FRA Emergency Order No. 30

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FRA is recommending that any HHFT
traveling long distances have a predeparture inspection performed by a
designated inspector. Designated
inspectors are typically mechanical
employees. Unlike train crew members
or other railroad employees, designated
inspectors’ duties primarily relate to the
detection and remedy of mechanical
defects on railroad rolling equipment.
FRA believes that designated inspectors
are better trained, equipped, and
experienced to detect mechanical
defects on rail cars that may lead to
derailments than railroad employees
whose duties primarily involve other
tasks, such as operating trains. Thus,
FRA believes safety is improved by
using only designated inspectors to
perform pre-departure inspections of
HHFTs.
In addition to the required predeparture inspection that is performed
on trains to determine compliance with
part 215, trains also must undergo an
air-brake and other mechanical-related
inspections prior to transportation
under 49 CFR part 232. In 2001, FRA
promulgated a final rule (66 FR 4104)
that established minimum inspection
standards for ‘‘extended haul’’ trains
that travel long distances (up to 1,500
miles). 49 CFR 232.213. Railroads
typically use the standards in § 232.213
to identify, inspect, and operate unit
trains that travel long distances across
the United States, such as coal trains
and high priority intermodal trains. FRA
believes that trains can be transported
safety over such long distances if,
among other requirements, quality
mechanical inspections are performed
to ensure that all air brakes in a train are
operative at the point of origin, and that
no mechanical defects exist prior to the
train’s departure. As explained in the
final rule, § 232.213 contains ‘‘stringent
inspection requirements, both brake and
mechanical, by highly qualified
inspectors’’ that ensure the safety of
trains operated over long distances
under that section’s requirements. 66 FR
4121.
The brake inspection applicable to an
extended haul train must be performed
by a ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’
(QMI) as defined by § 232.5, while the
part 215 inspection is required to be
performed by a designed inspector
under § 215.11 as discussed above. A
QMI is required to receive instruction
and training on the ‘‘troubleshooting,
inspection, testing, maintenance or
repair of the specific train brake
components and systems for which the
person is assigned responsibility.’’ 49
CFR 232.5. FRA believes that QMIs
(versus other employees such as train
crew members) possess the skill to

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perform high quality inspections and
can identify defective conditions, know
how those defects might affect other
parts of the freight car’s brake or
mechanical systems, and know how
such defects might be caused. 66 FR
4148.
In evaluating the recent incidents
involving HHFTs, many of the trains
were traveling uninterrupted (such as
for reclassification at a yard) for long
distances. For example, the recent crude
oil derailments have involved trains
transporting product from its source in
North Dakota to refineries on the
coasts—in some instances distances of
well over 1,000 miles. FRA recognizes
that many railroads already move these
long distance trains as extended haul
trains and conduct the mechanical and
brake inspections discussed above. To
assure the safety of HHFTs that might
travel long distances, FRA recommends
that such trains receive mechanical and
brake inspections conducted by QMIs
and designated inspectors. FRA believes
that having these critical inspections
conducted by highly qualified
inspectors at the point where such
trains are initiated will help ensure the
safe mechanical condition of these
trains.
In seeking the appropriate approach
to ensuring safety, FRA has also limited
the recommendations in this Safety
Advisory to HHFTs only and would
have applied to all of the recent
incidents described above. This
threshold ensures that FRA is focusing
on the highest risk shipments and not
unnecessarily making safety-related
recommendations that would impose
undue burdens on lesser risks that do
not represent the same safety and
environmental concerns. However, FRA
also supports additional safety-related
inspections or measures that railroads
wish to adopt, irrespective of
commodity being hauled or the type of
operation.
Recommended Railroad Action: In
light of the above discussion, FRA
recommends for any HHFT that
railroads:
(1) Continue to install and maintain
Wheel Impact Load Detectors (WILD)
along routes traveled by affected trains,
and adjust the existing industry
standards for actions to be taken when
wayside WILDs detect an impact above
a certain threshold for an affected train.
If a railroad receives notification of a
wheel impact for a car in an affected
train above the below-listed thresholds,
at a minimum, take the following
actions:
• 60 kips—issue maintenance
advisory to the car owner of the affected
car;

