Hour of Service of Drivers; Driver Rest and Sleep for Safe Operations, Final Rule 2003

Monday,
April 28, 2003

Part II

Department of
Transportation
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 385, 390, and 395
Hours of Service of Drivers; Driver Rest
and Sleep for Safe Operations; Final Rule

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 385, 390, and 395
[Docket No. FMCSA–97–2350]
RIN 2126–AA23

Hours of Service of Drivers; Driver
Rest and Sleep for Safe Operations
AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The FMCSA revises its hoursof-service (HOS) regulations to require
motor carriers of property to provide
drivers with better opportunities to
obtain sleep, and thereby reduce the
incidence of crashes attributed in whole
or in part to drivers operating
commercial motor vehicles (CMVs)
while drowsy, tired, or fatigued. This
action is necessary because the FMCSA
estimates that between 196 and 585
fatalities occur each year on the Nation’s
roads because of drowsy, tired, or
fatigued CMV drivers transporting
property. The FMCSA estimates that
this final rule when adhered to fully
will save between 24 and 75 lives each
year as a result of giving truck drivers
an increased incremental amount of
time to obtain rest and sleep.
DATES: The effective date is June 27,
2003, except for § 395.0 which is
effective from June 27, 2003, through
June 30, 2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
Mary M. Moehring, Division Chief,
Driver and Carrier Operations Division,
Office of Bus and Truck Standards and
Operations, FMCSA, (202) 366–4001,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
D.C. 20590–0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Preamble Table of Contents
The following is an outline of the
preamble.
Preamble Table of Abbreviations
Statutory Requirement
Agency Determination
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Supporting Documents Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
Development of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
ATA Recommendation Submitted While
NPRM Was Under Review at OMB
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Comments to the NPRM
General Overview
Use of an Independent Consulting Firm
FMCSA Response
Use of Science
FMCSA Response

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Discussion of Specific Issues of Concern to
Commenters
Categories of operations
FMCSA Response
Passenger carrier operations
FMCSA Response
NHS Act Exemptions
For-hire Trucking
Associations and Carriers That May Have
NHS Act Sec. 345 Subject Operations
Special Operations
Private Carriers of Freight
Safety Advocacy Groups
FMCSA Response
Sleeper berth requirements
Motor Carriers
Safety advocacy groups
Law Enforcement
FMCSA Response
Carrier notification of drivers during their
off-duty hours
Motor Carriers
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Daily work/rest cycle
General concept
ATA and DLTLCA Recommendations
Industry Comments
Private Carriers of Freight
Truckload Carriers
LTL Carriers
Driver Associations
Special Operations
Shippers
Safety Advocacy Groups
FMCSA Response
Daily off-duty time
Industry comments
Private carriers of freight
Truckload carriers
LTL carriers
Driver associations
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Daily on-duty time
Industry comments
Private carriers of freight
Truckload carriers
LTL carriers
Driver associations
Special operations
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Daily driving time
Industry comments
Private carriers of freight
Truckload carriers
LTL carriers
Driver associations
Special operations
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Distinctions in duty time
General concept
ATA Recommendation
Other industry comments
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Weekly or longer cycle
General concept
ATA Recommendation
Other industry comments
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Weekly recovery periods
General concept

