FRA Safety Advisory 2015-03

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices
between the humane handling of
animals or compliance with the rule.
FMCSA analyzed the request and on
June 11, 2014, granted, subject to
specific terms and conditions, an
exemption from the rest break
requirement for drivers transporting
livestock. The term of the exemption
ends on June 11, 2015. The exemption
period was limited to one year in order
to gather additional data about the
highway safety of operations under the
exemption. Carriers utilizing the
exemption were required to report any
accidents, as defined in 49 CFR 390.5,
to FMCSA. As of May 1, 2015, no
accidents had been reported.
Population of Drivers and Carriers
Engaged in Livestock Transportation

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As of May 13, 2015, FMCSA’s Motor
Carrier Management Information System
(MCMIS) listed 65,872 motor carriers
that identified livestock as a type
(though not necessarily the only type) of
cargo they transport. These carriers
operate 220,481 vehicles. The carriers
employ 277,782 drivers, but
approximately 145,000 drivers qualify
as ‘‘short-haul’’ drivers and thus are
exempt from the 30-minute break
requirement. Therefore, fewer than
135,000 CMV drivers could utilize this
exemption.
Data in the docket show that the
temperature inside a stopped livestock
trailer can rise rapidly during hot
summer days, and can drop rapidly on
winter days, especially in windy
conditions. Substandard transportation
of livestock elevates the risk that the
food derived therefrom may be unsafe
for human consumption. Industry
guidelines describe stops of up to 30
minutes as problematic for many
animals, even in favorable weather, and
encourage drivers of livestock to keep
the CMV moving ‘‘if at all possible.’’
Livestock drivers take breaks, but
generally of much shorter duration than
30 minutes.
As noted below, carriers utilizing the
exemption are required to report any
accidents, as defined in 49 CFR 390.5,
to FMCSA. Since the granting of this
exemption on June 11, 2014, the
FMCSA has not received any such
reports.
FMCSA Determination
In consideration of the above, FMCSA
has determined that it is appropriate to
renew this exemption from the 30minute break requirement for a period
of two years, subject to the following
terms and conditions:

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Extent of the Exemption
This exemption is limited to drivers
engaged in the interstate transportation
of livestock by CMV. The exemption
from the 30-minute rest-break
requirement is applicable during the
transportation of livestock and does not
cover the operation of the CMVs after
the livestock are unloaded from the
vehicle.
This exemption is only available to
drivers transporting livestock as defined
in the Emergency Livestock Feed
Assistance Act of 1988, as amended (the
1988 Act) [7 U.S.C. 1471(2)]. The term
‘‘livestock’’ as used in this exemption
means ‘‘cattle, elk, reindeer, bison,
horses, deer, sheep, goats, swine,
poultry (including egg-producing
poultry), fish used for food, and other
animals designated by the Secretary [of
Agriculture] that (A) are part of a
foundation herd (including dairy
producing cattle) or offspring; or (B) are
purchased as part of a normal operation
and not to obtain additional benefits
under [the 1988 Act].’’ The exemption is
further limited to motor carriers that
have a ‘‘satisfactory’’ safety rating or are
‘‘unrated’’; motor carriers with
‘‘conditional’’ or ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ safety
ratings are prohibited from utilizing this
exemption.
Accident Reporting
Motor carriers must notify FMCSA by
email addressed to MCPSD@DOT.GOV
with 5 business days of any accident (as
defined in 49 CFR 390.5) that occurs
while its driver is operating under the
terms of this exemption. The
notification must include:
a. Name of the motor carrier and
USDOT number,
b. Date of the accident,
c. City or town, and State, in which
the accident occurred, or closest to the
accident scene,
d. Driver’s name and license number,
e. Vehicle number and state license
number,
f. Number of individuals suffering
physical injury,
g. Number of fatalities,
h. The police-reported cause of the
accident,
i. Whether the driver was cited for
violation of any traffic laws, motor
carrier safety regulations, and
j. The total driving time and total onduty time prior to the accident.
Period of the Exemption
This exemption from the 30-minute
break requirement [49 CFR
395.3(a)(3)(ii)] is effective during the
period June 12, 2015, through June 12,
2017, unless withdrawn or restricted
sooner.