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• 70 kips—change the wheel at the
tank car’s next movement onto a repair
or shop track;
• 80 kips—condemn the wheel and
replace it at the first opportunity; and
• 120 kips—immediately stop the
train to inspect the wheel and remove
the car from service at the first available
location.
(2) Conduct initial terminal brake
inspections by qualified mechanical
inspectors as defined in 49 CFR 232.5
and conduct freight car inspections at
initial terminals with designated
inspectors under 49 CFR 215.11 for any
affected train that will travel 500 miles
or more from its initial terminal to
destination.
FRA encourages railroad industry
members to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding
recommendations and to take other
complementary actions to help ensure
the safety of the Nation’s railroad
employees. FRA may modify this Safety
Advisory, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate
actions necessary to ensure the highest
level of safety on the Nation’s railroads,
including pursuing other corrective
measures under its rail safety authority.
Sarah Feinberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–09612 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 30, Notice
No. 1]

Emergency Order Establishing a
Maximum Operating Speed of 40 mph
in High-Threat Urban Areas for Certain
Trains Transporting Large Quantities
of Class 3 Flammable Liquids
FRA is issuing this
Emergency Order (E.O. or Order) to
require that trains transporting large
amounts of Class 3 flammable liquid
through certain highly populated areas
adhere to a maximum authorized
operating speed limit. FRA has
determined that public safety compels
issuance of this Order. This Order is
necessary due to the recent occurrence
of railroad accidents involving trains
transporting petroleum crude oil and
ethanol and the increasing reliance on
railroads to transport voluminous
amounts of those hazardous materials in
recent years. Under the E.O., an affected
train is one that contains: (1) 20 or more
loaded tank cars in a continuous block,
or 35 or more loaded tank cars, of Class

SUMMARY:

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3 flammable liquid; and, (2) at least one
DOT Specification 111 (DOT–111) tank
car (including those built in accordance
with Association of American Railroads
(AAR) Casualty Prevention Circular
1232 (CPC–1232)) loaded with a Class 3
flammable liquid. Affected trains must
not exceed 40 miles per hour (mph) in
high-threat urban areas (HTUAs) as
defined in 49 CFR 1580.3.
DATES: Effective Date: This Order is
effective immediately. Railroads shall
immediately initiate steps to implement
FRA Emergency Order No. 30. Railroads
shall complete implementation no later
than April 24, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron
Hynes, Director, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202) 493–6404; or, Thomas
Herrmann, Assistant Chief Counsel for
Safety, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493–6036.
Introduction: FRA has determined
that public safety compels issuance of
this E.O.. This Order sets the maximum
authorized operating speed of 40 mph
for certain trains transporting large
quantities of Class 3 flammable liquids
within HTUAs.1 FRA finds that this
action is necessary as a result of the
unique risks associated with the
growing reliance on trains to transport
large quantities of flammable liquids.
The risk of flammability is compounded
in the context of rail transportation
because petroleum crude oil and
ethanol are commonly shipped in large
blocks or single commodity unit trains.
Further, the differing tank cars currently
available to transport petroleum crude
oil and ethanol in this country have
varying levels of protection, with the
most commonly used tank cars having
shown a propensity to puncture or
otherwise release hazardous material
that catches fire in the event of a
derailment.
DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) has developed a final rule that
will contain enhanced tank car
standards for both new and existing
tank cars and certain speed restrictions.
Until those standards are issued, FRA
believes that public safety dictates that
an appropriate speed restriction be
placed on trains containing large
1 HTUA is defined by the Transportation Security
Administration as ‘‘an area comprising one or more
cities and surrounding areas include a 10-mile
buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to [part 1580].’’
49 CFR 1580.3. Appendix A to part 1580 lists the
specific metropolitan areas within the United States
that are considered HTUAs.

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quantities of flammable liquid,
particularly in areas where a derailment
could cause a significant hazard of
death, personal injury, or harm to the
environment and property.
Since the July 2013 derailment in LacMe´gantic, Quebec, Canada, which
demonstrated the consequences of a
railroad accident resulting in the
sudden release of flammable liquids,
there have been numerous derailments
in the United States involving trains
transporting large quantities of crude oil
and ethanol. Although none of these
recent derailments resulted in the tragic
loss of life that occurred as a result of
the Lac-Me´gantic derailment, the
pattern of derailments and resulting
hazardous material releases and fires
involving tank cars transporting
flammable liquids lead FRA to the
conclusion that additional action is
necessary in highly populated areas
where any such derailment could result
in catastrophic consequences. This
action is being taken to eliminate an
unsafe condition or practice, or a
combination of such, causing an
emergency situation involving the
hazard of death, personal injury, or
significant harm to the environment.
This Order applies to:
(1) Any train in the United States
transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars
in a continuous block, or containing 35
or more loaded tank cars, of Class 3
flammable liquid; and
(2) Which contains at least one DOT–
111 tank car (including those built to
the CPC–1232 standard) loaded with
Class 3 flammable liquid.
FRA believes that only trains
transporting large quantities of
petroleum crude oil and ethanol (Class
3 flammable liquids described by DOT’s
Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR;
49 CFR parts 171 to 180)) will be
affected by this Order as those are the
only Class 3 flammable liquids
transported in this quantity. FRA is
ordering that any affected train adhere
to a maximum authorized operating
speed limit of 40 mph in HTUAs as
defined in 49 CFR 1580.3.
Authority: Authority to enforce
Federal railroad safety laws has been
delegated by the Secretary of
Transportation to the Administrator of
the FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. Railroads are
subject to FRA’s safety jurisdiction
under the Federal railroad safety laws.
49 U.S.C. 20101, 20103. FRA is
authorized to issue emergency orders
where an unsafe condition or practice,
or a combination therof, ‘‘causes an
emergency situation involving a hazard
of death, personal injury or significant
harm to the environment . . . .’’ 49
U.S.C. 20104(a). These orders may