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Industry comments
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Short rest breaks during a work shift
General concept
ATA Recommendation
Other industry comments
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Economic Impacts
Proposed costs
Industry reaction
Other industry comments
Advocacy groups
Proposed benefits
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs)
Industry comments
Other industry comments
Law enforcement comments
Safety advocacy groups
Vendors’ comments
FMCSA Response
Proposed compliance and enforcement
Industry comments
Law enforcement
Safety advocacy groups
FMCSA Response
Regulatory Impact Analysis
PATT Alternative
ATA Alternative
FMCSA Staff Alternative
Safety impacts
Safety benefits
Changes in Crash Damages Due to
Schedule Changes
Changes in Fatigue-related Fatalities Due to
Schedule Changes
Adjustments to Benefits Due to Secondary
Effects
Costs of the alternatives
Net benefits
Discussion of net benefit results
Limitations and Sensitivities
Costs and Benefits Relative to the Status
Quo
Changes Compared to May 2, 2000 NPRM
Categories of operations
Passenger carrier operations
NHS Act Exemptions
Sleeper berth requirements
Carrier notification of drivers during their
off-duty hours
Daily work/rest cycle
Daily off-duty time
Daily on-duty time
Daily driving time
Distinctions in duty time
Weekly or longer cycle
Weekly recovery periods
Short rest breaks during a work shift
Electronic on-board recording devices
Use of Department of Labor time records
Conclusion
Section-by-section evaluation
Appendix B to Part 385 Explanation of Safety
Rating Process
390.23 Relief from regulations.
395.0 Compliance date for certain
requirements for hours of service of
drivers.
395.1 Scope of the rules in this part.
395.3 Maximum driving time for
property-carrying vehicles.
395.5 Maximum driving time for
passenger-carrying vehicles.

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395.13 Drivers declared out of service.
395.15 Automatic on-board recording
devices.
Rulemaking analysis and notices
Preamble Table of Abbreviations
The following are abbreviations of terms
used as well as abbreviations of commenters’
names in the preamble.
ANPRM—Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
AHAS—Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety
AAA—American Automobile Association
ABA—American Bus Association
ACOEM—American College of Occupational
and Environmental Medicine
AMSA—American Moving and Storage
Association
ARTBA—American Road and Transportation
Builders Association
ARA—Agricultural Retailers Association
ATC—Agricultural Transporters Conference
ATA—American Trucking Associations, Inc.
AGC—Associated General Contractors
AAR—Association of American Railroads
CTA—California Trucking Association
CRASH—Citizens for Reliable and Safe
Highways
CDL—Commercial Driver’s License
CVSA—Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
CFI—Contract Freight, Inc.
DLTLCA—Distribution and Less-than-TruckLoad (LTL) Carriers Association
DOL—U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment Standards Administration,
Wage and Hour Division.
DOT—Department of Transportation
FARS—Fatality Analysis Reporting System
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
FHWA—Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA—Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
FMCSR—Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations
FRA—Forest Resources Association
GES—General Estimates System
GRP—Gross Regional Product
IME—Institute of Makers of Explosives
IIHS—Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
IBA—International Bakers Association
IBT—International Brotherhood of Teamsters
IC—Collection of information
ICC—Interstate Commerce Commission
ICCTA—Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act
IVI—Intelligent Vehicle Initiative
Landstar—Landstar System, Inc.
LTL—Less Than Truckload
LCM—Logistics Cost Model
MCMIS—Motor Carrier Management
Information System
MFCA—Motor Freight Carriers Association
NAICS—North American Industry
Classification System
NASTC—National Association of Small
Trucking Companies
NASS—National Automotive Sampling
System
NERA—National Economic Research
Association
NHS—National Highway System Designation
Act of 1995
NHTSA—National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration

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NITL—National Industrial Transportation
League
NIOSH—National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
NPTC—National Private Truck Council
NRMCA—National Ready-Mixed Concrete
Association
NSC—National Safety Council
NSTA—National School Transportation
Association
NSF—National Sleep Foundation
NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
OOIDA—Owner Operators Independent
Drivers Association
PATT—Parents Against Tired Truckers
PMTA—Pennsylvania Motor Truck
Association
PMAA—Petroleum Marketers Association of
America
RIA—Regulatory Impact Analysis and Small
Business Analysis for HOS Options,
December, 2002
RODS—Records of Duty Status
RSP—Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus
Center, George Mason University
TL—Truck Load
UMA—United Motorcoach Association
UMTIP—University of Michigan Trucking
Industry Program
VMT—Vehicles Miles Traveled
Watkins—Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.

