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Project Role
Marcus Hartley, Northern Economics
Project Manager & Primary Analyst
Jon McCracken, NPFMC
Contributing Author
Michael Fey, AKFIN
Data Manager
Steve Lewis-Gaius, NMFS Alaska Region
Data Analyst
Dr. Edward Waters, Independent Consultant
Contributing Author
Dr. Jennifer Lincoln, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
Contributing Author
Dr. Devin Lucas, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
Contributing Author
Dr. Donald Schug, Northern Economics
Contributing Author
Gary Eaton, Northern Economics
Contributing Author
David Weiss, Northern Economics
Contributing Author
Jonathan King, Northern Economics
Econometrician
Terri McCoy, Northern Economics
Technical Editor
Please cite as: Northern Economics, Inc. Five-Year Review of the Effects of Amendment 80. Prepared
for North Pacific Fishery Management Council. October 2014.
1.1
1.2
1.2.1
1.3
1.4
Requirements for a 5-year Review ...................................................................................... 1
Issues to Study in the 5-Year Review ................................................................................... 2
5-Year Review Issues from the Goals of Amendment 80 ...................................................... 2
5-Year Review Issues from General Goals for LAPPs as Stated in the MSA ........................... 4
5-Year Review Issues Derived From MSA’s National Standards ............................................ 5
2.1
2.1.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.3
An Assessment of the Uses and Quality of Information in Economic Data Reports ............... 8
A Brief Review Recent Studies Using Data from the EDRs ................................................... 8
A Qualitative Review of the Data Collected in the EDRs...................................................... 9
Vessel Identification and Characteristics Information in the EDR.......................................... 9
Review of Annual Cooperative Reports ............................................................................. 15
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.2
Rationalization and Consolidation Effects in the AM80 Sector ........................................... 19
Numbers of Vessels and Owners Participating in the AM80 Fisheries ................................ 19
Outcomes for Owners and Crew no Longer Participating in the AM80 Fisheries................ 20
Amendment 80 Quota Share Ownership and Issuance ..................................................... 22
Excess Capacity ................................................................................................................ 24
Capacity and Utilization of Capacity ................................................................................. 28
Sideboards on Expansion in the Gulf of Alaska .................................................................. 31
Other Impacts of Rationalization ....................................................................................... 33
Creation of a Race for Yellowfin Sole in the BSAI TLA Sector............................................. 40
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 44
Data Collection ................................................................................................................ 44
Results: Personnel Casualties ............................................................................................ 45
Results: Vessel Casualties .................................................................................................. 52
Safety Regulations for AM80 Vessels ................................................................................. 54
Final Conclusion and Recommendations .......................................................................... 55
6.1
Comparison of Biomass Estimates, with Allowable and Actual Harvests of AM80 Target
Species ............................................................................................................................. 57
6.2
The Flatfish Flexibility Plan ................................................................................................ 62
7.1
7.2
Groundfish Retention Summary ........................................................................................ 64
Suspension and Revocation of the Groundfish Retention Standard .................................... 66
8.1
8.2
PSC Bycatch of AM80 CPs in the BSAI .............................................................................. 67
AM80 Bycatch in Gulf of Alaska ........................................................................................ 76
9.1
9.1.1
A Discussion of Estimates of Net Operating Revenues of AM80 Vessels ............................. 90
A Comparison of the AM80 Fleet to other Resource Industries .......................................... 91
10.1
10.2
Volume and Value of Catch in CDQ Fisheries with Increased Allocations .......................... 97
Prohibited Species Bycatch in CDQ Fisheries for AM80 Species ...................................... 100
11.1
11.1.1
11.2
11.3
Summary of Port Calls Made by AM80 Vessels ................................................................ 101
Assessment of Impact of the AM80 Fleet on the Port of Adak .......................................... 103
An Economic Impact Model of the AM80 Fleet ............................................................... 105
An Assessment of Fish Tax Payments Related to AM80 .................................................... 107
12.1
Catch, Retained and Revenue by Species in the BSAI and the GOA ................................ 110
Table ES-1. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish of All AM80 Vessels in the BSAI
and GOA................................................................................................................................ ES-1
Table ES-2. Comparison of Total Catch and Revenue between the BSAI and GOA with
Participation Levels ................................................................................................................. ES-2
Table ES-3. Summary of EDR Revenues and Expenses over All AM80 Vessels, 2008–2012 ............ ES-2
Table ES-4. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80 BSAI Fishery ............................................. ES-6
Table ES-5. Bycatch Rates in the AM80 BSAI Fishery ..................................................................... ES-6
Table ES-6. EDR Revenue and Labor Expenses over All AM80 Vessels ........................................... ES-8
Table ES-7. Estimated Geographic Distribution of Total AM80 Sector Impacts ............................. ES-12
Table 1. Allocation, Catch and Transfer Amounts in Alaska Groundfish Cooperative
Voluntary Reports ...................................................................................................................... 16
Table 2. Allocation, Catch and Transfer Amounts in Alaska Seafood Cooperative
Voluntary Reports...................................................................................................................... 17
Table 3. Groundfish Retention Percentages Reported in Voluntary Cooperative Reports ................... 17
Table 4. AM80 Vessels with Current Owners ................................................................................... 20
Table 5. Estimated Crew and Crew Weeks on AM80 Vessels before and After Implementation ........ 21
Table 6. AM80 QS Unit Issuance (1,000s), 2008–2014 .................................................................... 24
Table 7. AM80 QS Unit Issuance, Percent of Total, 2008–2014 ....................................................... 26
Table 8. Catch of AM80 Species by Individual AM80 CPs as a Percentage of All AM80 CPs—
Selected Statistics ...................................................................................................................... 27
Table 9. Number of Active AM80 Vessels in any AK Fishery by Month and Year............................... 28
Table 10. Production By Month of AM80 Vessels, 2003–2012 ......................................................... 30
Table 11. Production By Month as a Percent of Annual Production of AM80 Vessels,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 30
Table 12. Groundfish Sideboard Limits (mt) for AM80 Vessels in the Gulf of Alaska,
2008–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 31
Table 13. Catch (mt) of Groundfish Sideboard Species by AM80 Vessels in the Gulf of Alaska,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 32
Table 14. Catch as a Percent of Groundfish Sideboards for AM80 Vessels in the Gulf of Alaska,
2008–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 32
Table 15. Halibut Prohibited Species Catch Limits (mt) for AM80 Vessels in the Gulf of Alaska,
2008–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 32
Table 16. Changes in Product Mix and Species Mix under Rationalization with AM80 ..................... 34
Table 17. Proportions of Pacific Cod Taken in AM80 CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fisheries,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 35
Table 18. Incidental Catch Rates of Pacific Cod in AM80 CP BSAI Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ....... 36
Table 19. Real Gross Revenue ($ 2012) in AM80 CP BSAI Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................... 36
Table 20. Real Groundfish Revenue ($2012) per MT of Groundfish in AM80 CP BSAI Target
Fisheries .................................................................................................................................... 37
Table 21. Halibut Mortality (MT) as a Percent Groundfish (MT) in AM80 CP BSAI Target Fisheries ... 38
Table 22. Harvests and Value of Groundfish in Yellowfin Sole Target Fisheries of Vessels Other
Than AM80 CPs ........................................................................................................................ 41
Table 23. Halibut PSC, Bycatch Rates and Value per MT of Bycatch in the BSAI TLA Yellfowfin
Sole Fishery ............................................................................................................................... 42
Table 24. Injury Severity Scale ......................................................................................................... 46
Table 25. Descriptions of Fatal Occupational Injuries in the AM80 Fleet during 2001–2012............. 47
Table 26. Frequency and Rate of Fatal and Non-Fatal Work-Related Injuries in the AM80 Fleet ....... 48
Table 27. Descriptions of Serious Occupational Injuries in the AM80 Fleet during 2001–2012 ......... 49
Table 28. Rates* of vessel casualties involving AM80 and FL vessels during 2003–2012 .................... 55
Table 29. Acceptable Biological Catch and Total Allowable Catch of AM80 Vessel Target
Species, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................................. 58
Table 30. Total Allowable Catch as a Percent of Acceptable Biological Catch of AM80 Vessel
Target Species, 2003–2012 ....................................................................................................... 59
Table 31. Catch (mt) in AM80 Target Fisheries and BSAI Trawl Limited Access Yellowfin Sole
Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................................................................................................................ 59
Table 32. Catch as a Percent of Total Allowable Catch in AM80 Target Fisheries and BSAI Trawl
Limited Access Yellowfin Sole Fisheries, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 60
Table 33. Groundfish Retention Percentages Reported in Voluntary Cooperative Reports ................. 65
Table 34. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80 BSAI Fishery ....................... 67
Table 35. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80 BSAI Fishery .................................................. 68
Table 36. Bycatch Rates in the AM80 BSAI Fishery ........................................................................... 70
Table 37. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80 BSAI Fishery ........................... 70
Table 38. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80 GOA Fishery ...................... 76
Table 39. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80 GOA Fishery .................................................. 77
Table 40. Bycatch Rates in the AM80 GOA Fishery .......................................................................... 78
Table 41. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80 GOA Fishery .......................... 78
Table 42. Summary of EDR Data and Estimation of Residuals for all AM80 Vessels Submitting
EDRs ......................................................................................................................................... 86
Table 43. Summary of EDR Data and Estimation of Residuals for all “Atka Mackerel” Vessels
Submitting EDRs ........................................................................................................................ 87
Table 44. Summary of EDR Data and Estimation of Residuals for all “Flatfish” Vessels Submitting
EDRs ......................................................................................................................................... 88
Table 45. Summary of EDR Revenue and Expenses over All AM80 Vessels ....................................... 89
Table 46. Hypothetical Discounted Cash Flow Model Based on Information in AM80 EDRs ............. 91
Table 47. CDQ Allocation of Major Groundfish Species, 2003–2012 ............................................... 94
Table 48. CDQ Allocation of Greenland Turbot and Pacific Ocean Perch, 2003–2012 ..................... 95
Table 49. Catch (mt) in CDQ Non-Pollock/Non-Sablefish Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 .................... 97
Table 50. CDQ Harvest Volumes as a Percent of CDQ Allocations ................................................... 99
Table 51. Prohibited Species Bycatch Amounts in CDQ Non-Pollock Trawl Target Fisheries,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 100
Table 52. Prohibited Species Bycatch Rates in CDQ Non-Pollock Trawl Target Fisheries,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 100
Table 53. Starting and Ending Ports of AM80 Vessels, 2003–2012 .................................................. 103
Table 54. Amount of CV Pacific cod harvested in Areas 541/542, by processing sector,
2003 through 2013 ................................................................................................................. 105
Table 55. Estimated geographic distribution of total AM80 sector impacts ...................................... 106
Table 56. Estimates of Fish Taxes Paid by BSAI Fisheries Affected by AM80 .................................... 107
Table 57. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish of All AM80 Vessels in the
BSAI and GOA ........................................................................................................................ 109
Table 58. Comparison of Total Catch and Revenue between the BSAI and GOA with
Participation Levels .................................................................................................................. 110
Table 59. Total Catch by Species of AM80 Vessels in the BSAI ....................................................... 111
Table 60. Estimated Retention Percentages by Species in the BSAI ................................................. 111
Table 61. Total Catch by Species of AM80 Vessels in the GOA ....................................................... 112
Table 62. Estimated Retention Percentages by Species in the GOA ................................................ 112
Table 63. Total AM80 Quota Share Allocation by Species, 2003–2014 .......................................... 124
Table 64. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation by Species, 2003–2014 .............................. 124
Table 65. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Yellowfin Sole, 2003–2014 ....................... 125
Table 66. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Rock Sole, 2003–2014 .............................. 126
Table 67. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Flathead Sole, 2003–2014 ........................ 127
Table 68. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Atka Mackerel, 2003–2014 ....................... 128
Table 69. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Pacific Ocean Perch, 2003–2014 .............. 129
Table 70. Total Percent AM80 Quota Share Allocation, Pacific Cod, 2003–2014 ........................... 130
Table 71. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin
Sole Target Fishery .................................................................................................................. 131
Table 72. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery ........... 131
Table 73. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery ................................... 131
Table 74. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 131
Table 75. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 138
Table 76. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery ................. 138
Table 77. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery ......................................... 138
Table 78. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 138
Table 79. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead
ole Target Fishery .................................................................................................................... 145
Table 80. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery ............ 145
Table 81. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery .................................... 145
Table 82. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 145
Table 83. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 152
Table 84. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery .......... 152
Table 85. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery................................... 152
Table 86. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 152
Table 87. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod
Target Fishery ......................................................................................................................... 159
Table 88. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery ............... 159
Table 89. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery ....................................... 159
Table 90. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 159
Table 91. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish
Target Fishery ......................................................................................................................... 166
Table 92. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery.................... 166
Table 93. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery ............................................ 166
Table 94. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target
Fishery .................................................................................................................................... 166
Table 95. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth
Flounder and Kamchatka Target Fishery .................................................................................. 173
Table 96. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth Flounder Target &
Kamchatka Fishery .................................................................................................................. 173
Table 97. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder Target
Fishery.................................................................................................................................... 173
Table 98. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and
Kamchatka Flounder Target Fishery ......................................................................................... 173
Table 99. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 180
Table 100. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery ................. 180
Table 101. Bycatch Rates in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery ......................................... 180
Table 102. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 180
Table 103. Total Catch and Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the AM80 GOA Rex Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 187
Table 104. Bycatch of Prohibited Species in the AM80 GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery ..................... 187
Table 105. Bycatch Rates in the AM80 GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery ............................................. 187
Table 106. Groundfish Wholesale Value per Unit of PSC in the AM80 GOA Rex Sole
Target Fishery .......................................................................................................................... 187
Figure ES-1. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch for All AM80 Vessels in
the BSAI and GOA ................................................................................................................. ES-1
Figure ES-2. EDR Revenues and Expenses of all AM80 Vessels, 2008–2012 ................................... ES-3
Figure ES-3. Herring and Halibut Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ............................ ES-5
Figure ES-4. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................. ES-5
Figure ES-5. Bycatch of Salmon Species by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ............................... ES-6
Figure ES-6. Groundfish Retention Percentages in the BSAI by AM80 Vessels, 2003–2010............. ES-7
Figure ES-7. CDQ Allocations of Groundfish other than Pollock and Sablefish ............................... ES-9
Figure ES-8. Catch (mt) in CDQ Non-Pollock/Non-Sablefish Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ........... ES-10
Figure ES-9. Real Wholesale Revenue ($2012) in CDQ Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................... ES-11
Figure ES-10. Estimates of Fish Taxes Paid by BSAI Fisheries Affected by AM80 ........................... ES-11
Figure ES-11. Volume, Wholesale Value and Processor Count in the BSAI TLA Yellowfin
Sole Fishery .......................................................................................................................... ES-14
Figure 1. Volume, Wholesale Value and Processor Count in the BSAI TLA Yellowfin Sole Fishery ..... 41
Figure 2. Halibut Bycatch Rates in BSAI TLA and AM80 CP Yellowfin Sole Fisheries ......................... 42
Figure 3. Harvests in BSAI TLA and A80-CP Yellowfin Sole Fisheries by Month, 2008–2012 ............ 43
Figure 4. Severity of Injuries Reported in the AM80 Fleet during 2001–2012 (Severity unknown
for 13 cases) .............................................................................................................................. 46
Figure 5. Rate of Occupational Injuries Reported in the AM80 Fleet, n=343.................................... 48
Figure 6. Job Task and Severity of Occupational Injuries 2001–2012, n=333 ................................... 51
Figure 7. Injury Type and Severity of Occupational Injuries Reported in the AM80 Fleet during
2001–2012, n=387 .................................................................................................................. 52
Figure 8. Vessel Casualty Type and Severity Reported in the AM80 Fleet during 2001–2012,
n=349 ...................................................................................................................................... 53
Figure 9. Comparisons of OFLs, ABCs, TACs, and Retained Catches of Flatfish, Atka Mackerel,
and Rockfish.............................................................................................................................. 61
Figure 10. Groundfish Retention Percentage in the BSAI by AM80 Vessels, 2003–2010 ................... 65
Figure 11. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in AM80 BSAI Fisheries,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 70
Figure 12. Herring and Halibut Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 .................................. 71
Figure 13. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012....................... 71
Figure 14. Bycatch of King Crab Species by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................................. 72
Figure 15. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ............................. 72
Figure 16. Bycatch of Salmon Species by AM80 BSAI Fisheries, 2003–2012 ..................................... 73
Figure 17. Bycatch of Halibut by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 73
Figure 18. Bycatch of Herring by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 19. Bycatch of King Crab by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 20. Bycatch of Tanner Crab by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and
Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 21. Chinook Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 22. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch by AM80 BSAI Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch
and Value, 2003–2012 .............................................................................................................. 76
Figure 23. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in AM80 GOA Fisheries,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 79
Figure 24. Herring and Halibut Bycatch by AM80 GOA Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................................. 79
Figure 25. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch by AM80 GOA Fisheries, 2003–2012 ...................... 80
Figure 26. Bycatch of King Crab Species by AM80 GOA Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................................ 80
Figure 27. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species by AM80 GOA Fisheries, 2003–2012 ............................ 81
Figure 28. Bycatch of Salmon Species by AM80 GOA Fisheries, 2003–2012 .................................... 81
Figure 29. Bycatch of Halibut by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 82
Figure 30. Bycatch of Herring by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 82
Figure 31. Bycatch of King Crab by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 83
Figure 32. Bycatch of Tanner Crab by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and
Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................................................... 83
Figure 33. Chinook Bycatch by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 84
Figure 34. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch by AM80 GOA Fisheries as Share of Groundfish Catch
and Value, 2003–2012 .............................................................................................................. 84
Figure 35. EDR Revenues and Expenses of all AM80 Vessels, 2008–2012 ........................................ 90
Figure 36. Typical Timeframe for a Completed Mine Project, Alaska ................................................ 92
Figure 37. CDQ Allocations of Groundfish other than Pollock and Sablefish ..................................... 96
Figure 38. Components of Change in Non-Pollock/Non-Sablefish CDQ Allocations from
2008–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 96
Figure 39. Catch (mt) in CDQ Non-Pollock/Non-Sablefish Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ................... 98
Figure 40. Real Wholesale Revenue ($2012) per MT in CDQ Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 .............. 98
Figure 41. Real Wholesale Revenue ($2012) in CDQ Target Fisheries, 2003–2012 ........................... 99
Figure 42. Estimates of Fish Taxes Paid by BSAI Fisheries Affected by AM80 ................................... 108
Figure 43. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch for All AM80 Vessels in
the BSAI and GOA .................................................................................................................. 109
Figure 44. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 132
Figure 45. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery, 2003–
2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 132
Figure 46. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target
Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................................................ 133
Figure 47. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery, 2003–
2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 133
Figure 48. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 134
Figure 49. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 134
Figure 50. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 135
Figure 51. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 135
Figure 52. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 136
Figure 53. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 136
Figure 54. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 137
Figure 55. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Yellowfin Sole Target Fishery as
Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 137
Figure 56. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Rock Sole Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ...................................................................................... 139
Figure 57. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................ 139
Figure 58. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 140
Figure 59. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 140
Figure 60. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 141
Figure 61. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 141
Figure 62. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 142
Figure 63. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 142
Figure 64. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 143
Figure 65. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 143
Figure 66. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 144
Figure 67. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rock Sole Target Fishery as
Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 144
Figure 68. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Flathead Sole Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 146
Figure 69. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery, 2003–
2012 ....................................................................................................................................... 146
Figure 70. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target
Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................................................ 147
Figure 71. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 147
Figure 72. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................ 148
Figure 73. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 148
Figure 74. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 149
Figure 75. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 149
Figure 76. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 150
Figure 77. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 150
Figure 78. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 151
Figure 79. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Flathead Sole Target Fishery
as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .............................................................. 151
Figure 80. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI Atka
Mackerel Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ....................................................................................... 153
Figure 81. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 153
Figure 82. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target
Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................................................ 154
Figure 83. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 154
Figure 84. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 155
Figure 85. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 155
Figure 86. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 156
Figure 87. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 156
Figure 88. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 157
Figure 89. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 157
Figure 90. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 158
Figure 91. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Atka Mackerel Target Fishery
as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .............................................................. 158
Figure 92. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Pacific Cod Target Fishery, 2003–2012 .................................................................................... 160
Figure 93. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery,
003–2012 ............................................................................................................................... 160
Figure 94. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 161
Figure 95. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 161
Figure 96. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 162
Figure 97. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................ 162
Figure 98. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 163
Figure 99. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 163
Figure 100. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 164
Figure 101. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 164
Figure 102. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 165
Figure 103. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Pacific Cod Target Fishery as
hare of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................... 165
Figure 104. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Rockfish Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ........................................................................................ 167
Figure 105. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 167
Figure 106. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 168
Figure 107. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................ 168
Figure 108. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 169
Figure 109. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 169
Figure 110. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 170
Figure 111. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 170
Figure 112. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 171
Figure 113. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 171
Figure 114. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 172
Figure 115. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Rockfish Target Fishery as
Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 172
Figure 116. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP BSAI
Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 ....................................................... 174
Figure 117. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka
Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................. 174
Figure 118. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and
Kamchatka Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 175
Figure 119. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka
Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................. 175
Figure 120. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka
Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................. 176
Figure 121. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka
Flounder Fishery, 2003–2012 .................................................................................................. 176
Figure 122. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Fishery as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................. 177
Figure 123. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Fishery as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................. 177
Figure 124. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Fishery as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................. 178
Figure 125. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Fishery as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................. 178
Figure 126. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Fishery as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................. 179
Figure 127. Non-Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP BSAI Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder
Target as Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012.................................................... 179
Figure 128. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP GOA
Rockfish Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ........................................................................................ 181
Figure 129. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................ 181
Figure 130. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 182
Figure 131. Bycatch of King Crab Species in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 182
Figure 132. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 183
Figure 133. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 183
Figure 134. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 184
Figure 135. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 184
Figure 136. Bycatch of King Crab in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 185
Figure 137. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 185
Figure 138. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 186
Figure 139. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rockfish Target Fishery as
Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 186
Figure 140. Total Volume and Wholesale Value of Groundfish Catch in the AM80CP GOA
Rex Sole Target Fishery, 2003–2012 ........................................................................................ 188
Figure 141. Herring and Halibut Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 188
Figure 142. King Crab and Tanner Crab Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 189
Figure 143. Bycatch of Tanner Crab Species in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery,
2003–2012 ............................................................................................................................. 189
Figure 144. Bycatch of Salmon Species in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery, 2003–2012 190
Figure 145. Bycatch of Halibut in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 190
Figure 146. Bycatch of Herring in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 191
Figure 147. Bycatch of Tanner Crab in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 ................................................................................ 191
Figure 148. Chinook Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery as Share of
Groundfish Catch and Value, ................................................................................................... 192
Figure 149. Non-Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the AM80CP GOA Rex Sole Target Fishery as
Share of Groundfish Catch and Value, 2003–2012 .................................................................. 192
§
Section
X2
Chi-Square
ABC
Acceptable biological catch
AFA
American Fisheries Act
ACSA
Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement
ADF&G
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
AFSC
Alaska Fisheries Science Center
AGC
Alaska Groundfish Cooperative
AI
Aleutian Islands
AKFIN
Alaska Fisheries Information Network
AKSC
Alaska Seafood Cooperative
AM80
Amendment 80
AM80 LA
AM80 Limited Entry Fishery
AS
Alaska Statute
BS
Bering Sea
BSAI
Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands
BUC
Best Use Cooperative
CAA
Catch and Area
CAS
Catch Accounting System
CDQ
Western Alaska Community Development Quota Program
COAR
ADF&G Commercial Operator Annual Report
CP
Catcher/processor
CQ
Cooperative Quota
CV
Catcher vessel
DCF
Discounted cash flow
DNR
Alaska Department of Natural Resources
EDR
Economic Data Report
FBT
Fishery Business Tax
FCA
Fishing Company of Alaska
FFP
Flatfish Flexibility Plan
FL
Freezer-longliner
FMP
Fishery Management Plan
FRT
Fishery Resource Tax
FTE
Full-time equivalent worker
GOA
Gulf of Alaska
GRS
Groundfish Retention Standards
H&G
Headed and gutted
HR
Human resources
IRR
Internal rate of return
ITAC
Initial Total Allowable Catch
kg
Kilograms
LAPP
Limited Access Privilege Program
LOA
Length overall
MSA
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
mt
Metric tons
NIOSH
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NBBTA
Northern Bristol Bay Trawl Area
NMFS
National Marine Fisheries Service
NMFS-AKR
NMFS Alaska Region
NPFMC
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
NPV
Net present value
OFL
Overfishing level
PSC
Prohibited Species Catch
PSQ
Prohibited species quota
QS
Quota Share
ROCE
Return on capital employed
RWE
Round weight equivalent
SSC
Scientific and Statistical Committee
TAC
Total Allowable Catch
TLA
Trawl Limited Access
U.S.
United States
USCG
United States Coast Guard
VMS
Vessel Monitoring System
The Executive Summary (ES) provides an overview of all activities in the Amendment 80 (AM80)
sector. The first section of the ES describes all harvesting and processing of the AM80 fleet of catcher
processors (CPs) in both the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) and the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI),
including catch and processing associated with the Western Alaska Community Development Quota
Program (CDQ) and processing that AM80 vessels have undertaken while acting as motherships. The
first ES section then discusses operating costs and estimates of net operating residuals.
Following the overview, the ES examines the goals and objectives set by the Council in developing the
AM80 program. This section of the ES includes summary tables and figures that specifically address
the question of whether and the extent to which, the Council’s AM80 goals and objectives have been
attained.
Table ES-1 and Figure ES-1 summarize total catch and total wholesale revenue in all AM80 fisheries in
both the BSAI and the GOA, including CDQs and processed catch of AM80 motherships. From
2003–2006 total groundfish catch ranged between 319,000 to 333,000 metric tons (mt) before
increasing in 2007 to 347,000 mt. In 2008, total catch by all AM80 vessels (including mothership
deliveries) jumped to 385,000 mt and from 2010–2012 averaged 392,000 mt. Overall increases in
total wholesale revenues in recent years have been even more pronounced than increases in tonnage.
Although total revenues declined in 2008 and 2009, they surged upward in 2010 and, in 2011,
exceeded $1,000 per ton harvested in real values ($2012) for the first time.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
319,530
$231.29
2004
333,552
$262.68
2005
324,345
$305.88
2006
324,437
$311.71
2007
346,659
$325.86
2008
384,987
$313.84
2009
362,090
$273.08
2010
387,881
$314.28
2011
394,133
$400.87
2012
396,182
$392.56
500,000
$500
400,000
$400
300,000
$300
200,000
$200
100,000
$100
0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
Note: Includes all AM80 CPs along with their CDQ and mothership activities.
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Wholesale Value (Million of
$2012)
Groundfish (MT)
Note: Includes all AM80 CPs along with their CDQ and mothership activities.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from Catch Accounting System (CAS) data provided by Alaska
Fisheries Information Network (AKFIN) (Fey, 2014).
Table ES-2 shows the relative importance of the BSAI and the GOA to AM80 vessels in terms of total
groundfish catch and revenue. The table also shows the number of active vessels in the both the BSAI
and the GOA, as well as the number of vessels that fished only in either the BSAI or the GOA. As can
be inferred from the table, the relative importance of the GOA and the BSAI to the AM80 fleet has
not changed significantly overall—over the 10-year period, 92 percent of the catch and 91 percent of
the revenue have come from the BSAI.
The review of vessel activity also shows that the number of vessels active only in the Bering Sea fell to
four from 2009–2011, and only one AM80 vessel (the Golden Fleece) has participated exclusively in
the GOA since the program was implemented.
Item
BSAI Catch ÷ All Catch
BSAI Revenue ÷ All Revenue
2003
88%
86%
2004
94%
92%
2005
93%
91%
2006
91%
89%
2007
93%
93%
2008
94%
93%
2009
93%
92%
2010
93%
92%
2011
93%
91%
2012
93%
92%
GOA Catch ÷ All Catch
GOA Revenue ÷ All Revenue
12%
14%
6%
8%
7%
9%
9%
11%
7%
7%
6%
7%
7%
8%
7%
8%
7%
9%
7%
8%
20
2
0
22
15
7
0
22
15
7
0
22
15
7
0
22
14
8
0
22
12
10
1
23
17
4
0
21
16
4
0
20
16
4
0
20
16
4
0
20
Vessels Active in Both FMP Areas
Vessels Active in the BSAI Only
Vessels Active in the GOA Only
Total Number of Active Vessels
Note: Includes all AM80 CPs along with their CDQ and mothership activities.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table ES-3 summarizes fleet-wide revenue and expenses as reported in the Economic Data Reports
(EDRs) that are now required under AM80. The tables show reported revenues, capital expenses, and
operating expenses that were included in the EDRs from 2008-2012. It should be noted that EDRs are
required of all vessels that have applied for quota share (QS) under AM80. The EDRs include
revenues and expenditures of two vessels that have not been active at any time since implementation
of AM80 in 2008, as well as revenues and expenditures of three other vessels that have exhibited
relatively sporadic activity. Table ES-3 and Figure ES-2 summarize revenues and expenses for the
AM80 fleet, as reported in the EDS from 2008-2012. Since implementation of the AM80 in 2008
there has been a steady increase in overall operating residuals for AM80 owners and operators. While
it is probably too early to be certain, it appears that operating residuals have improved over time
under AM80. There are no data for residuals prior to 2008, but AM80 active owners and operators
report that they are better off under AM80 than before.
EDR Expenditure Item
Total Revenue
Capital Expenditures
Operating Expenditures
2008
$ million
275.7
(7.9)
(232.9)
2009
% $ million
100%
238.5
2010
% $ million
100%
298.3
2011
% $ million
100%
399.3
2008 – 2012
Average
% $ million
%
2012
% $ million
320.8
100%
2.9%
(8.3)
84.5% (205.1)
3.5% (10.1)
86.0% (231.4)
3.4%
(8.5)
77.6% (286.1)
100%
2.1% (24.2)
71.6% (292.3)
392.1
100%
6.2% (11.8)
74.6% (249.6)
3.7%
77.8%
Operating Residual
(Total Rev. - Operating
Expenditures)
42.9
15.5%
33.3
14.0%
66.9
22.4%
113.3
28.4%
99.8
25.4%
71.2
22.2%
Total Residual
(Total Rev. - All Expenditures)
34.9
12.7%
25.0
10.5%
56.7
19.0%
104.8
26.3%
75.6
19.3%
59.4
18.5%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from EDR Data from provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014)
Revenue and Expense ($ millions)
$450
Total Residual
$400
$350
$300
$250
Operating Residual
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
2008
Total Revenue
2009
2010
2011
Total Expenditures (capital + operating)
2012
Operating Expenditures
Note: EDR revenues and expenses have not been adjusted for inflation.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from EDR Data from provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014)
The AM80 Problem Statement provided in full in Section 1.2 articulates six specific goals and
implicitly includes a seventh. These are listed below:
1. To maintain a healthy marine ecosystem to ensure the long-term conservation and
abundance of the groundfish and crab resources;
2. To reduce bycatch;
3. To minimize waste and improve utilization to the extent practical;
4. To provide maximum benefit to present generations of fishermen, including CDQ groups,
communities, and the nation as a whole;
5. To further rationalize the fishery as a means to mitigate costs of achieving the goals of bycatch
reduction and other program objectives;
6. To minimize negative impacts on other fisheries;
7. To apportion the yellowfin sole fishery between the AM80 Sector and the BSAI Trawl Limited
Access (BSAI TLA) Sector.
AM80 has led to the near elimination of the race for fish in the BSAI non-pelagic trawl fisheries. No
longer forced by the race for fish to maximize catch and revenue per unit of time, participants in
these fisheries have been much more amenable to gear changes and other behavioral changes that
have reduced negative impacts of non-pelagic trawling on the ecosystem. Examples include the use of
modified trawl doors and sweeps, ongoing experiments with gear modifications, and the use of
excluders and deck sorting to reduce bycatch mortality. More detailed discussions of these points are
included in Section 3.1.7.3, which examines the issue of innovation and experimentation, as well as
in Section 5, which discusses the move to gear modifications that lift trawl sweeps off bottom.
AM80 subdivided the halibut PSC allocation to the trawl sectors, with 875 metric tons (mt) allocated
to the BSAI TLA sector and the remainder assigned to the AM80 sector. AM80 also reduced the total
PSC allocated to the trawl sector, in general, and to the AM80 sector, in particular. The AM80 sector
was allocated 2,525 mt in 2008, with the amount reduced 50 mt each year through 2012. In years
2012 and beyond, the AM80 PSC allocation of halibut PSC was set at 2,325 mt. AM80 also
establishes a halibut prohibited species quota (PSQ) for CDQ harvests. The 5-year review summarizes
halibut PSC in the AM80, CDQ, and BSAI TLA fisheries for AM80 species.
AM80 also sets an initial AM80 Crab PSQ percentage based on historical usage from 1995–2002 in all
groundfish fisheries. The crab PSQs have been reduced five percent per year from 2009–2012, such
that by 2012 PSQs for crab species are set at 80 percent of historical usage. The five-year review will
summarize crab PSC in the BSAI TLA and AM80 Sectors and in CDQ fisheries for AM80 species. The
crab PSQs under AM80 are abundance-based limits. The five-year review documents crab PSC limits
and use in the AM80, CDQ, and BSAI TLA fisheries, as well bycatch of herring and salmon.
Analysis of catch of various prohibited species in the BSAI sector over the five-year periods before and
after the implementation of the AM80 regulations reveals pronounced declines in bycatch volumes
across species over the five years ending 2012. Similarly, bycatch rates for these prohibited species,
measured as the ratio of volume of prohibited species catch to volume of groundfish catch, dropped
off considerably in BSAI sector from 2003–2007 to the following five years.
Declines in bycatch rates for these species—including halibut, herring, king and tanner crab, and
Chinook and other salmon—ranged from 32 percent (halibut) to 82 percent (Chinook), while declines
in total volumes of prohibited species catch ranged from 18 percent (king crab) to 79 percent
(Chinook). That declines in catch of each of these prohibited species occurred, on average, following
the initiation of the AM80 regulations suggests that they are having the intended effect of reducing
bycatch. Importantly, reductions in bycatch did not occur at the expense of the groundfish catch.
Indeed, both the average total groundfish catch and wholesale value of the catch were higher from
2008–2012 than over the prior five years. The following three figures show AM80 PSC trends in the
BSAI, while the two tables that follow provide the details of total PSC and PSC rates.
100
2,500
80
2,000
60
1,500
40
1,000
20
500
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
King Crabs (1,000s)
Halibut (MT)
3,000
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
140
7.0
120
6.0
100
5.0
80
4.0
60
3.0
40
2.0
20
1.0
0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006 2007
All King Crab
2008 2009 2010
All Tanner Crab
2011
2012
Source: Both figures developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
Herring (MT)
120
16,000
14,000
Number of Salmon
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Chinook
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Other Salmon
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
2,649
90,901
608,798
951,732
51,692
5,698
1,126
2004
2,732
87,997
1,734,731
774,933
94,193
5,526
8,854
2005
2,700
116,133
3,118,248
1,461,852
80,387
4,567
3,442
2006
2,540
110,893
832,166
770,884
24,252
2,625
13,468
2007
2,572
102,852
1,214,389
602,427
57,103
4,010
1,866
2008
2,012
113,163
615,392
554,482
82,703
583
1,535
2009
2,080
85,794
364,563
396,036
23,401
623
1,247
2010
2,255
70,726
267,030
389,198
4,117
1,625
1,589
2011
1,838
91,270
484,842
802,076
14,048
983
3,078
2012
2,082
54,539
339,775
352,912
11,445
848
1,717
2011
2012
0.0057
0.2811
1.4933
2.4703
0.0433
0.0030
0.0095
0.0064
0.1668
1.0390
1.0792
0.0350
0.0026
0.0053
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
2004
0.0099
0.3387
2.2682
3.5459
0.1926
0.0212
0.0042
0.0092
0.2959
5.8328
2.6056
0.3167
0.0186
0.0298
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0095
0.0091
0.0087
0.0060
0.0066 0.0067
0.4072
0.3969
0.3488
0.3400
0.2726 0.2100
10.9349
2.9785
4.1182
1.8491
1.1584 0.7929
5.1263
2.7591
2.0429
1.6660
1.2584 1.1557
0.2819
0.0868
0.1936
0.2485
0.0744 0.0122
0.0160
0.0094
0.0136
0.0018
0.0020 0.0048
0.0121
0.0482
0.0063
0.0046
0.0040 0.0047
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
A major goal of AM80 is the improvement of retention and utilization of groundfish within the AM80
sector. To this end, it was presumed that the establishment of multispecies cooperatives could lead to
greater retention improvements and could provide cost-effective means for the sector to meet the
Groundfish Retention Standards (GRS) approved by the Council in 2003 under Amendment 79. GRS
would require AM80 CPs, if they were > 125’, to meet standards for retention of BSAI groundfish
each year. The GRS for 2008 was set at 65 percent and by 2010 it would increase to 80 percent. In
2011 and each subsequent year, the GRS would be set at 85 percent. The regulations governing the
implementation of AM80 effectively supersede those proposed for implementation under the GRS.
Under AM80 regulations, the retention standards set by GRS will still apply to any AM80 cooperative
as an aggregate. Meanwhile, vessels that do not join an AM80 cooperative must comply with GRS
percentages on an individual basis.
Figure ES-6 shows estimated groundfish retention percentages of AM80 for individual vessels
operating in the BSAI from 2003–2012, noting that estimated retention rates for the vessels with the
lowest four retention percentages have been deleted for the years 2009–2012 to prevent disclosure of
confidential information. The heavy black dashed line shows the estimated average retention
percentage of all of the vessels in the AM80 sector operating in the BSAI. The fleet-wide weighted
average is also summarized in the table embedded at the bottom of the figure and includes vessels
excluded from the figure.
The data summarized in the figure include catch and retention from CDQ fisheries, as well as catch
and retention of AM80 vessels when they are acting as motherships in the BSAI TLA fisheries. It
should also be noted that the figure uses retention estimates based on observer data in the CAS. As is
clearly evident from the graphic, overall levels of groundfish retention increased significantly from the
low of 69 percent seen in 2004. In 2005, the weighted average retention jumped to 78 percent, but
five vessels still had retention percentages below 60 percent. From 2005–2007, overall retention
remained between 78 and 79 percent. The fleet’s overall retention improved to 90 percent with the
implementation of AM80 and the modified GRS in 2008, with all but two vessels (not shown)
achieving a rate well above 80 percent. The overall weighted average retention percentages of the
fleet have improved every year under AM80 and, in 2012, were estimated at 94 percent.
Groundfish Retention Percentage
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
2003
71%
Notes:
1)
2)
2004
69%
2005
78%
2006
2007
2008
2009
Fleet-wide Retention Percentage
79%
78%
90%
90%
2010
91%
2011
93%
2012
94%
Includes retention of AM80 vessels acting as motherships and catches in the CDQ fisheries.
In order to protect the confidentiality of the data, the lines of lowest four the participating vessels from
2009 – 2012 have been excluded from the figure, but their retention is included in the fleet averages.
3) Retention percentages were calculated by Northern Economics from CAS data.
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This goal clearly is very broad-based and is addressed below by it components.
and operators are perhaps most effectively captured by the increases in total
revenues under AM80 as demonstrated in , and by the fact that operating residuals (the amount
remaining after operating expenses are subtracted from total revenue) appear to be increasing more
slowly than revenues, as summarized in Table ES-3 and Figure ES-2, above.
The extent to which AM80 benefits crew members can be seen in increased
total revenue in the AM80 fisheries. In general, crew members are paid on a share basis: if shares are
stable and total revenues increase, payments to labor are higher. As shown in Table ES-6, direct labor
payments peaked in 2012 at $106.6 million.
2008
EDR Expenditure Item
Total Revenue
$ million
275.7
2009
% $ million
100%
238.5
2010
%
100%
$ million
298.3
2011
%
100%
2008 – 2012
Average
2012
$ million
% $ million
399.3 100%
392.1
%
100%
$ million
320.8
%
100%
Direct Labor Expenditures
(79.6) 28.9%
(71.1)
29.8%
(82.6) 27.7%
(104.6) 26.2%
(106.6)
27.2%
(88.9) 27.7%
Indirect Labor Expenditures
Total Labor Expenditures
(14.3) 5.2%
(93.92) 34.1%
(12.8)
(83.83)
5.4%
35.2%
(13.4) 4.5%
(95.96) 32.2%
(17.3) 4.3%
(121.92) 30.5%
(15.1)
(121.62)
3.8%
31.0%
(14.6) 4.5%
(103.45) 32.2%
Note: EDR revenues and expenses have not been adjusted for inflation.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from EDR Data from provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014)
as a whole benefit from increased safety that may have occurred under
AM80. This section summarizes the findings from Section 4.3 – 4.5 and is based on data for all worker
injuries and vessel casualties that were reported to the USCG and NMFS for the AM80 fleet during
2001–2012. The findings were developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) specifically for this 5-year review.
The rates of injuries are steady over the time period (except for the minor injuries as explained).
While the rate of injuries did not decrease, serious vessel casualties did decline slightly, which we
attribute to the vessel safety improvements required by Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement
(ACSA). Since ACSA and AM80 occurred at similar times, it is impossible to establish definitively
which program influenced the decrease in serious vessel casualties. However, because ACSA focuses
entirely on improving vessel safety, it seems likely that it had the more direct influence.
The USCG considers the AM80 fleet high-risk for several reasons (USCG, 2006). The fleet can operate
in the most remote areas of Alaska for extended periods of time, far away from search and rescue
support if an emergency occurs. In addition to the hazards of catching fish, these vessels also contain
processing and freezing machinery, as well as large crew complements who are fish processors and
not professional mariners. These vessels carry hazardous gases for refrigeration and large amounts of
flammable packaging materials which pose hazards that do not exist on catcher vessels.
During the most recent decade of data (2003–2012), the annual risk of fatal injuries in the AM80 fleet
was 1.3 per 1,000 full-time equivalent workers (FTEs). This is similar to the average fatality rate for the
entire Alaskan fishing fleet which was 1.1 per 1,000 for 2000–2009. Risk reduction measures should
continue for the AM80 fleet since high numbers of crewmembers can be put in danger during a single
vessel emergency. To reduce the risk of fatal falls overboard and fatal deck injuries, crewmembers
should wear personal floatation devices while working on deck and establish and follow deck safety
procedures (Lucas et al., 2014b).
The annual risk of non-fatal injuries was 43 per 1,000 FTEs. For injuries greater than minor in severity,
the rates were stable across the time period. Most of the serious and moderately severe injuries
occurred during the handling of frozen fish and while processing fish, which reflects the relatively high
number of people required to perform these tasks. A thorough review of each process should reveal
opportunities to reduce the numbers severity of the injuries that occur during these processes.
Although the majority of vessel casualties reported were minor, 27 percent of the vessel casualties
could not be resolved at sea. Moderate vessel casualties were defined as problems that required the
vessel to return immediately to port for repairs, and serious casualties meant that the vessel was
unable to cope with the problem at sea on its own and had to be rescued by a third party (such as
being towed to port). These events most commonly occurred as a result of a loss of propulsion.
Current ACSA requirements do little to address this area. Since serious vessel casualties have the most
immediate potential to develop into vessel disasters that put crews’ lives at risk, more effort should be
placed in preventing loss of propulsion events at sea (Lucas et al., 2014a).
ACSA was developed to prevent vessel disasters at sea. Lucas et al. (2014a) found indications of a
positive effect of ACSA on vessel safety in the AM80 and FL fleets. On both types of vessels, reported
rates of serious vessel casualties decreased after the vessels reached compliance with ACSA
requirements. Owners of AM80 vessels are encouraged to maintain enrollment in the program.
from AM80 through increased allocations of most of their groundfish species
within AM80. Allocations increased from 7.5 percent to 10.7 percent of the TAC for all CDQ
groundfish species, with the exceptions of pollock, which was already at allocated to CDQs at 10
percent, and sablefish, which currently is allocated to CDQ at over 15 percent. Figure ES-7 shows the
CDQ allocations in metric tons from 2003–2012. As discussed in Section 10, the very large increase
in 2008 is due only in part to the increased allocation percentages. TAC increases in 2008 contribute
a larger portion of the overall increases than can be attributed to the percentage change.
CDQ Allocations (Metric Tons)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
Pacific cod
Rock sole
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Atka mackerel
Pacific ocean perch
Arrowtooth flounder
Flathead sole
2010
2011
2012
Yellowfin sole
Greenland turbot
Note: The legend (from left-to-right and top-to-bottom) corresponds with areas moving up from the bottom.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Figure ES-8 shows the combined harvest for all six CDQ groups in non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ
target fisheries.1 The figure stacks the catch of each species to show the total for the year. It is very
clear that the largest single component of these CDQ harvests are Pacific cod using fixed gear. Overall
CDQ harvests increased in 2008 but in 2009 dropped to levels below those experienced in 2007.
Overall harvest levels were flat in 2010 but increased in 2011 and again in 2012. CDQ harvests of
yellowfin sole appear to have the greatest variability: both the decline in 2009 and the increase in
2011 can be attributed primarily to changes in yellowfin sole.
CDQ Harvests (Metric Tons)
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
2004
Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear)
Atka Mackerel
2005
2006
2007
Pacific Cod (Fixed Gear)
Flathead Sole
2008
Yellowfin Sole
Arrowtooth
2009
2010
2011
2012
Rock Sole
POP & Greenland Turbot
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Note: The legend (from left-to-right and top-to-bottom) corresponds with areas moving up from the bottom. Thus
the first area shows Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear) then the next darker area shows Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear).
As shown in Figure ES-9 the wholesale revenue generated in non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ fisheries
fell dramatically in 2009. The leading component of the decline in 2009 was the value generated in
the CDQ fisheries for Pacific cod, although revenue in flatfish fisheries also declined. The assessment
in Section 10.1 finds that there were very large price declines for Pacific cod and several of the flatfish
species. These price declines, coupled with declining CDQ flatfish harvests, led to a large drop in the
total wholesale value in 2009. In 2009, the biggest revenue decline was seen in the Pacific cod
fisheries, which fell from over $50 million in 2008 to less than $33 million in 2009. CDQ revenues
began to increase in 2010 and now exceed levels witnessed in 2007.
1
An average of 1,114 tons of CDQ groundfish (primarily Pacific cod, arrowtooth flounder, flathead sole, and rock
sole) are taken incidentally in CDQ target fisheries for pollock and sablefish.
Wholesale Value ($ Millions 2012)
$90.00
$80.00
$70.00
$60.00
$50.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00
2003
2004
2005
2006
Trawl Pacific Cod
Fixed Gear Pacific Cod
2007
2008
Flatfish Targets
2009
2010
Atka Mackerel
2011
2012
Rockfish Targets
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
from AM80 accrue in part from increases in fish taxes.
Figure ES-10 provides estimates of Fishery Resources Tax (FRT) and Fishery Business Tax (FBT) paid by
th4ee groups: 1) AM80 CPs, 2) vessels participating in BSAI TLA fisheries (excluding pollock and
Pacific cod) and 3) CDQ fisheries. Details of the calculations are provided in Section 11.3. Estimated
fish tax payments jumped in 2008 then fell in 2009 due to depressed prices and the global recession.
Estimated taxes have since increased and, in 2012, topped $5.0 million. Data are not available to
quantify AM80-related fish taxes by community. However, since almost all of the offloads of AM80
products occur at Dutch Harbor, that community, along with the State of Alaska, receives the vast
majority of the FRT and FBT taxes.
$6.00
Millions of 2012 $
$5.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
2003
2004
Total Tax Payments
2005
2006
2007
AM80 CPs
2008
2009
BSAI TLA
2010
2011
2012
CDQ (Selected Fisheries)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
benefit from AM80 due to the increased
economic activity of AM80 CPs and of the vessels in the BSAI TLA. These economic impacts are also
felt in the
. The 5-year review summarizes estimated economic
impacts (multiplier effects) of the AM80 fleet from a recently published report (Waters, 2014) that
incorporated EDR data from the 2008–2010 AM80 fisheries to develop a model that estimated the
multiplier impacts associated with activities of the AM80 fleet in Alaska, the West Coast (Washington,
Oregon and California), and the rest of the U.S.
The report estimates that in 2008 the total economic contribution of the AM80 sector’s $281 million
of first wholesale revenues (estimated from 2008 COAR data) was approximately $1 billion in total
output, which contributed $571 million in total value added, $289 million in total labor income,
$351 million in total household income, $79 million in total state and local government revenue, and
6,800 total jobs in the combined economies of the three regions. About 80 percent of the $351
million total household income generated by AM80 sector activities accrued to households outside
Alaska (including payments to non-Alaska residents in the AM80 sector workforce). Also, about 71
percent of the $79 million in total state and local government revenues were paid to governments
outside Alaska. The primary findings from that report are summarized in Table ES-7. The table
highlights the wide geographic distribution of economic impacts of the AM80 fleet’s activities.
Region
Output
Household Income
S-L Government Revenue
Jobs
Alaska
47%
20%
29%
53%
West Coast
18%
39%
27%
18%
Rest of the U.S.
35%
40%
44%
29%
1,027
351
79
-
-
-
-
6.8
Total (Direct, Indirect and Induced) U.S. Impacts:
Total U.S. Impact in $ million
Total U.S. Impact in jobs (1,000)
Note: Economic impacts are based on the 2008 economic contribution from the SAM model
Source: Table excerpted from Table 6 of Waters (2014).
AM80 rationalized the AM80 fishery by allocating catch shares of primary target species to owners of
vessels that historically had participated in the fishery. Shares were also provided for prohibited
species. The allocation of catch shares for both target species and prohibited species provided
operators with the means to mitigate the cost of significant reductions in halibut PSC limits set for the
AM80 fisheries. Vessels were also incentivized to join cooperatives as a means to meet the program
objective of increasing the retention of groundfish. With rationalization, AM80 CPs have been able to:
1) Reduce bycatch of prohibited species across the board, as shown in Tables ES-4 and ES-5, as well
as in Figures ES-3 – ES-5;
2) Improve retention and utilization of groundfish species and meet target retention rates set under
GRS rules as shown in Figure ES-6; and
3) Increase overall harvest levels and wholesale revenues as seen in Figure ES-1.
Catch limits, commonly known as sideboards, limit the ability of AM80 vessels to expand their harvest
efforts in the GOA. Otherwise, AM80 vessels could use the economic advantages attributable to
AM80 to increase their participation in GOA fisheries, thereby adversely affecting the participants in
those fisheries. GOA groundfish and halibut PSC sideboards prevent these undesirable effects by
limiting the catch by AM80 vessels to historic levels in the GOA. The AM80 sideboards in the GOA
are discussed more completely in Section 3.1.6.