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immediately impose ‘‘restrictions and
prohibitions . . . that may be necessary
to abate the situation.’’ Id.
Background: In the last two years,
DOT (including FRA and PHMSA) has
taken numerous actions to address the
safe transportation by rail of flammable
liquids. Among other actions, DOT has
issued three emergency orders 2 and
several safety advisories, has reached
voluntary agreements with the railroad
industry,3 and has undertaken several
separate rulemaking proceedings to
address the transportation and handling
of trains transporting large quantities of
flammable liquids. Notably, PHMSA, in
cooperation with FRA, has formulated
the final rule mentioned above that will
address issues including a new HMR
tank car standard and speed limits
governing the transportation of large
quantities of flammable liquids. The
final rule will codify certain proposals
contained in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) in the HM–251
rulemaking proceeding (79 FR 45016,
Aug. 1, 2014).4 The final rule was
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for review pursuant
to Executive Order 12866 on February 5,
2015 (http://www.reginfo.gov/public). A
chronology of certain DOT actions to
address safe transportation of flammable
liquids is listed on PHMSA’s Internet
Web site.5
Despite efforts by DOT, the railroad
industry, tank car manufacturers, and
other interested parties, trains
transporting large quantities of
petroleum crude oil and ethanol
continue to derail in this country. These
derailments have resulted in the release
of large quantities of hazardous material
and subsequent fires. In addition to the
2013 Lac-Me´gantic derailment
mentioned above in which 47 people
were killed, numerous derailments
involving crude oil unit and ethanol
trains have occurred in this country.
Three significant accidents have
occurred domestically already in 2015
in Iowa, West Virginia, and Illinois,
respectively.
2015 Accidents
The following is an overview of the
circumstance surrounding the most
recent derailments involving trains
2 DOT Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order,
Docket No. DOT–OST–2014–0067 (May 7, 2014);
DOT Amended and Restated Emergency
Restriction/Prohibition Order, Docket No. DOT–
OST–2014–0025 (March 6, 2014); and, FRA
Emergency Order No. 28, 78 FR 48218, Aug. 2,
2013.
3 http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/letterassociation-american-railroads.
4 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01/
pdf/2014-17764.pdf.
5 http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/chronology.

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transporting large amounts of crude oil
or ethanol that have occurred in 2015.
FRA has not definitively established the
probable causes of these accidents.
Accordingly, nothing in this Order is
intended to attribute definitive causes to
these accidents, or to place
responsibility for the accidents on the
acts or omissions of any specific person
or entity.
On February 4, a southbound
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (CP) train
consisting of three locomotives, 1 buffer
car loaded with sand, and 80 tank cars
loaded with ethanol derailed near
Dubuque, Iowa while traveling
approximately 24 mph. As a result there
was an ethanol spill, a fire, and at least
two loaded tank cars came to rest on the
frozen Mississippi River. Legacy DOT–
111 cars were among the seven cars that
released ethanol during the incident.
One non-jacketed CPC–1232 car was
punctured. It is estimated that
approximately 53,000 gallons of ethanol
was released as a result of the
derailment.
On February 16, 2015, a CSX
Transportation, Inc. (CSX) train
consisting of 109 tank cars loaded with
crude oil derailed near Mt. Carbon, West
Virginia. The train was en route to a
shipping terminal in Yorktown,
Virginia, and was transporting crude oil
sourced from the Bakken region (Bakken
oil) and traveling at an approximate
speed of 33 mph when 28 cars derailed.
Two tank cars were punctured, thirteen
cars experienced catastrophic thermal
tears, and two cars released crude oil
through their bottom outlet valves.
Multiple fires and explosions occurred
and emergency responders established a
one-half mile evacuation zone,
involving approximately 300 people. In
all, the tank cars lost a total of almost
379,000 gallons of crude oil. All of the
tank cars involved in this accident were
CPC–1232 tank cars built between 2011
and 2013 and were non-jacketed tank
cars.
Most recently, on March 5, 2015, a
BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) train
consisting of 103 tank cars also loaded
with Bakken crude oil derailed near
Galena, Illinois, resulting in a fire. The
train was traveling at an approximate
speed of 23 mph when 21 cars derailed.
Seven cars experienced thermal tears,
three cars released product through
their bottom outlet valves, and two cars
released product from their top fittings.
All of the tank cars involved in this
accident were constructed to the CPC–
1232 standard, and were non-jacketed.
FRA notes that no cars were punctured
as a result of this derailment.
In addition to the above-described
incidents, previous publicized

