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34720
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892,
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Dianne Hardy, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 6175,
MSC 7892, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435–
1154, dianne.hardy@nih.gov.
Name of Committee: AIDS and Related
Research Integrated Review Group,
Behavioral and Social Science Approaches to
Preventing HIV/AIDS Study Section.
Date: July 14–15, 2011.
Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: Westin Seattle Hotel, 1900 5th
Avenue, Seattle, WA 98101.
Contact Person: Jose H Guerrier, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5222,
MSC 7852, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435–
1137, guerriej@csr.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel, Fellowship:
Genes, Genomes, and Genetics.
Date: July 14–15, 2011.
Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications
Place: Hotel Nikko San Francisco, 222
Mason Street, San Francisco, CA 94102.
Contact Person: Michael A Marino, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 2216,
MSC 7890, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 435–
0601, marinomi@csr.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel, Small
Business: Respiratory Sciences.
Date: July 14–15, 2011.
Time: 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892,
(Virtual Meeting).
Contact Person: Ghenima Dirami, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Scientific Review, National Institutes of
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4122,
MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–594–
1321, diramig@csr.nih.gov.
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine;
93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333,
93.337, 93.393–93.396, 93.837–93.844,
93.846–93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National
Institutes of Health, HHS.)
Dated: June 8, 2011.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory
Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2011–14688 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
National Institutes of Health
National Institute on Aging; Notice of
Closed Meeting
Pursuant to section 10(d) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is
hereby given of the following meeting.
The meeting will be closed to the
public in accordance with the
provisions set forth in sections
552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C.,
as amended. The grant applications and
the discussions could disclose
confidential trade secrets or commercial
property such as patentable material,
and personal information concerning
individuals associated with the grant
applications, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.
Name of Committee: National Institute on
Aging Special Emphasis Panel, Skeletal
Indicators, Health and Aging.
Date: July 7, 2011.
Time: 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institute on Aging,
Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue,
Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892.
(Telephone Conference Call)
Contact Person: Rebecca J. Ferrell, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, National Institute
on Aging, Gateway Building Rm. 2C212, 7201
Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892,
301–402–7703, ferrellrj@mail.nih.gov.
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.866, Aging Research,
National Institutes of Health, HHS.)
Dated: June 8, 2011.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory
Committee Policy.
property such as patentable material,
and personal information concerning
individuals associated with the grant
applications, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.
Name of Committee: National Institute on
Aging Special Emphasis Panel,
Frontotemporal Dementia.
Date: July 26, 2011.
Time: 12 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institute on Aging,
Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue,
Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892,
(Telephone Conference Call).
Contact Person: William Cruce, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, National Institute
on Aging, Scientific Review Branch, Gateway
Building 2C–212, 7201 Wisconsin Ave.,
Bethesda, MD 20814, 301–402–7704,
crucew@nia.nih.gov.
Name of Committee: National Institute on
Aging Special Emphasis Panel, Antecedent
Biomarkers For AD.
Date: July 28, 2011.
Time: 1 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
applications.
Place: National Institute on Aging,
Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue,
Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892,
(Telephone Conference Call).
Contact Person: William Cruce, PhD,
Scientific Review Officer, National Institute
on Aging, Scientific Review Branch, Gateway
Building 2C–212, 7201 Wisconsin Ave.,
Bethesda, MD 20814, 301–402–7704,
crucew@nia.nih.gov.
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Nos. 93.866, Aging Research,
National Institutes of Health, HHS)
Dated: June 8, 2011.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory
Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2011–14685 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P
[FR Doc. 2011–14687 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
[Docket No. DHS–2009–0026]
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program
National Institutes of Health
National Institute on Aging; Notice of
Closed Meetings
AGENCY:
Pursuant to section 10(d) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is
hereby given of the following meetings.
The meetings will be closed to the
public in accordance with the
provisions set forth in sections
552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C.,
as amended. The grant applications and
the discussions could disclose
confidential trade secrets or commercial
SUMMARY:
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National Protection and
Programs Directorate, DHS.
ACTION: Response to comments received
during 30-day comment period: New
information collection request 1670–
NEW.
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS or the Department),
National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD), Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP),
Infrastructure Security Compliance
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices
Division (ISCD) has submitted an
information collection request (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review and clearance in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The
information collection is a new
information collection. A 60-day public
notice for comments was previously
published in the Federal Register on
June 10, 2009, at 74 FR 27555. A 30-day
public notice for comments was
published in the Federal Register on
April 13, 2010, at 75 FR 18850. In the
30-day notice the Department
responded to comments received during
the 60-day comment period. This notice
responds to comments received during
the 30-day notice. This process is
conducted in accordance with 5 CFR
1320.8.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: A copy of the
ICR, with applicable supporting
documentation, may be obtained
through the Federal Rulemaking Portal
at http://www.regulations.gov.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Program Description
The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS), 6 CFR Part 27,
require high-risk chemical facilities to
submit information to the Federal
government about facility personnel
and, as appropriate, unescorted visitors
with access to restricted areas or critical
assets at those facilities. As part of the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program this
information will be vetted by the
Federal government against the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB) to identify
known or suspected terrorists (KSTs).
The TSDB is the Federal government’s
consolidated and integrated terrorist
watchlist of known and suspected
terrorists, maintained by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC). For more information on
the TSDB, see DOJ/FBI—019 Terrorist
Screening Records System, 72 FR 47073
(August 22, 2007).
High-risk chemical facilities must also
perform three other types of background
checks in order to comply with CFATS’
Personnel Surety Risk-Based
Performance Standard 12 (RBPS–12).
See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii): Highrisk chemical facilities must ‘‘perform
appropriate background checks * * *
including (i) Measures designed to
verify and validate identity; (ii)
Measures designed to check criminal
history; [and] (iii) Measures designed to
verify and validate legal authorization to
work.’’ These three other types of
background checks are not the subjects
of this notice, nor are they subjects of
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the underlying ICR or of the 30- or 60day notices preceding this notice. The
CFATS Personnel Surety Program is not
intended to halt, hinder, or replace
these three other types of background
checks, nor is it intended to halt,
hinder, or replace high-risk chemical
facilities’ performance of background
checks which are currently required for
employment or access to secure areas of
those facilities.
Background
On October 4, 2006, the President
signed the DHS Appropriations Act of
2007 (the Act), Public Law 109–295.
Section 550 of the Act (Section 550)
provides DHS with the authority to
regulate the security of high-risk
chemical facilities. DHS has
promulgated regulations implementing
Section 550, the Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards, 6 CFR Part 27.
Section 550 requires that DHS
establish Risk Based Performance
Standards (RBPS) as part of CFATS.
RBPS–12 (6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv))
requires that regulated chemical
facilities implement ‘‘measures
designed to identify people with
terrorist ties.’’ The ability to identify
individuals with terrorist ties is an
inherently governmental function and
requires the use of information held in
government-maintained databases,
which are unavailable to high-risk
chemical facilities. Therefore, DHS is
implementing the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, which will allow
chemical facilities to comply with
RBPS–12 by implementing ‘‘measures
designed to identify people with
terrorist ties.’’
DHS has submitted the proposed
information collection for the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program to OMB for
review and clearance in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.
Overview of CFATS Personnel Surety
Process
The CFATS Personnel Surety Program
will work with the DHS Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to
identify individuals who have terrorist
ties by vetting information submitted by
each high-risk chemical facility against
the TSDB.
High-risk chemical facilities or their
designees will submit the information
of: (1) Facility personnel who have or
are seeking access, either unescorted or
otherwise, to restricted areas or critical
assets; and (2) unescorted visitors who
have or are seeking access to restricted
areas or critical assets. These persons,
about whom high-risk chemical
facilities and facilities’ designees will
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submit information to DHS, are referred
to in this notice as ‘‘affected
individuals.’’ 1
Information will be submitted to
NPPD through the Chemical Security
Assessment Tool (CSAT), the online
data collection portal for CFATS. The
high-risk chemical facility or its
designees will submit the information of
affected individuals to DHS through
CSAT. The submitters of this
information (‘‘Submitters’’) for each
high-risk chemical facility will also
affirm, to the best of their knowledge,
that the information is: (1) True, correct,
and complete; and (2) collected and
submitted in compliance with the
facility’s Site Security Plan (SSP) or
Alternative Security Program (ASP), as
reviewed and authorized and/or
approved in accordance with 6 CFR
27.245. The Submitter(s) of each highrisk chemical facility will also affirm
that, in accordance with their Site
Security Plans, notice required by the
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, has
been given to affected individuals before
their information is submitted to DHS.
DHS will send a verification of receipt
(previously referred to as a ‘‘verification
of submission’’ in the 60-day and 30-day
notices) to the submitter(s) of each highrisk chemical facility when a high-risk
chemical facility: (1) Submits
information about an affected individual
for the first time; (2) submits additional,
updated, or corrected information about
an affected individual; and/or (3)
notifies DHS that an affected individual
no longer has or is seeking access to that
facility’s restricted areas or critical
assets.