Under AM80, AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA are subject to Central GOA (Area 620 and 630),
Western GOA (Area 610) and West Yakutat (Area 640) northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, and
Pacific Ocean perch sideboard limits, as well as limits on Pacific cod and pollock. Table 12 in Section
3.1.6 identifies the sideboards placed on the AM80 CPs participating in the GOA. The analysis
indicates that AM80 vessels operating in the GOA generally have been able to stay within their
sideboard limits for Pacific cod, northern rockfish, and pelagic shelf rockfish but have exceeded limits
for Pacific Ocean perch and pollock. According NMFS-AKR, the sideboards for pollock are managed
as a soft constraint that strictly limit the amount of targeting for pollock that vessels can undertake
(Furuness, 2014).
AM80 also imposes deep- and shallow-water halibut PSC limits for AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA.
A total limit has been set at 418 mt for the deep-water species fishery (sablefish, rockfish, deep-water
flatfish, rex sole, and arrowtooth flounder) and 137 mt for the shallow-water species fishery (pollock,
Pacific cod, shallow-water flatfish, flathead sole, Atka mackerel, skates, and “other species”). There
were instances from 2008–2012, in which NMFS closed directed fishing by AM80 vessels for species
that comprise the shallow-water species fishery or deep-water species fishery because the seasonal
apportionments of the halibut PSC limits in the GOA had been reached.
Implementation of AM80, coupled with TACs in excess of 125,000 mt, mean that sideboards on
yellowfin sole harvests of AFA CVs and AFA CPs have not been enforced since 2008. Elimination of
the sideboards allows the AFA vessels to expand their operations in the yellowfin sole fishery if they
choose. In addition, one AM80 vessel has operated as a mothership in the yellowfin sole fishery every
year since 2003, utilizing non-AFA CVs with valid trawl licenses and endorsements to harvest
yellowfin sole. Because the harvests in the mothership operations are made by non-AFA CVs, the
harvests are assigned to the BSAI TLA sector and are not constrained by AFA sideboards.
The BSAI TLA fishery for yellowfin sole receives specific apportionments of PSC species for halibut,
king crab, and tanner crab (c. bairdi and c. opilio) and other PSC species. As with other “race for fish”
fisheries, both halibut and crab bycatch limits have the potential to shut down the fishery or move the
activity out of preferred fishing areas.
The fact that neither the AFA CPs nor the mothership operations have an exclusive privilege to harvest
a predetermined quantity means that the various operations must engage in a race for fish if they
want to maximize their revenues from the fishery. As in many “race-for-fish” fisheries, the BSAI TLA
fishery for yellowfin sole has been contentious at times with both AFA CPs and mothership operations
hoping the other will limit their activities in the fishery. An in-depth analysis of the fishery that could
shed light on the difference between AFA CPs and mothership operations in the yellowfin sole fishery
would provide sector-by-sector details of historic harvest volumes and values generated in the fishery,
along with relative rates of halibut and crab PSC. However, because fishery data are considered
confidential, and because there are fewer than three mothership operations involved, sector-specific
(AFA CPs vs. motherships) data cannot be provided in a public document or public forum. Therefore,
information provided in Section 3.2 summarizes the BSAI TLA sector as a whole.
Figure ES-11 shows groundfish species caught in yellowfin sole target fisheries harvested by vessels
other than AM80 CPs in the BSAI from 2003–2012. Total groundfish harvested in BSAI TLA target
fisheries for yellowfin sole increased from 4,486 mt in 2003 to 22,762 by 2007. Harvest dropped in
2009, then climbed rapidly, and by 2012 over 34,000 mt were harvested. Total revenues (in nominal
terms) in the fishery have increased from just over $5 million in 2003 to $39 million in 2012.
50.0
15
40.0
12
30.0
9
20.0
6
10.0
3
0.0
Number of Processors
Harvest snd Wholesale Value
It is also very clear from Figure ES-11 that there has been a significant increase in the number of
processing vessels involved in the BSAI TLA yellowfin sole fishery. From the low in 2004 to high in
2012, the total amount of groundfish harvest in the fishery has increased by nearly an order of
magnitude. Similarly, the number of processors increased from a low of 4 in 2003 to a high of 14 in
2008. Over the 10-year period ending in 2012, a total of 17 different processors participated in the
fishery.
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
# of Processors (uses right axis)
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Wholesale Value (millions of 2012 $)
Groundfish Harvests (mt 1,000s)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This document is a 5-year review of Amendment 80 (AM80) to the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI)
groundfish Fishery Management Plan (FMP).
AM80 was approved by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council or NPFMC) in June
of 2006, and enabled the formation of fishery cooperatives for trawl catcher/processors (CPs) that are
not eligible under the American Fisheries Act (AFA) to participate in directed pollock fisheries. This
group of Trawl CPs is hereafter referred to as the AM80 CPs or the AM80 Sector. In addition to
enabling the formation of a cooperative for the AM80 CPs, AM80 also had the effect of creating a
separate BSAI Trawl Limited Access (TLA) fishery for yellowfin sole, Pacific cod, and Atka mackerel,
and increased the Community Development Quota (CDQ) allocations of target species of flatfish,
Pacific Ocean Perch, Atka Mackerel, and Pacific cod from 7.5 percent to 10.7 percent.
Because AM80 created a Limited Access Privilege Program (LAPP) as defined under the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), a formal and detailed review to determine
progress in meeting the goals of the program and of the MSA is required.
The remainder of this introduction contains a subsection that provides additional details regarding the
requirements that a 5-year review be developed, and a subsection that provides the basis for inclusion
of particular issues within the 5-year review.
This subsection of the introduction summarizes the requirements that a 5-year review of AM80 be
developed. Not only is the 5-year review a requirement of the MSA, it was also requested by the
Council in its motion approving the AM80.
The Council’s AM80 motion provides the first reference to a 5-year review of AM80. (The Council
motion from June 10, 2006 is included as Appendix A.) Component 6 of the Council motion
established Prohibited Species Catch (PSC) allowances of halibut and crab. The language in
Component 6 further states that “the halibut and crab PSC levels shall be reviewed by the Council
during the fifth year of the program (implemented in 2008) and adjusted as necessary (through the
normal amendment process)”.
Additional guidance for development of 5-year reviews comes from the MSA. The MSA defines LAPPs
in Section 303A(c)(1) and has a requirement to …
(G) include provisions for the regular monitoring and review by the Council and the
Secretary of the operations of the program, including determining progress in meeting
the goals of the program and this Act, and any necessary modification of the program
to meet those goals, with a formal and detailed review 5 years after the
implementation of the program and thereafter to coincide with scheduled Council
review of the relevant fishery management plan (but no less frequently than once
every 7 years)…
While the Council did not specifically use the term “LAPP” in their motion approving AM80,2 it is
clear that the Council was creating a program that conveyed harvesting privileges to an exclusive set
2
The term “Limited Access Privilege Program” is not found in any of the draft versions of the EA/RIR/IRFAs
developed for Amendment 80, nor was the term contained in Final Secretarial Review version of the
EA/RIR/FRFA published on September 7, 2007.
of vessels—i.e., a LAPP. Further, when the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) developed and
approved the regulations implementing AM80 in September 2007, it made the assertion that the
AM80 has the effect of creating a LAPP.
The MSA does contain language at §303A(i) exempting existing programs from certain LAPP
Requirements if the action was approved by the Council no later than 6 months after the enactment
date of the amended MSA. While the Council took its final action nearly seven months prior to
enactment of the MSA, the MSA requires that LAPPs that are otherwise exempt from LAPP rules, are
not exempt from the requirement to develop a 5-year review. Specifically, §303A(i)(1)(B) indicates
that even though AM80 is exempt from other MSA requirements for LAPPs …
(B) the program shall be subject to review under subsection (c)(1)(G) of this section
not later than 5 years after the program implementation…
As indicated earlier, language in the MSA states that a formal and detailed review to determine
progress in meeting the goals of the program (AM80) and of the MSA is required. In the following
sections we examine the stated goals of AM80, language regarding LAPPs in the MSA, the 10 National
Standards of the MSA, and finally, specific AM80 program components, in order to develop a
comprehensive list of issues that could be included in the 5-Year review of AM80. The discussion of
particular 5-year review issues in this section is relatively general.
This section summarizes both stated and implicit goals of AM80 as determined from the September
2007 EA/RIR/FRFA for the Amendment. Issues arising from these goals are addressed in the 5-year
review.
In December 2004, the Council approved the following Problem Statement for AM80:
The Council’s primary concern is to maintain a healthy marine ecosystem to ensure
the long-term conservation and abundance of the groundfish and crab resources. To
this end, the Council is committed to reducing bycatch, minimizing waste, and
improving utilization of fish resources to the extent practicable in order to provide the
maximum benefit to present generations of fishermen, associated fishing industry
sectors, including the CDQ sector, communities, and the nation as a whole, while at
the same time continuing to look for ways to further rationalize the fisheries. Focusing
on reduction of bycatch and the attendant benefits of cooperatives and CDQ
allocations in meeting bycatch reduction objectives are initial steps towards
rationalization of the BSAI groundfish fisheries. Bycatch reduction measures for the
Non-AFA trawl Catcher Processor sector is a priority focus in this step toward
rationalization given this sector’s historical difficulty in achieving acceptable bycatch
levels. Allocations to this sector associated with cooperative management of catch
and bycatch provide the opportunity for participants in this sector to mitigate the
cost, to some degree, associated with bycatch reduction. In addition to reducing
bycatch in one sector, assurance should be provided to minimize negative impacts on
others.
Six specific goals are articulated in the AM80 Problem Statement. Below we summarize each goal,
and indicate briefly whether and how the attainment of the goal could be addressed in the 5-year
review.
Goal 1: To maintain a healthy marine ecosystem to ensure the long-term conservation and
abundance of the groundfish and crab resources
Discussion: AM80 has led to the near elimination of the race for fish in the BSAI non-pelagic trawl
fisheries. No longer forced by the race for fish to maximize catch and revenue per unit of time,
participants in these fisheries have been much more amenable to gear changes and other
behavioral changes that have reduced negative impacts of non-pelagic trawling on the ecosystem.
Examples include the use of modified trawl doors and sweeps, and ongoing experiments with
gear modifications and excluders and to reduce bycatch. The 5-year review addresses these issues
in a qualitative manner.
Goal 2: To reduce bycatch—this a priority focus of AM80.
Discussion: AM80 subdivided the halibut PSC allocation to the trawl sectors; 875 metric tons (mt)
are allocated to the BSAI TLA sector with the remainder assigned to the AM80 Sector. AM80 also
reduced the total PSC allocated to the trawl sector in general and the AM80 sector in particular.
The AM80 Sector was allocated 2,525 mt in 2008, and the amount was reduced 50 mt each year
through 2012. In years 2012 and beyond, the AM80 PSC allocation of halibut PSC would be
2,325. AM80 also establishes a halibut prohibited species quota (PSQ) for CDQ harvests. The 5year review summarizes halibut PSC in the AM80, CDQ, and BSAI TLA fisheries for AM80
species.
AM80 also sets an initial AM80 Crab PSQ percentage based on historical usage from 1995–2002
in all groundfish fisheries. The crab PSQs have been reduced 5 percent per year from 2009–
2012, such that by 2012 PSQs for crab species are set at 80 percent of historical usage. The 5year review summarizes crab PSC in the BSAI TLA and AM80 Sectors, and in CDQ fisheries for
AM80 species.
Goal 3: Minimize waste and improve utilization to the extent practical.
Discussion: Improving retention and utilization of the flatfish species was a major driver of AM80
and is assessed in the 5-year review. A more detailed discussion of the issue follows the discussion
of Goal #6 below.
A major goal of AM80 is facilitating bycatch reductions and retention improvements in the AM80
sector. To this end, it was presumed that multispecies cooperatives could lead to greater retention
improvements, and could provide cost-effective means for the sector to meet the Groundfish
Retention Standards (GRS) approved by the Council in 2003 under Amendment 79. GRS would
require AM80 CPs, if they were > 125’, to meet standards for retention of BSAI groundfish each
year. The GRS for 2008 was set at 65 percent and by 2010 it would increase to 80 percent. In
2011 and each subsequent year, the GRS would be set at 85 percent.
The regulations implementing AM80 have the effect of superseding regulations proposed for
implementation of The GRS. Under AM80, regulations the retention standards set by GRS still
apply to any AM80 cooperative as an aggregate. Vessels that do not join an AM80 cooperative
must comply with GRS percentages on an individual basis.
The 5-year review includes an accounting of groundfish retention and utilization based on GRS
accounting rules for the years before and after implementation of AM80.
Goal 4: To provide maximum benefit to present generations of fishermen, including CDQ groups,
communities, and the nation as a whole.
Discussion: The primary benefits of the AM80 fisheries include:
1) income and employment to vessel owners, operators, crew-members, and CDQ groups;
2) income and employment to community members in related industries;
3) tax revenues to local and state governments; and
4) consumer benefits resulting from the production and supply of seafood products.
The 5-year review provides an assessment of these benefits within the limits of the existing data,
and secondary sources.
Goal 5: To further rationalize the fishery as a means to mitigate costs of achieving the goals of bycatch
reduction and other program objectives.
Discussion: It has been presumed that reducing or eliminating the “race for fish” and its
deleterious effects on the AM80 fisheries can be accomplished by rationalizing the fishery. The 5year review summarizes the extent to which rationalization of AM80 fisheries has occurred. The
review also summarizes (qualitatively) the benefits (and mitigation of costs) that can be attributed
in whole or in part to the rationalization of the fishery.
Goal 6: To minimize negative impacts on other fisheries.
Discussion: The Council AM80 action included provisions that limit via sideboards the activities of
AM80 vessels in the Gulf of Alaska (GOA). The 5-year review includes a summary of AM80 vessel
activities in the GOA relative to their sideboards.
In addition to the Council’s stated goals in approving AM80, the Council also established the BSAI
TLA and provided a schedule for apportioning the Initial Total Allowable Catch (ITAC)—the portion of
the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) after CDQs have been removed—of yellowfin sole between the
AM80 and BSAI TLA Sectors. If the ITAC is greater than 125,000 mt, then the AM80 Sector is
allocated 60 percent and the BSAI TLA Sector is allocated 40 percent. At ITACs less than 125,000 mt,
the AM80 sector receives an increasing apportionment. If the ITAC is less than 87,500 mt, the AM80
Sector is allocated 93 percent of the ITAC.
The 5-year review includes an assessment of the effects of the apportionment of the yellowfin sole
ITAC between the AM80 and BSAI TLA Sectors. In particular, the 5-year review summarizes BSAI TLA
harvesting and processing in the yellowfin sole fishery to the extent reasonable within constraints of
confidentiality rules.
Section (§)303A(c)(1) of the MSA, as amended, establishes requirements for LAPPs including the
requirement for a 5-year review for all LAPPs. While AM80 is exempt from all of these requirements,
except for the requirement to conduct a 5-year review, it is reasonable to include assessments of
applicable MSA requirements for LAPPs. The following list of questions summarizes issues derived
from language in §303A that appear relevant to a 5-year review.
Has the LAPP …
1) promoted capacity reductions?
2) promoted fishing safety?
3) promoted social and economic benefits?
4) precluded attainment of excessive shares?
5) promoted fishery conservation and management?
Capacity Reductions: §303A(c)(1)(B) addresses the issue of LAPPs’ role in reducing excess capacity.
The 5-year review provides an assessment of capacity measures for the five years before and after
implementation of AM80. Capacity measures include summaries of the number of vessels operating in
AM80 fisheries as well as measures of capacity utilization such as number of actual operating weeks as
a percentage of potential operating weeks. The 5-year review also assesses consolidation of the AM80
Sector as well as expansion of operations in the BSAI TLA Sector. The review examines the effects of
consolidation on vessels and operations that remain in the AM80 fishery and on vessels and
operations that are no longer participating.
Fishing Safety: §303A(c)(1)(C) addresses the issue of LAPPs’ role in improving fishing safety. While
measures of fishing safety are not part of NMFS primary data collection process, an assessment of
fishing vessel safety under AM80 has developed by analyists from the The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Social and Economic Benefits: §303A(c)(1)(C) address the issue of LAPPs’ role in promoting social
and economic benefits. As with fishery conservation and management, this goal is considered too
broad-based to include as a separate element of the 5-year review. This general goal will be assessed
as an aggregate of other issues.
Excessive Shares: In §303A(c)(5)(D), the MSA addresses the question of excessive shares. AM80
includes provisions to preclude attainment of excessive shares—no person can hold more than 30
percent of the overall allocation to the AM80 Sector, and no vessel may harvest more than 20 percent
of the AM80 Sector’s total allocation in a given year. Owners or vessels that exceeded these caps in
the initial allocation are “grandfathered” at those levels. Because data regarding initial allocations and
Quota Share (QS) allocations are published by NMFS, and these data report ownership information, it
is possible to track and report the shares assigned to a single person and to determine whether an
excessive ownership share has been attained. However, due to confidentiality restrictions, the 5-year
review does report on excessive shares of harvest at the vessel level except in a qualitative manner.
Fishery Conservation and Management: §303A(c)(1)(C) addresses the issue of LAPPs’ role in
promoting fishery conservation and management. Nearly all of the goals and objectives that have
been discussed above and that are discussed in the following subsection can be considered
components of fishery conservation and management. Therefore, the conclusion section of the 5-year
review serves as a summary of the fishery conservation and management effects of AM80.
In this section we list the ten National Standards contained in the MSA and discuss whether any add
potential issues to the 5-year review that haven’t already been addressed.
National Standard 1: Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery.
Discussion: The 5-year review includes summaries of harvests of AM80 species relative to TACs as
an indicator of progress toward achieving optimum yield.
National Standard 2: Conservation and management measures shall be based on the best scientific
information available.
Discussion: The Council’s action in approving AM80 has had meaningful impacts on the use of
the best scientific information available.
AM80 expands the amount of “scientific information” collected with its provisions to collect
operating cost data in the form of an annual Economic Data Report (EDR) from the operators of
all vessels eligible to participate in cooperatives under AM80 (i.e. the AM80 CPs). The 5-year
review examines these data, summarizes them to the extent reasonable, and describes the ways
that these data have been used.
In addition, any cooperatives that form under AM80 must provide an Annual AM80 Cooperative
Report to the Regional Administrator of NMFS. The Annual AM80 Cooperative Reports submitted
to NMFS are considered confidential by NMFS because among other elements, they include
vessel-by-vessel catch and discard information. AM80 Cooperatives have also been providing the
Council a “public” version of the Cooperative Reports on a voluntary basis. The 5-year review
examines both versions of the cooperative reports and describes in a qualitative manner their
contribution to conversation and management of the AM80 fisheries.
National Standard 3: To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close
coordination.
Discussion: Nothing in AM80 changes this aspect of fishery management and therefore nothing
related to this standard appears in the 5-year review.
National Standard 4: Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between
residents of different states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among
various U.S. fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen, (B)
reasonably calculated to promote conservation, and (C) carried out in such a manner that no
particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
Discussion: The initial allocation of catch history under AM80 was determined to comply with this
standard, and therefore no additional review of the fairness and equity of the allocation is
included in the 5-year review. The 5-year review includes discussions of excessive shares as well
as summaries of the distribution of quota shares, harvest, and revenue across vessels and
ownership entities.
National Standard 5: Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources, except that no such measure shall have economic
allocation as its sole purpose.
Discussion: The 5-year review examines the question of efficient utilization of the fishery
resources in many of the issues already described. For example, to address the relative efficiency
of halibut PSC use the 5-year review compare the groundfish value per unit of PSC. In addition,
the EDR data are used as an additional element in efficiency assessments. Using the EDRs the 5year review assesses whether operating costs relative to revenues have changed during the years
since implementation of AM80 (2008–2012).
National Standard 6: Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for
variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
Discussion: The elimination of the race for fish for the AM80 fleet allows vessels to focus their
individual efforts on the species for which they are best suited. The catch shares that are
embedded in AM80 allows vessels to adapt to changing market conditions and changing levels of
constraining species such as halibut PSCs and Pacific cod. The 5-year review lookw at costs and
revenue of two segments of the fleet—vessels that focus on Atka mackerel and vessels that focus
on flatfish. The 5-year review will also discuss the fleet’s adaptation to reduced access to Pacific
cod TACs and some of the ways they have been to innovate to reduce bycatch.
National Standard 7: Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
Discussion: The 5-year review discusses the issue of duplication of effort within the data collection
requirement of AM80. Specifically, the review discusses this issue with respect to the Co-op
Reports submitted to NMFS and in the EDRs.
National Standard 8: Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation
requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished
stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to
(A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable,
minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.
Discussion: This standard implies that a review of community impacts of AM80 should be
included in the 5-year review. AM80 regulations (incorporating changes included in the MSA)
increased the amount of CDQ allocations from 7.5 percent of the TAC to 10.7 percent of the
TAC for the AM80 species (Atka mackerel, yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, and Pacific
Ocean perch) and for arrowtooth flounder, Greenland turbot in the Bering Sea, and Pacific cod in
the BSAI. CDQ allocations for sablefish and pollock are unchanged. AM80 also establishes and
allocates a prohibited species quota (PSQ) to CDQs for halibut, crab, and Chinook. The 5-year
review includes a summary of CDQ harvests of of the eight species for which CDQ allocations
increased.
This standard implies that the 5-year review should summarize levels of involvement by particular
communities important to the AM80 fisheries. For example, all of the AM80 vessels use Dutch
Harbor as an operational base. The 5-year review provides a summary of port-calls by community
which clearly indicates that Dutch Harbor is the focal point of AM80 activity.
In addition, the 5-year review utilizes findings from a recently published economic base analysis
of the AM80 fleet. The research was funded by NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center (AFSC),
and investigators include Dr. Ed Waters an independent consultant from Beaverton OR, Dr.
Chang K Seung (AFSC) and Marcus L. Hartley of Northern Economics. The paper uses available
economic data from the 2008–2010 fisheries to assess direct and multiplier impacts of the AM80
fleet in Alaska, in the Pacific Northwest and in the rest of the U.S.
National Standard 9: Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch, and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of
such bycatch.
Discussion: An assessment of bycatch of prohibited species in the AM80 fisheries including
harvests of the BSAI TLA sector is included in the 5-year review.
National Standard 10: Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable,
promote the safety of human life at sea.
Discussion: This issue is included as Chapter 4 of the 5-year review.
The regulations following implementation of AM80 now require all AM80 vessels to submit EDRs to
NMFS each spring for the previous fishing year. The regulations also require all AM80 cooperatives to
submit to NMFS each spring a summary report of the activities of the cooperative for the previous
fishing year.
This section reviews these new data and information from a qualitative perspective, and assesses
whether the information that is being provided is serving its intended purposes.
This section summarizes some of the analyses in addition to this 5-year review that have depended on
the information provided in the AM80 EDRs.
In 2013 Dr. Edward Waters (an independent economist based in Oregon) in association with Dr.
Chang Seung and Dr. Michael Dalton (economists with NMFS AFSC) and Marcus Hartley of Northern
Economics and lead author of this 5-year review, developed an analysis of the economic impacts of
the AM80 fleet in an AFSC working paper titled: Measuring the Multiregional Economic Contribution
of an Alaska Seafood Industry with Linkages to International Markets (Waters, 2014).
The recently published paper estimates the economic impacts from the AM80 sector activities, not
only in Alaska but also extending to other parts of the U.S. due to economic linkages with economic
agents in those other areas. Using a multiregional social accounting matrix model of three U.S. regions
(Alaska, West Coast, and rest of U.S.), the paper estimated the multiregional contribution of the AM80
fleet, and evaluated multiregional impacts of selected shifts in the sector’s production in terms of
changes in output, employment, and income. Results indicate that the AM80 vessels are important
participants in Alaska fisheries and that they generate a significant economic impact within the state.
The paper also found that more than half of the impacts from the fleet on total economic output and
about 80 percent of the impacts on household income accrue outside Alaska. The paper also found
that the AM80 fleet is relatively insensitive to variations in the world prices of its primary products.
In addition to applications noted above, EDR data for the AM80 sector have been used in preparation
of a number of management analyses and program reports. Selected statistics representing the
economic status of the AM80 sector over the 2008–2012 period are presented in the Groundfish
Economic Status Report for 2013 (Fissel et al. 2013), intended to indicate trends in a variety of
economic indicators and metrics. The reported statistics provide a general overview of fishery
performance over the period in terms of the physical characteristics of the participating vessel stock,
including productive capacity of vessel physical plant (freezer and processing line capacity and
maximum potential throughput) and fuel consumption rates, efficiency and diversification of
processing output, investment in vessel capital improvements, operational costs incurred for fishing
and processing in the AM80 fisheries and elsewhere, and employment and compensation of vessel
crews and processing employees. These results complement the analysis presented for the AM80
program in the catch share metrics section of the Economic Status Report for the period 2007–2012,
which rely primarily on in-season catch accounting (eLandings) and other administrative data sources
other than the EDR.
Data on crew employment and earnings provided by the AM80 EDR program were used to support
assessment of the economic impact of Steller sea lion protection measures on the seven CPs
participating in the Atka mackerel fishery in the 2013 Draft EIS/RIR/IRFA (NMFS, 2013b). The draft of
the document reviewed by the Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) in October, 2012 included a
preliminary analysis of changes in gross revenues, costs, and quasi rents (i.e., revenues less variable
costs) to the fishery associated with the protection measures, but due to concerns raised by the SSC it
was not included in the most recent draft of the document.
In addition to the analyses summarized above, EDR data have been used in research studies funded
by the AFSC intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals, including an analysis that tested the
effect of implementing a catch shares system and the associated changes in incentives on fishing
behavior and selectivity (Abbott, 2014).
This section provides a qualitative review of the data that are collected in the EDRs and discusses
some of the benefits of collecting these data as well as some of the shortcomings of the data as
currently collected. Actual data from the EDRs are summarized in Section 9.
Table 1 in the EDR Questionnaire asks for the respondent to provide the AM80 QS Permit Number,
and the AM80 Vessel name, and then asks for the information listed below.
1. USCG Documentation No.
4. Amendment 80 LLP No(s).
7. Home Port
10. Length overall
13. Fuel capacity (U.S. gal.)
2. ADF&G Vessel No.
5. Amendment 80 limited access fishery permit No.
8. U.S. gross registered tonnage
11. Beam
14. Year Built
3. ADF&G processor code
6. Name of Amendment 80 cooperative
9. Net tonnage
12. Shaft horsepower
With the exception of #11, which asks for the vessel’s “Beam,” all of this information is already
accessible in publically available data that are required to be reported under existing fishing
regulations. All users of the EDR data would already have access to this information. There appears to
be very little benefit but the potential for errors or confusion from requiring these data elements to be
reported in the EDR.
Table 2.3 of the EDR asks about the vessel’s annual and average fuel consumption per hour.
According to audit reports prepared for the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, most
respondents expressed difficulty in preparing the information for this table. There was inconsistency in
how respondents addressed this variable. The audit report recommended that the EDR instructions
include a more detailed explanation as to how this variable should be calculated.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 of the EDR are questions that focus on freezing capacity and processing
capacity, respectively. The two questions in Table 2.3 are relatively straightforward single answer
questions about freezer space and freezing capacity. Both questions ask for responses in terms of
product pounds:
1. How much freezer space (measured in pounds of product) did the vessel have at the
beginning of calendar year 2012 (round to the nearest 100 pounds)? Include only product
storage capacity. Do not include plate freezer, galley freezer, or other non-product storage
capacity.
2. What is the maximum freezing capacity of this vessel in pounds per hour? Report the
maximum capacity of all plate freezers in pounds, divided by the average number of hours
required to freeze product (note: this is not throughput under realistic operating conditions).
The data collected on frozen storage space and freezing capacity appear to be valuable additions to
information we already have about the AM80 vessels. Industry members report that frozen storage
space is the key determinant on how long a vessel stays at sea. When the frozen storage space has
been filled, the vessel returns to port to offload. While other data sources ask about the hold size of
vessels, it is never entirely clear whether the information provided is a measure of frozen storage
space.
Information on maximum freezing capacity is new information that is not collected by other sources.
Industry sources state that freezing capacity is often the primary constraint that determines how often
tows are made and how quickly processing can be completed. Assuming that the vessel is able to
locate schools of fish, then the number of tows made and the amount of fish harvested in a given day
will depend on the freezing capacity of the vessel.
The questions in Table 2.4 are much less straightforward and ask respondents to describe processing
capacity for each product produced during the year for each species. The questions ask respondents
to provide answers in terms of round weight rather than product weight.
Table 2.4 - Vessel Characteristics: Processing Capacity
Report the total number of processing lines on the vessel in the first line. For each type of product processed on
the line in the BSAI Amendment 80 fisheries, record the number of processing lines of similar type (equipment
and/or product mix), and the vessel’s maximum average throughput in pounds (round weight) per hour, totaled
over all processing lines for this product type. Assume optimal operating conditions and that quantity of raw fish
and other inputs are not limiting. Use species and product codes to describe product types produced. Record all
species processed in the BSAI, including non-Amendment 80 species harvested with Amendment 80 PSC
allocations. Amendment 80 species are starred (*) in the table.
For each product and species combination vessel operators are asked to report the following:
1) Species Code
2) Product Code
3) Number of Processing Lines
4) Maximum throughput per hour (in Round Weight Pounds)
There are several issues with this set of questions:
1) NMFS objectives in asking this set of questions are not clear.
a. Because the question asks for information on the number of processing lines, it can
be interpreted that that the focus of the question is on the cleaning, cutting and
preparation of raw fish up to the point of the fish entering the freezer. In this case,
the capacity of the “processing” may easily exceed the capacity of the freezer(s),
particularly if the product does not involve much processing—whole fish for example.
There are, in fact, several respondents that report processing line capacities for whole
fish that are in excess of their reported maximum freezing capacity. There are also
several respondents that report whole fish processing line capacities less than freezing
capacity and some that report whole fish processing line capacity equal to freezing
capacity.
b. Because of the instruction to use round weights when reporting for this question, it
can be interpreted that the question is trying to assess product recovery rates,
particularly if the definition of the processing line is assumed to include the freezer.
This is because plate freezers that are generally used on AM80 vessels tend to have
the same capacity in terms of product pounds regardless of the product type or
species. In other words, the freezer can freeze X tons of product in Y hours for a given
species regardless of whether the product is a whole fish, headed and gutted (H&G),
H&G with roe, H&G with tail removed, or kirimi (headed with tail removed but not
gutted). Because each of these products have different product recovery rates, the
round-weight capacity of the “processing line” may vary considerably.
As an example, assume that yellowfin sole kirimi has a product recovery rate of 50
percent, while a whole yellowfin sole has (obviously) a product recovery rate of 100
percent. Assume that a plate freezer can freeze 10 tons of either kirimi or whole fish
in 5 hours. The freezing capacity is 2 tons (4,413 pounds) of product per hour for
both products. But the processing line capacity, if measured in terms of round weight,
is 4 tons per hour if kirimi is processed and only 2 tons per hour if whole fish is
processed.
It is clear from reviewing the data reported in the EDRs that some vessels interpreted
the question as in the previous example—processing capacity of the lines increases
with products that have lower product recovery rates and vice versa. For other vessels
however, the opposite is true—recorded processing line capacity is higher for
products with higher product recovery rates, and lower for products with lower
product recovery rates.
2) It is not clear whether ancillary products should be reported. Over the five years from 2008–
2012, 5 of the 26 vessels that have submitted EDRs have reported information for ancillary
products.
3) The language in the question makes it very clear that only species and product produced
while processing fish harvested in the AM80 fisheries should be included. Any unique species
or products that are produced in CDQ fisheries, in GOA fisheries, or in BSAI TLA fisheries,
should therefore not be included. This differs from the other questions in the EDR—CDQ,
GOA, and BSAI TLA fisheries are included in all other sections.
4) A review of the EDR data from 2008–2012 shows that a total of 1,782 combinations of
species and products (primary products only) have been reported in these EDR questions. A
review of weekly production report data showed 2,316 different combinations of species and
primary products over the same period.
From the discussion above, as well as the review of information in the EDRs, it is fairly clear that this
section of the EDR could benefit from a significant revision. However, because the analysts of this
report are not certain of the intended objectives for this set of questions, no specific
recommendations have been developed.
Table 2.5 of the EDR asks about vessel activity in terms of fishing and processing days. These
questions are problematic and responses do not appear to add new information to available data.
The EDRs recognize that AM80 vessels may be engaged in AM80 fisheries and non-AM80 fisheries,
such as fisheries in the GOA, BSAI CDQ fisheries, and BSAI TLA fisheries if they choose to take
deliveries as motherships. It does not appear likely that the developers of the EDR anticipated the
amount of overlap between AM80 fisheries and non-AM80 fisheries. In 2012 for example, 16 of the
AM80 vessels fished in both the GOA and the BSAI, 7 were active in CDQ fisheries, and 3 were
active both as CPs in AM80 fisheries and as motherships in the BSAI TLA fishery. The amount of
activity in fisheries other than the AM80 fishery makes it very difficult to interpret responses to these
questions. Further, since users of the AM80 EDR would undoubtedly also have access to other data
within the NMFS Catch Accounting System (CAS) that more precisely document activities of the
vessels, the activity questions in the EDR do not appear to add to the information set already available
for AM80 vessels.
Table 3 in the EDR asks vessels to report revenues from various potential sources. In general, these
questions appear to provide good information about the AM80 vessels that is not available elsewhere.
Currently no other data collected by NMFS or the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) ask
directly for total sales volume and value. In addition, the EDRs are the only source of “official”
information on revenues generated from tendering or other non-fishery related activities. The EDRs
also ask for information about revenue from sales of groundfish and crab limited entry licenses, and
for information on formal leases of AM80 QS or halibut/crab PSC (PSQ). No other official source
exists for the latter two types of information.
However, it does appear that the EDR questions on leases of QS and PSC could have the potential to
be misinterpreted both by respondents and by analysts reviewing the information. One potential
source of confusion may involve use of the term “QS shares leased.” The potential confusion arises
from the fact that QS amounts are converted by NMFS to Cooperative Quota (CQ) amounts each
year for each vessel for each of the AM80 species. A vessel can formally transfer CQ from one vessel
to another. While a sale of CQ would be considered by analysts as a lease of QS for a given year, it is
very possible that the AM80 respondents would not interpret it the same way.
The product volume and value data collected in the AM80 EDRs has led to a significant improvement
in the quality of wholesale revenue data reported within this analysis, and coincidentally an improved
understanding of product weights that are reported for the fishery. The improvement came about
because the analysts noticed that product volumes and revenues reported in the EDRs were
noticeably and consistently lower than estimated product weights and wholesale values reported
within the CAS. The analysts also noticed that the product volumes and wholesale revenue data in the
EDRs were closer to values reported in ADF&G Commercial Operator Annual Report (COAR) data.
The issue was brought to the attention of the AM80 fleet by contacting representatives of the Alaska
Seafood Cooperative and Groundfish Forum. They in turn asked fleet owners and managers if they
could help explain the apparent discrepancies. A member of the O’Hara Corporation’s management
team quickly solved the “puzzle” by pointing out that product weights reported in the CAS are gross
product weights that include “overpack” and glaze, while the product weights reported in the COAR
data are “net weights” sold. The net weights sold are typically 5–10 percent less than the actual glazed
weight of the product in each case. The “overpack” ensures that customers always received at least as
much product as the stated net weight sold.
The difference also explains the discrepancy between EDR product volumes and values and product
volumes and wholesale revenue estimates in the CAS—the revenue estimates in the CAS utilize
product prices calculated from COAR data (i.e. $ per net-weight pound sold). These prices are then
applied to the gross-weight pounds in the CAS, and since the gross weight is greater than the net
weight sold, the estimated wholesale revenue in the CAS is overstated.
Throughout this 5-year review, therefore, the wholesale values that are reported have been adjusted
to reflect wholesale values as reported in the EDRs for the years 2008–2012. Similar proportional
adjustments have been made to estimates of wholesale value for 2003–2007.
Tables 4 and 5 of the EDR request information on capital and operational expenditures, respectively,
made during the year. In general it appears that the expenditure questions are specific and detailed
enough that both the respondents and the analysts should not be misinterpreting the information
requested or provided. There are, however, at least a few questions that do appear to have significant
potential for confusion or misinterpretation.
Questions in Table 4 ask for calendar year expenditures on fully capitalized assets that were made
during the year. The questions ask for expenditures on fishing gear, processing equipment (including
freezers), other vessel and onboard equipment, and other capital expenditures to be itemized.
However, there may be some issues associated with responses to these questions. First, since it is not
always clear in which category a major capital expenditure should fall, there may be differences in
how different owners interpret and categorize their responses. Also it is not always clear that it is the
capitalized amount that is being entered rather than the total amount of the investment. This may
make expenditures appear to be “lumpier” than they actually are, thus making it less informative to
compare estimates of net revenues between vessels or between years.
Question #5 in Table 5 asks respondents to report on: “Recruitment, travel, benefits and other
employee related costs (excluding food and provisions and other employee costs already provided in
items 1, 2 and 3.).” This question may be misleading because these costs could all be interpreted as
the total cost of the human resources (HR) department of the firm. It is not clear, however, whether
wages/salaries and benefits of the HR staff should be included, or whether the HR department’s share
of building rent and other operating costs should be included. We presume that multi-vessel
companies would report the share of HR expenses related to each particular vessel.
This question could be improved if respondents were explicitly instructed to include all HR-related
costs including wages/salaries and benefits of HR staff. It would probably be best if the instructions
told respondents to exclude the HR department’s share of building costs.
Question #15 in Table 5 asks respondents to report on: “General Administrative Cost, including
professional services and management fees (do not include costs reported in items 13 or 14) associated
with vessel operation.”
It is assumed that the costs of managing the vessel at the vessel’s land-based offices would be reported
here, except that HR costs were presumably already reported in question #5. It is presumed that
even though the instructions do not explicitly state that HR costs should be excluded, respondents will
not intentionally add HR costs here if they have already reported them elsewhere.
It is presumed that vessels that are part of a multi-vessel company would itemize and report each
vessel’s share of the company’s non-HR administrative costs. It is also presumed that any profits or
returns to owners are not included in this question. However, since there are no questions that
specifically ask about profits or returns to owners, or otherwise mention profits or returns to owners,
there is the possibility that some respondents may include some profits or returns to capital within this
answer.
There is a possibility that the wording of the question may lead respondents to believe the question
pertains exclusively to just consulting fees, accounting fees, and legal fees. There is also the possibility
that because all other questions in the EDR specifically ask about vessel-level costs and not companywide expenses, respondents may not include the vessel’s share of the company-wide costs under this
cost item. The fact that some of the completed EDRs report a zero amount for this question indicates
that the question is likely being misinterpreted by at least some respondents.
This question could be improved by rewording and making it explicit that this cost category includes
the vessel’s share of total administrative cost of managing and operating the vessel, including the
company’s office-based staff as well as the costs of office space. It should also be made explicit that
profits or returns to capital should not be included within this category. It may also be useful to create
a separate question regarding the costs of administrative office space.
Question #18 in Table 5 asks respondents to report on: Total raw fish purchases from other vessels
(all fisheries and species). It is fairly clear that the intent of this question is to capture the volume and
costs of mothership-type activities. However, the wording of the question explicitly asks about rawfish purchases. If an AM80 vessel is acting as a mothership and the catcher vessels (CV) that deliver to
it are owned by the same company, then the delivery of fish from the CV to the processing vessel
would not be considered a “purchase” of raw fish and therefore would not be reported. In
mothership operations in which the CVs are not owned by the processing company, the purchase
amount of raw fish is assumed to be at least equal to the marginal operating cost of the CV. However,
when the CV and the processing vessel are owned by the same company, then it is likely that the
operating costs of the CVs cannot be estimated, and thus may wind up being included in the residual
returns to capital or profits of the processing vessel.
Also it appears that the set of cost questions in the EDRs do not provide for the reporting of payments
for royalties or lease of quota that may be transferred between vessels under common ownership,
since these transfers may be made without explicit payment, or to CDQ organizations for the right to
fish CDQ shares. Between 2008–2012, an estimated $98.6 million ($2012) in wholesale revenues
were generated from CDQ harvests by nine different AM80 vessels, and it is likely that the associated
CDQ royalties would have been at least $10 million.
Finally, if the EDR expenditure data are intended to be used for modeling the distribution of regional
economic impacts, an accounting is needed of where each expenditure item is made. For example, to
accurately estimate the distribution of regional economic impacts resulting from the fleet’s activities, it
is necessary to know approximately what proportions of expenditures for major cost items like repair
and maintenance, fuel and lube, freight and storage, and administration were made in Alaska ports vs.
elsewhere (e.g., Seattle). In addition, it is necessary to know the approximate geographic distribution
of residence of the crew members so that impacts of their income and spending can be accurately
assigned to the correct region. This type of information may be estimated post hoc from informal
surveys or interviews with industry representatives. But it would be clearer and more straightforward if
expenditure distribution information were collected along with the expenditure value information as
part of the EDR.
Table 6 of the EDR asks respondents to report on the average number of positions and total number
of employees that worked onboard the vessel during the calendar year. There do not appear to be
major issues with respect to reporting onboard labor, although in some cases vessels have reported
either the average number of positions or total number of employees, but not both. There have also
been sporadic cases of significant apparent over-reporting of the number of employees.
Additional questions surveying the average length of a typical onboard assignment for fishing,
processing and other employees would be helpful. Also, the EDR should explicitly ask for the number
of office-based staff, and wages/salaries and bonuses paid to office-based staff, as well as the
proportion of those staff and payments that should be assigned to a particular vessel.
The question in Table 6 about average number of hours worked per day by a typical processing line
employee may be of limited utility except perhaps for making comparisons between vessels.
Responses to questions about whether a vessel used crew shares or revenue sharing to pay processing
and non-processing workers can be difficult to interpret. For example what is the interpretation of
meaning in cases where a vessel checks “Yes” for the question asking whether crew or revenue shares
were used to pay some processing crew as well as for the question asking whether crew or revenue
shares were used to pay all processing crew?
This section summarizes the types of information provided in the Annual AM80 Cooperative Reports
that are submitted to NFMS Regional Administrator. The “official” reports include vessel-by-vessel
catch data, while public versions of the reports that have been voluntarily supplied to the Council
exclude these vessel-by-vessel data.
The regulations at 50 CFR 679.5(s) require AM80 Cooperatives to submit an annual report detailing
cooperative activities for the previous fishing year. These regulations require the report to contain the
following information:
A description of the method used by the cooperative to monitor fisheries in which
cooperative vessels participated.
The cooperative’s actual retained and discarded allocated catch and GOA sideboard limited
fisheries by statistical area on a vessel-by-vessel basis.
A description of any actions taken by the cooperative against specific members in response to
a member that exceeded allocated species that the member was assigned to catch for the
AM80 cooperative.
Voluntary Cooperative reports have been submitted to the Council each by Alaska Seafood
Cooperative (AKSC) and its predecessor the Best Use Cooperative (BUC). The Alaska Groundfish
Cooperative (AGC) has also submitted required reports each year from 2011–2013 as well as
voluntary reports.
Technically, the primary difference between the reports submitted to NMFS and the reports that are
made available to the public is that the reports made available to the public aggregate catch and
discard reports over all of the vessels in the cooperative. The reports made to NMFS list retained and
discarded catches by individual vessel by area, including the GOA. Both cooperatives report that the
data they supply in the Cooperative Reports to NMFS are exact duplicates of information in the CAS
that is provided to the cooperative through SeaState Inc.
Both voluntary and required reports describe the methods that the cooperative uses to monitor catch
within the cooperative. In theory, if there had been any internal violation of cooperative rules, the
description of actions taken against specific members would be spelled out in the confidential report
to NMFS and not included in the voluntary reports.
One of the cooperatives (AKSC) augments the “public” version of their annual cooperative report with
additional information that they feel helps inform decision-makers of issues facing the AM80. The
public versions of the Cooperative Reports are available on the NMFS Alaska Region (NMFS-AKR)
web page at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/amds/80/default.htm.
The following is a summary of allocation and catch data provided in the AGC voluntary reports from
2011–2012 followed by the AKSC/BUC voluntary cooperative reports for the years 2008–2012. The
numbers shown below have all been compared to CAS data. With the exception of a few
typographical errors, they all match up very closely.
Species
Pacific Cod (mt)
Yellowfin Sole (mt)
Rock Sole (mt)
Flathead Sole (mt)
Atka Mackerel in 541 (mt)
Atka Mackerel in 542 (mt)
Atka Mackerel in 543 (mt)
Pacific Ocean Perch in 541 (mt)
Pacific Ocean Perch in 542 (mt)
Pacific Ocean Perch in 543 (mt)
Halibut Mortality (mt)
Red King Crab in Zone 1 (#s)
Bairdi Crab in Zone 1 (#s)
Bairdi Crab in Zone 2 (#s)
C. Opilio COBLZ (#s)
Chinook Salmon (#s)
Non-Chinook Salmon (#s)
AGC Am 80 Allocation
2011 Amounts
5,079
59,798
19,902
6,269
19,181
5,389
755
2,364
2,078
3,879
732
41,602
174,839
407,987
1,834,026
-
AGC Catch
3,600
21,487
5,071
460
19,142
5,128
183
2,332
2,054
3,835
488
6,407
54,801
297,279
274,157
0
270
AGC Am 80 Allocation
2012 Amounts
6,188
60,313
19,000
4,976
17,770
5,016
759
2,347
2,091
3,883
716
13,809
109,094
194,629
1,093,362
-
Source: Adapted by Northern Economics from AGC Voluntary Cooperative Reports (2012, 2013).
AGC Catch
4,074
16,792
14,213
318
17,237
4,709
150
2,304
2,043
3,844
444
10,785
61,544
117,582
209,105
6
388
Species
Data Type
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
17,135
20,654
20,278
23,232
28,188
Pacific Cod
AKSC Catch (mt)
13,517
19,637
20,023
21,139
23,917
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
98,982
56,811
110,733
89,814
92,358
Yellowfin Sole
AKSC Catch (mt)
84,853
69,563
74,034
85,424
85,216
AKSC Catch in NBBTA (mt)
4,850
3,168
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
47,003
93,987
58,863
55,576
52,525
Rock Sole
AKSC Catch (mt)
34,982
33,668
44,558
42,388
46,656
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
35,758
43,351
42,872
29,773
23,219
Flathead Sole
AKSC Catch (mt)
16,931
12,031
13,915
6,965
5,472
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
8,683
10,512
9,282
13,694
12,653
Atka Mackerel in 541
AKSC Catch (mt)
8,556
10,318
9,234
13,558
12,538
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
8,447
11,047
9,863
3,809
3,544
Atka Mackerel in 542
AKSC Catch (mt)
7,472
10,412
7,826
3,765
3,488
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
5,784
5,797
7,036
545
541
Atka Mackerel in 543
AKSC Catch (mt)
5,377
5,414
6,727
17
41
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
1,908
1,543
1,551
2,095
2,041
Pacific Ocean Perch in 541
AKSC Catch (mt)
1,845
1,510
1,515
2,045
2,032
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
1,984
1,604
1,591
1,841
1,852
Pacific Ocean Perch in 542
AKSC Catch (mt)
1,941
1,566
1,458
1,812
1,826
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
3,124
2,676
2,665
3,436
3,440
Pacific Ocean Perch in 543
AKSC Catch (mt)
3,096
2,645
2,583
3,403
3,414
Allocation with Rollovers (mt)
1,837
1,793
2,094
1,708
1,718
Halibut Mortality
AKSC Catch (mt)
1,293
1,497
1,668
1,321
1,501
AKSC Catch in NBBTA (mt)
1.67
0.83
Allocation with Rollovers (#s)
78,631
73,351
118,237
95,104
27,409
King Crab in Zone 1
AKSC Catch (#s)
48,931
50,406
48,615
24,557
13,378
Allocation with Rollovers (#s)
340,520
321,922
547,715
410,906
222,629
Bairdi Crab in Zone 1
AKSC Catch (#s)
106,731
131,712
132,095
167,238
109,698
Allocation with Rollovers (#s)
580,311
548,443
1,320,277
898,620
347,382
Bairdi Crab in Zone 2
AKSC Catch (#s)
211,792
135,331
125,648
268,709
49,331
Allocation with Rollovers (#s)
1,632,432 1,544,825
1,461,308 3,538,834 1,560,133
Opilio Crab COBLZ
AKSC Catch (#s)
286,781
315,582
163,136
204,540
115,534
Chinook
AKSC Catch (#s)
329
508
1,437
563
570
Non-Chinook
AKSC Catch (#s)
1,225
1,128
929
2,715
727
Note: At the Council’s request, ASKSC has reported yellowfin sole catch and halibut bycatch in the Northern
Bristol Bay Trawl Area (NBBTA) in 2011 and 2012
Source: Adapted by Northern Economics from AKSC & BUC Voluntary Cooperative Reports (2009–2013).
The voluntary cooperative reports also provide estimates of GRS percentages. BUC/AKSC makes it
very clear that the numbers they are reporting are their attempt to measure the GRS percentage as it
was intended to be measured in the GRS regulations. The CAS also reports retention percentages, but
CAS retention percentages do not include all non-groundfish amounts in the denominator—Table 3
shows the GRS percentages reported in the coop reports.
Alaska Seafood / Best Use Cooperative
Alaska Groundfish Cooperative
2008
76.9%
-
2009
81.0%
-
2010
84.0%
-
2011
95.2%
87.6%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from AKSC/ BUC and AGC Cooperative Reports (2009–2013).
2012
94.2%
87.1%
While the confidential reports that are supplied by the cooperatives to NMFS do not appear to
provide any critically important information that NMFS does not already have, they do appear to have
a significant a role in promoting communication between the cooperative and the public at large via
the non-confidential versions that are distributed more broadly. The public versions of the cooperative
reports inform the Council and other interested persons about the workings of the cooperative and
about issues that are important to them.
An example of this is discussed in Section 7.2. In this case, the public version of the Annual Report of
the BUC for fishing year 2009, was cited as a primary information source leading to a NMFS
Emergency Rule suspending the GRS. The following has been excerpted from the Groundfish
Retention Emergency Rule (NMFS, 2010):
In its March 10, 2010 report to the Council, the Best Use Cooperative, a cooperative
established under the cooperative formation provisions of AM80, noted several issues
that could pose potential compliance problems with the current GRS regulations.
Specifically, the report stated that as retention requirements are increased through
2011, current GRS percentages may become economically impractical and
unattainable.
In response to these concerns, the Council asked NMFS to assess the GRS and the
issues raised by the Best Use Cooperative. In June 2010, NMFS reported to the
Council the agency’s opinion that unintended implementation, compliance, and
enforcement issues are apparent with the GRS program. These issues center around
(1) the regulatory methodology used to calculate annual GRS percentages for vessels
and (2) the high enforcement and prosecution costs associated with the GRS.