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derailments resulting in releases of
crude oil or ethanol and and/or
resulting fires have occurred with
increasing frequency (e.g., Casselton,
North Dakota; Aliceville, Alabama;
Lynchburg, Virginia; Columbus, Ohio;
Cherry Valley, Illinois; Arcadia, Ohio;
New Brighton, Pennsylvania). Since
February 2015, an additional three
incidents have occurred in Ontario,
Canada, two of which involved trains
transporting large quantities of
petroleum crude in loaded CPC–1232
tank cars that were punctured, one of
which occurred at a train speed of over
40 mph. Some of these recent accidents
listed above that occurred prior to 2015
have been the impetus for DOT
regulatory actions, such as the recent
DOT emergency orders and the HM–251
rulemaking proceeding mentioned
above. Rail incidents involving crude oil
have also been the subject of several
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigations and subsequent
NTSB recommendations to DOT.
Tank Cars
Traditionally, DOT–111 cars have
been the primary type of tank cars used
to transport large quantities of
flammable liquids such as petroleum
crude oil and ethanol in this country.
Part 173 of the HMR authorizes the
DOT–111 as a permissible packaging to
transport ethanol and crude oil, as well
as certain other low, medium, and highhazard liquids and solids. DOT–111 cars
are general purpose, non-pressure
railroad tank cars. Subpart D of 49 CFR
part 179 in the HMR establishes the
design requirements for DOT–111 cars.
Baseline (legacy) DOT 111 tank cars
have traditionally been designed to
operate at a gross rail load of 263,000
pounds, and additional tank car
protections intended to improve
crashworthiness, such as head shields,
jackets, and thermal protection systems,
are optional features. DOT–111 cars are
required to have a shell and head
thickness of 7⁄16″.
However, there have been changes in
railroad operations over the last several
years that have impacted the use of
DOT–111 cars to transport flammable
liquids. These changes primarily
include (1) increased DOT–111 traffic
due the rapid increase in production
levels of domestic energy products such
as petroleum crude oil, (2) higher intrain forces due to the transportation of
hazardous materials in tank cars at
higher gross rail loads (286,000 lbs.),
and (3) the likelihood of tank cars
accumulating more miles annually. This
has resulted in tank car design
modifications to accommodate these

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increased stresses and to reduce the
chance of a catastrophic tank car failure.
However, despite those efforts, a
significant number of older, legacy
DOT–111 tank cars remain in flammable
liquid service. In the HM–251 NPRM,
DOT estimated that over 50,000 such
non-jacketed DOT–111 cars (and an
estimated 5,500 jacketed DOT–111 cars
(79 FR 45025)) were still being used in
crude oil and ethanol service as of
August 2014.6 FRA is aware that the
number of CPC–1232 and DOT–111 cars
in crude oil service is variable, as new
cars are currently being constructed and
older cars are retired.
The NTSB has described DOT–111
tank cars as having ‘‘. . . a high
incidence of failure when involved in
accidents,’’ 7 and has recommended that
DOT update the design requirements for
DOT–111 tank cars, including for use in
crude oil and ethanol service
specifically.8 The NTSB
recommendations were made with the
intent to enhance the cars’ performance
in accidents.9 The forthcoming HM–251
rulemaking will address certain of these
NTSB recommendations.
In 2011, the rail industry, through
CPC–1232, adopted a new industry
standard intended to improve the
crashworthiness of newly-constructed
DOT–111 tank cars intended for use in
crude oil and ethanol service. Cars built
to the CPC–1232 standard are DOT–111
cars that are designed to operate at a
gross rail load of 286,000 pounds, and
include a thicker shell and head
protection (1⁄2 height head shield, 1⁄2″
thick shell and head thickness), are
constructed with normalized steel, are
constructed with top fittings protection,
and with relief valves having a greater
flow capacity as when compared to
legacy DOT–111 cars. Additionally,
some new tank cars constructed to the
CPC–1232 standard are also jacketed
and equipped with insulation and/or
thermal protection. The jacket is 1⁄8″
thick around the shell and 1⁄2″ thick at
the heads providing full-height head
protection.
Based on recent railroad accidents,
the risk of additional future accidents,
and the NTSB’s findings that DOT–111
cars have a propensity to fail when
involved in accidents, FRA has a safety
concern regarding the continued use of
a large number of DOT–111 cars to
6 Id.
7 Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691–18 With
Subsequent Hazardous Materials Release and Fire,
Cherry Valley, Illinois June 19, 2009; NTSB
Accident Report NTSB/RAR–12–01 (Feb. 14, 2012);
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1201.pdf.
8 Id.
9 Id.