Upon receipt of each affected
individual’s information in CSAT,
NPPD will send a copy of the
information to TSA. Within TSA, the
Office of Transportation Threat
Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC)
conducts vetting against the TSDB for
several DHS programs. TTAC will
compare the information of affected
individuals collected by DHS (via
CSAT) to information in the TSDB.
TTAC will forward potential matches to
the TSC, which will make a final
determination of whether an
individual’s information is identified as
a match to a record in the TSDB.
In the event that an affected
individual’s information is confirmed to
match a record in the TSDB (which DHS
refers to as a ‘‘match to the TSDB,’’ or
1 Individual high-risk facilities may classify
particular contractors or categories of contractors
either as ‘‘facility personnel’’ or as ‘‘visitors.’’ This
determination should be a facility-specific
determination, and should be based on facility
security, operational requirements, and business
practices.
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices
simply as a ‘‘match’’), the TSC will
notify NPPD and the appropriate
Federal law enforcement agency for
coordination, investigative action, and/
or response, as appropriate. NPPD will
not routinely provide vetting results to
high-risk chemical facilities nor will it
provide results to an affected individual
whose information has been submitted
by a high-risk chemical facility. As
warranted, high-risk chemical facilities
may be contacted by DHS or Federal law
enforcement agencies as part of law
enforcement investigation activity.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Information Collected
DHS may collect the following
information about affected individuals:
• Full name;
• Aliases;
• Date of birth;
• Place of birth;
• Gender;
• Citizenship;
• Passport information;
• Visa information;
• Alien registration number;
• DHS Redress Number (if available).
For purposes of clarifying the exact
data points which will be routinely
collected as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, the
Department offers the following data
clarification to the public. Under this
information collection, the Department
will require that high-risk chemical
facilities submit the following
information about affected individuals
that are U.S. Citizens and Lawful
Permanent Residents, for vetting against
the TSDB:
a. Full name;
b. Date of birth; and
c. Citizenship or Gender.
The Department will require that
high-risk chemical facilities submit the
following information about affected
individuals that are Non-U.S. Persons,
for vetting against the TSDB:
a. Full name;
b. Date of birth;
c. Citizenship; and
d. Passport information and/or alien
registration number.
To reduce the likelihood of false
positives in matching against the TSDB,
high-risk chemical facilities may also
(optionally) submit the following
information about affected individuals:
a. Aliases;
b. Gender (for Non-U.S. persons);
c. Place of birth; and
d. DHS Redress Number.
In lieu of conducting new TSDB
vetting of an affected individual, DHS
may collect information to verify that an
affected individual is currently enrolled
in a DHS program that also requires a
TSDB check equivalent to the TSDB
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vetting performed as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program. For purposes
of clarifying the exact data points which
will be routinely collected as part of the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the
Department offers the following data
clarification to the public. To verify
enrollment in a DHS screening program,
the high-risk chemical facility must
submit the affected individual’s:
a. Full Name;
b. Date of Birth; and
c. Program-specific information or
credential information, such as unique
number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for
Commercial Driver’s License with an
Hazardous Materials Endorsement).
When verifying enrollment in a DHS
screening program, the high-risk
chemical facility may also (optionally)
submit the affected individual’s:
a. Aliases;
b. Place of birth;
c. Gender;
d. Citizenship; and
e. DHS Redress Number.
If high-risk chemical facilities find it
administratively easier to submit to DHS
the routine vetting information of an
affected individual, even if the affected
individual has been previously vetted,
facilities may do so. In that case, DHS
will vet affected individuals against the
TSDB, and will not seek to verify an
affected individual’s enrollment in
TWIC, HME, NEXUS, SENTRI or FAST.
DHS will collect information that
identifies the high-risk chemical facility
or facilities, to which the affected
individual has or is seeking access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
DHS may contact a high-risk chemical
facility to request additional
information (e.g., visa information)
pertaining to particular individuals in
order to clarify suspected data errors or
resolve potential matches (e.g., in
situations where an affected individual
has a common name). Such requests
will not imply, and should not be
construed to indicate, that an
individual’s information has been
confirmed as a match to a TSDB record.
In the event that a confirmed match
is identified as part of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, DHS may
obtain references to and/or information
from other government law enforcement
and intelligence databases, or other
relevant databases that may contain
terrorism information.
DHS may collect information
necessary to assist in tracking
submissions and transmission of
records, including electronic
verification that DHS has received a
particular record.
DHS may also collect information
about points of contact at each high-risk
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chemical facility, and which points of
contact the Department or Federal law
enforcement personnel may contact
with follow-up questions. A request for
additional information from DHS does
not imply, and should not be construed
to indicate, that an individual is known
or suspected to be associated with
terrorism.
DHS may also collect information
provided by individuals or high-risk
chemical facilities in support of any
redress requests or any adjudications
initiated under CFATS.
DHS may request information
pertaining to affected individuals,
previously provided to DHS by high-risk
chemical facilities, in order to confirm
the accuracy of that information, or to
conduct data accuracy reviews and
audits as part of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program.
DHS will also collect administrative
or programmatic information (e.g.,
affirmations or certifications of
compliance, extension requests, brief
surveys for process improvement, etc.)
necessary to manage the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program.
The Department will also collect
information that will allow high-risk
chemical facilities to manage their data
submissions. Specifically, the
Department will make available to highrisk chemical facilities two blank data
fields. These blank data fields may be
used by a high-risk chemical facility to
assign each record of an affected
individual a unique designation or
number that is meaningful to the highrisk chemical facility. Collecting this
information will enable a high-risk
chemical facility to manage the
electronic records it submits into CSAT.
Entering this information into CSAT
will be completely voluntary, and is
intended solely to enable high-risk
chemical facilities to search through,
sort, and manage the electronic records
they submit into.
Responses to Comments Received
During the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program ICR 30-Day Comment Period
The Department received 20
comments in response to the 30-day
notice for comment. Comments were
received from eight private sector
companies; nine associations; one
training council; one union; and one
council composed of chemical industry
trade associations. Many of the
comments were in response to the
questions posed by the Department in
the 30-day notice for comments. The
Department first addresses comments
responding to questions posed in the 30day notice, and then responds to
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices
unsolicited comments received in
response to the 30-day notice.
(A) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited
Comments That Evaluate Whether the
Proposed Collection of Information Is
Necessary for the Proper Performance of
the Functions of the Agency, Including
Whether the Information Will Have
Practical Utility
Comment: The Department received
several comments addressing whether
the proposed collection of information
had any practical utility. One
commenter suggested that the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program does not
provide owners or operators of regulated
facilities with a value-added tool to
screen potential personnel, contractors,
and visitors or to identify potential
security risks. Another commenter
suggested that the proposed program is
a one-way process that provides
information to the Department on
personnel with access to restricted
areas, without any feedback provided to
the owners or operators of regulated
facilities on their personnel. In contrast,
one commenter stated that, ‘‘[i]n the
context of CFATS requirements for
personal surety and protecting the
nation’s chemical infrastructure, the
consolidated and integrated terrorist
watchlist, even with [its] limitations
* * * is likely the best check for
potential terrorists by DHS compared to
other methods and information.’’
Response: The CFATS Personnel
Surety Program is necessary for the
proper performance of the functions of
the Department, including protecting
chemical facilities and the nation from
terrorist attacks. DHS will perform this
responsibility by identifying individuals
with terrorist ties that have or are
seeking access to restricted areas or
critical assets at high-risk chemical
facilities. The CFATS Personnel Surety
Program also has practical utility—
enabling the Federal government to take
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Name ..........................
Date of Birth ...............
Unique Credential Information.
individuals: (1) Serves no security
purpose; (2) means that the Department
is not granting TSDB vetting reciprocity
between its own programs; and (3) is
redundant, particularly in situations
where commenters believe that other
DHS credentialing programs have more
stringent vetting criteria than CFATS.
Several commenters requested
clarification on which Federal
credentialing programs the Department
will recognize as conducting TSDB
checks equivalent to CFATS Personnel
Surety Program TSDB checks.
Response: The 30-day notice
reiterated the Department’s position,
first outlined in the preamble to the IFR,
that DHS supports the sharing and reuse
of vetting results. See 72 FR 17709 (Apr.
9, 2007). An affected individual will not
need to undergo additional vetting as
part of the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program if he/she has successfully
undergone TSDB vetting, and possesses
a valid credential or endorsement, as
part of the Department’s Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
program, Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME) program, NEXUS
program, Secure Electronic Network for
Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)
program, or Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) program. DHS must collect a
limited amount of information for that
affected individual, however, to
determine that the affected individual is
currently enrolled in an above-listed
DHS program. This information is
necessary (1) To verify that the affected
individual is currently enrolled in the
DHS program, and (2) to enable DHS to
access both the original enrollment data
and the TSDB vetting results already in
the possession of the Department, when
necessary. The following information is
necessary to verify an affected
individual’s enrollment in a DHS
program:
TWIC
HME
NEXUS
SENTRI
FAST
Required ...................
