +
1,310
Urbanicity
Urban
8,115,717
9.37 %
3,153
10.06
3,430
37.62 %+
3,332
Non-urban
15,785,600
9.20
6,915
9.73
487
33.33 +
460
Unknown
~
~
~
~
20
65.07
20
Note: Standard errors are provided in appendix tables. Percentages are based on the number of persons in each category.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018; 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

10.10
10.27
6.97
3.33
3.53

Persons Who Experienced One or More Incidents of Identity Theft
During the Past 12 Months, by Victim Characteristics, Survey
Administrator, and Mode
2018 Census ITS*

Sex

57
58
39
19
20

38.56 %+
37.40 +

40
84

18.13 %+
24.23 +

35.63
38.18
36.36
46.81
39.08
38.17

%+
+
+
+
+
+

75
27
1
12
4
5

22.48 %+
20.71 +
20.07 +
23.41
17.37
21.61

~
43.64
43.29
40.28
36.48
27.85

%+
+
+
+
+
+

~
0
1
7
42
74

~
0.00
17.77
27.27
30.59
18.60

+
+
+

37.23
36.59
37.32
39.93

%+
+
+
+

52
44
17
11

18.72
29.28
26.51
14.91

%+
+
+
+

38.40 %+
34.49 +
65.07

97
26
0

22.11 %+
21.06 +
0.00

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

3. Recommendations for the 2021 ITS Based on Key Findings
Based on the findings from the AmeriSpeak testing, Version 2 appears to perform better
than Versions 1 and 3 in terms of controlling for telescoping and eliminating attempted
incidents (key goals of BJS’s) while ensuring that victims of the misuse of social media
accounts are captured in the estimates. Respondents appeared to understand the distinction
between the lifetime and 12-month reference periods, and the dual reference period likely
helped to control for some telescoping among victims who wanted to be able to share their
experiences. Because Version 2 respondents were allowed to and did provide dates of most
recent occurrence that were outside of the 12-month reference period, there is evidence
that some telescoping still occurred despite the dual reference period. Table 20 shows the
potential impact on Version 2 estimates if respondents who did not provide a date of most
recent occurrence or provided a date outside the reference were removed from the original
prevalence rates based solely on the question of whether the incident occurred during the
past 12 months. With the removal of these cases, which BJS could do during data analysis,
Version 2 estimates are significantly lower than both Versions 1 and 3.
Table 20.

Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months Accounting for
Version 2 Victims Who Failed to Provide Dates of Occurrence or Who
Provided Dates of Occurrence Outside the Reference Period, by Type of
Identity Theft, victim race/Hispanic origin, and Instrument Version
Version 1
Version 2 -ORIGINAL
Number Percent of all Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a of victims respondents/a
3,937
37.11 %++
3,494 31.98 %++

Version 2 - NEW*
Number of Percent of all
victims/b respondents/a
2,755 25.21 %

Version 3
Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/a
3,213 30.20 %++

Total
Type of ID theft
Existing account
Credit card
1,703
16.05 ++
1,349 12.35 ++
1,088
9.96
Bank
2,148
20.25 ++
1,641 15.02 ++
1,272 11.64
Social media
~
~
1,338 12.25 ++
1,089
9.97
Other
1,675
15.79 ++
962
8.81 ++
740
6.77
New account
779
7.35 ++
570
5.21 ++
395
3.61
Personal information
507
4.78 ++
333
3.05 ++
225
2.06
Race/Hispanic origin/c
White
2,329
21.96 ++
1,987 18.19 ++
1,575 14.42
Black
460
4.34 ++
506
4.63 ++
392
3.58
Asian
178
1.68 ++
123
1.12 +
95
0.87
Hispanic
816
7.69 ++
721
6.60 ++
565
5.17
Other
42
0.39 ++
28
0.26
23
0.21
Two or more races
112
1.05
129
1.18
105
0.96
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
~Not applicable.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/Includes only victims who provided dates of occurrence within the reference period.
c/White, black, Asian other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.

1,484
1,724
~
1,093
455
400

13.94
16.20
~
10.27
4.27
3.75

++
++

1,808
432
123
696
38
116

16.99
4.06
1.16
6.54
0.35
1.09

++
++
++

+
++
+

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Although Version 2 is the recommended version, there are several downsides to moving to
Version 2 that should be considered. First, given the difference between the estimates for
Versions 1 and 2, it appears that switching to Version 2 would result in a break of series.
Because of the many changes to the Version 2 instrument, it would be difficult to quantify
the exact magnitude of expected change. Another challenge with Version 2, though
considerably less significant, is that the coding on the backend is quite complicated. If BJS
switches to Version 2, it would be prudent to ask the Census Bureau to keep programming
variables (e.g., Check Items, any variables created to populate the autofills used for
determining most recent incident) on the files to simplify the recodes. Finally, Version 2
does cause slightly more burden on respondents. Table 21 shows the mean and median
times that respondents spent completing each of the survey versions.
Although Version 3 also appeared to result in lower prevalence rates than Version 1,
possibly due to the exclusion of attempted incidents, these findings should be interpreted
with caution given findings from the cognitive interviews that suggested that Version 3 may
be inadvertently screening out victims who have experienced the completed misuse of an
existing social media account. If BJS were to decide to use Version 3 instead of Version 2, it
would be important to separate social media accounts from the “other existing account”
category.
Table 21.

Average and Median Number of Minutes Spent on the Survey, by
Platform, Survey Mode, and Instrument Version (unweighted)
Excluding speeders/skippers
N
Mean
Median
32,177
6.16
5.00

Total
Panel
Amerispeak
10,962
4.72
4.00
Lucid
11,210
6.19
5.00
MTurk
10,005
7.70
6.00
Mode
Web
30,901
6.12
4.00
Phone
1,276
7.17
6.00
Version
1
10,609
5.89
4.00
2
10,926
6.49
5.00
3
10,642
6.10
4.00
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Including speeders/skippers
N
Mean
Median
34,527
5.90
4.00

Victims only
N
Mean
Median
12,611
7.67
6.00

12,350
12,097
10,080

4.34
6.01
7.68

3.00
5.00
6.00

3,592
4,240
4,779

5.83
7.13
9.54

5.00
5.00
7.00

33,208
1,319

5.86
7.07

4.00
6.00

12,345
266

7.63
9.85

6.00
9.00

11,402
11,685
11,440

5.64
6.23
5.83

4.00
5.00
4.00

4,653
3,831
4,127

7.09
8.28
7.76

5.00
6.00
6.00

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4. Methodology
NORC conducted the 2020 RTI/AmeriSpeak Identity Theft Survey on behalf of RTI and BJS
using NORC’s AmeriSpeak® Panel, Lucid’s nonprobability online opt-in panel, and MTurk for
the sample sources. The research was done to evaluate the effectiveness of three different
screener options for a larger survey about identity theft conducted by RTI for BJS. This
study was offered in English only and conducted via both web and phone.

4.1
4.1.1

Sampling
AmeriSpeak

A general population sample of U.S. adults age 18 and older was selected from NORC’s
AmeriSpeak Panel for this study. Survey respondents were those who gave consent to take
the survey and met the following screening criteria: age 18 or older, English speaking, and
living in the United States.
The sample for a specific study is selected from the AmeriSpeak Panel using sampling strata
(48 in total) based on age, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, and gender. The size of each
stratum of the selected sample is determined by its population distribution. In addition,
sample selection takes into account expected differential survey completion rates by
demographic groups so that the set of panel members with completed interviews for a study
is a representative sample of the target population. Even if a panel household has more
than one active adult panel member, only one adult in the household is eligible for selection
(using random within-household sampling). Panelists selected for an AmeriSpeak study
earlier in the same business week are not eligible for sample selection until the following
business week.
The AmeriSpeak panel sample was supplemented with respondents from the Lucid
nonprobability online opt-in panel and from MTurk workers.

4.1.2

MTurk

On the crowdsourcing platform Amazon MTurk, any work—ranging from audio transcription
to receipt categorization to survey participation—will be created and published by a
“requester” (e.g., social science researcher) in a format called Human Intelligence Task
(HIT). When the HIT is published on the platform, interested MTurk workers can accept to
complete the task in exchange for the designated incentives once the requester approves
the completed task.
The MTurk platform gives requesters a great deal of control over the recruitment of workers
for survey participation by allowing researchers to specify the geographic location and the
past-performance benchmarks to determine the eligibility threshold for completing the HIT.
Specifically, the past-performance benchmarks (e.g., past HIT approval rate, number of

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

past HITs approved) enable researchers to recruit quality participants who tend to put in the
effort to produce good quality of data in the context of scientific research (Hsieh et al.,
2018; Stambaugh et al., 2018).
Our MTurk recruitment strategy was designed to use a very high threshold of past
performance as the eligibility criteria at the beginning of data collection, followed by an
iterative adjustment of the eligibility criteria to gradually lower the threshold and allow more
workers to participate in the survey. Workers who accepted the survey participation HIT
were redirected to participate in our web survey. Those who completed the survey and
successfully submitted the completion notice with the MTurk-required verification received
$1 for participating.
Additionally, RTI’s past experiences with MTurk were leveraged by soliciting survey
participation from all workers who had participated in our past research projects via MTurk
recruitment. The MTurk protocol also included mechanisms to verify survey completion and
to prevent workers from accessing and recompleting the survey.

4.2
4.2.1

Fielding
AmeriSpeak

A small sample of English-speaking Lucid web-mode panelists were invited on July 10,
2020, for a pretest. In total, NORC collected 168 pretest interviews. The initial data from
the pretest was reviewed by NORC and a delivered to RTI.
No change was made before fielding the Main survey to collect the Main interviews. In total,
NORC collected 32,177 interviews—30,901 by web mode and 1,276 by phone mode—
during the July 16, 2020, through August 4, 2020, field period.

4.2.1.1 Response Rate Reporting for AmeriSpeak Sample

▪

Weighted AAPOR RR3 recruitment rate: 20.97%

▪

Weighted household retention rate: 80.37%

▪

Screener completion rate: 34.72%

▪

Survey completion rate: 96.90%

▪

Weighted AAPOR RR3 cumulative response rate: 5.67%

4.2.1.2 Gaining Cooperation of AmeriSpeak Panelists for the Study
To encourage study cooperation, NORC sent email reminders to sampled web-mode
panelists on Tuesday, July 21, 2020. To administer the phone survey, NORC dialed the
sampled phone-mode panelists throughout the field period. Panelists were offered the cash
equivalent of $2 for completing the survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4.2.2

MTurk

Data collection for the MTurk recruitment started on July 16, 2020, and concluded on July
30, 2020. It started with a “soft” launch of recruiting 50 workers who had 100% past HIT
approval ratings and had not participated in any past RTI research projects. Once data were
reviewed to ensure the instrument was working as intended, an invitation was sent out to
3,566 past participants who had provided us with good quality survey response data based
on reviews of response patterns for falsification and survey completion times. These
participants were sent an invitation email with a direct link to the “RTI past-participant
recruitment HIT”; 1,526 completed the survey (see Table 22).
RTI also published the survey recruitment HIT on the MTurk platform to solicit participation
from all MTurk workers who had passed our high eligibility threshold of past performance.
To ensure the recruitment HIT would be placed at the top of the MTurk worker feed on their
dashboards, RTI sequentially published a total of eight recruitment HITs with a fulfillment
quota of 500 to 2000. When the pace of completion slowed down significantly, the HIT was
closed and then re-published as a new recruitment HIT. RTI also evaluated the eligibility
threshold of past performance based on the iterative adjustment strategy. The purpose of
establishing the threshold was to ensure that only workers with a proven track record of
successfully completed tasks could complete the survey. The lowest eligibility threshold for
the final HIT prior to achieving the recruitment goal was a 98% approval rate or better for
all work completed on MTurk with a minimum of 50 approved HITs.
Once the HITs were reviewed, workers were approved or, if rejected, were tagged to
prevent them from participating in future HITs from the same study. A total of 10,164
workers participated in the survey with a final sample 10,062 workers after validating the
survey completion and engaging in data cleaning.
Table 22.

Detailed Breakdown of the Survey Recruitment HITs
Number of
Submissions

Number of
Approvals

1,526

1,515

99.3%

General 0

98.0%

General 1

500

497

99.4%

General 2

1,000

982

98.2%

General 3

2,000

1,976

98.8%

General 4

1,500

1,484

98.9%

General 5

100.0%

General 6

102

101

99.0%

General 7

1,897

1,886

99.4%

General 8

1,500

1,483

98.9%

Invited

Approval Rate
Based on HIT

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Survey data review
Total

4.2.3

100.0%

10,164

10,062

99.0%

Tables Presenting Sample Sizes by Mode and Platform

Tables 1 and 2 at the beginning of the report show the unweighted sample characteristics
by mode of completion and sample platform. Tables 23 and 24 show the unweighted
prevalence rates of the different types of identity theft, mode and platform. Tables 25 and
26 show the unweighted prevalence rate of identity theft overall, by demographic
characteristics of victims and by mode and platform.
Table 23.

Unweighted Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by
Type of Identity Theft and Mode
Total
Percent of
Number of
respondents/a
victims
39.19 %
12,611

Web
Number of
Percent of
victims
respondents/a
12,345
39.95 %

Total
Existing account
Credit card
6,087
18.92
5,961
Bank
7,122
22.13
7,003
Social media
1,613
5.01
1,587
Other
5,344
16.61
5,286
New account
3,759
11.68
3,724
Personal information
3,293
10.23
3,263
Note: Standard errors provided in Appendix Tables.
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Table 24.

19.29
22.66
5.14
17.11
12.05
10.56

Phone
Percent of
respondents/a
20.85 %
266
126
119
26
58
35
30

9.87
9.33
2.04
4.55
2.74
2.35

Unweighted Prevalence of Identity Theft in the Past 12 Months, by
Type of Identity Theft and Platform
Total
Number of Percent of
victims
respondents/a
12,611
39.19 %

AmeriSpeak
Number of Percent of
victims
respondents/a
3,592
32.77 %

Total
Existing account
Credit card
6,087
18.92
1,608
14.67
Bank
7,122
22.13
1,549
14.13
Social media
1,613
5.01
419
3.82
Other
5,344
16.61
1,050
9.58
New account
3,759
11.68
489
4.46
Personal information
3,293
10.23
337
3.07
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Number of
victims

Lucid
Number of Percent of
victims
respondents/a
4,240
37.82 %
1,971
2,653
526
1,845
1,415
1,273

17.58
23.67
4.69
16.46
12.62
11.36

MTurk
Number of Percent of
victims
respondents/a
4,779
47.77 %
2,508
2,920
668
2,449
1,855
1,683

25.07
29.19
6.68
24.48
18.54
16.82

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 25.