This section of the 5-year review focuses on the some of the rationalization impacts of the AM80 that
are not covered explicitly in other sections of the 5-year review: the impacts of rationalization and the
elimination of the race for fish
In particular, this section looks at consolidation of the AM80 fleet, as well as some of the effects of
rationalization that occurred. Conversely, the separate allocation of yellowfin sole for the vessels in
the BSAI TLA Sector has led to a new “race-for-sole” between AFA CPs and new mothership
operations.
This section summarizes the transition from a race for fish during the years prior to implementation of
AM80; to partial rationalization from 2008–2010; and to full rationalization beginning in 2011.
This section
This section summarizes the number of Non-AFA Trawl CPs participating in the AM80 fisheries from
2003–2012.
Officially, the final rule for AM80 published in the Federal Register on September 14, 2007 listed a
total of 28 vessels that would be considered AM80 vessels. These vessels are all listed in Table 4,
along with their vessel identifiers; their current owners and information on whether the vessels fished
through 2012. Of these 28 vessels, 3 have sunk: 1) the Arctic Rose in 2001; 2) the Prosperity in 2004,
3) the Alaska Ranger in 2008. The Arctic Rose has been replaced by the Ocean Cape (now renamed
as Pacific Capes). Three other vessels have not fished in Alaska between 2003–2012: 1) Bering
Enterprise, 2) Harvester Enterprise, and 3) Alaska Voyager. One of the named vessels—the Golden
Fleece—has chosen to opt out of the AM80, but continues to participate in the GOA.
Of the 24 vessels that actively participated in BSAI fisheries since implementation of AM80, 21
participated in 2012 (the last year included in this 5-year review). As indicated above the Alaska
Ranger sank in 2008,3 the Tremont last fished in 2008, the Ocean Cape (now the Pacific Capes) has
not fished in the BSAI since 2010. Fishing activity from 2013–2014 has not been examined.
3
Three crew members were lost when the vessel sank on March 28, 2008, the first year of fishing under AM80.
Vessel Name
Alaska Juris
Alaska Spirit
Alaska Victory
Alaska Warrior
Alaska Ranger
Alaska Voyager
American No I
US Intrepid
Arica
Cape Horn
Rebecca Irene
Unimak
Tremont
Arctic Rose
Ocean Cape
Ocean Peace
Seafisher
Constellation
Defender
Enterprise
Bering Enterprise
Harvester Ent.
Alaska Vaerdal
Alliance
Legacy
Ocean Alaska
Seafreeze Alaska
Prosperity
Golden Fleece
USCG #
569276
554913
569752
590350
550138
536484
610654
604439
550139
653806
697637
637693
529154
931446
583721
677399
575587
640364
665983
657383
610869
584902
611225
622750
664882
623210
517242
615485
609951
LLP # ADFG # NMFS #
LLG 2082
54693
2443
LLG 3043
59870
3819
LLG 2080
61083
4093
LLG 2083
56965
3423
LLG 2118
57444
3400
LLG 2084
51926
1311
LLG 2028
36202
1879
LLG 3957
54392
2800
LLG 2429
57228
3694
LLG 2432
55921
2110
LLG 3958
51873
1610
LLG 3662
57211
3369
LLG 2785
55466
2018
LLG 3895
63511
4650
LLG 3895
29923
1615
LLG 2138
55767
2134
LLG 2014
56964
3835
LLG 1147
61081
4092
LLG 3217
62545
4635
LLG 4831
69038
5822
LLG 3744
36502
3003
LLG 3741
55183
2732
LLG 1402
1119
2123
LLG 2905
55045
2924
LLG 3714
48183
3367
LLG 4360
41219
528
LLG 4692
39798
2733
LLG 1802
41864
3361
LLG 2524
43260
367
Current Owner | Notes
Fishing Company of Alaska
Fishing Company of Alaska
Fishing Company of Alaska
Fishing Company of Alaska
Fishing Company of Alaska | Sunk in 2008
Fishing Company of Alaska | No fishing 2003-2012
Fisherman’s Finest
Fisherman’s Finest
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. via Arctic Sole| Last fished in 2008
Sunk 2001 | Replaced by Ocean Cape
Iquique U.S. via Arctic Sole. | Last fished in 2010
Ocean Peace Inc.
Ocean Peace Inc. via MV Savage in 2010/11
O’Hara Corp.
O’Hara Corp.
O’Hara Corp.
O’Hara Corp owns QS via Trident in 2009 | No fishing 2003-2012
O’Hara Corp owns QS via Trident in 2009 | No fishing 2003-2012
US Seafoods via Jubiliee Fisheries in 2010
US Seafoods via Kodiak Fish Co. in 2007/8
US Seafoods via Kodiak Fish Co in 2007/8
US Seafoods via Iquique U.S. in 2007
US Seafoods
US Seafoods owns LLP via Legacy | Last fished in 1990s
Did not apply for AM80 QS. Active in GOA.
One of the often-cited negative impacts of rationalization programs is the negative effects on vessel
owners and operators and crewmembers of the vessels that are no longer participating. As
documented in Table 4, several vessels have changed owners since 2003, one vessel sank, and two
vessels that were active from 2003–2012 are no longer active.
In an interview with one former owner—Teressa Kandianis (2014) of Kodiak Fish Company and
former owner of the Alliance and the Legacy, AM80 provided an reasonable way to exit the fishery
for owners of marginally performing vessels. In the absence of AM80, GRS regulations would likely
have forced these more marginal vessels out of the fishery and the owners would not have been
compensated. Instead of being forced out of the fishery by competition or regulation, vessel owners
were able to sell to willing buyers.
In the course of this analysis we have spoken with both current and previous owners of vessels to gain
some understanding of outcomes for crew that are no longer participating in the fishery. In general, it
appears that the increased season length for most of the vessels that have continued to operate
coupled with regular turnover of crew members means there continue to be opportunities for
qualified fishing crew and skippers. According to both current and past owners, if experienced crew
members and officers wanted to remain in the fishery, they are most likely still in the fishery.
Data limitations preclude a full quantitative assessment of the number of crew members participating
on AM80 vessels before and after implementation of AM80. There are, however, two new sources of
crewmember data for AM80 vessels available from 2008–2012: 1) crew information in the EDRs, and
2) Vessel crew complements reported by observers. Unfortunately, both sources have been collected
from 2008 forward. There are no comprehensive data on AM80 crewmembers prior to 2008.
It is possible, however, to use that the data from 2008–2012 to make inferences regarding
crewmembers in prior years. Table 5 uses the assumption that the average crew complement on
vessels prior to 2008 is equal to the number of crew members reported by observers on AM80 vessels
in 2008 (the first year these data are available). Since all of the AM80 vessels that participated from
2003–2007 also participated in 2008, there is at least one year of observed crew data for all vessels.
While the number of active A80 vessels has declined since implementation—from an average of 22.6
in the five years prior to implementation to an average of 20.8 vessels following implementation—the
average number of weeks that vessels were active during the year has increased by over 4 weeks per
year—from an average of 32.2 weeks per year to an average of 36.8 weeks per year. The size of the
crew complement also appears to have increased in the years following implementation. In 2008, the
average reported crew complements over all vessels and weeks was 35.3 crewmembers. In 2009 that
number increased to 36.2 and every year from 2010–2012 had reported crew complements that
averaged 37.6 crewmembers or higher.
In Table 5, average crew member weeks is calculated by multiplying the average crew complement
on each vessel by the number of weeks that vessel participated, and then by dividing the product by
the number of vessels that participated during the year—in other words “Average Crewmember
Weeks” is a weighted average. Prior to AM80, the Crewmember Weeks averaged 1,199 across all
vessels. During the five years after AM80, the Crewmember Weeks jumped to a weighted average of
1,386, an increase of 187 crewmember weeks per vessel. The estimated total number of
crewmember weeks (the right-most column) jumped by 1,677 in the five years following
implementation of AM80. Given these large increases in crew member weeks, it does seem likely that
displaced but qualified crewmembers from vessels that have left the fishery since 2008 are likely to be
able to find work in the AM80 fleet if they desire.
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Avg 2003-07
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Avg 2008-12
Number of
AM80 Vessels
23.0
22.0
23.0
22.0
23.0
22.6
23.0
21.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.8
Average
Vessel Weeks
32.2
33.7
31.6
32.0
31.7
32.2
36.1
35.8
38.2
37.6
36.6
36.8
Average Crew
Complement
35.3
36.5
35.3
36.5
35.3
35.8
35.3
36.2
37.8
37.6
37.8
36.9
Average Crewmember Weeks
1,204
1,243
1,183
1,196
1,167
1,199
1,299
1,315
1,455
1,433
1,426
1,386
Estimated Crew
Weeks on all Vessels
27,685
27,354
27,210
26,310
26,832
27,078
29,878
27,615
29,095
28,664
28,525
28,755
Note: Shaded cells indicate that information was estimated using the assumption that the crewmember counts
for 2003–2007 equal the crewmember counts for those vessels in 2008.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Rationalization of the AM80 fishery was made possible through the issuance of AM80 QS and the
annual assignment of CQ to cooperatives or to the AM80 Limited Access fishery (AM80 LA). In this
section we document the QS issued to vessels and companies. Unlike catch amounts, the amount of
QS issued to a vessel or to a fishing company is not confidential as is available from NMFS at
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/amds/80/default.htm.
QS were assigned to vessels based on the best their catch history in the vessels five of seven calendar
years for each AM80 species from 1998–2004.
The AM80 species are defined with an associated fishing area as follows:
Atka mackerel in the Eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
Flathead sole in the BSAI
Pacific cod in the BSAI
Pacific ocean perch in the Aleutian Islands (AI)4
Rock sole in the BSAI
Yellowfin sole in the BSAI
If a “listed” AM80 vessel did not have any legal landings of BSAI rock sole or yellowfin sole between
1998–2004, it was assigned 0.5 percent of the initial QS applied for by other AM80 vessels. Similarly,
if a vessel did not have legal landings of flathead sole during the period it was assigned 0.1 percent of
the initial QS.5
Of the 28 members that qualified for AM80 QS in 2008, 25 applied during the initial issuance in
2007 and 2008. As aforementioned, Golden Fleece was the only vessel to opt out of the AM80
fishery. The Bering Enterprise and Harvester Enterprise did not apply for AM80 QS until late in 2009,
and therefore their QS were not part of the AM80 QS pool until 2010. Using registered address data,
it appears that AM80 QS was dispersed among nine companies during initial issuance. In 2010 QS
issued to Vaerdal and Seafisher were transferred to U.S. Seafoods and Ocean Peace, respectively. This
consolidation brought the total number of companies participating in AM80 to seven. Further
consolidation took place in 2013 when Arctic Rose/Ocean Cape QS was transferred to Iquique U.S.,
bringing the total number of companies operating in AM80 to six.
4
5
Pacific ocean perch harvests are considered AM80 harvests only if they were taken in the Aleutian Islands—
management zones 541, 542, or 543. Pacific ocean perch harvests in the Bering Sea are not consider catch of
AM80 species.
Three of the “listed” 28 AM80 vessels did not have legal landings during the 1998–2004 period and were issued
QS as a result of this clause—Bering Enterprise, Harvester Enterprise, and Prosperity. Each vessel received
2,693,390 QS in total broken down as follows: 1) Yelllowfin Sole—1,757,999 QS, 2) Rock Sole—850,175 QS,
3) Flathead Sole—85,216 QS. Two vessels that did have legal landings of yellowfin sole, (Alliance and Arctic
Rose) received fewer Yellowfin sole QS than the three that had no legal landings.
Since the first year of issuance, consolidation of AM80 QS has taken place. The study team, using
registered address data from NMFS issuance data, monitored the movement of QS units. For years
prior to the first QS issuance, license data and addresses, along with personal communication with
NPFMC, were utilized. This analysis attempts to capture the movements of QS units from when AM80
was first initiated, but not implemented, to its current state. Table 6 tracks these movements from the
date of initial issuance. While some consolidation appears obvious, other movements appear have a
degree of uncertainty. Consolidation findings prior to initial issuance are listed below:
U.S. Seafoods acquires Ocean Alaska and Prosperity from Iquique and Kodiak Fishing
Company, respectively. (2006/07)
Iquique acquires Tremont from Arctic Sole Seafoods. (2007/08)
U.S. Seafoods acquires Alliance from Kodiak Fishing Company and Kodiak Fishing Company
leaves the AM80 market. (2007/08)
Ocean Peace is registered to the same address as other U.S. Seafoods vessels in 2003 and
2004 and as an independent company ‘Ocean Peace, Inc.’ onward. It is unclear if any
relationship existed between U.S. Seafoods and Ocean Peace, Inc. in those years. Ocean
Peace, Inc.’s website (http://www.oceanpeaceinc.com/) states ownership of the vessel
beginning in 1991.
License data shows the Seafisher being transferred to Ocean Peace, Inc. in 2012, and is
consistent with Ocean Peace, Inc.’s website (http://www.oceanpeaceinc.com/). However,
analysis using QS issuance data reveals QS being transferred to Ocean Peace, Inc. in 2010.
Prior to 2008, findings suggest that Kodiak Fishing Company was the only company that left the
fishery before initial issuance of QS. All other consolidations took place after 2008 and are shown in
Table 6.
A similar summary of QS issued to each vessel and company for AM80 species is in Appendix B.
Company
Vessel
ALLIANCE
LEGACY
OCEAN ALASKA
U.S. Seafoods
PROSPERITY
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
VAERDAL
U.S. Seafoods Total
ALASKA JURIS
ALASKA RANGER
ALASKA SPIRIT
Fishing
Company of
ALASKA VICTORY
Alaska
ALASKA VOYAGER
ALASKA WARRIOR
Fishing Company of Alaska Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
Arctic Sole
Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
ARICA
CAPE HORN
Iquique U.S.
REBECCA IRENE
TREMONT
UNIMAK
Iquique U.S. Total
VAERDAL
Jubilee
Fisheries, Inc. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
SEAFISHER
M/V Savage,
Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
OCEAN PEACE
Ocean Peace
SEAFISHER
Ocean Peace Total
AMERICAN NO I
Fishermans
US INTREPID
Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
CONSTELLATION
DEFENDER
ENTERPRISE
O'Hara
Corporation
BERING ENTERPRISE
HARVESTER ENTERPRISE
O'Hara Corporation Total
Grand Total
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,580
28,820
6,140
6,140
6,140
6,140
6,140
6,140
6,140
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
2,693
59,339
-
-
20,464
20,464
20,464
20,464
20,464
103,573
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
181,689
20,464
20,464
87,064
87,064
65,103
65,103
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
135,316
1,070,153
103,573
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
181,689
20,464
20,464
87,064
87,064
65,103
65,103
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
135,316
1,070,153
124,036
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
181,689
65,103
87,064
152,167
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
2,693
2,693
140,703
1,075,540
124,036
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
181,689
65,103
87,064
152,167
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
2,693
2,693
140,703
1,075,540
124,036
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
181,689
65,103
87,064
152,167
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
2,693
2,693
140,703
1,075,540
124,036
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
184,601
65,103
87,064
152,167
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
2,693
2,693
140,703
1,075,540
124,036
87,116
62,984
68,422
69,679
10,030
88,633
386,863
2,913
40,301
33,860
36,734
30,182
40,612
184,601
65,103
87,064
152,167
40,506
46,664
87,170
46,785
43,184
45,347
2,693
2,693
140,703
1,075,540
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014
This section reviews the question of excess capacity from the regulatory perspective. The Council’s
AM80 motion and implementing regulations at § 679.92(a) state that a single person may not
individually or collectively hold or use more than 30 percent of the AM80 QS units initially assigned
to the AM80 sector. Persons that were initially allocated more than the QS use cap limit are
grandfathered in and need not sell their excess QS. Similarly, there is a use cap on the amount of
AM80 CQ that limits a single vessel from harvesting more than 20 percent of the CQ of the AM80
groundfish species in a given year.
The 5-year review examines initial allocations of AM80 QS to persons as well as the QS ownership
amounts reported at the beginning of the year. The 5-year review also examines the question of
whether any individual vessel has reached the 20-percent CQ use cap using CAS data. However,
because of disclosure rules, the 5-year review cannot report actual amounts that have been attained.
The only entity grandfathered as exceeded the AM80 QS personal use cap is the Fishing Company of
Alaska (FCA). As show in Table 7, FCA’s initial issuance was 36.15 percent of total QS issuance in
2008. This proportion decreased to 35.97 percent in 2010, when additional QS units were issued to
additional applicants (Harvester Enterprise and Bering Enterprise). Total QS units have remained
constant since 2010.
Since initial issuance, total AM80 QS has gone from being dispersed to nine companies to being
dispersed among six companies. FCA’s QS holdings are more than twice the amount of the next
largest AM80 QS holder, Iquique U.S. The three largest companies (FCA, Iquique U.S., and O’Hara)
account for more than two-thirds of total AM80 QS. If O’Hara Corp. is included, the top four
companies hold 80 percent of AM80 QS. Of the top four companies, U.S. Seafoods increased their
QS holdings with the acquisition of Vaerdal in 2010. Also in 2010, O’Hara increased its QS holdings
with the acquisition of the Bering Enterprise and Harvester Enterprise from B&N Fisheries.
Company
U.S. Seafoods
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ALLIANCE
LEGACY
0.61%
2.69%
0.61%
2.69%
0.61%
2.68%
0.61%
2.68%
0.61%
2.68%
0.61%
2.68%
0.61%
2.68%
OCEAN ALASKA
0.57%
0.57%
0.57%
0.57%
0.57%
0.57%
0.57%
PROSPERITY
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
0.25%
5.54%
0.25%
5.54%
0.25%
5.52%
0.25%
5.52%
0.25%
5.52%
0.25%
5.52%
0.25%
5.52%
VAERDAL
Fishing Company of Alaska
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc.
Iquique U.S.
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc.
Ocean Peace
Fishermans Finest
O'Hara Corporation
U.S. Seafoods Total
ALASKA JURIS
ALASKA RANGER
ALASKA SPIRIT
ALASKA VICTORY
ALASKA VOYAGER
ALASKA WARRIOR
Fishing Company of Alaska Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
ARICA
CAPE HORN
REBECCA IRENE
TREMONT
UNIMAK
Iquique U.S. Total
VAERDAL
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
SEAFISHER
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
OCEAN PEACE
SEAFISHER
Ocean Peace Total
AMERICAN NO I
US INTREPID
Fishermans Finest Total
CONSTELLATION
DEFENDER
ENTERPRISE
BERING ENTERPRISE
HARVESTER ENTERPRISE
O'Hara Corporation Total
Grand Total
-
-
1.90%
1.90%
1.90%
1.90%
1.90%
9.68%
8.14%
5.89%
6.39%
6.51%
0.94%
8.28%
36.15%
0.27%
0.27%
3.77%
3.16%
3.43%
2.82%
3.79%
16.98%
1.91%
1.91%
8.14%
8.14%
6.08%
6.08%
3.79%
4.36%
8.15%
4.37%
4.04%
4.24%
12.64%
100.00%
9.68%
8.14%
5.89%
6.39%
6.51%
0.94%
8.28%
36.15%
0.27%
0.27%
3.77%
3.16%
3.43%
2.82%
3.79%
16.98%
1.91%
1.91%
8.14%
8.14%
6.08%
6.08%
3.79%
4.36%
8.15%
4.37%
4.04%
4.24%
12.64%
100.00%
11.53%
8.10%
5.86%
6.36%
6.48%
0.93%
8.24%
35.97%
0.27%
0.27%
3.75%
3.15%
3.42%
2.81%
3.78%
16.89%
6.05%
8.09%
14.15%
3.77%
4.34%
8.10%
4.35%
4.02%
4.22%
0.25%
0.25%
13.08%
100.00%
11.53%
8.10%
5.86%
6.36%
6.48%
0.93%
8.24%
35.97%
0.27%
0.27%
3.75%
3.15%
3.42%
2.81%
3.78%
16.89%
6.05%
8.09%
14.15%
3.77%
4.34%
8.10%
4.35%
4.02%
4.22%
0.25%
0.25%
13.08%
100.00%
11.53%
8.10%
5.86%
6.36%
6.48%
0.93%
8.24%
35.97%
0.27%
0.27%
3.75%
3.15%
3.42%
2.81%
3.78%
16.89%
6.05%
8.09%
14.15%
3.77%
4.34%
8.10%
4.35%
4.02%
4.22%
0.25%
0.25%
13.08%
100.00%
11.53%
8.10%
5.86%
6.36%
6.48%
0.93%
8.24%
35.97%
0.27%
3.75%
3.15%
3.42%
2.81%
3.78%
17.16%
6.05%
8.09%
14.15%
3.77%
4.34%
8.10%
4.35%
4.02%
4.22%
0.25%
0.25%
13.08%
100.00%
11.53%
8.10%
5.86%
6.36%
6.48%
0.93%
8.24%
35.97%
0.27%
3.75%
3.15%
3.42%
2.81%
3.78%
17.16%
6.05%
8.09%
14.15%
3.77%
4.34%
8.10%
4.35%
4.02%
4.22%
0.25%
0.25%
13.08%
100.00%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b.
As indicated above, the second measure of excess capacity is the CQ vessel use cap. The regulation
states that no vessel can catch more than 20 percent of the combined CQ of all six AM80 species.
This measure is somewhat more difficult to measure because the amount of CQ issued can change
during the year if there is a rollover of ITAC from another sector. For example, if it is determined that
the BSAI TLA sector will not be harvesting all of the apportionment of yellowfin sole, NMFS will reallocate the unused amounts to the AM80 sector, thereby increasing the CQ of all of the vessels in the
cooperative that receive the rollover. Similarly, rollovers can and have occurred for Pacific cod.
An alternative measure of whether any given vessel is exceeding the CQ vessel use cap is to look at
total catch of the AM80 species by individual vessels. Given that the total catch of the AM80 species
by AM80 CPs has not exceeded the CQ of any of the AM80 species during the 5-year period from
2008–2012, the percent of total AM80 CP catch of any given species will always be less than the
percent of the AM80 CQ, and thus will serve as a very reasonable measure. If it appears that one or
more of the vessels are approaching 20 percent of catch, then a more precise estimate of CQ use may
be necessary. In addition, catch by individual AM80 CPs as a percent of all AM80 CPs can be assessed
for the years 2003–2007, and thus enable reviewers to understand whether there has been an
increase in individual vessel shares during the first 5 years of AM80 compared to the 5 years prior to
implementation.
Table 8 summarizes the catch of AM80 CPs of the six AM80 species by four groups of vessels from
2003–2012. For the table, vessels were divided into four groups based on each vessel’s ranking in
terms of total catch of AM80 species. The top three groups each comprise five vessels, while the last
group comprises the eight lowest ranked vessels, including vessels that were not active during the
years. The group in which an individual vessel is assigned can and does vary from year to year. In fact,
the only time that composition of vessels within the top group was the same for two consecutive years
occurred during the 2004–2005 period.
Because of confidentiality rules, the percent attained by the highest ranked vessels cannot be
divulged. However, by using the information in the table it is possible to estimate the highest possible
percentage that the top ranked vessel in any group could have attained. For example, in 2012, the
lowest ranked member of the groups achieved a catch of 6.4 percent. If the next three vessels also
achieved 6.4 percent, then the top four vessels could have not caught less than 25.6 percent (6.4% ×
4) in aggregate. That means that the most the top ranked boat in 2012 could have taken of the AM80
species is 8.8 percent (34.4%–25.6% = 8.8%). Similar calculations lead to the conclusion that in none
of the years from 2003–2012 could any given vessel have taken more than 13.6 percent of the total
harvest of AM80 species during the year. Since total harvest of AM80 species has been less than the
total CQ of AM80 species each year from 2008–2012, it is clear that no vessel has come close to
reaching the CQ vessel use cap.
Vessel Groups
Statistics
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total %
39.3% 36.3% 37.9% 38.2% 38.1% 36.2% 36.5% 34.4% 34.4%
Vessels
Average %
7.9%
7.3%
7.6%
7.6%
7.6%
7.2%
7.3%
6.9%
6.9%
Ranked 1–5
Minimum %
6.9%
6.5%
6.8%
6.9%
6.6%
5.6%
6.7%
6.3%
6.3%
Total %
26.0% 26.5% 28.7% 27.1% 27.0% 27.0% 30.4% 30.2% 29.6%
Vessels
Average %
5.2%
5.3%
5.7%
5.4%
5.4%
5.4%
6.1%
6.0%
5.9%
Ranked 6–10
Minimum %
4.3%
4.6%
4.4%
4.2%
4.1%
5.3%
5.5%
5.8%
5.7%
Total %
20.1% 19.9% 19.3% 19.8% 19.7% 22.3% 23.1% 24.8% 25.2%
Vessels
Average %
4.0%
4.0%
3.9%
4.0%
3.9%
4.5%
4.6%
5.0%
5.0%
Ranked 11–15
Minimum %
3.4%
3.8%
3.4%
3.5%
3.1%
3.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.6%
Total
%
14.6%
17.4%
14.1%
14.9%
15.2%
14.5%
10.0%
10.6%
10.7%
Vessels
Ranked 16 –23 Average % (if > 0)
2.4%
2.9%
2.4%
2.5%
2.5%
2.4%
2.0%
2.7%
2.7%
(lowest 8 vessels) Vessels with zero mt
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by Alaska Fisheries Information
Network (AKFIN) (Fey, 2014).
2012
34.4%
6.9%
6.4%
30.4%
6.1%
5.7%
25.1%
5.0%
3.9%
10.1%
3.4%
4
The data in Table 8 lead to other findings regarding the effects of consolidation under AM80. The
average percentage of the AM80 species catch for the top 5 vessels in the fleet for each year has
declined, meaning more of the harvest is taken by lower ranked vessels. From 2003–2007 the top five
vessels averaged 38.0 percent of the total, while in 2008–2012 the top five average only 35.2
percent. The percentage for the second and third tier groups both increased over the two 5-year
periods—for the third tier the increase was nearly a 5 percentage point gain. The bottom tier, like the
first tier is harvesting a lower percent of the total—from an average of 15.2 percent from 2003–2007
to only 11.2 percent from 2008–2012.
In this section, the review assesses the capacity and utilization of AM80 vessels from 2002–2012. The
focus here is on the potential capacity to harvest and process fishery resources compared to the actual
utilization of that capacity. While there are many potential ways to measure capacity and utilization,
the quantitative assessment in the 5-year review focuses on season length in which AM80 vessels have
been utilized. In this section the analysis includes not only fisheries of AM80 CPs in the BSAI, but also
activities of AM80 in other fisheries including activities in the GOA, CDQ fisheries, and activities in
the BSAI TLA fisheries.
The most straightforward demonstration that the capacity of active vessels has increased is an
assessment of whether active vessels are participating in the groundfish fishery during the month. The
fleet would be considered close to full capacity if all of the vessels that choose to participate during
the year are active during every month. In particular, we would expect that participation in months
toward the end of the year would be higher after AM80 was implemented, while participation in the
earlier months would tend to be higher in the years before AM80 was implemented. Table 9 shows
the number of active vessels in each month from 2003–2012, along with the count of active vessels in
the year.
Month
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1
20
22
21
21
21
20
18
15
13
2
21
22
22
22
22
23
21
19
18
3
21
22
22
21
22
23
21
19
18
4
21
22
22
22
22
21
20
20
20
5
18
22
22
20
22
21
17
19
20
6
15
20
16
19
22
15
11
13
19
7
21
22
22
21
22
21
21
20
19
8
22
16
22
22
22
21
21
19
17
9
22
20
15
21
14
21
20
19
19
10
19
12
11
11
10
21
21
19
18
11
3
3
3
3
12
17
8
12
15
12
1
0
0
1
1
3
0
3
6
Unique Active
22
22
22
22
22
23
21
20
20
X2 probability
2.8%
1.1%
0.4%
1.2%
17.1%
83.3%
16.9%
70.6%
89.8%
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
14
17
18
18
19
17
19
17
18
17
12
3
20
67.8%
The shifts in the number of active vessels pre- and post-AM80 are most noticeable during the month
of January and later in the year from October–December. After AM80 was implemented, the number
of active vessels relative to the total active for the year decline. Apparently vessels did not necessarily
feel the need to begin the season when it opens on January 20. Under AM80, vessels in cooperatives
do not need to fear losing catch to other vessels if they are not on the grounds when the season
opens. There has been a shift at the end of the year with many more vessels extending their seasons
out through October, Novemeber and even December.
It is possible to test whether the distribution of active vessels by month is statistically different before
and after AM80. The Chi-Square (X2) test shows the probability that the difference between two
distributions can be explained by random variations. The X2 probablities shown in the last row of the
table tested compared the number of active vessels in each month for that year against a null
hypothesis that each active vessel during that year would be active in each month (excluding
December).6 A probability greater than 5 percent indicates that we can’t reject the null hyptothesis
that random variation causes the difference. As shown in the table, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis any year from 2008–2012, but we can reject the null hypothesis each year from 2003–
2006. This is a fairly strong indication that participation levels by month have evened out across the
AM80 fleet.7
It should be noted that the table above counts a vessel as being active not only if it was fishing in
AM80 fisheries—i. e. as a CP for non-CDQ fish in the BSAI—but also if it was participating in CDQ
fisheries, the BSAI TLA fishery as a mothership, or if it was fishing as a CP in the GOA. It could be
argued that a more appropriate test of capacity utilization would look strictly at participation in AM80
fisheries. This analysis rejects that notion because the rationalization brought about by AM80 gives
vessels the flexibility to participate in other fisheries without fear that potential harvest in AM80 will
be precluded by the actions of other vessels. We also note that tables showing partipation in the GOA
are shown in Section 3.1.6. as part of the review of GOA sideboards, while a summary of CDQ
fisheries and in GOA fisheries is provided in Section 0.
An alternative means to assess whether capacity utilization has changed under AM80 examines
production levels of the AM80 fleet by month. As above, we include all activities of AM80 vessels,
whether in AM80 fisheries, BSAI TLA fisheries, CDQ fisheries, or GOA fisheries.
Table 10 shows the total amount of product produced by AM80 vessels by month from 2003–2012.
There has obviously been an increase in total product pounds by year in the post-AM80 years relative
to the pre-AM80 years. From 2003–2012, annual total production averaged 317.4 million pounds.
That number increased to 438.7 million pounds from 2008–2012.
6
7
This test takes into account the fact that the Alaska Ranger sank in March 2008, and has not been replaced.
2
We also conducted X tests using the “theoretical maximum” number of active vessels in each year based on
the number of vessels that have participated in any year since 2003. In this case the null hypothesis was that
from 2003, as many as 23 vessels could have fished during any given month from January 2003–March 2008.
The Alaska Ranger sank in March 2008, and so from April 2008–2012 the maximum was set at 22 vessels. In
each case, participation in December was excluded. As with the previous test, this alternate test indicates that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 percent probability level any year after AM80 was approved,
2
although the X probabilities are somewhat lower.
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Month
Millions of Product Pounds from All Fisheries in which AM80 Vessels Participate
1
8.35
19.71
15.56
15.29
13.89
10.15
17.99
14.62
10.40
2
34.01
41.21
41.87
46.44
46.20
45.05
41.81
47.20
44.10
3
43.15
41.02
42.16
45.99
52.57
53.38
43.97
43.02
47.29
4
25.08
34.04
59.83
46.67
36.89
39.96
37.42
45.97
59.16
5
22.71
44.30
28.09
19.81
22.98
44.46
34.84
50.65
44.82
6
13.46
14.65
15.46
22.23
35.40
17.56
21.82
27.76
41.00
7
39.44
40.13
40.74
47.35
46.37
40.15
39.40
49.96
50.46
8
38.89
15.02
24.72
26.02
17.93
37.95
45.46
37.20
37.62
9
42.43
31.07
33.58
41.10
39.84
50.03
47.22
51.94
47.79
10
15.40
17.59
23.73
13.56
13.91
45.07
58.54
55.20
54.78
11
7.57
4.07
5.69
5.30
5.41
24.27
10.91
19.46
23.60
12
0.23
0.19
0.87
1.50
1.00
6.87
Total
290.74
302.82
331.43
329.95
332.25
409.51
399.37
443.98
467.89
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
11.63
47.33
61.51
49.81
46.70
53.99
45.19
39.90
52.98
40.07
18.69
4.97
472.76
To assess capacity utilization, we examined the distribution of production by month relative to an
even distribution of production by month taking into account the difference in the number of days
available in each month. For example, we assumed that the fishing season started each year on
January 20, and that only 12 days are available during that month. Similarly, we accounted for the
number of days in each month. Finally, we excluded the entire month of December from the
analysis—while December is excluded from the statistical analysis we have included its production as
a percentage of production from January–November. Table 11 shows the distribution of production
by month for the years 2003–2012. The bottom line of the table shows the X2 probability scores
exclude December and test against the null hypothesis that average total production of the fleet is
evenly distributed across months. It is clear that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any year
after 2008, and we conclude that production capacity is more efficiently utilized under AM80.
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Month
AM80 Vessel Production as a Percent all January–November Production from All Fisheries
1
2.9%
6.5%
4.7%
4.6%
4.2%
2.5%
4.5%
3.3%
2.3%
2
11.7%
13.6%
12.6%
14.1%
13.9%
11.0%
10.5%
10.7%
9.6%
3
14.9%
13.5%
12.7%
13.9%
15.9%
13.1%
11.0%
9.7%
10.3%
4
8.6%
11.2%
18.1%
14.2%
11.1%
9.8%
9.4%
10.4%
12.8%
5
7.8%
14.6%
8.5%
6.0%
6.9%
10.9%
8.7%
11.4%
9.7%
6
4.6%
4.8%
4.7%
6.7%
10.7%
4.3%
5.5%
6.3%
8.9%
7
13.6%
13.3%
12.3%
14.4%
14.0%
9.8%
9.9%
11.3%
10.9%
8
13.4%
5.0%
7.5%
7.9%
5.4%
9.3%
11.4%
8.4%
8.2%
9
14.6%
10.3%
10.1%
12.5%
12.0%
12.3%
11.8%
11.7%
10.4%
10
5.3%
5.8%
7.2%
4.1%
4.2%
11.0%
14.7%
12.5%
11.9%
11
2.6%
1.3%
1.7%
1.6%
1.6%
5.9%
2.7%
4.4%
5.1%
12
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.0%
0.2%
1.5%
Total
100.1%
100.0%
100.0%
100.1%
100.3%
100.4%
100.0%
100.2%
101.5%
X2 probability
3.8%
1.2%
1.9%
1.2%
1.5%
70.6%
40.6%
79.3%
90.1%
2
Note: The X probability scores exclude December and test against the null hypothesis that average total
production of the fleet is evenly distributed across months.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
2.5%
10.1%
13.1%
10.6%
10.0%
11.5%
9.7%
8.5%
11.3%
8.6%
4.0%
1.1%
101.1%
80.4%
Catch limits, commonly known as sideboards, limit the ability of AM80 vessels to expand their harvest
efforts in the GOA. Otherwise, AM80 vessels could use economic advantages of AM80 to increase
their participation in GOA fisheries, thereby adversely affecting the participants in those fisheries.
GOA groundfish and halibut PSC sideboards prevent these undesirable effects by limiting the catch by
AM80 vessels to historic levels in the GOA.
Under AM80, AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA are subject to Central GOA (Area 620 and 630),
Western GOA (Area 610) and West Yakutat (Area 640) northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, and
Pacific ocean perch sideboard limits, as well as limits on Pacific cod and pollock (with an exception
for the F/V Golden Fleece which is prohibited from directed fishing for rockfish, Pacific cod, or pollock
in the GOA) (Table 12). In addition, only specific AM80 vessels that met minimum participation
thresholds in GOA flatfish fisheries during 1998 through 2004 are allowed to target those species. The
vessels eligible to target GOA flatfish are listed in regulation.
2008
Species
Season
A Season
Jan 20–
Feb 25
B Season
Mar 10–
May 31
Pollock
C Season
Aug 25–
Sep 15
D Season
Oct 1–
Nov 1
Pacific Cod
Pacific Ocean
Perch
Northern Rockfish
Pelagic Shelf
Rockfish
Annual
A Season
Jan 1–Jun 10
B Season
Sep 1–Dec 31
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Area
610
620
630
610
620
630
610
620
630
610
620
630
640
610
620/630
610
620/630
640
610
640
610
610
640
AM80
Ratio
0.0030
0.0020
0.0020
0.0030
0.0020
0.0020
0.0030
0.0020
0.0020
0.0030
0.0020
0.0020
0.0020
0.0200
0.0440
0.0200
0.0440
0.0340
0.9940
0.9610
1.0000
0.7640
0.8960
TAC
3,322
6,215
3,069
3,321
7,576
1,709
5,480
2,695
4,431
5,479
2,695
4,431
1,517
11,669
17,056
7,780
11,370
2,394
3,686
1,100
2,141
1,003
251
Sideboard
10
12
6
10
15
3
16
5
9
16
5
9
3
233
750
156
500
81
3,664
1,057
2,141
766
225
2009
TAC
3,234
4,365
2,503
3,233
5,413
1,455
4,391
2,160
3,550
4,391
2,160
3,550
1,215
9,705
14,185
6,470
9,456
1,991
3,713
1,108
2,054
819
234
Sideboard
10
9
5
10
11
3
13
4
7
13
4
7
2
194
624
129
416
68
3,691
1,065
2,054
626
210
2010
TAC
5,551
8,414
4,403
5,551
9,925
2,891
7,577
4,878
5,912
7,577
4,878
5,912
2,031
12,458
22,069
8,306
14,713
2,017
2,895
2,004
2,703
650
434
Sideboard
17
17
9
17
20
6
23
10
12
23
10
12
4
249
971
166
647
69
2,878
1,926
2,703
497
389
2011
TAC
4,786
11,895
4,475
4,876
14,231
2,139
8,729
5,619
6,812
8,729
5,619
6,812
2,339
13,671
24,217
9,114
16,145
1,953
2,798
1,937
2,573
611
407
Sideboard
14
24
9
15
28
4
26
11
14
26
11
14
5
273
1,066
182
710
66
2,781
1,861
2,573
467
365
2012
TAC
5,797
14,023
5,787
5,797
17,221
2,589
9,338
7,282
8,986
9,338
7,282
8,986
3,244
12,614
25,623
8,410
17,082
1,971
2,102
1,692
2,156
409
542
Sideboard
17
28
12
17
34
5
28
15
18
28
15
18
6
252
1,127
168
752
67
2,089
1,626
2,156
312
486
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Table 13 shows the catch of groundfish sideboard species by AM80 Vessels in the GOA from 2003–
2012, while Table 14 compares the catch of each species to its sideboard limit from 2008–2012. The
sideboard limits for pollock and Pacific ocean perch were exceeded each year from 2008–2012, and
the sideboard limit for pelagic shelf rockfish was exceeded in 2009.
According to Mary Furuness at NMFS-AKR, trawl catcher processors have generally been precluded
from engaging in direct fishing for pollock since Inshore-Offshore allocations were implemented in
1992. The sideboards for pollock are therefore managed as a soft constraint. The vessels may not
keep more than the maximum retainable percentages allowed for pollock. (Furuness, 2014).
Species
Pollock
Pacific Cod
Pacific Ocean Perch
Northern Rockfish
Pelagic Shelf Rockfish
Area
All Areas
All Areas
610 & 640
610 & 640
610 & 640
All Sideboard Groundfish
2003
701
1,773
5,317
2,273
1,562
2004
408
1,242
6,342
2,438
1,212
2005
281
885
6,609
2,559
1,010
2006
336
1,012
8,668
2,987
1,381
2007
400
807
7,962
1,895
1,615
2008
532
846
7,260
2,514
1,911
2009
1,675
1,181
8,256
2,614
1,489
2010
923
920
8,794
2,723
1,712
2011
1,600
964
7,259
2,473
1,576
2012
1,197
1,086
8,076
3,130
1,938
11,642
11,344
14,384
12,679
13,063
15,215
15,072
13,872
15,427
11,642
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Species
Area
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Pollock
Pacific Cod
Pacific Ocean Perch
Northern Rockfish
All Areas
All Areas
610 & 640
610 & 640
447%
49%
112%
87%
1,709%
83%
131%
95%
513%
44%
150%
75%
796%
42%
107%
68%
497%
46%
170%
84%
Pelagic Shelf Rockfish
610 & 640
71%
105%
66%
50%
54%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a) and
from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
AM80 also imposes deep- and shallow-water halibut PSC limits for AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA
(this restriction does not apply to the F/V Golden Fleece), and these limits are applied on a seasonal
basis (Table 15). A total limit has been set at 418 mt for the deep-water species fishery (sablefish,
rockfish, deep-water flatfish, rex sole, and arrowtooth flounder) and 137 mt for the shallow-water
species fishery (pollock, Pacific cod, shallow-water flatfish, flathead sole, Atka mackerel, skates, and
“other species”). From 2008–2012, there were instances when NMFS closed directed fishing by
AM80 vessels for species that comprise the shallow-water species fishery or deep-water species fishery
because the seasonal apportionments of the halibut PSC limits in the GOA had been reached (see
Section 8.2 for halibut PSC usage data).
Season
Shallow-Water Species
Deep-Water Species
Jan 20–Apr 1
10
23
Apr 1–Jul 1
38
214
Jul 1–Sep 1
29
104
Sep 1–Oct 1
15
3
Oct 1–Dec 31
45
74
137
418
Total by Species Complex
Total for the Year
555
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
The rationalization that has taken place under AM80 has had impacts that might not have been fully
anticipated or expected. These impacts include:
1) An expansion of markets for AM80 vessels;
2) The transition of Pacific cod from a target species into an incidental catch species;
3) Behavioral changes, innovation and flexibility to reduce PSC.
According AM80 vessel owners and operators, the rationalization under AM80 has provided the fleet
with the ability develop new markets and expand existing markets. Changes in product values by
major AM80 species are summarized in Table 16 for the two 5-year periods before and after AM80.
The data in the table include revenue from CDQ harvests, as well as revenue generated by AM80
vessels when they are acting as motherships. The data in Table 16 also include revenue from AM80
CPs fishing in the GOA.
8
Yellowfin Sole: There has been a very noticeable shift away from whole fish and kirimi to
H&G Eastern Cut.8 Yellowfin sole has declined slightly in relative importance.
Atka Mackerel: There has not been any real shift in product forms for Atka mackerel, but the
species is relatively more important overall.
Pacific cod: There has been a very large shift from Western cut8 product to Eastern cut
product. Overall Pacific cod has lost 50 percent of its share of revenue for the AM80 vessels.
Rockfish: There have been small increases in the proportion of rockfish going into H&G
product away from whole fish. Rockfish has increased its importance to the AM80 vessels
from 10.7 percent in 2003–2008 to 13.6 percent in the years 2008–2012.
Rock sole: The relative importance of rock sole with roe has fallen significantly under AM80
while the relative importance of H&G rock sole has increased. The overall importance of rock
sole is about the same.
Flathead sole: Very little flathead sole with roe is being produced since 2008, and much more
of the flathead sole is going into an Eastern cut product. Flathead sole’s share of overall
revenue has fallen from 6 percent to 3.5 percent.
Arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder: Most of these two flounder species are processed as
H&G product with the tail removed. The relative importance of these products has increased
substantially under AM80. Owners and operators indicate their ability to reduce halibut
bycatch.
In an Eastern Cut product is the head is cut posterior to the pectoral girdle/collar. A Western cut product leaves
the pectoral girdle/collar intact.
Species
Yellowfin Sole
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Cod
Rockfish
Rock Sole
Flathead Sole
Arrowtooth/
Kamchatka
Other Species
All Species
Product
H & G Eastern Cut
Whole fish
Kirimi
All Products
H & G Eastern Cut
Whole fish
All Products
H & G Eastern Cut
H & G Western Cut
Whole fish
All Other Products
All Products
H & G Eastern Cut
Whole fish
All Products
H & G Eastern Cut
H & G with Roe
Whole fish
All Products
H & G Eastern Cut
H & G with Roe
All Products
H & G Tail Removed
H & G Eastern Cut
All Products
All Products
All Products
Wholesale Revenue
($Millions 2012)
2003–2007
2008–2012
$301.18
$377.86
$53.66
$21.00
$20.23
$2.16
$376.10
$401.04
$200.93
$319.49
$14.66
$18.52
$215.60
$338.04
$165.12
$135.46
$105.50
$37.37
$4.81
$4.80
$12.87
$3.74
$288.29
$181.38
$140.68
$221.22
$11.62
$9.51
$153.94
$230.96
$67.97
$131.29
$98.65
$80.52
$0.28
$6.26
$167.14
$218.08
$63.31
$55.79
$22.04
$3.13
$86.09
$59.11
$30.67
$102.91
$1.36
$0.26
$32.12
$103.20
$118.13
$162.82
$1,437.43
$1,694.63
Product Revenue as a
Percent of Species Revenue
2003–2007
2008–2012
80.08%
94.22%
14.27%
5.24%
5.38%
0.54%
100.00%
100.00%
93.19%
94.51%
6.80%
5.48%
100.00%
100.00%
57.27%
74.68%
36.59%
20.60%
1.67%
2.65%
4.46%
2.06%
100.00%
100.00%
91.39%
95.78%
7.55%
4.12%
100.00%
100.00%
40.67%
60.20%
59.02%
36.92%
0.17%
2.87%
100.00%
100.00%
73.53%
94.39%
25.61%
5.29%
100.00%
100.00%
95.46%
99.72%
4.23%
0.26%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Product Revenue as a
Percent of Total Revenue
2003–2007
2008–2012
21.00%
22.30%
3.70%
1.20%
1.40%
0.10%
26.20%
23.70%
14.00%
18.90%
1.00%
1.10%
15.00%
19.90%
11.50%
8.00%
7.30%
2.20%
0.30%
0.30%
0.90%
0.20%
20.10%
10.70%
9.80%
13.10%
0.80%
0.60%
10.70%
13.60%
4.70%
7.70%
6.90%
4.80%
0.40%
11.60%
12.90%
4.40%
3.30%
1.50%
0.20%
6.00%
3.50%
2.10%
6.10%
0.10%
2.20%
6.10%
8.20%
9.60%
100.00%
100.00%
Note: Data in the table include revenue generated from AM80 vessels operating as motherships AM80 CPs
fishing in CDQs and AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Prior to implementation of AM80, NMFS set aside 7.5 percent of the Pacific cod TAC into a general
incidental catch “reserve” then 7.5 percent would be allocated to CDQs. The remainder—the Pacific
cod ITAC was allocated each of several gear groups including the 23.5 percent of the ITAC to Trawl
CPs. All catches of Pacific cod, whether taken in targeted fisheries for Pacific cod or incidentally in
target fisheries for other species would count against each gear group’s ITAC allocation. If the entire
ITAC allocation to a gear group was harvested, NMFS would close the Pacific target fishery for the
gear group and prohibited directed fishing. Any Pacific cod taken as an incidental harvest when
directed fishing was closed, counted as part of the “incidental catch” reserve that was set aside from
the TAC at the beginning of the process. The combination of an incidental catch reserve, an ITAC gear
allocation, and the potential for closures to directed fishing, meant that each gear groups faced a
“soft” cap for Pacific cod.
Under AM80, access to the incidental catch reserve for was eliminated for AM80 CPs for Pacific cod
and the other five target species for which they received allocations. Instead AM80 CPs are issued
fixed percentage of the ITAC of the AM80 species, and these allocations are treated as a “hard” cap. If
an AM80 cooperative takes the entire allocation of any of the six AM80 species then no additional
fishing is allowed.
AM80 CPs are allocated 13.4 percent of the Pacific cod ITAC,9 and according to AM80 owners and
operators, the “hard” cap under AM80, coupled with the size of the allocation, and other
rationalization elements of AM80, has led to the transition of Pacific cod from a target species to an
incidental catch species that sometimes constrains harvest in other target fisheries. In other words, the
hard-cap on Pacific cod under AM80 has forced operators to manage their incidental catch of Pacific
cod in ways that are similar to ways they manage halibut or crab PSC apportionments.
Under AM80, operators indicate that they calculate how much Pacific cod they will need in their fall
fisheries, and then adjust the amount of effort undertaken in fisheries with high catch rates of cod in
the earlier part of the year. It is believed that relatively high rates of incidental catch of Pacific cod in
the flathead sole and Alaska place fisheries have contributed to reductions in the amount of effort in
those targets. More recently, the relatively low levels of Pacific cod seen in fisheries for arrowtooth
and Kamchatka flounder appears to have led to an increase in targeted effort in those fisheries.
Table 17 shows the proportion of Pacific cod taken in Pacific cod target fisheries by AM80 CPs from
2003–2012. Beginning in 2008 with the implementation of AM80, there is a very distinct drop in the
proportion of Pacific cod catch taken in Pacific cod target fisheries. In the five years from 2003–2007,
62 percent of AM80 CPs harvests of Pacific cod were taken in Pacific cod target fisheries. After
implementation of AM80, the proportion of catch taken drops to an average of 13 percent.
Pacific Cod Targets
All Other Targets
All Targets
% of PCOD in PCOD Targets
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
17,756
12,378
30,134
59%
23,279
14,732
38,012
61%
17,206
13,868
31,074
55%
18,657
11,234
29,891
62%
25,106
9,259
34,364
73%
3,959
12,619
16,578
24%
3,867
18,392
22,259
17%
3,477
21,732
25,209
14%
1,601
24,203
25,805
6%
2,356
26,763
29,119
8%
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 18 shows the incidental catch rate of Pacific cod in BSAI target fisheries of AM80 CPs.
Incidental catches of Pacific cod are relatively high in all of the flatfish fisheries. The relatively high
volume/high value rock sole fishery has the highest incidental catch rate of the flatfish targets, but rates
in the flathead sole and Alaska plaice fishery are also high compared to the yellowfin sole fishery.
Incidental catch rates in the arrowtooth/Kamchatka fishery have fallen sharply since 2008.
9
The ITAC of Pacific cod equals 89.5 percent of TAC with the other 10.5 percent of the TAC allocated to CDQs.
