Filtered Flight Data - SNPRM

Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Proposed Rules
November 2006 and changes in
available technology have caused us to
reexamine our position on data filtering.
Reproduction:
Photocopy, per page .................
$0.25 We are now proposing that certain
Paper Copies of Microfiche,
critical data parameters may be filtered
per frame ...............................
0.25 if a certificate holder can show that the
Duplicate
Microfiche,
per
data can be accurately reconstructed.
microfiche .............................
0.50 This proposed rule would improve the
Electronic Productions, per reintegrity and quality of the data
quest ......................................
5.00
recorded on digital flight data recorders
Search and Processing:
Clerical/Technical, hourly rate
22.00 while giving aircraft designers and
operators more flexibility in system
Computer Support Specialist,
hourly rate .............................
30.00 design and operation where allowable,
Manager/Supervisory, hourly
including an option to filter data.
rate .........................................
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ACTION: Supplemental notice of
Management Facility in Room W12–140
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).
of the West Building Ground Floor at
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
SUMMARY: The FAA is amending its
proposal to prohibit the filtering of some Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
original flight recorder sensor signals.
Federal holidays.
Comments to the NPRM published in

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Appendix A to § 219.3—Reimbursement
Schedule

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For
technical questions concerning this
proposed rule contact Brian A. Verna,
Avionics Systems Branch, Aircraft
Certification Service, AIR–130, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202)
385–4643; fax (202) 385–4651; e-mail
brian.verna@faa.gov. For legal questions
concerning this proposed rule contact
Karen L. Petronis, Senior Attorney for
Regulations, Regulations Division,
Office of the Chief Counsel, AGC–200,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202)
267–3073; fax 202–267–7971; e-mail
karen.petronis@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in
this preamble under the Additional
Information section, we discuss how
you can comment on this proposal and
how we will handle your comments.
This discussion includes related
information about the docket, privacy,
and the handling of proprietary or
confidential business information. We
also discuss how you can get a copy of
this proposal and related rulemaking
documents.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA’s authority to issue aviation
safety rules is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code. Subtitle I, Section
106 describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the
scope of the agency’s authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section
44701. Under that section, the FAA is
charged with prescribing regulations
providing minimum standards for other
practices, methods and procedures
necessary for safety in air commerce.
This regulation is within the scope of
that authority since flight data recorders
are the only means available to account
for aircraft movement and flight crew
actions critical to finding the probable
cause of incidents or accidents,
including data that could prevent future
incidents or accidents.
I. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
During several aircraft accident
investigations, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or
Board) found that some flight data
recorder systems were filtering flight
recorder parameter signals before they
were recorded. As a result, the recorded
data did not accurately reflect the
aircraft’s performance or the movements

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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Proposed Rules

of the flight control systems before and
during the accident or incident under
investigation. Such signal filtering both
hampered and delayed the
investigations. Throughout the
investigation of American Airlines
Flight 587 (Flight 587), the NTSB
expended significant resources and time
trying to recreate the performance and
movements of the flight controls of the
accident aircraft.
In November 2003, the NTSB issued
three recommendations (NTSB
Recommendations A–03–48/A–03–49/
A–03–50, November 6, 2003) on digital
flight data recorder (DFDR) recording
requirements. The NTSB recommended
that the FAA require all aircraft have a
DFDR system installed ‘‘capable of
recording values that meet the accuracy
requirements through the full dynamic
range of each parameter at a frequency
sufficient to determine a complete,
accurate, and unambiguous time history
of parameter activity, with emphasis on
capturing each parameter’s dynamic
motion at the maximum rate possible,
including reversals of direction at the
maximum rate possible.’’

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B. Action by the FAA
The FAA agreed with these
recommendations. In 2006, we issued a
notice that proposed a prohibition on
filtering certain original flight data
sensor signals. The 2006 NPRM contains
a more complete discussion of the
proposal and the events leading up to it
(November 15, 2006, 71 FR 66634).
The comments we received on the
proposed rule alerted us to several
features of the proposed prohibition that
could have significantly more impact
than we would have predicted. The first
was the proposed definition of filtering,
which described it as a change to any
original parameter signal for any reason
other than the three specified in the
rule. The comments indicated that the
level of signal processing that is in use
on newer flight data systems no longer
coincides with more traditional
concepts of filtering, and leaves in
question whether current system
designs would be considered filtering. A
more detailed consideration of this issue
is included in the discussion that
follows.
As we considered whether to change
the proposed definition of filtering, we
studied what is quickly becoming the
standard in electronic signal processing.
Our intent in the 2006 NPRM was to
prohibit the processing of certain flight
data sensor signals that would result in
inaccurate data being preserved, as
happened with the rudder movement
data on Flight 587. That airplane

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crashed after takeoff from LaGuardia
Airport in November 2001.
The investigation following the crash
of Flight 587 indicated that the issue
was not that data were filtered, but that
the actual rudder movement data could
not be reconstructed once processed by
installed filtering devices. While a
prohibition like our 2006 proposal
would solve the problem, current
capabilities suggest that when properly
processed and documented, data can be
recovered from a system design that
incorporates filtering. We are now
proposing that data filtering be allowed
if a certificate holder can demonstrate
that the ‘filtered’ recorded data meet the
recording requirements of the
regulations, and that the original sensor
signal data can be accurately
reconstructed using a documented,
repeatable process.
C. Changes in This Supplemental Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking
We have moved the filtering
regulation from proposed § 121.344(n)
to its own section, § 121.346 (or
complementary sections in other parts),
to avoid any confusion with the other
flight recorder requirements. While
today’s document uses part 121 as a
reference, we are proposing the same
changes for parts 125, and 135.
Section 121.346 begins with a
definition of filtering that differs slightly
from the one we proposed in 2006. The
new proposed definition indicates that
when a signal is formatted in any way
to be DFDR compatible, it is not
considered filtered. As discussed below,
we disagreed with commenters that
thought the definition was too specific
to allow certain current practices in
signal conditioning.
We have changed our position from a
strict filtering prohibition to one of
conditional allowance that distinguishes
between two groups of flight recorder
parameters. The first contains those that
are prohibited from being filtered unless
a certificate holder can demonstrate that
it has done the tests, analyses, and
maintains the procedures necessary to
reconstruct the original sensor signal
values from the filtered recorded data.
The FAA understands that such
technology is available, and where it
can be shown to be reliable, it will be
allowed. The second includes those
parameters whose signals may be
filtered without further action.
We have split the 88 parameters listed
in § 121.344(a) into two groups.
The first group includes those
parameters that may be filtered only if
a certificate holder can demonstrate that
the original sensor signal data (values)
can be reconstructed using a valid,