Statutory Requirement
Section 408 of the ICC Termination
Act (Pub. L. 104–88, December 29, 1995,
109 Stat. 803, 958) (ICCTA) requires
rulemaking to increase driver alertness
and reduce fatigue-related incidents.
Agency Determination
When Congress created FMCSA, it
provided that, ‘‘[i]n carrying out its
duties the Administration shall consider
the assignment and maintenance of
safety as the highest priority * * *’’ [49
U.S.C. 113(b)]. As indicated above, Sec.
408 of the ICCTA directed the agency—
then part of the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA)—to begin
rulemaking dealing with a variety of
fatigue-related safety issues, including
‘‘8 hours of continuous sleep after 10
hours of driving, loading and unloading
operations, automated and tamper-proof
recording devices, rest and recovery
cycles, fatigue and stress in longer
combination vehicles, fitness for duty,
and other appropriate regulatory and
enforcement countermeasures for
reducing fatigue-related incidents and
increasing driver alertness) * * *’’ [109
Stat. 958]. The agency’s statutory focus
on safety and the specific mandate of
Sec. 408 both demand that this
rulemaking improve commercial motor
vehicle (CMV) safety. While recognizing
the primacy of its safety mission, the
agency must comply with a variety of
statutes and executive orders requiring
detailed analysis of the cost of
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impact on regulated entities and other
segments of society.
The FMCSA analyzed three
alternative regulatory proposals in
depth. Compared to the status quo,
which includes a degree of noncompliance with the current HOS rules,
the option proposed by the American
Trucking Associations (ATA), would
have marginally reduced fatigue-related
fatalities and somewhat increased the
cost of regulatory compliance. This
results in a negative cost/benefit ratio.
The option suggested by Parents Against
Tired Truckers (PATT) would have
reduced fatalities far more than the ATA
option, but would have generated
significant increases in compliance and
operational expenses. This results in a
cost/benefit ratio far more negative than
the ATA option.
The third alternative was proposed by
the FMCSA staff. The analysis shows
that this option would save many more
lives than the ATA alternative, though
not quite as many as the PATT option.
While it would cost more than the ATA
option, it would be much cheaper than
the PATT alternative. The net result is
a cost/benefit ratio slightly more
negative than the ATA option but not
nearly as negative as the PATT option.
The FMCSA has adopted the third
alternative for this final rule. The rule
represents a substantial improvement in
addressing driver fatigue over the
current regulation. Among other things,
it increases required time off duty from
8 to 10 consecutive hours; prohibits
driving after the end of the 14th hour
after the driver began work; allows an
increase in driving time from 10 to 11
hours; and allows drivers to restart the
60- or 70-hour clock after taking 34
hours off duty. Together, these
provisions (and others discussed in
detail below) are expected to reduce the
effect of cumulative fatigue and prevent
many of the accidents and fatalities to
which fatigue is a contributing factor.
Because the agency’s statutory priority
is safety, we have adopted a rule that is
marginally more expensive than the
ATA option but which will reduce
fatigue-related accidents and fatalities
more substantially than that option. The
FMCSA believes that the rule represents
the best combination of safety
improvements and cost containment
that can realistically be achieved.
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
On November 5, 1996, the FHWA
published an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) for this
ICCTA proceeding (61 FR 57252). The
FHWA received and transcribed
comments at six nationwide public