Required ...................
—TWIC Serial Number: Required.
—Expiration Date:
Required.
Required ...................
Required ...................
—Commercial Driver’s License (CDL)
Issuing State(s):
Required.
—CDL Number: Required.
—Expiration Date:
Required.
Required ...................
Required ...................
—PASS Number: Required.
—Expiration Date:
Required.
Required ...................
Required ...................
—PASS Number: Required.
—Expiration Date:
Required.
Required.
Required.
—PASS Number: Required.
—Expiration Date:
Required.
If DHS cannot confirm an affected
individual’s current enrollment in one
of the previously mentioned programs,
or if previous vetting results cannot be
VerDate Mar<15>2010
appropriate follow-up action if it
determines that known or suspected
terrorists have or seek access to
restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities.
Comment: One commenter stated that
the information collection and vetting
processes described in the 30-day notice
appeared to be an attempt to shift
responsibility from the government to
the private sector. The commenter
suggested that the 30-day notice read as
though facilities will assist the Federal
government in the performance of antiterrorism duties.
Response: High-risk chemical
facilities will submit information
pertaining to affected individuals to
DHS as part of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program. In the preamble to the
CFATS Interim Final Rule (IFR), DHS
stated that background checks
identifying individuals with terrorist
ties, required by 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv),
can only be achieved by conducting
vetting against the TSDB. See 72 FR
17709 (Apr. 9, 2007). Determining
whether individuals’ information
matches a record in the TSDB
necessarily includes checks of data sets
that are not commercially available. The
design of the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program will allow high-risk chemical
facilities to comply with 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12)(iv) by submitting
information necessary for DHS to
conduct vetting against the TSDB.
Comment: DHS received comments
regarding individuals who have
previously undergone TSDB vetting
equivalent to CFATS Personnel Surety
Program TSDB vetting, and who have
been subsequently issued and currently
maintain active, valid credentials or
endorsements (e.g., Transportation
Worker Identification Credentials) as a
result of that previous vetting.
Commenters stated that the
Department’s collection of information
from facilities about these affected
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verified, DHS will either: (1) Notify the
high-risk chemical facility that the
Department could not verify that the
affected individual is currently enrolled
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in a DHS program; and/or (2) vet the
affected individual against the TSDB.
When a high-risk chemical facility is
notified that the Department could not
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verify that the affected individual is
currently enrolled in a DHS program,
the high-risk chemical facility must
either: (1) Submit additional
information, which corrects or updates
the previous information to verify
enrollment; or (2) provide sufficient
information for the Department to
conduct vetting of the affected
individual against the TSDB. Such
notifications from DHS will not imply,
and should not be construed to indicate,
that an individual has been confirmed
as a match to the TSDB.
If high-risk chemical facilities find it
administratively easier to submit
information about affected individuals
for vetting against the TSDB (rather than
leveraging previous vetting against the
TSDB), high-risk chemical facilities may
do so. In that case, DHS will vet affected
individuals against the TSDB, and will
not seek to verify an affected
individual’s enrollment in TWIC, HME,
NEXUS, SENTRI, or FAST.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the Department was not
following recently-issued White House
recommendations to promote
comparability and reciprocity across
credentialing and screening programs.
One commenter specifically referred to
Recommendation 16 of the Surface
Transportation Security Priority
Assessment, which recommends that
the Federal government ‘‘Create a more
efficient Federal credentialing system by
reducing credentialing redundancy,
leveraging existing investments, and
implementing the principle of ‘enroll
once, use many’ to reuse the
information of individuals applying for
multiple access privileges.’’ See The
White House (March 2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/STSA.pdf.
Response: The design of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program aligns with
the recommendations of the Surface
Transportation Security Priority
Assessment.
In discussions with high-risk
chemical facilities, DHS has discovered
that the concept of ‘‘enroll once, use
many’’ may have been misinterpreted by
commenters as meaning that an
individual should only need to submit
information to DHS once, and that DHS
should never collect information from
that individual again. DHS, however,
defines the ‘‘enroll once, use many’’
concept as the ability to reuse
previously-submitted program
enrollment information and/or vetting
results, upon collection of sufficient
information to confirm an individual’s
prior enrollment in a DHS program or
prior vetting results. High-risk chemical
facilities will have to submit affected
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individuals’ personal data to DHS as
part of the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program in order for DHS to reuse
previously-submitted enrollment
information and previous vetting
results. The CFATS Personnel Surety
Program will require only the minimum
information necessary to verify affected
individuals’ enrollments in the TWIC,
HME, NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST
programs.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that it may be reasonable for
DHS to require chemical facilities to
perform visual inspections of TWICs
and other existing credentials, but that
requiring chemical facilities to submit
data pertaining to affected individuals
possessing such other credentials would
not serve any legitimate security
purpose. Further, one commenter stated
that facilities not regulated under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA) should not be expected to
obtain ‘‘readers’’ for TWIC credentials.
Response: As previously discussed,
DHS will collect information about
affected individuals who are currently
enrolled in certain DHS programs with
equivalent TSDB vetting to verify that
each affected individual is currently
enrolled in the TWIC, HME, NEXUS,
SENTRI, and/or FAST programs.
DHS agrees that there is no
expectation or requirement that nonMTSA facilities be equipped with TWIC
readers. DHS also emphasizes that
TWICs are not required for persons
accessing facilities regulated by CFATS.
High-risk chemical facilities may,
however, choose to leverage TWIC
credentials as part of the identity, legal
authorization to work, and criminal
history background checks they perform
as part of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii).
The precise manners in which high-risk
chemical facilities could leverage TWIC
credentials as part of identity, legal
authorization to work, and criminal
history background checks could vary
from facility to facility, and should be
described in individual facilities’ SSPs.
The precise manners in which facilities
could leverage TWIC credentials as part
of these other background checks are
beyond the scope of this Paperwork
Reduction Act response to comments.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the Department should
accept vetting results from other Federal
agencies, namely the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF), which conduct vetting against
the TSDB. Commenters suggested that
without this accommodation, the
Department would impose unreasonable
burdens on a segment of the community
regulated by more than one Federal
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agency without any corollary
enhancement to security.
Response: ATF conducts point-intime vetting against the TSDB, which
means that ATF’s checks are conducted
at only specified times, not on a
recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is a
DHS best practice, and compares an
affected individual’s information against
new and/or updated TSDB records as
new and/or updated records become
available.
(B) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited
Comments Which Evaluate the
Accuracy of the Department’s Estimate
of the Burden of the Proposed Collection
of Information, Including the Validity of
the Methodology and Assumptions Used
Comment: The Department received
comments which supported the
proposed CFATS Personnel Surety
Program information submission
schedule, published in the Federal
Register on April 13, 2010, at 75 FR
18853, as part of the Department’s 30day notice. The Department also
received comments raising the point
that the proposed schedule would create
situations in which an affected
individual’s name will be submitted to
DHS after he/she no longer has access
to a high-risk chemical facility. Several
commenters highlighted this issue by
pointing out that commercial delivery
companies may not always send the
same driver to a high-risk chemical
facility.
Response: Based in part on
commenters’ concerns, DHS will revise
the proposed information submission
schedule previously published in the
30-day notice. The revised schedule will
be published in the Federal Register
and/or disseminated to high-risk
chemical facilities individually, and
will align with the RBPS Metric 12.1 for
‘‘new/prospective employees [facility
personnel] & unescorted visitors.’’ (See
Table 17 in the May 2009 Risk Based
Performance Standards Guidance,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
chemsec_cfats_riskbased_performance_
standards.pdf.) Specifically, the revised
schedule will require high-risk chemical
facilities to submit the information of
new affected individuals prior to access
to restricted areas or critical assets. The
Department is considering whether to
establish that high-risk chemical
facilities be required to submit the
information at least 48 hours prior to
access to restricted areas or critical
assets. The Department may, on a case
by case basis, allow for variances from
the schedule.
In response to the comments received
about commercial delivery drivers, DHS
reminds the public that RBPS–12
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applies only to facility personnel with
access to a high-risk chemical facility’s
restricted areas or critical assets, and to
unescorted visitors with access to a
high-risk chemical facility’s restricted
areas or critical assets. Situations that
require visitors to generally access a
high-risk chemical facility will not
result in submission of information for
vetting under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program if the visitors do not
have access to restricted areas or critical
assets, or if the visitors are escorted
through restricted areas and critical
assets. If commercial delivery drivers
visiting high-risk chemical facilities are
escorted, or if they do not have access
to restricted areas or critical assets in
the first place, then they will not be
affected individuals and will not be
vetted under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program.