Sex

Total

Unweighted Persons Age 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More
Incidents of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim
Characteristics and Mode
Total
Number of
Percent of
victims
respondents/a
39.19 %
12,611

Web
Number of
Percent of
victims
respondents/a
12,345
39.95 %

Number of
victims

Phone
Percent of
respondents/a
266
20.85 %

Male
6,367
40.73 %
6,274
41.33 %
93
20.58
Female
6,244
37.74
6,071
38.62
173
21.00
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
7,062
34.42 %
6,904
35.07 %
158
18.97
Black
1,560
43.17
1,504
44.86
56
21.46
Other
489
36.44
485
36.41
4
40.00
Hispanic
3,024
55.42
3,006
55.79
18
26.09
Two or more races
121
34.87
111
35.92
10
26.32
Asian
355
39.49
335
40.17
20
30.77
Age
18–24
1,248
43.71 %
1,248
43.79 %
0
0.00
25–34
3,607
48.32
3,604
48.38
3
20.00
35–49
3,728
44.63
3,716
44.73
12
26.09
50–64
2,467
33.31
2,382
33.54
85
27.96
65 or older
1,561
25.60
1,395
26.87
166
18.32
Household income
$24,999 or less
2,326
36.96 %
2,221
38.51 %
105
19.92
$25,000–$49,999
3,288
38.74
3,207
39.56
81
21.32
$50,000–$74,999
2,703
40.09
2,669
40.54
34
21.52
$75,000 or more
4,294
40.30
4,248
40.68
46
21.80
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 26.

Sex

Total

Unweighted Persons Age 18 or Older Who Experienced One or More
Incidents of Identity Theft During the Past 12 Months, by Victim
Characteristics and Platform
Total
AmeriSpeak
Number of
Percent of
Number of Percent of
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
12,611
39.19 %
3,592
32.77 %

Lucid
Number of Percent of
respondents/a
victims
4,240
37.82 %

MTurk
Number Percent of
of victims respondents/a
4,779
47.77 %

Male
6,367
40.73 %
1,669
31.97 %
2,155
41.27 %
Female
6,244
37.74
1,923
33.50
2,085
34.82
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
7,062
34.42 %
2,206
29.63 %
2,326
33.79 %
Black
1,560
43.17
569
38.73
567
42.89
Other
489
36.44
148
42.29
132
39.52
Hispanic
3,024
55.42
447
40.02
1,107
46.77
Two or more races
121
34.87
66
35.87
30
30.30
Asian
355
39.49
156
39.39
78
38.24
Age
18–24
1,248
43.71 %
190
40.86 %
710
45.48 %
25–34
3,607
48.32
700
37.98
870
49.77
35–49
3,728
44.63
669
36.92
1,406
45.52
50–64
2,467
33.31
1,081
34.11
779
27.98
65 or older
1,561
25.60
952
25.92
475
23.42
Household income
$24,999 or less
2,326
36.96 %
714
33.71 %
973
34.55 %
$25,000–$49,999
3,288
38.74
909
32.95
1,049
34.55
$50,000–$74,999
2,703
40.09
653
30.80
760
35.95
$75,000 or more
4,294
40.30
1,316
33.19
1,458
44.94
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

4.3

2,543
2,236

49.01 %
46.43

2,530
424
209
1,470
25
121

40.89 %
51.52
31.76
74.51
39.06
40.47

348
2,037
1,653
607
134

41.98 %
52.58
47.87
41.78
33.84

639
1,330
1,290
1,520

46.99 %
49.41
51.44
44.12

Statistical Weighting

Statistical weights for the study eligible respondents were initially calculated using panel
base sampling weights.
Panel base sampling weights for all sampled housing units are computed as the inverse of
probability of selection from the NORC National Frame (i.e., the sampling frame used to
sample housing units for AmeriSpeak) or an address-based sample. The sample design and
recruitment protocol for the AmeriSpeak Panel involves subsampling initial nonrespondent
housing units, which are selected for in-person follow-up interviews. The subsample of
housing units that are selected for the nonresponse follow-up (NRFU) have their panel base
sampling weights inflated by the inverse of the subsampling rate. The base sampling
weights are further adjusted to account for unknown eligibility and nonresponse among
eligible housing units. The household-level nonresponse-adjusted weights are then poststratified to external counts for number of households obtained from the CPS. Then, these
household-level post-stratified weights are assigned to each eligible adult in every recruited
household. A person-level nonresponse adjustment accounts for all nonresponding adults
within a recruited household.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Finally, panel weights are raked to external population totals associated with age, sex,
education, race/Hispanic ethnicity, housing tenure, telephone status, and Census Division.
The external population totals are obtained from the CPS. The weights adjusted to the
external population totals are the final panel weights.
The following variables and categories were used for panel weighting:

▪

Age: 18–24, 25–29, 20–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–64, and 65+

▪

Gender: Male and Female

▪

Census Division: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North
Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and
Pacific

▪

Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic
Other

▪

Education: Less Than High School, High School/GED, Some College, and BA and
Above

▪

Housing Tenure: Home Owner and Other

▪

Household Phone Status: Cell Phone Only, Dual User, and Landline Only/Phoneless

Study-specific base sampling weights are derived using a combination of the final panel
weight and the probability of selection associated with the sampled panel member. Because
not all sampled panel members respond to the survey interview, an adjustment is needed to
account and adjust for survey nonrespondents. This adjustment decreases potential
nonresponse bias associated with sampled panel members who did not complete the survey
interview for the study. Thus, the nonresponse-adjusted survey weights for the study are
adjusted via a raking ratio method to general population totals associated with the following
topline sociodemographic characteristics: age, sex, education, race/Hispanic ethnicity, and
Census Division; and the following sociodemographic interactions: age x gender, age x
race/ethnicity, and race/ethnicity x gender.
The study-specific post-stratification weighting variables and the variable categories are as
follows:

▪

Age: 18–24, 25–29, 20–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–64, and 65+

▪

Gender: Male and Female

▪

Census Division: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North
Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and
Pacific

▪

Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic
Other

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

▪

Education: Less Than High School, High School/GED, Some College, and BA and
Above

▪

Age x Gender: 18–34 Male, 18–34 Female, 35–49 Male, 35–49 Female, 50–64 Male,
50–64 Female, 65+ Male, and 65+ Female

▪

Age x Race/Ethnicity: 18–34 Non-Hispanic White, 18–34 All Other, 35–49 NonHispanic White, 35–49 All Other, 50–64 All Other, 50–64 All Other, 65+ NonHispanic White, and 65+ All Other

▪

Race/Ethnicity x Gender: Non-Hispanic White Male, Non-Hispanic White Female, All
Other Male, and All Other Female

The weights adjusted to the external population totals are the final study weights. Raking
and re-raking is done during the weighting process such that the weighted demographic
distribution of the survey completes resemble the demographic distribution in the target
population. The assumption is that the key survey items are related to the demographics.
Therefore, by aligning the survey respondent demographics with the target population, the
key survey items should also be in closer alignment with the target population.
Table 27.

Census Current Population Survey (Feb 2020) Used for Benchmarking

Age
18–24
25–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60–64
65+
Gender
Male
Female
Census Division
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

4.4

11.48%
9.05%
17.31%
15.80%
16.61%
8.27%
21.49%
48.30%
51.70%
4.69%
12.75%
14.30%
6.44%
20.29%
5.80%
11.92%
7.51%
16.32%

Education
No High School
Diploma
High School
Diploma
Some College
College Degree
Race/Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Others

9.77%
28.25%
27.73%
34.26%

62.79%
11.93%
16.66%
8.62%

Weighting

NORC calculated panel weights for the completed AmeriSpeak Panel and nonprobability
online interviews. In this section, we first describe the calculation of the weights for the
AmeriSpeak sample and then the statistical corrections made to the nonprobability sample
via NORC’s TrueNorth calibration weighting service.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4.4.1

AmeriSpeak Sample

Calculating the weights for the AmeriSpeak Panel interviews generally involves the following
sequential steps: (1) incorporating the appropriate probability of selection and (2)
incorporating nonresponse and raking ratio adjustments (to population benchmarks).
For the AmeriSpeak Panel interviews, study-specific base weights are derived from the final
panel weight and the probability of selection from the panel under the study sample design.
Because not all sampled panel members responded to the interview request, an adjustment
is needed to compensate for survey nonrespondents. This adjustment decreases potential
nonresponse bias associated with sampled panel members who did not respond to the
interview for the study. A weighting class approach is used to adjust the weights for survey
respondents to represent nonrespondents.
At this stage of weighting, any extreme weights were trimmed using a power transformation
to minimize the mean squared error. Weights were then re-raked to the same population
totals.

4.4.2

TrueNorth Calibration for Nonprobability Sample

To incorporate the nonprobability sample, NORC used TrueNorth calibration, which is an
innovative, hybrid calibration approach developed at NORC based on small-area estimation
methods to explicitly account for potential bias associated with the nonprobability sample.
The purpose of TrueNorth calibration is to adjust the weights for the nonprobability sample
to bring weighted distributions of the nonprobability sample in line with the population
distribution for characteristics correlated with the survey variables. Such calibration
adjustments help to reduce potential bias, yielding more accurate population estimates.
The weighted AmeriSpeak sample and the calibrated nonprobability sample were used to
develop a small-area model to support domain-level estimates, where the domains were
defined by race/ethnicity, age, and gender. The dependent variables for the models were
key survey variables. The model included covariates, domain-level random effects, and
sampling errors. The covariates were external data available from other national surveys
such as health insurance, internet access, voting behavior, and housing type from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s ACS or CPS.
Finally, the combined AmeriSpeak and nonprobability sample weights were derived so that
the weighted estimate reproduced the small domain estimates (derived using the small area
model) for key survey variables for the combined sample.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4.4.3

Design Effect and Sampling Margin of Error Calculations

Study design effect:

▪

Screener Version 1: 1.44808

▪

Screener Version 2: 1.50797

▪

Screener Version 3: 1.53612

Study margin of error:

▪

Screener Version 1: +/- 1.23%

▪

Screener Version 2: +/- 1.24%

▪

Screener Version 3: +/- 1.27%

Under TrueNorth, the margins of error were estimated from the root mean-squared error
associated with the small area model and other statistical adjustments. A TrueNorth
estimate of margin of error is a measure of uncertainty that accounts for the variability
associated with the probability sample as well as the potential bias associated with the
nonprobability sample.
The final weighted sample for each instrument version is presented in Table 3 in the
introduction of the report.

4.5

Assessment of Item Nonresponse, Speeders, and Skippers

Tables 28 through 33 show the levels of item missingness for key variables for each of the
three instrument versions, by mode of completion and platform. Levels of missingness are
shown both including and excluding speeders and skippers. Respondents were not included
in the final weighted sample if their survey completion time was below the minimum
established threshold or their number of items skipped was above the maximum threshold.
Overall, for the majority of items across all three versions, levels of item missingness were
low.
Table 34 shows the average number of missing or “don’t know” responses, by respondent
demographics and instrument version.

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 28.

Instrument Version 1 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey
Platform

Total
AmeriSpeak
Lucid
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
eligible
Percent
eligible
Percent
missing
eligible
missing
8
3,764
3,658 0.41 %
Q1
38
10,738 0.35 %
15
3,411
37
3,460 0.75
26
Q1a
85
10,095 0.84
3,764
138
3,658 1.56
Q2
236
10,738 2.20
57
936
11
3,124 0.10
Q2a
15
8,775 0.17
3
Q3
51
10,738 0.47
14
3,123 0.45
19
2,794
14
3,764
3,658 0.71
Q4
49
10,738 0.46
26
3,764
12
3,658 0.63
Q5
59
10,738 0.55
23
3,764
10
Q7
59
10,738 0.55
40
3,658 1.09
Q9a
109
4,667 2.34
79
1,350 5.85
23
1,589
Q9b
84
4,667 1.80
48
1,350 3.56
28
1,589
1,589
118
Q10
313
4,667 6.71
116
1,350 8.59
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.
Number
missing

Table 29.

MTurk
Number Number
Percent missing eligible Percent
0.21 %
15
3,316
0.45 %
22
3,224
0.68
1.08
1.24
41
3,316
3.67
493
0.20
1
1.18
0.68
15
2,865
0.52
0.37
11
3,316
0.33
14
3,316
0.42
0.32
0.27
3,316
0.27
9
1.45
7
1,728
0.41
1.76
8
1,728
0.46
7.43
79
1,728
4.57

Total (excluding speeders and
skippers)*
Number
eligible Percent
31
10,609 0.29 %
84
9,989 0.84
224
10,609 2.11
14
1,933 0.72
45
8,688 0.52
38
10,609 0.36
35
10,609 0.33
44
10,609 0.41
103
4,635 2.22
79
4,635 1.70
311
4,635 6.71

Number
missing

Instrument Version 2 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey
Platform

Total
AmeriSpeak
Lucid
MTurk
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number Number
missing
eligible
missing
eligible
missing
eligible
Percent
Percent
Percent missing eligible Percent
Q1
26
11037 0.24 %
12
3813 0.31 %
6
3775 0.16 %
8
3449 0.23 %
Q2
29
10670 0.27
9
3728 0.24
14
3552 0.39
6
3390 0.18
Q3
12
4312 0.28
4
1350 0.30
4
1327 0.30
4
1635 0.24
Q4a
14
1916 0.73
9
394 2.28
5
701 0.71
0
821 0.00
Q4b
19
1916 0.99
6
394 1.52
9
701 1.28
4
821 0.49
Q5
30
11037 0.27
12
3813 0.31
9
3775 0.24
9
3449 0.26
Q6
36
9528 0.38
8
3447 0.23
19
3054 0.62
9
3449 0.26
Q7
18
4279 0.42
7
1564 0.45
4
1196 0.33
7
1519 0.46
Q8a
17
1680 1.01
14
444 3.15
3
517 0.58
0
716 0.00
Q8b
19
1680 1.13
8
444 1.80
7
517 1.35
4
716 0.56
Q9
38
11037 0.34
24
3813 0.63
13
3775 0.34
1
3449 0.03
Q10
33
3368 0.98
9
1028 0.88
9
1042 0.86
15
1298 1.16
Q10a
18
1626 1.11
12
425 2.82
3
529 0.57
3
672 0.45
Q10b
19
1626 1.17
7
425 1.65
7
529 1.32
5
672 0.74
Q11
51
11037 0.46
24
3813 0.63
11
3775 0.29
16
3449 0.46
Q12
18
2432 0.74
5
640 0.78
8
730 1.10
5
1062 0.47
Q14a
13
1286 1.01
6
249 2.41
4
396 1.01
3
641 0.47
Q14b
19
1286 1.48
7
249 2.81
5
396 1.26
7
641 1.09
Q15
58
11037 0.53
26
3813 0.68
12
3775 0.32
20
3449 0.58
Q16
12
1778 0.67
2
411 0.49
1
579 0.17
9
788 1.14
Q18a
6
861 0.70
4
105 3.81
0
289 0.00
2
467 0.43
Q18b
6
861 0.70
2
105 1.90
2
289 0.69
2
467 0.43
Q19
68
11037 0.62
30
3813 0.79
20
3775 0.53
18
3449 0.52
Q20
6
1527 0.39
0
320 0.00
2
492 0.41
4
715 0.56
Q22a
6
732 0.82
2
58 3.45
2
250 0.80
2
424 0.47
Q22b
19
732 2.60
4
58 6.90
8
250 3.20
7
424 1.65
Q25a
58
3805 1.52
31
1112 2.79
20
1227 1.63
7
1466 0.48
Q25b
61
3805 1.60
31
1112 2.79
22
1227 1.79
8
1466 0.55
Q26
244
3805 6.41
94
1112 8.45
91
2548 3.57
59
1466 4.02
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Total (excluding speeders and
skippers)*
Number
Number
missing
eligible
Percent
16
10926
0.15 %
27
10576
0.26
10
4265
0.23
13
1897
0.69
18
1897
0.95
18
10926
0.16
35
9455
0.37
16
4243
0.38
15
1664
0.90
18
1664
1.08
25
10926
0.23
32
3346
0.96
16
1613
0.99
18
1613
1.12
34
10926
0.31
17
2402
0.71
13
1277
1.02
19
1277
1.49
43
10926
0.39
12
1759
0.68
6
854
0.70
6
854
0.70
49
10926
0.45
6
1509
0.40
6
730
0.82
19
730
2.60
55
3776
1.46
58
3776
1.54
237
3776
6.28

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 30.

