Download:
pdf |
pdfIRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
A. Introduction
1.
Title:
Reliability Coordination – Monitoring and Analysis
2.
Number:
IRO-002-6
3.
Purpose: To provide System Operators with the capabilities necessary to monitor
and analyze data needed to perform their reliability functions.
4.
Applicability:
4.1. Functional Entities:
4.1.1. Reliability Coordinators
5.
Effective Date: See Implementation Plan
B. Requirements and Measures
R1.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall have data exchange capabilities with its Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators, and with other entities it deems necessary,
for it to perform its Operational Planning Analyses. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium]
[Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
M1. Each Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request, evidence that could
include, but is not limited to, a document that lists its data exchange capabilities with
its Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators, and with other entities it deems
necessary, for it to perform its Operational Planning Analyses.
R2.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall have data exchange capabilities, with redundant and
diversely routed data exchange infrastructure within the Reliability Coordinator's
primary Control Center, for the exchange of Real-time data with its Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators, and with other entities it deems necessary,
for performing its Real-time monitoring and Real-time Assessments. [Violation Risk
Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-Day Operations, Real-time Operations]
M2. Each Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request, evidence that could
include, but is not limited to, system specifications, system diagrams, or other
documentation that lists its data exchange capabilities, including redundant and
diversely routed data exchange infrastructure within the Reliability Coordinator's
primary Control Center, for the exchange of Real-time data with its Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators, and with other entities it deems necessary,
as specified in the requirement.
R3.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall test its primary Control Center data exchange
capabilities specified in Requirement R2 for redundant functionality at least once
every 90 calendar days. If the test is unsuccessful, the Reliability Coordinator shall
initiate action within two hours to restore redundant functionality. [Violation Risk
Factor: Medium ] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
Page 1 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
M3. Each Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request, evidence that it
tested its primary Control Center data exchange capabilities specified in Requirement
R2 for redundant functionality, or experienced an event that demonstrated the
redundant functionality; and if the test was unsuccessful, initiated action within two
hours to restore redundant functionality as specified in Requirement R3. Evidence
could include, but is not limited to: dated and time-stamped test records, operator
logs, voice recordings, or electronic communications.
R4.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall provide its System Operators with the authority to
approve planned outages and maintenance of its telecommunication, monitoring and
analysis capabilities. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning,
Same-Day Operations, Real-time Operations]
M4. Each Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request evidence that could
include, but is not limited to, a documented procedure or equivalent evidence that
will be used to confirm that the Reliability Coordinator has provided its System
Operators with the authority to approve planned outages and maintenance of its
telecommunication, monitoring and analysis capabilities.
R5.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor Facilities, the status of Remedial Action
Schemes, and non-BES facilities identified as necessary by the Reliability Coordinator,
within its Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas to
identify any System Operating Limit exceedances and to determine any
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit exceedances within its Reliability
Coordinator Area. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Real-Time Operations]
M5. Each Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request, evidence that could
include, but is not limited to, Energy Management System description documents,
computer printouts, SCADA data collection, or other equivalent evidence that will be
used to confirm that it has monitored Facilities, the status of Remedial Action
Schemes, and non-BES facilities identified as necessary by the Reliability Coordinator,
within its Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas to
identify any System Operating Limit exceedances and to determine any
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit exceedances within its Reliability
Coordinator Area.
R6.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall have monitoring systems that provide information
utilized by the Reliability Coordinator’s operating personnel, giving particular
emphasis to alarm management and awareness systems, automated data transfers,
and synchronized information systems, over a redundant infrastructure. [Violation
Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Real-time Operations]
M6. The Reliability Coordinator shall have, and provide upon request, evidence that could
include, but is not limited to, Energy Management System description documents,
computer printouts, SCADA data collection, or other equivalent evidence that will be
used to confirm that it has monitoring systems consistent with the requirement.
Page 2 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
C. Compliance
1.
Compliance Monitoring Process
1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:
“Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any
entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in
their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with
mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective
jurisdictions.
1.2. Evidence Retention:
The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity
is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances
where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time
since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to
provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period
since the last audit.
The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as
identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to
retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.
•
•
•
The Reliability Coordinator shall retain its current, in force document and
any documents in force for the current year and previous calendar year for
Requirements R1, R2, and R4 and Measures M1, M2, and M4.