If a high-risk chemical facility opts to
allow visitors (e.g., commercial truck
drivers) unescorted access to its
restricted areas or critical assets, the
visitors will be considered affected
individuals and the facility will be
required to both (1) Perform background
checks on the unescorted visitors as
required under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–
(iii), and (2) submit information
pertaining to those visitors to the
Department to identify individuals with
terrorist ties. The Department recognizes
that this may, or may not, necessitate
changes in business operations of highrisk chemical facilities.
Comment: Many commenters
suggested the Department did not
accurately estimate the burden to highrisk chemical facilities because it
underestimated the affected population.
The commenters suggested a total
population of 10,000,000 affected
individuals, rather than the
Department’s estimate of 1,063,200
affected individuals. Using the
Department’s estimated time per
respondent of 0.59 hours, commenters
estimated 6,000,000 burden hours. The
majority of commenters used an average
hourly rate of $20.00. Commenters
estimated that total annual cost of the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
would be $120,000,000.
Response: DHS disagrees with several
of the commenters’ assumptions that
resulted in the $120,000,000 estimate.
First, commenters suggested that the
ICR estimate of 1,063,200 total
respondents (i.e., affected individuals)
did not account for agricultural retail or
distribution facilities that cannot isolate
restricted areas or critical assets to a
limited number of employees or visitors.
In the CFATS Regulatory Assessment
the Department approximated
compliance costs through the use of
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model facility categories. See CFATS
Regulatory Assessment, section 5.1
(Apr. 1, 2007), http://
www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-00730116. Model facility categories were
created using four variables: (1) To
which of the four risk-based tiers a
covered facility is assigned; (2) whether
a covered facility is ‘‘enclosed’’ (inside
a building) or ‘‘open’’ (not inside a
building); (3) the size of a covered
facility (large or small); and (4) whether
the chemicals at a covered facility are at
risk of theft or diversion for subsequent
use as weapons or weapons
components. These variables provided
the Department with 16 variations for
which different estimates could be
approximated. See CFATS Regulatory
Assessment at 23, table 15 (Apr. 1,
2007). Several of the variations of these
model facility categories, notably Tier 4
Groups A, B, and C, do account for
agricultural retail or distribution
facilities that cannot isolate restricted
areas or critical assets to a limited
number of employees or visitors.
Therefore, the Department believes that
the information collection does
reasonably account for agricultural retail
or distribution facilities that cannot
isolate restricted areas or critical assets
to a limited number of facility personnel
or unescorted visitors.
Second, some commenters assumed
that the Department failed to account for
respondents at facilities that would be
required to submit Top-Screen
consequence assessments to DHS if the
‘‘indefinite time extension’’ issued by
the Department on January 9, 2008 is
lifted. The Department disagrees with
the commenters because the total
respondent estimate used by the
Department was derived from the
CFATS Regulatory Assessment, which
was published (on April 1, 2007) prior
to the ‘‘indefinite time extension’’
(issued on January 9, 2008). The CFATS
Regulatory Assessment assumed the
inclusion of these facilities when
estimating the population of individuals
affected by Personnel Surety costs.
The third assumption that
commenters used to support an
estimated total number of 10,000,000
affected individuals was that the
Department should include the
population of individuals working at
approximately 3,200 MTSA-regulated
facilities in its estimate of the
population of affected individuals. The
Department is precluded from including
any population in the total number of
respondents explicitly excluded from
regulation under CFATS. MTSA
facilities are excluded from regulation
under CFATS by Section 550.
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Commenters also suggested that many
high-risk facilities in the retail segment
could see large numbers of visitors (i.e.,
customers) entering facilities during
peak retail times of the year. The
commenters suggested that depending
on how the Department defines
‘‘unescorted visitor,’’ the total annual
number of respondents could be an
order of magnitude greater than the
354,400 figure estimated by the agency.
Commenters did not specify any order
of magnitude, so the Department
assumed that commenters were
suggesting that during peak times of the
year the Department should estimate an
increase of one order of magnitude (i.e.,
3,189,600 affected individuals) above
the Department’s current annual
population estimate.2 The Department
does not believe that high-risk chemical
facilities in the retail segment will opt
to conduct the other background checks
required under 6 CFR 27.230(a)12(i)–
(iii) on these individuals due to the cost
and burden that would place on the
high-risk chemical facility. Hence, highrisk chemical facilities in the retail
segment will likely ensure, through
their access controls, that customers
will not become affected individuals.
Therefore, the Department has chosen
not to modify the total number of
respondents based upon peak retail
times of the year.
The Department has concluded that
the comments which estimated that the
total annual cost on the regulated
community of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program would be $120,000,000
were based on inaccurate assumptions.
Comment: One commenter stated that
it conducted a study of twelve industry
members and subsequently concluded
the Department had significantly
underestimated the burden on the
industry.
Response: The Department requested
from the commenter, and was
subsequently provided, the survey data
underlying the study referenced in the
commenter’s response. The survey
requested information and specific
numeric data from 34 facilities (owned
and operated by 12 industry members).
The facilities ranged from a small
research facility to several large
facilities. The Department concluded
that an increase in the estimated
number of respondents was justified,
based on the survey data received.
The Department has concluded that
the type of facilities surveyed generally
aligned with Group A facilities
(described in section 5.1 of the CFATS
2 The estimate of 3,189,600 affected individuals is
derived from [(354,000 affected individuals x 10)—
354,400 affected individuals]
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Regulatory Assessment). Based on the
survey, and based on a brief description
of facilities responding to the survey,
the Department increased, for the
purposes of this ICR, the estimate of
Group A facilities by an order of
magnitude thus matching the results of
the survey.
In reviewing the comments, as well as
the survey data provided, the
Department identified a minor
computational error when calculating
the total annual number of respondents
in the 60-day and 30-day notices.
Specifically, the Department in the 30day and 60-day notices improperly
assumed that total number of
respondents as 1,063,200 affected
individuals over a three-year period.
Rather in the CFATS Regulatory
Assessment the Department had
assumed the total population of
individuals to be screened at 1,063,200
with an additional annual turnover that
resulted in an additional 177,290
respondents during the second and
third years. Therefore, in the 60-day and
30-day notices the Department should
have estimated a total number of
respondents over three years as
1,417,780 resulting in 472,593 annual
number of respondents.
In accounting for this minor
computational error, and for the
increase of Group A facilities by an
order of magnitude, the Department has
revised its average total annual number
of respondents from 354,400 to
1,303,700. As a consequence, the
estimated time per respondent (i.e., total
burden hours/number of respondents)
was revised from 0.59 hours to 0.54
hours.
Comment: Three of the four
commenters that analyzed the estimated
costs outlined in the 30-day notice
suggested an appropriate wage rate of
$20 per hour while the fourth
commenter suggested the wage rate
would range between $20 and $40 per
hour.
Response: Based upon the
commenters’ suggestions, the
Department has modified the wage rate.
Since comments on the appropriate
wage rate ranged from $20 to $40 per
hour, we picked the midpoint of $30 for
our hourly wage rate. To account for the
cost of employee benefits such as paid
leave, insurance, retirement, etc., we
multiplied the base wage rate of $30 by
1.4 to arrive at a fully loaded wage rate
of $42 per hour.3 The updated analysis
3 The average hourly wage rate previously used
by the Department in the 30-day and 60-day notices
was $84. This average hourly wage rate was based
upon the hourly wage rate estimate for Site Security
Officers (SSO) contained in section 6.3.1 of the
CFATS Regulatory Assessment, adjusted to account
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and costs submitted to OMB as part of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
ICR are reflected at the conclusion of
this notice.
Comment: Many commenters
suggested that the Department did not
accurately estimate the burden because
the estimate was limited to those
activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1).
Commenters suggested that such a limit
does not account for unnecessary
investigations, or for justified or
unjustified adverse employment
decisions that could result from a
person’s possibly unjustified presence
on the TSDB. One commenter expressed
concern that the Department’s estimate
did not account for the burden on
affected individuals whose information
matches that of records in the TSDB, but
who are not in fact terrorists.
Response: The activities which the
Department must account for when
estimating the burden of an ICR are
limited in scope to those activities listed
in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). Specifically, 5
CFR 1320.3(b)(1) requires the
Department to estimate the total time,
effort, or financial resources expended
by persons to generate, maintain, retain,
disclose, or provide information to or
for a Federal agency. The potential
burden described by the commenters is
not related to the burden high-risk
chemical facilities incur in collecting
and submitting the information of
affected individuals to DHS, nor is it
within the scope of the activities listed
in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1).