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repeatable procedure. This group
includes parameters such as flight
control positions, flight control input
forces and flight control surface
positions that are sampled at higher
rates. Filtering can and has been shown
to result in incorrect information being
recorded. This group also includes those
parameters that are considered critical
to accident investigation, including
altitude, airspeed, heading, vertical and
lateral acceleration, pitch attitude, roll
attitude and engine thrust. Parameters
that may not be filtered unless valid
reconstruction is demonstrated are
numbers 1–7, 9, 11–18, 26, 32, 42, 43,
68, 70, 77, and 88.
The second group includes all
parameters that may be filtered without
further showing by the certificate
holder. We have found that filtering
these parameters still results in
acceptable recorded data as long as the
accuracy and all other requirements of
the applicable appendix are met. A
significant number of parameters in this
group are those that have only two
states, on or off. These are known as
discretes. We received several
comments indicating that the
information from these parameters is
not affected by filtering. There are also
discretes that may have three or four
preprogrammed fixed values as their
output, and are recorded as a binary
numerical representation (BNR).
Examples are traffic alert and collision
avoidance system (TCAS), electronic
flight instrument system (EFIS) display,
and primary navigation system
reference. Filtering these parameters
would not result in any nonprogrammed value being recorded, nor
would it affect the determination of the
value at a given time. Other parameters
included in the ‘may be filtered’ group
are secondary flight control surfaces and
input positions, such as trailing and
leading edge flaps and pitch trim
surface position. Filtering does not
appear to affect an investigator’s ability
to determine the position of this
equipment. Parameters that may be
filtered without further action are
numbers 8, 10, 19–25, 27–31, 33–41,
44–67, 69, 71–76, and 78–87.
The option not to filter any or all
parameters remains an acceptable
means of compliance with the
regulations. In all cases, the accuracy
and all other requirements of Appendix
M (or Appendix E or Appendix F) must
continue to be met. The ability to
reconstruct data does not forgive any
appendix requirement for any
parameter. For purposes of this SNPRM,
when we refer to Appendix M in our
response to a comment, this response
also applies to operations covered by

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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Proposed Rules
Appendix E to part 125 or Appendix F
to part 135 unless otherwise noted.
The proposed time for compliance
with this rule is four years after the
effective date of the final rule. Within
that four-year period, one of two things
must happen.
If a certificate holder elects not to
filter any of the restricted parameters, it
has four years to test its DFDR systems,
verify that none of the restricted
parameters are being filtered, or, if any
restricted parameter is being filtered,
modify that parameter.
If a certificate holder chooses to filter
a restricted parameter and show by test
and analyses that the originating signal
can be reconstructed, the procedures for
reconstruction would have to be
submitted to the FAA after the next
heavy maintenance check of an airplane
(beginning six months after the effective
date of the final rule), but not later than
two years after the effective date of the
final rule. If a certificate holder has
several of the same make, model and
series airplane (group) with the same
certificated DFDR system installed, the
procedures need only be submitted once
for the entire group of airplanes with
identically installed systems. The
compliance date for a group would be
tied to the first airplane going in for a
heavy maintenance check six months
after the rule is final. Submission of the
data to the FAA would be required no
later than the time the first airplane of
a group completes that heavy
maintenance check. This compliance
schedule is intended to allow the FAA
to determine that the submitted
reconstruction procedures are
repeatable, but still allow time for other
compliance action (within the four
years) if repeatability is not
accomplished. A certificate holder that
is unable to show repeatability for any
restricted parameter would be required
to modify the parameter to eliminate
filtering before the four-year compliance
period ends.
We have not included in the rule text
a time limit for submission of the
reconstruction procedures to the NTSB
following an accident or occurrence that
requires the NTSB be notified. We
presume that the reconstruction data are
included as part of the recorder and its
data that are subject to § 121.344(i) and
the NTSB’s authority under 49 CFR 830.
We invite comment on whether a
specific, brief time for submission needs
to be included separately in the rule for
the reconstruction procedure data.

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II. Discussion of Comments to the
NPRM
A. Summary of Comments
The FAA received 16 comments in
response to the 2006 NPRM. AirTran
Airways, L3 Communications, the
National Transportation Safety Board
and two individuals supported the
intent of the 2006 NPRM, but offered
detailed changes.
The Air Transport Association (ATA),
Airbus, Boeing, FedEx, Dassault
Aviation, Northwest Airlines and the
Regional Airline Association (RAA)
opposed the proposed rule. They also
recommended that any final rule should
only apply to newly manufactured
airplanes.
The remaining commenters did not
specifically state support or opposition,
but suggested changes to the proposed
rule.
B. Definition of a Filtered Flight Data
Signal
We proposed to define when a flight
data recorder signal is filtered as
occurring when an original sensor signal
is changed in any way, other than
changes necessary to:
(1) Accomplish analog to digital
conversion of the signal;
(2) Reformat a digital signal into a
DFDR-compatible format; or
(3) Eliminate a high-frequency
component of a signal that is outside the
bandwidth of the sensor.
Boeing stated that it uses methods
other than those in the proposed
definition to enhance the quality of
original sensor signals by protecting
them against aliasing and noise. These
methods go beyond the three specific
kinds of processing allowed under the
proposed definition and would be
prohibited. Boeing suggested that the
proposed list of acceptable signal
conditioning is incomplete and does not
allow for technological advances.
Boeing indicated its preference for a
more general definition, and suggested
the following:
‘‘Filtered data is that for which the
actual sensor signal is amended, altered,
modified, or changed in any manner
such that it cannot be readily retrieved
using existing, easily understood
instructions and commonly available
tools and techniques.’’
Boeing’s concern that its signal
conditioning methods would be
prohibited is unfounded. Anti-aliasing
techniques and noise removal are each
different methods of eliminating highfrequency components of a signal. Highfrequency components are not
necessarily outside the bandwidth of the
sensor. The eliminated high-frequency

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component of a signal can be within the
operational bandwidth of a sensor, but
outside the operational bandwidth of a
parameter. In this case, anti-aliasing and
noise reduction techniques, by our
definition, would be an acceptable form
of filtering.
Accordingly, we do not agree that a
more general definition than that
proposed would be appropriate. While
Boeing noted that we used the more
general definition in a June 2002 survey
on filtering, that definition was not
subject to the extensive analysis and
review that we use when developing a
definition for a regulation. When
subjected to such analysis and review,
the failings of the general definition
become apparent. The general definition
fails to address two common and
acceptable changes—converting a signal
from analog to digital and formatting a
digital signal for DFDR compatibility.
It was unclear from the comments
whether there was some
misunderstanding of the phrase
‘‘operational bandwidth of the sensor’’
in paragraph (3) of the definition.
Comments are invited regarding the
application of this phrase in the context
of the filtering definition.
C. Appendix M Introductory Text
When we amended the DFDR
regulations in 1997 to increase the
number of parameters required to be
recorded, we created Appendix M to
part 121 (and comparable appendices in
other parts). These appendices establish
the upgraded technical requirements for
each of the 88 parameters. The
introductory text to Appendix M
currently states:
‘‘The recorded values must meet the
designated range, resolution, and
accuracy requirements during dynamic
and static conditions. All data recorded
must be correlated in time to one
second.’’
In the 2006 NPRM, we proposed
language that would present a more
detailed explanation of what we meant
by the term ‘‘dynamic condition.’’ We
proposed an additional sentence
indicating that dynamic condition
meant the parameter is experiencing
change at the maximum rate available,
including the maximum rate of reversal.
In its comment, the NTSB asked that
we change the term ‘‘maximum rate
available’’ to ‘‘maximum rate possible.’’
The NTSB did not provide any
rationale for this suggested change, and
we are unable to agree that the term
‘‘maximum rate possible’’ is an
improvement. Since we consider the
word ‘‘possible’’ to include states that
are well beyond the normal operational
range of equipment, the suggested