The Reliability Coordinator shall retain evidence for Requirement R3 and
Measure M3 for the most recent 12 calendar months, with the exception of
operator logs and voice recordings which shall be retained for a minimum of
90 calendar days.
The Reliability Coordinator shall keep data or evidence for Requirements R5
and R6 and Measures M5 and M6 for the current calendar year and one
previous calendar year.
1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program
As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Monitoring and
Enforcement Program” refers to the identification of the processes that will be
used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance
or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.
Page 3 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
Violation Severity Levels
R#
Violation Severity Levels
Lower VSL
Moderate VSL
High VSL
Severe VSL
R1.
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have data exchange
capabilities for performing its
Operational Planning Analyses
with one applicable entity, or
5% or less of the applicable
entities, whichever is greater.
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have data exchange
capabilities for performing its
Operational Planning Analyses
with two applicable entities, or
more than 5% or less than or
equal to 10% of the applicable
entities, whichever is greater.
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have data exchange
capabilities for performing its
Operational Planning Analyses
with three applicable entities,
or more than 10% or less than
or equal to 15% of the
applicable entities, whichever is
greater.
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have data exchange
capabilities for performing its
Operational Planning Analyses
with four or more applicable
entities or greater than 15% of
the applicable entities,
whichever is greater.
R2.
N/A
N/A
The Reliability Coordinator had
data exchange capabilities with
its Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators, and
with other entities it deems
necessary, for performing Realtime monitoring and Real-time
Assessments, but did not have
redundant and diversely routed
data exchange infrastructure
within the Reliability
Coordinator's primary Control
Center, as specified in the
requirement.
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have data exchange
capabilities with its Balancing
Authorities and Transmission
Operators, and with other
entities it deems necessary, for
performing Real-time
monitoring and Real-time
Assessments as specified in the
requirement.
R3.
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
Page 4 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
R#
R4.
Violation Severity Levels
Lower VSL
Moderate VSL
High VSL
Severe VSL
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality, but did so more
than 90 calendar days but less
than or equal to 120 calendar
days since the previous test;
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality, but did so more
than 120 calendar days but less
than or equal to 150 calendar
days since the previous test;
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality, but did so more
than 150 calendar days but less
than or equal to 180 calendar
days since the previous test;
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality, but did so more
than 180 calendar days since
the previous test;
OR
OR
OR
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality at least once
every 90 calendar days but,
following an unsuccessful test,
initiated action to restore the
redundant functionality in
more than 2 hours and less
than or equal to 4 hours.
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality at least once
every 90 calendar days but,
following an unsuccessful test,
initiated action to restore the
redundant functionality in
more than 4 hours and less
than or equal to 6 hours.
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality at least once
every 90 calendar days but,
following an unsuccessful test,
initiated action to restore the
redundant functionality in
more than 6 hours and less
than or equal to 8 hours.
N/A
N/A
N/A
OR
The Reliability Coordinator did
not test its primary Control
Center data exchange
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality;
OR
The Reliability Coordinator
tested its primary Control
Center data exchange
capabilities specified in
Requirement R2 for redundant
functionality at least once
every 90 calendar days but,
following an unsuccessful test,
did not initiate action within 8
hours to restore the redundant
functionality.
The Reliability Coordinator
failed to provide its System
Operator with the authority to
approve planned outages and
Page 5 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
R#
Violation Severity Levels
Lower VSL
Moderate VSL
High VSL
Severe VSL
maintenance of its
telecommunication, monitoring
and analysis capabilities.
R5.
N/A
N/A
N/A
The Reliability Coordinator did
not monitor Facilities, the
status of Remedial Action
Schemes, and non-BES facilities
identified as necessary by the
Reliability Coordinator, within
its Reliability Coordinator Area
and neighboring Reliability
Coordinator Areas to identify
any System Operating Limit
exceedances and to determine
any Interconnection Reliability
Operating Limit exceedances
within its Reliability
Coordinator Area.
R6.
N/A
N/A
N/A
The Reliability Coordinator did
not have monitoring systems
that provide information
utilized by the Reliability
Coordinator’s operating
personnel, giving particular
emphasis to alarm
management and awareness
systems, automated data
transfers, and synchronized
Page 6 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
R#
Violation Severity Levels
Lower VSL
Moderate VSL
High VSL
Severe VSL
information systems, over a
redundant infrastructure.