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transport large quantities of crude oil
and ethanol, especially at higher speeds.
Under current Federal regulations and
applicable railroad industry practices,
unit trains containing these older nonjacketed DOT cars may travel in
flammable liquid unit trains at up to 50
mph in this country, and at speeds of up
to 40 mph in populated urban areas
under certain circumstances (as further
discussed below).
FRA’s safety concern also extends to
the newer CPC–1232 tank cars in light
of recent incidents, especially those
incidents occurring at higher speeds.
FRA notes that a total of only five tank
cars were punctured as a result of the
2015 accidents in Iowa and West
Virginia. No CPC–1232 cars were
punctured as a result the Galena, Illinois
derailment, and only one CPC–1232
tank car was punctured as a result of the
2014 Lynchburg, Virginia, derailment
(23 mph). However, these accidents
indicate that the newer CPC–1232 cars
will still release hazardous material
which catches fire when the cars derail.
Train Speed
Speed is a factor that may contribute
to the severity of a derailment or the
derailment itself. Speeds can influence
the probability of an accident. A lower
speed may allow for a brake application
to stop a train before a collision, or
allow a locomotive engineer to identify
a safety problem and stop the train
before an accident or derailment occurs.
Higher speeds will increase the kinetic
energy of an accident or derailment and
the associated damage caused, resulting
in a greater possibility of tank cars being
punctured. For example, the unmanned
train that derailed and caught fire in the
Lac-Me´gantic derailment was believed
to have been traveling at over 60 mph
at the time of the incident, resulting in
approximately 59 tank car being
breached. As explained in the HM–251
NPRM, if an accident occurs at 40 mph
instead of 50 mph, DOT expects a
reduction in kinetic energy of 36
percent. 79 FR 45046. As discussed
above, the most recent derailment in the
United States near Galena, Illinois, that
occurred at 23 mph resulted in no tank
cars being punctured, and the 2014
Lynchburg derailment that occurred at a
similar speed only resulted in one CPC–
1232 tank car puncture.
Generally, with respect to operating
speeds, FRA has developed a system of
classification that defines different track
classes based on track quality. The track
classes include Class 1 through Class 9
and ‘‘excepted track.’’ See 49 CFR 213.9
and 213.307. Freight trains transporting
hazardous materials, including crude
oil, operate at track speeds associated

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with Class 1 through Class 5 track and,
in certain limited instances, at or below
‘‘excepted track’’ speeds (10 mph or less
up to 80 mph). However, AAR design
specifications effectively limit most
freight equipment to a maximum
allowable speed of 70 mph. The HMR
contain speed restrictions on railroad
cars transporting loads of certain
hazardous materials, such as material
poisonous-by-inhalation. See, e.g., 49
CFR 174.86.
In addition, the rail industry, through
AAR, implements a detailed protocol on
recommended operating practices for
the transportation of hazardous
materials. This protocol, set forth in
AAR Circular No. OT–55–N, August 5,
2013 (Circular) 10 includes a 50 mph
maximum speed for any ‘‘key train.’’
The Circular establishes that a key train
includes any train with 20 or more loads
of ‘‘any combination of hazardous
material.’’ This definition includes
trains affected by this Order that
transport large quantities of petroleum
crude oil and ethanol. In February 2014,
by way of Secretary of Transportation
Anthony Foxx’s letter to AAR,11 the
major railroads in this country
voluntarily committed to a lower 40mph speed limit for trains containing
one or more legacy DOT–111 tank cars
(or one non-DOT specification car) and
transporting large quantities of crude oil
within the limits of any HTUA as
defined by the regulations of the
Transportation Security Administration.
In addition, FRA is aware that the
nation’s second largest freight railroad,
BNSF, recently took steps to lower the
speeds of key trains in populated areas.
BNSF recently amended its railroad
rules to require that key trains traveling
within large municipal areas travel no
more than 35 mph, or an even lower
speed and in more locations than they,
other Class I railroads, AAR, and some
short line railroads committed to in
response to Secretary Foxx’s February
2014 letter described above.
PHMSA requested public comment on
appropriate speed limits for trains
transporting large quantities of certain
flammable liquids in the HM–251
NPRM, and will address train speeds in
the forthcoming final rule. As discussed
above, PHMSA will also address
updated tank car standards as related to
the transportation of flammable liquids
by rail. However, any lowered speed
requirements in the forthcoming
PHMSA rule will not be applicable until
the effective date of the final rule. In the
10 http://www.boe.aar.com/CPC-1258%20OT-55N%208-5-13.pdf.
11 http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/letterassociation-american-railroads.

