DHS/TSA/019 Secure Flight Records

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Louis Farrell, Director, Student and
Exchange Visitor Program, MS 5600,
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 500 12th Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20536–5600; email:
sevp@ice.dhs.gov, telephone: (703) 603–
3400. This is not a toll-free number.
Program information can be found at
http://www.ice.gov/sevis/.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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What action is DHS taking under this
notice?
The Secretary of Homeland Security
is exercising authority under 8 CFR
214.2(f)(9) to extend the suspension of
the applicability of certain requirements
governing on-campus and off-campus
employment for F–1 nonimmigrant
students whose country of citizenship is
Syria and who are experiencing severe
economic hardship as a direct result of
the civil unrest in Syria since March
2011. See 77 FR 20038 (April 3, 2012).
The original notice was effective from
April 3, 2012 until October 3, 2013. A
subsequent notice provided for an 18month extension from October 3, 2013
through March 31, 2015. See 78 FR
36211 (June 17, 2013). Effective with
this publication, suspension of the
employment limitations is extended for
18 months from March 31, 2015 until
September 30, 2016.
F–1 nonimmigrant students granted
employment authorization through the
notice will continue to be deemed to be
engaged in a ‘‘full course of study’’ for
the duration of their employment
authorization, provided they satisfy the
minimum course load requirement
described in 77 FR 20038. See 8 CFR
214.2(f)(6)(i)(F).
Who is covered under this action?
This notice applies exclusively to F–
1 nonimmigrant students whose country
of citizenship is Syria and who were
lawfully present in the United States in
F–1 nonimmigrant status on April 3,
2012, under section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); and
are—
(1) Enrolled in an institution that is
Student and Exchange Visitor Program
(SEVP)-certified for enrollment of F–1
students,
(2) Currently maintaining F–1 status,
and
(3) Experiencing severe economic
hardship as a direct result of the civil
unrest in Syria since March 2011.
This notice applies to both
undergraduate and graduate students, as
well as elementary school, middle
school, and high school students. The
notice, however, applies differently to

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elementary school, middle school, and
high school students (see the discussion
published at 77 FR 20040, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-201204-03/pdf/2012-7960.pdf, in the
question, ‘‘Does this notice apply to
elementary school, middle school, and
high school students in F–1 status?’’).
F–1 students covered by this notice
who transfer to other academic
institutions that are SEVP-certified for
enrollment of F–1 students remain
eligible for the relief provided by means
of this notice.
Why is DHS taking this action?
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) took action to provide
temporary relief to F–1 nonimmigrant
students whose country of citizenship is
Syria and who experienced severe
economic hardship because of the civil
unrest in Syria since March 2011. See
77 FR 20038 (April 3, 2012). It enabled
these F–1 students to obtain
employment authorization, work an
increased number of hours while school
was in session, and reduce their course
load, while continuing to maintain their
F–1 student status.
Syria continues to experience civil
unrest, with many people still displaced
as a result. The United Nations reported
in late September 2014 that
approximately 6.4 million Syrians are
internally displaced. A number of
violent extremist groups have factored
prominently in the conflict and pose a
danger to civilians. In early 2014, the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) emerged as one of the most
significant radical Islamist fighting
forces. The al-Nusra Front (also known
as the Jabhat al Nusra) represents the
interests of al-Qaeda in Syria. These
Jihadist groups have engaged in
indiscriminate attacks including
bombings and suicide attacks
throughout Syria. Various other radical
Islamist organizations have been
actively engaged in armed resistance in
Syria. Furthermore, economic sanctions
imposed by the international
community have negatively affected the
whole of the Syrian economy. Given
conditions in Syria, affected students
whose primary means of financial
support comes from Syria may need to
be exempt from the normal student
employment requirements to be able to
continue their studies in the United
States and meet basic living expenses.
The United States is committed to
continuing to assist the people of Syria.
DHS is therefore extending this
employment authorization for F–1
nonimmigrant students whose country
of citizenship is Syria and who are
continuing to experience severe

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economic hardship as a result of the
civil unrest since March 2011.
How do I apply for an employment
authorization under the circumstances
of this notice?
F–1 nonimmigrant students whose
country of citizenship is Syria who were
lawfully present in the United States on
April 3, 2012, and are experiencing
severe economic hardship because of
the civil unrest may apply for
employment authorization under the
guidelines described in 77 FR 20038.
This notice extends the time period
during which such F–1 students may
seek employment authorization due to
the civil unrest. It does not impose any
new or additional policies or procedures
beyond those listed in the original
notice. All interested F–1 students
should follow the instructions listed in
the original notice.
Jeh Charles Johnson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014–30868 Filed 1–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–28–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS–2014–0076]

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of
Homeland Security Transportation
Security Administration—DHS/TSA–
019 Secure Flight Records System of
Records
Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice Privacy Act System of
Records.
AGENCY:

In accordance with the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Homeland Security proposes to update
and reissue a current Department of
Homeland Security system of records
titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland
Security/Transportation Security
Administration—DHS/TSA–019 Secure
Flight Records System of Records.’’ This
system of records allows the Department
of Homeland Security/Transportation
Security Administration to collect and
maintain records on aviation passengers
and certain non-travelers to screen such
individuals before they access airport
sterile areas or board aircraft, in order to
identify and prevent a threat to aviation
security or to the lives of passengers and
others. TSA is reissuing this system of
records to update the categories of
records to include records containing
risk-based assessments generated by

SUMMARY:

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices

aircraft operators using data in their
Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening Systems (CAPPS). These
CAPPS assessments are used in riskbased analysis of Secure Flight and
other prescreening data that produces a
boarding pass printing result for each
passenger. This change identifies
additional passengers who may be
eligible for expedited screening at
airport security checkpoints. This
updated system will continue to be
included in the Department of
Homeland Security’s inventory of
record systems. Additionally, this notice
includes non-substantive changes to
simplify the formatting and text of the
previously published notice.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
February 4, 2015. This updated system
will be effective upon publication
except that the change to the categories
of records will be effective 30 days after
date of publication in the Federal
Register.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DHS–
2014–0076 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–343–4010.
• Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this rulemaking. All
comments received will be posted
without change to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, please visit http://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions, please contact: Peter
Pietra, Privacy Officer, TSA–36,
Transportation Security Administration,
601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA
20598–6036; email: TSAPrivacy@
dhs.gov. For privacy questions, please
contact: Karen L. Neuman, Chief Privacy
Officer, Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)/
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) proposes to update and reissue a
current DHS system of records titled,

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‘‘DHS/TSA–019 Secure Flight Records
System of Records.’’ This system of
records notice was last updated on
September 10, 2013.1
TSA is modifying DHS/TSA–019 by
adding Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS)
assessments received from aircraft
operators to the Categories of Records.
CAPPS assessments are the product of a
risk analysis of passenger name records
(PNR) 2 and other information
associated with flight reservations that
aircraft operators collect in the ordinary
course of business. These PNRs and
other data provide risk indications and
are used to assess passenger risk on a
per flight basis. The CAPPS assessment,
in turn, is used in the risk-based
analysis of Secure Flight Passenger Data
(SFPD) 3 and other prescreening data
that produce a boarding pass printing
result for each passenger. The early use
of CAPPS by aircraft operators was to
identify passengers other than those on
watch lists who merited additional
screening. TSA now will incorporate the
CAPPS assessment to identify low-risk
passengers who may be eligible for
expedited screening in airports with
TSA Pre✓® lanes. By receiving a CAPPS
assessment (as opposed to the
underlying data used to arrive at that
assessment), TSA obtains important
security value from information without
receiving all the underlying data that are
generated when individuals make their
flight reservations.
TSA established the Secure Flight
system of records and published the
System of Records Notice (SORN) in the
Federal Register on August 23, 2007.4
TSA updated and republished the
SORN in the Federal Register on
November 9, 2007,5 on November 19,
2012,6 and on September 10, 2013.
1 78

FR 55270 (Sept. 10, 2013).
PNR contains details about an individual’s
travel on a particular flight, including information
provided by the individual when making the flight
reservation. Though the content of PNRs varies
among airlines, PNRs may include: (1) Passenger
name; (2) reservation date; (3) travel agency or
agent; (4) travel itinerary information; (5) form of
payment; (6) flight number; and (7) seating location.
See DHS/TSA–017 Secure Flight Test Records, 70
FR 36320 (June 22, 2005). Some PNR data collected
by aircraft operators provide evidence of potential
security risks, and other data provide indications of
low security risk. Other PNR data are security
neutral.
3 SFPD is full name, gender, date of birth, redress
number or Known Traveler number, passport
information (if applicable), reservation control
number, record sequence number, record type,
passenger update indicator, traveler reference
number, and itinerary information. 49 CFR part
1560.
4 72 FR 48392.
5 72 FR 63711.
6 77 FR 69491.
2A