Page 7 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
D. Regional Variance
A. Regional Variance for the Western Electricity Coordinating Council Region
The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) region.
Purpose
To develop a methodology that creates models for performing Operational Planning
Analyses and Real-time Assessments.
Applicability
As used in this WECC Regional Variance, Reliability Coordinator is specific to those Reliability
Coordinators providing Reliability Coordinator service(s) to entities operating within the
Western Interconnection, regardless of where the Reliability Coordinator may be located.
Requirements and Measures
D.A.7.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall, in coordination with other Reliability
Coordinators, develop a common Interconnection-wide methodology to
determine the modeling and monitoring of BES and non-BES Elements that are
internal and external to its Reliability Coordinator Area, necessary for providing
operational awareness of the impacts on Bulk Electric System Facilities within its
Reliability Coordinator Area, including at a minimum: ([Violation Risk Factor:
High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning])
D.A.7.1.
A method for development, maintenance, and periodic review of
a Western Interconnection-wide reference model to serve as the
baseline from which Reliability Coordinator’s operational models
are derived;
D.A.7.2.
The impacts of Inter-area oscillations;
D.A.7.3.
A method to determine Contingencies included in analyses and
assessments;
D.A.7.4.
A method to determine Remedial Action Schemes included in
analyses and assessments;
D.A.7.5.
A method to determine forecast data included in analyses and
assessments; and
D.A.7.6.
A method for the validation and periodic review of the Reliability
Coordinator’s operational model for steady state and
dynamic/oscillatory system response.
M.D.A.7. Each Reliability Coordinator will have evidence that it developed a common
Western Interconnection-wide methodology, addressing modeling and
Page 8 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
monitoring, in coordination with other Reliability Coordinators, that includes the
features required in D.A.7.
D.A.8.
Each Reliability Coordinator shall use the methodology developed in D.A.7.
([Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning])
M.D.A.8. Each Reliability Coordinator will have evidence that it uses the methodology
developed in D.A.7., as required in D.A.8. above.
Compliance
Evidence Retention:
•
The Reliability Coordinator shall keep data or evidence for Requirements R5, R6, and
the WECC Regional Variance, and Measures M5, M6, and the WECC Regional
Variance for the current calendar year and one previous calendar year.
Violation Severity Levels for the WECC Regional Variance
R#
Lower VSL
Moderate VSL
High VSL
Severe VSL
D.A.7.
The Reliability Coordinator
did not develop the
methodology as required in
D.A.7.
D.A.8.
The Reliability Coordinator
did not implement the
methodology as required in
D.A.8.
E. Associated Documents
The Implementation Plan and other project documents can be found on the project page.
Page 9 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
Version History
Version
Date
Action
0
April 1,
2005
0
August 8,
2005
1
November Adopted by Board of Trustees
1, 2006
Change Tracking
Effective Date
New
Removed “Proposed” from Effective
Date
Errata
Revised
1
April 4,
2007
Replaced Levels of Non-compliance
with the Feb 28, BOT approved
Violation Severity Levels (VSLs)
Corrected typographical errors in
BOT approved version of VSLs
Revised to add missing
measures and compliance
elements
2
October
17, 2008
Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees
Deleted R2, M3 and
associated compliance
elements as conforming
changes associated with
approval of IRO-010-1.
Revised as part of IROL
Project
2
March 17, Order issued by FERC approving IRO2011
002-2 (approval effective 5/23/11)
FERC approval
2
February
24, 2014
Updated VSLs based on June 24,
2013 approval.
VSLs revised
3
July 25,
2011
Revised under Project 2006-06
Revised
3
August 4,
2011
Approved by Board of Trustees
Retired R1-R8 under Project
2006-06.
4
November Approved by Board of Trustees
13, 2014
Revisions under Project
2014-03
4
November FERC approved IRO-002-4. Docket
19, 2015 No. RM15-16-000
FERC approval
5
February
9, 2017
Adopted by Board of Trustees
5
April 17,
2017
FERC letter Order approved IRO-0025. Docket No. RD17-4-000
Revised
Page 10 of 13
IRO-002-6 - Reliability Coordination - Monitoring and Analysis
6
May 9,
2019
Adopted by the NERC Board of
Trustees
6
July 11,
2019
FERC Letter Order approved IRO-0026. Docket No. RD19-6-000
WECC Regional Variance
Page 11 of 13
Supplemental Material
Rationale
During development of IRO-002-5, text boxes are embedded within the standard to explain the
rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon Board adoption of IRO-002-5, the text from
the rationale text boxes will be moved to this section.