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listening sessions in March 1997 and
placed these comments in the docket.
The FHWA recorded more than 1,588
written (paper and electronic
submissions) and transcribed oral
comments to this docket after the
November 1996 ANPRM. The FHWA
extended the comment period for the
ANPRM once to June 30, 1997.
The ANPRM discussed 33 relevant
research studies the FHWA was aware
of in 1996. The FHWA requested that
the public provide additional research
studies it believed to be relevant. The
ANPRM comments provided or
referenced an additional 30 studies. The
FHWA obtained and examined these
studies and identified additional
research from 1997 through 1999 while
developing an NPRM. See the index to
all relevant research studies and the
annotated literature review. The FHWA
began developing a set of alternatives to
analyze based on more than 120
research studies included in the docket.
Supporting Documents Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking
On April 20, 1998, the FHWA
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) requesting
comments on a proposed definition of
‘‘supporting documents’’ for the HOS
regulations (63 FR 19457) in response to
the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–
311, 108 Stat. 1673 (August 26, 1994)
(HMTAA). Section 113 of the Act
requires the Secretary of Transportation
to prescribe regulations amending 49
CFR Part 395 to improve both (1)
compliance by CMV drivers and motor
carriers with the HOS requirements, and
(2) the effectiveness and efficiency of
Federal and State enforcement officers
reviewing such compliance.
The April 1998 NPRM proposed that
motor carriers develop and maintain
effective auditing systems to monitor
the accuracy of the drivers’ Records of
Duty Status and HOS. The NPRM
proposed that failure to create and
maintain such a system would result in
motor carriers being required to retain
various types of business documents.
The use of electronic recordkeeping
methods was also proposed as a
preferred alternative to paper records.
Development of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
The entire effort to revise the HOS
regulations has been based on the
concept that new rules would be
science-based. This was the theme
throughout the development of
alternatives leading up to the
publication of the May 2000 NPRM.
Science was often cited by industry as

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the basis upon which the HOS rules
should be reformed. Several modal
administrations within the DOT,
including the FMCSA, had undertaken
significant research into fatigue
causation and the dynamics of sleep.
There was general recognition that the
existing rules for the truck and bus
industries had been implemented well
before there had been a clear scientific
understanding of fatigue causal factors
(e.g., time of day, amount and timing of
sleep, time awake, and time on task).
The agency collected many relevant
studies by authorities in the area of
fatigue. It also completed its own
comprehensive Commercial Motor
Vehicle Driver Fatigue And Alertness
Study, a joint undertaking with Canada
and the trucking industry. In preparing
the May 2000 proposal, the agency
assembled an expert panel of recognized
authorities on traffic safety, human
factors, and fatigue to review the science
and evaluate potentially effective and
reasonably feasible regulatory
alternatives. The resulting agency
proposal relied heavily on scientific
conclusions based on the research and
analysis in Belenky, G., McKnight, A.J.,
Mitler, M.M., Smiley, A., Tijerina, L.,
Waller, P., Wierwille, W.W., Willis,
D.K., (1998), Potential Hours-Of-Service
Regulations For Commercial Drivers;
Report of the Expert Panel on Review of
the Federal Highway Administration
Candidate Options for Hours of Service
Regulations.
Regulatory reform of drivers’ HOS in
the truck and bus industries had been
the subject of consideration by the
agency for close to ten years before
publication of the May 2000 NPRM. The
FHWA’s Office of Motor Carriers
maintained an intensive driver fatigue
research program starting in 1989. Truck
and motorcoach driver fatigue had been
identified and discussed by many
industry analysts and safety advocates
as a significant motor carrier safety
issue. Major aspects of the proposal had
been the subject of trade journal stories
for nearly a year before the NPRM was
published.
ATA Recommendation Submitted While
NPRM Was Under Review at OMB
On December 3, 1999, the agency
submitted the draft NPRM for review to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) as required by Executive Order
12866.1 The ATA submitted
Recommendations for Future Hours of
Service Rules to the DOT two weeks
later on December 15, 1999. The ATA
1 OMB Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs Internet page for ‘‘Regulations Pending and
Reviews Completed Last 30 Days’’ dated 08 Dec 99.