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change appears inappropriate as a
regulatory standard. The proposed
introductory text for Appendix M is
unchanged from the 2006 NPRM.
D. Parameters Covered by the Filtering
Prohibition
In drafting the 2006 NPRM, we
reviewed each of the 88 parameters to
determine which are too critical to
allow any filtering beyond the proposed
allowable signal conditioning. The
parameters that met this critical
performance requirement included
flight control surface positions, flight
control input positions and flight
control input forces. We also
determined that discrete signals should
not be filtered since they, by definition,
show that something is either on or off,
and we knew of no need to filter these
data. We sought comment on these
choices.
While the 2006 NPRM proposed a
general prohibition on filtering any
flight data signal other than those
specifically excepted, some commenters
referred to those signals for parameters
covered by the general prohibition as
being on a ‘‘no filter’’ list. While this is
not technically correct, we are using the
term ‘‘no filter list’’ when discussing
these comments to prevent further
confusion.
Boeing asked that we remove discrete
signals from the ‘‘no filter’’ list and
provided several examples of how
discrete signals are filtered. For
example, Boeing noted that discrete
signals may be filtered to eliminate false
transitions that are typically
encountered with mechanical devices.
Boeing argued that the amount of signal
conditioning that may be applied to a
discrete signal should be determined by
what is needed for the equipment to
function as part of the overall aircraft
design, not what is required for a DFDR
recording. Boeing concluded that the
DFDR should only be monitoring the
status of functions interfaced with
discrete signal inputs, and not dictating
conditions that may prevent an
improvement in signal integrity.
Airbus recommended that we add 33
parameters to the list of those that may
be filtered. Airbus stated that the 33
parameters are not related to flight
controls or flight control inputs, and
that there would be ‘‘no critical loss of
information’’ even if the raw data were
not recorded.
The ATA questioned why we
included the majority of the 46
parameters covered by the filtering
prohibition when they do not relate to
primary flight controls. The ATA noted
that only 6 of the 88 recorded
parameters (7 in airplanes manufactured

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after August 18, 2002) record inputs to,
or surface positions of, primary flight
controls. The ATA also argued that we
should not include discrete signals
because their inclusion could expose
certificate holders to technical
noncompliance when the prohibition
serves no purpose. The ATA
recommended that the prohibition on
filtering be limited to parameters
numbers 12 through 17, and 88.
We note first that, in our review of the
parameters for this SNPRM, we
reanalyzed each parameter (as suggested
by Airbus) in light of the information
provided by several commenters. We
based our original proposal on two
presumptions. First, we believed that
currently operating airplanes did not
record discretes in a manner that would
be considered filtering under the
proposed definition. Second, we
thought that by prohibiting filtering of
discrete signals, future system and data
bus/network designs would not change
these signals in a way that might
prevent recording information
accurately. However, based on the
comments, we are now allowing
discrete signals to be filtered under the
language proposed in this SNPRM.
In contrast to the other commenters,
the NTSB recommended we increase the
number of parameters for which
filtering is prohibited. The NTSB asked
that we include time, pressure altitude,
indicated airspeed, normal, lateral and
longitudinal accelerations, heading,
pitch, roll, radio altitude, angle of
attack, brake pressure, yaw or sideslip
angle, and hydraulic pressure. The
NTSB characterized these parameters as
critical, and noted that their signals
could be distorted by filtering, and that
filtering could introduce random timing
biases that can change the timing of one
parameter relative to another.
We agree with the NTSB’s
characterization of these parameters as
critical for the work of accident
investigators. Accordingly, we have
included them in the list of parameters
that are restricted in this SNPRM.
An individual who is an accident
investigator also recommended that we
include parameter numbers 9 (thrust/
power on each engine) and 43
(additional engine parameters) in the
list of those parameters for which
signals may not be filtered. After our
review, we agree that these two
parameters are critical to accident
investigators and they are included in
the ‘‘no filter’’ list.

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E. Applicability
1. Existing and/or Newly Manufactured
Aircraft
In the 2006 NPRM, we proposed that
the prohibition against filtering apply to
both existing and newly manufactured
aircraft. While Airbus, Dassault
Aviation, Northwest Airlines and the
RAA opposed the proposed rule, they
also suggested that any final rule should
only apply to newly manufactured
airplanes.
Airbus noted that covering only
newly manufactured airplanes is less
costly for all parties, since
manufacturers would be able to
combine new designs into other flight
recorder system improvements. Airbus
also noted that the filter conversion
algorithms have been solved for inservice airplanes, concluding that the
problem will not occur again, and thus
there are no further benefits to be
achieved by the proposed rule.
The RAA viewed the safety concerns
expressed in the 2006 NPRM as
applicable to the design and
certification process, and thus better
suited to newly manufactured airplanes.
As we stated in the 2006 NPRM, we
considered the regulatory alternative of
limiting the filtering prohibition to
newly manufactured aircraft. While this
approach is always less costly than a
rule that affects the in-service fleet, it
would also fail to address the large
number of aircraft currently operating
on which filtering is occurring. We are
also concerned that failing to cover inservice aircraft could lead to future
system modifications that result in more
filtering.
Experience with the Boeing 767 and
the Airbus A300 has shown that
filtering has caused problems during
accident investigations. We disagree
that the efforts expended during the
Flight 587 accident investigation to
reverse-filter the critical rudder data
account for all the benefits that might
accrue from a stricter limit on filtering.
We also disagree that there was an
acceptable outcome following the
investigation. The NTSB has not
released any formal opinion that the
results for the Flight 587 data
reconstruction were satisfactory, or that
the processes involved in that data
reconstruction were acceptable. We
recognize that data reconstruction,
when satisfactory from an accuracy
standpoint and shown to be repeatable,
is an acceptable alternative. That is why
we are issuing this SNPRM. We do not
believe the problems uncovered by the
Flight 587 investigation have been
solved. Allowing airplanes to remain in

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the fleet while filtering critical data is
not an acceptable alternative.
2. Airplanes Omitted in the NPRM
In the 2006 NPRM, we inadvertently
failed to include airplanes covered
under § 121.344(b)(1) and Appendix B
to part 121, and § 125.226(b)(1) and
Appendix D to part 125. We had no
reason for excluding these airplanes.
While we realize that they are older
airplanes, many of the parameters
included in the proposed filtering
restriction are among the 18 required to
be recorded by these airplanes. These
airplanes are now included in this
SNPRM. We anticipate that some of the
equipment installed on these airplanes
may not be sophisticated enough to
allow filtering. However, we do not
know the exact composition of this fleet,
and have determined that it is
appropriate for airplanes covered by
§ 121.344(b)(1) or § 125.226(b)(1) to be
subject to the proposed analysis to
ensure that they are not filtering
restricted parameters.
We are not including the older
airplanes operating under § 135.152(a)
or (b) because of the complex nature of
the applicability in those paragraphs.
The applicability of the filtering
regulations for newer part 135 airplanes
remains as proposed in the 2006 NPRM.

