In accordance
with 5 CFR 1320, the information collection and associated
revisions are approved.
Inventory as of this Action
Requested
Previously Approved
03/31/2019
36 Months From Approved
09/30/2018
1,415
0
1,415
1,569,410
0
1,214,042
0
0
0
Pursuant to sec. 215 of Federal Power
Act (FPA), in the Final Rule in RM15-14, FERC approves 7 critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) Reliability Standards: CIP-003-6
(Security Management Controls), CIP-004-6 (Personnel &
Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems),
CIP-007-6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 (Recovery Plans
for BES Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change Management
& Vulnerability Assessments), & CIP-011-2 (Information
Protection) (proposed CIP Reliability Stds.). North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), FERC-certified Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted 7 proposed CIP
Reliability Stds.in response to Order 791. FERC also approves
NERC’s implementation plan & violation risk factor &
violation severity level assignments. In addition, FERC approves
NERC’s new or revised definitions for inclusion in NERC Glossary of
Terms Used in Reliability Stds., subject to modification. Further,
FERC approves retirement of Reliability Stds.CIP-003-5, -004-5.1,
-006-5, -007-5, -009-5, -010-1, & -011-1. Proposed CIP
Reliability Stds. are designed to mitigate cybersecurity risks to
bulk electric system facilities, systems, & equipment, which,
if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable as a
result of a cybersecurity incident, would affect reliable operation
of Bulk-Power System. As discussed below, FERC finds that proposed
CIP Reliability Stds. are just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, & in public interest, &
address directives in Order 791 by: (1) eliminating “identify,
assess, & correct” language in 17 of CIP version 5 Std.
requirements; (2) providing enhanced security controls for Low
Impact assets; (3) providing controls to address risks posed by
transient electronic devices (e.g., thumb drives & laptop
computers) used at High & Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems;
& (4) addressing in an equally effective & efficient manner
need for a NERC Glossary definition for term “communication
networks.” Accordingly, FERC approves proposed CIP Reliability
Stds. because they improve base-line cybersecurity posture of
applicable entities compared to current Commission-approved CIP
Reliability Stds. In addition, pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(5),
FERC directs NERC to develop certain modifications to improve CIP
Reliability Stds. First, NERC is directed to develop modifications
to address protection of transient electronic devices used at Low
Impact BES Cyber Systems. Modifications developed by NERC should be
designed to effectively address, in an appropriately tailored
manner, risks posed by transient electronic devices to Low Impact
BES Cyber Systems. Second, FERC directs NERC to develop
modifications to CIP-006-6 to require protections for communication
network components & data communicated between all bulk
electric system Control Centers according to risk posed to bulk
electric system. With regard to questions raised in NOPR concerning
potential need for additional remote access controls, NERC must
conduct a comprehensive study that identifies strength of CIP
version 5 remote access controls, risks posed by remote
access-related threats & vulnerabilities, & appropriate
mitigating controls. Third, FERC directs NERC to develop
modifications to its definition for Low Impact External Routable
Connectivity. FERC, in NOPR, also proposed to direct that NERC
develop requirements relating to supply chain mgt. for industrial
control system hardware, software, & services. After review of
comments on this topic, FERC scheduled a staff-led technical
conference for 1/28/2016, in order to facilitate a structured
dialogue on supply chain risk mgt. issues identified by NOPR.
Accordingly, this Final Rule does not address supply chain risk
mgt. issues;rather, FERC will determine appropriate action on this
area after scheduled conference.
The CIP Reliability Standards
are designed to mitigate the cybersecurity risks to bulk electric
system facilities, systems, and equipment, which, if destroyed,
degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable as a result of a
cybersecurity incident, would affect the reliable operation of the
Bulk-Power System. FERC finds that the CIP Reliability Standards
are just and reasonable and address the directives in Order 791 by:
(1) eliminating the “identify, assess, and correct” language in 17
of the CIP version 5 Standard requirements; (2) providing enhanced
security controls for Low Impact assets; (3) providing controls to
address the risks posed by transient electronic devices (e.g.,
thumb drives and laptop computers) used at High and Medium Impact
BES Cyber Systems; and (4) addressing in an equally effective and
efficient manner the need for a NERC Glossary definition for the
term “communication networks.” Accordingly, the Commission approves
the CIP Reliability Standards because they improve the base-line
cybersecurity posture of applicable entities compared to the
current Commission-approved CIP Reliability Standards. FERC also
directed NERC to develop certain modifications as discussed in the
order.
$5,193
No
No
No
No
No
Uncollected
Kevin Ryan 202 502-6840
kevin.ryan@ferc.gov
No
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that
the collection of information encompassed by this request complies
with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR
1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding
the proposed collection of information, that the certification
covers:
(i) Why the information is being collected;
(ii) Use of information;
(iii) Burden estimate;
(iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a
benefit, or mandatory);
(v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
(vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control
number;
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of
these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked
and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.