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Background on CAPPS
In response to the changing threat of
terrorism,7 President Clinton
established the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (Commission) in 1996.8 In its
final report,9 the Commission
recognized that aviation security is a
national security issue and
recommended that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) ‘‘work with
airlines and airport consortia to ensure
that all passengers are positively
identified and subjected to security
procedures before they board
aircraft.’’ 10 Specifically, the
Commission recommended that the
FAA, ‘‘based on information already in
[air carriers’] computer databases,’’
leverage that industry investment by
separating passengers ‘‘into a very large
majority who present little or no risk,
and a small minority who merit
additional attention.’’ 11 The
Commission supported the development
and implementation of automated
passenger screening systems such as the
system then under development by the
FAA and Northwest Airlines.
Following the Commission’s report,
CAPPS was created by the FAA 12 to
serve as a feasible alternative to
conducting the Commissionrecommended 100 percent checked
baggage matching and explosive
detection screening.13 CAPPS was
designed ‘‘to exclude from the
additional security measures the great
majority of passengers who are very
unlikely to present any threat and,
conversely, to identify passengers to
whom heightened security measures
7 In addition to overseas threats from foreign
terrorists, people and places in the United States
were becoming targets, and Americans joined the
ranks of terrorists. The 1993 and 1995 bombings of
the World Trade Center in New York, and the
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, respectively,
were clear examples of the shift, as was the 1996
conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb
American airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
8 Executive Order 13015, White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 61 FR
43937 (Aug. 22, 1996).
9 White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security, Final Report to President Clinton,
February 12, 1997, found at www.fas.org/irp/threat/
212fin∼1.html (hereinafter Report).
10 Id. at section 3.7.
11 Id. at section 3.19. The Commission noted that
the U.S. Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and
Border Protection) successfully used such a system
to better focus its resources and attention.
12 The FAA implemented CAPPS pursuant to its
general authority to prescribe regulations ‘‘to
protect passengers and property on an aircraft
operating in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation against an act of criminal violence or
aircraft piracy.’’ 49 U.S.C. 44903(b).
13 See Report at section 3.24.

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should be applied.’’ 14 The FAA
evaluated whether PNR and other data
associated with flight reservations that
the aircraft operator collected in the
ordinary course of business provided
indicators of high security risk or low
risk, or whether the data were risk
neutral.15 Aircraft operators ran CAPPS
in their reservation systems for
originating passengers who checked
bags prior to passenger boarding using
the FAA-set standards for assessing
these data.16 When a CAPPS assessment
raised security concerns the aircraft
operator either screened the passenger’s
checked baggage using FAA-certified
explosives detection equipment, or
matched the bag to the passenger to
ensure that the passenger’s checked
baggage was not transported aboard an
airplane unless that passenger was
aboard the same airplane and flight.
TSA was created in 2001 with the
enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA),17
and assumed responsibility for the
CAPPS program from the FAA.18
CAPPS continued to be operated by U.S.
aircraft operators pursuant to the TSAmandated Aircraft Operator Standard
Security Program (AOSSP). Under this
program, and prior to the
implementation of Secure Flight,
airlines were required to check
passenger reservation data against watch
lists. A CAPPS assessment indicating
risk above a pre-set threshold required
14 See FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the
United States, 64 FR 19220, 19221 (April 19, 1999).
15 These evaluation criteria were reviewed by the
Department of Justice, id. at 19224–25, and
implemented in consultation with aircraft
operators.
16 Id. FAA funds subsidized a substantial portion
of the aircraft operators’ cost for development of the
core CAPPS system, which was provided to eight
lead operators (six separate Computer Reservation
Systems), all smaller operators associated with the
lead operators (e.g., regional feeder airlines), plus
19 other regional and national aircraft operators that
collectively served approximately 95 percent of
domestic airline passengers. Id. at 19222.
17 Pub.L. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
18 In section 136 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C.
44903(j)(2)(C)), Congress directed that aircraft
operators use CAPPS or any successor system to
screen all aircraft passengers, not just those who are
checking bags. See also TSA Notice of rulemaking
status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights
Within the United States; Certification of Screening
Companies, 67 FR 67382, 67383 (Nov. 5, 2002). In
addition, ATSA continued in effect all ‘‘orders,
determinations, rules, [and] regulations’’ of the FAA
‘‘until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside,
or revoked in accordance with law by the [TSA
Administrator], any other authorized official, a
court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of
law.’’ See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also
explicitly recognized the continuance of CAPPS
when it exempted CAPPS from the requirement that
the screening of passengers and property before
boarding flights originating in the United States be
carried out by a Federal Government employee. See
49 U.S.C. 44901(a).

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enhanced screening for passengers who
were not on a watch list. For those
passengers requiring additional
screening as a result of their CAPPS
assessment, the aircraft operator added
the additional screening instruction to
the boarding pass and TSA would
perform the additional screening. As
with the FAA, TSA did not receive the
underlying PNR or associated
reservations information. The additional
screening included enhanced physical
searches of individuals and their carryon bags at the checkpoint.
The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) was enacted in December
2004.19 Section 4012(a)(1)–(2) of IRPTA
directed TSA and DHS to assume the
function of comparing aircraft operator
passenger information to data in the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
maintained by the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) from aircraft operators.20
TSA promulgated its Secure Flight
Program regulations consistent with this
statutory directive.21 By November
2010, TSA fully assumed the watch list
matching function from aircraft
operators and air carriers in Secure
Flight. Since that time, CAPPS has not
been used to determine whether
additional screening is warranted for
certain passengers. Notably, however,
IRTPA did not remove or amend the
statutory requirement for aircraft
operators to use CAPPS. Accordingly,
the statutory and regulatory authorities
for the use of CAPPS remain.
Use of CAPPS Assessments in Secure
Flight Risk-Based Analysis
TSA plans to incorporate a CAPPS
assessment generated by aircraft
19 Pub. L. 108–458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004).
A genesis for IRPTA was the report of the The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (the 9/11 Commission), which
recommended that TSA perform watch list
matching using the ‘‘larger set of watch lists
maintained by the Federal Government,’’ and that
screening issues associated with CAPPS be elevated
for high-level attention and addressed promptly by
the government. See Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, page 393 (July 22, 2004).
20 The TSC maintains the Federal Government
watch lists, including the terrorism watch list
known as the TSDB. The TSC was established by
the Attorney General in coordination with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Secretary of Defense. The Attorney General, acting
through the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), established the TSC in support
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6
(HSPD–6), dated September 16, 2003, which
required the Attorney General to establish an
organization to consolidate the Federal
Government’s approach to terrorism screening and
to provide for the appropriate and lawful use of
terrorist information in screening processes.
21 73 FR 64018 (Oct. 28, 2008).