Target Fishery
2003 2004 2005 2006
2007
2008 2009
2010
2011
2012 Average
Atka Mackerel
3.2% 3.6% 3.4% 2.4%
2.8%
1.6% 2.5%
2.0%
2.4%
2.1%
2.1%
Yellowfin Sole
4.4% 3.8% 3.2% 2.2%
1.8%
3.4% 7.9%
8.6%
8.6% 10.3%
7.8%
Rock Sole
8.9% 12.0% 12.6% 10.1%
7.7%
6.1% 7.1%
9.2% 10.3% 11.1%
8.8%
Flathead Sole
9.5% 9.6% 8.9% 10.2%
8.5%
6.8% 10.1%
8.9% 12.0%
7.3%
9.0%
Alaska Plaice
- 4.6%
3.2%
4.8% 4.3% 12.4%
8.0%
7.1%
7.3%
Other Flatfish
6.6% 6.6% 5.5% 8.9%
3.2%
1.1% 4.9% 16.0%
4.0%
8.0%
6.8%
Arrowtooth/Kamchatka
7.4% 4.3% 8.3% 8.5%
3.6%
1.0% 0.8%
0.3%
0.8%
0.7%
0.7%
Rockfish
2.0% 1.4% 1.0% 0.9%
0.5%
1.2% 0.4%
1.4%
1.4%
1.1%
1.1%
Greenland Turbot
2.0% 1.2% 0.0%
0.0%
0.0% 0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Sablefish
- 2.7% 0.2%
0.0%
0.5% 0.0%
0.2%
Other Species
16.0% 3.4% 12.4% 5.9%
5.0%
- 11.3% 21.7% 15.2%
16.1%
Pollock (bottom & midwater)
1.5% 4.4% 11.2% 7.0% 15.3%
7.3% 7.5%
7.8% 12.0%
8.6%
8.7%
Pacific Cod (target catch rate)
45.6% 38.0% 42.7% 43.5% 51.2% 62.3% 51.3% 61.3% 45.2% 61.6%
56.4%
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Note: Percentages shown in the “Average” column are the average of the percentages in each year since 2008.
From the table above it is possible to start to understand the decisions that operators of AM80 CP
make. The rock sole with roe fishery is highly value and has to take place at the beginning of the year
when roe is available, but the fishery also has relatively high incidental catches of Pacific cod, which
may become a constraining species later in the year. Since Pacific cod is now a constraint, operators
can’t afford to target Pacific cod to the same degree they have in the past. Clearly however, more
information is needed to understand targeting decisions, starting with potential revenue amounts in
each of the various target fisheries as shown in Table 19.
Target Fishery
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Atka Mackerel
$32.47 $40.82 $50.35 $49.03 $59.88 $51.00 $73.73 $76.54 $71.76
Yellowfin Sole
$73.91 $78.46 $106.46 $89.13 $91.27 $115.80 $84.29 $82.09 $131.88
Rock Sole
$25.60 $35.62 $38.70 $47.58 $37.33 $52.23 $32.59 $51.19 $60.50
Flathead Sole
$15.19 $22.18 $22.73 $19.49 $17.53 $22.51 $13.18 $16.29
$6.85
Alaska Plaice
$0.30
$0.03
$0.08
$0.01
$0.22
$1.35
Other Flatfish
$1.17
$1.30
$1.49
$0.37
$2.17
$0.12
$0.28
$0.13
$0.02
Arrowtooth/Kamch.
$2.71
$2.67
$4.85
$3.35
$1.39 $13.16 $19.23 $24.87 $22.97
Rockfish
$11.03
$9.33 $11.47 $16.04 $19.84 $14.53 $12.69 $16.04 $37.47
Greenland T.
$0.83
$0.19
$0.16
$0.01
$0.73
$2.38
$0.20
$0.01
Sablefish
$0.26
$0.07
$0.01
$0.14
$0.03
Other Species
$0.49
$0.03
$0.01
$0.04
$0.18
$0.01
$0.00
$0.00
Pollock
$0.07
$0.01
$0.29
$0.14
$0.38
$3.80
$4.62
$5.41
$4.20
Pacific Cod
$36.56 $50.37 $41.64 $53.12 $71.26 $10.47
$6.65
$6.05
$4.00
All Targets
$200.04 $241.24 $278.21 $278.58 $301.26 $284.58 $249.69 $279.03 $341.01
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$67.77
$126.77
$72.72
$5.44
$1.73
$0.14
$26.48
$28.11
$1.81
$4.55
$335.52
Average
Since
AM80
$68.16
$108.17
$53.85
$12.85
$0.68
$0.14
$21.34
$21.77
$0.66
$0.03
$0.00
$3.97
$6.34
$297.96
Revenues in the Atka mackerel, yellowfin sole, and rock sole fisheries have accounted for 72 percent
of total AM80 CP revenue over the 10-year period and 77 percent of total revenue since
implementation of AM80. Questions about why these species are targeted are somewhat moot
because they have been the mainstays of the fishery over the entire period. However, since 2008,
there has been a significant increase in the relative importance of the arrowtooth/Kamchatka flounder
fishery and the rockfish fishery, and a noticeable decline in the importance of the flathead sole, Alaska
plaice and Pacific cod target fisheries. These shifts can generally be explained by the tradeoffs
between four factors: 1) the fact that Pacific cod is now a constraint, 2) the incidental catch rates of
Pacific cod other target fisheries, 2) the revenue per ton of groundfish in various target fisheries and 4)
halibut bycatch rates, which obviously remains an important consideration in all targeting decisions.
The incidental catch rates of Pacific cod in the various target fisheries are shown in Table 18. Gross
revenues per metric ton of groundfish in BSAI target fisheries of AM80 CPs are shown in Table 19,
and halibut mortality as a percent of groundfish in those same fisheries is shown in Table 20. A
comparison of these decision factors for the arrowtooth/Kamchatka fishery, the flathead sole fishery
and the Alaska plaice fishery reveals the following:
1) Incidental catch rates of Pacific cod in the arrowtooth/Kamchatka fishery (1.1 percent) are
much lower than in the flathead sole fishery (9.0 percent), but higher than in the Alaska plaice
fishery (7.3 percent).
2) Halibut bycatch rates for arrowtooth/Kamchatka (1.0 percent) are about same as in the
flathead sole fishery (0.9 percent), but higher than in the Alaska plaice fishery (0.3 percent).
3) Wholesale revenue per ton in the arrowtooth/Kamchatka fishery ($828/mt) is 8 percent higher
than in the flathead sole fishery ($763/mt), and 2 percent higher than in the Alaska plaice
fishery ($808/mt).
When all three of these factors are combined, it becomes apparent that when harvesters are faced
with the choice between targeting flathead sole, Alaska place or arrowtooth/Kamchatka flounder, the
latter species are likely to win out.
Target Fishery
Atka Mackerel
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
Flathead Sole
Alaska Plaice
Other Flatfish
Arrowtooth/Kamch.
Rockfish
Greenland T.
Sablefish
Other Species
Pollock
Pacific Cod
All Targets
2003
$520
$710
$687
$805
$694
$993
$817
$1,178
$635
$432
$940
$712
2004
$631
$833
$757
$785
$533
$764
$918
$677
$2,109
$195
$246
$821
$773
2005
$723
$969
$939
$972
$757
$860
$1,383
$1,958
$2,186
$674
$681
$1,035
$925
2006
$702
$900
$981
$1,032
$781
$741
$744
$1,571
$342
$787
$1,239
$944
2007
$891
$772
$916
$806
$815
$708
$753
$1,327
$1,990
$1,668
$662
$919
$1,454
$949
2008
$802
$741
$818
$804
$758
$656
$818
$947
$1,208
$2,464
$1,287
$1,835
$807
2009
$951
$644
$659
$676
$445
$597
$799
$984
$921
$4,391
$430
$1,004
$988
$759
2010
$1,004
$654
$710
$712
$557
$846
$791
$1,172
$794
$789
$947
$1,081
$788
2011
$1,363
$827
$874
$891
$801
$630
$847
$1,643
$1,199
$520
$1,016
$1,142
$979
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$1,358
$866
$865
$886
$869
$585
$877
$1,322
$986
$1,221
$970
Average
Since
AM80
$1,066
$753
$795
$763
$809
$640
$828
$1,234
$962
$2,676
$481
$1,031
$1,256
$861
Target Fishery
Atka Mackerel
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
Flathead Sole
Alaska Plaice
Other Flatfish
Arrowtooth/Kamch.
Rockfish
Greenland T.
Sablefish
Other Species
Pollock
Pacific Cod
All Targets
2003
0.1%
0.7%
2.6%
0.9%
2.5%
1.9%
0.4%
1.1%
3.6%
0.0%
1.5%
1.0%
2004
0.1%
0.5%
1.2%
1.5%
2.2%
2.7%
0.5%
0.7%
1.3%
5.3%
0.0%
1.8%
0.9%
2005
0.1%
0.5%
1.9%
1.0%
3.4%
3.5%
0.2%
2.7%
0.3%
7.9%
0.1%
1.9%
0.9%
2006
0.1%
0.4%
1.7%
1.6%
0.2%
3.0%
3.3%
0.3%
4.7%
1.6%
1.9%
0.9%
2007
0.3%
0.4%
2.4%
1.4%
2.3%
2.4%
1.3%
0.1%
0.0%
2.2%
1.4%
2.0%
1.3%
0.9%
2008
0.1%
0.6%
1.0%
0.8%
1.2%
6.1%
0.8%
0.3%
0.3%
4.3%
1.3%
0.8%
0.6%
2009
0.1%
0.7%
1.2%
1.0%
0.1%
2.5%
1.0%
0.3%
0.2%
1.2%
1.1%
0.9%
1.1%
0.7%
2010
0.1%
0.7%
1.3%
0.8%
0.2%
1.5%
0.6%
0.4%
0.7%
22.0%
1.2%
0.6%
0.7%
2011
0.2%
0.5%
0.7%
0.9%
0.3%
3.6%
1.0%
0.4%
11.8%
18.3%
1.3%
0.8%
0.5%
2012
0.3%
0.5%
0.5%
1.4%
0.2%
2.7%
1.7%
0.4%
1.5%
2.4%
0.6%
Average
Since
AM80
0.1%
0.6%
0.9%
0.9%
0.3%
3.1%
1.0%
0.4%
0.3%
4.0%
8.7%
1.2%
1.1%
0.6%
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This subsection provides an overview of the allocation history of Pacific cod that led eventually to
13.4 percent allocation of Pacific cod ITAC to AM80 sector in 2008.
In the early years of the fishery, BSAI Pacific cod was an open access fishery prosecuted primarily by
trawl gear. Under open access management, Pacific cod was not allocated among competing
fishermen. As the market value of Pacific cod increased with the removal of foreign and joint venture
fisheries in 1990, the domestic fixed gear sector began to increase its harvest of the TAC. In 1994,
NMFS began to allocate the Pacific cod TAC with the implementation of BSAI Amendment 24 to the
FMP. The allocations roughly represented the harvests of the trawl and fixed gear sectors during
1991–1993. Competition within the trawl and fixed gear sectors eventually led to the Council
recommending, in subsequent amendments, further subdivisions of the allocations to these sectors to
provide the desired stability within the subdivided sectors.
Amendment 46, implemented in 1997, further split the trawl allocation equally between CVs and
CPs. The action also included specific authority for NMFS to annually reallocate among the various
sectors, if necessary, any portion of the Pacific cod allocations that were projected to remain unused.
In the years following Amendment 46, there were two amendments (Amendments 64 and 77) that
further allocate Pacific cod in the BSAI among the various fix gear sectors.
Development of Amendment 85 began in October 2002 when the Council initiated discussions
regarding the allocation of certain BSAI groundfish species to the non-AFA trawl CP sector. In
February 2003, the Council considered a vastly expanded program for this sector, known as AM80.
Growing demand for Pacific cod, a fully exploited fishery, and other distributional concerns among
sectors led the Council to consider a separate action to revise allocations of Pacific cod among the
many BSAI groundfish sectors. In October 2004, in a two-step process, the Council:
1) Simplified AM80 to provide allocations only to the AM80 sector (then known as the Non-AFA
Trawl Catcher Processor Sector) and removed allocation of Pacific cod from that proposed
action.
2) The Council then initiated a new plan amendment, which became Amendment 85, to alter
the BSAI Pacific cod allocations.
The intent of Amendment 85 was to modify the sector allocations to better reflect actual dependency
and use by sector, in part by basing the allocations on each sector’s historical retained catch. The
intent of the Council was to establish direct allocations for each specified sector in the BSAI Pacific
cod fishery, in order to protect the relative historical catch distribution among those sectors.
Under Amendment 85, the Council selected nine individual non-CDQ sectors to receive separate
BSAI Pacific cod allocations. The allocations to the identified sectors were selected using catch history
from 1995 through 2003 and other socioeconomic and community considerations. The Council
concluded that the adopted allocations better reflected actual dependency and use by each sector.
The primary objective of the Council in revising the BSAI Pacific cod non-CDQ TAC allocations to
each sector was to reduce the level and frequency of annual reallocations, and thus enhance stability
so each sector could better plan its fishing year and operate more efficiently.
The AM80 sector received an allocation of 13.4 percent of the BSAI Pacific cod ITAC. This was based
on the sector’s average share during the catch history period from 1995–2003. This allocation was,
however, less than the sector’s average harvest share of 16 percent during the last four years of the
catch history period (2000–2003), and an even greater reduction from its average of 17.7 percent of
total retained harvest in 2004 and 2005. The Council’s stated intent was that the allocations would
represent the sector’s historical retained catch of Pacific cod, while considering socioeconomic and
community factors. It should be noted that at the time of final action, the sector did express its
concern that the size of the allocation could constrain its ability to conduct a directed fishery for
Pacific cod in order to have sufficient Pacific cod available for incidental catch in its other fisheries. As
documented in the previous section, the transition from a target species to incidental species appears
to have taken place.
Although not entirely unexpected, rationalization under AM80 appears to have led to behavioral
changes, innovation and increased flexibility on the part of AM80 operators as they work to optimize
revenues under the constraints of halibut and crab PSCs. A thorough summary of PSC bycatch by the
AM80 CPs from 2003–2012 is contained in Section 8 and in Appendix C.
During interviews with AM80 vessel owners and operators it was noted several times that the fleet is
no longer trying to maximize revenue per day, and instead is trying to maximize total catch and
revenue per pound while staying within their PSC apportionments and other constraints. This change
in their primary motivation means they are much less averse to trying new gear configurations, to
moving when they hit high levels of bycatch and reducing night-time trawling when halibut are
abundant. They are also more willing to test bycatch reduction tools and methods like experimental
halibut excluder devices, and to push for deck sorting of halibut to reduce mortality rates.
The following discussion, which summarizes the findings of Abbott, Haynie, and Reimer in their
paper, Hidden Flexibilities: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing” (Abbot,
2014), provides some insights into the theoretical underpinning of these changes.
In their analysis of the BSAI non-pollock groundfish trawl fishery, Abbott et al. conclude that
behavioral—rather than strictly technical—considerations are significant in explaining changes in
catch composition in the fishery following implementation in 2008 of AM80. The authors apply
multiple statistical measures and econometric modeling techniques to two primary data sources to
estimate the significance of various factors in predicting pre- and post-AM80 bycatch. These data
sources include: confidential observer data on the location and catch of each vessel from the North
Pacific Groundfish Observer Program (NPGOP); and vessel-level data on the production weight of
final products for each target species, as well as estimates of the initial catch weight embodied in the
final products. The authors focus their analysis on three margins of behavioral change, concluding that
each has proved significant in explaining reduced bycatch rates: large-scale adjustments to fishing
grounds away from areas with traditionally high rates of halibut and cod bycatch; smaller-scale
movements away from bycatch hotspots; and reductions in night fishing, particularly during the first
third of the year.
The authors also point out that AM80 represented a major policy shift away from a system under
which the catch of all species, including bycatch species, was regulated by the common-pool
assignment of multiple TACs for each species to one under which individual vessels operate under a
multispecies catch share system with individual accountability for catch of both target and bycatch
species. In addition to granting a defined share of the total AM80 TAC for the six primary target
species to each vessel in the previous limited-entry program according to its catch history, AM80
allows vessels to vest their shares in either a cooperative formed by participating members, or in the
limited-access common pool fishery. The regulations afford cooperatives considerable flexibility with
regard to the allocation of internal allocation of catch entitlements. The authors point out that groups
of AM80 CPs operating under cooperatives have avoided reaching their collective halibut and cod
allocations every year since AM80 implementation. The authors also point out that halibut bycatch
rates in the non-cooperative portion of the AM80 fishery remained unchanged in 2008 and reached
historically high levels in 2009 and 2010.
Implementation of AM80 coupled with TACs in excess of 125,000 mt mean that sideboards on
yellowfin sole harvests of AFA CVs and AFA CPs have not been enforced since 2008. Elimination of
the sideboards allows the AFA vessels to expand their operations in the yellowfin sole fishery if they
choose. In addition, one AM80 vessel has operated as a mothership in the yellowfin sole fishery every
year since 2003, utilizing non-AFA CVs with valid trawl licenses and endorsements to harvest
yellowfin sole. Because the harvests in the mothership operations are made by non-AFA CVs, the
harvests are assigned to the BSAI TLA sector and are not constrained by AFA sideboards.
The BSAI TLA fishery for yellowfin sole receives specific apportionments of PSC species for halibut,
king crab, and tanner crab (c. bairdi and c. opilio) and other PSC species. As with other “race for fish”
fisheries, both halibut and crab bycatch limits have the potential to shut down the fishery, or move
the activity out of preferred fishing areas.
The fact that neither the AFA CPs nor the mothership operations have an exclusive privilege to harvest
a predetermined quantity means that the various operations must engage in a race for fish if they
want to maximize their revenues from the fishery. As in many “race-for-fish” fisheries, the BSAI TLA
fishery for yellowfin sole has been contentious at times with both AFA CPs and mothership operations
hoping the other will limit their activities in the fishery. An in-depth analysis of the fishery that could
shed light on the difference between AFA CPs and mothership operations in the yellowfin sole fishery
would provide sector-by-sector details of historic harvest volumes and values generated in the fishery,
along with relative rates of halibut and crab PSC. However, because fishery data are considered
confidential, and because there are fewer than three mothership operations involved, sector-specific
(AFA CPs v. motherships) data cannot be provided in a public document or public forum. Therefore,
information provided in this section summarizes the BSAI TLA sector as a whole.
Table 22 shows groundfish species caught in yellowfin sole target fisheries harvested by vessels other
than AM80 CPs in the BSAI from 2003–2012. The information in the table is also summarized in
Figure 1. Incidental catches of yellowfin sole in other target fisheries are not included in the table.
Total groundfish harvested in BSAI TLA target fisheries for yellowfin sole increased from 4,486 mt in
2003 up to 22,762 by 2007. Harvest dropped in 2009, then climbed rapidly, and by 2012 over
34,000 mt were harvested. Total revenues (in nominal terms) in the fishery have increased from just
over $5 million in 2003 to $39 million in 2012.
It is also very clear from Table 22 that there has been a significant increase in the number of
processing vessels involved in the BSAI TLA yellowfin sole fishery. From the low in 2004 to high in
2012, the total amount of groundfish harvest in the fishery has increased by nearly an order of
magnitude. Similarly, the number of processors has increased from a low of 4 to a high of 14 in 2008.
Over the 10-year period a total of 17 different processors have participated in the fishery.
Species
Yellowfin sole
Alaska plaice
Pollock
Pacific cod
Rock sole
All other flatfish
Other groundfish
All Groundfish
Wholesale Value
($ Millions)
# of Processors
2003
4,486
344
132
36
6
18
12
5,034
2004
4,386
304
159
47
32
24
22
4,974
2005
7,993
1,087
562
215
191
71
114
10,233
2006
13,649
3,464
1,463
368
1,106
358
458
20,866
2007
22,762
3,668
1,024
412
678
571
732
29,846
2008
19,972
1,906
1,412
512
1,997
627
691
27,116
2009
10,226
973
622
408
1,506
501
483
14,719
2010
19,421
2,413
712
337
278
599
340
24,099
2011
30,475
3,773
1,704
2,596
1,073
1,204
869
41,694
2012
34,223
3,820
3,244
4,090
1,098
1,346
1,071
48,893
Total
167,593
21,752
11,032
9,021
7,964
5,320
4,792
227,474
$5.08
$5.56
$10.67
$19.45
$27.66
$18.93
$10.55
$20.13
$30.65
$39.00
$187.69
4
6
6
8
10
14
9
9
11
12
17
50.0
15
40.0
12
30.0
9
20.0
6
10.0
3
0.0
Number of Processors
Harvest snd Wholesale Value
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
# of Processors (uses right axis)
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Wholesale Value (millions of 2012 $)
Groundfish Harvests (mt 1,000s)
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 23 summarizes total halibut PSC, bycatch rate and the groundfish value in the BSAI TLA target
fishery for yellowfin sole. Similar information is available for the AM80 CP fishery in Appendix C
beginning on page 131. In general, halibut bycatch rates in the BSAI TLA fishery have been lower than
bycatch rates in the AM80 CP fishery (see Figure 2). It is believed that the difference in halibut
bycatch is primarily due to the difference in the timing of the two fisheries (see in Figure 3). A higher
percentage of harvests take place early in the year in the BSAI-TLA than in the AM80 CP fishery.
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
Halibut Bycatch Rate
(kg/mt of groundfish)
Groundfish Value
($-millions per MT Halibut)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2.2
2.8
15.5
92.6
58.2
119.4
94.7
26.8
71.6
92.4
0.4
0.6
1.5
4.5
2.0
4.4
6.4
1.1
2.1
2.3
$2.34
$2.01
$0.69
$0.21
$0.47
$0.16
$0.11
$0.75
$0.43
$0.42
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Bycatch Rate (Halibut MT/Grounfish MT)
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
2003
2004
2005
2006
AM80 CPs
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
BSAI TLA
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
Percent of Yellowfin Sole Total
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
AM80 CPs
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
BSAI TLA
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Dec
10
This report reviews the various safety matrices for the AM80 fleet to understand the trends and to
identify opportunities to enhance safety for crews who work on these vessels. In addition to the
adoption of AM80 in 2008, vessels also enrolled in a USCG safety and risk reduction program known
as the Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA) during 2006–2009. ACSA focuses on
safety improvements for the fleet.
Unlike catcher vessels, which catch and deliver fish in the round to shore plants, AM80 vessels catch,
sort, head, eviscerate, clean, and prepare fish into various fish products onboard the vessel. To
conduct these operations, these vessels have larger crew complements than catcher vessels. The
majority of AM80 vessel crews are not professional mariners, but instead are fish processing workers.
In addition to large crews, these vessels also carry processing and freezing machinery, hazardous gases
for refrigeration, and large amounts of combustible packaging materials which pose hazards that do
not exist on catcher vessels. AM80 vessels operate nearly year-round. Because of their ability to
freeze, package, and store frozen catch, these vessels can operate in the most remote areas of Alaska
for extended periods of time, far away from search and rescue support.
NIOSH previously provided testimony for this fleet in 2010 when the council was reviewing
alternatives to allow for vessel replacement. The lack of vessel replacement provisions, other than for
actual total loss or total constructive loss, ultimately inhibited long term safety improvements for the
AM80 fleet. At that time, the council voted to allow owners to replace vessels with another vessel for
any purpose. A replacement vessel cannot exceed a length overall of 295 feet. This is now not
dependent on the total loss of the vessel.
This 5-year review discusses the numbers of personnel and vessel casualties that have occurred in this
fleet since 2001. In addition, we discuss the changes in safety regulations due to the enrollment in the
ACSA and to what extent safety indicators have improved as a result of the ACSA program.
The AM80 fleet for this report was defined as the non-AFA trawl catcher-processors that were listed in
the original AM80 legislation (28 vessels), except for the 4 original AM80 vessels that were retired
prior to 2001, resulting in the 24 AM80 vessels in our study group. Vessel safety was assessed by
analyzing data on a selection of marine casualties including personnel casualties (e.g., fatal and nonfatal work-related injuries) and vessel casualties (e.g., sinking, grounding, collision, flooding, fire, loss
of propulsion, loss of electrical power, and loss of steering).
Cases of marine casualties were identified through two sources, the USCG Marine Information for
Safety and Law Enforcement and the NMFS Observer Vessel Survey. For personnel casualties, all
reported traumatic occupational injuries to workers onboard AM80 vessels during 2001–2012 were
included. For each case of occupational injury identified in the two data sources, measures on the
geographic location (latitude and longitude), weather conditions (wind speed, wave height, air
10
This section provided by Devin Lucas, PhD & Jennifer Lincoln, PhD of NIOSH. Minor edits and formatting for
style have been made by Northern Economics. NIOSH is the federal agency responsible for conducting
scientific research and making evidence-based recommendations to prevent workplace injury and illness. The
NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office has been involved with research on worker safety in the commercial fishing
industry since 1991.
temperature), vessel characteristics (length, year built), injury characteristics (nature, body part,
mechanism, source, severity), and victim demographics were collected. For vessel casualties, all
reported breakdowns at sea and other vessel safety events involving AM80 vessels during 2001–2012
were included. Data were collected on the type of vessel casualty, severity, resolution, location, and
weather conditions.
Because fishing vessels vary in terms of days at sea and crew size, they experience different amounts
of exposure to hazards that result in marine casualties. A common denominator is necessary to
accurately measure the risk of marine casualties in the AM80 fleet and allow it to be compared to
other fishing fleets and industries. The exposure estimate used as the denominator to calculate injury
rates in this study was full-time equivalent workers (FTEs). FTEs adjust the worker population to reflect
the same amount of exposure to risk as workers in other fishing fleets and industries, thereby allowing
comparisons of risk between fleets and industries. Risk was expressed as the number of injuries that
occurred for every 1,000 FTEs. For vessel casualties, the exposure estimate used to measure risk was
vessel-days-at-sea, expressed as the number of vessel casualties per 1,000 days at sea. A statistical
analysis was performed to explore and characterize the data. The results of the analysis are presented
next to provide a current assessment of vessel safety in the AM80 fleet.
During 2001–2012, 24 AM80 vessels operated in Alaskan waters at some time during this time period
(range 20–24 vessels each year). The median length of AM80 vessels was 148 feet (91 to 267 feet)
with a median of 35 crewmembers (11 to 77 crewmembers). For the 12-year period 2001–2012, a
total of 772 marine casualties were reported, resulting in 409 work-related injuries. The median age
of injured workers was 33 years (16 to 65 years). Only six women were among the injured workers.
Data on race/ethnicity were missing in almost all case reports. The state of Washington was the
residence for 138 injured workers (60 percent). The median amount of work experience was two
years (0 to 48 years). Fish processors were the most frequently injured workers (268, 75 percent),
followed by deckhands (61, 17 percent). The majority of injuries occurred throughout the fleet’s main
operating areas in the Bering Sea and along the Aleutian Island Chain. The median distance from
shore of an injury incident was 29 miles (0 to 174 miles).
Of the 409 injuries, 25 were fatal and 384 were non-fatal (Figure 4). Approximately half (187, 47
percent) of injuries were minor and 39 percent (153) were moderate. Table 24 contains detailed
descriptions of injury severity levels. Most of the fatal injuries occurred during two vessel disasters, the
sinking of the Arctic Rose in 2001 (15 deaths) and the sinking of the Alaska Ranger in 2008 (5 deaths).
The other five fatal injuries were caused by drowning after falling overboard (3 deaths) and blunt force
trauma due to being struck by a cable and a hydraulic door (2 deaths). A complete list of fatal injuries
occurring in the AM80 fleet during 2001–2012 is shown in Table 25.
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
Minor
Moderate
Serious
Severe
Critical
The injury is minor or superficial. No
medical treatment was required.
Examples: Minor /superficial scrapes (abrasions);
minor bruises; minor buts; digit sprain; first degree
burn; minor head trauma with headache or
dizziness; minor sprain/strain.
The injury exceeds the minor level, but did
not result in broken bones (other than
fingers, toes, or nose) loss of limbs,
severe hemorrhaging, muscle, nerve,
tendon, or internal organ damage.
Professional medical treatment may have
been required. If so the person was not
hospitalized from more than 48 hours
within 5 days of the injury.
Examples: broken fingers, toes, or nose,
amputated fingers or toes; degloving of fingers or
toes; dislocated joint; severe strain/sprain; second
or third degree burn covering 10 percent or less of
the body (if face is included move up one
category); herniated disc.
The injury exceeds the moderate level and
requires significant medical/surgical
management. The person was not
hospitalized for more than 48 hours within
5 days of the injury.
Examples: broken bones (other than fingers, toes,
or nose) partial loss of limb (amputation below
elbow/knee); degloving of the entire hand/arm or
foot/leg; second or third degree burns covering 2030 percent of the body (if face included move up
one category); bruised organs.
The injury exceeds the moderate level and
requires significant medical/ surgical
management. The person was
hospitalized for more than 48 hours within
5 days of the injury and, if in intensive
care, was in for less than 48 hours.
Examples: Internal hemorrhage; punctured
organs; severed blood vessels; second/third
degree burns covering 30–40 percent of the body
(if face included , move up one category), loss of
entire limb (amputation of whole arm/leg)
The injury exceeds the moderate level and
requires significant medical/surgical
management. The person was
hospitalized and intensive care for more
than 48 hours within 5 days of the injury.
Examples: Spinal cord injury; extensive second-or
third degree burns; concussion with sever
neurological signs; severe crushing injury; internal
hemorrhage; second/third degree burn covering 40
percent or more of the body; sever/multiple organ
damage.
Source: Table developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
Date of
Incident
Description of Fatal Injury Event (25 Fatal Injuries)
Vessel Disasters
4/2/2001
The Arctic Rose flooded and sank in the Bering Sea. All 15 workers onboard died as a result of
the sinking.
3/23/2008
The Alaska Ranger flooded and sank in the Bering Sea. Five of the 47 workers onboard died as a
result of the sinking.
Fatal Falls Overboard
7/6/2009
A deckhand was on deck setting a net when the net became caught and would not continue into
the water. He jumped on the net to free it, but fell into the water died due to drowning.
7/4/2009
A processor jumped overboard in a suspected suicide and died due to drowning.
5/25/2011
A supervisor was on deck working when he fell backwards into the water. He fell into the water
and died due to drowning.
Onboard Fatalities
6/3/2007
A processor walked into the live tank to hose it out when a hydraulic door closed. The door
crushed his head and caused a severe head injury. The processor died as a result of the injury.
3/1/2012
A processor was on deck when he was struck in the head by a cable. This caused a fatal head
injury to the processor.
Source: Table developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
The time period for which exposure estimates (i.e., vessel days at sea and crew size) were available
was 2003–2012. The rate of minor injuries appeared fairly stable during 2003–2005, and then
increased sharply for two years before declining back to the level observed in the first three years of
the time period (Figure 5). For injuries that were greater than minor severity, the rates were more
stable across the time period. The trends observed in the reported injury rates were most likely
influenced by the fluctuating level of reporting of injuries to USCG authorities rather than actual
increase in injuries. There was a USCG initiative during 2005–2008 aimed at improving the level of
reporting of injuries by these fishing companies. For additional explanation, see Lucas et al., 2014b.
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
In the decade between 2003 and 2012, the annual risk of fatal injuries in the AM80 fleet was 1.3 per
1,000 FTEs, and the annual risk of non-fatal injuries was 43 per 1,000 FTEs as shown in Table 26.
Fatal Rate
Year
Fatal
2001
15
19
–
–
–
2002
0
24
–
–
–
2003
0
19
779
0
24
2004
0
15
767
0
20
2005
0
18
784
0
23
2006
0
42
768
0
55
2007
1
63
785
1.3
80
2008
5
48
877
5.7
55
2009
2
34
715
2.8
48
2010
0
49
848
0
58
2011
1
28
842
1.2
33
2012
1
25
846
1.2
30
25
384
8,012*
1.3*
43*
Period total
Non-Fatal
FTE
Non-Fatal Rate
Per 1,000 FTE
Note: *Period total is for 2003–2012
Source: Table developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
The injury rates measured in the AM80 fleet showed that workers on those vessels were at high risk
for work-related injuries. The risk of fatal injury was 41 times higher than for all U.S. workers, and the
risk of non-fatal injury was four times higher than for all U.S. workers. Compared to other fisheries in
the U.S., the fatality rate in the AM80 fleet was lower than in many others, including the Northeast
U.S. groundfish trawl fleet, Atlantic scallop fleet, and West coast Dungeness crab fleet (Lincoln and
Lucas, 2010). However, both the fatality rate and non-fatal injury rate in the AM80 fleet were higher
than in the similar freezer-longline fleet (Lucas et al., 2014b).
Non-fatal injuries were grouped within job task categories or activities such as processing fish or
walking around the vessel. The job tasks associated with the highest number of injuries were handling
frozen fish (139, 41 percent), processing fish (72, 21 percent), and foot traffic onboard (41, 12
percent) (Figure 6). The specific job tasks that were associated with the most injuries while handling
frozen fish were stacking blocks of fish (in the freezer hold) and offloading product. The 31 serious
injuries reported are described in Table 27, and are grouped by the job task being completed at the
time of injury.
Year of
Incident
Description of Serious Injury Event (31 Serious Injuries)
Processing Fish
2002
A processor was using a header machine in the factory when his hand was caught in the running
equipment and amputated.
2004
A processor was pushing fish into a bin when he lost his balance. He fell into the fish bin and broke his
leg.
2010
A processor was repairing the header machine in the factory when another individual turned the
machine on causing the processor’s hand to get caught in the running equipment. His wrist was cut
very deep.
2012
A processor was cleaning the fish grinder equipment in the factory when he put his hand into the chute
and it became caught in the grinder. His fingers on one hand were all amputated to the palm.
2012
A processor was processing fish in the factory when an ammonia line broke causing him to inhale
ammonia. He had ammonia poisoning, which resulted in severe nausea, stomach pain, and burning in
his lungs.
2012
A processor was processing fish in the factory when an ammonia line broke causing him to inhale
ammonia. He had ammonia poisoning, which resulted in severe nausea, stomach pain, and burning in
his lungs.
2012
A processor processing fish was in the factory when an ammonia line broke causing him to inhale
ammonia. He had ammonia poisoning, which resulted in severe nausea, stomach pain, and burning in
his lungs.
2001
A processor was kicking fish into a bin when a crewmember shut the hydraulic door crushing his foot.
Handling Frozen Fish
2001
A factory processor supervisor was offloading fish product in the freezer when he fell 20 to 30 feet into
the freezer hold and broke his ribs.
2003
A processor was offloading fish product from the vessel when another crewmember tossed a block of
frozen fish to the processor. The processor was struck by the block and broke his hand.
2007
A processor was unloading the plate freezer in the factory when the vessel rolled and cases of frozen
fish struck him. The frozen fish broke his knee.
2008
A processor was stacking blocks of fish in the freezer when he stood up on the conveyor belt railing
and lost his footing. His foot went into the running equipment and was fractured.
Hauling the Gear
2001
A deckhand was on deck hauling in a trawl net when he tripped and broke his arm.
2006
A deckhand was on deck hauling in a trawl net when he was struck in the head by a swinging hook.
His head was injured.
Year of
Incident
Description of Serious Injury Event (31 Serious Injuries)
2007
A deckhand was on deck pushing fish from the trawl deck into the hold when the fish tank hydraulic
door opened. This caused his leg to fall into the open space, but then the door closed and amputated
his leg.
2007
A processor was working on deck to haul in the trawl net when he slipped on a fish and broke his
ankle.
Foot Traffic Onboard
2003
A processor walked into the freezer during off-loading the catch when a case of fish fell 15 feet and
landed on his head, which caused serious head injuries.
2010
The chief engineer was walking across the deck when he tripped on a deck tie down and fell onto the
ladder railing, which caused his arm to break.
2010
The captain was entering his stateroom when he stepped on a cardboard tube lying on the floor and
broke his ankle.
2001
A deckhand was repairing the trawl net on deck when a boom crane fell on top of him and broke his
pelvis.
2008
A deckhand was on deck removing the crane hook from the codend. A winch was activated and his leg
became caught in the running equipment. This force broke his leg.
2010
A deckhand was on deck preparing the deck gear when a heavy wire struck him in the head causing a
concussion.
Other Work on Deck
Other
2003
A deckhand was kicked and stabbed by his crewmembers in the galley. He had seven stab wounds.
2006
A processor was taking a shower when he slipped and fell. As a result of his fall, he broke his tailbone.
2011
An engineer was conducting general maintenance in the storage compartment when he slipped and
fell into the steering room during bad weather. The fall caused his shoulder to break.
2011
A deckhand was riding a crane hook out of the cargo hold, while the crew was readying the ship for
sea, when he fell 15 feet back into the hold. His ankle was broken due to the fall.
2012
An engineer was repairing the generator in the engine room when he slipped and fell into the electrical
panel. He was electrocuted due to the direct exposure to electricity.
2012
A processor was repairing freezer pans in the workshop when his hand became caught between the
hydraulic press pressure plate and fish pan. His hand was crushed due to being caught in the running
equipment.
Not Enough Information
2011
A fisherman broke his arm in a hydraulic belt.
2002
A processor broke his hand.
2001
A processor fell through floor grating in the factory and broke his wrist.
Source: Table developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
Handling frozen fish was the most common job task for undiagnosed pain/swelling,
sprains/strains/tears, contusions, fractures, crushing injuries, and intracranial injuries. Handling frozen
fish injuries were most often caused by being struck by a box of frozen fish (45, 32 percent) and by
single episodes of overexertion (42, 30 percent). Almost all injuries sustained while handling frozen
fish were minor (88, 64 percent) or moderate (45, 33 percent); four (3 percent) were serious
(Figure 6).
Fish products manufactured in the factories onboard AM80 vessels are frozen in plate freezers and
then packaged in boxes and stored in freezer holds. Boxes of frozen fish products are moved around
by a combination of conveyor systems, chutes, and manual labor. The job task of handling frozen fish
was responsible for nearly half of all injuries and should be a priority area for injury prevention
strategies. Interventions are needed to protect workers from being struck by boxes of frozen fish,
especially while stacking boxes in the freezer holds and during offload. Ergonomic interventions are
also needed to prevent injuries caused by single episodes of overexertion while manually moving
boxes of fish.
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
The job task of processing fish was responsible for most of the laceration/puncture/avulsion injuries,
amputations, and poisonings. These injuries were most often caused by being caught in running
equipment (28, 39 percent) and by slipping knives (11, 15 percent). The majority of injuries sustained
while processing the catch were minor (29, 41 percent) or moderate (33, 47 percent). The remaining
eight (11 percent) were serious (Figure 6).
The factories onboard AM80 vessels are equipped with fish processing machinery and conveyor
systems to move fish from one machine to the next. The machines have different levels of automation
that either increase or decrease the need for worker contact. The injuries sustained while processing
fish were different in nature than those sustained while handling frozen fish, suggesting that successful
injury prevention efforts must also be different. Interventions to reduce injuries need to target the
specific hazards encountered while processing fish that cause lacerations, punctures, avulsions and
amputations, which were the most frequent types of injuries associated with processing fish. Working
with knives and running equipment are exposures of particular concern that need to be a high
priority.
As noted above, handling frozen fish and fish processing account for most injuries resulting in
sprains/strains/tears, undiagnosed pain/swelling, lacerations/punctures/avulsions, contusions, fractures,
amputations, intracranial injuries, and crushing injuries. Figure 7 below shows the severity and type of
all injuries reported in the AM80 fleet between 2001 and 2012.
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
During 2001–2012, 357 vessel casualties were reported in the AM80 fleet. The majority of vessel
casualties were minor (254, 73 percent), meaning that the problem was resolved permanently by the
crew at sea without any third-party assistance. Moderate vessel casualties were defined as problems
that required the vessel to return immediately to port for repairs, accounting for 20 percent (70) of
reported casualties. The remaining 7 percent (25) of vessel casualties were serious, meaning that the
vessel was unable to cope with the problem at sea on its own and had to be rescued by a third party
(such as being towed to port).
The most common types of vessel casualties were loss of electrical power (113, 32 percent) and loss
of propulsion (112, 31 percent). Although the majority of loss of power casualties were minor (Figure
8), vessel owners could potentially improve production efficiency and vessel safety by reviewing their
engineering systems and identifying ways to make electrical systems more reliable. In contrast to the
largely minor problem of loss of power, loss of propulsion casualties were often moderate or serious.
Loss of propulsion was the most common cause of serious casualties, accounting for 21 out of 25 total
serious casualties. Serious casualties involving loss of propulsion were most often caused by
mechanical failures of the main engines, gears, and engine cooling systems. Losing propulsion at sea is
a hazard that should be addressed by vessel owners reviewing their inspection and maintenance
policies to identify areas that may need more attention.
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
Fires were the third most common type of vessel casualty, although almost all were minor. The
frequent occurrence of fires on AM80 vessels is concerning, and the causes of fires should be
investigated and addressed by vessel owners. The predominance of minor fires as opposed to serious
fires may indicate that current fire alarm, response, and suppression systems are effectively preventing
small fires from becoming serious threats to the vessel and crew.
USCG safety regulations for commercial fishing vessels are based upon the function of the vessel.
Specifically, safety regulations are based upon the types of fish products made by the vessels. The
most stringent safety regulations of classification and loadline are reserved for “fish processing vessels.”
According to 46 USC 2101 (11b), a “fish processing vessel” is “a vessel that commercially prepares
fish or fish products other than by gutting, decapitating, gilling, skinning, shucking, icing, freezing or
brine chilling.” A vessel which does not prepare fish beyond these eight statutory limitations is
regulated to a significantly lesser degree as a “fishing vessel” in accordance with 46 USC 2101 (11a).
Prior to 2006, the AM80 fleet had been regulated by the USCG for safety purposes as “fishing vessels”
that conducted H&G operations. This meant that these vessels only had to meet minimal standards
for the carriage of primary lifesaving equipment. However, in 2005, formal USCG investigations into
the sinking of the Arctic Rose (2001) and Galaxy (2002) found that most AM80 vessels were actually
operating as “fish processing vessels,” based on the products they produced. As fish processing vessels,
these AM80 vessels were required to be classed or loadlined. Due to restrictions imposed by the
classification societies of Det Norske Veritas and American Bureau of Shipping, the vast majority of
the AM80 vessels could not be either loadlined or classed due to age restrictions. Neither class society
would class an existing vessel older than 20 years old (unless that vessel was already classed and
loadlined). The average age of a vessel within the AM80 fleet was approximately 32 years.
This inability to meet current safety regulations of loadline and classification is what led the USCG and
owners of AM80 vessels to collaborate to develop the ACSA (USCG, 2006). Program development
began in June 2005 and implementation was achieved between June 2006 and January 2009.
The emphasis of ACSA was placed on the primary prevention of vessel disasters (i.e., preventing vessel
disasters from occurring in the first place); it included rules for vessel stability, watertight integrity, and
the material condition of the hull, tail shaft, rudder, and machinery. Alongside the standards for
primary prevention, ACSA also included requirements aimed at secondary prevention of fatalities,
such as having life-saving equipment, fire-fighting equipment, emergency communications, and
navigation equipment, and conducting emergency drills (USCG, 2012). As a result of ACSA
enrollment, these standards are achieved through mandatory annual inspections and regular dry-dock
examinations (twice in five years). Through requirements of ACSA standards, compliant vessels
approach levels of safety equivalent to loadline and to vessel classification. Millions of dollars have
been spent on these vessels to reach compliance since 2006.
A recent NIOSH study evaluated the effectiveness of ACSA at improving vessel safety in the AM80
fleet (Lucas et al., 2014a). To determine if ACSA had been effective, the researchers conducted a
longitudinal study using historical data on vessel casualties in the AM80 fleet and freezer-longline (FL)
fleet (also included in ACSA) during 2003–2012. The goal was to compare the rate of vessel casualties
before and after implementation of ACSA.
The study group consisted of all AM80 and FL vessels that operated in Alaska during the study time
period and were in full compliance with ACSA standards during 2012. There were 17 AM80 vessels
and 20 FL vessels that met the criteria and were included in the study group. The metric used to
assess the efficacy of ACSA was the number of vessel casualties on each vessel during each year in the
study period. The metric was selected by the researchers in collaboration with AM80 vessel owners
and USCG staff.
The study found indications of a positive effect of ACSA on vessel safety in the AM80 and FL fleets
(Lucas et al., 2014a). On both types of vessels, reported rates of serious vessel casualties decreased
after the vessels reached compliance with ACSA requirements (Table 28). Serious casualties are the
most important to prevent since they have the most immediate potential to develop into vessel
disasters under certain circumstances (such as severe weather conditions or prolonged time until
rescuers arrive) leading to fatal injuries.
Outcome
Pre-ACSA rate
Post-ACSA rate
Pre/Post
Rate Ratio
95% Confidence
Interval
AM80 Vessels (n=17)
All casualties
3.05
4.62
1.52
1.07, 2.15
Serious casualties
0.52
0.48
0.92
0.34, 2.46
FL Vessels (n=20)
All casualties
4.25
3.8
0.89
0.61, 1.31
Serious casualties
0.25
0.04
0.17
0.02, 1.37
Note: *Number of casualties per 1,000 vessel days
Source: Figure developed by NIOSH, for this 5-year review
The major objective of ACSA was to reduce worker fatalities in the AM80 and FL fleets through
primary prevention of vessel disasters. The decline in serious vessel casualties on both AM80 and FL
vessels suggests that ACSA may be having the desired effect on vessel safety.
A full overview of this section in provided in the Executive Summary. In general, some safety
improvements have been observed in this fleet. Specifically, the risk of serious vessel casualties
appears to have declined slightly. Further improvements should be tailored to address specific tasks
and vessel systems that have been identified in this review.
One suggestion for the current AM80 Fisheries Management Program is to provide for a more direct
collection of safety indicators for this fleet by adding questions to the Economic Data Report (for
instance, in Table 6 - Calendar Year Labor) to indicate how many personnel and vessel casualties
occurred during the year. The new questions would ask for a simple count of the minor, moderate,
serious, and fatal injuries that occurred on the vessel during the year, and the number of minor,
moderate and serious vessel casualties that occurred. Alternatively, since these events are reported to
the USCG, a regular report of marine casualties for this fleet could be scheduled.
11
This section discusses gear changes and experimental research into bycatch reductions that have been
facilitated by the reduction and elimination of the race for fish following implementation of AM80.
One of the more important regulatory changes has been requirements that trawl sweeps on be
elevated off the bottom in the BSAI (in 2011) and in the GOA beginning in 2014 (NPFMC, 2013a).
These issues are discussed because they are indirectly a result of AM80. According to NMFS-AKR
(Furuness, 2014) the development of the regulations and their quick acceptance by the fleet was
undoubtedly made much easier because of the fact that the race-for-fish had been eliminated. With
an assured percent of the TACs of their primary targets, AM80 vessel operators did not need not to
worry that reduced catch rates would erode their share of the overall harvest.
Since the beginning of 2011, elevating devices on trawl sweeps have been required for the flatfish
vessels operating in the Bering Sea (BS). Starting February 18, 2014 elevating devices were required
for trawl vessels targeting flatfish in the Central GOA using non-pelagic trawl gear. Many of the trawl
vessels affected by these requirements are AM80 since these vessels target the majority of flatfish in BS
and also participate in the Central GOA flatfish fisheries. The purpose of the elevating devices on
trawl sweeps is to reduce unobserved crab mortality in the BS and Central GOA from the potential
adverse effects of non-pelagic trawl gear used for flatfish fishing. The requirements combine a gear
and performance standard to raise the elevated section of sweep at least 2.5 inches, measured next to
the elevating device. To achieve this performance standard, elevating devices are necessary along the
entire length of the elevated section of the sweep.
Overall, trawl sweep modification has been tested to be effective in the BS flatfish trawl fishery in
reducing trawl sweep impact effects on C. bairdi, C. opilio, and red king crabs by reducing the
unobserved mortality of these species. In a study during the summer of 2008, researchers conducted
a study in the BS, funded by the North Pacific Research Board, to estimate the mortality rates of C.
bairdi and C. opilio that encounter non-pelagic trawls, but remain on the seafloor. The study
estimated mortalities for both species for conventional and modified sweeps. Estimates of mortality for
crabs encountering conventional sweeps were approximately 5 percent for both species. Mortality
rates dropped to nearly zero for crab encountering the modified sweeps. In a similar study during the
summer of 2009 in Bristol Bay on red king crab, results indicated a similar trend in reduced mortality
rates for king crab encountering the modified sweeps.
Additionally, the trawl sweep modification has proven effective on the BS shelf at reducing effects on
sea whips (a long-lived species of primary concern), and did not substantially reduce catches of target
flatfish. Tests for reduced impacts on basket-stars, sponges, and polychaete siphons were positive in
direction, but non-significant.
The trawl sweep modifications were estimated to result in additional equipment costs as vessels
comply with the addition of disks to the trawl sweeps. On some vessels the requirement would likely
result in modification to operations and/or the cost of additional deck equipment. For all vessels, the
additional cost of purchasing the modified gear was estimated at the time of Council action to be
between $3,000 to $3,400, annually—a 25 to 75 percent increase over the cost of sweeps without
elevating devices. There may, however, be some potential for offseting these costs, or even overall
savings, if the use of the elevating devices saves fuel, or reduces wear on the sweep rope or cable.
11
This section of the report has been provided by Jon McCracken, an economist on the staff of the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council. Some minor technical edits and formatting for style have been provided by NEI.
This section examines the consistency of AM80 with National Standard 1, which requires FMPs to
achieve the optimum yield of fishery resources, and National Standard 6, which requires FMPs to
account for variations and contingencies in the use of fishery resources. Information is presented on
the total allowable catch, acceptable biological catch, and catch of AM80 vessel target species from
2003–2012. In addition, a summary of the Flatfish Flexibility Plan (FFP) is provided, along with a
discussion of the potential implications of the plan with respect to achieving optimum yield. The
section also includes a brief discussion of cooperative behavioral changes within the AM80 fleet that
appear to have eased regulatory changes with respect to gear.
This section compares the TAC and acceptable biological catch (ABC), which, in this assessment
represents optimum yield. The section also examines harvests of AM80 species relative to TACs.
The TAC and ABC for each species targeted by AM80 vessels are presented in Table 29, while Table
30 shows the TAC as a percent of the ABC. In federal fishery management, TACs are set below the
ABC to account for implementation uncertainty (i.e., imperfect management control that results in
imprecision in achieving the target). Since implementation of AM80, the TAC has been set closer to
(or equal to) the ABC for most species, which suggests that fisheries for species targeted by AM80
vessels have become more predictable.
Species Groups
Yellowfin sole
Area
BSAI
Rock sole
BSAI
Flathead sole
BSAI
Pacific Cod
BSAI
Arrowtooth + Kam. Fl.