Rationale text from the development of IRO-002-4 in Project 2014-03 follows. Additional
information can be found on the Project 2014-03 project page.
Changes made to the proposed definitions were made in order to respond to issues raised in
NOPR paragraphs 55, 73, and 74 dealing with analysis of SOLs in all time horizons, questions on
Protection Systems and Special Protection Systems in NOPR paragraph 78, and
recommendations on phase angles from the SW Outage Report (recommendation 27). The
intent of such changes is to ensure that Real-time Assessments contain sufficient details to
result in an appropriate level of situational awareness. Some examples include: 1) analyzing
phase angles which may result in the implementation of an Operating Plan to adjust generation
or curtail transactions so that a Transmission facility may be returned to service, or 2)
evaluating the impact of a modified Contingency resulting from the status change of a Special
Protection Scheme from enabled/in-service to disabled/out-of-service.
Rationale for Requirements:
The data exchange elements of Requirements R1 and R2 from approved IRO-002-2 have been
added back into proposed IRO-002-4 in order to ensure that there is no reliability gap. The
Project 2014-03 SDT found no proposed requirements in the current project that covered the
issue. Voice communication is covered in proposed COM-001-2 but data communications needs
to remain in IRO-002-4 as it is not covered in proposed COM-001-2. Staffing of communications
and facilities in corresponding requirements from IRO-002-2 is addressed in approved PER-0042, Requirement R1 and has been deleted from this draft.
Rationale for R2:
Requirement R2 from IRO-002-3 has been deleted because approved EOP-008-1, Requirement
R1, part 1.6.2 addresses redundancy and back-up concerns for outages of analysis tools. New
Requirement R4 (R6 in IRO-002-5) has been added to address NOPR paragraphs 96 and 97:
“…As we explain above, the reliability coordinator’s obligation to monitor SOLs is important to
reliability because a SOL can evolve into an IROL during deteriorating system conditions, and for
potential system conditions such as this, the reliability coordinator’s monitoring of SOLs provides
a necessary backup function to the transmission operator….”
Rationale for Requirements R1 and R2:
The proposed changes address directives for redundancy and diverse routing of data exchange
capabilities (FERC Order No. 817 Para 47).
Redundant and diversely routed data exchange capabilities consist of data exchange
infrastructure components (e.g., switches, routers, servers, power supplies, and network
cabling and communication paths between these components in the primary Control Center for
the exchange of system operating data) that will provide continued functionality despite failure
Page 12 of 13
Supplemental Material
or malfunction of an individual component within the Reliability Coordinator's (RC) primary
Control Center. Redundant and diversely routed data exchange capabilities preclude single
points of failure in primary Control Center data exchange infrastructure from halting the flow of
Real-time data. Requirement R2 does not require automatic or instantaneous fail-over of data
exchange capabilities. Redundancy and diverse routing may be achieved in various ways
depending on the arrangement of the infrastructure or hardware within the RC's primary
Control Center.
The reliability objective of redundancy is to provide for continued data exchange functionality
during outages, maintenance, or testing of data exchange infrastructure. For periods of planned
or unplanned outages of individual data exchange components, the proposed requirements do
not require additional redundant data exchange infrastructure components solely to provide
for redundancy.
Infrastructure that is not within the RC's primary Control Center is not addressed by the
proposed requirement.
Rationale for Requirement R3:
The revised requirement addresses directives for testing of data exchange capabilities used in
primary Control Centers (FERC Order No. 817 Para 51).
A test for redundant functionality demonstrates that data exchange capabilities will continue to
operate despite the malfunction or failure of an individual component (e.g., switches, routers,
servers, power supplies, and network cabling and communication paths between these
components in the primary Control Center for the exchange of system operating data). An
entity's testing practices should, over time, examine the various failure modes of its data
exchange capabilities. When an actual event successfully exercises the redundant functionality,
it can be considered a test for the purposes of the proposed requirement.
Rationale for R4 (R6 in IRO-002-5):
The requirement was added back from approved IRO-002-2 as the Project 2014-03 SDT found
no proposed requirements that covered the issues.
Page 13 of 13
File Type | application/pdf |
Author | Mark Olson |
File Modified | 2019-07-11 |
File Created | 2019-07-11 |