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3. Part 129 Airplanes
Airbus stated that aircraft operating
under part 129 (Foreign Air Carriers and
Foreign Operators operating
N-registered aircraft engaged in
Common Carriage) may also be affected
because § 129.20 references § 121.344
for applicability. Airbus concluded that
omitting these airplanes from the cost/
benefit analysis will result in more
significant costs.
While the proposed rule would affect
certain airplanes operating under part
129, the applicability of § 129.20 is
limited to those airplanes registered in
the United States. We included these
airplanes in the cost/benefit analysis for
the 2006 NPRM and in the cost/benefit
analysis for this SNPRM.
4. Part 91 Airplanes
Both the NATA and the GAMA noted
that the proposed regulation would have
a significant cost and burden impact on
the owners and operators of aircraft that
are equipped with DFDRs as required
under § 91.609. They each estimated
that more than 5,500 aircraft would be
affected, resulting in a $9,000,000
impact on the general aviation
community for no measurable benefit.
We did not propose any change to
part 91 in the 2006 NPRM. The
proposed regulations apply only to

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airplanes operated under parts 121, 125
or 135. Part 91 certificate holders would
not be affected by these regulations.
F. Compliance Time
The proposed rule included a
compliance time of four years for
airplanes manufactured up to 18 months
after the effective date of a final rule.
Airbus, FedEx and Frontier Airlines
asked for additional time to develop
design solutions, manufacture parts, and
perform modifications during scheduled
heavy maintenance checks.
Airbus stated that it would need 18–
24 months to develop new system
analog to digital converter (SDAC) or
electronic instrument system (EIS)
software, plus an additional 2–3 years to
complete the retrofit of over 800
airplanes. Frontier Airlines, which
operates 34 Airbus airplanes, asked for
at least eight years because Airbus has
not designed or communicated a
proposed solution for EIS–1 equipped
airplanes.
FedEx proposed a compliance date of
five years from the release of the new
rule to coincide with the heavy
maintenance check cycle for its A300/
A310s (about 30 months).
The 2006 NPRM proposed that
aircraft manufactured 18 months after
the effective date of the rule be
compliant at manufacture. Boeing asked
that we provide a compliance date
rather than a compliance period
associated with a date of manufacture
because Boeing does not normally
provide a date of manufacture. Boeing
also suggested that 18 months is
insufficient to assess airplane designs,
coordinate with parts suppliers if
changes are needed, and incorporate
any changes into production.
The compliance time proposed in this
SNPRM is no longer tied to an airplane’s
date of manufacture. For those
parameters that are restricted from
filtering, a certificate holder has the
choice of removing the filtering, or
demonstrating by test and analysis that
an original sensor signal value can be
reconstructed from the filtered, recorded
signal data. Verifying that there is no
filtering occurring on the restricted
parameters, or finding filtering and
modifying the affected parameters is
required within 4 years.
If a certificate holder discovers signal
filtering and chooses to show that the
data can be reconstructed by test and
analysis, the compliance period begins
six months after the rule’s effective date,
when an aircraft goes in for its next
scheduled heavy maintenance check. If
an airplane in for a heavy maintenance
check has a DFDR system identical to
other airplanes in a certificate holder’s

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fleet, compliance by test and analysis
need only be submitted once for the
entire group. This compliance schedule
is intended to allow the FAA to
determine that the submitted
procedures are repeatable, but still
allow time for other compliance action
(within the four years) if repeatability
cannot be accomplished.
A certificate holder that is unable to
show repeatability for any restricted
parameter would be required to modify
the parameter to eliminate signal
filtering before the four year compliance
period ends.
We believe these compliance times
provide ample opportunity for
certificate holders to make choices
about their equipment and conduct the
necessary analyses during a regularly
scheduled heavy maintenance visit,
reducing potential impact on scheduled
operations or additional out-of-service
time. In addition, a four-year
compliance time is consistent with FAA
actions in previous flight recorder
regulations and has been supported by
the industry as an adequate time for
retrofit and for introducing new system
designs into aircraft being
manufactured.
G. Cost/Benefit Analysis
1. Inspection Cost
Boeing disagreed with the estimated
cost of $75 per airplane to assess an FDR
system for filtering. While the 2006
NPRM suggests that this assessment is
the responsibility of the operators,
Boeing stated that it expects the
operators to request Boeing to research
individual FDR systems installed on its
airplanes. Boeing stated that it will take
a significant number of work hours to
assess each airplane because of the
complexity of unique configurations
with interfacing systems. Out-ofproduction airplanes will also require
more than one hour per airplane
because of the research involved in
determining the data frame and the
service bulletins that have been
incorporated over the years.
Airbus agreed with Boeing that our
estimated cost of $75 is too low.
The commenters misunderstood the
underlying factor in our estimate of this
cost. In the 2006 NPRM, we averaged
the cost of these assessments over the
entire fleet of approximately 14,000
affected airplanes. We did not mean to
imply that each individual airplane
would require a unique evaluation or
that such an evaluation would cost $75.
Rather, a manufacturer would assess its
airplane models and apply the analysis
of each model to as many of its
airplanes as have the same DFDR

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system. We assumed that there was a
high-level of similarity of DFDR systems
within individual airplane models and
a few analyses per model would suffice
for most of the fleet. On that basis, our
estimated total cost was about $1
million to determine whether filtering
was occurring.
2. A300/A310 Retrofit Cost
In the Initial Regulatory Evaluation
for the 2006 NPRM, we stated that
Airbus reported that it had already
completed the engineering analyses to
modify the A300/A310 series airplane.
Consequently, there would be no
incremental engineering costs for these
models because those costs have already
been expended.
In its comment, Airbus stated that the
engineering analysis to modify the
A300/310 has not been completed.
Therefore, we need to add these costs
(about $750,000) to our cost analysis.
Airbus also stated that it has not yet
calculated the cost to modify the A320
family of airplanes. Frontier Airlines
added that this lack of analysis is the
reason it is unable to comment on the
costs estimated for the proposed
rulemaking.
As we stated in the proposed rule, we
do not consider the cost of compliance
with Appendix M for Airbus 300/310
and the A320 family to be a cost of this
rule. Even though the 1997 regulations
do not specifically prohibit filtering, the
Flight 587 investigation revealed that
the airplanes’ recorded data did not
meet the accuracy performance
requirements of Appendix M. The cost
of compliance for Airbus airplanes is
the cost of complying with Appendix M,
which has been in effect since 1997.
This would be true whether we had ever
proposed a change regarding filtering.
The added compliance option of this
SNPRM does not change these
circumstances. The recorded data for
each parameter must meet all of the
requirements of Appendix M, whether
the data are recorded unfiltered or are
filtered and can be reconstructed.

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3. Risk Assessment
The RAA considers the FAA’s Safety
Management System (SMS) to be
applicable to all rulemaking activities.
Given the low accident rate of
commercial air carriers over the last 10
years, the RAA does not consider this
rulemaking to be justified under the
SMS. The RAA considered the
likelihood that an accident in which the
elimination of signal filtering will make
a difference in the accident’s
investigation to be extremely remote.
The RAA concluded that the FAA

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should conduct a risk assessment before
issuing a final rule.
The SMS initiative is still under
development at the FAA, and it will
cover much more than proposed
regulatory changes. There is nothing to
suggest that it will require every
rulemaking be subject to a full risk
analysis, and those that are will most
likely be chosen on a case-by-case basis.
Regarding this rule, we already know
that signal filtering has complicated
accident investigations, and allowing
filtering to continue is unacceptable.
Further, until we get more information
on the estimated costs of this rule and
the option added in this SNPRM, we
would not have sufficient data to
support a risk analysis.
4. Benefits Not Demonstrated
The ATA questioned the basis for the
proposed rulemaking. The ATA stated
that this rulemaking is not based on a
demonstrated inability of existing FDRs
to realize their intended function, which
is to aid in the determination of the
probable cause of an accident.
The NTSB has repeatedly stated that
filtered flight data have hampered its
investigations. This issue is of such a
concern to the NTSB that it has issued
several recommendations to address it
specifically. The NTSB has found that
existing FDRs are unable to fulfill their
intended function when filtered flight
data are recorded. We agree with the
NTSB’s findings.
The ATA also indicated that prior
experience with filtered flight data does
not represent a pressing aviation safety
need. Other than the loss of Flight 587,
prior filtering events occurred 14 to 15
years ago with no resulting injuries.
We cannot discount the loss of Flight
587 (and its 260 passengers and crew)
and the lessons we learned from
investigation of that accident. Whenever
an accident occurs, it is critical that the
NTSB has accurate flight data to
determine the probable cause of the
accident. In addition, we need accurate
data to determine whether we need to
take action to prevent future accidents.
We know that there are hundreds of
airplanes operating with DFDR systems
that filter critical flight data before it is
recorded. We will not allow that
situation to continue when the known
result is data that cannot be accurately
replicated when needed for accident
investigation. The risk continues to
exist. More importantly, such signal
filtering has hidden the underlying
problem that the recorded data are not
in compliance with the accuracy
requirements of Appendix M, which
went into effect in 1997.