(C) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited
Comments To Enhance the Quality,
Utility, and Clarity of the Information
To Be Collected
Comment: One commenter suggested
that requiring covered facilities to
collect, submit and maintain affected
individuals’ information creates a
situation subject to data entry errors and
presents a significant challenge to
maintain current information.
Response: The Department has made
an effort to create a user-friendly Web
tool (in CSAT) that will reduce data
entry errors. Hence, the Department
believes that Submitters of high-risk
chemical facilities will be able to affirm
that, to the best of their knowledge,
information submitted to DHS as part of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is
true, correct, and complete.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that it would be inappropriate to require
facilities to submit affected individuals’
for passage of time since publication of the
Regulatory Assessment. See CFATS Regulatory
Assessment (Apr. 1, 2007), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2006-0073-0116.
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information to DHS. The commenter
suggested that requiring covered
facilities to collect, verify, submit, and
maintain this information creates an
increased legal liability for covered
facilities that have to accurately and
timely collect, verify, submit, maintain
and protect this sensitive information.
Response: DHS presumes that
chemical facilities, as employers, have
access to basic biographical information
(such as names, dates of birth, genders,
and citizenships) of many facility
personnel and visitors.
As part of RBPS–12, each high-risk
chemical facility is also required to
conduct background checks to verify the
identity, legal authorization to work,
and criminal history of affected
individuals. Many high-risk chemical
facilities are collecting, verifying, and
properly maintaining information
necessary for these other verifications
already. This already-collected
information should include many, if not
most of the necessary data elements
required for submission to DHS to
complete the check for an individual’s
ties to terrorism.
Comment: A few commenters stated
that high risk chemical facilities are
rarely in a legal position to guarantee
the truth, correctness or completeness of
information related to contractors,
vendors, truck drivers or any other nonemployees. Requiring signed documents
by company officials will not ensure
that information from parties outside of
their legal control is true, correct, and
complete. One commenter expressed
concern that company or facility
representatives are not experts in
determining the validity of
identification, and the affirmation
statements the Department will require
each Submitter to affirm should be
modified to be ‘‘the same information
presented by the affected individual.’’
Response: Each Submitter will be
expected to affirm, to the best of his/her
knowledge, that the information he/she
submits to DHS on behalf of a high-risk
chemical facility for vetting against the
TSDB is true, correct, and complete. In
the event that a high-risk chemical
facility submits incorrect information
through no fault of its own, the
Department will expect the high-risk
chemical facility to update the
information in accordance with the
proposed submission schedule. Steps
that high-risk chemical facilities might
take to validate personal information
collected as part of identity, legal
authorization to work, or criminal
history checks are beyond the scope of
this notice and are beyond the scope of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
ICR.
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Comment: The Department received
comments requesting clarity as to
whether covered facilities should
submit names of emergency personnel
who would qualify as affected
individuals. One commenter noted a
CFATS Frequently Asked Question
(FAQ) which indicated that fire
department personnel would not be
required to undergo background checks.
Response: The Department expects
high-risk chemical facilities to submit
the information of affected individuals
in accordance with the submission
schedule to be published or
disseminated by the Department. For
purposes of RBPS–12, the Department
affirms that certain populations are not
affected individuals. Specifically:
(1) Federal officials that gain unescorted
access to restricted areas or critical
assets as part of the performance of their
official duties are not affected
individuals; (2) law enforcement
officials at the state or local level that
gain unescorted access to restricted
areas or critical assets as part of the
performance of their official duties are
not affected individuals; and
(3) emergency responders at the state or
local level that gain unescorted access to
restricted areas or critical assets during
emergency situations are not affected
individuals. This aligns with the
population assumptions for the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program embedded
within the Regulatory Assessment.
The Department has updated FAQ
1368 (see http://csat-help.dhs.gov), and
appreciates the comment which brought
the FAQ to the Department’s attention.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the Department is requesting
information beyond what is required to
identify people with terrorist ties when
collecting work phone numbers and
work email addresses. The commenter
also suggested that collecting additional
information for auditing purposes is
beyond the scope of CFATS.
Response: DHS no longer plans to
routinely collect affected individuals’
work phone numbers and work email
addresses. The Department disagrees,
however, that collection of information
for auditing purposes is beyond the
scope of CFATS.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the burden would be
difficult to estimate unless the
Department provided definitions for
such terms as ‘‘contractor’’ and
‘‘vendor.’’
Response: Individual high-risk
facilities may classify particular
contractors or vendors, or categories of
contractors or vendors, either as
‘‘facility personnel’’ or as ‘‘visitors.’’
This determination should be a facility-
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specific determination, and should be
based on facility security, operational
requirements, and business practices.
The Department’s estimates regarding
the information collection burden of the
Personnel Surety Program reflect this
approach.
Comment: One commenter was not
aware of any facility that currently
maintains, in an easily accessible or
transferrable format, the information
required for submission discussed in the
ICR.
Response: The Department believes
that the information necessary to
identify individuals with terrorist ties is
already in the possession of many highrisk chemical facilities, due to the other
background checks already performed
by those facilities. The burden outlined
in this ICR accounts for the fact that
some facilities do not possess this
information, and that others do not
possess this information in easily
accessible or transferrable formats.
Comment: One commenter suggested
that various flaws in the TSDB and
various flaws in the Federal
government’s watchlisting protocols
need to be addressed in order to make
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
viable and fair.
Response: As indicated in the CFATS
IFR, the Department has determined
that a TSDB check is necessary for the
purpose of protecting restricted areas
and critical assets of high-risk chemical
facilities from persons who may have
ties to terrorism. See 72 FR 17708
(Apr. 9, 2007). The TSDB is the Federal
government’s integrated and
consolidated terrorist watchlist and is
the appropriate database to use to
identify individuals with terrorist ties.
Discussions regarding TSDB flaws and
the Federal government’s watchlisting
protocols are beyond the scope of this
notice.
Comment: One commenter requested
clarity about the Department’s reference
that it may ‘‘collect information on
affected individuals as necessary to
enable it to provide redress.’’ Another
commenter expressed concern that the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
design does not set up a uniform,
thorough system that gives workers full
appeals or waiver procedures. Several
commenters expressed concern about
how the Department would provide
meaningful redress under the design of
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
Response: An ICR is not the
appropriate vehicle for the Department
to use to address privacy and redress
issues related to the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program. The Department will
publish a Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA) about the CFATS Personnel Surety
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34727
Program, to be made available on the
Department’s Web page at http://www.
dhs.gov/privacy and http://www.dhs.
gov/chemicalsecurity. The Department
will also publish a System of Records
Notice (SORN) for the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, and a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking proposing to take
certain Privacy Act exemptions for the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
System of Records.
(D) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited
Comments Regarding the Minimization
of the Burden of Information Collection
on Those Who Are To Respond,
Including Tthrough the Use of
Aappropriate Automated, Electronic,
Mechanical, or Other Technological
Collection Techniques or Other Forms of
Information Technology (e.g., Permitting
Electronic Submissions of Responses)
Comment: Three commenters
suggested that the Department should
allow private third parties to submit
information of individuals to DHS on
behalf of chemical facilities.
Specifically, these commenters
suggested that if private third parties
could directly submit information,
substantial burden could be eliminated
for high-risk chemical facilities. Another
commenter suggested that the
Department should provide a means
through which non-employees would be
able to directly provide their
information to the Department.
Response: As part of the Personnel
Surety Program, DHS will also allow
facilities to designate third party
individuals as Submitters. Designated
individuals will be able to submit TSDB
screening information to DHS on behalf
of the facilities that designate them as
Submitters.
Comment: Commenters suggested that
the ICR places undue burdens and costs
on businesses that operate multiple
regulated facilities where redundant
information submissions would be
required for a given individual who
visits multiple sites.
Response: The Department has taken
steps to minimize the potential for an
affected individual’s information to be
submitted multiple times. Further, in
the event that an affected individual’s
information is submitted to the
Department multiple times, only one
record will be transmitted to TSA to be
vetted against the TSDB.
The primary step the Department has
taken to minimize the potential for an
affected individual’s information to be
submitted multiple times is ensuring
that companies with many high-risk
chemical facilities have flexibility to
consolidate CSAT user roles.
Specifically, CSAT will provide
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companies the flexibility either to
consolidate their user roles to allow a
single Submitter for many facilities, or
to elect for each facility to
independently submit information to
the Department. Each company may
implement the best strategy for itself.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that requiring facilities to
update and correct information about
affected individuals will neither
‘‘increase the accuracy of data
collected,’’ nor ‘‘decrease the probability
of incorrect matches’’ against the TSDB.
The commenters further suggested that
updating and correcting information
will significantly increase the
administrative burden on companies
required to provide the information and
will also increase the likelihood that
data may be incomplete and/or
inaccurate.