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operators into its Secure Flight riskbased analysis of passenger and other
prescreening data as part of ongoing
efforts to enhance aviation security by
identifying appropriate security
screening for aviation travelers.22 The
CAPPS assessments are designed to
enhance TSA’s analysis of passenger
security risk and enable TSA to make
better passenger risk decisions. The
incorporation of a CAPPS assessment
into the Secure Flight risk-based
analysis program with Secure Flight
Passenger Data (SFPD) and other
prescreening data is consistent with
Congress’s direction in ATSA to use
CAPPS in passenger screening. CAPPS
assessments generated by aircraft
operators continue to rely on
information collected by those operators
in the ordinary course of business.
Secure Flight does not receive the
underlying data that are used for the
CAPPS assessment.23
TSA has taken a number of steps to
review the security value of CAPPS data
including evaluating whether certain
CAPPS data are indicative of low-risk
passengers. First, TSA worked with its
airline partners to re-assess the security
value of the individual CAPPS data
elements. This effort resulted in refining
CAPPS data elements. Second, TSA
engaged the Civil Aviation Threat
Working Group (CATWG), which is
composed of analysts from various
Federal Government agencies and led by
a representative from the National
Counterterrorism Center, to provide its
assessment of the security value of
CAPPS data. The CATWG provided its
report of findings and recommendations
in September 2013, which further
refined the security value assigned to
CAPPS data elements. Third, TSA asked
the Homeland Security Studies and
Analysis Institute 24 (a federally-funded
research and development center) to
review its approach to risk-based
security screening including the use of
CAPPS assessments. In March 2014, the
Institute endorsed TSA’s approach for
22 For a discussion of Secure Flight risk-based
analysis, see the September 10, 2013 Secure Flight
SORN update at 78 FR 55270, and the Privacy
Impact Assessment for Secure Flight, DHS/TSA/
PIA–018(f) (Sept. 4, 2013), found at http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy-pia-tsa-secure-flight-update-09042013.pdf.
23 TSA, however, remains authorized to obtain
such data for transportation security purposes
under TSA’s general compliance and enforcement
authorities, such as TSA’s authority to inspect
aircraft operators to ensure compliance with
security programs and TSA regulations (49 U.S.C.
114(f)(7), 49 CFR 1544.3); and TSA’s authority to
issue subpoenas and orders for the production of
information (49 U.S.C. 40113(a) and 46104, 49 CFR
503.203(a)). TSA also collects the SFPD required to
be provided under the Secure Flight Rulemaking.
24 See www.homelandsecurity.org.

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conducting Secure Flight risk-based
analysis and recommended that TSA
continue to strengthen this analysis by
including CAPPS assessments. Finally,
TSA reviewed its plans to use CAPPS
assessments with senior officials from
the Department of Homeland Security
Offices of Privacy, Civil Rights and
Liberties, and General Counsel. TSA
further refined the security value
assigned to CAPPS data elements based
on input from these offices. These
offices found that CAPPS assessments
may be used as part of the Secure Flight
risk-based analysis while also protecting
passengers’ privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties. In addition, these DHS
offices will review CAPPS operations on
an on-going basis, including the risk
value assigned to individual CAPPS
data elements, to assure CAPPS’s
continued security value, its connection
to evolving security threat information,
and its adherence to privacy, civil
rights, civil liberties, and legal
principles.
Currently, the Secure Flight passenger
prescreening system has watch lists of
high-risk individuals and uses these
lists to issue boarding pass printing
results, e.g., selectee screening or ‘‘do
not board’’ instructions. TSA also has
lists of low-risk individuals who have
been issued known traveler numbers
(KTN) 25 that makes them eligible for
expedited screening. These individuals
may receive a boarding pass printing
instruction that enables them to use
TSA Pre✓® lanes.26 TSA also uses riskbased analysis of SFPD and other
prescreening data to make screening
determinations (e.g., to determine
whether a passenger is eligible for
expedited screening). The addition of
CAPPS assessments to existing Secure
Flight risk-based analysis will
strengthen the risk assessment and
increase the confidence level in the
determination that a passenger is a
lower risk and eligible for expedited
screening.27
25 A Known Traveler Number means ‘‘a unique
number assigned to an individual for whom the
Federal government has conducted a security threat
assessment and determined does not pose a security
threat.’’ 49 CFR 1560.3.
26 Passengers who are eligible for expedited
screening are referred to a TSA Pre✓® lane where
they typically are permitted to leave on their shoes,
light outerwear, and belt, to keep their laptop in its
case, and to keep their 3–1–1 compliant liquids/gels
bag in a carry-on. TSA Pre✓® lanes are available at
more than 118 airports nationwide. See http://
www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/airlines-airports.
27 Another potential outcome of Secure Flight
risk-based analysis is that the addition of a CAPPS
score may result in a passenger receiving standard
screening who otherwise may have been eligible for
expedited screening, or receiving enhanced
screening instead of standard screening.