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The ATA also noted that Airbus has
developed algorithm-based methods for
reconstructing the filtered signals in its
airplanes to establish actual system
performance histories. These methods
should be sufficient to prevent the
potential for filtered data to impede any
future investigation, minimizing the
value of the proposed rule.
The NTSB has never been satisfied
with the results of the ‘reverse filtered’
data from the Flight 587 accident
investigation, nor the time it took to get
it. The method used has never been
subject to FAA review or approval, and
without this proposed rule, the use of
reconstructed data is not authorized.
There is also no regulatory requirement
to develop or maintain proper
methodologies for data reconstruction.
The Flight 587 accident demonstrated a
deficiency in our own flight recorder
rules that cannot be satisfactorily
addressed by after-the-fact efforts.
H. Harmonization
Three commenters (Airbus, Boeing,
Embraer) expressed the need for
harmonization of FAA requirements
with those of other civil aviation
authorities. The commenters raised
concerns that industry will be faced
with conflicting requirements, high
costs of compliance, and potentially
complex system designs in an attempt to
satisfy two different sets of regulations.
They view harmonization as an
opportunity to standardize flight
recorder requirements.
The FAA is working with the
European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), ICAO and other non-U.S.
regulatory authorities to harmonize our
regulations whenever possible. While
we support harmonization, our efforts
regarding filtered flight data are
considerably ahead of other aviation
authorities worldwide. Since the NTSB
has already encountered problems, we
are moving forward with our efforts to
correct known deficiencies and forestall
future problems that might be corrected
by new designs. We remain open to
assisting other aviation authorities that
seek to benefit from our discoveries and
experience with these regulatory efforts.
I. Propriety of Change to Part 121
While AirTran supported the intent of
the 2006 NPRM, it opposed using the
operating rules of part 121 to impose
technical requirements unique to a
specific model of aircraft or unique to
the design of an aircraft system. AirTran
believes the proposed requirement to be
outside the scope of part 121. AirTran
noted that operators do not typically
install or alter components that affect
filtering of DFDR data, and data filtering

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is a function of the DFDR system design
and not the responsibility of the
operators.
While we understand AirTran’s
position, DFDR requirements are a part
of the operating rules. The only effective
way to implement changes to currently
operating aircraft are through the
operating rules. For the most part, our
certification rules are not retroactive.
Since the parameters that we are
specifying as restricted exist only in
parts 121, 125 and 135, a change to part
25 would be confusing while not
changing the impact on certificate
holders.
AirTran also stated that it would like
to see the flight recorder rules of part
121, 125, and 135 reviewed to redefine
responsibility based on capability.
AirTran suggested that information such
as correlation of parameters at
certification, filtering of parameters, and
other data that are beyond the
capabilities of most operators be placed
in a special federal aviation regulation
(SFAR). This could be accomplished by
the manufacturers who have the
expertise and data to provide the
analysis. The results of this analysis
should come to the operators in the
form of FAA approved instructions for
continued airworthiness to ensure
continued compliance, similar to
§ 121.370(b) regarding fuel tanks.
We appreciate AirTran’s input. Such
an approach would, as suggested,
require considerable rulemaking and an
assessment of the impact on
manufacturers for equipment that may
vary considerably between certificate
holders. While we will keep AirTran’s
comments under advisement, we have
determined that there is an immediate
need to correct the current problems
and prevent future ones. The comments
to the proposed rule also indicate that
aircraft manufacturers know their roles
in compliance.

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

J. Conflicts With Other Proposed DFDR
Regulations
The ATA stated that the changes
proposed in the 2006 NPRM are not
coordinated with other flight recorder
changes proposed separately. The ATA
stated that the proposed filtering
changes are redundant of the changes
proposed in our NPRM entitled
‘‘Revisions to Cockpit Voice Recorder
and Digital Flight Data Recorder
Regulations’’ (70 FR 9752; February 28,
2005). The ATA noted that seven of the
parameters that we proposed to have
increased recording rates in the 2005
NPRM are also proposed to be restricted
from filtering. The ATA stated that both
changes are not ‘‘needed to derive flight

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control histories or accomplish the
intended purpose of FDRs.’’
The ATA also stated that the filtering
proposal is not fully coordinated with
the SNPRM entitled ‘‘Revisions to
Digital Flight Data Recorder Regulations
for Boeing 737 Airplanes and for Part
125 Operators’’ (71 FR 52382;
September 5, 2006). The ATA reiterated
its disagreement with the proposed rule
for 737s, and stated that if the FAA goes
forward with both rules, the compliance
times must be coordinated for 737s. The
ATA is also concerned with the impact
of filtering changes on older 737s that
only record 18 parameters, and were
specifically not required to upgrade
equipment in the 1997 rule changes.
We disagree in both instances. The
proposed rule for Boeing 737 airplanes
would add three additional parameters
that are not part of this rule, and that
proposed rule does not speak to
filtering. As to their coordination, both
rules are proposals, with one addressing
the addition of three parameters on one
specific model of airplane, and this rule
addressing the propriety of filtering
certain parameters on all airplane
models. The FAA will consider the
filtering status of the proposed 737
parameters when a final rule is
promulgated.
Similarly, the 2005 NPRM addressed
many topics, but filtering was not one
of them. Both data sampling rates and
filtering affect what gets recorded and
can play major roles in data integrity
and unrecoverable loss of data. But the
two factors are separate and the
proposed solutions are not inconsistent.
The ATA states that both modifications
are not necessary to achieve the
‘‘intended purposes of FDRs’’ but does
not state what it sees as this purpose.
History has already shown that filtered
signals can raise serious questions in an
accident investigation. It is also
accepted that lower sampling rates
provide much less reliable data. While
the two characteristics of recorded data
are related, they are not as inextricably
intertwined as the comment suggests.
The two proposals result from different
problems and analyses, and reflect
upgrades in technology that were not
anticipated when the previous
regulations were written.
K. Exemption Request
The RAA asked that we add a
provision that allows for deviations for
the current fleet ‘‘upon approval by the
Administrator.’’ The RAA was
unconvinced that, given what the NTSB
now knows about the characteristics of
the Airbus FDR parameters, the Board
would be unable to successfully and
timely complete an investigation of a