BSAI
Alaska plaice
BSAI
Other flatfish
BSAI
Greenland turbot
BS
Greenland turbot
AI
Atka mackerel
BSAI
Pacific ocean perch
BS
Pacific ocean perch
AI
Northern rockfish
BSAI
Notes:
1)
2)
Item
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
ABC
TAC
2003
114,000
83,750
110,000
44,000
66,000
20,000
223,000
207,500
112,000
12,000
137,000
10,000
16,000
3,000
3,920
2,680
1,960
1,320
63,000
60,000
2,410
1,410
12,690
12,690
7,101
6,000
2004
114,000
86,075
139,000
41,000
61,900
19,000
223,000
215,500
115,000
12,000
203,000
10,000
13,500
3,000
3,162
2,700
1,578
800
66,700
63,000
2,128
1,408
19,285
19,285
3,059
3,059
2005
124,000
90,686
132,000
41,500
58,500
19,500
206,000
206,000
108,000
12,000
189,000
8,000
21,400
3,500
2,720
2,700
1,210
800
124,000
63,000
2,920
1,400
11,680
11,200
8,260
5,000
2006
121,000
95,701
126,000
41,500
59,800
19,500
194,000
189,768
136,000
13,000
188,000
8,000
18,100
3,500
1,890
1,890
850
850
110,000
63,000
2,960
1,400
11,840
11,200
8,530
4,500
2007
225,000
136,000
198,000
55,000
79,200
30,000
176,000
170,720
158,000
20,000
190,000
25,000
21,400
10,000
1,680
1,680
760
760
74,000
63,000
4,160
2,160
17,740
17,740
8,190
8,190
2008
248,000
225,000
301,000
75,000
71,700
50,000
176,000
170,720
244,000
75,000
194,000
50,000
21,600
21,600
1,750
1,750
790
790
60,700
60,700
4,200
4,200
17,500
17,500
8,180
8,180
2009
210,000
210,000
296,000
90,000
71,400
60,000
182,000
176,540
156,000
75,000
232,000
50,000
17,400
17,400
5,090
5,090
2,290
2,290
83,800
76,400
3,820
3,820
14,980
14,980
7,160
7,160
2010
219,000
219,000
240,000
90,000
69,200
60,000
174,000
168,780
156,000
75,000
224,000
50,000
17,300
17,300
4,220
4,220
1,900
1,900
74,000
74,000
3,830
3,830
15,030
15,030
7,240
7,240
2011
239,000
196,000
224,000
85,000
69,300
41,548
235,000
227,950
170,700
43,600
65,100
16,000
14,500
3,000
4,590
3,500
1,550
1,550
85,300
53,080
5,710
5,710
18,990
18,990
8,670
4,000
2012
203,000
202,000
208,000
87,000
70,400
34,134
314,000
261,000
168,600
42,700
53,400
24,000
12,700
3,200
7,230
6,230
2,430
2,430
81,400
50,763
5,710
5,710
18,990
18,990
8,610
4,700
ABCs and TACs for arrowtooth and Kamchatka flounder are combined.
Subarea ABCs and TACs for Atka mackerel are combined. TACs in the Central and Western Aleutians
(CAI, WAI) have been reduced due as a result of Stellar sea lion protection measures.
3) Subarea ABCs and TACs for Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch are combined.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Species Groups
Area
Item
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Yellowfin sole
BSAI TAC/ABC
73
76
73
79
60
91
100
100
82
100
Rock sole
BSAI TAC/ABC
40
29
31
33
28
25
30
38
38
42
Flathead sole
BSAI TAC/ABC
30
31
33
33
38
70
84
87
60
48
Pacific Cod
BSAI TAC/ABC
93
97
100
98
97
97
97
97
97
83
Arrowtooth + Kam. Fl.
BSAI TAC/ABC
11
10
11
10
13
31
48
48
26
25
Alaska plaice
BSAI TAC/ABC
7
5
4
4
13
26
22
22
25
45
Other flatfish
BSAI TAC/ABC
19
22
16
19
47
100
100
100
21
25
Greenland turbot
BS TAC/ABC
68
85
99
100
100
100
100
100
76
86
Greenland turbot
AI TAC/ABC
67
51
66
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Atka mackerel
BSAI TAC/ABC
95
94
51
57
85
100
91
100
62
62
Pacific ocean perch
BS TAC/ABC
59
66
48
47
52
100
100
100
100
100
Pacific ocean perch
AI TAC/ABC
100
100
96
95
100
100
100
100
100
100
Northern rockfish
BSAI TAC/ABC
84
100
61
53
100
100
100
100
46
55
Notes:
1) ABCs and TACs for arrowtooth and Kamchatka flounder are combined.
2) Subarea ABCs and TACs for Atka mackerel are combined. TACs in the Central and Western Aleutians
(CAI, WAI) have been reduced due as a result of Stellar sea lion protection measures.
3) Subarea ABCs and TACs for Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch are combined.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Table 31 shows the catch of AM80 target species from 2003–2012, while Table 32 compares the
catch of each species to its TAC. Implementation of AM80 has helped achieve the goal of attaining
the TAC as closely as possible without exceeding the catch limit for some AM80 species, including
yellowfin sole and rock sole, as well as other target species such as arrowtooth and Kamchatka
flounder and Bering Sea Pacific ocean perch.
Species Groups
Yellowfin sole (AM80 + TLA)
Rock sole
Flathead sole
Pacific cod
Arrowtooth + Kam. Fl.
Alaska plaice
Other flatfish
Greenland turbot
Greenland turbot
Atka mackerel
Pacific ocean perch
Pacific ocean perch
Northern Rockfish
All Included Species
Area
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BS
AI
BSAI
BS
AI
BSAI
BSAI
2003
78,767
32,794
11,624
30,170
9,679
9,498
2,394
549
334
55,831
209
13,551
4,821
220,051
2004
73,813
44,062
14,412
38,066
14,628
7,567
3,761
454
194
58,761
214
11,120
4,571
233,558
2005
93,475
34,698
12,729
31,302
11,113
10,066
3,563
390
298
60,941
214
9,290
3,781
240,559
2006
97,682
32,908
13,857
30,275
9,625
13,615
2,184
115
178
60,533
308
11,777
3,686
246,468
2007
120,233
33,951
13,781
35,141
7,084
15,557
4,605
171
165
56,890
245
16,754
3,761
273,197
2008
147,355
46,085
19,221
19,409
17,884
15,329
2,991
1,133
712
56,751
175
15,894
3,082
326,613
2009
104,863
38,235
13,984
23,959
26,089
12,712
1,958
873
2,148
69,391
512
13,533
2,893
287,192
2010
117,437
50,495
15,077
27,778
35,712
13,667
1,844
300
1,649
64,872
3,289
13,270
3,964
321,575
2011
148,406
49,646
7,607
33,782
26,603
19,261
2,436
1,090
425
46,455
4,898
17,017
2,363
326,206
2012
143,738
63,983
5,908
37,695
28,125
12,359
2,807
841
1,591
42,257
4,810
16,546
1,909
324,875
Notes: Yellowfin sole includes CDQ & non-CDQ harvests of AM80 CPs all BSAI TLA harvesters. Catch of other
species other CDQ and non-CDQ catch of AM80 CPs only. Source:
Developed by Northern Economics based on from the CAS provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014) and information at
NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Species Groups
Yellowfin sole (AM80 + TLA)
Rock sole
Flathead sole
Pacific Cod
Arrowtooth + Kam. Fl.
Alaska plaice
Other flatfish
Greenland turbot
Greenland turbot
Atka mackerel
Pacific ocean perch
Pacific ocean perch
Northern Rockfish
All Included Species
Area
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BSAI
BS
AI
BSAI
BS
AI
BSAI
BSAI
2003
94%
75%
58%
15%
81%
95%
80%
20%
25%
93%
15%
107%
80%
86%
2004
86%
107%
76%
18%
122%
76%
125%
17%
24%
93%
15%
58%
149%
89%
2005
103%
84%
65%
15%
93%
126%
102%
14%
37%
97%
15%
83%
76%
93%
2006
102%
79%
71%
16%
74%
170%
62%
6%
21%
96%
22%
105%
82%
93%
2007
88%
62%
46%
21%
35%
62%
46%
10%
22%
90%
11%
94%
46%
74%
2008
65%
61%
38%
11%
24%
31%
14%
65%
90%
93%
4%
91%
38%
55%
2009
50%
42%
23%
14%
35%
25%
11%
17%
94%
91%
13%
90%
40%
47%
2010
54%
56%
25%
16%
48%
27%
11%
7%
87%
88%
86%
88%
55%
52%
2011
76%
58%
18%
15%
61%
120%
81%
31%
27%
88%
86%
90%
59%
69%
2012
71%
74%
17%
14%
66%
51%
88%
14%
65%
83%
84%
87%
41%
67%
Notes: Yellowfin sole includes CDQ & non-CDQ harvests of AM80 CPs all BSAI TLA harvesters. Catch of other
species other CDQ and non-CDQ catch of AM80 CPs only. Source:
Developed by Northern Economics based on from the CAS provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014) and information at
NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Figure 9 compares BSAI overfishing levels (OFLs), ABC, TACs, and retained harvests of the main
groups of species affected under AM80. The figure contains a series of three charts showing: 1) all
flatfish species, 2) Atka mackerel, and 3) all rockfish species. The vertical arrangement of the charts
within the figure allows an easy comparison across the species groups. In particular, TAC levels are
quite low relative to ABCs and OFLs for flatfish species. The gap between TACs and OFLs/ABCs are
much smaller for Atka mackerel and rockfish.
For flatfish the combined OFL/ABC levels increased substantially by 54 percent in 2007 and 2008
from 2006 levels, but by 2012 they have dropped back down to levels closer to those seen from
2004–2006. The collective TACs of the flatfish species jumped by over 170 percent during the two
year period from 2007–2008 to over 500,000 mt, and were relatively flat through 2010 before
dropping back down to approximately 400,000 mt in 2011–2012—levels that are more than double
the TACs seen from 2003–2006. Retained catch has risen every year since 2006 with the exception of
a decline in 2009 that was most likely related to the global recession and possibly an over-supply in
the market after the very large jump in retained harvests seen in 2008. Since 2009, retained harvests
of flatfish have increased an average of 11 percent each year.
A very different picture is shown for Atka mackerel. In 2005 there was an 87 percent increase in the
OFL and a commensurate increase in the ABC. OFLs and ABCs dropped back down starting in 2006,
and by 2008 ABCs were only 95 percent of levels seen in 2004. During the same 5-year period TACs
where held constant at 63,000 mt until the ABC fell to 60,000 mt in 2008. Both ABCs and TACs were
higher in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, ABC increased but TACs dropped (due to Stellar Sea Lion issues)
to levels last seen in 2003 and 2004. Since 2005, retained catch has tracked very closely to TACs at
about 91 percent.
OFL and ABCs for rockfish species have been generally increasing over the 10-year period—the only
sizeable declines occurred in 2004 and 2009. Overall, rockfish ABCs increased from 2003–2012 by
43 percent while OFLs jumped 56 percent. During the same period, rockfish TACs increased by 38
percent while retained harvests of rockfish doubled.
Metric Tons
1,400,000
All Flatfish Species
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
2003
2004
2005
Metric Tons
160,000
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2009
2010
2011
2012
Atka Mackerel
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
2003
2004
Metric Tons
50,000
2005
2006
2007
2008
All Rockfish Species
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
Overfishing Level
2004
2005
2006
2007
Allowable Biological Catch
2008
2009
2010
Total Allowable Catch
2011
2012
Retained Catch
Note: Figures include retained catch from all BSAI trawl activity including CDQ.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on from the CAS provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014) and
information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
The FFP is summarized here to demonstrate one of the ways that AM80 is leading to greater
utilization of fishery resources and efficiency in that utilization as mandated by National Standard 1
and National Standard 5.
The FFP was an initiative of the AM80 fleet that was first brought to the Council’s attention in
February 2011 as part of the regular presentation that the AM80 Cooperative gives to the Council.
The FFP was proposed as a means of providing additional harvesting opportunities to the AM80 fleet
for flathead sole, rock sole, and yellowfin sole while remaining within the TACs for those species. As a
result of the proposal, the Council requested that staff bring back a more detailed discussion paper of
the issue. The Council formally reviewed the FFP discussion paper in June 2012, and formally
initiated an analysis to assess ways to utilize the differences between the ABC and TACs for the
included species. The Council reviewed an initial draft analysis of the FFP (NPFMC, 2013b) and the
plan was approved by the Council in June of 2013.
Under the FFP, AM80 cooperatives and CDQ groups could access yellowfin sole, rock sole, or
flathead sole ABC that may be available in excess of the TAC. The ABC surplus for the three flatfish
species, minus a discretionary buffer amount that the NPFMC would determine based on social,
economic, or ecological considerations, would be allocated among the AM80 cooperatives and CDQ
groups using the same formulas used in the annual harvest specifications process. Any entity wanting
to access the ABC surplus for a particular flatfish species (e.g., yellowfin sole) would need to exchange
an equivalent amount of existing quota for another of the two flatfish species (e.g., rock sole or
flathead sole). The number of exchanges that each entity can make would be limited to three per
calendar year. Because open-access participants would not have quota to exchange, they would not
be eligible to participate in the FFP. The FFP is intended to increase the opportunity for maximizing
the harvest of the three flatfish species, while ensuring that the overall 2 million mt optimum yield,
together with the ABCs for each individual species, are not exceeded.
The FFP requires AM80 cooperatives to provide draft annual reports to the NPFMC that include
information on their use of ABC reserve exchanges and quota share transfers, actual harvest, and
annual changes in catch capacity (for example, measured by a change in the number of harvesting
platforms). The draft reports would have to be submitted no later than December 1st of each year so
that the current year’s information could inform the NPFMC’s decision, during the harvest
specifications process, as to whether to establish a buffer reducing the amount of the ABC reserve
available to be exchanged by eligible entities. The NPFMC could use the discretionary buffer to
address any potential adverse impacts to other sectors, or environmental concerns, should they arise.
With respect to implementation of the FFP, NMFS noted that due to the changes that will be required
to the catch accounting system, it is unlikely to be effective before the 2016 fishing season.
One of the major drivers behind AM80 was the relatively low levels of groundfish retention of the
fleet. As part of their initiative to improve retention and improve utilization, the Council, in June
2003, approved Amendment 79 to the BSAI Groundfish FMP that would implement GRS. Approved
by the Secretary of Commerce in 2005 and scheduled to be implemented on January 20, 2008, the
GRS required AM80 vessels to significantly improve their retention and utilization of groundfish
resources in the BSAI.
Under GRS, all AM80 CPs 125’ in length overall (LOA) or longer would be required to meet
increasing retention standards while fishing and processing groundfish in the BSAI. The GRS would be
phased in from 2008–2011 as shown below:
2008: 65 percent
2009: 75 percent
2010: 80 percent
2011 and forward: 85 percent
In addition to the increasing GRS, Amendment 79 mandated flow-scales on all AM80 vessels
participating in BSAI fisheries and required that two observers be onboard all trips. While the Council
recognized that vessels less than 125’ had generally higher levels of discards, the Council also
recognized that the compliance costs for smaller vessels (two observers and flow scales) could
potentially drive vessels out of the fishery. Therefore, vessels less than 125’ were exempted from the
GRS. The following language is found in the preamble of the final rule for AM80:
Amendment 79 authorizes the GRS as a tool for further increasing the retention and
utilization of groundfish and responding to bycatch reduction goals described in the
MSA National Standards (16 U.S.C. 1851(a)). The GRS balanced the requirements for
conservation and management of the groundfish fisheries under the MSA with the
requirements to minimize bycatch under National Standard 9 and minimize
economic burdens under National Standard 7 to the extent practicable (minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication).
AM80 supersedes Amendment 79—the GRS and its phased in retention percentage would still be
implemented under AM80, but it would apply to all AM80 vessels regardless of length that operate in
the BSAI. For vessels that choose to join cooperatives, the GRS would be measured jointly over the
entire co-op, while vessels choosing to operate in the AM80 LA fishery would, as before, be
individually accountable to meet the standards. The preamble to the final rule for AM80 has the
following language.
The Council recognized that if harvesters could apply the GRS to a cooperative by
aggregating the retention rate of all vessels assigned to a cooperative, owners of nonAFA trawl catcher/ processors less than 125 ft (38.1 m) LOA could choose to join a
cooperative, assign their harvest privilege to the cooperative, and allow other larger
vessels to harvest the cooperative’s exclusive allocation of fish without incurring the
compliance costs associated with monitoring the GRS. Non-AFA trawl
catcher/processor vessels less than 125 ft (38.1 m) LOA would still receive economic
benefits from the cooperative’s harvests but would not need to refit their vessels to
meet the additional monitoring and enforcement (M&E) requirements and pay the
additional costs to fish in the BSAI. Those vessels could continue to participate in
other fisheries in the GOA. Furthermore, the catch associated with smaller non-AFA
trawl catcher/ processor vessels that are used to fish in the BSAI would be subject to
the GRS, thereby further improving retention of groundfish and reducing discards of
fish.
Figure 10 shows estimated groundfish retention percentages of AM80 of individual vessels operating
in the BSAI from 2003–2012, noting that estimated retention rates for the lowest four vessels have
been deleted for the years 2009–2012 in order to prevent disclosure of confidential information. The
heavy black dashed line shows the estimated average retention percentage of all of the vessels in the
AM80 sector operating in the BSAI. The fleet-wide weighted average is also summarized in the table
embedded at the bottom of the figure—these estimates include the four vessels excluded from the
figure.
The data summarized in the figure include catch and retention from CDQ fisheries as well as catch
and retention of AM80 vessels when they are acting as motherships in the BSAI TLA fisheries. It
should also be noted that the figure uses estimates of retention based on observer data in the CAS.
The analysis does not attempt to estimate retention percentages based on the formula used in NMFS
final rule implementing AM80.12 That formula used a combination of: 1) production reports that are
submitted by all processors and 2) standard product recovery rates as listed in the regulations.
As is clearly evident from the graphic, overall levels of groundfish retention increased significantly from
the low seen in 2004 at 69 percent. In 2005 the weighted average retention jumped to 78 percent,
but five vessels still had retention percentages below 60 percent. From 2005–2007, overall retention
stayed between 78 and 79 percent. In 2008 AM80 and the modified GRS was implemented. Overall
the fleet’s retention improved to 90 percent, with all but two vessels (not shown) achieving a rate well
above 80 percent. The overall weighted average retention percentages of the fleet have improved
every year under AM80 and in 2012 were estimated in this analysis at 94 percent.
12
The differences in estimated retention rates using observer based retention rates as found in CAS data (and
used in Figure 10), and retention rates estimated using product recovery rates and weekly/daily product reports
based estimates as defined in the regulation are reported by industry and NMFS to be significant.
Groundfish Retention Percentage
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
2003
71%
2004
69%
2005
78%
2006
2007
2008
2009
Fleet-wide Retention Percentage
79%
78%
90%
90%
2010
2011
91%
2012
93%
94%
Notes:
4)
5)
Includes retention of AM80 vessels acting as motherships and catches in the CDQ fisheries.
In order to protect the confidentiality of the data, the lines of the lowest four participating vessels from
2009–2012 have been excluded from the figure, but their retention is included in the fleet averages.
6) Retention percentage were calculated by Northern Economics from CAS data using the observer
estimated weight of retained groundfish ÷ estimated total weight of groundfish.
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
The AM80 cooperative reports also provide estimates of GRS percentages. BUC/AKSC in their
cooperative reports make it very clear that the numbers they are reporting are their attempt to
measure the GRS percentage as they were intended to be measured in the GRS regulations. Table 3
shows the GRS percentages reported in the co-op reports.
Alaska Seafood / Best Use Cooperative
Alaska Groundfish Cooperative
2008
76.9%
-
2009
81.0%
-
2010
84.0%
-
2011
95.2%
87.6%
2012
94.2%
87.1%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from AKSC/ BUC and AGC Cooperative Reports (2009–2013).
Development of retention rate estimates following the formula specified in AM80 regulations for
inclusion in this initial draft of the AM80 5-Year Review has not yet been completed. If requested, a
comparison of CAS-based rates and estimates based on regulations could be added to the final draft
of the report, but as discussed below, NMFS has suspended enforcement of the GRS, and the
relevance of the comparison may have diminished.
On December 15, 2010 NMFS issued an emergency order exempting the AM80 fleet from the
requirements of the GRS as implemented under AM80. In exempting the fleet from compliance
NMFS cited information provided to NMFS in the 2009 Fishing Year Report submitted by the BUC in
2010. In the Emergency Rule NMFS indicates they believe that the methodology used to calculate the
GRS percentage has the effect of requiring retention well above that intended by the NPFMC or as
implemented by NMFS. In addition, NMFS indicates that the monitoring and enforcement of the GRS
is much more complex and costly than anticipated.
In December 2012, NMFS published a Final Regulatory Impact Review/Final Environmental
Assessment/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis13 to “Remove the Groundfish Retention Standard for
the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Processors in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands.” On February 25, 2013
NMFS publish a Final Rule to change the regulations regarding the GRS.14
The new regulation would remove the requirement to meet the GRS, and would instead require
cooperatives to internally monitor their retention percentages and submit annual retention reports in
their report to NMFS. In addition, third-party audits of cooperatives’ retention percentages would be
required. If vessels choose to participate in the AM80 LA fishery, NMFS will estimate each vessel’s
retention percentage independently. NMFS management reports to the Council regarding the AM80
fisheries will include summaries of estimated retention percentages.
As with the GRS, retention percentages will continue to be measured as: Round Weight Equivalent
(RWE) of Retained Product ÷ Total Groundfish Catch. The RWE of Retained Product is a two part
calculation using the Production Reports submitted daily by processors. These product amounts
would be expanded to RWE using standard product recovery rates published in the regulations and
available online at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/rr/tables/tabl3.pdf. Total Groundfish Catch would
continue to be measured using flow scales and observer estimates.
13
14
The document is available online at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/analyses/groundfish/rireairfa_grs1212.pdf.
The final rule was published in the Federal Register
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-25/html/2013-04262.htm
and
is
available
online
at
This section of the AM80 5-year review summarizes PSC of halibut and crab in the AM80 CP fisheries
from 2003–2012. Total PSC, and PSC rates as a percentage of target catches are reported for each
target fishery. The 5-year report also includes estimates of the first wholesale value of groundfish
products per unit of PSC in each of the AM80 target fisheries.
As mentioned in earlier discussions regarding confidentiality, it not possible to report PSCs by sector
(AFA-CPs v, Other CVs) within the BSAI TLA Sector in the yellowfin sole target fishery. It does
however provide information for the two sectors combined.
Analysis of catch of various prohibited species in the BSAI sector over the five-year periods before and
after the implementation of the AM80 regulations reveals pronounced declines in bycatch volumes
across species over the five years ending 2012. Similarly, bycatch rates for these prohibited species,
measured as the ratio of volume (alternately weight or number) of prohibited species catch to volume
of groundfish catch, dropped off considerably in BSAI sector from 2003–2007 to the following five
years. Declines in bycatch rates for these species—including halibut, herring, king crab, tanner crab,
Chinook salmon, and other salmon—ranged from 32 percent (halibut) to 82 percent (Chinook), while
declines in total volumes of prohibited species catch ranged from 18 percent (king crab) to 79 percent
(Chinook). That declines in catch of each of these prohibited species occurred, on average, following
the initiation of the AM80 regulations suggests that they are having the intended effect of reducing
bycatch. Importantly, reductions in bycatch did not occur at the expense of the groundfish catch.
Indeed, both the average total groundfish catch and wholesale value of the catch were higher from
2008–2012 than over the prior five years.
Meanwhile, changes in bycatch volumes and rates among AM80 vessels in the Gulf of Alaska (GOA)
exhibited far more variation with regard to both magnitude and direction of change. Average annual
bycatch volumes and rates decreased over the five years beginning 2008 from the previous five years
for halibut, tanner crab, and non-Chinook salmon but increased for king crab and herring. Catch of
Chinook salmon within the AM80 GOA sector remained virtually unchanged, on average, over the
first and second halves of the decade ending 2012.
The groundfish catch in the AM80 CPs in BSAI fisheries was substantially higher over the five years
2008–2012 than from 2003–2007. The total groundfish catch averaged 285,000 mt over the first five
years of this decade and 327,000 mt over the next five years (see Table 34 and Figure 11). The
average wholesale value of the catch over the five years ending in 2012 also exceeded that of the
preceding five years, but this primarily is due to a sharp increase in catch value in 2011 and 2012
from previous years. Total catch wholesale values of $317 million and $314 million in 2011 and
2012, respectively, represent a jump from catch values from the previous eight years, over which time
the greatest single-year catch value was $278 million. All dollar values in this analysis have been
adjusted for inflation to 2012 dollars.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
268,404
190.3
2004
297,410
228.3
2005
285,166
261.2
2006
279,394
262.5
2007
294,881
277.6
2008
332,814
266.5
2009
314,705
235.8
2010
336,764
262.1
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2011
324,686
316.9
2012
327,016
314.2
Total halibut bycatch in the AM80 BSAI fishery was greater each year from 2003–2007 than from
2008–2012 (see Table 35 and Figure 12). Annual halibut bycatch averaged 2,638 mt over the five
years ending 2007 and 2,053 mt over the next five years. Halibut bycatch also exhibited relatively
little variation over each of these five-year periods. Bycatch of herring, meanwhile, fell considerably
from 2009–2012 from levels witnessed over the preceding six years. Herring bycatch ranged from
24,252 mt (2006) to 94,193 mt (2004) over the years 2003–2008, before dropping to 23,401 mt in
2009. From 2010 to 2012, herring bycatch did not exceed 14,048 in any single year.
Total bycatch of both king crab and tanner crab in the AM80 BSAI fishery trended downward over the
five years ending in 2012 from levels witnessed from 2003–2007. This difference was much more
pronounced, however, among king crab species than tanner crab species (see Figure 13). The average
annual king crab bycatch fell from nearly 102,000 crabs from 2003–2007 to just over 83,000 crabs
over the next five years. Total average annual bycatch of tanner crab, meanwhile, fell from over 1.2
million crabs from 2003–2007 to under 457,000 crabs from 2008–2012. Bycatch of C. Bairdi crab
was particularly high in 2005 at 3.1 million crabs and did not exceed 616,000 crabs any year from
2008–2012. Bycatch of C. Opilio crab was lower each year from 2008–2012 than over the preceding
five years except in 2011, when C. Opilio bycatch spiked to 802,000 crabs (see Figure 15). Among
king crab species, bycatch of red king crab exceeded that of both golden king crab and blue king crab
until 2011, when bycatch of golden king crab was greater than that of red king crab (see Figure 16).
Bycatch of red king crab fell each year from 2005 to 2012, while golden king crab bycatch trended
upward from 2007–2012.
Total bycatch of Chinook and other salmon species has remained relatively low since 2008. Total
bycatch of Chinook ranged from 2.625 to 5,698 fish from 2003–2007 and from 583 to 1,625 fish
from 2008–2012. The average annual Chinook bycatch totaled 4,485 fish over the five years ending
2007 and 932 fish over the next five years (see Figure 16). Annual bycatch of other salmon species
exhibited inconsistency from 2003–2007 but was, on average, substantially lower over the next five
years. Bycatch of non-Chinook salmon averaged 5,751 fish from 2003–2007 and 1,833 fish from
2008–2012.
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
2,649
90,901
608,798
951,732
51,692
5,698
1,126
2004
2,732
87,997
1,734,731
774,933
94,193
5,526
8,854
2005
2,700
116,133
3,118,248
1,461,852
80,387
4,567
3,442
2006
2,540
110,893
832,166
770,884
24,252
2,625
13,468
2007
2,572
102,852
1,214,389
602,427
57,103
4,010
1,866
2008
2,012
113,163
615,392
554,482
82,703
583
1,535
2009
2,080
85,794
364,563
396,036
23,401
623
1,247
2010
2,255
70,726
267,030
389,198
4,117
1,625
1,589
2011
1,838
91,270
484,842
802,076
14,048
983
3,078
2012
2,082
54,539
339,775
352,912
11,445
848
1,717
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Figure 17 through Figure 22 show bycatch of prohibited species as shares of both the volume and
wholesale value of target groundfish catches from 2003–2012. The left axis of each figure shows the
ratio of prohibited species bycatch weight to total weight of target groundfish species, while the right
axis shows the wholesale value of the target groundfish catch per unit of weight of bycatch species.
Assuming groundfish prices remain fairly stable, an increase in the bycatch rate (represented by the
left axis) generally will be accompanied by a decrease in the value of the groundfish catch per unit of
weight of the bycatch species; thus, the lines representing these two metrics should move in opposite
directions. Table 36 and Table 37 display the bycatch rate and groundfish wholesale values,
respectively, for prohibited species each year from 2003–2012.
The halibut bycatch rate, measured as mt of groundfish catch to mt of halibut bycatch, fell
considerably over the five years ending 2012 from the previous five years (see Figure 17). Halibut
bycatch averaged 0.93 percent of groundfish catch from 2003–2007 but only 0.63 percent from
2008–2012. Conversely, the average wholesale value of groundfish catch per mt of halibut bycatch
rose sharply from the five years ending 2007 ($93,000) to the next five years ($137,000).
The herring bycatch rate, measured as the ratio of kilograms (kg) of herring bycatch to mt of
groundfish catch, fell sharply after 2008 (see Figure 18). From 2003–2008, an average of 0.22 kg of
herring were caught for every mt of groundfish, compared to 0.04 kg per mt of groundfish over the
following four years. The decline in herring bycatch rate was accompanied by a more than six-fold
increase in the wholesale value of groundfish caught per kg of herring bycatch. This ratio increased
from $4,710/kg from 2003–2008 to $30,941/kg for the next four years.
The king crab bycatch rate, measured as the number of king crabs bycatch per mt of groundfish catch,
trended downward over the second half of the decade ending 2012, while the value of groundfish
catch per king crab rose (see Figure 19). From 2003–2008, an average of 35 king crabs were caught
for every 100 mt of groundfish catch. This ratio declined over the next four years, averaging 23 king
crabs per 100 mt of groundfish. Accompanying this decline in the bycatch rate was an increase in the
average value of groundfish catch per king crab of bycatch from $2,393 from 2003–2008 to $3,922
from 2009–2012.
The tanner crab bycatch rate exhibited a particularly pronounced decline over the five years ending
2012 from the prior five years (see Figure 20). On average, 523 C. Bairdi crabs were caught for every
100 mt of groundfish from 2003–2012, compared to 127 C. Bairdi crabs per 100 mt of groundfish
over the following five years. Similarly, an average of 322 C. Opilio crabs were caught for every 100
mt of groundfish from 2003–2007, compared to 153 C. Opilio crabs from 2008–2012. Not
unexpectedly, each of these declines in bycatch rate occurred in tandem with an increase in the
average value of groundfish catch per bycatch of crab. The average wholesale value of groundfish
catch per C. Bairdi increased from $214 from 2003–2007 to $728 from 2008–2012, while the
average value of groundfish catch per C. Opilio jumped from $295 to $607.
The Chinook bycatch rate, measured as the number of salmon caught per mt of groundfish caught,
fell sharply over the five years ending 2012 from the previous five years (see Figure 21). An average of
16 Chinook salmon were caught per 1,000 mt of groundfish from 2003–2007, compared to fewer
than three salmon per 1,000 mt from 2008–2012. Meanwhile, the value of groundfish catch per
Chinook caught as prohibited species bycatch experienced a more than five-fold increase over the
five years ending 2012 from the prior five years, jumping from $60,000 to $338,000. The average
annual bycatch rate among non-Chinook salmon species also was lower from 2008–2012 than 2003–
2007, but this bycatch rate exhibited volatility from 2003–2007. Overall, an average of 20 nonChinook salmon were caught for every 1,000 mt of groundfish catch from 2003–2007, compared to
only 6 salmon per 1,000 mt of groundfish from 2008–2012. The average value of groundfish catch
per non-Chinook salmon caught as a prohibited species also increased over the five years ending
2012 from the previous five years, from $88,000 $163,000. This value varied considerably, however,
from 2003–2007, from as low as $19,487 (2006) to as high as $169,038 (2003).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
2004
0.0099
0.3387
2.2682
3.5459
0.1926
0.0212
0.0042
0.0092
0.2959
5.8328
2.6056
0.3167
0.0186
0.0298
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0095
0.0091
0.0087
0.0060
0.0066 0.0067
0.4072
0.3969
0.3488
0.3400
0.2726 0.2100
10.9349
2.9785
4.1182
1.8491
1.1584 0.7929
5.1263
2.7591
2.0429
1.6660
1.2584 1.1557
0.2819
0.0868
0.1936
0.2485
0.0744 0.0122
0.0160
0.0094
0.0136
0.0018
0.0020 0.0048
0.0121
0.0482
0.0063
0.0046
0.0040 0.0047
2011
2012
0.0057
0.2811
1.4933
2.4703
0.0433
0.0030
0.0095
0.0064
0.1668
1.0390
1.0792
0.0350
0.0026
0.0053
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
2003
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
71,843
2,093
313
200
3,681
33,394
169,038
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
83,590
96,757
103,335
107,902
132,446
113,395
116,251
172,467
2,595
2,249
2,367
2,699
2,355
2,749
3,706
3,472
132
84
315
229
433
647
982
654
295
179
340
461
481
595
674
395
2,424
3,250
10,822
4,861
3,222
10,078
63,677
22,559
41,318
57,195
99,992
69,221
457,154
378,468
161,350
322,396
25,788
75,892
19,487
148,775
173,617
189,103
164,962
102,972
2012
150,907
5,761
925
890
27,452
370,512
182,992
400,000
$400
350,000
$350
300,000
$300
250,000
$250
200,000
$200
150,000
$150
100,000
$100
50,000
$50
0
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Groundfish (mt)
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
3,500
120
3,000
100
2,500
80
2,000
60
1,500
40
1,000
20
500
0
Halibut (MT)
Herring (MT)
140
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Herring (mt)
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
140
7.0
120
6.0
100
5.0
80
4.0
60
3.0
40
2.0
20
1.0
0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
All King Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
120.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Red King Crab
2007
2008
2009
Golden King Crab
2010
2011
2012
Blue King Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
3.5
3.0
Millions of Crabs
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
C.Opilio Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
16,000
14,000
Number of Salmon
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Chinook
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Other Salmon
1.2%
$240,000
1.0%
$200,000
0.8%
$160,000
0.6%
$120,000
0.4%
$80,000
0.2%
$40,000
0.0%
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$70,000
0.30
$60,000
0.25
$50,000
0.20
$40,000
0.15
$30,000
0.10
$20,000
0.05
$10,000
0.00
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
0.35
2012
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
0.45
$9,000
0.40
$8,000
0.35
$7,000
0.30
$6,000
0.25
$5,000
0.20
$4,000
0.15
$3,000
0.10
$2,000
0.05
$1,000
0.00
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$500
18.0
$450
16.0
$400
14.0
$350
12.0
$300
10.0
$250
8.0
$200
6.0
$150
4.0
$100
2.0
$50
0.0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
20.0
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2009
2010
2011
2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
0.025
$500,000
0.020
$400,000
0.015
$300,000
0.010
$200,000
0.005
$100,000
0.000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Number of salmon/mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$200,000
0.040
$160,000
0.030
$120,000
0.020
$80,000
0.010
$40,000
0.000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
2009
2010
2011
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Number of Salmon/mt)
0.050
2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
The average groundfish catch by AM80 vessels in the Gulf of Alaska exhibited little variation over the
five-year periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012 (see Table 38 and Figure 23). Total average annual
groundfish catch for each of these periods was close to 27,000 mt. However, total catch over the first
five years of this decade was as high as 38,000 mt and as low as 21,000 mt. Annual total catch
exhibited much less variation from 2008–2012, ranging from more than 24,000 mt to less than
29,000 mt. The average wholesale value of the groundfish catch also differed very little between the
first and second five-year segments of the decade ending 2012. The average value was $27.4 million
over the first five years of the decade and $27.6 million over the next five years. The wholesale value
ranged from $21.4 million (2004) to $33.1 million (2006) from 2003–2007 and from $21.5 million
(2009) to $37.4 million (2011) from 2008–2012.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
38,402
31.3
2004
21,294
21.4
2005
22,896
27.6
2006
28,380
33.1
2007
24,284
23.8
2008
24,459
23.2
2009
26,280
21.5
2010
26,615
25.6
2011
28,760
37.4
2012
27,609
30.3
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut bycatch was higher during the first half of the decade ending 2012 but varied somewhat over
the second half of the decade (see Table 35 and Figure 24). Average halibut bycatch from 2003–2007
totaled 454 mt, compared to 313 mt from 2008–2012. Halibut bycatch reached a ten-year peak in
2003 at 692 mt and, despite declining on average over the second half of the decade, experienced a
five-year high of 336 mt in 2012. Meanwhile, herring bycatch among AM80 vessels fishing in the
GOA was minimal over the decade ending 2012, peaking at 70 kg in 2010.
Bycatch of king crab exhibited inconsistency from 2003–2012 but peaked in 2009 and 2010 at more
than 2,900 crabs each year (see Figure 25). The greatest number of king crabs caught on any other
year over the decade ending 2012 was 522, in 2004. King crab bycatch totaled 1,361 crabs over the
five years ending 2012, compared to 181 crabs over the five years ending 2007. However, only 129
and 102 king crabs were caught in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Virtually all king crab bycatch from
2003–2012 consists of bycatch of golden king crab (see Figure 26). Average annual bycatch of tanner
crabs was much higher from 2003–2007 (21,628 crabs) than 2008–2012 (4,093 crabs) but spiked in
2011 at more than 12,000 crabs. In this analysis, tanner crab bycatch among AM80 vessels fishing in
the GOA consists exclusively of bycatch of C. Opilio crabs (see Figure 27). Total tanner crab bycatch
exceeded 25,000 crabs in 2003, 2005, and 2006, and was less than 1,500 crabs each year from
2008–2010.
Average annual bycatch of Chinook salmon remained virtually unchanged over the five years
beginning 2008 from the prior five years. Average annual Chinook bycatch totaled 2,540 fish from
2003–2007 and 2,537 fish from 2008–2012 (see Figure 28). Chinook bycatch ranged from 840
salmon (2006) to 5,200 salmon (2003) over the first half of the decade ending 2012 and from 1,525
salmon (2009) to 3,791 salmon (2010) over the second half of the decade. Average annual bycatch of
other salmon species declined considerably over the five years ending 2012 (897 salmon) from the
prior five years (414 salmon) (see Figure 27). From 2008–2012, non-Chinook bycatch ranged from as
few as 250 salmon (2009) to 749 salmon (2011).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
692
206
32,156
6
5,200
1,185
2004
364
522
11,859
0
2,123
862
2005
423
34,432
7
2,168
592
2006
459
49
25,971
50
840
645
2007
332
129
3,725
1
2,366
1,203
2008
311
339
1,469
2
2,967
429
2009
298
3,246
1,361
13
1,525
250
2010
308
2,988
1,729
70
3,791
336
2011
313
129
12,028
2,503
749
2012
336
102
3,877
68
1,901
304
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Figure 29 through Figure 34 show bycatch of prohibited species as shares of both the volume and
wholesale value of target groundfish catches from 2003–2012 for AM80 vessels in the GOA. Table 40
and Table 41 display these bycatch rate and groundfish wholesale values, respectively, for prohibited
species each year from 2003–2012.
The halibut bycatch rate, measured as mt of groundfish catch to mt of halibut bycatch, declined from
an average of 0.017 over the years 2003–2007 to 0.012 from 2008–2012 (see Figure 29). Conversely,
the average value of groundfish catch per metric ton of halibut bycatch increased from $63,000 over
the five years ending 2007 to $88,000 over the following five years. Low herring bycatch volumes
among AM80 vessels fishing in the GOA translated to low average annual bycatch rates of 0.4 and 1.1
kg of herring per mt of groundfish catch over the five-year periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012,
respectively (see Figure 30).
The king crab bycatch rate, measured as the number of king crabs bycatch per mt of groundfish catch,
was substantially higher on average over the latter half of the decade ending 2012 than the first half
(see Figure 31). This was driven primarily by the relatively large volumes of golden king crab bycatch
in 2009 and 2010. Meanwhile, the average value of groundfish catch per king crab from 2003–2007
$134,000) was nearly double that from 2007–2012 ($263,000).
The tanner crab bycatch rate was lower each year from 2007 through 2012 than the previous four
years (see Figure 32). Fewer than 15 tanner crabs were caught for each 100 mt of groundfish catch
each year from 2007 to 2012 except for 2011, when the rate jumped to 42 crabs per100 mt of
groundfish. An average of 95 tanner crabs were caught per 100 mt of groundfish from 2003–2006,
compared to 15 crabs per 100 mt over the next six years. As a byproduct of this lower bycatch rate,
the average yearly value of groundfish catch per tanner crab caught as a prohibited species increased
from $1,214 from 2003–2006 to $10,629 from 2007–2012.
The Chinook bycatch rate, measured as the number of salmon caught per mt of groundfish caught,
fluctuated somewhat across the ten years ending 2012 but exhibited less variation when averaged
across the first and second halves of the decade (see Figure 33). On average, between 9 and 10
Chinook were caught each year per 100 mt of groundfish from 2003–2007 and from 2008–2012.
However, the bycatch rate ranged from 3 to 14 fish (per 100 mt) from 2003–2007 and from 6 to 14
fish from 2008–2012. Over the first half of the decade ending 2012, the average value of groundfish
catch per Chinook caught as a prohibited species ranged from just over $6,000 to more than
$39,000; this value varied less from 2008–2012, from under $7,000 to close to $16,000.
The bycatch rate for non-Chinook salmon species, measured as number of salmon caught per mt of
groundfish catch, dropped off considerably between the first and second halves of the decade ending
2012 (see Figure 34), from 0.034 to 0.015. With the exception of 2011, when the rate spiked
somewhat to 0.0260, the non-Chinook bycatch rate was lower each year from 2008–2012 than
2003–2007. The average yearly value of groundfish catch per non-Chinook salmon caught as a
prohibited species more than doubled from 2003–2007 to 2008–2012, from under $34,000 to over
$73,000.
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0180
0.0054
0.8373
0.0001
0.1354
0.0309
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0171
0.0185
0.0162
0.0137
0.0127
0.0113 0.0116
0.0245
0.0017
0.0053
0.0139
0.1235 0.1123
0.5569
1.5038
0.9151
0.1534
0.0601
0.0518 0.0650
0.0000
0.0003
0.0018
0.0000
0.0001
0.0005 0.0026
0.0997
0.0947
0.0296
0.0974
0.1213
0.0580 0.1424
0.0405
0.0259
0.0227
0.0495
0.0175
0.0095 0.0126
2011
2012
0.0109
0.0045
0.4182
0.0870
0.0260
0.0122
0.0037
0.1404
0.0025
0.0689
0.0110
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
45,135
151,818
0
972
5,671,833
6,010
26,375
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
58,878
65,407
72,072
71,668
74,671
72,301
83,296 119,746
41,099
0 676,259
184,357
68,554
6,631
8,578 290,222
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,808
803
1,273
6,389
15,821
15,820
14,825
3,113
63,060,914 4,125,884 664,571 38,384,938 11,796,895 1,700,312 364,080
0
10,098
12,750
39,360
10,059
7,831
14,113
6,762
14,960
24,859
46,689
51,296
19,788
54,152
86,056
76,347
49,980
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
90,044
296,797
0
7,809
442,894
15,925
99,439
$40
35,000
$35
30,000
$30
25,000
$25
20,000
$20
15,000
$15
10,000
$10
5,000
$5
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
40,000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Groundfish (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
80
800
70
700
60
600
50
500
40
400
30
300
20
200
10
100
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (kg)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
40,000
3,500
35,000
3,000
30,000
2,500
25,000
2,000
20,000
1,500
15,000
1,000
10,000
500
5,000
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
3.5
King Crabs (1,000s)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
4,000
40,000
35,000
Millions of Crabs
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
C.Opilio Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
6,000
Number of Salmon
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$150,000
1.8%
$135,000
1.6%
$120,000
1.4%
$105,000
1.2%
$90,000
1.0%
$75,000
0.8%
$60,000
0.6%
$45,000
0.4%
$30,000
0.2%
$15,000
0.0%
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
2.0%
2012
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.0028
$70,000,000
0.0024
$60,000,000
0.0020
$50,000,000
0.0016
$40,000,000
0.0012
$30,000,000
0.0008
$20,000,000
0.0004
$10,000,000
0.0000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-0.0004
$0
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$0.7
0.12
$0.6
0.10
$0.5
0.08
$0.4
0.06
$0.3
0.04
$0.2
0.02
$0.1
0.00
$0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2009
2010
2011
Value per Unit of Bycatch (Millions of
$2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.14
2012
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
1.6
$20,000
1.4
$17,500
1.2
$15,000
1.0
$12,500
0.8
$10,000
0.6
$7,500
0.4
$5,000
0.2
$2,500
0.0
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$40,000
0.140
$35,000
0.120
$30,000
0.100
$25,000
0.080
$20,000
0.060
$15,000
0.040
$10,000
0.020
$5,000
0.000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
2009
2010
2011
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Number of salmon/mt)
0.160
2012
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.060
$120,000
0.050
$100,000
0.040
$80,000
0.030
$60,000
0.020
$40,000
0.010
$20,000
0.000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Number of salmon/mt)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes measures of benefits generated by the AM80 fisheries. Calculations of net
revenues for the AM80 fleet as a whole and two subsets of the AM80 fleet are provided for the years
2008–2012. Estimates of total revenues used in the calculations and all expenditure and employment
items are taken from the EDR. Total revenues are defined as total fishery sales revenue plus other
income, total revenue LLP sales, and QS royalties earned minus QS royalties paid and raw fish costs.
Percentage shares of total revenues are calculated each year and in average over the period. Two
indicators of net income (“residual”) are provided to estimate and compare returns to the fleet’s fixed
capital assets (vessels and equipment) over the period. “Total Residual” (defined as total revenue
minus all EDR expenditures) is the broader measure, while “Operating Residual” (defined as total
revenue minus non-capital expenditures only) may provide a more representative estimate of average
returns to capital because it excludes expenditures on major physical assets which tend to be large
and rather “lumpy.”
Table 42 itemizes aggregate expenditures and revenues by EDR category for all vessels participating in
AM80 fisheries each year during 2008–2012, and also in average over those five years. The table
shows total revenues fluctuating from a low of $238.5 million in 2009 to a high of $399.3 million in
2011. The average over the period was $320.8 million. The table also shows each item’s percentage
share of total revenues. For example, a pronounced downward trend in the annual expenditure share
for fuel and lubrication is apparent over the period. The total residual (a broad measure of net
income) share varies from a low of 10.5 percent in 2009 to a high of 26.5 percent in 2011. The
average total residual share over the period was 18.5 percent. The operating residual share (a
narrower measure of net income) varies from a low of 14 percent in 2009 to a high of 28.4 percent in
2011, with an average over the period of 22.2 percent.
Table 43 shows aggregate expenditures and revenues by EDR category for the subset of vessels
participating in AM80 fisheries that had at least 12 percent of annual catch and revenues from Atka
mackerel. These vessels tend to be larger than the average AM80 vessel, and are clearly distinct from
the remainder of the fleet in terms of the composition of their AM80 species catch. The table shows
total revenues for these vessels fluctuating from a low of $124.3 million in 2009 to a high of $192.6
million in 2011. The average over the period was $157.3 million. The table also shows each item’s
percentage share of total revenues. Notice the fluctuations and absence of a distinct downward trend
in the annual expenditure share for fuel and lubrication costs. The total residual (net income) share for
these vessels varies from a low of 18.3 percent in 2009 to a high of 28.6 percent in 2011. The
average total residual share over the period was 23.9 percent, 5.4 percentage points above the overall
fleet average. The operating residual share varies from a low of 20.6 percent in 2009 to a high of 29.6
percent in 2011. The average over the period of 26.7 percent was 4.5 percentage points above the
overall fleet average.
Table 44 shows aggregate expenditures and revenues by EDR category for the subset of vessels
participating in AM80 fisheries that had less than 12 percent of annual catch and revenues from Atka
mackerel. The table shows total revenues for these vessels fluctuating from a low of $114.2 million in
2009 to a high of $206.7 million in 2011. The average over the period was $163.5 million. The table
also shows each item’s percentage share of total revenues. The downward trend in these vessels’
aggregate annual fuel and lubrication expenditure share is noticeable, but less distinct than it is for the
whole fleet. The total residual (net income) share for this subset of vessels varies from a low of two
percent in 2009 to a high of 24.1 percent in 2011. The average total residual share over the period
was 13.4 percent, 5.1 percentage points below the overall fleet average. The operating residual share
varies from a low of 6.7 percent in 2009 to a high of 27.3 percent in 2011. The average over the
period of 17.9 percent was 4.3 percentage points below the overall fleet average.
No. EDR Expenditure Item
1 Fishing gear capital expenditures
2 Processing equipment capital expenditures
3 Capital expenditures
Other capital expenditures related to vessel
4
operations
Sub-total: Capital Expenditures
Deck crew labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll
5
taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Processing crew labor expense. Include bonuses and
6
payroll taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Other employees (officers, engineers, cooks, etc)
7 labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll taxes, but
exclude benefits and insurance.
8 Food and provisions expenses (not paid by crew)
Recruitment, travel, benefits and other employee
9
related expenditures
Lease expenses for vessels and onboard equipment
10
expenditures
Fishing gear leases, repairs and purchase expenses
11 (e.g. nets, doors, and cables that were fully expensed
in 2011)
12 Repair and maintenance expenditures
13 Freight, storage, and other sales costs
14 Freight and storage costs other than for products (e.g.
gear, supplies, wharfage and offloading costs)
15 Product and packaging materials expenses
16 Fuel and lubrication expenses
Observer fees and other fishery monitoring and
17
reporting costs
Cooperative costs including lawyer and accountant
18 costs, association fees, and other fees charged to you
by the harvest cooperative
General administrative costs associated with vessel
operation. Include professional services and
19
management fees, but exclude costs reported in the
two previous questions.
Insurance expenses associated with the operation of
this vessel (not including employee health insurance)
Fisheries landings taxes, including Shared Fisheries
21
Business Tax and Fishery Resource Landing Tax
Sub-total: Non-capital Expenditures
Total Residual (Total Revenue - All EDR expenditures)
Operating Residual (Total Rev - Non-capital expends.)