Response: The Department is
confident that matching correct and
accurate information against records in
the TSDB increases the accuracy of the
vetting process. The use of inaccurate or
false data prevents DHS from accurately
screening individuals with or seeking
access to high-risk chemical facilities for
ties to terrorism.
Comment: Several commenters
requested that the Department eliminate
the requirement that facilities notify the
Department when an affected individual
no longer has access to a facility’s
restricted areas or critical assets.
Response: For the duration that an
affected individual has or is seeking
access to restricted areas or critical
assets at high-risk chemical facilities,
DHS will compare the affected
individual’s information against new
and/or updated TSDB records. When
the Department is made aware that an
individual no longer has or is seeking
access, that individual’s information
will no longer be vetted against the
TSDB. Therefore, the Department will
not eliminate the requirement that
facilities must notify the Department
when an affected individual no longer
has or is seeking access to a facility’s
restricted areas or critical assets.
(E) DHS Solicited Comments That
Respond to the Department’s
Interpretation of the Population
Affected by RBPS–12’s Background
Check Requirement
Comment: Some commenters
acknowledged the plain reading of
CFATS, describing what categories of
individuals are affected individuals for
purposes of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program, while expressing their
dissatisfaction that the Department was
not pursuing rulemaking to modify the
text of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). The majority
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of commenters, however, reiterated
comments submitted during the 60-day
comment period expressing
disagreement with the definition of
affected individuals. Commenters
described the definition as a ‘‘new’’
CFATS requirement for escorted facility
personnel and inconsistent with
congressional intent, regulatory
language contained in CFATS, guidance
DHS has issued on RBPS satisfaction
(available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cfats_risk
based_performance_standards.pdf), and
with other regulatory programs designed
to enhance the security of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. For example,
some commenters mentioned that the
U.S. Coast Guard permits individuals
without TWICs to access the secure
areas of MTSA-regulated facilities so
long as those individuals are escorted.
Commenters requested additional
information as to why the Department
has seemingly crafted new categories of
affected individuals in the context of
CFATS.
Response: The text of 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12) identifies who should
appropriately undergo background
checks as part of CFATS. The
population of individuals who must be
vetted under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) is the
same as described in both the 60-day
and 30-day notices: (1) Facility
personnel who have or are seeking
access (unescorted or otherwise) to
restricted areas or critical assets, and
(2) unescorted visitors who have or are
seeking access to restricted areas or
critical assets.4 In this response to
comments, however, the Department
has clarified that certain populations are
not affected individuals. Specifically:
(1) Federal officials that gain unescorted
access to restricted areas or critical
assets as part of the performance of their
official duties are not affected
individuals; (2) law enforcement
officials at the State or local level that
gain unescorted access to restricted
areas or critical assets as part of the
performance of their official duties are
not affected individuals; and
(3) emergency responders at the state or
local level that gain unescorted access to
restricted areas or critical assets during
emergency situations are not affected
individuals.
Comment: Some commenters
suggested that the Department is
selecting only one possible
interpretation of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12).
Specifically, commenters suggested that
a plain English interpretation of the text,
‘‘* * * appropriate background checks
on and ensure appropriate credentials
4 See
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Frm 00090
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* * *’’ could mean that sometimes it is
appropriate not to conduct background
checks on individuals with access to
restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities.
Response: DHS disagrees with the
commenters’ interpretation of 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12). That section of CFATS
requires that high-risk chemical
facilities perform identity checks,
criminal history checks, legal
authorization to work checks, and
terrorist ties checks on both (1) Facility
personnel with access (unescorted or
otherwise) to restricted areas or critical
assets, and (2) unescorted visitors with
access to restricted areas or critical
assets.5
Comment: One commenter
representing farmer-owned cooperatives
explained that it is common for farmers
to be unescorted in or near critical
assets or restricted areas of high-risk
chemical facilities when picking up
products sold by or available from those
facilities. The commenter stated that
such a farmer would be seen at various
times by various people throughout
such facilities. The commenter
requested clarity as to whether or not
such a farmer would be an affected
individual.
Response: The Department
emphasizes that each high-risk chemical
facility has the ability to tailor its SSP
to meet its unique business and security
needs, including the ability to tailor
access control procedures for restricted
areas and critical assets. Each high-risk
chemical facility will need to consider
its unique security concerns when
determining which individuals will be
afforded access to restricted areas or
critical assets. If a farmer-owned
cooperative, determined by the
Department to be a high-risk chemical
facility, decided to establish access
controls such that an unescorted
individual had access to restricted areas
and critical assets within the high-risk
chemical facility, then that unescorted
individual’s information would need to
be submitted to the Department.
Comment: A few commenters
requested clarity from the Department
as to whether or not the scope of RBPS–
12 extended beyond the physical
perimeter of the high-risk chemical
facility and potentially impacted
individuals with access to networked
computer systems.
Response: If a networked computer
system is listed as a restricted area or
critical asset in an approved SSP, then
individuals with access to that
networked computer system would be
5 See
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(F) DHS Solicited Comments Which
Respond to the Statement That a
Federal Law Enforcement Agency May,
if Appropriate, Contact the High-Risk
Chemical Facility as a Part of a Law
Enforcement Investigation Into Terrorist
Ties of Facility Personnel
Comment: The Department received
several comments suggesting that
Federal law enforcement agencies
should not be hindered in their
investigatory or anti-terrorism
responsibilities. Most commenters
believe, however, that both high-risk
chemical facilities and individuals
being vetted against the TSDB should,
on a routine basis, be notified of TSDB
vetting results.
Response: It is the policy of the U.S.
Government to neither confirm nor deny
an individual’s status in the TSDB.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the policy of not
routinely notifying high-risk chemical
facilities of vetting results is
inconsistent with other Federal security
vetting programs. One commenter stated
that another Federal background check
program provides notice to the facility
and the individual when an individual
has or has not cleared a background
check. The commenter further stated
that, ‘‘[t]his notice does not reveal to the
employer facts that led the agency to
disqualify the employee, but it does
allow the employer the opportunity to
immediately, if appropriate, remove the
employee from work functions that
would allow the individual to [perform
sensitive work functions].’’
Response: Providing a vetting result
back to the facility or the individual
being vetted would conflict with the
U.S. Government policy to neither
confirm nor deny an individual’s status
in the TSDB.
Comment: Several commenters
requested additional information about
the process and procedures the Federal
Government would follow in the event
that a known or suspected terrorist is
identified who has or seeks access to
restricted areas or critical assets at a
high-risk chemical facility.
Response: DHS will not routinely
notify high-risk chemical facilities of
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
vetting results. DHS will coordinate
with Federal law enforcement entities to
monitor and/or prevent situations in
which known or suspected terrorists
have access to high-risk chemical
facilities. The precise manners in which
DHS or Federal law enforcement entities
could contact high-risk chemical
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facilities following vetting are beyond
the scope of this notice.
Comment: One commenter
recommended that the Department
collect information on all employees
who have CFATS-related adverse
employment decisions, and make this
information (not including personal
identifiers) publically available.
Response: DHS will not collect
information on employment decisions
as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program.
(G) Respond to the Department’s
Intention To Collect Information That
Identifies the High-risk Chemical
Facilities, Restricted Areas and Critical
Assets to Which Each Affected
Individual Has Access
Comment: One commenter supported
the Department’s intention to collect
information that identifies the high-risk
chemical facilities to which each
affected individual has access. Most
commenters generally objected,
however, to the Department’s intention
to collect information that identifies the
high-risk chemical facilities to which
each affected individual has access. One
commenter expressed concern that the
ICR indicated that the Department was
collecting information about specific
restricted areas or critical assets within
each facility.
Response: As part of the Personnel
Surety Program the Department does not
intend to collect information that
identifies the specific restricted areas
and critical assets within high-risk
chemical facilities to which each
affected individual has or is seeking
access.
Comment: A common objection made
by commenters was that the Department
was creating a tool to track individuals’
movement from site to site, resulting in
a program which far exceeds the
Department’s stated goal of identifying
individuals that have ties to terrorism.
Response: DHS has no intention to
and will not track the movement of
affected individuals between and among
high-risk chemical facilities. The
Department will only require a high-risk
chemical facility to submit information
about an affected individual to the
Department (through CSAT) for the
purpose of identifying individuals with
terrorist ties once. A high-risk chemical
facility will not need to submit to DHS
information about a single affected
individual each time that affected
individual accesses restricted areas or
critical assets.
As mentioned previously in this
notice, in accordance with the proposed
submission schedule, high-risk
chemical facilities will also be required
PO 00000
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34729
to submit updated or corrected
information about each affected
individual, and to notify DHS when an
affected individual no longer has or is
seeking access to that facility’s restricted
areas or critical assets.