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interim, FRA believes that further action
is necessary to ensure public safety.
While FRA applauds the industry for
its voluntary commitments related to
speed reductions, FRA believes that it is
necessary for it to require that the
existing industry commitments be
applied to all trains carrying large
quantities of Class 3 flammable liquids,
including those transporting newer
CPC–1232 cars. FRA believes that
immediately lowering maximum train
speeds in HTUAs to all trains carrying
large quantities of flammable liquids
will help to mitigate the potential effects
of future accidents should they occur in
a highly populated area. Despite the
efforts of all stakeholders, these
accidents continue to occur on a regular
basis. While accidents involving
affected trains have recently occurred at
speeds below 40 mph, FRA anticipates
that the reduction in maximum speed
for certain trains carrying large volumes
of flammable liquid in higher risk areas
based on the type of tank car being used
may prevent fatalities and other injuries
and damages, and limit the amount of
environmental damage that would likely
result were an accident to occur in one
of these densely populated areas.
HTUA’s encompass locales where, were
a derailment to occur, there is a greater
chance that a catastrophic loss of human
life could occur than in other less
populated areas. Further, by limiting
speeds for certain higher risk trains,
FRA also hopes to reduce in-train forces
related to acceleration, braking, and
slack action that are sometimes the
cause of derailments.12 FRA believes
these restrictions are necessary until the
HM–251 final rule is issued and
becomes effective.
FRA’s approach here is based on
longstanding concerns regarding the
crashworthiness of legacy DOT–111
cars, as evidenced by NTSB and FRA
investigations of derailments involving
trains consisting of large blocks or unit
trains of tank cars containing flammable
liquids. A recent FRA study, involving
a tank car puncture model validated by
full scale testing was conducted at the
Transportation Technology Center in
Pueblo, Colorado.13 The study evaluated
the relative performance of a variety of
DOT–111 tank cars, including those that
are the subject of this E.O. In addition,
a soon to be released report issued in
March 2015 by Sharma & Associates,
12 See, e.g., FRA Report to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the
House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure: Safe Placement of Train Cars (June
2005).
13 http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/
L15900#p6_z50_gD; http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/
details/L15901#p6_z50_gD.

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 80 / Monday, April 27, 2015 / Notices
Inc. to FRA, addressed the reduction in
tank car puncture probabilities based on
changes to tank car designs or the tank
car operating environment. FRA expects
to post this report to its Web site in the
near future. The report discusses the
fact that tank cars are exposed to a wide
range of hazards during derailments that
affect the outcomes. It also discusses the
assumption that higher derailment
speeds tend to lead to ‘‘more cars
derailing as well as higher magnitudes
of forces, and thereby, a higher
probability of puncture.’’ The study
estimated derailment impacts at 30, 40,
and 50 mph, respectively, as applied to
tank cars equipped with varying
protections. The results of the study
indicate more likely tank car punctures
occur as accident speeds increase.
Accordingly, FRA is limiting speeds
for affected trains to 40 mph. Recent
accidents involving unit trains of crude
oil indicate that these legacy DOT–111
cars are prone to punctures, tears, and
hazardous material releases when
involved in accidents. Newer tank cars
built to the CPC–1232 standard have
more robust protections than do legacy
DOT–111 tank cars. However, recent
incidents have shown that those cars
will still release hazardous material
when involved in derailments. Thus,
FRA is also limiting the speed for
affected trains transporting CPC–1232
cars to 40 mph or less. While past
accidents have shown that there still
may be hazardous material releases
when derailments occur at less than 40
mph, FRA believes this speed restriction
will substantially mitigate the effects of
any accidents as when compared to
accidents that occur at higher speeds.
To formulate the speed limitation for
certain trains, FRA balanced the need to
alleviate an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the
environment against the impacts speed
limitations may have on efficient rail
transportation in this country. An
analysis of certain speed restrictions
below 40 mph indicated that such
restrictions could potentially cause
harmful effects on interstate commerce,
and actually increase safety risks.
Increased safety risks could occur if
speed restrictions cause rail traffic
delays resulting in trains stopping on
main track more often and in trains
moving into and out of sidings more
often requiring more train dispatching.
Increased safety risks could also occur
if shippers offer more affected trains
onto the rail network to maintain
constant inventories to offset train
delays. FRA also evaluated speed
restrictions in the context of potential
delays to passenger rail service. FRA