20
Total Revenue 2
2008
$million %
Annual Totals for All Vessels1 Submitting EDR Data
2009
2010
2011
2012
$million %
$million %
$million %
$million %
Average
$million %
1.6
1.8
1.8
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6
1.0
6.2
0.2%
0.4%
2.6%
1.2
2.9
5.3
0.4%
1.0%
1.8%
1.3
2.4
3.0
0.3%
0.6%
0.8%
2.9
3.0
17.4
0.7%
0.8%
4.4%
1.5
2.2
6.7
0.5%
0.7%
2.1%
2.8
7.9
1.0%
2.9%
0.6
8.3
0.2%
3.5%
0.8
10.1
0.3%
3.4%
1.8
8.5
0.5%
2.1%
0.8
24.2
0.2%
6.2%
1.4
11.8
0.4%
3.7%
14.8
5.4%
21.3
8.9%
13.2
4.4%
16.9
4.2%
16.5
4.2%
16.5
5.2%
40.5
14.7%
28.2
11.8%
41.2
13.8%
51.5
12.9%
52.4
13.4%
42.7
13.3%
24.3
6.3
8.8%
2.3%
21.6
5.1
9.0%
2.1%
28.2
4.7
9.5%
1.6%
36.2
5.5
9.1%
1.4%
37.7
5.6
9.6%
1.4%
29.6
5.4
9.2%
1.7%
8.1
2.9%
7.7
3.2%
8.7
2.9%
11.8
3.0%
9.5
2.4%
9.2
2.9%
0.0
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
6.3
25.4
15.4
2.3%
9.2%
5.6%
8.8
28.5
12.2
3.7%
11.9%
5.1%
8.2
38.5
14.2
2.7%
12.9%
4.7%
9.1
34.4
14.4
2.3%
8.6%
3.6%
9.3
42.1
12.6
2.4%
10.7%
3.2%
8.3
33.8
13.7
2.6%
10.5%
4.3%
1.4
4.3
48.2
0.5%
1.5%
17.5%
1.9
3.3
32.7
0.8%
1.4%
13.7%
1.6
3.9
40.5
0.5%
1.3%
13.6%
1.8
4.5
52.4
0.4%
1.1%
13.1%
1.8
5.0
48.9
0.5%
1.3%
12.5%
1.7
4.2
44.5
0.5%
1.3%
13.9%
4.3
1.6%
3.6
1.5%
3.7
1.2%
3.6
0.9%
3.6
0.9%
3.8
1.2%
0.5
0.2%
1.2
0.5%
1.1
0.4%
1.3
0.3%
1.2
0.3%
1.0
0.3%
19.5
7.1%
15.3
6.4%
11.3
3.8%
26.8
6.7%
27.4
7.0%
20.1
6.3%
10.9
3.9%
10.9
4.6%
10.5
3.5%
13.5
3.4%
15.6
4.0%
12.3
3.8%
2.8
232.9
34.9
42.9
1.0%
84.5%
12.7%
15.5%
3.0
205.1
25.0
33.3
1.3%
86.0%
10.5%
14.0%
1.9
231.4
56.7
66.9
0.6%
77.6%
19.0%
22.4%
2.1
286.1
104.8
113.3
0.5%
71.6%
26.3%
28.4%
3.1
292.3
75.6
99.8
0.8%
74.6%
19.3%
25.4%
2.6
249.6
59.4
71.2
0.8%
77.8%
18.5%
22.2%
275.7
100%
238.5
100%
298.3
100%
399.3
100%
392.1
100%
320.8
100%
Employment:3,4
EMPLOYEES_FISH
392
173
357
234
242
280
EMPLOYEES_PROC
1,308
1,043
1,742
1,234
1,296
1,325
EMPLOYEES_OTHER
490
291
689
356
436
452
Total Employees
2,190
1,507
2,788
1,824
1,974
2,057
AVG_POSITIONS_FISH
134
120
114
111
107
117
AVG_POSITIONS_PROC
529
516
476
473
447
488
AVG_POSITIONS_OTHER
156
136
145
150
176
153
Total Avg_Positions
819
772
735
758
734
730
1/ Excludes data from two vessels that submitted EDR forms but recorded zero fisheries sales revenue in all five years.
2/ Total fishery sales revenue plus other income, total revenue LLP sales and QS royalties earned minus QS royalties paid and raw fish cost (from EDR data).
3/ Number of employees or average number of positions from responses to questions in EDR Table 6.
4/ Data for 2010 were adjusted based on input from AFSC 11/04/2013.
No. EDR Expenditure Item
1 Fishing gear capital expenditures
2 Processing equipment capital expenditures
3 Capital expenditures
Other capital expenditures related to vessel
4
operations
Sub-total: Capital Expenditures
Deck crew labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll
5
taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Processing crew labor expense. Include bonuses and
6
payroll taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Other employees (officers, engineers, cooks, etc)
7 labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll taxes, but
exclude benefits and insurance.
8 Food and provisions expenses (not paid by crew)
Recruitment, travel, benefits and other employee
9
related expenditures
Lease expenses for vessels and onboard equipment
10
expenditures
Fishing gear leases, repairs and purchase expenses
11 (e.g. nets, doors, and cables that were fully expensed
in 2011)
12 Repair and maintenance expenditures
13 Freight, storage, and other sales costs
14 Freight and storage costs other than for products (e.g.
gear, supplies, wharfage and offloading costs)
15 Product and packaging materials expenses
16 Fuel and lubrication expenses
Observer fees and other fishery monitoring and
17
reporting costs
Cooperative costs including lawyer and accountant
18 costs, association fees, and other fees charged to you
by the harvest cooperative
General administrative costs associated with vessel
operation. Include professional services and
19
management fees, but exclude costs reported in the
two previous questions.
Insurance expenses associated with the operation of
20
this vessel (not including employee health insurance)
Fisheries landings taxes, including Shared Fisheries
21
Business Tax and Fishery Resource Landing Tax
Sub-total: Non-capital Expenditures
Total Residual (Total Revenue - All EDR expenditures)
Operating Residual (Total Rev - Non-capital expends.)
Total Revenue 2
Annual Totals for All "A" Vessels1 Participating in A80 Fisheries and Submitting EDR Data
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Average
$million %
$million %
$million %
$million %
$million % $million %
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.6%
0.3%
0.5%
0.2
0.4
2.3
0.1%
0.4%
1.8%
0.1
1.1
2.9
0.1%
0.7%
1.9%
0.7
0.3
1.0
0.3%
0.1%
0.5%
0.5
0.6
10.2
0.3%
0.3%
5.4%
0.4
0.6
3.4
0.3%
0.4%
2.2%
0.1
1.8
0.1%
1.4%
0.0
2.9
0.0%
2.3%
0.0
4.2
0.0%
2.7%
0.0
1.9
0.0%
1.0%
0.0
11.4
0.0%
6.0%
0.0
4.4
0.0%
2.8%
6.0
4.8%
14.2
11.5%
5.2
3.4%
5.8
3.0%
5.8
3.0%
7.4
4.7%
17.9
14.1%
10.4
8.3%
18.3
12.0%
20.2
10.5%
19.9
10.5%
17.3
11.0%
7.7
2.9
6.1%
2.3%
7.6
2.8
6.1%
2.3%
10.7
2.6
7.0%
1.7%
11.9
3.0
6.2%
1.6%
12.7
3.3
6.7%
1.7%
10.1
2.9
6.4%
1.9%
4.5
3.6%
4.1
3.3%
4.3
2.8%
6.8
3.5%
4.4
2.3%
4.8
3.1%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
3.3
12.0
2.2
2.6%
9.4%
1.7%
4.4
14.8
6.6
3.5%
11.9%
5.3%
4.1
22.2
7.5
2.7%
14.5%
4.9%
5.0
13.8
7.4
2.6%
7.2%
3.8%
5.3
21.2
4.4
2.8%
11.1%
2.3%
4.4
16.8
5.6
2.8%
10.7%
3.6%
0.4
1.9
19.4
0.3%
1.5%
15.2%
0.6
1.2
14.9
0.5%
1.0%
12.0%
0.8
1.6
19.1
0.6%
1.0%
12.5%
0.8
2.2
27.5
0.4%
1.1%
14.3%
0.8
2.6
23.8
0.4%
1.4%
12.5%
0.7
1.9
20.9
0.4%
1.2%
13.3%
1.4
1.1%
1.3
1.0%
1.3
0.8%
1.3
0.7%
1.4
0.7%
1.3
0.8%
0.2
0.1%
0.2
0.2%
0.3
0.2%
0.4
0.2%
0.3
0.2%
0.3
0.2%
9.8
7.7%
8.4
6.8%
6.1
4.0%
19.9
10.3%
19.4
10.2%
12.7
8.1%
4.9
3.9%
6.1
4.9%
5.5
3.6%
8.8
4.6%
10.0
5.3%
7.1
4.5%
1.2
95.6
29.6
31.4
0.9%
75.2%
23.3%
24.8%
1.1
98.7
22.8
25.7
0.8%
79.4%
18.3%
20.6%
0.5
110.2
38.2
42.3
0.3%
72.2%
25.0%
27.8%
0.7
135.7
55.0
56.9
0.4%
70.4%
28.6%
29.6%
1.2
136.4
42.4
53.8
0.6%
71.7%
22.3%
28.3%
0.9
115.3
37.6
42.0
0.6%
73.3%
23.9%
26.7%
127.0
100%
124.3
100%
152.5
100%
192.6
100%
190.2
100%
157.3
100%
Employment:3,4
EMPLOYEES_FISH
212
47
121
141
142
133
EMPLOYEES_PROC
559
350
345
613
685
510
EMPLOYEES_OTHER
248
119
103
170
175
163
Total Employees
1,019
516
569
924
1,002
806
AVG_POSITIONS_FISH
58
57
55
54
54
56
AVG_POSITIONS_PROC
250
221
228
226
223
230
AVG_POSITIONS_OTHER
65
55
62
63
67
62
Total Avg_Positions
373
333
345
348
343
344
1/ Vessels with at least 12% of annual catch and revenues consisting of Atka mackerel.
2/ Total fishery sales revenue plus other income, total revenue LLP sales and QS royalties earned minus QS royalties paid and raw fish cost (from EDR data).
3/ Number of employees or average number of positions from responses to questions in EDR Table 6.
4/ Data for 2010 were adjusted based on input from AFSC 11/04/2013.
No. EDR Expenditure Item
1 Fishing gear capital expenditures
2 Processing equipment capital expenditures
3 Capital expenditures
Other capital expenditures related to vessel
4
operations
Sub-total: Capital Expenditures
Deck crew labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll
5
taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Processing crew labor expense. Include bonuses and
6
payroll taxes, but exclude benefits and insurance.
Other employees (officers, engineers, cooks, etc)
7 labor expense. Include bonuses and payroll taxes, but
exclude benefits and insurance.
8 Food and provisions expenses (not paid by crew)
Recruitment, travel, benefits and other employee
9
related expenditures
Lease expenses for vessels and onboard equipment
10
expenditures
Fishing gear leases, repairs and purchase expenses
11 (e.g. nets, doors, and cables that were fully expensed
in 2011)
12 Repair and maintenance expenditures
13 Freight, storage, and other sales costs
Freight and storage costs other than for products (e.g.
14
gear, supplies, wharfage and offloading costs)
15 Product and packaging materials expenses
16 Fuel and lubrication expenses
Observer fees and other fishery monitoring and
17
reporting costs
Cooperative costs including lawyer and accountant
18 costs, association fees, and other fees charged to you
by the harvest cooperative
General administrative costs associated with vessel
operation. Include professional services and
19
management fees, but exclude costs reported in the
two previous questions.
Insurance expenses associated with the operation of
this vessel (not including employee health insurance)
Fisheries landings taxes, including Shared Fisheries
21
Business Tax and Fishery Resource Landing Tax
Sub-total: Non-capital Expenditures
Total Residual (Total Revenue - All EDR expenditures)
Operating Residual (Total Rev - Non-capital expends.)
20
Total Revenue 2
Annual Totals for All Non-"A" Vessels 1 Participating in A80 Fisheries and Submitting EDR Data
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Average
$million %
$million %
$million %
$million %
$million % $million %
0.8
1.4
1.2
0.5%
0.9%
0.8%
0.4
0.5
3.9
0.4%
0.5%
3.4%
1.1
1.7
2.4
0.7%
1.2%
1.6%
0.6
2.1
2.0
0.3%
1.0%
1.0%
2.3
2.4
7.2
1.2%
1.2%
3.6%
1.1
1.6
3.3
0.6%
1.0%
2.0%
2.7
6.1
1.8%
4.1%
0.6
5.4
0.5%
4.8%
0.8
6.0
0.6%
4.1%
1.8
6.5
0.9%
3.1%
0.8
12.8
0.4%
6.3%
1.4
7.4
0.8%
4.5%
8.8
5.9%
7.1
6.2%
8.0
5.5%
11.1
5.4%
10.7
5.3%
9.1
5.6%
22.6
15.2%
17.8
15.6%
22.9
15.7%
31.3
15.1%
32.5
16.1%
25.4
15.5%
16.6
3.4
11.1%
2.3%
14.0
2.2
12.2%
1.9%
17.5
2.1
12.0%
1.4%
24.3
2.5
11.8%
1.2%
25.0
2.3
12.4%
1.1%
19.5
2.5
11.9%
1.5%
3.5
2.4%
3.7
3.2%
4.4
3.0%
5.0
2.4%
5.1
2.5%
4.3
2.6%
0.0
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
0.1
0.1%
0.0
0.0%
0.1
0.0%
0.0
0.0%
3.0
13.4
13.2
2.0%
9.0%
8.9%
4.4
13.7
5.6
3.9%
12.0%
4.9%
4.1
16.4
6.6
2.8%
11.2%
4.5%
4.2
20.6
7.0
2.0%
10.0%
3.4%
4.0
20.9
8.1
2.0%
10.3%
4.0%
3.9
17.0
8.1
2.4%
10.4%
5.0%
1.0
2.4
28.9
0.7%
1.6%
19.4%
1.3
2.0
17.8
1.1%
1.8%
15.6%
0.7
2.3
21.4
0.5%
1.6%
14.7%
1.0
2.3
24.9
0.5%
1.1%
12.0%
1.0
2.4
25.1
0.5%
1.2%
12.4%
1.0
2.3
23.6
0.6%
1.4%
14.5%
2.9
2.0%
2.3
2.0%
2.4
1.6%
2.3
1.1%
2.2
1.1%
2.4
1.5%
0.3
0.2%
0.9
0.8%
0.8
0.5%
0.8
0.4%
0.9
0.4%
0.8
0.5%
9.7
6.5%
6.8
6.0%
5.2
3.5%
7.0
3.4%
8.1
4.0%
7.3
4.5%
6.0
4.0%
4.8
4.2%
5.0
3.4%
4.7
2.3%
5.6
2.8%
5.2
3.2%
1.7
137.3
5.3
11.4
1.1%
92.3%
3.6%
7.7%
2.0
106.5
2.2
7.7
1.7%
93.3%
2.0%
6.7%
1.4
121.2
18.6
24.6
1.0%
83.2%
12.7%
16.8%
1.4
150.4
49.8
56.3
0.7%
72.7%
24.1%
27.3%
1.9
155.9
33.2
46.0
1.0%
77.2%
16.4%
22.8%
1.7
134.3
21.8
29.2
1.0%
82.1%
13.4%
17.9%
148.7
100%
114.2
100%
145.8
100%
206.7
100%
201.9
100%
163.5
100%
Employment:3,4
EMPLOYEES_FISH
180
126
236
93
100
147
EMPLOYEES_PROC
749
693
1,397
621
611
814
EMPLOYEES_OTHER
242
172
586
186
261
289
Total Employees
1,171
991
2,219
900
972
1,251
AVG_POSITIONS_FISH
76
63
59
57
53
62
AVG_POSITIONS_PROC
279
295
248
247
224
259
AVG_POSITIONS_OTHER
91
81
83
87
109
90
Total Avg_Positions
446
439
390
410
391
386
1/ Vessels with less than 12% of annual catch and revenues consisting of Atka mackerel.
2/ Total fishery sales revenue plus other income, total revenue LLP sales and QS royalties earned minus QS royalties paid and raw fish cost (from EDR data).
3/ Number of employees or average number of positions from responses to questions in EDR Table 6.
4/ Data for 2010 were adjusted based on input from AFSC 11/04/2013.
Table 45 condenses down the detailed information for all AM80 vessels that was provided in Table
42. The condensed version enables discussion of cost component groups. Capital Expenditures as
shown in Table 45 summarize four categories of capital expenditures in the more detailed tables
above. Capital expenditures include purchases of deck gear or equipment that is intended to last over
several years as well as expenditures made to reconfigure the deck, replace engines, or to “sponson” a
vessel for stability. The $24.2 million in capital expenditures made in 2012 were well over twice the
$11.6 million average over the five year period.
Unlike capital expenditures which varied widely by year, direct labor expenditures are fairly stable as
a percent of revenue. This is to be expected as most crewmembers are paid on a share basis. There is
some indication that direct labor expenses as a percent of total revenue may be declining, but with
only five years of data, it probably too soon to tell.
Indirect labor expenditures are payments for food and provisions that are not paid by the crew and
other labor-based expenses such as airfare, recruiting, and includes benefits provided to labor.
Indirect labor expenditures also appear to be trending downward as a percent of total revenue.
Other operating expenditures include purchases of trawl gear, ordinary repairs and maintenance,
product storage and shipping costs, and packing materials. There doesn’t appear to be a trend in this
group of expenditures.
The costs of fuel and lubricants were relatively high in 2008 at 17.5 percent of total revenue. During
the remaining four years for which there are data, fuel expenditures were relatively stable as a percent
of revenue.
Administrative expenditures include vessel insurance, observer costs, and costs for professional
services. These costs were relatively low in 2010, but the other years are fairly consistent as a percent
of total revenues.
State shared taxes are taxes paid to the State of Alaska. Catcher processors and motherships pay a
“fishery resource tax” based on the estimated ex-vessel value of the products that are reported. These
taxes as reported on the EDRs have varied from a high of $3.0 million in 2009—the year with the
lowest total revenue to a low of $2.1 million in 2011—the year with the highest total revenue.
2008
2009
$ million
Total Revenue
Capital Expenditures
275.7
(7.9)
100%
2.9%
238.5
(8.3)
100%
3.5%
298.3
(10.1)
100%
3.4%
Direct Labor Expenditures
(79.6)
28.9%
(71.1)
29.8%
(82.6)
Indirect Labor Expenditures
Other Operating Expenditures
(14.3)
(52.7)
5.2%
19.1%
(12.8)
(54.7)
5.4%
22.9%
(13.4)
(66.4)
Fuel & lubrication expenses
(48.2)
17.5%
(32.7)
13.7%
Administrative Expenditures
State Shared Taxes
(35.2)
(2.8)
12.8%
1.0%
(30.9)
(3.0)
13.0%
1.3%
Operating Residual
(Total Rev. - Operating
Expenditures)
Total Residual
(Total Rev. - All Expenditures)
(232.9)
% $ million
2011
EDR Expenditure Item
Operating Expenditures
% $ million
2010
% $ million
399.3
(8.5)
2008 – 2012
Average
2012
% $ million
100%
2.1%
% $ million
%
392.1
(24.2)
100%
6.2%
320.8
(11.8)
100%
3.7%
27.7% (104.6)
26.2% (106.6)
27.2%
(88.9)
27.7%
4.5%
22.3%
(17.3)
(64.4)
4.3%
16.1%
(15.1)
(70.9)
3.8%
18.1%
(14.6)
(61.8)
4.5%
19.3%
(40.5)
13.6%
(52.4)
13.1%
(48.9)
12.5%
(44.5)
13.9%
(26.6)
(1.9)
8.9%
0.6%
(45.3)
(2.1)
11.3%
0.5%
(47.8)
(3.1)
12.2%
0.8%
(37.2)
(2.6)
11.6%
0.8%
84.5% (205.1)
86.0% (231.4)
77.6% (286.1)
71.6% (292.3)
74.6% (249.6)
77.8%
42.9
15.5%
33.3
14.0%
66.9
22.4%
113.3
28.4%
99.8
25.4%
71.2
22.2%
34.9
12.7%
25.0
10.5%
56.7
19.0%
104.8
26.3%
75.6
19.3%
59.4
18.5%
Note: EDR revenues and expenses have not been adjusted for inflation.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from EDR Data from provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014)
Figure 35 summarizes revenues and expenses for the AM80 fleet as reported in the EDS from 20082012. Since implementation of the AM80 in 2008 there has been a steady increase in overall
operating residuals for AM80 owners and operators. While it is probably to early to be certain, it
appears that operating residual have improved over time under AM80. There are no data for residuals
prior to 2008, but AM80 active owners and operators report that they are better off under AM80.
Revenue and Expense ($ millions)
$450
Total Residual
$400
$350
$300
$250
Operating Residual
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
2008
Total Revenue
2009
2010
Total Expenditures (capital + operating)
2011
2012
Operating Expenditures
Note EDR revenues and expenditures have not been adjusted for inflation.
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from EDR Data from provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014)
The EDRs for the AM80 fleet provide a relatively unique opportunity for fishery managers and the
general public to understand the impacts of management actions on the costs and revenues for an
entire fleet of vessels from harvesting operations through the processing and sale of products. No
other fleet of CPs in the North Pacific or elsewhere in the U.S. provide the level of detail with respect
to operating costs and revenues that is provided in the AM80 EDRs.
It is important to note, however, that the EDRs do have some limitations. These limitations are most
evident with respect to the long-term investments that were made by the current owners. The EDRs
do not include the cost of building or acquiring the vessels in the first place, nor do they include any
ongoing debt service payments that the current owners may be making.
The fact that acquisition costs and costs of long-term capital improvements made by the owners are
not included in the EDRs, means that it is not possible to calculate the actual internal rate of return
(IRR) on investment that the vessels generate for their owners. We are left instead with estimates of
the average annual “Operating Residuals,” which exclude all reported capital expenditures. While
these estimates indicate whether or not vessel operations are providing some level of income to
owners, they are insufficient (without additional information) to determine whether or not the
investment in an AM80 CP was a sound decision. A more complete assessment of the returns to
owners of AM80 vessels would undoubtedly involve a discounted cash flow (DCF) model in which the
upfront capital costs of the investment are included along with annual revenues and expenditures.
Table 46 is developed as a hypothetical DCF model that might be used by a potential investor in an
AM80 vessel. This hypothetical DCF model contains the types of information contained in the AM80
EDRs and not coincidentally shows annual operating revenues of $15.8 million and average operating
residual percentages of 22.0 percent. Both of these numbers are approximately equal to the revenues
and operating residual percentages of the average AM80 vessel over the first 5 years of the program.
Year
Capital
Costs
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Year 11
Year 12
Year 13
Year 14
Year 15
15 Year Total
$4.00
$6.00
$10.00
Operating
Operating
Operating
Revenues Expenditures
Residual
All dollar values are shown in $ millions
$16.75
$10.30
$9.61
$12.54
$19.15
$16.83
$20.19
$18.59
$9.83
$20.27
$18.82
$13.03
$20.43
$12.94
$17.33
$236.58
$14.15
$9.52
$8.16
$8.84
$16.15
$10.56
$18.69
$12.33
$6.48
$12.71
$16.00
$12.76
$12.36
$9.99
$15.86
$184.55
$2.60
$0.78
$1.45
$3.70
$3.00
$6.27
$1.50
$6.26
$3.34
$7.56
$2.82
$0.27
$8.07
$2.95
$1.46
$52.03
Operating
Residual %
Total
Residual
Discounted
Cash Flow
@ 10%
15.5%
7.6%
15.1%
29.5%
15.7%
37.3%
7.4%
33.7%
34.0%
37.3%
15.0%
2.1%
39.5%
22.8%
8.4%
22.0%
$2.60
$0.78
$1.45
$3.70
($1.00)
$6.27
$1.50
$6.26
$3.34
$7.56
($3.18)
$0.27
$8.07
$2.95
$1.46
$42.03
$2.36
$0.65
$1.09
$2.53
($0.62)
$3.54
$0.77
$2.92
$1.42
$2.91
($1.12)
$0.09
$2.34
$0.78
$0.35
$20.00
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on hypothetical data from AM80 EDRs.
The DCF model shown in Table 46 was intentionally constructed for demonstration purposes only. It
was developed so that it would show yield a 10 percent IRR on an initial $20 million investment over
the 15 year period with average operating residual of 22.0 percent and average revenues of $15.8
million. Actual capital investments in AM80 vessels are unknown, and therefore the hypothetical DCF
model is used only as a tool to demonstrate the uses of EDR data.
One of the major take-home points of the hypothetical DCF model, is that even though the operating
residuals of the AM80 fleet have averaged 22.0 percent over all vessels, the annual rate of return to
owners may be much less.
Is should also be noted that even though the hypothetical DCF model shows an example of a 15-year
period that would have provided an investor of $20 million an IRR of 10 percent, there are no
guarantees that the particular circumstances shown in the hypothetical model will repeat themselves,
or whether they are a good predictor of future revenue and cost streams for AM80 owners.
As a matter of fact, the hypothetical DCF model depicted in Table 46 is randomized in terms of
revenue and operating costs, and is run iteratively until the random numbers combine to yield a 10
percent IRR on a $20 million investment with average revenues of 15.5 and 16 million with average
operating residual of 22.0 and 22.5 percent. To arrive at the numbers in shown in Table 46, a total of
1,399 iterations were required and the average annual IRR was just 7.5 percent.
A comparison of the profitability of the AM80 fleet and other resource-based industries warrants the
consideration of the comprehensive and long-term costs and risks associated with each. Indeed, the
exclusive focus on year-to-year operating costs and revenues in the AM80 EDRs may bias an analysis
of the comparative profitability of industries whose risk profiles and upfront capital costs may vary
considerably.
The substantial upfront costs and inherent risks associated with mining and oil and gas projects
illustrate the importance of employing some type of DCF analysis of lifecycle costs and revenues in
assessing the comparative profitability of these industries and their participants. Unlike fishing
operations, however, most mining and oil and gas companies evaluate their year-to-year financial
performance based on portfolios of projects. Further, annual financial statements of mining and oil
and gas companies typically reflect aggregations of capital and operating costs, debts, and revenues
across multiple projects. This muddies the direct comparison of profitability of the A80 fleet with
players in other resource-based industries.
Profitability within the mining industry varies according to both the prevailing value of the commodity
being mined relative to costs of production and the duration and cost of pre-operation project
development. According to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR), very few exploration
projects ever become producing mines, and project owners frequently abandon projects after
independently determining them to be technically or economically unfeasible. Mines in Alaska must
obtain numerous permits from various state and federal agencies prior to reaching the production
stage, and, as shown in Figure 36, permitting is just one of numerous major steps in the mineral
development process (DNR, 2014).
Source: Figure reproduced from DNR, 2014.
One financial measure that the mining industry uses to assess profitability over a particular timeperiod is the return on capital employed (ROCE), which is a ratio of earnings before interest and tax
to the value of capital employed (www.investopedia.com 2014). ROCE allows for the comparison of
companies’ (or projects’) profitability based on the amount of capital they use but does not necessarily
account for the explicit or opportunity costs accrued by companies prior to the production stage.
Across mining companies worldwide, ROCE rose from 5 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2006,
before bouncing around to 9 percent in 2009, 18 percent in 2010, and 8 percent in 2012 (Finweek,
2013).
According to a contact with more than 20 years of direct employment in the oil and gas industry,
standard DCF/net present value (NPV) analysis should be employed to evaluate the financial feasibility
of potential projects. Most companies use a stage-gate process that includes several stages of
peer/management review before final approval is granted. The DCF/NPV analysis is tied to a rate-ofreturn—or hurdle rate—that a project must meet to receive final approval. These hurdle rates vary by
company but typically range from 8–12 percent (Nelson, 2014).
The use of standard DCF/NPV analysis allows for the comparison of competing projects with disparate
attributes. For most companies, this analysis includes the use of probabilistic/stochastic methods that
account for the variable risk of all input factors in the calculation of an estimated project NPV (Nelson,
2014).
The CDQ Program receives apportionments of the annual catch limits for a variety of commercially
valuable species in the BSAI, which are in turn allocated among six different non-profit managing
organizations representing different affiliations of communities (CDQ groups). The CDQ Program was
established by the NPFMC in 1992, and in 1996, the program was incorporated into the MSA. The
final rule to implement AM80 increased the percentage of TAC for directed fisheries (with the
exception of pollock and sablefish) that are allocated to the CDQ Program from 7.5 percent to 10.7
percent, modified the percentage of halibut, crab, and non-Chinook salmon PSC allocated to the
CDQ Program as prohibited species quota, and included other provisions necessary to bring AM80
and the CDQ Program into compliance with applicable law.
Table 47 summarizes the CDQ allocations for groundfish species from 2003 to 2012. CDQ allocations
of Greenland turbot are made only for the Bering Sea portion of the BSAI, and CDQ allocations of
Pacific Ocean perch are made only for Aleutian Islands portions of the BSAI. Therefore, the CDQ
allocations shown for those two species here are less than the full 10.7 percent. Table 48 on the
following page, contains details of the CDQ allocations for Greenland turbot and Pacific Ocean perch.
Species
Variable
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
TAC
12,000
12,000
12,000
13,000
20,000
75,000 75,000 75,000
25,900
25,000
Arrowtooth
CDQ
900
900
900
975
1,500
8,025
8,025
8,025
2,771
2,675
flounder
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
TAC
60,000
63,000
63,000
63,000
63,000
60,700 76,400 74,000
53,080
50,763
Atka
CDQ
4,500
4,725
4,725
4,725
4,725
6,495
8,175
7,918
5,680
5,432
mackerel
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
TAC
20,000
19,000
19,500
19,500
30,000
50,000 60,000 60,000
41,548
34,134
Flathead
CDQ
1,500
1,425
1,463
1,463
2,250
5,350
6,420
6,420
4,446
3,652
sole
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
TAC
4,000
3,500
3,500
2,740
2,440
2,540
7,380
6,120
5,050
8,660
Greenland
CDQ
300
263
263
206
126
187
545
452
375
667
turbot
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
5.2%
7.4%
7.4%
7.4%
7.4%
7.7%
TAC
207,500 215,500 206,000 189,768 170,720 170,720 176,540 168,780 227,950 261,000
Pacific cod CDQ
15,563
16,163
15,450
14,233
12,804
18,267 18,890 18,059
24,391
27,927
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
TAC
14,100
12,580
12,600
12,600
19,900
21,700 18,800 18,860
24,700
24,700
Pacific
ocean
CDQ
1,059
943
945
945
1,331
1,872
1,603
1,609
2,033
2,032
perch
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
6.7%
8.6%
8.5%
8.5%
8.2%
8.2%
TAC
1,492,810 1,493,050 1,497,510 1,504,010 1,413,010 1,019,010 834,050 832,050 1,271,150 1,219,150
Pollock
CDQ
149,176 149,200 149,750 150,400 141,300 101,900 83,400 83,200 127,100 121,900
CDQ %
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
TAC
44,000
41,000
41,500
41,500
55,000
75,000 90,000 90,000
85,000
87,000
Rock sole CDQ
3,300
3,075
3,113
3,113
4,125
8,025
9,630
9,630
9,095
9,309
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
TAC
6,000
6,000
5,360
5,820
5,790
5,300
4,920
4,860
4,750
4,280
Sablefish
CDQ
922
922
778
887
884
805
745
733
713
653
CDQ %
15.4%
15.4%
14.5%
15.2%
15.3%
15.2% 15.1% 15.1%
15.0%
15.3%
TAC
83,750
86,075
90,686
95,701 136,000 225,000 210,000 219,000 196,000 202,000
Yellowfin
CDQ
6,281
6,456
6,801
7,178
10,200
24,075 22,470 23,433
20,972
21,614
sole
CDQ %
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
7.5%
10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
10.7%
10.7%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Species
Area
Greenland
BSAI
turbot
Pacific
ocean
perch
Variable
TAC
CDQ
CDQ%
TAC
AI
CDQ
CDQ%
TAC
BS
CDQ
CDQ%
TAC
BSAI
CDQ
CDQ%
TAC
BS
CDQ
CDQ%
TAC
Central
CDQ
AI
CDQ%
TAC
Eastern
CDQ
AI
CDQ%
TAC
Western
CDQ
AI
CDQ%
2003
4,000
300
7.5%
1,320
99
7.5%
2,680
201
7.5%
14,100
1,059
7.5%
1,410
106
1,516
3,500
263
7.5%
3,340
251
7.5%
5,850
439
7.5%
2004
3,500
263
7.5%
800
60
7.5%
2,700
203
7.5%
12,580
943
7.5%
1,408
106
1,514
3,059
229
7.5%
2,926
219
7.5%
5,187
389
7.5%
2005
3,500
263
7.5%
800
60
7.5%
2,700
203
7.5%
12,600
945
7.5%
1,400
105
1,505
3,080
231
7.5%
3,035
228
7.5%
5,085
381
7.5%
2006
2,740
206
7.5%
850
64
7.5%
1,890
142
7.5%
12,600
945
7.5%
1,400
105
1,505
3,080
231
7.5%
3,035
228
7.5%
5,085
381
7.5%
2007
2,440
2008
2,540
2009
7,380
2010
6,120
2011
5,050
2012
8,660
CDQ Allocated at Sub-Area level
760
790
2,290
1,900
1,550
2,430
3,500
375
10.7%
24,700
6,230
667
10.7%
24,700
AI CDQs not Allocated
1,680
126
7.5%
18,890
1,750
187
10.7%
21,700
5,090
545
10.7%
18,800
4,220
452
10.7%
18,860
CDQ Allocated at Sub-Area level
2,160
4,200
3,820
3,830
5,710
5,710
5,660
606
10.7%
4,960
531
10.7%
8,370
896
10.7%
5,620
601
10.7%
4,990
534
10.7%
8,380
897
10.7%
BS CDQs not Allocated
4,970
373
7.5%
5,050
379
7.5%
7,720
579
7.5%
4,900
524
10.7%
4,990
534
10.7%
7,610
814
10.7%
4,200
449
10.7%
4,260
456
10.7%
6,520
698
10.7%
4,220
452
10.7%
4,270
457
10.7%
6,540
700
10.7%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
Under the MSA, the primary portion of each CDQ reserve (10 percent of the TAC) must be allocated
among the six CDQ groups based on the percentage allocations that were in effect on March 1, 2006.
The balance of each reserve (0.7 percent of the TAC) is allocated among CDQ groups based on the
percentage allocations agreed on by the Western Alaska Community Development Association Board
of Directors, serving in its capacity as the CDQ Program Panel. Relative proportions allocated to each
group vary by species. In 2012, for example, three of the six CDQ groups were each allocated
approximately a quarter of the CDQ Program’s apportionment of yellowfin sole, while the other three
groups all shared the remaining amount. For flathead sole, the allocations to each group were more
comparable, with only one group allocated a substantially smaller amount (NMFS, 2013a).
Table 47 and Figure 37, on the following page, demonstrate the very significant increase in CDQ
allocations that occurred in 2008 and which have continued since. It is, however, important to note
that the very large increases seen are due to two separate components of change:
1) Increases in the percentage of TACs allocated to non-pollock and non-sablefish CDQs—the
allocation percentages for non-pollock/non-sablefish allocations of CDQs increased by
30 percent in 2008 from 7.5 percent to 10.7 percent.
2) Increases in the TACs for non-pollock and non-sablefish CDQ species—TACS increased
collectively by 27 percent in 2008 and since then have exceeded 2007 TACs by an average
of 28 percent.
Figure 38, on the following page, shows these two components of change graphically. In the figure the
blue shaded area at the bottom shows the actual non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ allocations from
2003–2007, and then holds the 2007 allocations constant for the remaining years. The red area, in
the middle, shows the increase in 2008–2012 CDQ allocations that are due to the increase in TACs
relative to the 2007 TACs using a 7.5 percent allocation. The green area at the top of the figure shows
the change that is due to the increase in the CDQ percentage from 7.5 to 10.7 percent. The
combined increase from the two components has resulted in a 49 percent average increase in nonpollock/non-sablefish CDQ allocations relative to 2007.
CDQ Allocations (Metric Tons)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
Pacific cod
Rock sole
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Atka mackerel
Pacific ocean perch
Arrowtooth flounder
Flathead sole
2010
2011
2012
Yellowfin sole
Greenland turbot
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
CDQ Allocations (Metric Tons)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
CDQs with 2007 TACs held constant @ 7.5%
CDQs with Actual TACs @ 10.7%
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
CDQs with 2007 TACs held constant @ 10.7%
Source: Developed by Northern Economics based on information at NMFS-AKR webpage, (NMFS, 2014a).
The remainder of this section focuses on CDQ harvests made in directed fisheries of the eight CDQ
species for which the allocation increased under AM80—i.e. the six AM80 species, as well as
arrowtooth flounder, and Greenland turbot. For completeness, some of the tables include catches in
directed fisheries for pollock and sablefish, and separately report on CDQ target fisheries for Pacific
cod by gear (fixed and trawl).
All the CDQ groups partner with established companies to harvest their allocations of the various
groundfish target species. In general, CDQ groups have a single contract with a partner company to
harvest their CDQ Pollock, and in some cases have a separate contract or partner for harvesting their
flatfish, rockfish, and Atka mackerel. Similarly, CDQ harvests of Pacific cod and sablefish are often
conducted with a different partner than used for their CDQ Pollock. The CDQ groups vary
individually in the degree to which they harvest their non-pollock/non-sablefish AM80 species
allocations.
Table 49 shows the combined harvest for all six CDQ groups in non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ target
fisheries. It should be noted that an average of 1,114 tons of CDQ groundfish are taken incidentally in
CDQ target fisheries for pollock and sablefish, of which 50 percent is Pacific cod and 46 percent is a
combination of rock sole, flathead sole and arrowtooth flounder. Figure 39 shows the information
from the table graphically, but leaves out incidental catches of pollock, sablefish and non-CDQ
groundfish. Note that the figure stacks the catch of each species.
In both Table 49 and Figure 39, it is clear that overall CDQ harvests in non-pollock/non-sablefish
CDQ fisheries have increased substantially since 2007. By 2011 and 2012 CDQ harvests in these
fisheries approached 60,000 mt. In spite of the overall increases, CDQ harvests in 2008 and 2009 of
yellowfin sole and rock sole actually declined in spite of significantly higher allocations. Overall the
increases in total non-pollock non-sablefish CDQ harvests have not kept pace with allocations.
Species
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
Flathead Sole
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Cod Fixed
Pacific Cod Trawl
Pacific Ocean Perch
Arrowtooth Flounder
Greenland Turbot
Sablefish
Pollock
Non-CDQ Groundfish
Total
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
5,539
491
154
4,028
13,622
409
846
263
49
13
1,286
2,720
29,422
6,284
585
330
4,494
14,898
490
673
346
47
20
1,426
3,930
33,521
6,588
1,671
700
4,370
13,668
554
608
527
60
19
648
2,792
32,203
6,384
2,071
219
4,423
13,064
558
807
636
31
37
756
2,897
31,882
10,081
3,643
816
4,663
11,554
744
1,252
1,042
64
35
1,187
4,327
39,407
7,637
1,695
236
6,303
16,732
844
1,659
740
155
15
1,268
4,501
41,786
1,741
644
263
8,049
17,407
648
1,490
1,490
157
18
1,083
3,422
36,410
3,003
1,244
591
7,791
16,320
1,141
1,497
806
42
23
1,231
4,333
38,023
16,274
3,057
373
5,319
20,538
1,648
1,815
656
84
12
1,655
7,219
58,649
13,986
5,962
328
5,181
19,959
3,852
1,878
1,011
131
25
2,297
5,220
59,829
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Note: Excludes CDQ harvests that were harvested in target fisheries for pollock or sablefish.
CDQ Harvests (Metric Tons)
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear)
Pacific Cod (Fixed Gear)
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
Atka Mackerel
Flathead Sole
Arrowtooth
POP & Greenland Turbot
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Note: The legend (from left-to-right and top-to-bottom) corresponds with areas moving up from the bottom. Thus
the first area shows Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear) then the next darker area shows Pacific Cod (Trawl Gear).
Figure 40 and Figure 41 combine to explain, at least in part, the reductions CDQ catches of flatfish in
2008 and 2009 relative to harvests in 2007. In 2008 average revenue per MT in real terms (adjusted
for inflation) in the CDQ flatfish target fisheries dropped by 23 percent relative to 2007, by 2010 real
prices 44 percent lower than their peak in 2007. The global recession undoubtedly contributed to the
price declines, but the fact that the overall amount of flatfish coming of the North Pacific (in the nonCDQ fisheries) was almost certain a factor in those price declines. Pacific cod revenues per MT
experienced similar declines, while real revenue per unit in CDQ rockfish fishery fell by 82 percent in
2008. In 2009 the weighted average revenue per unit sold in CDQ fisheries over all of nonpollock/non-sablefish targets was 31 percent less than revenue per unit sold in 2007.
Wholesale Revenue/MT ($ 2012 )
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
2003
2004
2005
2006
Weighted Average
Pacific Cod (all gears)
2007
2008
Flatfish Targets
2009
2010
Atka Mackerel
2011
2012
Rockfish Targets
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
The price declines coupled with declining CDQ flatfish harvests led to a large drop in the total
wholesale value generated in non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ fisheries in 2009. In 2009 the biggest
revenue decline was seen in the Pacific cod fisheries, which fell from over $50 million in 2008 to less
than $33 million in 2009. All of this decline in revenues can be attributed to declining prices as
overall Pacific cod harvest levels were flat between 2008 and 2009. Beginning in 2010, CDQ
revenues have increased and now exceed levels experienced in 2007.
Wholesale Value ($ Millions 2012)
$90.00
$80.00
$70.00
$60.00
$50.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00
2003
2004
2005
2006
Trawl Pacific Cod
Fixed Gear Pacific Cod
2007
2008
Flatfish Targets
2009
2010
Atka Mackerel
2011
2012
Rockfish Targets
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 50 summarizes CDQ harvest volumes as percent of CDQ allocations. The combination of a
49 percent allocation increase over all non-pollock/non-sablefish CDQ relative to 2007, coupled with
declining wholesale prices at least partially explains the lower than expected utilization of CDQ
allocations from 2008–2010. Utilization rates increased substantially in 2021–2012.
Species
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
89%
19%
98%
29%
97%
59%
89%
70%
99%
89%
32%
24%
8%
9%
13%
14%
78%
36%
65%
66%
Flathead Sole
Arrowtooth Flounder
Greenland Turbot
26%
49%
27%
38%
48%
23%
61%
65%
28%
28%
70%
21%
48%
81%
68%
9%
10%
96%
8%
20%
34%
15%
11%
13%
15%
28%
27%
14%
39%
22%
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Cod
Pacific Ocean Perch
45%
93%
81%
95%
99%
71%
92%
95%
64%
94%
100%
86%
99%
100%
94%
97%
100%
89%
98%
98%
93%
98%
100%
93%
94%
94%
89%
95%
87%
93%
20%
101%
19%
101%
73%
100%
55%
101%
71%
99%
50%
99%
49%
99%
68%
99%
51%
93%
59%
102%
Sablefish
Pollock
Percent of Total Excluding
70%
87%
88%
89%
94%
52%
44%
44%
73%
73%
Pollock & Sablefish
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics with CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014) combined with
CDQ allocations information from NMFS-AKR (NMFS, 2014a).
Other seemingly reasonable theories regarding the decline in CDQ utilization rates in non-pollock/
non-sablefish fisheries have been expressed. According to one CDQ group, harvest rates of Bering Sea
flatfish species decreased after 2008 largely due to the formation of the AM80 cooperatives, which
reduced the incentive for the group’s partner company to lease CDQ quota for the flatfish species
(Alaska Departments of Fish and Game et al. 2013). The allocation of exclusive harvest privileges
among cooperative members allows them to slow the pace of their fishing operations, thereby
encouraging each member to concentrate on their own allocation rather than lease CDQ quota
(Aleutian Pribilof Island Community Development Association undated). Since 2010, however, a new
contract with the CDQ group’s partner company in the flatfish fisheries requires the company to
harvest at least 80 percent of the group’s yellowfin sole and rock sole allocations (Alaska Departments
of Fish and Game et al. 2013). In addition, beginning in 2011, some CDQ groups have contracted
non-AM80 vessels to harvest their yellowfin sole and rock sole (NMFS, 2013). Nevertheless, anecdotal
evidence suggests that leasing CDQ species by AM80 vessels is desirable, and as these vessels increase
their efficiency they will continue to seek other fishing opportunities, such as CDQ fishery harvests
(NMFS, 2013).
Table 51 shows the amount of prohibited species caught in CDQ non-pollock trawl target fisheries,
while Table 52 shows the prohibited species catch rates in those fisheries. Bycatch rates in CDQ
fisheries have been lower than those in non-CDQ fisheries for all prohibited species except nonChinook salmon. (See Section 8.1).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
91.9
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2004
93.8
569
15,814
30,117
35
200
2005
69.4
1,441
1,717
7,362
123
671
2006
103.6
6,901
4,741
2,518
47
158
2007
166.7
7,015
60,597
63,150
24
706
2008
105.3
2,901
13,151
10,602
77
77
2009
63.6
2,187
12,858
56,688
56
8
2010
74.9
1,687
28,740
12,389
0
0
2011
128.6
4,407
24,153
29,506
0
163
2012
186.6
2,927
30,152
27,003
29
168
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Notes: Includes estimated bycatch in all trawl groundfish hauls designated as a “CDQ hauls” in target fisheries
for yellowfin sole, rock sole, Atka mackerel, rockfish, arrowtooth flounder, Kamchatka flounder, Alaska plaice,
flathead sole, Greenland turbot and “Other Species”.
Item
PSC Halibut Rate
PSC King Crab Rate
PSC Bairdi Crab Rate
PSC Opilio Crab Rate
PSC Chinook Rate
PSC non-Chinook Rate
2003
0.0073
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2004
0.006
0.039
1.076
2.050
0.002
0.014
2005
0.004
0.092
0.110
0.471
0.008
0.043
2006
0.006
0.423
0.290
0.154
0.003
0.010
2007
0.007
0.282
2.439
2.542
0.001
0.028
2008
0.005
0.141
0.638
0.514
0.004
0.004
2009
0.004
0.139
0.817
3.603
0.004
0.001
2010
0.004
0.091
1.557
0.671
-
2011
0.004
0.130
0.714
0.873
0.005
2012
0.005
0.085
0.871
0.780
0.001
0.005
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Notes:
1) Bycatch rates are calculated by dividing the bycatch amount into the total groundfish catch.
2) Includes estimated bycatch in all trawl groundfish hauls designated as a “CDQ hauls” in target fisheries
for yellowfin sole, rock sole, Atka mackerel, rockfish, arrowtooth flounder, Kamchatka flounder, Alaska
plaice, flathead sole, Greenland turbot and “Other Species”.
This section describes in general terms the community impacts of the AM80 fisheries. The section has
three components.
The first section provides a summary of port calls made by AM80 vessels. The port call summary
provides an assessment of the best available data regarding the different communities in Alaska
affected by the AM80 fleet and indicates that Dutch Harbor is the most important hub of activity for
the AM80 Fleet. Included in this summary is separate sub-section that address the AM80 activities in
Adak.
The second section reports the findings of an Economic Impact Model showing the multiplier effects
the AM80 fleet that was developed in 2012 and published in the journal Marine Policy in July 2014
(Waters, 2014). The section focuses on impacts in Dutch Harbor—the community out of which the
vessels operate during the fishing year; and in Seattle—the community in which most of the vessels
undertake maintenance and shipyard work and where most of the company are based.
The third component of the community impact section contains an assessment of shared fished taxes
that are estimated to have been paid from harvests of the AM80 CPs and the BSAI TLA sector from
2003–2012. Also included are estimates of taxes paid in CDQ harvests in fisheries for the CDQ
species that saw increased apportionments in 2008 under the regulations implementing AM80.
This section provides an overview of port calls made by AM80 vessels as an indicator of the
geographic scope of the community impacts of the AM80 fleet. Port call information used in this
summary has been developed by Steve Lewis and colleagues at NMFS-AKR using the “Catch and
Area” (CAA) database. The CAA combines Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data with other CAS data.
VMS data report the longitude and latitude every 15 minutes of nearly every active groundfish and
crab vessel operating in Alaska,15 and is the primary source of information used to “generate” the port
call information. The port call summaries rely on an algorithm rather than on actual port call data. The
algorithm tracks each vessel’s movement over time. If a vessel is “stationary” for fixed period of time
or longer within a pre-determined geographic area16 that has been defined around each Alaska port,
then the algorithm makes the determination that a port call has been made.
It should be noted that the port-call algorithm is not perfect, but it is the best information that is
available to researchers and fishery managers. One part of the algorithm known to have flaws is when
a vessel offloads directly to another vessel, rather than onto a dock at a fixed location. For example, if
a ship-to-ship transfer takes place in Unalaska Bay but outside of the CAA’s pre-determined polygon
that defines Unalaska with respect to port calls, the transfer will not be recorded as having taken place
in Unalaska. In fact it might not be recorded as an offload at all.
Another area of uncertainty is whether a port call necessarily implies an offload of product. Each trip
in the port-call data includes a starting port and an ending port and must have included some fishing
activity between port calls. Repositioning trips (i.e. moving from one port to another) are not included
in the port-call data set. It is very possible that vessels, particularly vessels operating far out in the
15
16
VMS regulations are summarized online at https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/vms/.
Each port is defined within the CAA as a GIS-based “polygon”. The polygons, developed by NMFS staff for
use in the port-call algorithm, are only estimates and as such may not be infallible.
Aleutians, will make port calls for fuel or other provisions and not make an offload. The port call
algorithm is unable to distinguish port calls that involve an offload from those that do not.
It should further be noted that it appears that most operators of AM80 vessels consider a “trip” to
begin when their vessel leaves a port with an empty fish hold to go fishing and end with the offload of
product. Under this definition, a port call made for refueling, or re-provisioning that doesn’t involve
an offload would not typically be considered the end of a trip.
There is a need to distinguish between “trips” as used in the port-call dataset and “trips” defined as
fishing activity from offload-to-offload. For the remainder of the discussion in this section the term
“port-call fishing trip” will be used to denote trips as defined in the port-call dataset, and the term
“offload fishing trip” will refer to an offload-to-offload fishing trip.
It should also be noted that all CPs and motherships are required by regulation to report to NMFS
Enforcement Division, the location of every offload of product from fish harvested in Alaska waters
(i.e. for all offload-to-offload fishing trips). The “Product Transfer Report” (an example of which is
shown in Appendix D) shows not only the products that are offloaded, by species, product type and
weight, but also the date, time, and specific location (by latitude and longitude) of the offload, as well
as the receiver of the product, the mode of transportation, and its intended route. These data are not
provided to NMFS-AKR Sustainable Fisheries Division, and have not been integrated into the CAS or
CAA data bases. (Furuness, 2014). Were these data integrated into the CAS system, then any
uncertainty regarding the number of offloads and the locations of offloads made by CPs and
motherships would be eliminated.
Table 53 summarizes the starting and ending ports of over 5,400 port-call fishing trips that were made
by AM80 vessels from 2003–2012. In the table, the rows indicate the starting port and the columns
indicate the trip-ending port.
It is very clear that Dutch Harbor is the center of AM80 activity. Between 2003 and 2012 there were
4,097 AM80 port-call fishing trips that started at Dutch Harbor, and 4,096 that ended at Dutch
Harbor. Adak has been the second most import port for the AM80 fleet, and it appears that vessels
will occasionally start a port-call fishing trip in Dutch Harbor and fish before make a port call in Adak
(186 port-call fishing trips). They then will make an Adak–Adak trip (239 port-call fishing trips), and
then make another trip starting in Adak and ending in Dutch Harbor (178 port-call fishing trips).
Similar cycles are seen for Dutch Harbor–St. Paul, Dutch Harbor–Atka, and for Dutch Harbor–Sand
Point in the GOA. While Kodiak has the most port calls in the GOA with 253 trip-starts, Sandpoint is
not far behind with 194 trip-starts.