Instrument Version 3 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Survey
Platform

Total
AmeriSpeak
Lucid
MTurk
Number
Number Number
Number
Number
Number Number
eligible
missing
eligible
missing
eligible
missing eligible Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Q1
34
10758
0.32 %
12
3706
0.32 %
13
3737
0.35 %
9
3315
0.27 %
Q1a
39
10174
0.38
10
3531
0.28
16
3425
0.47
13
3218
0.40
Q2
197
10758
1.83
39
3706
1.05
121
3737
3.24
37
3315
1.12
Q2a
28
8837
0.32
5
3218
0.16
9
2741
0.33
14
2878
0.49
Q3
76
10758
0.71
29
3706
0.78
26
3737
0.70
21
3315
0.63
Q4
40
10758
0.37
19
3706
0.51
14
3737
0.37
7
3315
0.21
Q5
61
10758
0.57
23
3706
0.62
21
3737
0.56
17
3315
0.51
Q9a
155
4128
3.75
88
1120
7.86
47
1415
3.32
20
1593
1.26
q9b
145
4128
3.51
71
1120
6.34
54
1415
3.82
20
1593
1.26
Q10
34
4128
0.82
90
1120
8.04
138
1415
9.75
75
1593
4.71
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.
Number
missing

Table 31.

Instrument Version 1 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode

Total
Web
Phone
Number
Number
Number
Number Number
Number
eligible
Percent
missing
eligible
Percent
missing
eligible
missing
Q1
38
10738 0.35 %
36
10302 0.35 %
2
436
Q1a
85
10095 0.84
81
9726 0.83
4
369
Q2
236
10738 2.20
235
10302 2.28
1
436
Q2a
15
8775 0.17
15
1854 0.81
0
109
Q3
51
10738 0.47
47
8448 0.56
1
334
Q4
49
10738 0.46
47
10302 0.46
4
436
Q5
59
10738 0.55
45
10302 0.44
4
436
Q7
59
10738 0.55
53
10302 0.51
6
436
Q9a
109
4667 2.34
85
4560 1.86
24
107
Q9b
84
4667 1.80
80
4560 1.75
4
107
Q10
313
4667 6.71
302
4560 6.62
11
107
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Total (excluding speeders and skippers)*
Number
Number
missing
eligible
Percent
27
10642
0.25 %
37
10080
0.37
180
10642
1.69
27
8758
0.31
61
10642
0.57
25
10642
0.23
45
10642
0.42
147
4111
3.58
138
4111
3.36
297
4111
7.22

Percent
0.46 %
1.08
0.23
0.00
0.30
0.92
0.92
1.38
22.43
3.74
10.28

Total (excluding speeders and
skippers)*
Number
Number
missing
eligible Percent
31
10609 0.29 %
84
9989 0.84
224
10609 2.11
14
1933 0.72
45
8688 0.52
38
10609 0.36
35
10609 0.33
44
10609 0.41
103
4635 2.22
79
4635 1.70
311
4635 6.71

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 32.

Instrument Version 2 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode

Total
Web
Phone
Number
Number
Number Number
Number Number
eligible
missing
Percent
missing eligible
Percent
missing eligible
416
0
26
10621 0.24 %
11037 0.24 %
26
Q1
384
10286 0.27
1
28
29
10670 0.27
Q2
108
1
11
4204 0.26
4312 0.28
Q3
12
4
35
1881 0.53
10
1916 0.73
14
Q4a
35
19
1881 1.01
0
19
1916 0.99
Q4b
416
0
10621 0.28
11037 0.27
30
30
Q5
345
Q6
36
9528 0.38
36
9183 0.39
0
109
Q7
18
4279 0.42
16
4170 0.38
2
37
17
1680 1.01
13
1643 0.79
4
Q8a
1
37
18
1643 1.10
1680 1.13
19
Q8b
9
416
29
10621 0.27
11037 0.34
38
Q9
46
31
3322 0.93
2
3368 0.98
Q10
33
1626 1.11
6
26
18
12
1600 0.75
Q10a
Q10b
19
1626 1.17
1
26
18
1600 1.13
3
416
11037 0.46
48
10621 0.45
51
Q11
416
17
2397 0.71
1
18
2432 0.74
Q12
10
1286 1.01
11
1276 0.86
2
Q14a
13
10
19
1276 1.49
0
Q14b
19
1286 1.48
3
416
55
10621 0.52
Q15
58
11037 0.53
35
1
11
1743 0.63
12
1778 0.67
Q16
9
3
852 0.35
3
6
861 0.70
Q18a
1
9
5
852 0.59
861 0.70
Q18b
6
66
10621 0.62
2
416
Q19
68
11037 0.62
24
0
1527 0.39
6
1503 0.40
Q20
6
0
5
6
727 0.83
732 0.82
Q22a
6
5
0
19
727 2.61
732 2.60
19
Q22b
3805 1.52
56
3736 1.50
2
69
Q25a
58
69
61
3736 1.63
0
Q25b
61
3805 1.60
4
69
240
3736 6.42
Q26
244
3805 6.41
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Table 33.

Total (excluding speeders and
skippers)*
Number
Number
eligible
Percent missing
Percent
16
10926
0.15 %
0.00 %
10576
0.26
27
0.26
4265
0.23
0.93
10
13
1897
0.69
11.43
1897
0.95
0.00
18
0.16
18
10926
0.00
9455
0.37
35
0.00
4243
0.38
1.83
16
1664
0.90
10.81
15
2.70
18
1664
1.08
2.16
25
10926
0.23
3346
0.96
32
4.35
0.99
1613
23.08
16
1.12
1613
3.85
18
34
10926
0.31
0.72
0.24
17
2402
0.71
20.00
13
1277
1.02
1.49
19
1277
0.00
0.39
10926
0.72
43
0.68
2.86
12
1759
33.33
6
854
0.70
854
0.70
11.11
6
10926
0.45
0.48
49
0.40
6
1509
0.00
0.00
6
730
0.82
2.60
0.00
19
730
2.90
55
3776
1.46
1.54
0.00
58
3776
3776
6.28
5.80
237

Instrument Version 3 Item Nonresponse, by Key Items and Mode

Total
Web
Phone
Total (excluding speeders and skippers)*
Number
Number Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
eligible
missing
eligible
missing
eligible
missing
eligible
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Q1
34
10758
0.32 %
33
10320
0.32 %
1
438
0.23 %
27
10642
0.25 %
Q1a
39
10174
0.38
38
9799
0.39
1
375
0.27
37
10080
0.37
Q2
197
10758
1.83
196
10320
1.90
1
438
0.23
180
10642
1.69
Q2a
28
8837
0.32
28
8492
0.33
0
345
0.00
27
8758
0.31
Q3
76
10758
0.71
74
10320
0.72
2
438
0.46
61
10642
0.57
Q4
40
10758
0.37
39
10320
0.38
1
438
0.23
25
10642
0.23
Q5
61
10758
0.57
61
10320
0.59
0
438
0.00
45
10642
0.42
Q9a
155
4128
3.75
140
4049
3.46
15
79
18.99
147
4111
3.58
Q9b
145
4128
3.51
141
4049
3.48
4
79
5.06
138
4111
3.36
Q10
34
4128
0.82
296
4049
7.31
7
79
8.86
297
4111
7.22
Note: Number missing includes 'don't know' responses. Based on unweighted data.
*Excludes respondents who did not meet the data quality thresholds for inclusion in the final sample.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.
Number
missing

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 34.

Sex

Total

Average Number of Missing or “Don't Know” Responses, by Respondent
Demographics and Instrument Version (unweighted)
Total

AmeriSpeak

Lucid

MTurk

Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
0.10
0.07
0.09

Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
0.11
0.08
0.09

Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
0.11
0.06
0.11

Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
0.07
0.06
0.07

Male
0.10
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.07
0.08
0.12
0.06
0.12
0.07
0.07
0.08
Female
0.10
0.07
0.09
0.12
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.04
0.06
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
0.08
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.04
0.05
Black
0.15
0.12
0.13
0.18
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.11
0.16
0.12
0.08
0.09
Other
0.19
0.09
0.11
0.24
0.09
0.16
0.17
0.16
0.05
0.09
0.00
0.08
Hispanic
0.12
0.10
0.15
0.11
0.14
0.19
0.13
0.08
0.16
0.12
0.11
0.13
Two or more races
0.11
0.08
0.09
0.17
0.11
0.08
0.10
0.08
0.12
0.04
0.03
0.07
Asian
0.09
0.06
0.10
0.13
0.13
0.23
0.14
0.06
0.12
0.04
0.03
0.03
Age
18–24
0.15
0.09
0.15
0.24
0.07
0.30
0.17
0.12
0.17
0.03
0.05
0.03
25–34
0.10
0.08
0.11
0.13
0.10
0.13
0.13
0.08
0.14
0.07
0.07
0.08
35–49
0.10
0.07
0.09
0.13
0.09
0.08
0.11
0.06
0.12
0.07
0.05
0.07
50–64
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.04
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.06
65 or older
0.08
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.02
0.06
0.02
Household income
$24,999 or less
0.14
0.10
0.13
0.17
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.08
0.14
0.10
0.07
0.10
$25,000–$49,999
0.10
0.06
0.10
0.12
0.07
0.11
0.09
0.05
0.12
0.09
0.07
0.07
$50,000–$74,999
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.10
0.06
0.10
0.06
0.06
0.07
$75,000 or more
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.09
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.06
0.09
0.04
0.05
0.05
Note: Out of 12 questions included for version 1; 22 items for version 2; and 12 items for version 3. Includes speeders and skippers. Based on unweighted data.
*White, black, Asian other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

4.6

Feedback from MTurk Workers

One of the features of MTurk was the ability for workers to communicate with survey
requesters. A few workers have taken advantage of this feature to let us know that they
submitted the wrong code, give us feedback about the survey, and give more detail of their
story in relation to the survey.
Feedback about the survey through email:
“Good survey and well done. Keep up the good work and have a great day.”
“Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this survey. I really
appreciate it.”
“Dear Requester I like your work thank you for approval my job I want to
earn more then rewards survey next time work in improve the request.”
“Excellent pay and it didn't take long to do.”
“Thanks for the survey, have a nice day.”
More detail about their experience with identity theft:
“Just wanted to clarify something. I remembered something after I answered.
There actually was this one time that I had to dispute a few small items on
my checking account. But this was about 15 years ago so I don't remember.
There was also a time back in 2010 or 2011 that I wasn't able to open a

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

checking account because my name was on...was it Chexsystems?? I don't
know, but I remember it had something to do with someone trying to use my
e-trade account or something. It was a big hassle getting my name off of it,
but I don't remember the details.”
“I completed this survey but I'd say that for most of the questions my honest
answer was "not that I know of" because it is certainly possible that people
have used my identity for things that would not immediately, or perhaps even
ever come to my attention as long as there was no problem with the
fraudulent use, such as opening up a utility in my name.”
“Thank you for the email invitation to this hit. I wanted to provide you with a
little additional data related to this topic in case it is of any use to your
research. My Partner and I both pay Zander for identity theft protection and
in addition to BitDefender for protection against computer viruses, I also have
Zemana which includes a program to prevent someone using a keystroke
logger on my computer. Those are just some of the steps we take to protect
ourselves against identity theft.”
“I’m not sure if my original message went through or not but I was delighted
to assist in giving information for this HIT. But I am asking if your team has
any additional information outside of the norm of the FED trade, make
another HIT. I'm sure there are other TURkers who might help with the HIT.
Also, if you do know of any information now, please divulge, it would be
greatly appreciated.”
“Thanks so much for allowing me to work on this HIT.”
“Hi there.. I just finished your identity theft survey and honestly, the yes and
no only answers are a bit off-putting considering most people have no idea if
their information is being misused or not. Every single question asked, the
honest answer would have to be "Not to my knowledge". Yes or No doesn't
apply to me and I'm betting on most people here.”
“On TurkerView, a site where MTurk workers write reviews of the project they
completed for the benefit of other workers, a majority thought our pay is fair
or generous. One reviewer liked that no one gets screened out as long as
they qualify for the survey. A reviewer mentioned that the demographics
page was annoying but thought it was a simple HIT and asked us to keep up
the good work.”

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

5. References
American Association for Public Opinion Research. (2015). Standard definitions: Final
dispositions of case codes and outcome rates for surveys. Available at:
https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/StandardDefinitions2015_8thEd.pdf
Hsieh, Y. P., Sanders, H., Eckman, S., & Smith, A. (2018). Motivated misreporting in
crowdsourcing tasks of content coding, image classification, and survey. Paper
presented at the 73th Annual Conference of the American Association for Public
Opinion Research, Denver, CO. May 16–19, 2018.
Krebs, C., Lindquist, C., Berzofsky, M., Shook-Sa, B., & Peterson, K. (2016). Campus
climate validation study: Final technical report. Bureau of Justice Statistics Research
and Development Series. NCJ 249545. Available at:
https://rvap.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/2898aa5950/Campus-Climate-Survey2016.pdf

Appendix A.
Three Versions of ITS Screener Used in Testing
A.1

Identity Theft Supplement Questionnaire–Version 1

SECTION A. SCREENER QUESTIONS
INTRO 1: This survey asks questions about possible experiences with identity theft. Identity
theft means someone else using your personal information without your permission to buy
something, get cash or services, pay bills, or avoid the law. We will not ask you for any
specific account information. We estimate these questions will take between 5 to 15 minutes
depending on your circumstances.
The first set of questions are about the possible misuse of EXISTING ACCOUNTS.
1.

During the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR] until today, have you had at least one active checking or savings account
through a bank or financial institution?
YES
NO (skip to Q2)

1a.

[During the past 12 months,] Has someone, without your permission, used or
attempted to use your existing checking or savings account, including any debit or
ATM cards?
YES
NO

Do you currently have at least one credit card in your name? Include major credit
cards such as a MasterCard or Visa, and store credit cards such as a Macy’s card.
Please do not include debit cards.
YES
NO (ask follow up)
Have you had one in the past 12 months, since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1
YEAR PRIOR]?
YES
NO (skip to Q3)
2a.

During the past 12 months, has someone used or attempted to use one or more
of your existing credit cards without your permission? Please do not include debit
cards.
YES
NO

A-1

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

[During the past 12 months,] Has someone misused or attempted to misuse another type of
existing account such as your telephone, cable, gas or electric accounts, online
payment account like Paypal, insurance policies, entertainment account like ITunes, or
something else?
YES
NO (skip to Intro to Q4)
Which of the following types of your EXISTING accounts, other than credit card or banking
accounts did the person run up charges on, take money from, or otherwise misuse? Did
they use or attempt to use one or more of your…
3a.