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Jkt 235001

believes the restriction in this Order
will address an emergency situation
while avoiding other safety impacts and
harm to interstate commerce and the
flow of necessary goods to the citizens
of the United States. FRA and DOT will
continue to evaluate whether additional
action with regard to train speeds is
appropriate.
The speed restriction in this Order
applies to trains transporting DOT–111
and CPC–1232 cars that pose dangers in
a derailment. In seeking the appropriate
approach to ensure safety, FRA has also
limited this Order’s applicability to only
those trains transporting large quantities
of flammable liquids. This Order will
primarily apply to unit trains only.
Further, this Order would have applied
to all of the recent incidents described
above involving unit trains transporting
petroleum crude oil and ethanol. This
Order’s threshold ensures that FRA is
focusing on the highest risk shipments
and not unnecessarily imposing safetyrelated burdens on lesser risks that do
not represent the same safety and
environmental concerns.
Findings and Order: Due to the
recently increasing volume of petroleum
crude oil, and consistently high volume
of ethanol being shipped by railroads in
recent years, the numerous recent rail
accidents involving trains transporting
these hazardous materials to occur, and
the subsequent releases of large
quantities of crude oil into the
environment and the imminent hazard
those releases present to human life and
the environment, this Order is requiring
that each railroad carrier in this country
adhere to the below-described
maximum speed limit when operating
certain trains containing large quantities
of Class 3 flammable liquid.
The transportation of hazardous
materials by rail is extremely safe, and
the vast majority of hazardous materials
shipped by rail each year arrive at their
destinations without incident. However,
FRA finds that there are gaps in the
existing regulatory scheme that create
an emergency situation involving a
hazard of death, personal injury, or
significant harm to the environment,
with respect to the speed at which trains
transporting large quantities of certain
flammable liquids are currently
operated and the crashworthiness of the
tank cars being used to transport those
materials. The risks are magnified when
less robust tank cars are used to
transport large quantities of flammable
liquids. As evidenced by recent
accidents, even affected trains traveling
at lower speeds have accidents with a
propensity to result in fires and the
release of large quantities of hazardous
material.

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23325

To mitigate the effects of future
accidents and to prevent others from
occurring, and pursuant to the authority
of 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated to the FRA
Administrator by the Secretary of
Transportation (49 CFR 1.89), effective
immediately, this Order requires that
certain trains identified below must not
exceed 40 mph while operating within
High Threat Urban Areas. This Order
applies to:
(1) Any train in the United States
transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars
in a continuous block, or containing 35
or more loaded tank cars, of Class 3
flammable liquid; and
(2) Which contains at least one DOT–
111 tank car (including those built to
the CPC–1232 standard) loaded with
Class 3 flammable liquid.
A High Threat Urban Area is as
defined by 49 CFR 1580.3. A Class 3
flammable liquid is as described by
§ 173.120 of the HMR. A Class 3
flammable liquid includes the
hazardous materials described by
§ 172.101 of the HMR as UN 1267,
petroleum crude oil, 3, PG I, II, or III,
and UN 3475, Ethanol and gasoline
mixture, 3, PG II, or UN 1287,
Denatured alcohol, 3, PG II or III. For
purposes of this Order, a Class 3
flammable liquid includes petroleum
crude oil that might otherwise be
reclassified as a combustible liquid
under § 173.150 of the HMR. A DOT–
111 car means a jacketed or nonjacketed tank car built to the
specification established by subpart D of
part 179 of the HMR, but not meeting
the standard established by CPC–1232.
A CPC–1232 car is a jacketed or nonjacketed DOT–111 tank car built to the
CPC–1232 standard. A ‘‘train’’ for
purposes of this order is as defined by
49 CFR 232.5. This Order will remain in
effect until the effective date of the HM–
251 final rule (Docket No. PHMSA–
2012–0082; RIN 2137–AE91).
Relief: Petitions for special approval
to take actions not in accordance with
this Order may be submitted to the
Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety and Chief Safety Officer
(Associate Administrator), who is
authorized to dispose of those requests
without needing to amend this Order.
When reviewing any petition for special
approval, the Associate Administrator
shall grant petitions only when a
petitioner has clearly articulated an
alternative action that will provide, in
the Associate Administrator’s judgment,
at least a level of safety equivalent to
that provided by this Order. This Order
will be supplanted and terminated upon
the effective date of the HM–251 final
rule (Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0082;
RIN 2137–AE91).