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future accident on an Airbus airplane
that filters data. The RAA does not
support a retrofit program for any
aircraft type until the characteristics of
the filtered data are known to be
sufficiently nonresponsive. The RAA’s
proposal would allow a certificate
holder that has a deviation to avoid a
costly retrofit if the deviation is
considered minor and would not hinder
a future NTSB accident investigation.
We disagree with the RAA’s premise
that the NTSB would be able today to
complete a timely and comprehensive
accident investigation of an Airbus
airplane that filters data. While
significant work was put into data
reconstruction during the Flight 587
investigation, the Board has never stated
its satisfaction with the reconstruction.
In addition, Airbus has never been
required to formalize the analysis or
results or maintain any data
reconstruction technique. Nor can we
support the inclusion of some
unspecified deviation that would allow
for an incalculable number of different
flight recorder system changes that
would only worsen the problem of data
reconstruction from individual
airplanes.
L. Relationship to the 1997 Regulations
The ATA submitted a lengthy
comment on what it considers the effect
of the 1997 rule. While the ATA
correctly concluded that the 1997 rule
does not specifically prohibit filtering, it
is not clear how the ATA connected this
rule to the amount of data being
recorded, or how it could provide ‘‘more
valuable raw data.’’
We are unable to respond to this
because we do not understand the
connection the ATA is trying to make
between filtering and recording greater
amounts of data. The FAA has never
made any correlation between filtering
and the amount of data being recorded,
nor was it addressed in the 1997 rule.
Airbus noted that the preamble
language to the 1997 rule says ‘‘the
standards proposed are harmonized
with the current JAR–OPS, which will
be based on ED–55 standards.’’ Airbus
commented that the ED–55
recommendation to correlate recorded
data to flight deck display led it to
record filtered rudder data.
We believe this is Airbus’s
interpretation of its compliance with
ED–55. Airbus appears to have
concluded that the recorded rudder data
must be the same ‘‘smoothed’’ data that
are displayed in the cockpit, and that to
be correlated, the data must be filtered.
However, correlation does not require
that identical data be recorded and
displayed in the cockpit. Correlation

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requires a mathematical relationship
between the displayed and recorded
data, not that recorded data be filtered.
Although the 1997 rule language does
not specifically prohibit filtering, in the
case of Flight 587, the data recorded
were not in compliance with the
accuracy requirements of part 121
Appendix M. This failure to meet
Appendix M, and not the fact that the
data were filtered, has always been the
compliance issue following the Flight
587 investigation.
III. Regulatory Notice and Analysis
Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposal contains the following
new information collection
requirements. As required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted
the information requirements associated
with this proposal to the Office of
Management and Budget for its review.
Title: Filtered Flight Data.
Summary: The FAA is amending its
proposal to prohibit the filtering of some

original flight recorder sensor signals.
Comments to the notice of proposed
rulemaking published on November 15,
2006, and changes in available
technology have caused us to reexamine our position on data filtering.
We are now proposing that certain
critical data parameters may be filtered
if a certificate holder can show that the
data can be accurately reconstructed.
This proposed rule would improve the
accuracy and quality of the data
recorded on digital flight data recorders
while giving aircraft designers and
operators more flexibility in system
design and operation where allowable,
including an option to filter data.
Use of: This information collection
supports the Department of
Transportation’s strategic goals on safety
and security. If a certificate holder
chooses to show that filtered data from
certain critical data parameters can be
accurately reconstructed, the certificate
holder must maintain documentation of
the procedure required to perform the
reconstruction. This will allow the FAA

and accident investigators to access
accurate data promptly.
Respondents (including number of):
The likely respondents to this proposed
information requirement are those
certificate holders that use a flight data
recorder system that filters the data from
any of the critical data parameters.
Frequency: The proposal would
require operators to have a one-time
engineering analysis performed (spread
over two years) to evaluate whether the
DFDR systems on their airplanes record
certain flight data parameter signals
after they have been filtered.
Annual Burden Estimate: Since the
one-time engineering analysis will be
performed on individual type certified
DFDR systems, we estimate that there
would be 16 of these engineering
analyses that would be completed and
that each would require an average of 16
hours of engineering time to complete
and submit to the FAA.
The total burden is estimated as
follows:

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

Documents required to show compliance with the Final Rule

One-time hours

Present value
discounted cost
(in $2008)

Report to FAA of an Engineering Analysis of whether Certain Flight Data Parameters Are Being Filtered before Being Recorded ...................................................................................................................

256

$28,160

Total ......................................................................................................................................................

256

28,160

This rule will result in a minimal
annual recordkeeping and reporting
burden.
The agency is soliciting comments
to—
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of collecting
information on those who are to
respond, including by use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
Individuals and organizations may
send comments on the information
collection requirement by November 13,
2008, and should direct them to the
address listed in the Addresses section
at the beginning of this preamble.
Comments also should be submitted to
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs via facsimile at (202) 395–6974.

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According to the 1995 amendments to
the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not
collect or sponsor the collection of
information, nor may it impose an
information collection requirement
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The OMB control
number for this information collection
will be published in the Federal
Register, after the Office of Management
and Budget approves it.
International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards
and Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed
regulations.

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Regulatory Evaluation, Regulatory
Flexibility Determination, International
Trade Impact Assessment, and
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866 directs that
each Federal agency shall propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.
Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis of
U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by

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State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the
economic impacts of this proposed rule.
Department of Transportation Order
DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies and
procedures for simplification, analysis,
and review of regulations. If the
expected cost impact is so minimal that
a proposed or final rule does not
warrant a full evaluation, this order
permits that a statement to that effect
and the basis for it to be included in the
preamble if a full regulatory evaluation
of the cost and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for
this proposed rule. The reasoning for
this determination follows:
This SNPRM proposes to allow
certain parameters to be filtered if the
certificate holder can show that the data
can be reconstructed. The expected
economic impact would be a minimal
cost with positive net benefits and,
therefore, a regulatory evaluation was
not prepared. To estimate the costs for
any final rule, we request specific
economic data in response to the
questions in this section.
The FAA has, therefore, determined
that this proposed rule would not be a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as
defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866, and would not be
‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
Aviation Industry Affected
The proposed rule would apply to all
aircraft operated under parts 121, 125,
and 135 and required to have a DFDR
system. Aircraft operated under other
FAR parts would not be affected.

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

Benefit and Cost Methodology
The baseline for determining the
proposed rule’s benefits and costs is that
each affected aircraft must be in
compliance with appendix B or M of
part 121, appendix D or E of part 125,
or appendix F of part 135.
The first step in assessing costs of this
SNPRM is for each certificate holder to
determine whether any of its aircraft are
filtering DFDR data before it is recorded.
For purposes of filtering, we have
divided the 88 required parameters into
two groups:
• Those parameters that may not be
filtered unless the certificate holder can
demonstrate that the original sensor
signal data (values) can be reconstructed
using a valid, repeatable procedure (1–
7, 9, 11–18, 26, 32, 42, 43, 68, 70, 77,
and 88); and

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• Those parameters that may be
filtered without this demonstration as
long as the accuracy requirements are
met (8, 10, 19–25, 27–31, 33–41, 44–67,
69, 71–76, and 78–87).
A certificate holder must first
determine whether any of the original
sensor signal data from any of the
parameters in the first group are filtered
before being recorded. The cost of this
determination is a cost of this proposed
rule.
If no parameters in the first group are
being filtered, no further action is
required, and the only cost is reporting
this status to the FAA.
If any of the parameters in the first
group are being filtered, the certificate
holder must determine whether the
recorded data meet the accuracy
requirements of the applicable
appendix. If the requirements are met,
no further action is necessary, and the
only cost attributable to this rule is to
report the status to the FAA.
If the requirements of the applicable
appendix are not being met, the
allocation of costs will depend on the
option chosen by the certificate holder
to address the non-compliance. If a
certificate holder chooses to remove the
filtering in order to comply with
Appendix M, the cost is attributable to
compliance with the 1997 rule. If a
certificate holder chooses to show by
test and analysis that the data can be
acceptably reconstructed, the cost is
attributable to this proposed rule
because it is a new option in this
SNPRM. We are requesting estimates of
the costs of these two options and their
expected use.