Medical insurance accounts?
YES
NO

3b.

Telephone accounts?
YES
NO

3c.

Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas or electric accounts?
YES
NO

3d.

Online payment accounts such as Paypal?
YES
NO

3e.

Did they use or attempt to use one or more of your…
Entertainment accounts such as for movies, music, or games?
YES
NO
EX_ENTERTAINMENT

3f.

Email accounts?
YES
NO

3g.

Some other type of accounts?
YES
NO

[If yes] What other type of accounts were misused? __________________________
HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q3 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q3a through Q3g are marked “no”

A-2

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

You reported one or more of your existing accounts were misused but didn't identify any of
these existing accounts in Q3a, Q3b, Q3c, Q3d, Q3e, Q3f, or Q3g. Would you like to change
one of your responses?
YES
NO
Intro: The next questions are about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have opened.
4.

During the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR] until today, has someone, without your permission, used or attempted to use
your personal information to open any NEW accounts such as wireless telephone
accounts, credit card accounts, loans, bank accounts, online payment accounts, or
something else?
YES
NO (skip to Intro to Q5)

Which of the following types of NEW accounts did someone open or attempt to open? Did
someone open or attempt to open…
4a.

New telephone accounts?
YES
NO

4b.

New credit card accounts?
YES
NO

4c.

New checking or savings accounts?
YES
NO

4d.

New loans or mortgages?
YES
NO

4e.

New insurance policies?
YES
NO

4f.

Did someone open or attempt to open…
New online payment accounts such as Paypal?
YES
NO

4g.

New utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric?
YES
NO

A-3

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4h. Some other type of new account?
YES
NO
[If yes] What other type of new account was opened or attempted to be opened?
_______________________________________________________
HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q4 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q4a through Q4h are marked “no”
Responses to questions Q4a, Q4b, Q4c, Q4d, Q4e, Q4f, Q4g, and Q4h are inconsistent with
answer to Q4 = Yes. Would you like to change one of your responses?
YES
NO
Intro: The next questions about any other misuses of your personal information.
5.

[During the past 12 months,] Has someone used or attempted to use your personal
information for some other fraudulent purpose, such as filing a fraudulent tax return,
getting medical care, applying for a job or government benefits; giving your
information to the police when they were charged with a crime or traffic violation, or
something else?
YES
NO (skip to Check Item A)

As far as you know, did the person use or attempt to use your personal information in any
of the following ways? Did they use or attempt to use your personal information…
5a.

To file a fraudulent tax return?
YES
NO

5b.

To get medical treatment?
YES
NO

5c.

To apply for a job?
YES
NO

5d.

To provide false information to the police?
YES
NO

5e.

To apply for government benefits?
YES
NO

A-4

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

5f.

In some other way we haven’t already mentioned?
YES
NO
[If yes] How was your personal information misused in some other way that we
haven’t already mentioned? ______________________________________

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q5 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q5a through Q5f are marked “no”
Response to Q5 is inconsistent with responses to Q5a, Q5b, Q5c, Q5d, Q5e, Q5f. Would you
like to change one of your responses?
YES
NO
CHECK ITEM A
Is “no” marked for Q1a, Q2a, Q3, Q4, and Q5
YES - Skip to Section G
NO - Check Item B
CHECK ITEM B
Is only one response marked “yes” from questions Q1a, Q2a, Q3, Q4, and Q5?
YES – (Skip to Q6a)
NO – (Skip to Q6b)
6a.

You said that someone, in the past 12 months, that is since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH
1 YEAR PRIOR], . Did this happen to you
once or more than once?
1.

More than once (skip to Section B)

Once (skip to Section B)

If you don’t know, please select the best response.
6b.

Now we would like to know how many times you were a victim of identity theft in
the past 12 months. An incident of identity theft occurs when your identity is
stolen. A stolen credit card or debit card may be used multiple times but this
should be considered a single incident. Also, if multiple credit card numbers and a
Social Security number were obtained at the same time, this should be
considered a single incident.

A-5

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

You said that someone in the past 12
months, that is, since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR]. Were all these thefts
the result of one related incident, or was your personal information stolen multiple times in
separate unrelated incidents?
1.

Multiple Incidents (ask Q7)

One related incident (skip to Section B)

If you don’t know, please select the best response.
7.

You said that there were: in the past
12 months. Which of these happened during the most recent incident in which
someone misused or attempted to misuse your personal information?

(Only show response items that match autofill in this question)
Mark all that apply.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Misuse or attempted
Misuse or attempted
ATM, savings)
Misuse or attempted
Misuse or attempted
Misuse or attempted

misuse of an existing credit card account
misuse of an existing banking account (debit, checking,
misuse of other types of existing accounts
misuse of personal information to open a NEW account
misuse of personal information for other fraudulent purpose.

SECTION B. HOW/WHEN IDENTITY THEFT DISCOVERED
INTRO: For those with more than one incident: The next questions ask you to consider only
the most recent incident during the past 12 months in which you discovered that someone
misused or attempted to misuse your personal information.
For everyone: Thinking about incident, the next couple of questions
are about when you discovered the misuse of your personal information.
9.

In what month and year did you first discover that someone had misused or attempted
to misuse your personal information?
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2018)

10.

How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

A-6

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

SECTION C. DEMOGRAPHICS
The last set of questions ask about your personal characteristics.
11.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1
2
3
4

12.

What is your gender?
1
2
3
4

13.

Yes
No

Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.
1
2
3
4
5
6

15.

Male
Female
Transgender
None of these

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?
1
2

14.

High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate
Post-Graduate degree

White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Other (specify ____________________ )

Which of the following age groups includes your age?
1
2
3
4
5

Under 18
18-25
26-34
35-49
50 or Older

A-7

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

A.2

Identity Theft Supplement Questionnaire—Version 2

First, have you ever had an active checking or savings account through a bank or
financial institution?
YES
NO (skip to Q5)

Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your checking or savings account,
including any debit or ATM cards, to make a purchase or withdraw money? Please
consider only times when money was actually deducted from your checking or savings
account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later. Please do not include times
when anyone used your credit card or online pay accounts.
YES
NO (skip to Q5)

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Q5)

4a.

In what year did this most recently happen? ________________________

4b.

And in what month? ____________________________

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
5.

The next questions are about the possible misuse of EXISTING CREDIT CARD
ACCOUNTS.

Have you ever had a credit card account in your name? Include major credit cards such as a
MasterCard or Visa, and retail credit cards such as a Macy’s, Walmart, or Amazon card.
Please do not include debit cards.
YES
NO (skip to Q9)

A-8

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

Thinking only of credit card accounts, has anyone EVER used one or more of your
credit card accounts without your permission? Please consider only times when
charges actually posted to your account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed
later.
YES
NO (skip to Q9)

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Q9)

8a.

In what year did this most recently happen? ________________________

8b.

And in what month? ____________________________

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
9.

These next questions focus on the misuse of your email or social media accounts.

Has anyone EVER, without your permission used your email or social media account to
pretend to be you?
Yes
No (skip to Q11)
10.

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Q11)
10a. In what year did this most recently happen? ________________________
10b. And in what month? ____________________________

11.

These next questions ask about the possible misuse of any of your EXISTIING
ACCOUNTS other than banking, credit card, email or social media accounts.

Has anyone EVER, without your permission used another of your accounts, such as your
telephone, internet or utilities accounts; medical insurance accounts; entertainment
accounts, such as for music, movies, or games; online payment accounts like Paypal or
Venmo; or some other accounts? Please include only times when someone successfully got
into and used your account.
YES
NO (skip to Q15)
12.

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Q15)

A-9

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

13.

Which of the following types of your EXISTING accounts, other than credit card or
bank accounts, did someone run up charges on, take money from, or otherwise
misuse? Did they misuse one or more of your….
13a. Telephone or internet accounts?
YES
NO
13b. Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas or electric accounts?
YES
NO
13c. Medical insurance accounts?
YES
NO
13d. Entertainment accounts, such as for movies, music, or games?
YES
NO
13e. Online payment accounts, such as Paypal or Venmo?
YES
NO
13f. Some other type of accounts?
YES
NO
[If yes] What other type of accounts were misused? __________

(If any 13a-13f = yes, ask Q14a; else skip to Q15)
14a. Please think about the most recent time someone misused [this/one of these] existing
accounts. In what year did this most recently occur?
______________________________
14b. In what month [was this existing account/were these existing accounts] most recently
misused? __________________________
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
15.

The next questions are about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have opened using
your personal information.

Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your personal information to successfully
open any NEW accounts, such as telephone or internet accounts; credit card or bank
accounts; loans or mortgages; insurance accounts; entertainment accounts, such as for
music, movies or games; email or social media accounts; utilities accounts; online payment
accounts, such as Paypal or Venmo; or some other type of account? Please include times

A-10

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

when someone successfully opened a new account, even if you did not lose any money or
were reimbursed later.
YES
NO (skip to Q19)
16.

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Q19)

17.

Which of the following types of NEW accounts did someone successfully open during
the past 12 months? Did someone open…
17a. New telephone or internet accounts?
YES
NO
17b. New credit card accounts?
YES
NO
17c. New checking or savings accounts?
YES
NO
17d. New loans or mortgages?
YES
NO
17e. New insurance policies?
YES
NO
17f. New entertainment accounts, such as for music, movies, or games?
YES
NO
17g. New email or social media accounts?
YES
NO
17h. New utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric?
YES
NO
17i. New online payment accounts, such as Paypal or Venmo?
YES
NO

A-11

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

17j. Some other type of new account?
YES
NO
[If yes] What other type of new account was opened? __________
(If any 17a-17j = yes, ask Q18a; else skip to Q19)
18a. Please think about the most recent time someone successfully opened [this/one of
these] new accounts. In what year was this?______________________________
18b. And in what month? Think about the most recent month when the new account was
opened in your name regardless if it remained opened for multiple months or years.
___________________________
19.

The next set of questions are about any other misuses of your personal information.

Has anyone EVER used your personal information for some other fraudulent purpose, such
as filing a fraudulent tax return, getting medical treatment, applying for a job; giving your
information to the police when they were charged with a crime or traffic violation; applying
for government benefits or something else? Please consider only times when your
information was actually used, even if the situation was later resolved.
YES
NO (skip to Check Item A)
20.

Has this happened during the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF
MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until today?
YES
NO (skip to Check Item A)

21.

In which of the following ways has someone used your personal information during the
past 12 months? Was your personal information used….
21a. To file a fraudulent tax return?
YES
NO
21b. To get medical treatment?
YES
NO
21c. To apply for a job?
YES
NO
21d. To provide false information to the police?
YES
NO

A-12

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

21e. To apply for government benefits?
YES
NO
21f. In some other way we haven’t already mentioned?
YES
NO
[If yes] How else was your personal information misused? __________
(If any 21a-21f = yes, ask Q22a; else skip to Check Item A)
22a. Please think about the most recent time your personal information was misused in
[this way/one of these ways]. In what year did this most recently happen?
__________________________
22b. And in what month? If your information was misused for multiple months or years,
think about the month it was most recently misused.
____________________________
If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
CHECK ITEM A
Is “no” or ‘out of universe’ marked for Q2, Q6, Q9, Q11, Q15, and Q19
YES – Survey is completed (no identity theft in respondent’s lifetime)
NO - Read Check Item B
CHECK ITEM B
Is “no” or ‘out of universe’ marked for Q3, Q7, Q10, Q12, Q16, AND Q20
Yes – Skip to Long Term Consequences
NO – Read Check Item C
CHECK ITEM C
Is only one response marked “yes” from questions Q3, Q7, Q10, Q12, Q16, AND Q20
YES – Skip to Section B (intro 2)
NO – Read Check Item D
CHECK ITEM D
Is the most recent Month/Year provided more than once in Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10a/b,
Q14a/b, Q18a/b, and Q22a/b (e.g. if respondent answered 2021, May in both Q4a/b and
Q8a/b, select ‘yes.’)?
NO – Skip to Section B (intro 1)
YES – Ask Q23
23.

You said that in someone . Were these the result of one related incident, or was
your personal information misused multiple times in separate unrelated incidents?
1.
2.

Multiple Incidents (ask Q24)
One related incident (skip to Section B, intro 1)

A-13

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

If respondent states “I don’t know,” instruct him/her to select what he/she believes to be
the best response.
24.

Which of these happened most recently?

(Mark all that apply, and only read response items that match autofill from Q3, Q7, Q10,
Q12, Q16, and Q20)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Misuse
Misuse
Misuse
Misuse
Misuse

of
of
of
of
of

an existing credit card account
an existing banking account (debit, checking, ATM, savings)
other types of existing accounts
personal information to open a NEW account
personal information for other fraudulent purpose.

(Skip to Intro 1)

SECTION B. HOW/WHEN IDENTITY THEFT WAS DISCOVERED
INTRO 1: For those with more than one incident: The next questions will ask you to
consider only the most recent incident of identity theft that you experienced during the
prior 12 months. (read intro 2)
INTRO 2: For the next series of questions, please think about the [autofill most recent
type of ID theft from (Q3, Q7, Q10, Q12, Q16, Q20) OR Q24, if applicable] you
experienced in [autofill most recent month/year from Q4a/b, Q8a/b, Q10a/b, Q14a/b,
Q18a/b, or Q22a/b].
25.

Thinking about [the/the most recent time] your personal information was misused, in
what month and year did you first discover that someone had misused your personal
information?
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2021)

26.

How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A-14

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

SECTION C. DEMOGRAPHICS
The last set of questions ask about your personal characteristics.
27.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1
2
3
4

28.

What is your gender?
1
2
3
4

29.

Yes
No

Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.
1
2
3
4
5
6

31.

Male
Female
Transgender
None of these

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?
1
2

30.

High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate
Post-Graduate degree

White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Other (specify ____________________ )

Which of the following age groups includes your age?
1
2
3
4
5

Under 18
18-25
26-34
35-49
50 or Older

A-15

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

A.3

Identity Theft Supplement Questionnaire—Version 3

SECTION A. SCREENER QUESTIONS
INTRO 1. This survey asks questions about possible experiences with identity theft. Identity
theft means someone else using your personal information without your permission to buy
something, get cash or services, pay bills, or avoid the law. We will not ask you for any
specific account information. We estimate these questions will take between 5 to 15 minutes
depending on your circumstances.
The first set of questions are about the possible misuse of EXISTING ACCOUNTS.
1.

[During the past 12 months,] Has someone, without your permission, used your
existing checking or savings account, including any debit or ATM cards? Please
consider only times when money was actually deducted from your checking or
savings account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later. Please do not
include times when anyone used your credit card or online pay accounts.
YES
NO

During the past 12 months, has someone used one or more of your existing
credit cards without your permission? Please do not include debit cards. Please
consider only times when charges actually posted to your account, regardless of
whether you were reimbursed later.
YES
NO

[During the past 12 months,] has someone misused another type of existing account
such as your telephone, cable, gas or electric accounts, online payment account like
Paypal, insurance policies, entertainment account like ITunes, or something else?
Please include only times when someone successfully got into and used your account.
YES
NO (skip to Intro to Q4)

A-16

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

Which of the following types of your EXISTING accounts, other than credit card or
banking accounts did the person run up charges on, take money from, or otherwise
misuse? Did they use one or more of your…
3a.