End Port
Dutch
Harbor
Adak
Saint
Paul
Atka
Other BSAI
Ports
Kodiak
Sand
Point
Seward
Other GOA
Ports
Grand
Total
Dutch Harbor
Adak
Saint Paul
Atka
Other BSAI Ports
3,549
178
169
55
12
186
239
42
-
161
2
65
1
71
36
42
-
13
1
-
16
-
86
3
-
5
-
10
-
4,097
459
234
139
13
Kodiak
Sand Point
Seward
Other GOA Ports
21
97
5
10
2
2
1
2
-
-
-
218
14
-
9
76
9
1
5
2
3
3
8
4
253
194
26
19
3,963
133
467
5
229
2
149
-
14
-
16
232
89
95
5
10
10
15
4,942
492
Start Port
All BSAI Ports
All GOA Ports
Grand Total
4,096
472
231
149
14
248
184
15
25
5,434
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics based on data from NMFS-AKR “Catch and Area Database”
(Lewis, 2014).
A review of starting and ending ports before and after AM80 reveals some relatively minor shifts in
port usage by the AM80 fleet. First it must be said that the total number of port-call fishing trips
increased in the post-AM80 years from 2,450 to 2,984—a 21 percent increase over the 5-year
period. In the BSAI, port-call fishing trips increased by 23 percent, while in the GOA port-call fishing
trips increased by 7 percent. The relative importance17 of Dutch Harbor, Adak, and Atka all increased
in the post-AM80 period, while the relative importance of St. Paul and all of the GOA ports declined,
although the total number of port-call fishing trips in and out of both Sand Point and Seward actually
increased.
18
This section provides a summary of the impact of the AM80 fleet on the Port of Adak—the second
most important port for the AM80 vessels. The information has been adapted from NMFS
EIS/RIR/IRFA for Steller Sea Lion Protection Measures (NMFS, 2013b) and was discussed and
requested by the Council at its December 2013.
Historically, the AM80 sector has participated in the AI Pacific cod fishery on a limited basis prior to
the implementation of the AM80 program, but since implementation of the program in 2008,
participation in the fishery by the sector has increased. This increased participation in the AI Pacific
cod fishery during 2008 through 2012 by the AM80 vessels has likely impacted the community of
Adak through reduced processing of AI Pacific cod, but has also increased economic activity in the
community as a remote port for AM80 vessels purchasing goods and services during extended
western fishing.
17
The relative importance of ports were measured by percent of port-call fishing trips starting or ending in a port
for the periods in question.
18
This section of the report has been provided by Jon McCracken, an economist on the staff of the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council. Some minor technical edits and formatting for style have been provided by
Northern Economics.
Adak is located on Kuluk Bay on Adak Island in the Aleutian chain. It is the southernmost community
in Alaska. It lies 350 miles west of Unalaska in the Aleutian Island chain and is not a CDQ community.
The Aleut Corporation acquired the majority of Adak’s former military facilities in 2004. Since that
time, the Aleut Corporation has continued its efforts to develop Adak as a civilian community with a
private sector economy focused heavily on commercial fishing. Adak is pursuing a broad range of
fisheries for a resident fleet to be able to deliver to Adak Fisheries, the shoreside processor.
Most commercial fishing deliveries to Adak are to a single processing plant from larger vessels from
outside the area. Of the species processed, Pacific cod, halibut, and sablefish have been the primary
species. The community has also seen some crab and Pacific cod activity related to other companies,
but these companies are not physically located in the community. During the 2003 to 2009, the Adak
processing plant was most activate from January through March followed by a relatively quiet period
from April through June, and then running about half-speed from July through September before
activity tapering off from October into November. The A season Pacific cod fishery is the main source
of income for the plant (and raw fish tax revenue for the City of Adak), accounting for about 75% of
the plant revenue. The plant has the capability to process one million round pounds (454 mt.) of
Pacific cod daily (Fraser, 2013).
With no other shore-based processor in the community, the Pacific cod processing activity at the
Adak shore plant accounted for a large proportion of effort and local employment in Adak. The A
season Pacific cod fishery “overwhelms anything else that happens during the rest of the year, not just
in terms of volume at the plant, but in terms of crew utilizing local businesses (the fuel, dock, store,
and bar); without A season cod, the plant does not survive” (EDAW 2008).
As noted in the May 2013 version of the Steller Sea Lion Protection Measures EIS, Chapter 10:
Community Impacts, during 2004 through 2010, the Adak shoreplant accepted deliveries of Pacific
cod from Area 541 every year. The shore-based processor accepted deliveries from Area 542 for
every year 2004 through 2009, and accepted deliveries from Area 543 for every year 2004 through
2008. As part of the EIS, Adak Fisheries (now Adak Seafood) did provide a confidentiality waiver for
harvest volume for the years 2002 through 2008. The volume of Pacific cod landings from the AI
subarea processed at Adak Fisheries was substantial, accounting for an average of 63% of the total CV
landings of Pacific cod from the AI subarea. In some years, the proportion of Pacific cod from the AI
subarea landings processed at the shore plant was over 80%. The high level of processing at the Adak
facility suggests an overwhelming importance the plant plays in the AI Pacific cod fishery. The vast
majority of AI Pacific cod comes from Area 541.
While the deliveries of Area 541/542 Pacific cod cannot be provided on an individual sector level due
to confidentiality, Table 54 shows how much of the total trawl catcher vessel Pacific cod harvest from
area 541/542 was delivered the Adak processing plant relative to how much was processed offshore.
As noted in Table 54, during the 2003 through 2009 period, the majority of Area 541/542 Pacific cod
was delivered to the plant in Adak. The data shows that the shoreside sector received an increasing
share of the Area 541/542 Pacific cod deliveries from 2003 through 2007. In contrast, the offshore
sector, which ranges from one to two Amendment 80 vessels depending on the time of the year,
during this same time period processed a declining share of Area 541/542 Pacific cod. During 2010
and 2011 fishing years, financial difficulties surrounding the Adak shoreplant resulted in no processing
of Pacific cod, so the offshore sector processed nearly all of the Area 541/542 Pacific cod processed
during those two years. In 2012, the Adak shoreplant was once again open for business and once
again processed a large portion of Area 541/542 Pacific cod in the years since. In April 2013, Icicle
Seafoods closed its operation in Adak citing concerns about the health of the region’s Pacific cod
resource and increased regulatory uncertainty surrounding AI Pacific cod. In September 2013, Aleut
Corporation’s subsidiary Aleut Fisheries signed a 20-year lease with Adak Cod Cooperative to operate
the Adak seafood processing facility. The Adak seafood processing facility has been renovated from an
H&G operation into a fillet operation. The renovated shore plant began processing AI Pacific cod in
early February of 2014.
CV deliveries to AFA/Crab/
AM80 motherships
Shoreside landings
Total CV
CV cod
Percentage of Areas 541 &
and floaters
(Areas 541 & 542)
Year
cod catch
landings in
542 CV cod landings
(Areas 541 & 542)
in BSAI
Areas
relative to total CV cod
mt
% of Al
% of BSAI
mt
% of Al
% of BSAI
541 & 542
catch in BSAI
2003
8,209
48%
13%
9,033
52%
14%
17,242
65,353
26
2004
4,153
31%
7%
9,345
69%
17%
13,498
55,700
24
2005
1,521
19%
3%
6,478
81%
13%
8,000
50,574
16
2006
1,324
21%
3%
4,879
79%
10%
6,203
50,242
12
2007
2,147
17%
5%
10,163
83%
22%
12,310
46,743
26
2008
6,514
58%
14%
4,764
42%
10%
11,278
47,382
24
2009
3,307
29%
8%
8,272
71%
20%
11,578
40,532
29
2010
8,016
96%
18%
291
4%
1%
8,307
43,254
19
2011
7,726
99%
12%
43
1%
0%
7,769
64,617
12
2012
3,056
49%
5%
3,202
51%
5%
6,258
67,887
9
2013
1,586
31%
2%
3,516
69%
5%
5,102
65,281
8
Source: Developed by NPFMC staff using CAS data from AKFIN for the discussion paper Aleutians Islands Pacific Cod CV
Allocation with a Regionalized Delivery Requirement (NPFMC, 2014).
Note: Includes landings to Adak, Akutan, Dutch Harbor, and other Alaska communities.
Looking specifically at the AM80 sector, in general, only two vessels participated in the AI Pacific cod
fishery on a regular basis during 2008 through 2012. Given the limited number of AM80 vessels that
participated in the AI Pacific cod fishery during this period, quantitative information concerning their
activity in the AI Pacific cod fishery cannot be disclosed. From a qualitative perspective, these AM80
vessels operated predominately as motherships in the AI Pacific cod fishery. Prior to implementation
of AM80 Program, these AM80 vessels participated rarely as motherships in the AI Pacific cod fishery.
Since implementation of the AM80 program, these vessels have increased their mothership activity in
the AI Pacific cod fishery significantly. One likely consequence of their increased mothership activity
in the AI Pacific cod fishery is some amount of AI Pacific cod, which would otherwise have been
processed by the Adak seafood processing facility, was instead processed by AM80 vessels. This
redistribution of AI Pacific cod processing during the 2008 through 2012 likely represents a loss in
economic activity for the community of Adak.
Another consequence of the increased mothership activity by the AM80 vessels has been the
increased economic activity in Adak from the purchase of goods and services from Adak venders by
the AM80 companies. The economic activity generated by the AM80 vessel port calls are a
substantial. For example, the May 2013 version of the Steller Sea Lion Protection Measures EIS notes
that the owners of F/V Seafisher conduct offloads and/or crew changes in Adak about four times a
year. In another example, United States Seafoods reported that they flew hundreds of crewmembers
through Adak during 2008 through 2012, and spent over $4 million in Adak community. Purchases of
services and goods include fuel, general store, marine storage facility, logistics, lodging, vehicle rentals,
and airport services to include crew movements, critical freight, and resupply. Although Adak
undoubtedly has a relatively low economic multiplier, the money spent on goods and services by
AM80 companies during port calls does circulate in the small economy of Adak.
This section summarizes estimated economic impacts (multiplier effects) of the AM80 fleet from a
soon to be recently published report funded by the AFSC. Investigators included Dr. Ed Waters an
independent consultant from Beaverton OR, Dr. Chang K Seung of AFSC, and Marcus Hartley of
Northern Economics. The paper incorporated EDR data from the 2008–2010 fisheries to develop a
model that was used to measure the multiplier impacts in Alaska, the West Coast (Washington,
Oregon and California), and the rest of the U.S. that are associated with activities of the AM80 fleet.
Results from that report show that on average during 2008–2010 the AM80 fleet accounted for nearly
100 percent of Atka mackerel, 80 percent of flatfish, and 74 percent of rockfish (Pacific Ocean perch)
products manufactured by Alaska processors. The estimated total economic contribution of the AM80
sector’s $281 million of first wholesale revenues (estimated from 2008 COAR data) was approximately
$1 billion in total output which contributed $571 million in total value added, $289 million in total
labor income, $351 million in total household income, $79 million in total state and local government
revenue and 6,800 total jobs in the combined economies of the three regions. About 80 percent of
the $351 million total household income generated by AM80 sector activities accrued to households
outside Alaska (including payments to non-Alaska residents in the AM80 sector workforce). Also about
71 percent of the $79 million in total state and local government revenues generated were paid to
governments outside Alaska.
The primary findings from that report are summarized in Table 55. The table highlights the wide
geographic distribution of economic impacts of the AM80 fleet’s activities.
Region
Output
Household Income
S-L Government Revenue
Jobs
Alaska
47%
20%
29%
53%
West Coast
18%
39%
27%
18%
Rest of the U.S.
35%
40%
44%
29%
1,027
351
79
-
-
-
-
6.8
Total (Direct, Indirect and Induced) U.S. Impacts:
Total U.S. Impact in $ million
Total U.S. Impact in jobs (1,000)
Note: Economic impacts are based on the 2008 economic contribution from the SAM model.
Source: Table excerpted from Table 6 of Waters (2014).
The finding that the majority of economic impacts of the AM80 fishery occur outside of Alaska is not
ground-breaking, and has been found to be the case for many other fisheries in Alaska. In its initial
decision to allocate pollock and Pacific cod in the BSAI and GOA among inshore and inshore-offshore
processors, NPFMC economists found that the vast majority of economic impacts of both the shorebased and at-sea fisheries occurred in the Pacific Northwest rather than in Alaska. (NPFMC, 1992).
Similar findings have also been documented in the Alaska salmon fisheries, including a 2013 report
on The Economic Importance of the Bristol Bay Salmon Industry report by Dr. Gunnar Knapp (Knapp,
2013), which found the following impacts:
1) Direct employment in harvesting and processing in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery by residents
of Washington and Oregon exceeds employment of Alaska residents by 23 percent,
2) Household income impacts going to Washington and Oregon exceeds income impacts going
to households in Alaska by 44 percent
3) Overall economic output attributable to Washington and Oregon exceeds estimated total
economic output generated in Alaska by 80 percent.
This section develops estimates of fish tax payments made by vessels and processors that have been
active in the AM80 fisheries, or in the CDQ fisheries for which allocations increased under AM80.
Under Alaska Statute (AS) 43.77, CPs and motherships are required to pay a Fishery Resources Tax
(FRT) at a rate that is the equivalent of rates paid by catcher vessels and shore-based processors under
the Fisheries Business Tax (FBT) (see AS 43.75). The rate for both taxes in nominally 3 percent, but
there may be some variations of rates for developing fisheries. The FRT is applied to the ex-vessel
value equivalent of the processed products that are offloaded in state waters by all CPs and
motherships. Both the FRT and the FBT are “shared taxes” in which the revenue is split evenly
between the State of Alaska and the Borough at which the offload occurred. If the offload or landing
occurs at a community in the “un-organized borough” (as is the case for communities like Dutch
Harbor and Adak), the fish taxes are shared primarily between that community and State, with a small
portion going out to other communities in the un-organized borough. The State reports FRT and FBT
revenues by community and borough each year, but the information is not separated by species or
gear type so the standard reports cannot be used to assess the tax impacts of AM80.
Table 56 shows the calculations used to estimate FRT and FBT in the BSAI fisheries affected by
AM80.19 As indicated above both the FRT and FBT are paid as a percent of the ex-vessel value of the
landings or offload. For this assessment the analysts used estimates of ex-vessel value that are
calculated by AKFIN in the CAS for processed products of at-sea processors. For this analysis, nominal
ex-vessel values and taxes have been adjusted for inflation to 2012 $. The values in the table include:
1) all BSAI harvests of AM80 CPs in non-CDQ fisheries, 2) all BSAI harvests by the vessels in the BSAI
TLA fisheries, excluding landings made in pollock and Pacific cod fisheries, and 3) All CDQ landings
and offloads excluding landings in CDQ fisheries for pollock, sablefish, and halibut. As seen in the
table, real ex-vessel values in the included fisheries have increased from a low in 2004 of $99.34
million to a high in 2012 of $190.82 million. Estimates of tax payments have increased similarly; from
$2.77 million in 2004 to $5.31 million in 2012.
2003
Sector
AM80 CPs
BSAI TLA
CDQ (Selected Fisheries)
Total Ex-Vessel $
Sector
AM80 CPs
BSAI TLA
CDQ (Selected Fisheries)
Total Tax Payments
$88.60
$1.79
$13.01
$103.40
2004
$84.85
$1.77
$12.72
$99.34
2005
$106.52
$3.95
$12.56
$123.03
2009
2010
Ex-Vessel Value (Millions of 2012 $)
$101.03 $111.70 $135.67 $105.53
$8.04 $12.66 $10.35
$7.06
$14.69 $19.11 $27.79 $14.14
$123.77 $143.47 $173.81 $126.73
2006
2007
2008
$123.14
$9.34
$19.37
$151.85
2011
2012
$137.18 $146.58
$15.98 $18.73
$24.02 $25.50
$177.18 $190.82
Estimated Fish Taxes (Millions of 2012 $) using the Standard Fish-Tax Rate of 3 Percent
$2.66
$2.55
$3.20
$3.03
$3.35
$4.07
$3.17
$3.69
$4.12
$0.05
$0.05
$0.12
$0.24
$0.38
$0.31
$0.21
$0.28
$0.48
$0.18
$0.17
$0.17
$0.20
$0.26
$0.38
$0.19
$0.26
$0.33
$2.89
$2.77
$3.49
$3.47
$3.99
$4.76
$3.57
$4.24
$4.92
$4.40
$0.56
$0.35
$5.31
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Note: According to AS, landings and offloads of CDQ fish are taxed at a rate that is approximately 45 percent of
the standard fish tax rate of 3 percent.
19
Ideally analysts would be able to use the information provided in the “Product Transfer Report” (see Appendix
D) to assess the amount of product by species offloaded at each community. Unfortunately, as discussed in
Section 11.1 these data, while provided to NMFS Enforcement Division, are not part of the datasets included in
the CAS that are used to manage the fisheries.
Figure 42 shows the estimated fish tax payments related to BSAI portions of AM80. It is clear that with
the exception of 2009, when revenues dropped coincident with the global recession, fish taxes have
increased since the implementation of AM80 in 2008.
$6.00
Millions of 2012 $
$5.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
2003
2004
Total Tax Payments
2005
2006
AM80 CPs
2007
2008
BSAI TLA
2009
2010
2011
2012
CDQ (Selected Fisheries)
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data supplied by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Data are not available to quantify AM80 related fish taxes by community. However, since almost all of
the offloads of AM80 products occur at Dutch Harbor, that community, along with the State of
Alaska, receives that vast majority of the FRT and FBT taxes estimated above.
This section provides an overall summary of all activities in the AM80 sector. The data include all
harvesting and processing of the fleet in both the GOA and the BSAI, and combine CDQ catch and
processing as well as all processing AM80 vessels have undertaken while acting as motherships. The
section uses a top down approach, first describing all groundfish catch and revenues and estimates of
net operating residual. The section then moves on to summarize catch and retention by species.
Table 57 and Figure 43 summarize total catch and total wholesale revenue in all AM80 fisheries in
both the BSAI and the GOA including CDQs and processed catch of AM80 motherships. From 2003–
2006 total groundfish catch ranged between 319,000 to 333,000 mt before increasing in 2007 to
347,000 mt. In 2008, total catch by all AM80 vessels (including mothership deliveries) jumped to
385,000 mt and from 2010–2012 has averaged 392,000 mt. Overall Increases in total wholesale
revenues have been even more pronounced than increases in tonnage. Although total revenues
declined in 2008 and 2009, they surged upward in 2010. In 2011, for the first time, total revenue
exceeded $1,000 per ton harvested in real values ($2012).
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
319,530
$231.29
2004
333,552
$262.68
2005
324,345
$305.88
2006
324,437
$311.71
2007
346,659
$325.86
2008
384,987
$313.84
2009
362,090
$273.08
2010
387,881
$314.28
2011
394,133
$400.87
2012
396,182
$392.56
450,000
$450
400,000
$400
350,000
$350
300,000
$300
250,000
$250
200,000
$200
150,000
$150
100,000
$100
50,000
$50
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
Note: Includes CDQ catch and revenue as well as processed catch and revenues of AM80 vessels acting as
motherships.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
Note: Includes CDQ catch and revenue as well as processed catch and revenues of AM80 vessels acting as
motherships.
Source: Figure developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 58 shows the relative importance of the BASI and the GOA to AM80 vessels in terms of total
groundfish catch and revenue. The table also shows the number of active vessels in the both the BSAI
and the GOA (both FMP areas) as well as the number that fished only in the BSAI or only in the GOA.
As can be inferred from the table, the relative importance of the GOA and the BSAI to the AM80 fleet
overall has not changed significantly—over the 10-year period 92 percent of the catch and 91 percent
of the revenue have come from the BSAI.
The review of vessel activity also shows that the number of vessels that are active only in the Bering
Sea has fallen to four vessels from 2009–2011, and only one AM80 vessel has participated only in the
GOA since the program was implemented.20
Item
BSAI Catch ÷ All Catch
BSAI Revenue ÷ All Revenue
2003
88%
86%
2004
94%
92%
2005
93%
91%
2006
91%
89%
2007
93%
93%
2008
94%
93%
2009
93%
92%
2010
93%
92%
2011
93%
91%
2012
93%
92%
GOA Catch ÷ All Catch
GOA Revenue ÷ All Revenue
12%
14%
6%
8%
7%
9%
9%
11%
7%
7%
6%
7%
7%
8%
7%
8%
7%
9%
7%
8%
20
2
0
22
15
7
0
22
15
7
0
22
15
7
0
22
14
8
0
22
12
10
1
23
17
4
0
21
16
4
0
20
16
4
0
20
16
4
0
20
Vessels Active in Both FMP Areas
Vessels Active in the BSAI Only
Vessels Active in the GOA Only
Total Number of Active Vessels
Note: Includes CDQ catch and revenue as well as processed catch and revenues of AM80 vessels acting as
motherships.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes catch, retained catch, and revenue by species in the BSAI and the GOA for
all AM80 vessels. The tables include catch and revenues from CDQ fisheries and delivered catch and
revenues generated by AM80 vessels acting as motherships.
Table 59 shows the total retained catch by major species groups—in the table the species are sorted
by total catch over the 10-year period. Comparing the two periods before AM80 (2003–2007) and
after (2008–2012), there are clear winners and losers. Total catch of yellowfin sole has increased—
post-AM80 yellowfin sole jumped from 27 percent to 31 percent of total catch. Similarly, total catch
of arrowtooth and Kamchatka Flounder rose from 3 percent prior AM80 to 8 percent after. While it
doesn’t have a large share, catches of Greenland turbot have more than doubled since 2008.
Total catch numbers of Pacific cod are relatively surprising given the reallocation of Pacific cod away
from the fleet under AM80. From 2003–2007 the AM80 fleet averaged slightly less than 32,777 mt of
Pacific cod per year. From 2008–2012 they have harvested an average of 27,454 per year. As a
percent of total catch, Pacific cod has dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent in the post AM80 era.
According to industry members, Pacific cod has shifted from a target species prior to AM80 to an
incidental catch species that has the potential to constrain harvests of other species.
Other species that have seen declining shares of total catch are pollock and Atka mackerel. Pollock
harvests as a percent of total catch have declined after AM80—falling from 9 percent of the total from
2003–2007 to 6 percent from 2008–2012. Atka mackerel has also declined slightly from 19 percent
to 17 percent.
20
The Golden Fleece, while listed as an AM80 vessel in the final rule has never applied for AM80 QS and
therefore for purposes of this analysis has not been included in any of the tables and figures.
2003
Species
Yellowfin Sole
Atka Mackerel
Rock Sole
Pacific Cod
Pollock
Arrowtooth & Kam. Flounder
Pacific Ocean Perch
Alaska Plaice
Flathead Sole
All Other Groundfish
Northern Rockfish
All Other Flatfish
Greenland Turbot
All Other Rockfish
Sablefish
All Species
2004
2005
2006
74,306 69,470 85,832 84,644
55,831 58,762 60,941 60,533
32,796 44,070 34,844 33,081
30,138 38,019 31,090 29,909
26,880 36,162 29,974 23,983
9,679 14,631 11,114
9,625
13,760 11,334
9,504 12,085
9,501
7,567 10,108 13,646
11,625 14,417 12,731 13,857
7,627
7,879
6,502
7,869
4,821
4,571
3,781
3,686
2,394
3,762
3,586
2,204
882
648
688
293
670
667
376
509
217
298
376
136
281,128 312,258 301,449 296,058
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total Catch (mt)
98,041 129,867 95,219 98,016 120,143 116,328
58,328 57,946 72,669 68,458 50,647 46,561
34,902 46,380 38,422 50,524 50,057 64,819
34,732 18,985 23,740 27,442 32,044 35,058
21,790 20,996 20,802 18,492 20,520 19,652
7,101 17,926 26,109 35,739 26,782 28,229
17,491 16,802 14,853 17,589 23,341 22,838
15,674 15,533 12,804 13,667 19,682 13,197
13,782 19,256 13,990 15,080
7,732
6,120
10,921
7,918
8,444
7,411
6,532
6,866
3,919
3,172
3,023
4,162
2,705
2,235
4,685
3,048
1,959
1,847
2,437
2,847
344
1,845
3,037
1,953
1,526
2,433
545
600
574
782
1,133
1,153
120
256
166
104
90
239
322,374 360,528 335,810 361,265 365,373 368,573
Note: Includes CDQ catch as well as all processed catch of AM80 vessels acting as motherships.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 60 shows estimated retention percentages by species for the AM80 in the BSAI. Overall,
retention has increased from an average of 75 percent from 2003–2007 to an average of 92 percent
2008–2012. The highlighted rows indicate the species with the largest gains in retentions. The largest
gains in retention on a percentage basis are seen in Alaska plaice, northern rockfish and arrowtooth
and Kamchatka flounder—for which retention percentages have more than doubled. There have also
been large gains in pollock—these increases have undoubtedly been a result of changes in the way
that maximum retainable allowance percentages have been enforced.
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Species
Estimated Retention Percentage
Yellowfin Sole
86%
83%
91%
91%
89%
96%
94%
95%
Atka Mackerel
80%
81%
94%
96%
97%
98%
96%
94%
Rock Sole
60%
58%
68%
81%
77%
93%
93%
96%
Pacific Cod
98%
99%
98%
98%
99%
98%
98%
96%
Pollock
51%
47%
56%
54%
58%
87%
85%
93%
Arrowtooth & Kam. Flounder
37%
23%
53%
41%
33%
80%
86%
86%
Pacific Ocean Perch
85%
83%
85%
83%
86%
98%
94%
97%
Alaska Plaice
2%
2%
1%
4%
6%
45%
62%
59%
Flathead Sole
77%
76%
84%
79%
74%
97%
97%
97%
All Other Groundfish
25%
19%
17%
19%
15%
15%
12%
16%
Northern Rockfish
10%
15%
24%
28%
22%
48%
65%
79%
All Other Flatfish
44%
34%
40%
32%
22%
36%
61%
30%
Greenland Turbot
82%
67%
89%
77%
71%
72%
89%
95%
All Other Rockfish
70%
61%
73%
78%
62%
78%
86%
89%
Sablefish
74%
74%
92%
94%
97%
100%
97%
97%
All Species
71%
69%
78%
79%
78%
90%
90%
91%
Note: Includes all retained catches harvested by, or delivered to, AM80 vessels.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2011
2012
97%
97%
98%
99%
93%
91%
98%
69%
98%
13%
95%
29%
99%
87%
98%
93%
97%
97%
97%
98%
92%
94%
98%
80%
97%
14%
90%
25%
99%
87%
99%
94%
Table 61 shows total catch by species of AM80 vessels in the GOA. While the AM80 program does
not directly affect the GOA fisheries in terms of rationalization, there appear to have been some
coincidental changes or indirect effects. For example, the relative share of arrowtooth & Kamchatka
flounder has declined, and the relative share of Pacific ocean perch has increased.
Species
Arrowtooth & Kam. Flounder
Pacific Ocean Perch
Northern Rockfish
Pelagic Shelf Rockfish
All Other Rockfish
Rex Sole
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Cod
All Other Flatfish
Pollock
Sablefish
All Other Groundfish
All Species
2003
2004
2005
2006
18,389
5,317
2,273
1,562
2,309
2,585
553
1,773
1,168
701
1,096
675
38,402
4,725
6,342
2,438
1,212
1,417
871
772
1,242
969
408
608
289
21,294
6,343
6,610
2,559
1,010
1,171
1,298
774
885
1,073
282
572
338
22,915
8,399
8,668
2,987
1,381
1,243
1,484
810
1,012
1,121
336
550
388
28,380
2007
2008
Total Catch (mt)
6,484
6,378
7,962
7,488
1,895
2,514
1,615
1,911
1,170
1,139
796
913
1,233
1,782
807
847
875
554
400
557
471
406
575
234
24,284 24,723
2009
2010
2011
2012
4,153
8,256
2,614
1,489
1,240
1,989
2,153
1,181
837
1,675
360
335
26,280
5,325
8,794
2,723
1,712
1,114
1,487
2,197
920
621
923
396
404
26,615
9,379
7,259
2,473
1,576
1,372
1,039
1,594
964
585
1,600
513
407
28,760
7,118
8,076
3,130
1,938
1,508
1,014
1,170
1,086
536
1,197
421
416
27,609
Note: Includes all retained catches harvested by AM80 vessels.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Table 62 shows retention percentages by species in the GOA. During the five years prior to
implementation of AM80, overall retention of groundfish by AM80 vessels in the GOA averaged 74
percent. After implementation of AM80, overall retention has increased to 83 percent. In the table
the species showing the largest gains in retention are shaded. While retention of several species in the
GOA has increased, retention percentages have decreased for others, including pollock (from 74 to
66 percent), Atka mackerel (from 67 to 56 percent) and “All other rockfish” (from 68 to 61 percent).
Species
Arrowtooth Flounder
Pacific Ocean Perch
Northern Rockfish
Pelagic Shelf Rockfish
All Other Rockfish
Rex Sole
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Cod
All Other Flatfish
Pollock
Sablefish
All Other Groundfish
All Species
2003
2004
2005
59%
74%
80%
97%
67%
94%
57%
71%
68%
78%
52%
46%
68%
22%
92%
90%
97%
61%
94%
63%
96%
63%
72%
88%
34%
71%
55%
93%
96%
99%
79%
89%
82%
82%
70%
94%
91%
24%
79%
2006
2007
2008
2009
Estimated Retention Percentage
55%
64%
81%
33%
91%
96%
94%
91%
92%
97%
97%
96%
92%
99%
99%
98%
59%
80%
59%
57%
94%
96%
97%
99%
58%
70%
44%
60%
86%
93%
90%
92%
66%
76%
78%
84%
61%
65%
69%
68%
68%
86%
84%
85%
14%
18%
53%
43%
75%
82%
85%
77%
2010
2011
2012
53%
95%
98%
99%
53%
98%
54%
87%
88%
81%
92%
42%
80%
86%
92%
97%
98%
67%
99%
64%
96%
86%
49%
69%
33%
85%
87%
94%
99%
93%
65%
98%
58%
91%
71%
74%
88%
39%
88%
Note: Includes all retained catches harvested. Percentages are calculated using observer retention data.
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
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Draft
Amendment 80 – Council Motion (Final Action) – June
10, 2006
The Council adopts the following components and options for analysis as a Preferred Alternative:
Issue 1: Sector Allocation of BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish to the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher
Processor
Sector and CDQ Program
Component 1 Allocate only the following primary target species to the Non-AFA Trawl CP
sector: yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Atka mackerel, and Aleutian Islands Pacific Ocean
perch. Species could be added or deleted through an amendment process.
Component 2 CDQ allocations for each primary target (Component 1) species in the
program shall be removed from the TACs prior to allocation to sectors at percentage
amounts equal to 10%
For Amendment 80 species, the reserves would be set at 10% of the TAC and all would be
allocated to the
CDQ reserves.
CDQ allocations for secondary groundfish species (except Pacific cod) taken incidental in the
primary trawl target fisheries shall be removed from the TACs prior to allocation to sectors at
percentage amounts equal to
10%.
Component 3 Identifies the sector allocation calculation (after deductions for CDQs, ICAs,
and other existing fishery allocations, i.e., Atka mackerel jig) for the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector.
The remaining portion of the primary species TAC included in this program would be allocated to
the BSAI trawl limited access fishery.
For purpose of allocation to the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector, each primary species allocation is:
Yellowfin Sole
ITAC (mt)
< = 87,500
H&G/Limited Access
93% / 7%
87,500 – 95,000
87.5% / 12.5%
95,000 – 102,500
82% / 18%
102,500 – 110,000
76.5% / 23.5%
110,000 – 117,500
71% / 29%
117,500 – 125,000
65.5% / 34.5%
>125,000
60% / 40%
AFA Yellowfin sole sideboards are removed when the Yellowfin sole ITAC is 125,000
mt or greater. Rock Sole
100%
Flathead Sole
100%
Atka Mackerel
98% in 541/EBS and 542, in the first year of the program, decreasing by
2% increments over 4-yr period to 90%. 100% in 543.
AI POP
95% in 541 and 542 in the first year of the program, decreasing to 90% in
the second year of the program. 98% in 543.
Allocations would be managed as a hard cap for the H&G sector, and for the Non H&G
sector, an ICA would be taken off the top to accommodate incidental bycatch by the nonH&G sector. AFA vessel sideboard amounts will be determined after CDQ reserve
amounts are deducted from TAC.
Legal landing means, for the purpose of initial allocation of QS, fish harvested during the
qualifying years specified and landed in compliance with state and federal permitting, landing,
and reporting regulations in effect at the time of the landing. Legal landings exclude any test
fishing, fishing conducted under an experimental, exploratory, or scientific activity permit or
the fishery conducted under the Western Alaska CDQ program.
Target species, PSC, and ICA rollover: any unharvested portion of the Amendment 80 target
species or unharvested portion of PSC or ICA in the limited access fishery that is projected to
remain unused shall be rolled over to vessels that are members of Amendment 80
cooperatives.
Any roll over of halibut PSC to the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector shall be discounted by 5%. That
is, if 100 mt of halibut is available for roll over, then 95 mt of halibut would be re-allocated to
the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector. Once the initial allocation has been determined, the Non-AFA
Trawl CP sector may re-allocate the PSC among the target species.
NMFS shall perform a review on or before May 1 and August 1 each year, and at such other
times after August 1 as it deems appropriate. In making its determination, NMFS shall consider
current catch and PSC usage, historic catch and PSC usage, harvest capacity and stated harvest
intent, as well as other relevant information.
Component 4
percentages.
Elements of Component 4 were integrated in Component 3 with selection of
Issue 2: PSC Allowance for the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Processor Sector and the CDQ Program
Component 5 Increase PSQ reserves allocated to the CDQ program (except herring, halibut,
and Chinook salmon) to levels proportional to the CDQ allocation of primary species under
Component 2.
Component 6 PSC allowances of halibut and crab to the Non-AFA Trawl CP Sector. The
halibut and crab PSC levels shall be reviewed by the Council during the fifth year of the program
and adjusted as necessary (through the normal amendment process).
Halibut PSC
BSAI Trawl limited access sector: 875 mt
Non-AFA Trawl CP sector: 2525 mt initial allocation with a 50 mt reduction in the second,
third, fourth and fifth year after program implementation. In the sixth year and subsequent
years, the allocation would be 2325mt unless adjusted. In the third year only, the 50 mt
reduction would be reallocation to the CDQ/PSQ reserve program.
Crab PSC
Allocation of crab PSC to the non-AFA Trawl CP sector shall be based on the % of historic
usage of crab PSC in all groundfish fisheries from 2000-2002 for red king crab (62.48%) and
from 1995 to 2002 for opilio (61.44%) and bairdi (zone 1: 52.64% and zone 2: 29.59%)
(resulting percentages are reported in the far right column in Table 3-43 May 5, 2006
EA/RIR/IRFA). The initial allocation will be reduced by 5% per year starting in the second
year until the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector is at 80% of their initial allocation. Trawl limited
access sectors shall receive an allowance of the sum of the combined AFA CV/CP sideboards.
(Note – basing usage on a % of annual PSC limits, results in a calculation that is crab
abundance based.)
If Amendment 85 is implemented prior to Amendment 80, the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector
would receive an allocation of PSC in accordance with Amendment 85. Upon implementation
of Amendment 80, no allocation of PSC will be made to the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector under
Amendment 85.
Issue 3: Cooperative Development for the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Processor Sector
Component 7 The BSAI non-pollock groundfish CP buyback legislation establishes the vessels
eligible to participate as a catcher processor in the BSAI non-pollock groundfish fisheries. The
members of the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Processor subsector are defined as the owner of each
trawl CP:
a.) that is not an AFA Trawl CP
b.) to whom a valid LLP license that is endorsed for BSAI Trawl CP fishing activity has
been issued;
and
c.) that the Secretary determines who has harvested with trawl gear and processed not less
than a total of 150 mt of non-pollock groundfish during the period January 1, 1997 –
through December 31, 2002.
This definition establishes the vessels that can participate in the Amendment 80 program.
Restrict LLPs that are used for eligibility in Amendment 80 (either to be included in the NonAFA CP
sector or to be used in Amendment 80 cooperative formation) from being used outside of the
Amendment
80 sector, except that any eligible vessel which is authorized to fish Pollock under the AFA
would still be authorized to fish under the statute.
Only history from eligible vessels will be credited in the program. The catch history credited to
an eligible vessel will be catch history of that vessel. The catch history credited to an eligible
vessel for the first license assigned to that vessel will only be the catch history of the eligible
vessel. In the event of the actual total loss or constructive total loss of a vessel, or permanent
inability of a vessel to be used in the Program as documented by the vessel owner and NMFS
either before or after the qualifying period, the vessel owner may transfer the catch history of
the vessel that meets the non-AFA and catch criteria of Component 7 from that vessel to the
LLP license that was originally issued for that vessel. Any such license assigned to an eligible
vessel will be credited with the catch history during the Component 10 period of the eligible
non- AFA trawl CP from which the license arose, except that no history can be assigned to
more than one vessel at a given time. Once the catch history has been assigned to the license,
that license must be used on an eligible Non-AFA Trawl CP vessel.
Component 8 Component 8 establishes the number of vessels required before the cooperative
is allowed to operate. No later than November 1 of each year, an application must be filed with
NOAA fisheries by the cooperative with a membership list for the year.
In order to operate as a cooperative, membership must be comprised of at least three separate entities
(using the
10% AFA rule) and must be:
Option 8.2
At least 30% of the eligible vessels, including LLP licenses with associated
catch history for an eligible vessel that has been transferred to that LLP license
under Component 7.
Component 9 Determines the method of allocation of PSC limits and groundfish between the
cooperative and eligible Non-AFA Trawl CP participants who elect not to be in a cooperative.
Option 9.1
Catch history is based on total catch
Assign PSC within the sector to allocated target species and Pacific cod based on the average use
of PSC in each target species from the years 1998-2004, expressed as a percent of the total PSC
allocation to the sector.
Each eligible vessel will then receive an allocation percent of PSC for catch of allocated target
species and
Pacific cod equal to its proportion of the catch history of the allocated fishery.
This PSC allocation will not change from year to year (i.e., will not fluctuate annually with the
TAC).
Component 10 Determines which years of catch history are used for establishing cooperative
allocations. The allocation of groundfish between the cooperative and those eligible participants
who elect not to join a cooperative is proportional to the catch history of groundfish of the eligible
license holders included in each pool. Applicable PSC limits are allocated between the
cooperative and non-cooperative pool in same proportions as those species that have associated
PSC limits. The catch history as determined by the option selected under this component would be
indicated on the Sector Eligibility Endorsement, which indicates the license holder’s membership
in the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector. The aggregate histories would then be applied to the
cooperative and the non-cooperative pool.
Notwithstanding the qualifying history of the vessel, a qualified vessel that has not fished
after 1997 will receive an allocation under the program of no less than:
0.5 percent of the yellowfin sole catch history
0.5 percent of the rock sole catch history
0.1 percent of the flathead sole catch history
For all other qualified vessels, the allocation will be based on 1998 – 2004, but each vessel drops its
two lowest annual catches by species during this period.
For AI POP, all vessels will receive their allocation equally in 541, 542 and 543.
Each vessel will receive its historic share of the sector’s Atka mackerel allocation based on
component 10 (all areas combined). Vessels less than 200’ in length having less than 2% of the
sector’s Atka mackerel history (“Non-mackerel vessels”) will receive their allocation distributed
by area according to each individual vessel’s catch distribution during the component 10 years.
The remainder of EBS/541, 542 and 543 sector allocation after “Non-mackerel vessels” have been
removed will be allocated to vessels that are greater than 200’ in length or have more than 2% of
the sector’s Atka mackerel allocation (“mackerel vessels”). Mackerel vessels will receive their
respective percentages (adjusted to 100%) equally in each area.
In the event that the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector receives an exclusive allocation of Pacific cod,
that allocation will be divided between cooperatives and the sector’s limited access fishery in the
same manner (and based on the same history) as the division of the other allocated species within
the sector.
Component 11 Determines if excessive share limits are established in the Non-AFA Trawl CP
sector.
Option 11.2 Consolidation in the Non-AFA Trawl Catcher Processor sector is limited such
that no single person (using the individual and collective rule) can hold catch history more
than a fixed percentage of the overall sector apportionment history. The cap would be
applied on an aggregate basis at 30%, of the sector’s allocation).
Suboption 11.2.2 Persons (individuals or entities) that exceed the cap in the initial
allocation would be grandfathered based on catch history held at the time of final Council
action.
Option 11.3 No vessel shall harvest more than 20% of the entire Non-AFA Trawl CP sector
allocation.
Suboption 11.3.1 Vessels that are initially allocated a percentage of the sector allocation
that is greater than the vessel use cap shall be grandfathered at their initial allocation
based on catch history held at the time of final Council action.
If a buyback program proceeds, any person or vessel that exceeds a cap due to the buyback
removing catch history would be grandfathered in at that new level.
Component 12 Establishes measures to maintain relative amounts of non-allocated species until
such time that fisheries for these species are further rationalized in a manner that would
supersede a need for these sideboard provisions. Sideboards shall apply to eligible licenses
and associated vessels from which the catch history arose.
Option 12.3 In the BSAI, Pacific cod will be managed under existing sector
apportionments, with rollovers, until new Pacific cod sector allocations are
implemented. Pacific cod will be allocated between the cooperative and noncooperative sub-sectors based on the same formula as Component 10.
In the BSAI, management of unallocated species should remain status quo.
Option 12.4 GOA sideboard provisions
Sideboard provisions for Amendment 80 qualified non-AFA trawl CP sector with valid
GOA LLP with appropriate area endorsements are as follows:
Suboption 12.4.1 Vessels associated with LLPs that have Gulf weekly participation
of greater than 10 weeks in the flatfish fishery during the years defined in
Component 10 will be eligible to participate in the GOA flatfish fisheries.
Suboption 12.4.2 Non-AFA trawl CP vessel(s) that fished 80% of their weeks in the
GOA flatfish fisheries from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2003 will
be exempt from GOA halibut sideboards in the GOA. Vessel(s) exempted
from Amendment 80 halibut sideboards in the GOA and may participate fully
in the GOA open-access flatfish fisheries. Vessel(s) will be prohibited from
directed fishing for all other sideboarded species in the GOA (rockfish,
Pacific cod, and Pollock). The history of this vessel will not contribute to the
Non-AFA Trawl CP sideboards and its catch will not be subtracted from these
sideboards.
Suboption 12.4.2.1 Vessel(s) exempted from Amendment 80 GOA sideboards may
lease their BSAI Amendment 80 history.
Suboption 12.4.3 Gulf-wide halibut sideboards for the deep and shallow complex
fisheries would be established by season based on the actual usage of the
Amendment 80 qualified non-AFA trawl sector for the years defined in
Component 10. That calculation results in the following percentages, less the
percentage attributed to GOA PSC sideboard exempt vessel:
GOA Halibut PSC Sideboard Limits for Non-AFA Trawl CP Sector (as percent of GOA total sideboard limit, ie,
2,000mt in 2006)
Season 1
Season 2
Season 3
Season 4
Season 5
Total
Deep Water
Trawl
Fisheries
2.84%
11.92%
11.60%
n/a
Combined
w/shallow
water
26.36
Shallow
Water Trawl
Fisheries
0.85%
1.92%
2.06%
1.73%
5.15%
11.71%
Note: The F/V Golden Fleece data still needs to be deducted from the above table.
Suboption 12.4.4 GOA Pollock, Pacific cod, and directed rockfish species (POP,
NR and PSR) sideboards for the Amendment 80 qualified non-AFA trawl CP
sector would be established using the years defined in Component 10, where
catch is defined as retained catch by Gulf area as a percentage of total
retained catch of all sectors in that area.
Suboption 12.4.5 While the CGOA rockfish demonstration program is in place, the
CGOA rockfish demonstration program takes precedence. The demonstration
program would remove the need for catch sideboards for the CGOA directed
rockfish species. The Amendment 80 CPs deep halibut mortality sideboard
cap for the
3rd seasonal allowance (in July) will be revised by the amount of the deep complex
halibut mortality allocated to the rockfish demonstration program for the
Amendment 80 qualified non-AFA trawl CP sector while the demonstration
program is in effect.
Suboption 12.4.6 Sideboards apply to vessels (actual boats) and LLPs used to
generate harvest shares that resulted in allocating a percentage of the
Amendment 80 species TACs to the non-AFA trawl CP sector. The intent is
to prevent double-dipping with respect to GOA history related to sideboards.
Suboption 12.4.7 On completion of a comprehensive rationalization program in the
GOA, any sideboards from the BSAI Amendment 80 plan amendment will be
superseded by the allocations in the GOA rationalization program.
Suboption 12.4.8 GOA PSC and groundfish sideboard limits will be established.
An aggregate sideboard limit for each sideboarded species will be established
for all vessels subject to sideboards
Other Elements of Amendment 80
This section provides additional specifics and elements for the Non-AFA Trawl CP cooperative
program. These specifics and elements are common for any cooperative program that might be
developed.
• The cooperative program developed in Amendment 80 would not supersede pollock and
Pacific cod
IR/IU programs.
•
The Groundfish Retention Standards (GRS) (Amendment 79) would be applied to the
cooperative as an aggregate on an annual basis and on those vessels who did not join a
cooperative as individuals.
•
Non-AFA Trawl CP sector participants that did not elect to join a cooperative would be
subject to all current regulations including all restrictions of the LLP and the GRS if
approved.
•
All qualified license holders participating in the fisheries of the Non-AFA Trawl
CP sector for Amendment 80 species would need to have trawl and catcher processor
endorsements with general licenses for BSAI and the additional sector eligibility
endorsement. Length limits within the license would also be enforced such that any
replacement vessel entering the fishery would not exceed the Maximum Length Overall
(MLOA) specified on the license.
• Permanent transfers of an eligible vessel, its associated catch history, and its permit would
be allowed.
Eligible vessels, their associated catch history, and a sector eligibility endorsement
would not be separable or divisible. In the event of the actual total loss or constructive
total loss of a vessel, or permanent inability of a vessel to be used in the Program, catch
history would be attached to the license that arose from the vessel and would not be
separable or divisible. All transfers must be reported to NOAA fisheries in order to track
who owns the sector eligibility permit and harvest privileges of a vessel. The purchaser
must be eligible to own a fishing vessel under MarAd regulations or any person who is
currently eligible to own a vessel.
•
Annual allocations to the cooperative will be transferable among Non-AFA Trawl CP
cooperative members. Such transfers will not need NOAA Fisheries approval.
• Annual allocations to the cooperative will be transferable among Non-AFA Trawl CP
cooperatives.
Inter-cooperative transfers must be approved by
NOAA Fisheries.
•
Any non-trawl or non-BSAI catches by qualified license holders that are considered part
of the Non- AFA Trawl CP sector will not be included in the defined cooperative program.
In addition, these non- trawl or non-BSAI catches allocated to the Non-AFA Trawl CP
sector would not necessarily be excluded from other rationalization programs.
•
Catch history used for allocation and eligibility purposes will be legal and documented catch.
•
Disposition of groundfish species not allocated to the Non-AFA Trawl CP sector will not
change as a result of the cooperative program developed in Amendment 80.
•
Bycatch limits for non-specified species or marine resources would not be established.
However, if the Council deems that bycatch is unreasonable, specific regulations to
minimize impacts would be considered.
• AFA halibut PSC Sideboard limits will be fixed at the 2006/2007 level. (The intent is to
fix the AFA
halibut sideboard amounts, in metric tons, at the level listed in the 2006/2007
NMFS reports).
•
The allocation of halibut PSC between the AFA trawl CP and trawl CV sector under
Amendment 85 will incorporation the reallocation of halibut PSC to the Amendment 80
sector.
•
The cooperative(s) would need to show evidence of binding private contracts and
remedies for violations of contractual agreements would need to be provided to NOAA
Fisheries. The cooperative would need to demonstrate adequate mechanism for monitoring
and reporting prohibited species and groundfish catch. Participants in the cooperative
would need to agree to abide by all cooperative rules and requirements.
•
Specific requirements for reporting, monitoring and enforcement, and observer
protocols will be developed in regulations for participants in the Non-AFA Trawl CP
sector These monitoring and enforcement provisions are described in Section 3.3.7 of the
April 2006 EA/RIR/IRFA. Revisions to
3.3.7 have been described in March 27, 2006 letter from NMFS to the Council.
Modifications to the monitoring and enforcement requirements described in the current
version of the EA/RIR/IRFA necessary to accommodate changes in GOA sideboard
provisions, or other issues, will be incorporated in the Secretarial review draft of the
EA/RIR/IRFA.
•
A socioeconomic data collection program as described in section 3.2.12.15 of the May 5,
2006 draft EA/RIR/IRFA for Amendment 80 will be implemented for the non-AFA trawl
CP sector. The program will collect economic data from the non-AFA trawl CP sector
similar to the types of cost, revenue, ownership, and employment data included in the draft
Cost, Earnings and Employment Survey in Appendix 3 of the May 5, 2006, draft
EA/RIR/IRFA prepared for Amendment 80. Data will be collected on a periodic basis.
The purpose of the data collection program is to understand the economic effects of the
Amendment 80 program on vessels or entities regulated by this action, and to inform future
management actions. The data is needed to assess whether Amendment 80 addresses some
goals in the problem statement to mitigate, to some degree, the costs associated with bycatch
reduction. Data will be used by Council and agency staff, recognizing that confidentiality is
of extreme importance.
Economic data collected under this program include employment data by vessel collected to
determine the labor amounts and costs for the sector. In addition, revenue and cost data by
vessel will be collected to evaluate trends in returns to the sector that may be compared with
elements of the Amendment 80 program, such as bycatch reduction measures.
The tables in this Appendix present total AM80 QS units for each AM80 species and the annual
allocations of species QS to individual vessels and the companies with which they are affiliated. The
appendix begins by showing total species allocations as shown in Table 8 below. The percentage of
the total QS allocation each species represents is shown in Table 64.
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Species
(1,000s)
Yellowfin Sole
347,990
347,990
351,506
351,506
351,506
351,506
351,506
Rock Sole
167,869
167,869
169,569
169,569
169,569
169,569
169,569
Flathead Sole
84,896
84,896
85,066
85,066
85,066
85,066
85,066
Atka Mackerel
256,282
256,282
256,282
256,282
256,282
256,282
256,282
Pacific Ocean Perch
57,882
57,882
57,882
57,882
57,882
57,882
57,882
Pacific Cod
155,235
155,235
155,235
155,235
155,235
155,235
155,235
Total
1,070,153
1,070,153
1,075,540
1,075,540
1,075,540
1,075,540
1,075,540
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
As shown in Table 64, Yellowfin Sole and Atka Mackerel comprise of more than half of total QS units
issued in the AM80 fishery.