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Safety Oversight of Carriers Operating
Under the Exemption
FMCSA expects each motor carrier
operating under the terms and
conditions of this exemption to
maintain its safety record. However,
should safety deteriorate or credible and
substantial public comment in
opposition to the exemption be
received, FMCSA will, consistent with
the statutory requirements of 49 U.S.C.
31315, take all steps necessary to protect
the public interest. Authorization of the
exemption is discretionary, and FMCSA
will immediately revoke the exemption
of any motor carrier or driver for failure
to comply with the terms and
conditions of the exemption.
Preemption
During the period the exemption is in
effect, no State may enforce any law or
regulation that conflicts with or is
inconsistent with this exemption with
respect to a person or entity operating
under the exemption [49 U.S.C.
31315(d)].
Issued on: June 4, 2015.
T.F. Scott Darling, III,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2015–14277 Filed 6–11–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EXP

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2015–03]

Operational and Signal Modifications
for Compliance With Maximum
Authorized Passenger Train Speeds
and Other Speed Restrictions
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
AGENCY:

FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2015–03 to stress to passenger
railroads and railroads that host
passenger service and their employees
the importance of compliance with
Federal regulations and applicable
railroad rules governing applicable
passenger train speed limits. This safety
advisory makes recommendations to
these railroads to ensure that
compliance with applicable passenger
train speed limits is addressed by
appropriate railroad operating policies
and procedures and signal systems.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron
Hynes, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
SUMMARY:

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices

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Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202) 493–6404.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
overall safety of railroad operations has
improved in recent years. However, two
fatal passenger train accidents in the last
18 months in which serious overspeed
events occurred highlight the need to
ensure train speed limit compliance, as
mandated by existing Federal railroad
safety regulations and railroad operating
rules.
Amtrak Derailment
On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak
passenger train 188 (Train 188) was
traveling timetable east (northbound)
from Washington, DC, to New York City.
Aboard the train were five Amtrak crew
members, three Amtrak employees, and
250 passengers. Train 188 consisted of
a locomotive in the lead and seven
passenger cars trailing. Shortly after
9:20 p.m., the train derailed while
traveling through a curve at Frankford
Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
As a result of the accident, eight persons
were killed, and a significant number of
persons were seriously injured.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has taken the lead role
conducting the investigation of this
accident under its legal authority. 49
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As
is customary, FRA is participating in the
NTSB’s investigation and also
investigating the accident under its own
authority. While NTSB has not yet
issued any formal findings, the
information released to date indicates
that train speed was a factor in the
derailment. As Train 188 approached
the curve from the west, it traveled over
a straightaway with a maximum
authorized passenger train speed of 80
mph. The maximum authorized
passenger train speed for the curve was
50 mph. NTSB determined that the train
was traveling approximately 106 mph
within the curve’s 50-mph speed
restriction, exceeding the maximum
authorized speed on the straightaway by
26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad’s
maximum authorized speed for the
curve.1
In response to the derailment, FRA
issued Emergency Order No. 31 (EO 31;
80 FR 30534, May 28, 2015). EO 31
requires Amtrak to take the following
actions to ensure the safe operation of
passenger trains on the Northeast
Corridor: 2
1 FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is
unlawful to ‘‘[o]perate a train or locomotive at a
speed which exceeds the maximum authorized
limit by at least 10 miles per hour.’’ 49 CFR
240.305(a)(2).
2 EO 31’s requirements will not apply where
Amtrak’s Positive Train Control System (Advanced

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• Immediately implement code
changes to Amtrak’s Automatic Train
Control (ATC) System to enforce the
passenger train speed limit ahead of the
curve at Frankford Junction in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the
fatal derailment occurred.
• Survey its Northeast Corridor
system and identify each main track
curve where there is a reduction of more
than 20 mph from the maximum
authorized approach speed to that curve
for passenger trains, and provide a list
of each curve location to FRA within 5
days after EO 31 was issued.
• Submit an action plan for FRA
approval within 20 days identifying
modifications to its ATC System (or
other signal systems) that Amtrak will
make to enable warning and
enforcement of applicable passenger
train speeds at the identified curves. If
such modifications would interfere with
the timely implementation of a Positive
Train Control (PTC) system or are not
otherwise feasible, Amtrak’s plan must
describe alternative procedures that it
will adopt at the identified curves to
ensure compliance with applicable
passenger train speed limits. Amtrak’s
plan must contain milestones and target
dates for completion of action plan
items.
• Within 30 days of issuance of the
Order, Amtrak must begin to install
additional wayside signage alerting
engineers and conductors of the
maximum authorized passenger train
speed throughout its Northeast Corridor
system, with particular emphasis on
additional signage at the curve locations
where significant speed reductions
occur. Amtrak must identify the
locations where it intends to install the
additional wayside speed limit signs in
its action plan, and must notify FRA
when installation of the signs is
completed.
Metro-North Derailment
In addition to the recent Amtrak
passenger train derailment discussed
above, in December 2013 a New York
State Metropolitan Transportation
Authority Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Company (Metro-North) train
derailed as it approached the Spuyten
Duyvil Station in Bronx, New York. The
train traveled over a straightaway with
a maximum authorized passenger train
speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp
curve in the track with a maximum
authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB’s
investigation of the Metro-North
Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES)) is
already in use on the Northeast Corridor. Among
other features, ACSES enforces civil speed
restrictions that are in place at locations such as
curves and bridges.