Medical insurance accounts?
YES
NO

3b.

Telephone accounts?
YES
NO

3c.

Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas or electric accounts?
YES
NO

3d.

Online payment accounts such as Paypal?
YES
NO

3e.

Did they use or attempt to use one or more of your…
Entertainment accounts such as for movies, music, or games?
YES
NO

3f.

Email accounts?
YES
NO

3g.

Some other type of accounts?
YES
NO
[If yes] What other type of accounts were misused? __________

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q3 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q3a through Q3g are marked “no”
You reported one or more of your existing accounts were misused, but didn't identify any of
these existing accounts in 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, or 3g.
Intro: The next set of questions are about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have
opened.

A-17

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

During the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR
PRIOR] until today, has someone, without your permission, used your personal
information to open any NEW accounts such as wireless telephone accounts, credit
card accounts, loans, bank accounts, online payment accounts, or something else?
Please include times when someone successfully opened a new account, even if you
did not lose any money or were reimbursed later.
YES
NO (skip to Intro to Q5)

Which of the following types of NEW accounts did someone open? Did someone open …
4a.

New telephone accounts?
YES
NO

4b.

New credit card accounts?
YES
NO

4c.

New checking or savings accounts?
YES
NO

4d.

New loans or mortgages?
YES
NO

4e.

New insurance policies?

4f.

Did someone open …
New online payment accounts such as Paypal?
YES
NO

4g.

New utilities accounts, such as cable, gas, or electric?
YES
NO

4h.

Some other type of new account?
YES
NO
[If yes] What other type of new account was opened? __________

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q4 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q4a through Q4h are marked “no”
Responses to questions 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h are inconsistent with answer to Q4 =
Yes.
Intro: The next questions about any other misuses of your personal information.

A-18

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

[During the past 12 months,] Has someone used your personal information for some
other fraudulent purpose, such as filing a fraudulent tax return, getting medical care,
applying for a job or government benefits; giving your information to the police when
they were charged with a crime or traffic violation, or something else? Please consider
only times when your information was actually used, even if the situation was later
resolved.
YES
NO (skip to Check Item A)

As far as you know, did the person use your personal information in any of the following
ways? Did they use your personal information…
5a.

To file a fraudulent tax return?
YES
NO

5b.

To get medical treatment?
YES
NO

5c.

To apply for a job?
YES
NO

5d.

To provide false information to the police?
YES
NO

5e.

To apply for government benefits?
YES
NO

5f.

In some other way we haven’t already mentioned?
YES
NO
How was your personal information misused in some other way that we haven’t
already mentioned? __________

HARD EDIT CHECK - If Q5 is marked “yes” and ALL of Q5a through Q5f are marked “no”
Response to Q5 is inconsistent with responses to Q5a, Q5b, Q5c, Q5d, Q5e, Q5f.
CHECK ITEM A
Is “no” marked for Q1a, Q2a, Q3, Q4, and Q5
YES - Skip to Section G
NO –Check Item B

A-19

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

CHECK ITEM B
Is only one response marked “yes” from questions Q1a, Q2a, Q3, Q4, and Q5?
YES - Ask Q6a
NO - Ask Q6b
6a.

You said that someone, in the past 12 months, that is since [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH
1 YEAR PRIOR], . Did this happen to you
once or more than once?
1.
2.

More than once (skip to Section B)
Once (skip to Section B)

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
6b.

Now we would like to know how many times you were a victim of identity theft in the
past 12 months. An incident of identity theft occurs when your identity is stolen. A
stolen credit card or debit card may be used multiple times, but this should be
considered a single incident. Also, if multiple credit card numbers and a Social Security
number were obtained at the same time, this should be considered a single incident.

Multiple Incidents (ask Q7)
One related incident (skip to Section B)

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
7.

You said that there were: in the past
12 months. Which of these happened during the most recent incident in which
someone misused your personal information?

(only show response items that match autofill in this question)
Mark all that apply.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A-20

Misuse
Misuse
Misuse
Misuse
Misuse

of
of
of
of
of

Appendix A — Hate Crime Summary Report Review

SECTION B. HOW/WHEN IDENTITY THEFT WAS DISCOVERED
INTRO: For those with more than one incident: The next set of questions ask you to
consider only the most recent incident during the past 12 months in which you discovered
that someone misused your personal information.
For everyone: Thinking about incident, the next couple of questions
are about when the misuse of your personal information most recently occurred and how
and when you discovered the misuse of your personal information.
8.

Thinking about [the/the most recent] time your personal information was misused, in
what month and year did the misuse most recently occur?
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2021)

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
9.

In what month and year did you first discover that someone had misused your
personal information? This may be the same month and year as the most recent
occurrence, or the discovery may have happened before or after the most recent
occurrence.
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2021)

If you don’t know, please provide your best estimate.
10. How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

SECTION C. DEMOGRAPHICS
The last set of questions ask about your personal characteristics.
11.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1
2
3
4

12.

High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate
Post-Graduate degree

What is your gender?
1
2
3

Male
Female
Transgender

A-21

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

4
13.

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?
1
2

14.

White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Other (specify ____________________ )

Which of the following age groups includes your age?
1
2
3
4
5

A-22

Yes
No

Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.
1
2
3
4
5
6

15.

None of these

Under 18
18-25
26-34
35-49
50 or Older

Appendix B.
Findings From ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing

Cognitive Interviewing for the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) Identity Theft
Supplement (ITS)
Prepared by RTI International
June 5, 2020
Sarah Cook, Jeanne Snodgrass, Lynn Langton

INTRODUCTION
This report provides a summary of RTI findings from 27
adult cognitive interviews on the redesigned version of the
BJS Identity Theft Supplement (ITS) screener. Interviews
took place virtually via Zoom with participants in the
Eastern, Central and Pacific time zones in May and early
June 2020. Cognitive interviews were conducted virtually
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These preliminary findings
may be of use to BJS when incorporating the next round of
changes to the NCVS ITS instrument.

13
8
0
6
2
13
9
3
2
4
16
8
20
7
20
4
5
2
0

Once participants completed the online web screener, our
recruiter contacted those who were eligible for the study
via email to schedule interviews. Eligibility was based on
our need for demographic diversity as well as type of
1
identity theft experienced. An informed consent form was
sent via email to the participant for them to review. At the beginning of each virtual interview, the
interviewer verified that the respondent had received the informed consent form, asked if they had
questions, and received verbal consent to conduct the interview and be recorded.

B-1

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 1 shows the cumulative demographics of participants. Though already a diverse group of
participants, some diversity was lost to participants who changed their mind or did not attend their
interview. Table 2 shows this same information distributed by participants and includes the type of
identity theft as indicated in the online screener and as reported during the actual interview. The online
screener was a condensed version of the revised ITS screener that included four questions about identity
theft experiences:
1. During the past 12 months, that is, since [AUTOFILL DATE A YEAR AGO FROM SURVEY DATE], has
someone, without your permission used your existing checking account, savings account, or
credit card account?
2. During the past 12 months, has someone misused another type of existing account such as your
telephone, cable, gas or electric accounts, online payment account like Paypal, insurance
policies, entertainment account like ITunes, or something else?
3. During the past 12 months, that is from [AUTOFILL DATE 1st OF MONTH 1 YEAR PRIOR] until
today, has someone, without your permission, used your personal information to open any NEW
accounts such as wireless telephone accounts, credit card accounts, loans, bank accounts, online
payment accounts, or something else?
4. During the past 12 months, has someone used your personal information for some other
fraudulent purpose, such as filing a fraudulent tax return, getting medical care, applying for a job
or government benefits; giving your information to the police when they were charged with a
crime or traffic violation, or something else?
Endorsement of these questions is represented in the table below consecutively as: Existing (bank),
Existing (other), New account, and Personal info. Three of the recruited ‘non-victims’ of identity theft
ended up as ‘victims’ once the participants heard the full survey questions and self-reported their
experience, and three of our recruited ‘victims’ ended up as nonvictims during the interview.
Table 2. Participant Demographic, Recruitment, and Final Identity Theft Type Data (n=27)
P# Time
Age
Education
Gender
Race
Recruited IT
Final IT Type
Zone
Range
Type
1
EDT
35-49
Post-Graduate
Female
White
None
None
degree
2
PDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
Asian
Existing (bank); Existing (bank)
Existing (other)
3
CDT
26-34
Post-Graduate
Female
White
Existing (bank) Existing (bank)
degree
4
CDT
26-34
High School
Female
Black
Existing (bank); Existing (bank)
Graduate/GED
and
Existing
AI/AN
(other);
New account
5
PDT
35-49
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank); New account;
Existing
Personal info
(other);
Personal info
6
PDT
18-25
College Graduate
Male
Black
None
Existing (bank);
Existing
(other);
Personal info

B-2

Appendix B — Findings from ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing

Table 2. Participant Demographic, Recruitment, and Final Identity Theft Type Data (n=27)
P# Time
Age
Education
Gender
Race
Recruited IT
Final IT Type
Zone
Range
Type
7
EDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
Asian
All
None
8
EDT
35-49
Some College
Male
White
Existing (bank); Existing (other)
Existing (other)
10
CDT
35-49
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank) Existing (bank);
New account
11
PDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank); Existing (bank);
New account
New account
12
PDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
Black
All
Existing (bank);
Existing
(other); New
account
13
EDT
35-49
Post-Graduate
Male
Asian
Existing (bank); Existing (bank)
degree
Existing
(other);
New account
15
EDT
26-34
Post-Graduate
Male
Asian
None
Existing (other)
degree
16
EDT
50 or
Post-Graduate
Male
White
None
Existing (bank)
older
degree
17
EDT
26-34
Post-Graduate
Female
Asian
Existing (bank); Existing (bank)
degree
and
Existing (other)
AI/AN
18
EDT
50 or
Some College
Female
White
Existing (bank)
None
older
19
CDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
Asian
Existing (bank); Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
20
PDT
50 or
College Graduate Female
White
Existing (bank); Existing (bank);
older
Personal info
22
CDT
35-49
Post-Graduate
Female
White
Existing (bank) Existing (bank)
degree
23
CDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank); Existing (bank)
Existing (other)
24
EDT
35-49
Some College
Male
White
Existing (other) Existing (other)
26
EDT
35-49
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (other) Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
27
CDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank) Existing (bank);
Existing (other)
30
CDT
26-34
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (bank)
None
31
EDT
26-34
College Graduate Female
White
Existing (other) Existing (bank);
Existing
(other);
Personal Info
32
EDT
35-49
College Graduate Female
Black
Existing (bank) Existing (bank)

B-3

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Table 2. Participant Demographic, Recruitment, and Final Identity Theft Type Data (n=27)
P# Time
Age
Education
Gender
Race
Recruited IT
Final IT Type
Zone
Range
Type
34
EDT
18-25
College Graduate
Male
White
Existing (other) Existing (other)

METHODS
Once MTurk respondents completed the online screener, were determined to be eligible to participate in
the cognitive interview, and expressed interest in participating in a virtual interview, the RTI recruiter
scheduled an interview time with the participant. The recruiter then sent the participant a link to a private
Zoom meeting set up for their specific interview. RTI interviewers were trained to stop the interview if
anyone else joined the meeting. In many cases, the “waiting room” feature was turned on so no one could
join the meeting without being allowed in by the interviewer.
Prior to conducting any interviews, all interviewers completed training on the cognitive interview protocol
and project logistics. All interviews were conducted using a cognitive interview protocol that was based
on the most recent version of the supplement provided by BJS. The protocol included probes developed
to elicit an understanding of how respondents interpreted specific terms or questions. Along with the predetermined probes, interviewers were encouraged to use spontaneous probing when needed to further
understand the participant’s thinking. The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.
Prior to the start of the interview, the interviewer obtained verbal participant consent. After the interview,
participants were emailed an Amazon.com Gift Card code with a value of $40 to help cover data and
technology costs associated with participating in the interview.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes key findings and recommended changes to specific survey items for which any
problems or issues were identified. Overall, the survey performed very well. There are many questions
where none of the 27 participants had difficulty understanding and answering them as intended. These
items not discussed below did not appear to be problematic and have no recommended changes.
_________________________________________________________________

Q2 – Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your checking or savings account, including any
debit or ATM cards, to make a purchase or withdraw money? Please consider only times when money
was actually deducted from your account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed later.

1. Yes
2. No (Skip to Q5)
Although all respondents were able to answer this question in relation to bank accounts only, a few
mentioned that they also thought about their credit card accounts in this question, not knowing that we
were going to ask about credit card accounts separately. Three respondents had credit cards through their
bank, which made it more difficult to separate the two. One participant answered “Yes” to this question
and, through probing, shared that the theft actually happened in their Google Pay account, which is
connected to their bank account. They later said that the incident should be counted in Q9, not Q2, after
hearing the response options provided. If they had known there would be an option to report identity
theft of an account like Google Pay, they never would have answered “Yes” to Q2.
Recommendation: Suggest changing the last sentence to “Please consider only times when money was
actually deducted from your checking or savings account, regardless of whether you were reimbursed
B-4

Appendix B — Findings from ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing

later.” or adding "Please do not include times when anyone used your credit card or online pay accounts
without permission.” Alternatively, to be consistent with Q6, start the question with “Thinking only of
checking and savings accounts,”. It may still be helpful to conclude with "Please do not include times
when anyone used your credit card or online pay accounts without permission.”
_________________________________________________________________

Q5 – Now I’d like to ask you about the possible misuse of EXISTING CREDIT CARDS OR CREDIT CARD
ACCOUNTS.
Have you ever had a credit card in your name? Include major credit cards such as a Mastercard or
Visa, and store credit cards such as a Macy’s card. Please do not include debit cards.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q9)
Most respondents suggested including American Express and Discover as examples of major credit cards,
and “big box” retailer cards such as Target, Walmart and Amazon as examples of store cards. However,
the current examples still provided enough information for participants to know what they should be
thinking about. One person suggested saying “retail” instead of “store” credit cards because you can have
credit cards for things that do not have physical stores (such as Amazon).
Recommendation: Consider replacing “Macy’s” with “Target or Amazon” and changing “store credit
cards” to “retail credit cards” to encompass more possibilities.
_________________________________________________________________

Q6 – Thinking only of credit cards, has anyone EVER used one or more of your credit cards without
your permission? Please consider only times when charges actually posted to your account, regardless
of whether you were reimbursed later.

1 Yes
2 No (Skip to Q9)
One respondent mentioned he would answer this question as ‘No’ because he interprets this question to
be about the misuse of physical credit cards only. If the question were more specific about including the
misuse of credit card numbers as well, he would answer this question as “Yes”.
Recommendation: Consider adding “accounts” after the second mention of ‘credit card’ in the question
text.
_________________________________________________________________

Q9 – Now I’d like to ask you about the possible misuse of any of your EXISTIING ACCOUNTS other than
credit card or bank accounts.
Has anyone EVER, without your permission used another of your accounts, such as your telephone,
internet or utilities accounts, online payment accounts like Paypal, medical insurance accounts,
entertainment accounts, such as for music or games, email or social media accounts, or some other
accounts? Please include only times when charges were actually made on the account, regardless of
whether you were reimbursed later.