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The CAPPS assessment that a
passenger receives for any given flight
may change on the next flight because
of the range of CAPPS data and the
associated security risks and benefits.
After these changes are implemented,
passengers who are a match to a watch
list will continue to receive appropriate
enhanced screening. For all other
passengers, the Secure Flight passenger
prescreening computer system conducts
a risk-based analysis of passenger data
using: (1) The SFPD (including KTN)
that TSA already receives from aircraft
operators pursuant to Secure Flight
regulations; (2) the CAPPS assessments;
(3) frequent flyer designator codes that
aircraft operators submit to TSA; and (4)
other prescreening data available to
TSA. The Secure Flight risk-based
analysis determines whether passengers
receive expedited, standard, or
enhanced screening, and the results are
indicated on the passenger’s boarding
pass.
No one will be denied the ability to
fly or to enter the sterile area of an
airport based solely on the results of the
Secure Flight risk-based analysis,
including the use of a CAPPS
assessment in that analysis.
II. Privacy Act
The Privacy Act embodies fair
information practice principles in a
statutory framework governing the
means by which the Federal
Government agencies collect, maintain,
use, and disseminate individuals’
records. The Privacy Act applies to
information that is maintained in a
‘‘system of records.’’ A ‘‘system of
records’’ is a group of any records under
the control of an agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of
an individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.
The Privacy Act defines ‘‘individual’’ as
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents. As a matter of policy, DHS
extends administrative Privacy Act
protections to all individuals where
systems of records maintain information
on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
residents, and visitors.
Below is the description of the DHS/
TSA–019 Secure Flight Records System
of Records.
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(r),
DHS has provided a report of this
system of records to the Office of
Management and Budget and to
Congress.
System of Records

Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)/Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)–019.

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SYSTEM NAME:

DHS/TSA–019 Secure Flight Records.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified; Sensitive Security
Information.
SYSTEM LOCATION:

Records are maintained at the
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), 601 South 12th Street, Arlington,
VA, and at other secure TSA facilities in
Annapolis Junction, Maryland and
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records
may also be maintained at the secured
facilities of contractors or other parties
performing functions under the Secure
Flight program.
CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE
SYSTEM:

(a) Individuals who attempt to make
reservations for travel on, who have
traveled on, or who have reservations to
travel on a flight operated by a U.S.
aircraft operator; or a flight into, out of,
or overflying the United States that is
operated by a foreign air carrier; or
flights operated by the U.S.
Government, including flights chartered
or leased by the U.S. Government;
(b) Non-traveling individuals who
seek to obtain authorization from an
aircraft or airport operator to enter the
sterile area of an airport;
(c) For flights that TSA grants a
request by the operators of leased or
charter aircraft with a maximum take-off
weight over 12,500 pounds to screen the
individuals using Secure Flight, the
following individuals: (1) Individuals
who seek to charter or lease an aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight over
12,500 pounds or who are proposed to
be transported on or operate such
charter aircraft; and (2) owners or
operators of such chartered or leased
aircraft;
(d)(1) Known or suspected terrorists
identified in the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB) maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); and
(2) individuals identified on classified
and unclassified governmental
databases such as law enforcement,
immigration, or intelligence databases;
(e) Individuals who have been
distinguished from individuals on a
watch list through a redress process or
by other means; and
(f) Individuals who are identified as
Known Travelers for whom the Federal
Government conducted a security threat
assessment and determined that they do
not pose a security threat.
CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