Species
Yellowfin Sole
Rock Sole
Flathead Sole
Atka Mackerel
Pacific Ocean Perch
Pacific Cod
Total
2008
32.52%
15.69%
7.93%
23.95%
5.41%
14.51%
100.00%
2009
32.52%
15.69%
7.93%
23.95%
5.41%
14.51%
100.00%
2010
32.68%
15.77%
7.91%
23.83%
5.38%
14.43%
100.00%
2011
32.68%
15.77%
7.91%
23.83%
5.38%
14.43%
100.00%
2012
32.68%
15.77%
7.91%
23.83%
5.38%
14.43%
100.00%
2013
32.68%
15.77%
7.91%
23.83%
5.38%
14.43%
100.00%
2014
32.68%
15.77%
7.91%
23.83%
5.38%
14.43%
100.00%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
The following tables display AM80 QS allocation for each species by vessel and company. Comparing
the relative proportion of each species in Table 64 and the percentage of company holdings in
following tables, lends itself to understanding the composition of AM80 QS ownership. For example,
yellowfin sole and Atka Mackerel comprise of more than half of the AM80 fishery. By looking at Table
65 and Table 68 below reveals FCA to be the dominant holder of QS for both species.
Company
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ALLIANCE
0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
LEGACY
0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 0.79%
OCEAN ALASKA
0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25%
PROSPERITY
0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16%
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
1.24% 1.24% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23%
VAERDAL
- 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56%
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
2.54% 2.54% 3.09% 3.09% 3.09% 3.09% 3.09%
ALASKA JURIS
2.64% 2.64% 2.62% 2.62% 2.62% 2.62% 2.62%
ALASKA RANGER
2.01% 2.01% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
ALASKA SPIRIT
2.53% 2.53% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51%
ALASKA VICTORY
2.34% 2.34% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33%
ALASKA VOYAGER
0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34%
ALASKA WARRIOR
2.82% 2.82% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80%
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total 12.66% 12.66% 12.60% 12.60% 12.60% 12.60% 12.60%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
- 0.06% 0.06%
ARICA
1.56% 1.56% 1.55% 1.55% 1.55% 1.55% 1.55%
CAPE HORN
1.12% 1.12% 1.11% 1.11% 1.11% 1.11% 1.11%
REBECCA IRENE
1.38% 1.38% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37%
TREMONT
1.06% 1.06% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05%
UNIMAK
1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68%
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
6.79% 6.79% 6.76% 6.76% 6.76% 6.81% 6.81%
VAERDAL
0.56% 0.56%
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
0.56% 0.56%
SEAFISHER
1.54% 1.54%
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
1.54% 1.54%
OCEAN PEACE
1.30% 1.30% 1.29% 1.29% 1.29% 1.29% 1.29%
SEAFISHER
- 1.53% 1.53% 1.53% 1.53% 1.53%
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
1.30% 1.30% 2.82% 2.82% 2.82% 2.82% 2.82%
AMERICAN NO I
1.31% 1.31% 1.31% 1.31% 1.31% 1.31% 1.31%
US INTREPID
1.38% 1.38% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37% 1.37%
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
2.69% 2.69% 2.68% 2.68% 2.68% 2.68% 2.68%
CONSTELLATION
1.65% 1.65% 1.65% 1.65% 1.65% 1.65% 1.65%
DEFENDER
1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36%
ENTERPRISE
1.36% 1.36% 1.35% 1.35% 1.35% 1.35% 1.35%
BERING ENTERPRISE
- 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16%
HARVESTER ENTERPRISE
- 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16%
O'HARA CORPORATION O'Hara Corporation Total
4.38% 4.38% 4.68% 4.68% 4.68% 4.68% 4.68%
Grand Total
32.52% 32.52% 32.68% 32.68% 32.68% 32.68% 32.68%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
Company
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ALLIANCE
0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11%
LEGACY
0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70%
OCEAN ALASKA
0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
PROSPERITY
0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
0.53% 0.53% 0.53% 0.53% 0.53% 0.53% 0.53%
VAERDAL
- 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55%
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
1.53% 1.53% 2.07% 2.07% 2.07% 2.07% 2.07%
ALASKA JURIS
0.74% 0.74% 0.73% 0.73% 0.73% 0.73% 0.73%
ALASKA RANGER
0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56%
ALASKA SPIRIT
1.07% 1.07% 1.07% 1.07% 1.07% 1.07% 1.07%
ALASKA VICTORY
0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52%
ALASKA VOYAGER
0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09%
ALASKA WARRIOR
0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68%
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total 3.66% 3.66% 3.65% 3.65% 3.65% 3.65% 3.65%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
- 0.10% 0.10%
ARICA
0.81% 0.81% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80%
CAPE HORN
0.62% 0.62% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61%
REBECCA IRENE
0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66%
TREMONT
0.61% 0.61% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60%
UNIMAK
1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16%
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
3.85% 3.85% 3.84% 3.84% 3.84% 3.93% 3.93%
VAERDAL
0.55% 0.55%
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
0.55% 0.55%
SEAFISHER
0.30% 0.30%
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
0.30% 0.30%
OCEAN PEACE
0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67%
SEAFISHER
- 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
0.67% 0.67% 0.96% 0.96% 0.96% 0.96% 0.96%
AMERICAN NO I
1.20% 1.20% 1.19% 1.19% 1.19% 1.19% 1.19%
US INTREPID
1.13% 1.13% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12% 1.12%
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
2.32% 2.32% 2.31% 2.31% 2.31% 2.31% 2.31%
CONSTELLATION
0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86%
DEFENDER
0.98% 0.98% 0.97% 0.97% 0.97% 0.97% 0.97%
ENTERPRISE
0.87% 0.87% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86%
BERING ENTERPRISE
- 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
HARVESTER ENTERPRISE
- 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
O'Hara Corporation
O'Hara Corporation Total
2.71% 2.71% 2.85% 2.85% 2.85% 2.85% 2.85%
Grand Total
15.69% 15.69% 15.77% 15.77% 15.77% 15.77% 15.77%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
Company
Vessel
ALLIANCE
LEGACY
OCEAN ALASKA
PROSPERITY
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
VAERDAL
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
ALASKA JURIS
ALASKA RANGER
ALASKA SPIRIT
ALASKA VICTORY
ALASKA VOYAGER
ALASKA WARRIOR
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
ARICA
CAPE HORN
REBECCA IRENE
TREMONT
UNIMAK
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
VAERDAL
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
SEAFISHER
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
OCEAN PEACE
SEAFISHER
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
AMERICAN NO I
US INTREPID
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
CONSTELLATION
DEFENDER
ENTERPRISE
BERING ENTERPRISE
HARVESTER
ENTERPRISE
O'Hara Corporation
2008
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.66%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.07%
0.07%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.83%
0.12%
0.12%
0.09%
0.09%
0.42%
0.42%
0.20%
0.24%
0.44%
0.88%
0.75%
0.96%
2009
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.66%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.07%
0.07%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.83%
0.12%
0.12%
0.09%
0.09%
0.42%
0.42%
0.20%
0.24%
0.44%
0.88%
0.75%
0.96%
2010
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.12%
0.77%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.06%
0.06%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.81%
0.42%
0.09%
0.51%
0.19%
0.24%
0.44%
0.87%
0.74%
0.96%
2011
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.12%
0.77%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.06%
0.06%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.81%
0.42%
0.09%
0.51%
0.19%
0.24%
0.44%
0.87%
0.74%
0.96%
2012
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.12%
0.77%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.06%
0.06%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.81%
0.42%
0.09%
0.51%
0.19%
0.24%
0.44%
0.87%
0.74%
0.96%
2013
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.12%
0.77%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.06%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.88%
0.42%
0.09%
0.51%
0.19%
0.24%
0.44%
0.87%
0.74%
0.96%
2014
0.06%
0.23%
0.13%
0.01%
0.23%
0.12%
0.77%
0.19%
0.10%
0.15%
0.11%
0.02%
0.16%
0.73%
0.06%
0.56%
0.72%
0.58%
0.74%
0.22%
2.88%
0.42%
0.09%
0.51%
0.19%
0.24%
0.44%
0.87%
0.74%
0.96%
-
- 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
-
- 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
O'Hara Corporation Total
2.58% 2.58% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59% 2.59%
Grand Total
7.93% 7.93% 7.91% 7.91% 7.91% 7.91% 7.91%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
Company
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ALLIANCE
0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12%
LEGACY
0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35%
OCEAN ALASKA
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
1.88% 1.88% 1.87% 1.87% 1.87% 1.87% 1.87%
VAERDAL
- 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17%
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
2.35% 2.35% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51% 2.51%
ALASKA JURIS
3.23% 3.23% 3.22% 3.22% 3.22% 3.22% 3.22%
ALASKA RANGER
2.42% 2.42% 2.41% 2.41% 2.41% 2.41% 2.41%
ALASKA SPIRIT
2.04% 2.04% 2.03% 2.03% 2.03% 2.03% 2.03%
ALASKA VICTORY
2.74% 2.74% 2.73% 2.73% 2.73% 2.73% 2.73%
ALASKA VOYAGER
0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28%
ALASKA WARRIOR
3.27% 3.27% 3.25% 3.25% 3.25% 3.25% 3.25%
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total 13.98% 13.98% 13.91% 13.91% 13.91% 13.91% 13.91%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
- 0.00% 0.00%
ARICA
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
CAPE HORN
0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
REBECCA IRENE
0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
UNIMAK
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
VAERDAL
0.17% 0.17%
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
JUBILEE FISHERIES, INC. Total
0.17% 0.17%
SEAFISHER
4.46% 4.46%
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
4.46% 4.46%
OCEAN PEACE
2.20% 2.20% 2.19% 2.19% 2.19% 2.19% 2.19%
SEAFISHER
- 4.44% 4.44% 4.44% 4.44% 4.44%
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
2.20% 2.20% 6.63% 6.63% 6.63% 6.63% 6.63%
AMERICAN NO I
0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23%
US INTREPID
0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
0.53% 0.53% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52%
CONSTELLATION
0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07%
DEFENDER
0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
ENTERPRISE
0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
O'Hara Corporation
O'Hara Corporation Total
0.17% 0.17% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16%
Grand Total
23.95% 23.95% 23.83% 23.83% 23.83% 23.83% 23.83%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
Company
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
LEGACY
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77%
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77%
ALASKA JURIS
0.88% 0.88% 0.87% 0.87% 0.87% 0.87%
ALASKA RANGER
0.48% 0.48% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47%
ALASKA SPIRIT
0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13%
ALASKA VICTORY
0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36%
ALASKA VOYAGER
0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09%
ALASKA WARRIOR
0.93% 0.93% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92%
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total 2.87% 2.87% 2.85% 2.85% 2.85% 2.85%
CAPE HORN
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
UNIMAK
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SEAFISHER
1.00% 1.00%
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
1.00% 1.00%
OCEAN PEACE
0.74% 0.74% 0.73% 0.73% 0.73% 0.73%
SEAFISHER
- 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
0.74% 0.74% 1.73% 1.73% 1.73% 1.73%
AMERICAN NO I
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
US INTREPID
0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Grand Total
5.41% 5.41% 5.38% 5.38% 5.38% 5.38%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
2014
0.00%
0.77%
0.77%
0.87%
0.47%
0.13%
0.36%
0.09%
0.92%
2.85%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.73%
1.00%
1.73%
0.01%
0.02%
0.02%
5.38%
Company
Vessel
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ALLIANCE
0.23% 0.23% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22%
LEGACY
0.62% 0.62% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61% 0.61%
OCEAN ALASKA
0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09%
SEAFREEZE ALASKA
0.89% 0.89% 0.88% 0.88% 0.88% 0.88% 0.88%
VAERDAL
- 0.51% 0.51% 0.51% 0.51% 0.51%
U.S. Seafoods
U.S. Seafoods Total
1.82% 1.82% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33%
ALASKA JURIS
0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47%
ALASKA RANGER
0.32% 0.32% 0.32% 0.32% 0.32% 0.32% 0.32%
ALASKA SPIRIT
0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 0.46%
ALASKA VICTORY
0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44%
ALASKA VOYAGER
0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12%
ALASKA WARRIOR
0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43% 0.43%
Fishing Company of Alaska Fishing Company of Alaska Total 2.24% 2.24% 2.23% 2.23% 2.23% 2.23% 2.23%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Arctic Sole Seafoods, Inc. Total
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
ARCTIC ROSE/OCEAN CAPE
- 0.05% 0.05%
ARICA
0.84% 0.84% 0.83% 0.83% 0.83% 0.83% 0.83%
CAPE HORN
0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68%
REBECCA IRENE
0.78% 0.78% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77% 0.77%
TREMONT
0.41% 0.41% 0.41% 0.41% 0.41% 0.41% 0.41%
UNIMAK
0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72% 0.72%
Iquique U.S.
Iquique U.S. Total
3.42% 3.42% 3.40% 3.40% 3.40% 3.46% 3.46%
VAERDAL
0.52% 0.52%
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.
Jubilee Fisheries, Inc. Total
0.52% 0.52%
SEAFISHER
0.75% 0.75%
M/V Savage, Inc.
M/V Savage, Inc. Total
0.75% 0.75%
OCEAN PEACE
0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75%
SEAFISHER
- 0.74% 0.74% 0.74% 0.74% 0.74%
Ocean Peace, Inc.
Ocean Peace, Inc. Total
0.75% 0.75% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49% 1.49%
AMERICAN NO I
0.84% 0.84% 0.84% 0.84% 0.84% 0.84% 0.84%
US INTREPID
1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30%
Fishermans Finest
Fishermans Finest Total
2.15% 2.15% 2.14% 2.14% 2.14% 2.14% 2.14%
CONSTELLATION
0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90%
DEFENDER
0.92% 0.92% 0.91% 0.91% 0.91% 0.91% 0.91%
ENTERPRISE
0.99% 0.99% 0.98% 0.98% 0.98% 0.98% 0.98%
O'Hara Corporation
O'Hara Corporation Total
2.81% 2.81% 2.79% 2.79% 2.79% 2.79% 2.79%
Grand Total
14.51% 14.51% 14.43% 14.43% 14.43% 14.43% 14.43%
Note: 2009 QS pool was adjusted to reflect only active QS holders. QS for Bering Enterprise and Harvester
Enterprise was issued late in 2009 and therefore not approved for QS until 2010 (Buck, 2014).
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from NMFS AM80 QS Holder Reports, NMFS 2014b
This appendix provide bycatch summaries for AM80 target fisheries including sections for yellowfin
sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, and rockfish in the BSAI and rockfish and rex
sole in the GOA. All sections contain four tables, and 12 figures. Throughout the appendix both CDQ
harvests and activities of AM80 vessels while acting as motherships are excluded. It should also be
noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all catches and
revenues of groundfish not just the catch of the target species.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
98,040
$69.0
2004
86,072
$70.8
2005
103,435
$99.1
2006
92,901
$82.6
2007
108,257
$82.2
2008
147,768
$109.5
2009
128,746
$82.8
2010
121,447
$79.1
2011
146,308
$121.2
2012
138,034
$118.7
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
701
27,020
291,111
229,552
32,584
279
515
392
38,845
1,351,860
244,221
73,006
29
395
552
59,735
2,379,719
683,379
46,419
343
492
345
33,509
576,735
253,585
10,446
1
57
446
11,180
603,074
228,386
50,053
181
55
840
34,456
471,480
305,746
78,500
61
24
898
19,889
202,262
271,859
22,654
182
814
18,607
174,443
212,040
3,319
138
36
767
7,546
414,890
685,586
13,249
318
761
5,845
298,107
256,170
10,048
90
256
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0071
0.2756
2.9693
2.3414
0.3324
0.0028
0.0053
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0045
0.0053
0.0037
0.0041
0.0057
0.0070 0.0067
0.4513
0.5775
0.3607
0.1033
0.2332
0.1545 0.1532
15.7062
23.0069
6.2080
5.5708
3.1907
1.5710 1.4364
2.8374
6.6069
2.7296
2.1097
2.0691
2.1116 1.7459
0.8482
0.4488
0.1124
0.4624
0.5312
0.1760 0.0273
0.0003
0.0033
0.0000
0.0017
0.0004
- 0.0011
0.0046
0.0048
0.0006
0.0005
0.0002
0.0014 0.0003
2011
2012
0.0052
0.0516
2.8357
4.6859
0.0906
0.0022
0.0055
0.0423
2.1597
1.8558
0.0728
0.0007
0.0019
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
2003
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
$98,372
PSC King Crab ($/#)
$2,552
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
$237
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
$300
PSC Herring ($/kg)
$2,116
PSC Chinook ($/#)
$246,879
PSC non-Chinook ($/#) $133,861
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$180,708 $179,476
$239,231
$184,464
$130,439 $92,137
$97,284 $157,972
$155,902
$1,822
$1,659
$2,466
$7,351
$3,179
$4,161
$4,254 $16,064
$20,310
$52
$42
$143
$136
$232
$409
$454
$292
$398
$290
$145
$326
$360
$358
$304
$373
$177
$463
$969
$2,135
$7,909
$1,642
$1,395
$3,654
$23,843
$9,148
$11,815
$2,436,527 $288,577 $73,118,022
$453,245 $1,795,802
$573,310
- $1,318,606
$179,072 $201,593 $1,443,960 $1,499,677 $4,563,583 $454,708 $2,197,265 $380,848
$463,763
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$160
140,000
$140
120,000
$120
100,000
$100
80,000
$80
60,000
$60
40,000
$40
20,000
$20
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
160,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
80
1,000
70
875
60
750
50
625
40
500
30
375
20
250
10
125
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
Halibut (mt)
2011
2012
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
70
3.5
60
3.0
50
2.5
40
2.0
30
1.5
20
1.0
10
0.5
0
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
70.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
2.5
Millions of Crabs
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
C.Opilio Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
600
Number of Salmon
500
400
300
200
100
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$240,000
0.7%
$210,000
0.6%
$180,000
0.5%
$150,000
0.4%
$120,000
0.3%
$90,000
0.2%
$60,000
0.1%
$30,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
0.8%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.90
$27,000
0.80
$24,000
0.70
$21,000
0.60
$18,000
0.50
$15,000
0.40
$12,000
0.30
$9,000
0.20
$6,000
0.10
$3,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$24,000
0.50
$20,000
0.40
$16,000
0.30
$12,000
0.20
$8,000
0.10
$4,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.60
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
30.0
$240
25.0
$200
20.0
$160
15.0
$120
10.0
$80
5.0
$40
0.0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$80,000,000
0.0035
$70,000,000
0.0030
$60,000,000
0.0025
$50,000,000
0.0020
$40,000,000
0.0015
$30,000,000
0.0010
$20,000,000
0.0005
$10,000,000
0.0000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.0040
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.006
$4,800,000
0.005
$4,000,000
0.004
$3,200,000
0.003
$2,400,000
0.002
$1,600,000
0.001
$800,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch of AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for rock sole in the BSAI .The
tables and figures exclude CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels, while acting as motherships. It
should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all
catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of rock sole.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
36,562
$25.1
2004
46,524
$35.1
2005
38,682
$35.8
2006
46,019
$44.9
2007
36,052
$31.7
2008
61,496
$50.6
2009
48,597
$31.9
2010
69,902
$49.4
2011
66,436
$58.1
2012
79,658
$68.5
2011
453
26,667
10,463
69,951
196
19
78
2012
383
20,749
8,001
61,715
114
51
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
959
56,072
33,865
258,578
3,719
630
-
2004
534
43,563
185,914
175,145
5,691
664
-
2005
766
48,445
587,380
391,612
15,298
325
-
2006
802
60,529
73,316
137,767
2,800
123
716
2007
905
80,974
68,400
87,003
5,664
839
259
2008
621
43,512
9,957
87,175
478
82
643
2009
559
44,069
8,491
66,140
184
110
36
2010
879
36,262
10,591
91,359
452
463
171
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0262
1.5336
0.9262
7.0724
0.1017
0.0172
-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0115
0.0198
0.0174
0.0251
0.0101
0.0115 0.0126
0.9364
1.2524
1.3153
2.2460
0.7076
0.9068 0.5188
3.9961
15.1850
1.5932
1.8973
0.1619
0.1747 0.1515
3.7646
10.1240
2.9937
2.4133
1.4176
1.3610 1.3070
0.1223
0.3955
0.0608
0.1571
0.0078
0.0038 0.0065
0.0143
0.0084
0.0027
0.0233
0.0013
0.0023 0.0066
0.0156
0.0072
0.0105
0.0007 0.0024
2011
2012
0.0068
0.4014
0.1575
1.0529
0.0030
0.0003
0.0012
0.0048
0.2605
0.1004
0.7748
0.0014
0.0006
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$26,124
$447
$740
$97
$6,737
$39,795
-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$65,822
$46,757
$55,933
$35,035
$81,502
$57,065 $56,274 $128,273 $178,835
$806
$739
$741
$391
$1,162
$724
$1,363
$2,180
$3,303
$189
$61
$612
$463
$5,079
$3,760
$4,668
$5,557
$8,565
$201
$91
$326
$364
$580
$483
$541
$831
$1,110
$6,172
$2,341
$16,023
$5,596 $105,716 $173,915 $109,469 $296,611 $602,750
$52,868 $110,281 $365,520
$37,801 $616,976 $290,719 $106,882 $3,060,090 $1,343,924
$62,651 $122,274
$78,655 $887,021 $289,107 $745,598
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$80
70,000
$70
60,000
$60
50,000
$50
40,000
$40
30,000
$30
20,000
$20
10,000
$10
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
80,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
18
1,200
15
1,000
12
800
9
600
6
400
3
200
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
1.0
90
0.9
80
0.8
70
0.7
60
0.6
50
0.5
40
0.4
30
0.3
20
0.2
10
0.1
0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
100
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
90.0
80.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.7
0.6
Millions of Crabs
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
C.Opilio Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
900
800
Number of Salmon
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$180,000
2.5%
$150,000
2.0%
$120,000
1.5%
$90,000
1.0%
$60,000
0.5%
$30,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
3.0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.40
$640,000
0.35
$560,000
0.30
$480,000
0.25
$400,000
0.20
$320,000
0.15
$240,000
0.10
$160,000
0.05
$80,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$3,600
2.00
$3,000
1.60
$2,400
1.20
$1,800
0.80
$1,200
0.40
$600
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2.40
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
30.0
$1,200
25.0
$1,000
20.0
$800
15.0
$600
10.0
$400
5.0
$200
0.0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$3,500,000
0.020
$2,800,000
0.015
$2,100,000
0.010
$1,400,000
0.005
$700,000
0.000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.025
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.018
$900,000
0.016
$800,000
0.014
$700,000
0.012
$600,000
0.010
$500,000
0.008
$400,000
0.006
$300,000
0.004
$200,000
0.002
$100,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch of AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for flathead sole in the BSAI.
The tables and figures excludes CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels, while acting as
motherships. It should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and
figures includes all catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of flathead sole.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
18,642
$14.99
2004
28,257
$22.18
2005
22,492
$21.55
2006
18,758
$19.35
2007
20,442
$16.50
2008
27,999
$22.51
2009
18,932
$12.73
2010
21,479
$15.25
2011
7,573
$6.75
2012
6,091
$5.40
2011
68
1,885
52,306
31,885
371
331
2012
82
472
25,629
25,335
572
45
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
177
154
220,131
338,279
2,542
395
163
2004
434
223
120,677
166,231
6,220
515
2,344
2005
240
461
117,055
269,949
1,014
45
440
2006
305
682
100,507
219,505
1,725
288
802
2007
304
893
261,127
147,077
859
-
2008
233
4,228
111,631
116,360
1,139
103
145
2009
172
2,088
141,259
41,440
454
71
2010
169
933
76,931
65,546
232
15
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0095
0.0083
11.8083
18.1459
0.1363
0.0212
0.0087
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0154
0.0107
0.0162
0.0149
0.0083
0.0091 0.0078
0.0079
0.0205
0.0364
0.0437
0.1510
0.1103 0.0434
4.2707
5.2044
5.3581
12.7742
3.9869
7.4614 3.5817
5.8828
12.0022
11.7020
7.1949
4.1559
2.1889 3.0516
0.2201
0.0451
0.0920
0.0420
0.0407
0.0240 0.0108
0.0182
0.0020
0.0153
0.0037
0.0830
0.0196
0.0427
0.0052
0.0038 0.0007
2011
2012
0.0090
0.2489
6.9071
4.2105
0.0490
0.0437
0.0135
0.0776
4.2081
4.1597
0.0939
0.0074
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$84,628
$97,449
$68
$44
$5,897
$37,905
$92,158
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$51,046
$89,862
$63,487
$54,254
$96,560
$73,947
$90,467
$98,652
$99,397
$46,725
$28,372
$18,483
$5,324
$6,097
$16,343
$3,580
$184
$184
$193
$63
$202
$90
$198
$129
$133
$80
$88
$112
$193
$307
$233
$212
$3,565
$21,250
$11,216
$19,201
$19,763
$28,057
$65,714
$18,166
$43,042 $480,113
$67,240
- $218,501
$9,459
$48,964
$24,133
- $155,245 $179,122 $1,015,833
$20,390
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$65,512
$11,436
$211
$213
$9,448
$120,078
$24
25,000
$20
20,000
$16
15,000
$12
10,000
$8
5,000
$4
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
30,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
7
490
6
420
5
350
4
280
3
210
2
140
1
70
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.6
5
0.5
4
0.4
3
0.3
2
0.2
1
0.1
0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
6
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
3.5
King Crabs (1,000s)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.40
0.35
Millions of Crabs
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
C.Opilio Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2,500
Number of Salmon
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$100,000
1.8%
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
1.6%
$80,000
1.4%
1.2%
$60,000
1.0%
0.8%
$40,000
0.6%
0.4%
$20,000
0.2%
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
2.0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.25
$75,000
0.20
$60,000
0.15
$45,000
0.10
$30,000
0.05
$15,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$120,000
0.25
$100,000
0.20
$80,000
0.15
$60,000
0.10
$40,000
0.05
$20,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.30
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
32
$120
28
$105
24
$90
20
$75
16
$60
12
$45
8
$30
4
$15
0
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$500,000
0.020
$400,000
0.015
$300,000
0.010
$200,000
0.005
$100,000
0.000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.025
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.10
$1,250,000
0.08
$1,000,000
0.06
$750,000
0.04
$500,000
0.02
$250,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch of AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for Atka mackerel in the
BSAI. The tables and figures exclude CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels while acting as
motherships. It should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and
figures includes all catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of Atka mackerel.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
57,217
$28.8
2004
58,886
$36.5
2005
64,057
$45.1
2006
63,802
$43.4
2007
61,390
$52.7
2008
58,569
$45.6
2009
70,929
$66.2
2010
69,111
$68.1
2011
47,693
$64.7
2012
45,090
$60.3
2011
107
35,244
682
285
115
2012
159
7,998
64
34
161
1,078
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
55
582
193
482
205
2004
40
32
110
503
21
383
85
2005
76
234
1,752
3
123
2,056
2006
79
4,528
104
1,282
11
433
2007
185
1,841
275
266
723
2008
63
23,299
74
224
272
2009
64
4,919
124
298
2010
54
3,408
53
241
839
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0010
0.0102
0.0034
0.0084
0.0036
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0007
0.0012
0.0012
0.0030
0.0011
0.0009 0.0008
0.0005
0.0037
0.0710
0.0300
0.3978
0.0693 0.0493
0.0019
0.0016
0.0085
0.0274
0.0045
0.0013
- 0.0008
0.0003
0.0000
0.0201
0.0065
0.0019
0.0002
0.0043
0.0038
0.0017 0.0035
0.0014
0.0321
0.0068
0.0118
0.0046
0.0042 0.0121
2011
2012
0.0023
0.7390
0.0143
0.0060
0.0024
0.0035
0.1774
0.0014
0.0008
0.0036
0.0239
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$519,670
$49,433
$149,408
$59,703
$140,135
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$902,624
$593,428
$545,602
$285,268
$720,147 $1,038,294 $1,268,753
$1,146,472
$192,788
$9,574
$28,653
$1,958
$13,462
$19,985
$332,958
$416,858
$72,507
$25,731
$191,727
$616,514
- $1,284,824
$1,774,913 $16,160,340
$33,816
$95,372
$367,730 $3,786,305
$197,997
$203,624
$534,702
$282,620
$431,452
$21,926
$100,162
$72,973
$167,724
$222,203
$81,175
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2011
2012
$602,745
$1,835
$94,812
$227,283
$563,988
$378,673
$7,533
$941,558
$1,767,390
$374,202
$55,893
$80
70,000
$70
60,000
$60
50,000
$50
40,000
$40
30,000
$30
20,000
$20
10,000
$10
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
80,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
1.4
210
1.2
180
1.0
150
0.8
120
0.6
90
0.4
60
0.2
30
0.0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.0018
32
0.0016
28
0.0014
24
0.0012
20
0.0010
16
0.0008
12
0.0006
8
0.0004
4
0.0002
0
0.0000
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
36
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All King Crab
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
40.0
35.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.0
0.0
Millions of Crabs
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
C.Opilio Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2,500
Number of Salmon
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$1,600,000
0.35%
$1,400,000
0.30%
$1,200,000
0.25%
$1,000,000
0.20%
$800,000
0.15%
$600,000
0.10%
$400,000
0.05%
$200,000
0.00%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
0.40%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.024
$18,000,000
0.020
$15,000,000
0.016
$12,000,000
0.012
$9,000,000
0.008
$6,000,000
0.004
$3,000,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$1,200,000
0.70
$1,050,000
0.60
$900,000
0.50
$750,000
0.40
$600,000
0.30
$450,000
0.20
$300,000
0.10
$150,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.80
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
0.030
$1,500,000
0.025
$1,250,000
0.020
$1,000,000
0.015
$750,000
0.010
$500,000
0.005
$250,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$4,000,000
0.008
$3,200,000
0.006
$2,400,000
0.004
$1,600,000
0.002
$800,000
0.000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.010
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.040
$600,000
0.035
$525,000
0.030
$450,000
0.025
$375,000
0.020
$300,000
0.015
$225,000
0.010
$150,000
0.005
$75,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for Pacific cod in the BSAI. The
tables and figures exclude CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels while acting as motherships. It
should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all
catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of Pacific cod.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
38,903
$36.6
2004
61,262
$50.3
2005
40,228
$41.6
2006
42,859
$53.1
2007
48,834
$71.1
2008
5,286
$9.5
2009
6,692
$6.6
2010
5,517
$6.0
2011
3,453
$4.0
2012
3,708
$4.5
2011
29
422
3,930
3,331
320
127
2012
86
132
1,242
2,507
22
269
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
577
3,476
60,304
108,625
12,736
1,864
241
2004
1,129
2,582
66,503
174,314
8,363
2,986
5,945
2005
782
1,738
33,194
98,582
17,552
1,642
319
2006
833
7,837
75,096
131,035
7,782
1,943
6,092
2007
613
4,513
263,214
111,370
503
2,606
823
2008
44
116
4,169
2,854
379
97
153
2009
75
1,509
6,348
8,639
2
232
3
2010
35
427
531
5,846
71
123
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0148
0.0893
1.5501
2.7922
0.3274
0.0479
0.0062
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0184
0.0194
0.0194
0.0125
0.0083
0.0112 0.0063
0.0421
0.0432
0.1829
0.0924
0.0219
0.2254 0.0774
1.0856
0.8252
1.7522
5.3900
0.7887
0.9485 0.0963
2.8454
2.4506
3.0573
2.2806
0.5400
1.2910 1.0596
0.1365
0.4363
0.1816
0.0103
0.0717
0.0003 0.0129
0.0487
0.0408
0.0453
0.0534
0.0183
0.0347 0.0223
0.0970
0.0079
0.1421
0.0169
0.0289
0.0005
-
2011
2012
0.0083
0.1222
1.1382
0.9646
0.0928
0.0367
0.0232
0.0356
0.3348
0.6760
0.0060
0.0725
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$63,339
$10,519
$606
$337
$2,871
$19,618
$151,791
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$44,551
$53,218
$63,779 $116,000 $216,496
$88,095 $171,332 $138,602
$19,479
$23,961
$6,778
$15,747
$81,636
$4,375
$13,949
$9,375
$756
$1,254
$707
$270
$2,271
$1,040
$11,220
$1,007
$289
$422
$405
$638
$3,317
$764
$1,019
$1,188
$6,014
$2,372
$6,826 $141,411
$24,990 $3,250,946
$83,633
$16,841
$25,355
$27,341
$27,275
$97,628
$28,389
$48,423
$12,347
$8,460 $130,675
$8,719
$86,331
$61,889 $2,170,862
$31,189
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$52,754
$34,377
$3,657
$1,811
$202,537
$16,881
-
$80
70,000
$70
60,000
$60
50,000
$50
40,000
$40
30,000
$30
20,000
$20
10,000
$10
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
80,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
18
1,200
15
1,000
12
800
9
600
6
400
3
200
0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.40
7
0.35
6
0.30
5
0.25
4
0.20
3
0.15
2
0.10
1
0.05
0
0.00
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
8
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
7.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.3
Millions of Crabs
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
C.Opilio Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
7,000
Number of Salmon
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$250,000
2.0%
$200,000
1.5%
$150,000
1.0%
$100,000
0.5%
$50,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
2.5%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.5
$4,000,000
0.4
$3,200,000
0.3
$2,400,000
0.2
$1,600,000
0.1
$800,000
0.0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$90,000
0.20
$75,000
0.16
$60,000
0.12
$45,000
0.08
$30,000
0.04
$15,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.24
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
8
$1,600
7
$1,400
6
$1,200
5
$1,000
4
$800
3
$600
2
$400
1
$200
0
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
2009
2010
2011
2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$100,000
0.08
$80,000
0.06
$60,000
0.04
$40,000
0.02
$20,000
0.00
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.16
$2,400,000
0.14
$2,100,000
0.12
$1,800,000
0.10
$1,500,000
0.08
$1,200,000
0.06
$900,000
0.04
$600,000
0.02
$300,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch AM80-CPs in the target|fisheries for all rockfish in the BSAI. The
tables and figures exclude CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels while acting as motherships. It
should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all
catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of rockfish.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
13,037
$10.7
2004
10,070
$9.3
2005
8,156
$11.3
2006
10,009
$15.7
2007
14,882
$19.7
2008
12,685
$11.9
2009
10,535
$10.3
2010
12,407
$14.4
2011
20,639
$34.0
2012
20,387
$26.8
2011
96
5,344
406
359
-
2012
68
7,414
102
273
76
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
48
3,000
313
-
2004
50
1,944
1,248
8
-
2005
13
4,933
-
2006
29
2,758
-
2007
17
3,203
-
2008
33
3,343
9
5
3
2009
30
2,329
80
7
2010
56
3,476
103
660
540
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0037
0.2301
0.0240
-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0049
0.0016
0.0029
0.0011
0.0026
0.0028 0.0045
0.1930
0.6048
0.2756
0.2153
0.2636
0.2211 0.2802
- 0.0083
0.1239
0.0007
0.0076 0.0532
0.0008
0.0004
- 0.0435
0.0002
0.0007
-
2011
2012
0.0046
0.2590
0.0197
0.0174
-
0.0033
0.3637
0.0050
0.0134
0.0037
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$220,882
$3,565
$34,181
-
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$186,038
$857,667
$545,917 $1,176,823
$356,741
$350,085
$257,598
$4,760
$2,282
$5,692
$6,162
$3,571
$4,435
$4,144
$139,866
$7,413
- $1,326,610
$129,102
$21,824
$1,152,175
- $2,378,384
$26,673
- $3,993,140 $1,473,528
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2011
2012
$353,985
$6,354
$83,701
$94,592
-
$397,273
$3,618
$262,945
$98,264
$352,935
$36
20,000
$30
16,000
$24
12,000
$18
8,000
$12
4,000
$6
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
24,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
0.010
100
0.008
80
0.006
60
0.004
40
0.002
20
0.000
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring (mt)
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.0016
7
0.0014
6
0.0012
5
0.0010
4
0.0008
3
0.0006
2
0.0004
1
0.0002
0
0.0000
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
8
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
8.0
7.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.0014
0.0012
Millions of Crabs
0.0010
0.0008
0.0006
0.0004
0.0002
0.0000
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
C.Opilio Crab
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
600
Number of Salmon
500
400
300
200
100
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$1,200,000
0.5%
$1,000,000
0.4%
$800,000
0.3%
$600,000
0.2%
$400,000
0.1%
$200,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
0.6%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.0009
$1,400,000
0.0008
$1,200,000
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
0.0007
$1,000,000
0.0006
0.0005
$800,000
0.0004
$600,000
0.0003
$400,000
0.0002
$200,000
0.0001
0.0000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$7,000
0.6
$6,000
0.5
$5,000
0.4
$4,000
0.3
$3,000
0.2
$2,000
0.1
$1,000
0.0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.7
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
0.14
$1,400,000
0.12
$1,200,000
0.10
$1,000,000
0.08
$800,000
0.06
$600,000
0.04
$400,000
0.02
$200,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$2,500,000
0.045
$2,250,000
0.040
$2,000,000
0.035
$1,750,000
0.030
$1,500,000
0.025
$1,250,000
0.020
$1,000,000
0.015
$750,000
0.010
$500,000
0.005
$250,000
0.000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.050
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.0045
$4,500,000
0.0040
$4,000,000
0.0035
$3,500,000
0.0030
$3,000,000
0.0025
$2,500,000
0.0020
$2,000,000
0.0015
$1,500,000
0.0010
$1,000,000
0.0005
$500,000
0.0000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for arrowtooth and Kamchatka
flounder in the BSAI. Arrowtooth and Kamchatka have been combined for all years, noting that it was
not until 2011 that the differences between the two species were recognized in the reporting system.
The tables and figures exclude CDQ harvests and activities of AM80 vessels while acting as
motherships. It should also be noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and
figures includes all catches and revenues of groundfish not just the catch of arrowtooth and
Kamchatka flounder.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
2,732
$2.7
2004
3,314
$2.5
2005
5,604
$4.8
2006
3,877
$2.6
2007
1,243
$0.9
2008
15,340
$12.3
2009
22,594
$18.0
2010
30,661
$24.1
2011
26,804
$22.7
2012
30,148
$26.4
2011
258
13,495
1,975
2,860
177
111
2012
504
11,398
2,871
1,834
93
4
148
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
53
467
71
6,012
87
1,597
2
2004
88
730
3,732
104
930
-
2005
200
260
596
10,487
39
1,923
136
2006
123
835
5,840
25,418
146
259
5,369
2007
17
199
4,635
21,913
25
108
-
2008
127
3,461
6,985
34,058
2,019
142
2009
223
8,193
2,474
2,663
55
135
2010
179
6,328
432
819
9
27
-
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0195
0.1711
0.0262
2.2008
0.0320
0.5847
0.0006
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0267
0.0356
0.0317
0.0134
0.0083
0.0099 0.0058
0.2204
0.0463
0.2153
0.1603
0.2256
0.3626 0.2064
0.1064
1.5062
3.7296
0.4554
0.1095 0.0141
1.1262
1.8714
6.5560
17.6344
2.2203
0.1179 0.0267
0.0314
0.0070
0.0376
0.0201
0.1316
0.0025 0.0003
0.2806
0.3431
0.0668
0.0870
- 0.0009
0.0242
1.3847
0.0093
0.0060
-
2011
2012
0.0096
0.5035
0.0737
0.1067
0.0066
0.0041
0.0167
0.3781
0.0952
0.0608
0.0031
0.0001
0.0049
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$51,028
$5,804
$37,965
$451
$31,047
$1,698
$1,706,030
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$27,734
$24,030
$21,268
$53,319
$97,092
$80,549 $134,831 $88,065
$52,421
$3,356
$18,493
$3,131
$4,445
$3,564
$2,191
$3,810
$1,683
$2,319
$8,047
$447
$191
$1,766
$7,257
$55,801 $11,500
$9,205
$657
$458
$103
$40
$362
$6,742
$29,442
$7,941
$14,411
$23,582 $121,740
$17,908
$35,410
$6,112 $324,114 $2,652,380 $128,225 $283,535
$2,635
$2,496
$10,091
$8,192
- $892,968
- $6,607,067
$35,417
$487
$86,900 $132,963
- $204,642 $178,569
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$35
30,000
$30
25,000
$25
20,000
$20
15,000
$15
10,000
$10
5,000
$5
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
35,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
2.4
600
2.0
500
1.6
400
1.2
300
0.8
200
0.4
100
0.0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.042
12
0.036
10
0.030
8
0.024
6
0.018
4
0.012
2
0.006
0
Tanner Crabs (Millions)
King Crabs (1,000s)
14
0.000
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
16.0
14.0
King Crabs (1,000s)
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.0
0.0
Millions of Crabs
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
C.Opilio Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
6,000
Number of Salmon
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$160,000
3.5%
$140,000
3.0%
$120,000
2.5%
$100,000
2.0%
$80,000
1.5%
$60,000
1.0%
$40,000
0.5%
$20,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
4.0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.14
$2,800,000
0.12
$2,400,000
0.10
$2,000,000
0.08
$1,600,000
0.06
$1,200,000
0.04
$800,000
0.02
$400,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$24,000
0.50
$20,000
0.40
$16,000
0.30
$12,000
0.20
$8,000
0.10
$4,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.60
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
25.0
$25,000
20.0
$20,000
15.0
$15,000
10.0
$10,000
5.0
$5,000
0.0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$7,000,000
0.600
$6,000,000
0.500
$5,000,000
0.400
$4,000,000
0.300
$3,000,000
0.200
$2,000,000
0.100
$1,000,000
0.000
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.700
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
1.600
$1,800,000
1.400
$1,600,000
$1,400,000
1.200
$1,200,000
1.000
$1,000,000
0.800
$800,000
0.600
$600,000
0.400
$400,000
0.200
$200,000
0.000
$0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
2009
2010
2011
2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch of AM80-CPs in the target|fisheries for all rockfish in the GOA.
The tables and figures exclude activities of AM80 vessels while acting as motherships. It should also be
noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all catches and
revenues of groundfish not just the catch in the GOA rockfish fishery.
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
11,916
$12.8
2004
13,482
$14.9
2005
13,033
$18.5
2006
15,766
$21.7
2007
14,584
$15.5
2008
15,764
$15.8
2009
17,266
$15.1
2010
18,036
$19.1
2011
14,718
$25.3
2012
16,796
$21.7
2011
46
129
642
139
2012
61
102
19
884
194
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
101
59
7
119
29
2004
83
522
75
181
2005
108
175
352
107
2006
95
49
129
195
2007
71
129
81
1,533
438
2008
95
339
645
363
2009
62
3,246
34
4
534
160
2010
76
2,988
100
66
595
177
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0085
0.0049
0.0006
0.0099
0.0025
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0062
0.0083
0.0060
0.0049
0.0060
0.0036 0.0042
0.0387
0.0031
0.0089
0.0215
0.1880 0.1657
0.0134
0.0082
0.0056
0.0020 0.0056
0.0002 0.0037
0.0056
0.0270
0.1051
0.0409
0.0309 0.0330
0.0134
0.0082
0.0124
0.0300
0.0230
0.0093 0.0098
2011
2012
0.0031
0.0088
0.0436
0.0094
0.0036
0.0061
0.0011
0.0527
0.0116
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$126,054
$218,036
$1,743,392
$107,639
$435,550
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$178,011
$171,929
$229,425
$219,250
$166,712
$245,824
$251,719
$28,487
$443,512
$120,228
$46,664
$4,660
$6,380
$105,953
$167,849
$191,561
$444,762
$190,265
- $3,858,767
$288,289
$198,021
$52,606
$10,124
$24,510
$28,342
$32,015
$82,121
$173,030
$111,191
$35,434
$43,598
$94,434
$107,856
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2011
2012
$548,951
$196,104
$39,415
$181,944
$355,822
$212,568
$1,138,867
$24,518
$111,762
$30
16,000
$24
12,000
$18
8,000
$12
4,000
$6
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
20,000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
0.07
140
0.06
120
0.05
100
0.04
80
0.03
60
0.02
40
0.01
20
0.00
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Herring (mt)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
210
3.0
180
2.5
150
2.0
120
1.5
90
1.0
60
0.5
30
0.0
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
All King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Tanner Crabs
King Crabs (1,000s)
3.5
2012
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
3.5
King Crabs (1,000s)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2004
2005
Red King Crab
2006
2007
2008
Golden King Crab
2009
2010
2011
Blue King Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
0.0
0.0
Millions of Crabs
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
C.Opilio Crab
2009
2010
2011
2012
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
1,800
1,600
Number of Salmon
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Other Salmon
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$600,000
0.8%
$480,000
0.6%
$360,000
0.4%
$240,000
0.2%
$120,000
0.0%
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
1.0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
0.0045
$4,500,000
0.0040
$4,000,000
0.0035
$3,500,000
0.0030
$3,000,000
0.0025
$2,500,000
0.0020
$2,000,000
0.0015
$1,500,000
0.0010
$1,000,000
0.0005
$500,000
0.0000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$500,000
0.18
$450,000
0.16
$400,000
0.14
$350,000
0.12
$300,000
0.10
$250,000
0.08
$200,000
0.06
$150,000
0.04
$100,000
0.02
$50,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
0.20
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
King Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
King Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
0.015
$2,000,000
0.012
$1,600,000
0.009
$1,200,000
0.006
$800,000
0.003
$400,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$240,000
0.10
$200,000
0.08
$160,000
0.06
$120,000
0.04
$80,000
0.02
$40,000
0.00
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.12
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.032
$480,000
0.028
$420,000
0.024
$360,000
0.020
$300,000
0.016
$240,000
0.012
$180,000
0.008
$120,000
0.004
$60,000
0.000
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
This section summarizes PSC bycatch of AM80-CPs in the target|fishery for rex sole in the GOA. The
tables and figures exclude activities of AM80 vessels while acting as motherships. It should also be
noted that the overall amount of groundfish shown in the tables and figures includes all catches and
revenues of groundfish not just the catch in the GOA rex sole fishery
Item
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale $ Millions (2012)
2003
5,374
$3.7
2004
2,106
$1.8
2005
1,221
$1.3
2006
2,600
$1.8
2007
749
$0.9
2008
653
$0.6
2009
5,470
$3.8
2010
3,569
$2.0
2011
1,844
$1.5
2012
1,200
$1.1
2011
53
2,146
772
105
2012
50
887
81
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Mortality (mt)
PSC King Crab (#s)
PSC Bairdi Crab (#s)
PSC Opilio Crab (#s)
PSC Herring (kg)
PSC Chinook (#s)
PSC non-Chinook (#s)
2003
98
6,515
4
1,632
232
2004
111
5,915
302
588
2005
32
258
7
370
66
2006
67
20,495
656
23
2007
33
487
149
69
2008
25
255
40
2009
128
54
992
90
2010
132
545
1,761
82
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut Rate (mt/mt)
PSC King Crab (#/mt)
PSC Bairdi Rate (#/mt)
PSC Opilio Rate (#/mt)
PSC Herring Rate (kg/mt)
PSC Chinook (#/mt)
PSC non-Chinook (#/mt)
2003
0.0183
1.2123
0.0007
0.3037
0.0432
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
All rates are measured as the total units of PSC ÷ mt of Groundfish.
0.0528
0.0266
0.0257
0.0436
0.0385
0.0235 0.0370
2.8081
0.2116
7.8833
0.6505
0.3908
0.0098 0.1528
0.0055
0.1432
0.3034
0.2523
0.1996
0.1813 0.4935
0.2794
0.0543
0.0087
0.0915
0.0618
0.0164 0.0229
2011
2012
0.0288
1.1638
0.4187
0.0569
0.0419
0.7394
0.0679
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Item
PSC Halibut ($/mt)
PSC King Crab ($/#)
PSC Bairdi Crab ($/#)
PSC Opilio Crab ($/#)
PSC Herring ($/kg)
PSC Chinook ($/#)
PSC non-Chinook ($/#)
2003
$38,165
$575
$1,061,149
$2,295
$16,123
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
All values shown are calculated as: total wholesale value in 2012 $ ÷ total PSC units
$15,881
$38,488
$26,446
$27,337
$24,259
$29,370
$15,330
$28,496
$299
$4,842
$86
$1,833
$2,387
$70,188
$3,713
$706
- $187,202
$5,859
$3,377
$2,698
$5,974
$3,800
$1,150
$1,963
$3,003
$18,881
$78,205
$13,024
$15,104
$41,889
$24,727
$14,434
Source: Table developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
$21,493
$1,219
$13,274
$4.2
5,000
$3.5
4,000
$2.8
3,000
$2.1
2,000
$1.4
1,000
$0.7
0
Wholesale Value (Million of $2012)
Groundfish (MT)
6,000
$0.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Groundfish (mt)
Wholesale Value ($ 2012)
0.007
140
0.006
120
0.005
100
0.004
80
0.003
60
0.002
40
0.001
20
0.000
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring (mt)
Halibut (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Halibut (MT)
Herring (mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
1.0000
25,000
0.9000
20,000
0.7000
0.6000
15,000
0.5000
0.4000
10,000
Tanner Crabs
King Crabs (1,000s)
0.8000
0.3000
0.2000
5,000
0.1000
0.0000
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All King Crab
All Tanner Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
0.025
Millions of Crabs
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
2003
2004
2005
2006
C.Opilio Crab
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
C.Bairdi Crab
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
2012
2,000
1,800
Number of Salmon
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
Chinook
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Other Salmon
6%
$42,000
5%
$35,000
4%
$28,000
3%
$21,000
2%
$14,000
1%
$7,000
0%
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Halibut Bycatch Rate (mt/mt)
Halibut Bycatch Value ($/Halibut mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/MT Halibut)
Bycatch Rate (MT/MT)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$1,200,000
0.005
$1,000,000
0.004
$800,000
0.003
$600,000
0.002
$400,000
0.001
$200,000
0.000
$0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/kg Herring)
Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
0.006
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Herring Bycatch Rate (kg/mt)
Herring Bycatch Value ($/Herring kg)
8
$80,000
7
$70,000
6
$60,000
5
$50,000
4
$40,000
3
$30,000
2
$20,000
1
$10,000
0
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tanner Crab Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Tanner Crab Bycatch Value ($/Crab)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Crab)
Bycatch Rate (Crabs/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
$6,000
0.7
$5,250
0.6
$4,500
0.5
$3,750
0.4
$3,000
0.3
$2,250
0.2
$1,500
0.1
$750
0.0
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
0.8
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chinnook Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Chinook Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
0.30
$90,000
0.25
$75,000
0.20
$60,000
0.15
$45,000
0.10
$30,000
0.05
$15,000
0.00
$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Other Salmon Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Other Salmon Bycatch Value ($/Salmon)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
Value per Unit of Bycatch ($2012/Salmon)
Bycatch Rate (Salmon/mt)
Source: Developed by Northern Economics from CAS data provided by AKFIN (Fey, 2014).
| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Title | Five-year Review of the Effects of Amendment 80 |
| Subject | Amendment 80 |
| Author | Northern Economics for the North Pacific Fishery Management Coun |
| File Modified | 2014-12-30 |
| File Created | 2014-10-13 |