Although the Department will not
track the movement of affected
individuals between and among highrisk chemical facilities, the Department
will associate an affected individual
with the high-risk chemical facility (or
facilities) for which the high-risk
chemical facility Submitter providing
that affected individual’s information
into CSAT is responsible. In the event
that a Submitter enters information into
CSAT on behalf of more than one
facility, by default the Department will
associate the affected individual with all
of the facilities for which the Submitter
is responsible. A Submitter may,
however, modify the lists of facilities
with which particular affected
individuals are associated. The
Department may contact the designated
points of contact for particular high-risk
chemical facilities for several reasons,
including to identify exactly at which
high-risk chemical facilities particular
affected individuals have access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Comment: Commenters objected to
the Department’s intention to collect
information that identifies high-risk
chemical facilities because commenters
claimed that this would cause the
Department to run the risk of amassing
so much information that the
information collected will be
meaningless.
Response: The Department disagrees.
DHS requires a minimum amount of
information to perform checks to
determine if affected individuals have
ties to terrorism, and to identify the
facilities to which affected individuals
have access. DHS requires this
information in order to carry out the
terrorist ties checks required by CFATS.
DHS is confident that that it can
effectively collect and maintain this
information, as appropriate.
Comment: A few commenters
reported that during a meeting between
DHS and the Chemical Sector
Coordinating Council on April 28, 2010,
the Department stated its intention to
collect information that identifies the
high-risk chemical facilities, restricted
areas, and critical assets to which each
affected individual has access, and that
it would use this information to conduct
analysis and investigations.
Response: DHS met with the
Chemical Sector Coordinating Council
on April 28, 2010, and reiterated the
Department’s intention to collect
information that identifies the high-risk
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chemical facilities to which each
affected individual has access. The
Department clarified that in the event
that a match to a record in the TSDB is
identified, the Department would be
able to quickly identify the specific
chemicals of interest (COI) the match
may have access to and the contact
information of the appropriate person at
the chemical facility. This information
may prove useful in determining an
appropriate Federal, state, or local
response in the event that one is
necessary. The Department emphasizes
that there will be no ‘‘tracking’’ of
affected individuals, nor will DHS
collect information on specific restricted
areas or critical assets to which an
affected individual has or is seeking
access, as part of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program.
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the Department should
reach out to the facility contact that
submitted an individual’s information
to determine specifics about the
individual’s site access when
circumstances warrant.
Response: DHS will collect
information about facility points of
contact in case follow-up is necessary.
(H) DHS Solicited Comments Which
Respond to the Department’s Intention
to Seek an Exception to the Notice
Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
Comment: The Department received
only a few comments in response to this
question. None of these comments
supported the Department’s intention to
seek an exception to the notice
requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
Response: The Department carefully
reviewed the comments, but disagrees
that an exception to the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) requirement, as
contained in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3), that
requires information collections to
provide certain reasonable notices, will
pose a risk to privacy. Therefore, the
Department will request from OMB an
exception for the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program to the PRA requirement,
as contained in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3),
which requires Federal agencies to
confirm that their information
collections provide certain reasonable
notices to affected individuals. If this
exception is granted, DHS will be
relieved of the potential obligation to
require high-risk chemical facilities to
collect signatures or other positive
affirmations of these notices from
affected individuals. Whether or not this
exception is granted, DHS will still
require high-risk facilities to affirm that,
in accordance with their Site Security
Plans, notice required by the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, has been
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given to affected individuals before their
information is submitted to DHS.
The Department’s request for an
exception to the requirement under 5
CFR 1320.8(b)(3) would not exempt
high-risk chemical facilities from having
to adhere to applicable Federal, state,
local, or tribal laws, or to regulations or
policies pertaining to the privacy of
facility personnel and the privacy of
unescorted visitors.
(I) DHS Also Received Unsolicited
Comments in Response to the 30-day
Notice Related to the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program
Comment: Several commenters
suggested that the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program outlined in the ICR
exceeds the Department’s statutory
authority, because the proposed CFATS
Personnel Surety Program design
conflicts with Section 550. Commenters
suggested that the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program’s design eliminates a
high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve
compliance with RBPS–12. Specifically,
the commenters suggested that the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program
design precludes a facility from
satisfying RBPS–12 by leveraging
measures other than the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program to identify
ties to terrorism, which commenters
assert is a possible violation of Section
550.
Response: The CFATS Personnel
Surety Program will not exceed the
Department’s statutory authority, nor
will it violate or conflict with Section
550. DHS will provide and approve
sufficient alternative methods for
facility satisfaction of the terrorism ties
background check portion of RBPS–12.
Specifically, the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program will provide several
options to high-risk chemical facilities,
including the following options:
Facilities can restrict the numbers and
types of persons whom they allow to
access their restricted areas and critical
assets, thus limiting the number of
persons who will need to be vetted
against the TSDB. Facilities additionally
have wide latitude in how they define
their restricted areas and critical assets
in their SSPs, and thus are able to limit
or control the numbers and types of
persons requiring TSDB screening.
Facilities can choose to escort visitors to
restricted areas and critical assets in lieu
of performing the background checks
required by RBPS–12 on them. Facilities
can also submit different biographic
information to DHS through CSAT for
affected individuals holding TWIC,
HME, NEXUS, SENTRI, or FAST
credentials than for affected individuals
not holding such credentials.
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Comment: Many commenters
suggested that this ICR is improper
because it makes changes to CFATS and
results in de facto rulemaking.
Specifically, commenters suggested that
four elements of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program are changes to CFATS
prescribing specific protocols for
administering background checks that
take a categorically different approach
than all other TSDB background check
programs currently administered in the
United States. Those elements were: (1)
The Department’s plan to conduct
‘‘recurrent vetting’’ of affected
individuals, thus requiring facilities to
notify the Department when a person no
longer has access to restricted areas or
critical assets; (2) the Department’s
intention to require facilities to submit
updates on an approved schedule
whenever an affected individual’s
information has changed; (3) the
possibility that the Department would
not recognize TSDB vetting results
completed by other Federal programs as
satisfying RBPS–12’s terrorist ties check
requirement; and (4) the Department’s
intention to link each affected
individual to particular high-risk
chemical facilities.
Response: The ICR, and the associated
60-day and 30-day notices, do not make
changes to CFATS. The ICR and
associated notices provide descriptions
of the nature of the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program’s information collection,
categories of respondents, estimated
burden, and costs. The PRA requires the
Department to provide sufficient detail
about how the Department would
collect information under the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program to enable the
public to provide comment on that
information collection.
Comment: Many commenters
suggested that the Department did not
properly account for Executive Order
12866 in issuing the 60- and 30-day
notices preceding this notice. Among
other things, Executive Order 12866
directs agencies to assess the effects of
Federal regulatory actions on state,
local, and tribal governments, and the
private sector, and to provide qualitative
and quantitative assessments of the
anticipated costs and benefits of Federal
mandates resulting in annual
expenditures of $100,000,000 or more,
including the costs and benefits to state,
local, and tribal governments, and the
private sector. Commenters suggested
that the Department carefully consider
whether the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program ICR qualifies as a significant
rulemaking such that it is subject to
various requirements of Executive Order
12866.
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Response: The Department disagrees
that this information collection alone
will generate expenditures in excess of
$100,000,000. The Department also
disagrees that this information
collection constitutes rulemaking. When
the Department published CFATS,
however, it did consider CFATS to be a
significant rulemaking. Therefore, in
compliance with the requirements of
Executive Order 12866, the Department
outlined in the CFATS Regulatory
Assessment the assumptions it used to
estimate the costs of CFATS, which
included the Department’s estimates
related to Personnel Surety in section
6.3.10 of the CFATS Regulatory
Assessment.
Comment: A few commenters
suggested that this information
collection will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, which requires
the Department to conduct a Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis in accordance with
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA).
Response: The RFA mandates that an
agency conduct an analysis when an
agency is required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking, not when
soliciting comments in preparation of
submitting an ICR to OMB for review
and clearance in accordance with the
PRA. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a). The
Department concluded in the preamble
to the IFR that because Congress
authorized DHS to proceed in
promulgating CFATS without the
traditional notice-and-comment
required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Department was not
required to prepare an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. See 72 FR
17722 (Apr. 9, 2007). Even so, the
Department did consider the impacts of
CFATS on small entities. Specifically,
the CFATS Regulatory Assessment
contains the Department’s analysis of
the impacts of CFATS on small entities.
After consideration of the percentage of
small entities that may have to comply
with the risk-based performance
standards (which include background
checks under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program) required by CFATS and
the compliance costs explained in the
CFATS Regulatory Assessment, the
Department determined that CFATS
may have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities.
Comment: One commenter requested
that the Department remove
administrative roadblocks that either
complicate the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program or prohibit measures that
would simplify and enhance the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program. Specifically,
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the commenter requested that the
Department allow employees to apply
for TWICs, if their individual jobs
require them to have access to restricted
areas or critical assets at high-risk
chemical facilities. The commentor
suggested that there is no language in
MTSA that expressly prohibits the use
of TWICs at non-maritime facilities.