(a) Records containing passenger and
flight information (e.g., full name, date

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of birth, gender, redress number, known
traveler number, passport information,
frequent flyer designator code or other
identity authentication or verification
code obtained from aircraft operators,
and itinerary); records containing
assessments generated by aircraft
operators under the Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS); records containing the results
of risk-based analysis in the TSA
passenger prescreening system
including boarding pass printing results;
records containing information about
non-traveling individuals seeking access
to an airport sterile area for a purpose
approved by TSA; and records
containing information about
individuals who seek to charter, lease,
operate or be transported on aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight over
12,500 pounds if TSA grants the request
of an aircraft owner or operator to use
Secure Flight;
(b) Records containing information
from an individual’s form of
identification or a physical description
of the individual;
(c) Records obtained from the TSC of
known or suspected terrorists in the
TSDB; and records regarding
individuals identified on classified and
unclassified governmental watch lists;
(d) Records containing the matching
analyses and results of comparisons of
individuals to the TSDB and other
classified and unclassified
governmental watch lists.
(e) Records related to communications
between or among TSA and aircraft
operators, airport operators, owners or
operators of leased or charter aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight over
12,500 pounds, TSC, law enforcement
agencies, intelligence agencies, and
agencies responsible for airspace safety
or security regarding the screening
status of passengers or non-traveling
individuals and any operational
responses to individuals identified in
the TSDB;
(f) Records of the redress process that
include information on known
misidentified persons, including any
Redress Number assigned to those
individuals;
(g) Records that track the receipt, use,
access, or transmission of information as
part of the Secure Flight program;
(h) Electronic System for Travel
Authorization status code generated by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) for international travelers; and
(i) Records containing information
about individuals who are identified as
Known Travelers.

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AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM:

49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901, 44903,
and 44909.
PURPOSE(S):

The Secure Flight Records system are
used to identify and protect against
potential and actual threats to
transportation security and support the
Federal Government’s counterterrorism
efforts by assisting in the identification
of individuals who warrant further
scrutiny prior to boarding an aircraft or
seek to enter a sterile area or who
warrant denial of boarding or denial of
entry to a sterile area on security
grounds. It is also used to identify
individuals who are lower-risk and
therefore may be eligible for expedited
security screening at the airport
checkpoints. These functions are
designed to facilitate the secure travel of
the public.
ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE
SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND
THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:

(1) To the TSC in order to: (a)
Determine whether an individual is a
positive identity match to an individual
identified as a known or suspected
terrorist in the watch list; (b) allow
redress of passenger complaints; (c)
facilitate an operational response (if one
is deemed appropriate) for individuals
who are a positive identity match to an
individual identified as a known or
suspected terrorist in the watch list; (d)
provide information and analysis about
terrorist encounters and known or
suspected terrorist associates to
appropriate domestic and foreign
government agencies and officials for
counterterrorism purposes; and (e)
perform technical implementation
functions necessary for the Secure
Flight program.
(2) To contractors and their agents,
grantees, experts, consultants, and
others performing or working on a
contract, service, grant, cooperative
agreement, or other assignment for DHS,
when necessary to accomplish an
agency function related to this system of
records. Individuals provided
information under this routine use are
subject to the same Privacy Act
requirements and limitations on
disclosure as are applicable to DHS
officers and employees.
(3) To aircraft operators, foreign air
carriers, airport operators, the
Department of Transportation, and the
Department of Defense or other U.S.
Government agencies or institutions to
communicate individual screening
status and facilitate an operational
response (where appropriate) to
individuals who pose or are suspected

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237

of posing a risk to transportation or
national security.
(4) To owners or operators of leased
or charter aircraft to communicate
individual screening status and
facilitate an operational response (where
appropriate) to individuals who pose or
are suspected of posing a risk to
transportation or national security.
(5) To the appropriate federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, or foreign,
agency regarding or to identify
individuals who pose, or are under
reasonable suspicion of posing a risk to
transportation or national security.
(6) To the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or other Federal agencies for purposes of
conducting litigation or administrative
proceedings, when: (a) The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), or (b) any
employee or former employee of DHS in
his or her official capacity, or (c) any
employee or former employee of DHS in
his or her individual capacity where the
DOJ or DHS has agreed to represent the
employee, or (d) the United States or
any agency thereof, is a party to the
litigation or proceeding or has an
interest in such litigation or proceeding.
(7) To the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) or
other Federal agencies pursuant to
records management inspections being
conducted under the authority of 44
U.S.C. 2904 and 2906.
(8) To a congressional office in
response to an inquiry from that
congressional office made at the request
of the individual.
(9) To the Government Accountability
Office or other agency, organization, or
individual for the purposes of
performing authorized audit or
oversight operations, but only such
information as is necessary and relevant
to such audit and oversight functions.
(10) To the appropriate federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, or foreign agency
responsible for investigating,
prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing
a statute, rule, regulation, or order
regarding a violation or potential
violation of civil or criminal law,
regulation, or order when such
disclosure is proper and consistent with
the performance of the official duties of
the person making the disclosure.
(11) To international and foreign
governmental authorities in accordance
with law and formal or informal
international agreements when such
disclosure is proper and consistent with
the performance of the official duties of
the person making the disclosure.
(12) To appropriate agencies, entities,
and persons when (a) TSA suspects or
has confirmed that the security or
confidentiality of information in the
system of records has been