Yes
No (Skip to Q13)
Respondents overwhelmingly said listing the types of accounts was very helpful in helping them to think
about the types of accounts we are asking about, but mentioned that they focused in on specific service
provider names and then forgot things said after that. Keeping the proper names at the end of the list
B-5

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

might help with that. Another person mentioned that we should add “movies” so they would think of
streaming accounts. Some participants mentioned thinking about failed log-in attempts they were alerted
to on their accounts, but they all knew not to include those. (INTERVIEWER NOTE: We noticed movies are
included below in Q11e.)
We have had several respondents who had their Facebook or Instagram accounts taken over, but because
the language at the end of the question focuses on charges made to the account, they were not sure
whether to actually include them. Two respondents said they did not include times their accounts were
compromised for that very reason. It is possible to misuse entertainment, email, and social media
accounts without any financial transaction. In the case of entertainment accounts, the theft is the service
they are using and not paying for, not a financial theft. Using another person’s social media accounts is
often used for phishing, in which case the infiltration is a means to an end. Email accounts, however, carry
more weight because passwords can be sent or reset to an email account. Theft of an email account has
many more implications than that of entertainment or social media.
Recommendation: Move ‘online payment accounts’ to the end of the list and include Venmo with the
Paypal example. Revise example of entertainment accounts to, “entertainment accounts, such as for
music, games, or movies” so participants consider popular streaming services.
Consider the appropriate placement for accessing social media accounts. Does the misuse of email and
social media account fit better under the category of ‘misuse of personal information for other fraudulent
purposes?’ or should they be in their own either combined or separate categories?
If the intent of the question is to capture account access regardless of financial loss, replace the last
sentence with “Please include only times when someone actually got into your account. Do not include
failed login attempts”.
_________________________________________________________________

Q11 – Which of the following types of your EXISTING accounts, other than credit card or bank
accounts, did someone run up charges on, take money from, or otherwise misuse? Did they misuse one
or more of your….
11a. Telephone or internet accounts?
YES NO
11b. Utilities accounts, such as cable, gas or electric accounts? YES NO
11c. Online payment accounts, such as Paypal?
YES NO
11d. Medical insurance accounts?
YES NO
11e. Entertainment accounts, such as for movies, music, or games?
YES
NO
11f. Email or social media accounts?
YES NO
11g. Some other type of accounts?
YES NO
[If yes] What other type of accounts were misused? __________
(If any 11a-11g = yes, ask Q12a; else skip to Q13)

Recommendation: To remain consistent with Q10, move “Online payment accounts”, such as Paypal to
the end of the list above “other” and include Venmo as an example.

B-6

Appendix B — Findings from ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing

_________________________________________________________________

Q13 – Next, I have some questions about any NEW ACCOUNTS someone might have opened using your
personal information.
Has anyone EVER, without your permission, used your personal information to successfully open any
NEW accounts, such as telephone or internet accounts, credit card or bank accounts, loans or
mortgages, insurance accounts, online payment accounts, entertainment accounts, such as for music
or games, email or social media accounts, utilities accounts or some other type of account?

1 Yes
2 No (skip to Q17)
A few participants said “No” to this question because they assumed it required a financial loss, even
though the question does not specify monetary loss. This is due to priming effects from all of the previous
questions referring to losing money.
Recommendation: Consider adding, “Include times even when you did not lose any money.” Revise the
example of entertainment accounts to, “entertainment accounts, such as for music, games, or movies” so
participants consider streaming services and to be consistent with Question 9.
_________________________________________________________________

Q17 - Next, I have some questions about any other misuses of your personal information.
Has anyone EVER used your personal information for some other fraudulent purpose, such as filing a
fraudulent tax return, getting medical treatment, applying for a job; giving your information to the
police when they were charged with a crime or traffic violation; applying for government benefits or
something else? Please consider only times when your information was actually used, even if the
situation was later resolved.

1 Yes
2 No (LOOK AT ANSWER SHEET TO FIND NEXT QUESTION)
Some may find the word ‘actually’ from the final sentence as confusing. As one participant said “If you use
it, you actually use it. How do you not actually use it?”
Recommendation: Only one participant had concerns with this question and since “actually” is an adverb
that is often used to emphasize something in fact happening, we recommend leaving the questions as
written.
_________________________________________________________________

Q25 – Thinking about the most recent time your personal information was misused, in what month
and year did you first discover that someone had misused your personal information? This may be the
same month and year as the most recent occurrence, or the discovery may have happened before or
after the most recent occurrence.
Enter month: __________ Month (01-12)
Enter year: __________ Year (1955-2021)
Some participants found the last sentence to be confusing, especially remarking on not understanding
how discovery ‘before’ an occurrence happened. One participants was particularly confused and
apologized multiple times. When the interviewer read them the question without the second sentence,
they said that question was clear and had not realized it was the same question.

B-7

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Recommendation: Remove the last sentence to avoid unnecessary confusion. Alternatively, it could be
left in if it is made clear to only be read if a respondent is having difficulty answering the question. Consider
simplifying it to “You could have first discovered the incident before, during, or after the month and year
of the most recent occurrence.”
_________________________________________________________________

Q26 - How long had your personal information been misused before you discovered it?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Most participants reported learning about the identity theft within days or weeks of the first (known)
occurrence. A respondent did point out that since this question is in relation to the past 12 months, we
might not need response option 7. However, due to the possibility of reoccurring incidents of identity
theft, we see this response option as necessary.
Recommendation: Leave question as is.

_________________________________________________________________

General Findings
There are questions in this instrument about timelines that could be confusing for some or hard to follow.
The two sets of questions we focused on were questions about whether an incident occurred “Ever” or
“in the past 12 months, and Q25 and Q26 when we try to identify the date of discovery and length of
misuse (compared to the date of the most recent incident). For the questions on whether someone had
ever experienced identity theft, respondents were probed on how far back they were thinking when
answering those questions. Two respondents mentioned ‘lifetime’ or ’30 years, since I had my account,’
but the majority of respondents reported remembering back to when their most recent incident or
incidents occurred, whether that was 3 months ago or 5 years ago. This makes sense though because once
they recalled an event, they had their answer and did not need to think further. Table 3 provides the
responses for each type of identity theft and whether it “Ever” happened and whether it happened “in
the past 12 months.” Many participants recognized that they had been victimized in the past, but that in
many cases their incidents occurred outside of the 12-month time frame.

B-8

Appendix B — Findings from ITS Version 2 Cognitive Testing

Table 3. Responses to “Ever” and “12 months” Questions

Ever - 12 mos Ever - 12 mos Ever - 12 mos Ever - 12 mos - Ever - 12 mos Existing
Existing
Existing
New
New Personal Personal
bank Existing credit Existing other Existing account account
info
info
bank
card
credit
other
card
No
No
No
No
No

Yes

No
Yes

No
No

Yes

Yes.

Yes

No
No

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

B-9

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Another concern is whether respondents were able to distinguish among the concepts of when the
incident started, was discovered, and most recently occurred an whether they were able to provide dates
for each of those reference points. Respondents were asked to describe in their own words what these
different reference points meant in light of their own experience and all appeared to understand the
concepts. With the exception of one respondent, all of the participants were able to stop the identity theft
relatively quickly after they discovered it. Table 4 needs to be introduced.
Table 4. Key Dates in Incident Timeline
P#
Most Recent
Discovered (Q25)

2
3
4
5
6
10
11
12
13
17
19
20
22
24
26
27
31
32
34

B-10

Length of use (Q26)

Appendix C.
Standard Error Tables
Appendix Table 1. Standard errors for Table 1. Unweighted sample, by
demographic characteristics and mode

Total

Sex

Total

Male
Female
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
Black
Asian/c
Hispanic
Other
Two or more races
Age
18–24
25–34
35–49
50–64
65 or older
Household income
$24,999 or less
$25,000–$49,999
$50,000–$74,999
$75,000 or more

Web

Number
Percent
87.57
~%

Phone

Number
Percent
87.23
~%

Number
Percent
16.24
~%

71.47
70.94

0.45 %
0.45

71.07
70.18

0.45 %
0.45

9.63
13.12

2.92 %
2.92

74.24
38.53
21.95
52.34
10.98
18.74

0.44 %
0.29
0.17
0.38
0.09
0.15

73.64
37.86
21.86
52.20
10.52
18.21

0.45 %
0.29
0.17
0.39
0.08
0.15

12.54
7.48
2.00
4.24
3.16
4.47

3.01 %
2.50
0.75
1.54
1.17
1.62

34.64
56.59
57.41
47.73
38.54

0.27 %
0.40
0.41
0.35
0.29

34.64
56.57
57.33
46.97
36.53

0.27 %
0.41
0.41
0.36
0.28

0.00
1.73
3.46
9.21
12.85

0.00 %
0.65
1.27
2.86
2.97

46.45
54.33
49.76
61.00

0.35 %
0.39
0.37
0.42

45.47
53.74
49.47
60.72

0.35 %
0.39
0.37
0.43

10.23
8.99
5.83
6.78

3.00 %
2.82
2.05
2.32

*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-1

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 2. Standard errors for Table 2. Unweighted sample, by
demographic characteristics and platform
Total

Sex

Total

AmeriSpeak

Number Percent
87.57 ~

Percent
Number
56.49 ~

Lucid

MTurk

Percent
Number
60.67 ~
%

71.47
70.94

0.45 %
0.45

39.78
42.52

0.83 %
0.83

44.84
44.16

0.77 %
0.77

48.40
45.61

0.72 %
0.72

74.24
38.53
21.95
52.34
10.98
18.74

0.44 %
0.29
0.17
0.38
0.09
0.15

45.33
23.64
12.14
21.00
8.12
12.46

0.81 %
0.61
0.33
0.55
0.22
0.34

46.45
23.60
11.47
32.69
5.47
8.82

0.76 %
0.52
0.27
0.67
0.13
0.21

48.28
20.46
14.41
37.46
5.00
10.98

0.72 %
0.41
0.30
0.67
0.10
0.23

34.64
56.59
57.41
47.73
38.54

0.27 %
0.40
0.41
0.35
0.29

13.74
26.17
25.60
32.32
30.40

0.37 %
0.66
0.65
0.77
0.74

26.35
29.09
36.67
27.57
21.63

0.57 %
0.62
0.72
0.59
0.48

18.55
43.68
39.60
24.40
11.55

0.38 %
0.72
0.69
0.48
0.24

46.45
54.33
49.76
61.00

0.35 %
0.39
0.37
0.42

26.42
29.72
25.29
35.53

0.67 %
0.73
0.64
0.80

30.72
31.86
27.24
37.31

0.65 %
0.66
0.59
0.73

25.03
35.71
35.19
38.06

0.49 %
0.65
0.64
0.67

*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-2

Number Percent
63.79 ~
%

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 3. Standard errors for Table 3. Weighted sample, by demographic
characteristics

Version 1

Sex

Total

Male
Female
Race/Hispanic origin*
White
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Other
Two or more races
Age
18–24
25–34
35–49
50–64
65 or older
Household income
$24,999 or less
$25,000–$49,999
$50,000–$74,999
$75,000 or more

Version 2

Number Percent
Number Percent
111.71
~%
112.90
~%

Version 3
Number Percent
115.70
~%

85.48
83.18

0.60 %
0.60

85.08
85.80

0.59 %
0.59

87.18
86.85

0.61 %
0.61

88.50
46.22
26.86
56.11
13.97
20.16

0.59 %
0.41
0.25
0.48
0.13
0.19

88.70
46.70
25.58
57.97
14.25
23.68

0.59 %
0.40
0.23
0.48
0.13
0.21

90.94
47.49
26.42
58.95
14.97
20.88

0.61 %
0.42
0.24
0.50
0.14
0.19

50.11
45.33
57.51
61.19
60.13

0.44 %
0.41
0.49
0.51
0.51

47.80
44.75
58.48
64.65
61.51

0.41 %
0.40
0.49
0.52
0.50

51.46
46.64
60.33
64.36
59.61

0.45 %
0.42
0.51
0.53
0.51

66.19
62.42
50.81
64.92

0.54 %
0.52
0.45
0.54

67.09
64.69
52.16
64.00

0.53 %
0.52
0.45
0.52

68.14
64.03
52.94
66.74

0.56 %
0.53
0.46
0.55

*White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-3

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 4. Standard errors for Table 4: Prevalence of identity theft in the
past 12 months, by type of identity theft and instrument version
Version 1*
Version 2
Version 3
Number of Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all
victims
resondents/a victims
resondents/a victims
resondents/a
71.10
0.57
69.41
0.55 ++
67.40
0.55 ++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
46.88
0.42
44.03
0.38
Bank
53.49
0.47
49.23
0.42
Social media
~
~
44.19
0.38
Other
48.58
0.43
37.40
0.33
New account
31.63
0.29
29.08
0.26
Personal information
22.14
0.21
19.59
0.18
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-4

++
++
++
++
++

45.62
50.65
~
38.43
22.35
19.55

0.41
0.44
~
0.35
0.21
0.18

++
++
++
++
++

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 5. Standard errors for Table 5: Persons age 18 or older who
experienced one or more incidents of identity theft during the past 12 months, by
victim characteristics and instrument version

Sex

Total

Version 3
Version 1*
Version 2
Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
71.10
0.57
69.41
0.55 ++
67.40
0.55 ++

Male
52.72
0.84
48.81
0.78 ++
49.53
0.82 ++
Female
50.17
0.76
51.24
0.76 ++
47.43
0.75 ++
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White
53.86
0.68
50.68
0.64 ++
47.51
0.63 ++
Black
24.81
1.69
28.57
1.75
27.43
1.78
Asian
14.95
2.56
11.92
2.33 ++
12.20
2.25 ++
Hispanic
37.72
1.60
35.44
1.56 ++
36.87
1.64 ++
Other
6.88
5.11
5.91
4.56
6.93
4.31
Two or more races
11.37
3.13
15.25
3.24
13.21
3.56
Age
18–24
33.56
2.06
28.02
1.82 ++
29.94
2.01 ++
25–34
29.04
1.23
27.84
1.14 ++
27.11
1.19 ++
35–49
36.08
1.10
36.39
1.10 ++
33.86
1.10 ++
50–64
36.65
1.14
36.64
1.13 ++
35.41
1.13 ++
65 or older
28.65
1.12
29.82
1.12 +
27.64
1.08 ++
Household income
$24,999 or less
38.71
1.29
36.44
1.23 ++
36.61
1.26 ++
$25,000–$49,999
36.34
1.09
37.59
1.07 ++
34.00
1.05 ++
$50,000–$74,999
30.50
1.23
29.15
1.16 ++
30.16
1.22 ++
$75,000 or more
40.77
0.98
38.83
0.94 ++
37.07
0.95 ++
Urbanicity
Urban
66.80
0.62
65.16
0.59 ++
62.41
0.59 ++
Non-urban
26.05
1.48
25.00
1.45 ++
25.79
1.55 ++
Unknown
4.81
9.39
5.72
9.01
7.58
9.51
Note: Percentages are based on the number of persons in each category.
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-5

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 6. Standard errors for Table 6. Most recent incident of identity
theft, by type of identity theft and instrument version
Version 1*
Number Percent of all Percent of
of victims resondents/a all victims
71.10
0.57
~

Total
Only one type of existing account
Credit card
32.01
0.29
0.74
Bank
36.70
0.33
0.82
Social media
~
~ ~
~
Other
30.20
0.28
0.70
Opened new account only
14.54
0.14
0.36
Misused personal information only
10.18
0.10
0.26
Multiple types
42.70
0.38
0.89
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Version 2
Number of Percent of all Percent of
victims
resondents/a all victims
69.41 0.55 ++
~

31.85
38.34
33.93
24.01
15.68
9.34
24.05

0.28 ++
0.34
0.30
0.22 ++
0.14
0.09
0.22 ++

0.82
0.94
0.86
0.65
0.44
0.27
0.65

Version 3
Number of Percent of all Percent of
victims
resondents/ all victims
67.40
0.55 ++
~
35.81
39.28
~
21.83
12.13
10.32
35.06

++
++
+
++

0.33
0.35
~
~
0.20 ++
0.11 ++
0.10
0.32 ++

0.96
1.02
~
0.65
0.37
0.32
0.95

++
++
++

Appendix Table 7. Standard errors for Table 7. Prevalence of identity theft, by type
of identity theft, instrument version, and reference period
Version 1 - 12-month
Version 2 - 12-month
Version 3 - 12-month
Version 2 - Lifetime*
Number of
Percent of all Number of Percent of all
Number of Percent of all
Number of Percent of all
victims
resondents/a victims
resondents/a
victims
respondents/a victims
resondents/
71.10
0.57 %++
69.41
0.55 %++
67.40
0.55 ++
96.63
0.55 %

Total
Existing account
Credit card
46.88
0.42 ++
44.03
Bank
53.49
0.47 ++
49.23
Social media
~
~
44.19
Other
48.58
0.43 ++
37.40
New account
31.63
0.29 ++
29.08
Personal information
22.14
0.21 ++
19.59
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.