1. The aircraft makes, models and
series in your fleet.
2. The number of each aircraft make,
model and series in your fleet.
3. By aircraft make, model and series,
how many type certificated DFDR
systems are installed in your aircraft.
4. For each installed DFDR system, by
characteristics, determine the parameter
numbers in the first group that are
filtered before being recorded. For any
filtered parameter, which do not meet
the accuracy requirements of Appendix
B or M (or Appendix D or E or
Appendix F)?
5. For the information requested in
#4, do you have the technical capability
to determine the characteristics yourself
or is outside technical expertise
required? How many engineering hours
would be needed to determine whether
the DFDR system is recording filtered
flight data for the first group of
parameters? What other costs would be
required for this analysis?
6. For each installed DFDR system
that records filtered data for the first
group of parameters (the data for which
do not meet either Appendix B or M,
Appendix D or E or Appendix F), how
much would it cost to remove the
filtering?
7. For each installed DFDR system
that records filtered data for the first
group of parameters (the data for which
do not meet either Appendix B or M,
Appendix D or E or Appendix F), how
much would it cost to develop and
accomplish the tests and analyses
required to comply with the
reconstruction option proposed in this
SNPRM?

Benefits
The benefit of this proposed rule
would be to make accurate flight data
more quickly and unambiguously
available to accident investigators.
Inaccurate data have been shown to
delay accident analysis, and could
suggest unnecessary corrective action.
These were experienced during the
Flight 587 accident investigation.

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a
principle of regulatory issuance that
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objectives of the rule and of
applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle,
agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are
given serious consideration.’’ The RFA
covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If
the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory

Benefit Cost Analysis
We believe that the SNPRM would
provide a less costly means than the
2006 NPRM for certificate holders to
address compliance with the applicable
appendix. It will also provide accident
investigators with the more accurate and
less ambiguous data necessary to
determine the causes of airplane
accidents.
To estimate the costs of a final rule,
we need data on the costs of complying
with this SNPRM. We are requesting the
following information, including any
supporting documentation:

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flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA.
However, if an agency determines that
a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that
the head of the agency may so certify
and a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not required. The certification must
include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and
the reasoning should be clear.
While we have only limited
information on the costs of this
proposed rule, that information suggests
that the rule would be unlikely to have
a significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. We are
specifically requesting information
regarding the effect on small entities to
assist in our final analysis.
Therefore, the Acting Administrator
certifies that this proposed rule would
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities.
International Trade Analysis
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing any
standards or engaging in related
activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. Legitimate domestic
objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed
the effects of this SNPRM and notes that
its purpose is to ensure the safety of the
American public and thus the proposed
rule is not considered as creating an
unnecessary obstacle.

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

Unfunded Mandates Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the
base year 1995) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of
$136.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
The proposed rule does not contain
such a mandate; therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not
apply.

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Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We
determined that this action would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and, therefore,
would not have federalism implications.
Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined this proposed
rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in
Chapter 3, paragraph 312f and involves
no extraordinary circumstances.
Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA has analyzed this SNPRM
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We
have determined that it is not a
‘‘significant energy action’’ under the
executive order because it is not a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under
Executive Order 12866, and it is not
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.
Additional Information
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. We also invite comments relating
to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result
from adopting the proposals in this
document. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the
proposal, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. To ensure the docket
does not contain duplicate comments,
please send only one copy of written
comments, or if you are filing comments
electronically, please submit your
comments only one time.
We will file in the docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking.
Before acting on this proposal, we will

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consider all comments we receive on or
before the closing date for comments.
We will consider comments filed after
the comment period has closed if it is
possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. We may change this
proposal in light of the comments we
receive.
Proprietary or Confidential Business
Information
Do not file in the docket information
that you consider to be proprietary or
confidential business information. Send
or deliver this information directly to
the person identified in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document. You must mark the
information that you consider
proprietary or confidential. If you send
the information on a disk or CD ROM,
mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM
and also identify electronically within
the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or
confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are
aware of proprietary information filed
with a comment, we do not place it in
the docket. We hold it in a separate file
to which the public does not have
access, and we place a note in the
docket that we have received it. If we
receive a request to examine or copy
this information, we treat it as any other
request under the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We
process such a request under the DOT
procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
Regulations Affecting Intrastate
Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when
modifying regulations in title 14 of the
CFR in a manner affecting intrastate
aviation in Alaska, to consider the
extent to which Alaska is not served by
transportation modes other than
aviation, and to establish appropriate
regulatory distinctions. Because this
proposed rule would apply to the
certification of future designs of
transport category airplanes and their
subsequent operation, it could, if
adopted, affect intrastate aviation in
Alaska. The FAA, therefore, specifically
requests comments on whether there is
justification for applying the proposed
rule differently in intrastate operations
in Alaska.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy of
rulemaking documents using the
Internet by—
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking
Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);

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2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies Web page at http://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
You can also get a copy by sending a
request to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue,
SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by
calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to
identify the docket number, notice
number, or amendment number of this
rulemaking.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121, 125,
and 135
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety,
Safety, Transportation.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 121—OPERATING
REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG,
AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 121
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40101,
40102, 40103, 40113, 41721, 44105, 44106,
44111, 44701–44717, 44722, 44901, 44903,
44904, 44906, 44912, 44914, 44936, 44938,
46103, 46105.

2. Amend part 121 by adding a new
§ 121.346 to read as follows:

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

§ 121.346

Flight recorders—filtered data.

(a) A flight data signal is filtered when
an original sensor signal has been
changed in any way, other than changes
necessary to:
(1) Accomplish analog to digital
conversion of the signal;
(2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR
compatible; or
(3) Eliminate a high frequency
component of a signal that is outside the
operational bandwidth of the sensor.
(b) An original sensor signal for any
flight recorder parameter required to be
recorded under § 121.344 may be
filtered only if the signal continues to
meet the requirements of appendix B or
M of this part, as applicable and—
(1) It represents a parameter described
in § 121.344 (a)(1) through (7), (9), (11)
through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88) or the corresponding
parameter in Appendix B of this part,
and:
(i) The certificate holder is able to
demonstrate by test and analysis that
the original sensor signal value can be
reconstructed from the recorded data;

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(ii) The FAA determines that the
procedure submitted by the certificate
holder as its compliance with paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section is repeatable; and
(iii) The certificate holder maintains
documentation of the procedure
required to reconstruct the original
sensor signal value; or
(2) It represents a parameter described
in § 121.344(a) (8), (10), (19) through
(25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41),
(44) through (67), (69), (71) through (76),
or (78) through (87).
(c) Compliance. After [four years from
effective date], no aircraft flight data
recording system may filter any
parameter listed in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures
that have been approved by the FAA.
The procedures must be submitted to
the FAA no later than the completion of
the next heavy maintenance check after
[six months after effective date] but not
later than [two years after the effective
date].
3. Amend appendix M to part 121 by
revising the introductory text
immediately following the appendix
title to read as follows:
Appendix M to Part 121—Airplane
Flight Recorder Specifications
The recorded values must meet the
designated range, resolution and accuracy
requirements during static and dynamic
conditions. Dynamic condition means the
parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the
maximum rate of reversal. All data recorded
must be correlated in time to within one
second.