Response: TWIC’s authorizing statute,
the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA), as amended, 46
U.S.C. 70101 et seq., explicitly applies
‘‘transportation security card’’
requirements to: ‘‘individual[s] allowed
unescorted access to secure area[s]
designated in * * * [maritime] vessel or
[maritime] facility security plan[s]’’
(70105(b)(2)(A)); certain MTSA license
and permit holders (70105(b)(2)(B));
maritime vessel pilots (70105(b)(2)(C));
maritime towing vessel personnel
(70105(b)(2)(D)); individuals with access
to certain protected maritime security
information (70105(b)(2)(E)); and certain
other individuals (70105(b)(2)(F)–(G)).
Further, individuals are eligible to
receive a TWIC unless, among other
criteria, they have committed certain
‘‘disqualifying criminal offense[s],’’ or
do not meet certain ‘‘immigration status
requirements.’’ 49 CFR 1572.5(a)(1)–(2).
The CFATS authorizing statute,
however, applies to ‘‘chemical facilities
that * * * present high levels of
security risk.’’ Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007,
Pub. L. 109–295, 550 (Oct. 4, 2006).
CFATS ‘‘does not apply to facilities
regulated pursuant to the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002.’’ 6
CFR 27.110(b). CFATS Personnel Surety
Program screening requirements apply
only to high-risk chemical facilities’
‘‘personnel, and as appropriate * * *
unescorted visitors with access to
restricted areas or critical assets.’’ 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12). Individuals are not
eligible for TWICs solely because they
have access to high-risk chemical
facilities covered by CFATS.
Accordingly, the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program is not duplicative with
the TWIC program in terms of type of
facilities covered or program objectives.
High-risk chemical facilities may,
however, choose to leverage TWIC
credentials as part of the identity, legal
authorization to work, and criminal
history background checks they perform
under CFATS. See 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). The precise
manners in which high-risk chemical
facilities could leverage TWIC
credentials as part of identity, legal
authorization to work, and criminal
history background checks could vary
from facility to facility, and should be
described in individual facilities’ SSPs.
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Comment: Several commenters
suggested that collecting sufficient
information to conduct the background
checks required by RBPS–12 might
cause high-risk chemical facilities to
violate State privacy laws and/or the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.
Response: The Department does not
agree that participation in the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program will cause
high-risk chemical facilities to violate
the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Similarly,
the Department does not agree that
participation in the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program will cause high-risk
chemical facilities to violate State law.
High-risk chemical facilities may
conduct the identity, legal authorization
to work, and criminal history
background checks required by 6 CFR
27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii) in a variety of
ways. Although identity, legal
authorization to work, and criminal
history background checks are not the
subject of this notice, the Department
believes that high-risk chemical
facilities can structure and carry out
these background checks in compliance
with all applicable Federal and state
laws, including the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and state privacy laws.
Comment: One commenter stated that
screening databases and watchlists
should be publicly accessible to allow
for efficient and consistent background
checks. The commenter stated that other
U.S. and partner nation agencies share
this information in the public domain,
which allows for regulated entities to
engage third-party vendors to facilitate
background screening. The commenter
cited specifically Office of Foreign
Assets Control watch lists, which are
available to the public.
Response: The Department does not
agree that the TSDB should be publicly
available. The TSDB is the U.S.
government’s consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist, used to
identify known or suspected terrorists,
containing sensitive information not
appropriate for public consumption.
The TSDB remains an effective tool in
the government’s counterterrorism
efforts because its contents are not
disclosed. For example, if it was
revealed who was in the TSDB, terrorist
organizations would be able to
circumvent the purpose of the terrorist
watchlist by determining in advance
which of their members are likely to be
questioned or detained.
Comment: One commenter stated that
there is no central database that covered
entities could query to validate that an
already-existing background screening
may be on file with the Department.
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Response: DHS agrees that there is
currently no central database that allows
the public to determine that an
individual has already undergone
screening by the Department.
Comment: One commenter was
troubled by the information pertaining
to RBPS–12 contained in Appendix C of
the May 2009 Risk-Based Performance
Standards Guidance (http://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cfats_risk
based_performance_standards.pdf),
because the commenter believes that
certain types of measures, procedures,
policies, and plans mentioned in
Appendix C are not appropriate for
determining if chemical facility
personnel are terrorist threats.
Response: The Department expects
high-risk chemical facilities to
implement appropriate security
measures to conduct identity, criminal
history, and legal authorization to work
background checks. These security
measures can vary from facility to
facility commensurate with facilityspecific risks, security issues, and
business practices. The guidance
referenced by the commenter (see pages
180 to 186 of the Risk-Based
Performance Standards Guidance), and
other guidance addressing identity,
criminal history, and legal authorization
to work background checks, however, is
not guidance addressing compliance
with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as
such is not the subject of this notice, nor
is it the subject of the underlying ICR or
of the 30- or 60-day notices preceding
this notice.
Comment: One commenter requested
that the Department clarify what appeal
or waiver options an affected individual
has if his/her employer takes an adverse
employment action against him/her
based on RBPS–12 background checks
or based on information received or
obtained under the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program. The commenter also
requested that the Department prevent
high-risk chemical facilities from using
personal information collected from
affected individuals as part of RBPS–12
for purposes other than conducting the
background checks required by RBPS–
12.
Response: High risk chemical
facilities’ employment actions are not
regulated by CFATS.
The ICR the Department will submit
to OMB, this notice, the 60-day notice,
and the 30-day notice address the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program, not
the identity, legal authorization to work,
and criminal history background checks
required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)–(iii).
Discussion of information collected as
part of those other three background
checks, or employment decisions based
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:27 Jun 13, 2011
Jkt 223001
on them, is beyond the scope of this
notice.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the summary section
of this notice, DHS has submitted an
ICR to OMB for review and clearance in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. This notice
responds to comments received during
the 30-day notice.
Prior to implementation of the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program, the
Department will also publish a Privacy
Impact Assessment (PIA) about the
CFATS Personnel Surety Program,
available on the Department’s Web page
at http://www.dhs.gov/privacy and
http://www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity.
The Department will also publish a
System of Records Notice (SORN) for
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program,
and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
proposing to take certain Privacy Act
exemptions for the CFATS Personnel
Surety Program System of Records.
The Department will also publish a
notice, and/or send notice to high-risk
chemical facilities individually, stating
that the CFATS Personnel Surety
Program has been implemented. In that
notice, the Department will include
description of how the CFATS
Personnel Surety Program will be
implemented, as well as the information
submission schedule high-risk chemical
facilities will be required to follow. The
notice will also describe how a high-risk
chemical facility can request a variance
from the submission schedule.
Analysis
Agency: Department of Homeland
Security, National Protection and
Programs Directorate, Office of
Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure
Security Compliance Division.
Title: CFATS Personnel Surety
Program.
Form: DHS Form 11000–29.
OMB Number: 1670–NEW.
Frequency: As required by a DHSapproved schedule.
Affected Public: High-risk chemical
facilities as defined in 6 CFR Part 27,
high-risk chemical facility personnel,
and as appropriate, unescorted visitors
with access to restricted areas or critical
assets.
Number of Respondents: 1,303,700
individuals.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.54
hours (32.4 minutes).
Total Burden Hours: 707,200 annual
burden hours.
Total Burden Cost (capital/startup):
$0.00.
Total Burden Cost (operating/
maintaining): $29,704,000.
PO 00000
Frm 00094
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Signed: June 6, 2011.
David Epperson,
Chief Information Officer, National Protection
and Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2011–14382 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS–2011–0032]
Privacy Act of 1974; Department of
Homeland Security/National Protection
and Programs Directorate—002
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Personnel Surety Program
System of Records
Privacy Office, DHS.
Notice of Privacy Act system of
AGENCY:
ACTION:
records.
In accordance with the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Homeland Security proposes to
establish a new system of records notice
titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland
Security/National Protection and
Programs Directorate—002 Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
Personnel Surety Program System of
Records.’’ This new system of records
collects information on individuals,—
facility personnel and unescorted
visitors—who have or are seeking access
to restricted areas and critical assets at
high risk chemical facilities and
compares this information to the
Terrorist Screening Database, the
terrorist watchlist maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Terrorist Screening Center. The
Department of Homeland Security is
issuing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking concurrently with this
system of records elsewhere in the
Federal Register to exempt portions of
the system of records from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements. This newly
established system of records will be
included in the Department of
Homeland Security’s inventory of
record systems.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
July 14, 2011. This system will be
effective July 14, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number [DHS–
2011–0032] by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal:
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
SUMMARY:
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14JNN1
| File Type | application/pdf |
| File Modified | 2011-06-14 |
| File Created | 2011-06-14 |