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 80 / Monday, April 27, 2015 / Notices

Penalties: Any violation of this Order
shall subject the person committing the
violation to a civil penalty of up to
$105,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301. Any
individual who willfully violates a
prohibition stated in this order is
subject to civil penalties under 49
U.S.C. 21301. In addition, such an
individual whose violation of this order
demonstrates the individual’s unfitness
for safety-sensitive service may be
removed from safety-sensitive service
on the railroad under 49 U.S.C. 20111.
FRA may, through the Attorney General,
also seek injunctive relief to enforce this
order. 49 U.S.C. 20112.
Review: Opportunity for formal
review of this Order will be provided in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and
5 U.S.C. 554. Administrative procedures
governing such review are found at 49
CFR part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47,
211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.
Issued in Washington, DC.
Sarah Feinberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–09614 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]

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BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Docket No. FRA–2015–0007–N–8]

Agency Request for Emergency
Processing of Collection of
Information by the Office of
Management and Budget
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT).
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:

FRA hereby gives notice that
it is submitting the following
Information Collection request (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for emergency processing under
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
FRA requests that OMB authorize the
collection of information identified
below immediately upon publication of
this Notice for a period of 180 days.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A
copy of this individual ICR, with
applicable supporting documentation,
may be obtained by telephoning FRA’s
Office of Railroad Safety Clearance
Officer: Robert Brogan (tel. (202) 493–
6292) or FRA’s Office of Administration
Clearance Officer: Kimberly Toone (tel.
(202) 493–6132) (these numbers are not
toll-free); or by contacting Mr. Brogan
via facsimile at (202) 493–6216 or Ms.
Toone via facsimile at (202) 493–6497,
SUMMARY:

or via email by contacting Mr. Brogan at
Robert.Brogan@dot.gov; or by contacting
Ms. Toone at Kim.Toone@dot.gov.
Comments and questions about the ICR
identified below should be directed to
OMB’s Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Attn: FRA OMB
Desk Officer.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recent
derailments have occurred involving
trains transporting large quantities of
petroleum crude oil and ethanol.
Preliminary investigation of one of these
recent derailments involving a crude oil
train indicates that a mechanical defect
involving a broken tank car wheel may
have caused or contributed to the
incident. FRA is is issuing Safety
Advisory 2015–01 to make
recommendations to enhance the
mechanical safety of the cars in trains
transporting large quantities of
flammable liquids. The Safety Advisory
recommends that railroads use highly
qualified individuals to conduct the
brake and mechanical inspections and
recommends a reduction to the impact
threshold levels the industry currently
uses for wayside detectors that measure
wheel impacts to ensure the wheel
integrity of tank cars in those trains.
Title: Mechanical Inspections and
Wheel Impact Detector Standards for
Trains Transporting Large Amounts of
Class 3 Flammable Liquids.
Reporting Burden:
Average
time per
response
(minutes)

Total annual
burden
(hours)

Safety advisory 2015–01

Respondent
universe

Total annual
responses

(1) Maintenance Advisories from Railroads to Car Owners after
Wheel Impact Load Detector (WILD) Automatic Notification
that Detects an Impact Above Threshold of 60kips.
(2) Records of Initial Terminal Brake Inspection by Qualified Mechanical Inspector and Records of Freight Car Inspections at
Initial Terminals with Designated Inspectors.

70 Railroads .........

350,000 Advisories

1

5,833

70 Railroads .........

1,000 Inspections/
Records.

30

500

Form Number(s): N/A.
Respondent Universe: 70 Railroads.
Frequency of Submission: One-time;
on occasion.
Total Estimated Responses: 351,000.
Total Estimated Annual Burden:
6,333 hours.
Status: Emergency Review.
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3507(a) and 5
CFR 320.5(b), 1320.8(b)(3)(vi), FRA
informs all interested parties that it may
not conduct or sponsor, and a
respondent is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.

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Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Erin McCartney,
Budget Director.

Federal Railroad Administration

[FR Doc. 2015–09704 Filed 4–24–15; 8:45 am]

[Docket No. FRA–2015–0007–N–7]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

PO 00000

Agency Request for Emergency
Processing of Collection of
Information by the Office of
Management and Budget
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT).
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:

FRA hereby gives notice that
it is submitting the following
Information Collection request (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget

SUMMARY:

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