*

*

*

*

*

PART 125—CERTIFICATION AND
OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A
SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE
PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM
PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000
POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES
GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD
SUCH AIRCRAFT
4. The authority citation for part 125
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
44702, 44705, 44710–44711, 44713, 44716–
44717, 44722.

5. Amend part 125 by adding a new
§ 125.228 to subpart F to read as
follows:
§ 125.228

Flight recorders—filtered data.

(a) A flight data signal is filtered when
an original sensor signal has been
changed in any way, other than changes
necessary to:
(1) Accomplish analog to digital
conversion of the signal;

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(2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR
compatible; or
(3) Eliminate a high frequency
component of a signal that is outside the
operational bandwidth of the sensor.
(b) An original sensor signal for any
flight recorder parameter required to be
recorded under § 125.226 may be
filtered only if the signal continues to
meet the requirements of appendix D or
E of this part and—
(1) It represents a parameter described
in § 125.226(a)(1) through (7), (9), (11)
through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88) or the corresponding
parameter in Appendix D of this part,
and:
(i) The certificate holder is able to
demonstrate by test and analysis that
the original sensor signal value can be
reconstructed from the recorded data;
(ii) The FAA determines that the
procedure submitted by the certificate
holder as its compliance with paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section is repeatable; and
(iii) The certificate holder maintains
documentation of the procedure
required to reconstruct the original
sensor signal value; or
(2) It represents a parameter described
in § 125.226(a)(8), (10), (19) through
(25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41),
(44) through (67), (69), (71) through (76),
or (78) through (87).
(c) Compliance. After [four years from
effective date], no aircraft flight data
recording system may filter any
parameter listed in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures
that have been approved by the FAA.
The procedures must be submitted to
the FAA no later than the completion of
the next heavy maintenance check after
[six months after effective date] but not
later than [two years after the effective
date].
6. Amend appendix E to part 125 by
revising the introductory text
immediately following the appendix
title to read as follows:
Appendix E to Part 125—Airplane
Flight Recorder Specifications
The recorded values must meet the
designated range, resolution and accuracy
requirements during static and dynamic
conditions. Dynamic condition means the
parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the
maximum rate of reversal. All data recorded
must be correlated in time to within one
second.

*

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immediately following the appendix
title to read as follows:

PART 135—OPERATING
REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND
ON DEMAND OPERATIONS AND
RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON
BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

Appendix F to Part 135—Airplane
Flight Recorder Specifications

7. The authority citation for part 135
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113,
44701–44702, 44705, 44709, 44711–44713,
44715–44717, 44722.

8. Amend part 135 by adding a new
§ 135.156 to read as follows:

rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with PROPOSALS

§ 135.156

Flight recorders—filtered data.

(a) A flight data signal is filtered when
an original sensor signal has been
changed in any way, other than changes
necessary to:
(1) Accomplish analog to digital
conversion of the signal;
(2) Format a digital signal to be DFDR
compatible; or
(3) Eliminate a high frequency
component of a signal that is outside the
operational bandwidth of the sensor.
(b) An original sensor signal for any
flight recorder parameter required to be
recorded under § 135.152 may be
filtered only if the signal continues to
meet the requirements of Appendix F of
this part and—
(1) It represents a parameter described
in § 135.152(h)(1) through (7), (9), (11)
through (18), (26), (32), (42), (43), (68),
(70), (77), or (88), and:
(i) The certificate holder is able to
demonstrate by test and analysis that
the original sensor signal value can be
reconstructed from the recorded data;
(ii) The FAA determines that the
procedure submitted by the certificate
holder as its compliance with paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section is repeatable; and
(iii) The certificate holder maintains
documentation of the procedure
required to reconstruct the original
sensor signal value; or
(2) It represents a parameter described
in § 135.152(h)(8), (10), (19) through
(25), (27) through (31), (33) through (41),
(44) through (67), (69), (71) through (76),
or (78) through (87).
(c) Compliance. After [four years from
effective date], no aircraft flight data
recording system may filter any
parameter listed in paragraph (b)(1) of
this section unless the certificate holder
possesses test and analysis procedures
that have been approved by the FAA.
The procedures must be submitted to
the FAA no later than the completion of
the next heavy maintenance check after
[six months after effective date] but not
later than [two years after the effective
date].
9. Amend appendix F to part 135 by
revising the introductory text

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The recorded values must meet the
designated range, resolution and accuracy
requirements during static and dynamic
conditions. Dynamic condition means the
parameter is experiencing change at the
maximum rate available, including the
maximum rate of reversal. All data recorded
must be correlated in time to within one
second.

*

*

*

*

*

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 24,
2008.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Acting Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8–18933 Filed 8–14–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Fish and Wildlife Service
50 CFR Part 402
[FWS–R9–ES–2008–0093]
RIN 1018–AT50

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
50 CFR Part 402
[0808011023–81048–01]
RIN 0618–AX15

Interagency Cooperation Under the
Endangered Species Act
AGENCIES: U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Interior; National Marine
Fisheries Service, Commerce.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
(collectively, ‘‘Services’’ or ‘‘we’’)
propose to amend regulations governing
interagency cooperation under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, as
amended (Act). The Services are
proposing these changes to clarify
several definitions, to clarify when the
section 7 regulations are applicable and
the correct standards for effects analysis,
and to establish time frames for the
informal consultation process.
DATES: We must receive your comments
by September 15, 2008 to ensure their
full consideration in the final decision
on this proposal.

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Submit your comments or
materials concerning this proposed rule
in one of the following ways:
(1) Through the Federal eRulemaking
Portal at www.regulations.gov. Follow
the instructions on the Web site for
submitting comments.
(2) By U.S. mail or hand-delivery to
Public Comment Processing, Attention:
1018–AT50, Division of Policy and
Directives Management, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 4401 North Fairfax
Drive, Suite 222, Arlington, VA 22203.
We will not accept e-mail or faxes. We
will post all comments on http://
www.regulations.gov. This generally
means that we will post any personal
information you provide us (see the
Public Comments section below for
more information).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fish
and Wildlife and Parks, 1849 C Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20240; telephone:
202–208–4416; or James H. Lecky,
Director, Office of Protected Resources,
National Marine Fisheries Service, 1315
East-West Highway, Silver Spring, MD
20910; telephone: 301–713–2332.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
ADDRESSES:

Background
The Endangered Species Act of 1973,
as amended (‘‘Act’’; 16 U.S.C. 1531 et
seq.) provides that the Secretaries of the
Interior and Commerce (the
‘‘Secretaries’’) share responsibilities for
implementing most of the provisions of
the Act. Generally, marine species are
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Commerce and all other species are
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
the Interior. Authority to administer the
Act has been delegated by the Secretary
of the Interior to the Director of the FWS
and by the Secretary of Commerce
through the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration to the Assistant
Administrator for NMFS.
There have been no comprehensive
amendments to the Act since 1988. With
the exception of two section 7
counterpart regulations for specific
types of consultations, there have been
no comprehensive revisions to the
implementing section 7 regulations
since 1986. Since those regulations were
issued, much has happened: The
Services have gained considerable
experience in implementing the Act, as
have other Federal agencies, States, and
property owners; there have been many
judicial decisions regarding almost
every aspect of section 7 of the Act and
its implementing regulations; and the
Government Accountability Office has
completed reviews of section 7
implementation.

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