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compromised; (b) TSA has determined
that as a result of the suspected or
confirmed compromise there is a risk of
harm to economic or property interests,
identity theft or fraud, or harm to the
security or integrity of this system or
other systems or programs (whether
maintained by TSA or another agency or
entity) that rely upon the compromised
information; and (c) the disclosure made
to such agencies, entities, and persons is
reasonably necessary to assist in
connection with TSA’s efforts to
respond to the suspected or confirmed
compromise and prevent, minimize, or
remedy such harm.
(13) To appropriate federal, state,
local, tribal, or foreign governmental
agencies or multilateral governmental
organizations, including the World
Health Organization, for purposes of
assisting such agencies or organizations
in preventing exposure to or
transmission of communicable or
quarantinable disease or for combating
other significant public health threats;
appropriate notice will be provided of
any identified health threat or risk.
DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMER REPORTING
AGENCIES:

None.
POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING,
RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND
DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:
STORAGE:

Records are maintained at the
Transportation Security Administration,
601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA,
and at other secure TSA facilities in
Annapolis Junction, Maryland and
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records
also may be maintained at the secured
facilities of contractors or other parties
that perform functions under the Secure
Flight program. The records are stored
on magnetic disc, tape, digital media,
and CD–ROM, and may also be retained
in hard copy format in secure file
folders or safes.
RETRIEVABILITY:

Data are retrievable by the
individual’s name or other identifier, as
well as non-identifying information
such as itinerary.

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SAFEGUARDS:

All records are protected from
unauthorized access through
appropriate administrative, physical,
and technical safeguards. The system is
also protected through a multi-layer
security approach. The protective
strategies are physical, technical,
administrative, and environmental in
nature and provide role-based access
control to sensitive data, physical access

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control to DHS facilities, confidentiality
of communications, including
encryption, authentication of sending
parties, compartmentalizing databases;
auditing software and personnel
screening to ensure that all personnel
with access to data are screened through
background investigations
commensurate with the level of access
required to perform their duties.
Information in this system is
safeguarded in accordance with
applicable rules and policies, including
any applicable TSA and DHS automated
systems security and access policies.
The system will be in compliance with
Office of Management and Budget and
National Institute of Standards and
Technology guidance. Access to the
computer system containing the records
in this system of records is limited to
those individuals who require it to
perform their official duties. The
computer system also maintains a realtime audit of individuals who access the
system.
RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:

Records relating to an individual
determined by the automated matching
process to be neither a match nor a
potential match to a watch list are
destroyed within seven days after
completion of the last leg of the
individual’s directional travel itinerary.
Records relating to an individual
determined by the automated matching
process to be a potential watch list
match are retained for seven years after
the completion of the individual’s
directional travel itinerary. Records
relating to an individual determined to
be a confirmed watch list match are
retained for 99 years after the date of
match confirmation.
Lists of individuals stored in Secure
Flight, such as individuals identified as
Known Travelers and individuals who
have been disqualified from eligibility
to receive expedited screening as a
result of their involvement in certain
security incidents, are deleted or
destroyed when superseded by an
updated list.
SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS:

Secure Flight Mission Support Branch
Manager, Transportation Security
Administration, TSA–19, 601 South
12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598–6019.
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:

To determine whether this system
contains records relating to you, write to
the Freedom of Information Act Office,
Transportation Security Administration,
TSA–20, 601 South 12th Street,
Arlington, VA 20598–6020.

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RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:

Requests for records access must be in
writing and should be addressed to the
Freedom of Information Act Office,
Transportation Security Administration,
TSA–20, 601 South 12th Street,
Arlington, VA 20598–6020. Requests
should conform to the requirements of
6 CFR part 5, subpart B, which provides
the rules for requesting access to Privacy
Act records maintained by DHS. The
envelope and letter should be clearly
marked ‘‘Privacy Act Access Request.’’
The request should include a general
description of the records sought and
must include the requester’s full name,
current address, and date and place of
birth. The request must be signed and
either notarized or submitted under
penalty of perjury. Some information
may be exempt from access provisions.
An individual who is the subject of a
record in this system may access those
records that are not exempt from
disclosure. A determination whether a
record may be accessed will be made at
the time a request is received.
Individuals who believe they have
been improperly denied entry by CBP,
refused boarding for transportation, or
identified for additional screening may
submit a redress request through the
DHS Traveler Redress Program
(‘‘TRIP’’). See 72 FR 2294 (Jan. 18,
2007). TRIP is a single point of contact
for individuals who have inquiries or
seek resolution regarding difficulties
they experienced during their travel
screening at transportation hubs such as
airports and train stations, or crossing
U.S. borders. Through TRIP a traveler
can correct erroneous data stored in
Secure Flight and other data stored in
other DHS databases through one
application. Additionally, for further
information on the Secure Flight
program and the redress options please
see the accompanying Privacy Impact
Assessment for Secure Flight published
on the DHS Web site at www.dhs.gov/
privacy. Redress requests should be sent
to: DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program (TRIP), TSA–901, 601 South
12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598–6036
or online at http://www.dhs.gov/trip.
CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:

Same as ‘‘Notification Procedure’’ and
‘‘Record Access Procedure’’ above.
RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:

Information contained in the system
is obtained from U.S. aircraft operators,
foreign air carriers, the owners and
operators of leased or charter aircraft
with a maximum take-off weight over
12,500 pounds who request TSA
screening, the TSC, TSA employees,
airport operators, Federal executive

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branch agencies, Federal judicial and
legislative branch entities, State, local,
international, and other governmental
agencies, private entities for Known
Traveler program participants, and the
individuals to whom the records in the
system pertain.
EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM:

No exemption will be asserted with
respect to identifying information, or
flight information, obtained from
passengers, non-travelers, and aircraft
owners or operators.
This system, however, may contain
records or information recompiled or
created from information contained in
other systems of records, which are
exempt from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. For these records of
information only, in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), TSA claims
the following exemptions for these
records or information from subsections
(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4);
(e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and
(8); (f); and (g) of the Privacy Act of
1974, as amended, as necessary and
appropriate to protect such information.
Certain portions or all of these records
may be exempt from disclosure
pursuant to these exemptions.
Dated: December 10, 2014.
Karen L. Neuman,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014–30856 Filed 1–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–05–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS–2014–0065]

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of
Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement—013 Alien
Health Records System of Records
Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act System of
Records.
AGENCY:

In accordance with the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Homeland Security proposes to update
and rename a Department of Homeland
Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement system of records notice
now titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland
Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement—013 Alien Health Records
System of Records.’’ This system
maintains records that document the
health screening, examination, and
treatment of aliens arrested by the

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SUMMARY:

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Department of Homeland Security and
detained by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement for civil
immigration purposes in facilities where
care is provided by the ICE Health
Service Corps. With the publication of
this updated system of records, several
changes are being made: (1) New
categories of records have been added;
(2) new routine uses have been added to
allow the Department of Homeland
Security to share information from the
system; and (3) additional information
has been added to clarify the process
regarding notification of and access to
records. This updated system will be
included in the Department of
Homeland Security’s inventory of
record systems.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
February 4, 2015. This updated system
will be effective February 4, 2015.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DHS–
2014–0065 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal:
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–343–4010.
• Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this notice. All
comments received will be posted
without change to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, please visit http://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions, please contact Lyn
Rahilly (202–732–3300), Privacy Officer,
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. For privacy questions,
please contact Karen L. Neuman (202–
343–1717), Chief Privacy Officer,
Privacy Office, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC
20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) proposes to update and rename a
current DHS system of records titled,
‘‘DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health Records
System of Records.’’
DHS is updating and renaming the
DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health Records

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System of Records to add new categories
of records and routine uses, to provide
additional information regarding the
retention of records about minors, and
to clarify the process regarding
individual notification of and access to
records. This system of records was
previously titled DHS/ICE–013 Alien
Medical Records System of Records.
This system of records is maintained by
the ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC), a
division within ICE’s Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) office. (Note:
IHSC was previously named the
Division of Immigration Health Services
(DIHS).) This system of records
maintains medical, mental health, and
dental records that document the
medical screening, examination,
diagnosis, and treatment of aliens whom
ICE detains for civil immigration
purposes in facilities where medical
care is provided by IHSC. It also
maintains information about prisoners
of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
who are housed in a detention facility
operated by or on behalf of ICE pursuant
to an agreement between the USMS and
ICE, and where medical care is provided
by IHSC. IHSC provides necessary and
appropriate medical, mental health, and
dental care to ICE detainees. IHSC
medical staff may also procure
consultation, diagnostic, treatment, or
procedural services IHSC deems
necessary and appropriate from external
health care providers in facilities
outside of IHSC. Medical information is
typically shared with other health care
providers to ensure a detainee’s
continuity of care. For individuals with
infectious diseases of public health
significance, their information may be
shared with public health officials in
order to prevent exposure to or
transmission of the disease.
New categories of records have been
added to the DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health
Records System of Records to provide a
more complete list of the types of
records in the system. These include:
payment authorizations for care
provided to detainees by external
healthcare providers and healthcare
facilities; evaluation records, including
records related to mental health
evaluations; records related to medical
grievances filed by detainees; and
detainees’ medical or healthcare records
received from external healthcare
providers. Additionally, new routine
uses have been added to allow ICE to
share information from the system of
records. Below is a summary of the new
routine uses and their corresponding
letter:
U. To courts, magistrates,
administrative tribunals, opposing
counsel, parties, and witnesses, in the

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