C-6

0.38
0.42
0.38
0.33
0.26
0.18

++
++
++
++
++
++

45.62
50.65
~
38.43
22.35
19.55

0.41
0.44
~
0.35
0.21
0.18

++
++
++
++
++

71.07
75.86
64.93
55.29
44.51
31.63

0.55
0.57
0.52
0.46
0.39
0.28

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 8. Standard errors for Table 8. Persons age 18 or older who
experienced one or more incidents of identity theft, by victim characteristics,
instrument version, and reference period

Sex

Total

Version 1 - 12-month
Version 2 - 12-month
Version 3 - 12-month
Version 2 - Lifetime
Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
0.55 %
96.63
0.55 %
67.40
71.10
0.57 %
69.41
0.55 %

Male*
52.72
0.84 %
48.81
0.78 %
49.53
0.82
47.43
0.75
Female
50.17
0.76
51.24
0.76
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White*
53.86
0.68 %
50.68
0.64 %
47.51
0.63 %
Black
24.81
1.69
28.57
1.75 ++
27.43
1.78 ++
12.20
2.25
2.56
11.92
2.33
Asian
14.95
Hispanic
37.72
1.60 ++
35.44
1.56 ++
36.87
1.64 ++
Other
6.88
5.11
5.91
4.56
6.93
4.31
Two or more races
11.37
3.13
15.25
3.24 +
13.21
3.56 ++
Age
2.01 %
29.94
28.02
1.82 %
18–24
33.56
2.06 %
25–34
29.04
1.23 +
27.84
1.14
27.11
1.19
33.86
1.10
35–49*
36.08
1.10
36.39
1.10
50–64
36.65
1.14 ++
36.64
1.13 ++
35.41
1.13
27.64
1.08 ++
65 or older
28.65
1.12 ++
29.82
1.12 ++
Household income
36.61
1.26 %
$24,999 or less
38.71
1.29 %++
36.44
1.23 %++
$25,000–$49,999
36.34
1.09 ++
37.59
1.07 ++
34.00
1.05
1.23
30.16
1.22
$50,000–$74,999
30.50
29.15
1.16
$75,000 or more*
40.77
0.98
38.83
0.94
37.07
0.95
Urbanicity
Urban
66.80
0.62 %
65.16
0.59 %
62.41
0.59 %
1.55
Non-urban
26.05
1.48
25.00
1.45
25.79
Unknown
4.81
9.39
7.58
9.51
5.72
9.01
Note: Percentages are based on the number of persons in each category.
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

69.48
73.28

0.82 %
0.74 ++

74.61
37.47
19.71
48.72
11.98
20.81

0.66
1.74
2.76
1.48
5.45
2.74

38.37
38.19
49.43
54.15
48.85

1.85 %++
1.06
1.04
1.13 +
1.30 ++

52.51
52.80
44.05
55.88

1.34 %++
1.09 ++
1.15 ++
0.86

90.60
38.55
6.91

0.59 %
1.50
7.21

%
++
++
++

C-7

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 9. Standard errors for Table 9. Relationship between lifetime
prevalence and 12-month prevalence, by type of identity theft (Version 2)

Lifetime prevalence

12-month prevalence

Number of Percent of all Number of Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
0.55 %
69.41
0.55 %
96.63

Total
Existing account
44.03
71.07
0.55
Credit card
49.23
Bank
75.86
0.57
0.52
44.19
Social media
64.93
Other
55.29
0.46
37.40
New account
44.51
0.39
29.08
Personal information
31.63
0.28
29.08
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-8

0.38
0.42
0.38
0.33
0.26
0.18

Percent of
lifetime victims
No past year id
theft
0.70 %
0.93
0.95
1.11
1.37
1.61
1.79

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 10. Standard errors for Table 10. Relationship between lifetime
prevalence and 12-month prevalence of identity theft, by victim characteristics

Lifetime prevalence (any
identity theft)*

Sex

Total

12-month prevalence (any
identity theft)

Number of Percent of all Number of Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
reespondents/a
96.63
0.55
69.41
0.55

Percent of
lifetime victims
No past year id
theft
0.70

Male*
69.48
0.55
48.81
0.42
1.03
Female
73.28
0.56 ++
51.24
0.44
0.97
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White*
74.61
0.57
50.68
0.43
0.84
Black
37.47
0.33
28.57
0.26 ++
2.18
Asian
19.71
0.18 ++
11.92
0.11
3.40
Hispanic
48.72
0.42 ++
35.44
0.31 ++
1.91
Other/b
11.98
0.11
5.91
0.05
5.99
Two or more races
20.81
0.19 ++
15.25
0.14 +
3.81
Age
18–24
38.37
0.34 ++
28.02
0.25
2.42
25–34
38.19
0.34
27.84
0.25
1.38
35–49*
49.43
0.43
36.39
0.32
1.33
50–64
54.15
0.46 +
36.64
0.32 ++
1.47
65 or older
48.85
0.42 ++
29.82
0.27 ++
1.61
Household income
$24,999 or less
52.51
0.44 ++
36.44
0.32 ++
1.75
$25,000–$49,999
52.80
0.45 ++
37.59
0.33 ++
1.41
$50,000–$74,999
44.05
0.38 ++
29.15
0.26
1.49
$75,000 or more*
55.88
0.47
38.83
0.34
1.14
Urbanicity
Urban*
90.60
0.58
65.16
0.52
0.76
Non-urban
38.55
0.34
25.00
0.23 ++
1.97
Unknown
6.91
0.06
5.72
0.05 ++
10.19
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of
Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

++
++
+

++
++
++

+
++

C-9

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 11. Standard errors for Table 11. Prevalence of identity theft
during the past 12 months, by type of identity theft, instrument version, and
exclusion of attempts
Version 1 - attempts
Version 3
Version 1 - all
excluded*/a
Version 2
Number Percent of all Number Percent of all
Number Percent of all Number Percent of all
of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/b of victims respondents/b of victims resondents/a
71.10
0.57 ++
69.50 0.56
69.41
0.55 ++
67.40
0.55 ++

Total
Existing account
Credit card
32.01
0.29
31.70 0.29
Bank
36.70
0.33
35.54 0.32
Social media
~
~
~
~
Other
30.20
0.28
29.27 0.27
New account
14.54
0.14
13.00 0.12
Personal information
10.18
0.10
9.25 0.09
Multiple types
42.70
0.38
42.22 0.38
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.

31.85
38.34
33.93
24.01
15.68
9.34
24.05

0.28
0.34
0.30
0.22
0.14
0.09
0.22

++
+
++

35.81
39.28
~
21.83
12.13
10.32
35.06

0.33
0.35
~
0.20 ++
0.11
0.10
0.32 ++

~Not applicable.
a/Excludes victims who selected response option 9 ('not applicable, it was not actually misused) for Q10 (how long had your
personal information been misused before you discovered it.')
b/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Appendix Table 12. Standard errors for Table 12. Percentage of victims providing a
date of occurrence prior to or outside the 12-month reference period or providing
a “don't know” response, by type of identity theft (Version 2)
Out of reference
Number of victims period/a

Dating
error/b

Don't
know/missing

Within
reference period

Existing account
Credit card
44.03
1.17 %++
0.35
0.50 +
Bank
49.23
1.19 %++
0.42
0.44 ++
Social media
44.19
1.19 %++
0.35
0.60
Other
37.40
1.55 %++
0.48
0.94
New account
29.08
2.24 %
1.01
0.80
Personal information*
19.59
2.65 %
1.32
1.13
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date of June 2019 or earlier.
b/Includes victims who erroneously provided a date in the future (August/September 2020 or beyond).
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-10

1.27
1.28
1.32
1.74
2.40
2.86

++
++
++
++

C-11

Appendix Table 13. Standard errors for Table 13. Percentage of victims providing a date of occurrence prior to or
outside the 12-month reference period or providing a “don't know” response, by characteristics of victims and
select types of identity theft (Version 2)

Sex

Total

Credit card misuse
Out of
Don't
Number reference Dating
know/
missing
of victims period/a error/b
44.03 1.17
0.35
0.50

Within
reference
period
1.27

Banking account misuse
Out of
Don't
Number reference Dating
know/
of victims period/a error/b missing
49.23 1.19
0.42
0.44
0.66
0.58

1.93
1.70

Out of
Number reference
of victims period/a
29.08 2.24
21.49
19.71

3.30
2.93

Dating
error/b
1.01

Within
Don't know/ reference
period
missing
0.80
2.40

1.77
0.81

0.45
1.60 +

16.90 3.26
14.77 5.04
3.98 6.05 +
17.76 4.26
1.21 0.00 ++
4.00 13.15

0.93
1.77
0.00
2.58
0.00
0.00

0.29
3.42 +
0.00
0.92
0.00
0.00

3.48
3.22
3.32
5.75
6.05 ++
4.56 +
0.00 ++
13.15

Personal information
Don't
Out of
Number reference Dating
know/
of victims period/a error/b missing
19.59 2.65
1.32
1.13
14.76
12.95

3.69
3.79

2.18
1.20

1.48
1.73

10.62 3.46
7.83 6.75
2.91 7.45 +
14.00 5.10
1.11 21.72
2.49 9.66

1.26
0.00 +
0.00 +
3.22
0.00 +
0.00 +

1.28
4.60
0.00 ++
1.68
0.00 ++
0.00 ++

Within
reference
period
2.86
4.00
4.04

0.68
1.39
0.00 ++
0.56
0.00 ++
0.73

1.52
3.45 ++
6.43
2.93 ++
13.99
2.80 ++

3.65
7.16
7.45 ++
5.55
21.72
9.66 +

1.57
0.98
0.30
0.73
2.24 ++

4.41
2.40
2.19
2.80
3.36 ++

9.71
12.91
16.59
15.44
8.85

7.24
3.38 ++
4.24
3.89 ++
8.10

3.14
2.11
1.12
3.28
0.00

0.53
0.15
0.84
2.37
6.83

7.35
3.74 +
4.28
5.22 +
9.44

6.91
9.48
9.69
10.95
5.92

8.88
4.53
3.97
7.27
4.62 ++

0.00
2.29 +
0.28
5.07
0.00

5.45
1.05
1.46
2.61
6.92

9.22
4.76
4.13
7.79
8.20

1.26
0.75
0.88
0.59

3.22 ++
2.39
2.66 ++
1.94

18.10
16.07
10.75
12.31

4.88
4.14
4.89 ++
3.59

1.29
2.32
3.07
1.52

2.47
0.79
0.35
0.86

5.17 +
4.49
5.17 ++
3.83

11.66
11.46
7.73
7.70

5.83
4.82
5.41
4.49

0.41
4.03
2.18
2.21

2.60
1.95
2.46
1.75

5.98
5.83
5.71
4.80

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Male*
32.04 1.68
0.59
0.57
1.81
35.54 1.77
0.78
Female
30.66 1.61
0.37
0.83
1.78
34.67 1.61
0.36
Race/Hispanic origin/c
White*
31.15 1.38
0.21
0.80
1.55
32.41 1.40
0.06
Black
17.02 4.54 ++
1.30
1.07
4.67 ++
21.66 3.19 +
1.15
Asian
7.96 4.73
0.00 ++
0.00 ++
4.73
7.55 5.95
2.89
Hispanic
24.25 2.46
1.25
0.66
2.75
27.55 2.78 ++
1.32 ++
Other/b
4.48 4.59 +
0.00 ++
0.00 ++
4.59 ++
4.57 13.99
0.00 +
Two or more races
6.44 9.10
0.00 ++
1.28
9.10
11.04 2.70 ++
0.00 +
Age
18–24
15.22 5.92
0.00 +
0.50
5.93
20.67 4.13
1.71
25–34
16.29 2.44
0.42
1.24
2.63
21.71 2.28
0.26
35–49*
22.08 2.25
0.55
0.51
2.33
26.05 2.08
0.84
50–64
23.71 2.31 +
1.20
1.33 +
2.77
24.49 2.59
1.08
65 or older
20.86 1.49 ++
0.47
1.20 +
1.95 ++
17.64 2.64 ++
0.00 ++
Household income
$24,999 or less
19.82 3.89 ++
0.20 +
1.11
3.96 ++
26.48 3.00 ++
1.24
$25,000–$49,999
23.33 2.01
1.20
1.14
2.48
27.62 2.15
1.03
$50,000–$74,999
18.38 2.82 ++
0.69
0.96
2.96 ++
20.14 2.58 ++
0.14
$75,000 or more*
26.53 1.45
0.34
0.80
1.65
24.82 1.85
0.31
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date of June 2019 or earlier.
b/Includes victims who provided a date prior to when the interview occurred (August/September 2020 or later).
a/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

New account
Within
reference
period
1.28

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 14. Standard errors for Table 14. Relationship between the date of
most recent occurrence and the date of discovery, by type of identity theft

Percentage of victims
Total
Number

Same month/
year

Different month/ Missing/don't know/out
year
of reference period

Existing account
Credit card
31.85
2.28 %++
2.10 %++
Bank
38.34
2.01 ++
1.86 ++
Social media
33.93
2.17 ++
1.99 ++
Other
24.01017
2.85 ++
2.68 ++
New account
15.68353
4.53
4.71 ++
Personal information* 9.339869
5.30
5.46
Multiple types
24.05309
3.19 ++
2.99 ++
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-12