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accident determined the train was
traveling approximately 82 mph as it
entered the curve’s 30-mph speed
restriction before derailing. That
derailment resulted in four fatalities and
at least 61 persons being injured. The
Metro-North accident is similar to the
recent Amtrak accident in that it
involved a serious overspeed event in a
sharp curve in the track. As a result of
the derailment, FRA issued Emergency
Order No. 29 (78 FR 75442, Dec. 11,
2013) requiring Metro-North to take
certain actions to control passenger train
speeds. FRA also issued Safety Advisory
2013–08, which recommended that all
railroads in the United States:
(1) Review the circumstances of the
December 1, 2013, Spuyten Duyvil
derailment with each of their operating
employees.
(2) Provide instruction to their
employees during training classes and
safety briefings on the importance of
compliance with maximum authorized
train speed limits and other speed
restrictions. This training should
include discussion of the railroad’s
absolute speed limits, speed restrictions
based on physical characteristics,
temporary speed restrictions, and any
other restrictions commonly
encountered.
(3) Remind their employees that
Federal railroad safety regulation, at 49
CFR 240.305(a)(2) and 242.403(e)(2),
prohibits the operation of a locomotive
or train at a speed which exceeds the
maximum authorized speed by at least
10 mph.
(4) Evaluate quarterly and 6-month
reviews of operational testing data as
required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad
should consider increasing the
frequency of operational testing where
its reviews show any non-compliance
with maximum authorized train speeds.
A significant number of operational
tests should be conducted on trains that
are required to reduce speed by more
than 20 mph from the maximum
authorized train speed. Operational tests
should use the reliable methods
available, such as reviewing locomotive
event recorder data and testing by radar
to verify compliance with maximum
authorized speeds.
(5) Reinforce the importance of
communication between train
crewmembers located in the controlling
locomotive, particularly during safety
critical periods when multiple tasks are
occurring (e.g., copying mandatory
directives, closely approaching or
passing fixed signals and/or cab signals
at a reduced speed, approaching
locations where the train’s movement
authority is being restricted, during
radio conversations with other

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices
employees or job briefings about track
characteristics) and during extended
periods of inactivity.
Overspeed Prevention

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FRA recognizes that passenger rail
transportation is generally extremely
safe. However, these two recent
accidents, which both involved
overspeed events and resulted in
numerous passenger fatalities, highlight
the need to remain vigilant in ensuring
employee compliance with operational
speed limits and restrictions for
passenger trains. As required by 49
U.S.C. 20157, railroads operating
scheduled intercity and commuter
passenger service in this country are
required to implement PTC Systems by
December 31, 2015. By statute a PTC
system must be designed to prevent the
type of overspeed events that occurred
in the derailments discussed above, as
well as train-to-train collisions,
incursions into roadway work zone
limits, and the movement of a train over
a switch left in the wrong position.
Amtrak has indicated that it intends to
meet the statutory deadline to install
PTC on the Northeast Corridor. FRA
understands that other passenger
railroads in this country have concerns
about their ability to meet the December
31, 2015 deadline to install PTC. FRA
intends to enforce the December 31,
2015 deadline to ensure that PTC is in
use as quickly, safely, and efficiently as
possible.
Until PTC is in use across the
passenger railroad systems in this
country, and due to the significant
safety concerns presented by the two
accidents described above, FRA believes
all passenger railroads and railroads that
host passenger service need to evaluate
their systems and take immediate
actions to prevent future catastrophic
overspeed events from occurring.
Some railroads have ATC or cab
signal systems 3 that may be modified to
prevent overspeed events at critical
locations such as curves, bridges, and
stations, similar to what FRA required
of Amtrak at the May 12, 2015
derailment location in EO 31. Where
such signal system modifications are
appropriate and would not interfere
with the timely implementation of
3 FRA regulations require that ‘‘[p]rior to
December 31, 2015, where any train is permitted to
operate at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour,
an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or
automatic train control system complying with the
provisions of this part [part 236] shall be installed,
unless an FRA approved PTC system meeting the
requirements of this part [part 236] for the subject
speed and other operating conditions, is installed.’’
49 CFR 236.0(d)(1).