1.59 %
1.59
1.55
1.99
4.49 +
3.74
2.82 +

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 15. Standard errors for Table 15. Relationship between the date of
most recent occurrence and the date of discovery, by victim characteristics

Sex

Total

Percentage of victims
Missing/don't
Total
Same month/ Different
know/out of
number year
month/ year
reference period
1.03
0.96
0.79
69.41

Male*
48.81
1.51
1.43
1.19
Female
51.24
1.41 ++
1.29 ++
1.06
Race/Hispanic origin/a
White*
50.68
1.29
1.18
0.90
Black
28.57
2.79 ++
2.67 ++
2.49 ++
Asian
11.92
4.87 ++
4.42
4.06
Hispanic
35.44
2.45 ++
2.39 ++
2.05 ++
Other/b
5.91
9.38 ++
9.46
11.03
Two or more races
15.25
5.75
5.34
3.29
Age
2.88
2.76
18–24
28.02
3.14
25–34
27.84
1.88
1.89
1.49
35–49*
36.39
1.89
1.79
1.55
50–64
36.64
2.29 ++
2.12 ++
1.49 ++
65 or older
29.82
2.68 ++
2.34 ++
1.98
Household income
$24,999 or less
36.44
2.36 ++
2.29 ++
2.18 ++
2.00 ++
1.54
$25,000–$49,999
37.59
2.08 ++
1.97
1.67 ++
$50,000–$74,999
29.15
2.18 +
$75,000 or more*
38.83
1.66
1.50
1.07
Urbanicity
Urban*
65.16
1.10
1.02
0.85
Non-urban
25.00
2.96
2.77
2.21
Unknown
5.72
10.83 +
11.30 ++
3.48 ++
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude
persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-13

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 16. Standard errors for Table 16. Time from discovery of the most
recent incident to the interview, by questionnaire version and type of identity theft
Percentage of victims
Total number Less than 1
7-12
13-24
of victims
month
1-6 months months
months

25-36
months

More than
36 months

Version 1
0.92
0.86
0.32
0.30
0.22
0.26
69.55
Total
Existing account
68.26
0.94 ++
0.31
0.22
0.27
0.88
0.30
New account
30.60
2.02
2.05 ++
0.93
0.91 ++
0.65 +
1.00
Personal information
21.79
2.12
2.18 ++
0.91
0.93 ++
0.71 ++
1.55
Version 2
Total
67.67
0.97
0.89
0.39
0.34
0.07
0.14
Existing account
66.94
0.98
0.91
0.38
0.35
0.07
0.14
New account
28.58
2.61
2.49
1.48
1.02
0.16
0.73
Personal information
19.36
2.97
2.90
1.75
1.17
0.17
1.22
Version 3
Total
65.67
1.04
0.98
0.31
0.41
0.12
0.13
Existing account
64.42
1.07 ++
1.00
0.30
0.43
0.13
0.13
New account
21.96
2.55 ++
2.55
1.12
0.78
0.35
0.12 +
Personal information
19.21
2.53 ++
2.01 +
0.52
0.12 ++
0.93
2.43 ++
Note: Based on unweighted data. Includes victims who provided a month and year of discovery. For version 1 about
2% of victims were missing the date; version 2 about 1.5%; and version 3 about 4%.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-14

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 17. Standard errors for Table 17. Relationship between the time of
most recent occurrence and how long the identity theft had been happened when
it was discovered
Lenth of time from interview to most recent occurrence - Version 2
How long ID theft had been
happening when discovered
One day or less (1-24 hours)
More than a day, but less than a
week (25 hours-6 days)
At least a week, but less than one
month (7-30 days)
One month to less than three
months
Three months to less than six
Six months to less than one year
One year or more
Not applicable, not actually
misued
Unknown
Total Count

Same
month

1 to 6
months

7 to 12
months

Out of reference
period

Dating
error/a

Total

Version 1* Version 3

3.18

1.40 ++

1.94 ++

2.82 ++

5.03 ++

0.99 ++

0.93

1.05 ++

2.66

1.27 ++

1.77 ++

2.10

4.00 ++

0.88 ++

0.78

0.91 +

2.09

1.04 ++

1.30 +

2.09

3.91

0.71 ++

0.54

0.72 ++

1.52

0.86 ++

1.12 ++

2.31 ++

8.03 +

0.62 ++

0.51

0.67 ++

1.88 +

0.59

0.77

1.32 +

9.49 ++

0.47 ++

0.31

0.36

1.06

0.44

0.72

0.76

8.61

0.35

0.30

0.21

0.60

0.40

0.41

1.21 ++

0.45 ++

0.27

0.23

0.25

0.41

1.89

0.76

1.01

5.32

0.57

0.52

0.73 ++

2.15 ++

48.00
35.49
24.50
9.06
68.65
70.96
67.21
26.65
Note: Includes victims who provided a month and year of most recent occurrence. The percentage of victims not providing a month or year
varied depending on the type of identity theft but was generally less than 1%.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Includes victims who provided a date prior to when the interview occurred (August/September 2020
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

Appendix Table 18. Standard errors for Table 18. Prevalence of identity theft in the
past 12 months, by type of identity theft, survey administrator, and mode
2018 Census ITS*
Number of
Percent of all
victims
adults/a
404,533
0.13 %

NORC Version 1
Total
Web
Phone
Number of
Percent of all
Number of
Percent of all
Number of
Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/
71.10
0.57 %+
69.94
0.58 %+
13.92
2.26 %

Total
Existing account
Credit card
249,521
0.09
46.88
0.42 +
46.04
Bank
247,852
0.09
53.49
0.47 +
52.64
Other
105,612
0.04
48.58
0.43 +
47.95
New account
83,565
0.03
31.63
0.29 +
31.13
Personal information
57,890
0.02
22.14
0.21 +
21.51
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
~Not applicable.
a/Based on the population of US residents age 16 or older.
b/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018; 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

0.43
0.48
0.45
0.30
0.21

+
+
+
+
+

9.19
9.89
8.07
5.65
5.27

1.57
1.67
1.39
0.98
0.92

C-15

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 19. Standard errors for Table 19. Persons ages 18 or older who
experienced one or more incidents of identity theft during the past 12 months, by
victim characteristics, survey administrator, and mode

Sex

Total

NORC Version 1
2018 Census ITS*
Total
Web
Phone
Number of Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all Number of
Percent of all
victims
respondents/a victims
respondents/a
persons 16+ victims
respondents/a victims
404,533
0.13
71.10
0.57 %+
69.94
0.58 %+
13.92
2.26 %+

Male
218,952
0.15
52.72
0.84 %+
52.17
0.86 %+
Female
266,345
8.96
50.17
0.76 +
48.94
0.79 +
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White
340,618
0.16
53.86
0.68 %+
52.90
0.70 %+
Black
115,445
0.36
24.81
1.69 +
24.01
1.79 +
Asian
72,413
0.43
14.95
2.56 +
14.94
2.57 +
Hispanic
111,287
0.26
37.72
1.60 +
37.34
1.60 +
Other
21,422
1.29
6.88
5.11 +
6.50
5.81 +
Two or more races
44,813
1.18
11.37
3.13 +
11.08
3.28 +
Age
16-17
23,084
0.29
%+
%+
18–24
109,226
0.31
33.56
2.06 +
33.56
2.06 +
25–34
152,687
0.29
29.04
1.23 +
29.02
1.23 +
35–49
174,922
0.23
36.08
1.10 +
35.91
1.10 +
50–64
177,378
0.25
36.65
1.14 +
35.64
1.16 +
65 or older
124,257
0.21
28.65
1.12 +
26.79
1.25 +
Household income
$24,999 or less
116,448
0.23
38.71
1.29 %+
37.44
1.38 %+
$25,000–$49,999
173,663
0.24
36.34
1.09 +
35.52
1.12 +
$50,000–$74,999
152,880
0.27
30.50
1.23 +
30.12
1.25 +
$75,000 or more
265,643
0.21
40.77
0.98 +
40.66
0.99 +
Urbanicity
Urban
260,802
0.21
66.80
0.62 %+
65.78
0.63 %+
Non-urban
355,987
0.16
26.05
1.48 +
25.32
1.55 +
Unknown
~
~
4.81
9.39
4.81
9.39
Note: Percentages are based on the number of persons in each category.
*Comparison group.
†Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
‡Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Identity Theft Supplement, 2018; 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-16

7.89
11.48

3.44 %+
2.94 +

10.63
6.32
0.63
5.40
2.26
2.55

2.82 %+
4.67 +
16.01 +
10.41
8.77
10.11
%

0.00
0.94
3.51
8.67
10.28

18.67
12.14 +
5.44 +
2.43 +

9.95
7.83
4.88
3.14

3.32
4.66
6.86
4.02

12.47
6.20
0.00

%+
+
+
+

2.59 %+
4.58 +

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 20. Standard errors for Table 20. Prevalence of identity theft in the
past 12 months accounting for Version 2 victims who failed to provide dates of
occurrence or who provided dates of occurrence outside the reference period, by
type of identity theft, victim race/Hispanic origin, and instrument version
Version 1
Version 2 -ORIGINAL
Version 2 - NEW*
Version 3
Number of Percent of all Number Percent of all Number of Percent of all Number of Percent of all
victims
resondents/a of
resondents/a victims/b
resondents/a victims
resondents/a
71.10
0.57 ++
69.41
0.55 ++
62.09
0.51
67.40
0.55 ++

Total
Type of ID theft
Existing account
Credit card
46.88
0.42 ++
44.03
0.38 ++
39.99
0.35
45.62
Bank
53.49
0.47 ++
49.23
0.42 ++
43.39
0.38
50.65
Social media
~
~
44.19
0.38 ++
39.82
0.35
~
Other
48.58
0.43 ++
37.40
0.33 ++
32.08
0.29
38.43
New account
31.63
0.29 ++
29.08
0.26 ++
24.03
0.22
22.35
Personal information
22.14
0.21 ++
19.59
0.18 ++
15.58
0.14
19.55
Race/Hispanic origin/c
White
53.86
0.47 ++
50.68
0.43 ++
45.02
0.39
47.51
Black
24.81
0.23 ++
28.57
0.26 ++
24.88
0.22
27.43
Asian
14.95
0.14 ++
11.92
0.11 +
10.72
0.10
12.20
Hispanic
37.72
0.34 ++
35.44
0.31 ++
31.80
0.28
36.87
Other
6.88
0.06 ++
5.91
0.05
5.23
0.05
6.93
Two or more races
11.37
0.11
15.25
0.14
14.10
0.13
13.21
Note: Standard errors provided in appendix tables.
~Not applicable.
*Comparison group.
+Significant difference from comparison group at 95% confidence level.
++Significant difference from comparison group at 90% confidence level.
a/Based on a representative sample of US residents age 18 or older.
b/Includes only victims who provided dates of occurrence within the reference period.
c/White, black, Asian other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

0.41
0.44
~
0.35
0.21
0.18

++
++

0.42
0.25
0.11
0.33
0.07
0.12

++
++
++

+
++
+

Appendix Table 21. Standard errors for table 22. Unweighted prevalence of
identity theft in past 12 months, by type of identity theft and mode
Total
Web
Phone
Number of
Percent of
Percent of
Number of
Percent of
Number of
victims
surveyed adults/a victims
surveyed adults/a victims
surveyed adults/a
87.57
0.27
87.23
0.28
16.24
1.14

Total
Existing account
Credit card
70.25
0.22
69.69
Bank
74.47
0.23
74.02
Social media
39.14
0.12
38.84
Other
66.76
0.21
66.47
New account
57.62
0.18
57.39
Personal information
54.37
0.17
54.15
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

0.22
0.24
0.13
0.21
0.19
0.17

11.20
10.89
5.10
7.61
5.91
5.47

0.84
0.81
0.40
0.58
0.46
0.42

C-17

Identity Theft Screener Online Testing

Appendix Table 22. Standard errors for Table 23. Unweighted prevalence of
identity theft in the past 12 months, by type of identity theft and platform
AmeriSpeak
Lucid
MTurk
Total
Number of Percent of
Number of Percent of surveyed Number of Percent of
Number of Percent of
surveyed adults/a victims
adults/a
victims
surveyed adults/a
victims
surveyed adults/a victims
87.57
0.27
56.49
0.45
60.67
0.46
63.79
0.50

Total
Existing account
Credit card
70.25
0.22
39.09
0.34
Bank
74.47
0.23
38.40
0.33
Social media
39.14
0.12
20.34
0.18
Other
66.76
0.21
31.87
0.28
New account
57.62
0.18
21.95
0.20
Personal information
54.37
0.17
18.26
0.16
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

43.02
49.34
22.75
41.70
36.78
34.97

0.36
0.40
0.20
0.35
0.31
0.30

48.09
51.53
25.58
47.57
41.81
39.94

0.43
0.45
0.25
0.43
0.39
0.37

Appendix Table 23. Standard errors for Table 24. Unweighted persons age 18 or
older who experienced one or more incidents of identity theft during the past 12
months, by victim characteristics and mode

Sex

Total

Total
Number of
Percent of
victims
surveyed adults
87.57
0.27

Web
Number of
Percent of
victims
surveyed adults
87.23
0.28

Phone
Percent of
Number of
surveyed adults
victims
1.14
16.24

0.40
9.63
1.90
71.07
0.39
Male
71.47
Female
70.94
0.38
70.18
0.39
13.12
1.42
Race/Hispanic origin/b
White
74.24
0.33
73.64
0.34
12.54
1.36
Black
38.53
0.82
37.86
0.86
7.48
2.54
Asian/c
21.95
1.31
21.86
1.32
2.00
15.49
Hispanic
52.34
0.67
52.20
0.68
4.24
5.29
Other
10.98
2.56
10.52
2.73
3.16
7.14
Two or more races
18.74
1.63
18.21
1.70
4.47
5.72
Age
18–24
34.64
0.93
34.64
0.93
0.00
0.00
25–34
56.59
0.58
56.57
0.58
1.73
10.33
35–49
57.41
0.54
57.33
0.55
3.46
6.47
50–64
47.73
0.55
46.97
0.56
9.21
2.57
65 or older
38.54
0.56
36.53
0.62
12.85
1.29
Household income
$24,999 or less
46.45
0.61
45.47
0.64
10.23
1.74
$25,000–$49,999
54.33
0.53
53.74
0.54
8.99
2.10
$50,000–$74,999
49.76
0.60
49.47
0.61
5.83
3.27
$75,000 or more
61.00
0.48
60.72
0.48
6.78
2.84
a/Based on a representative sample of the population of US residents age 18 or older.
b/White, black, Asian, other race, and persons of two or more race categories exclude persons of Hispanic/Latino origin.
Source: 2020 RTI/Amerispeak Identity Theft Survey.

C-18

Appendix C — Standard Error Tables

Appendix Table 24. Standard errors for Table 25. Unweighted persons age 18 or
older who experienced one or more incidents of identity theft during the past 12
months, by victim characteristics and platform

C-19

File Type	application/pdf
Author	Harrell, Erika
File Modified	2021-04-26
File Created	2020-11-20