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PTC,4 FRA recommends that railroads
make such modifications after
identifying critical main track locations.
Where such modifications to the signal
system to slow trains at critical
locations are not viable or would
interfere with PTC implementation (or
on railroads where no cab signal or ATC
system is installed or operative), FRA
encourages railroads to take other
operational actions to prevent overspeed
events, such as requiring additional
qualified employees to occupy the
controlling locomotive of a train to
identify and communicate the
applicable passenger train speed limits
and restrictions, or by requiring
additional crew communications
regarding applicable passenger train
speed limits and restrictions.
FRA will continue to focus on
ensuring passenger railroad compliance
with maximum authorized train speeds
and relevant temporary and permanent
speed restrictions in the coming
months, including stepped up
enforcement actions. These actions will
include, but will not be limited to, onboard inspections, radar speed
monitoring at locations of significant
permanent or temporary speed
restrictions, monitoring of railroad
officers who conduct operational tests,
and comprehensive reviews of a
railroad’s implementation of their
operational tests and inspection
program.
FRA strongly encourages railroads
and other industry members to reemphasize the importance of
compliance with maximum authorized
train speeds and any applicable speed
restrictions, and to conduct operational
testing at a level that will ensure
compliance with all posted speed
restrictions.
Recommended Railroad Action: In
light of the accidents discussed above,
and in an effort to ensure the safety of
the Nation’s railroads, their employees,
and the general public, FRA
recommends that passenger railroads
and railroads that host passenger
service 5 do each of the following:
(1) Review and implement the
recommendations made in FRA Safety
Advisory 2013–08, which are discussed
above.
(2) Review the circumstances of the
fatal May 12, 2015, Philadelphia
derailment with their operating
employees.
4 FRA recommends that railroads consult with
FRA if they believe a modification would interfere
with PTC implementation.
5 This Safety Advisory only applies to the
portions of the railroad’s system over which
passenger service is operated.

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(3) Survey their entire systems, or the
portions on which passenger service is
operated, and identify main track
locations where there is a reduction of
more than 20 mph from the approach
speed to a curve or bridge and the
maximum authorized operating speed
for passenger trains at that curve or
bridge (identified locations).
(4) If the railroad utilizes an ATC, cab
signal, or other signal system capable of
providing warning and enforcement of
applicable passenger train speed limits,
make modifications to those systems
where appropriate to ensure compliance
with applicable speed limits at the
identified locations. If the railroad is
required to implement PTC at the
identified locations, implement these
recommended signal system changes in
the interim.
(5) If the railroad does not utilize an
ATC, cab signal, or other signal system
capable of providing warning and
enforcement of applicable passenger
train speed limits (or if a signal system
modification would interfere with the
implementation of PTC or is otherwise
not viable) all passenger train
movements at the identified locations be
made with a second qualified crew
member in the cab of the controlling
locomotive, or with constant
communication between the locomotive
engineer and an additional qualified
and designated crewmember in the body
of the train. If the railroad is required to
implement PTC at the identified
locations, implement these
recommended changes in the interim.
(6) Install additional wayside signage
alerting engineers and conductors of the
maximum authorized passenger train
speed throughout the passenger
railroad’s system or the portions of its
system in which passenger service is
operated, with particular emphasis on
additional signage at the identified
locations.
FRA encourages all railroad industry
members to take actions consistent with
the preceding recommendations. FRA
may modify this Safety Advisory 2015–
03, issue additional safety advisories, or
take other appropriate action necessary
to ensure the highest level of safety on
the Nation’s railroads, including pursing
other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC on June 9, 2015.
Sarah Feinberg
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–14394 Filed 6–11–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

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