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proposed that the agency ‘‘* * * issue
a notice of proposed rulemaking and
ultimately a final rule based on the ATA
recommendations.’’ The ATA stated that
its proposal was based ‘‘* * * on sound
science, public safety and the needs of
the American economy.’’ The 16th item
of the ATA recommendation stated that
‘‘[u]pon publication of the [FMCSA]
proposal, ATA should contract with a
firm to analyze the government’s cost/
benefit analysis, and if warranted,
conduct its own cost-benefit analysis for
comparison.’’
The ATA addressed its
recommendation both to the Secretary
of Transportation and the OMB director.
The agency had already considered and
analyzed five alternatives it believed
were reasonably feasible to implement.
The agency chose not to withdraw its
draft NPRM from review at OMB to add
a sixth ATA alternative and delay the
draft NPRM further. The OMB approved
the agency’s draft NPRM for publication
on April 24, 2000.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On May 2, 2000, FMCSA published
an NPRM covering a comprehensive
revision of the HOS regulations (65 FR
25540). The FMCSA received and
transcribed 700 comments at eight
nationwide public hearings in May,
June, and July 2000 and placed these
comments in the docket referenced at
the beginning of this document. After
holding the first seven public hearings,
the agency identified several recurring
themes and issues that warranted
additional stakeholder and public
discussion. The agency conducted three
two-day public roundtable discussions
in September and October 2000 in
Washington, D.C. for that purpose. A
transcript of each day of the public
roundtable discussions is also in the
docket. The FMCSA extended the
comment period for the May 2000
NPRM twice, first to October 31, 2000,
and then to December 15, 2000. The
FMCSA has recorded more than 53,750
written (paper and electronic
submissions to the docket) and
transcribed oral comments in response
to the May 2000 NPRM.
Comments to the NPRM
General Overview
The comments to the May 2000
proposal reflected widespread
recognition of the enormity of the
undertaking, and many commenters,
even those strongly opposed to the
NPRM, acknowledged the difficulty in
sifting through the data and presenting
the issues. The hearings gave many an
opportunity to express themselves on a

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variety of issues. The roundtable
discussions provided an opportunity to
focus on the specific major issues
mentioned at the hearings and helped
some commenters to explain their
reasons for opposing or supporting the
NPRM. The reactions of many
commenters reflected apprehension
about the effects on their jobs, earnings,
businesses, method of operation,
competitive status, and protection from
what they perceived to be a drastic
change from the status quo.
The generally unfavorable comment
and reaction to the NPRM led to
expressions of Congressional concern
regarding any short-term effort to
promulgate a final rule. The FY 2001
DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 106–
346, prohibited the agency from moving
to a final rule during that year. The FY
2002 DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
107–87, prohibited promulgation of a
final rule dealing with any of the HOS
exemptions in the National Highway
System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104–59, Sec. 345, 109 Stat. 568, 613
(NHS). This action reflects careful
consideration of the concerns expressed
by members of Congress as well as the
more than 53,000 comments to the
docket.
Use of an Independent Consulting Firm
The National Safety Council (NSC),
American Bus Association (ABA),
American Trucking Associations, Inc.,
and Distribution and LTL Carriers
Association (DLTLCA) petitioned
FMCSA to retain an independent
consulting firm to study the safety and
economic impacts of any next action.
The DLTLCA believed ‘‘that such an
approach, used previously by DOT in
the prior proceeding on these hours-ofservice rules, is in the interest of all the
participants, FMCSA, and the public.’’
FMCSA Response
The FMCSA has chosen to grant this
petition. The agency hired an
independent consultant who performed
an exhaustive analysis of several
regulatory alternatives, described below.
Use of Science
Numerous trucking industry
commenters applauded the agency for
its attempt to use science as the basis for
HOS reform. Although these
commenters found little on which to
disagree with the agency about the
actual research into the science of
fatigue, they consistently faulted the
agency for the way it applied that
science in the real world. They
commented that the proposed rules
lacked the flexibility necessary to apply
the science in an operationally practical

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manner. The industry position was
perhaps best summed up in the
comments of the National Private Truck
Council (NPTC). ‘‘While the fatigue
research may confirm that people do get
tired, and that they can become more
tired between midnight and 6 a.m., this
must be weighed against the result of
pushing nighttime runs into daylight
hours.’’
The trucking industry also found
much to disagree with regarding the
analysis of the accident and compliance
data used by the agency to justify many
of the provisions of the proposal.
The ATA found little support for the
agency’s position that the proposed
rules would save 755 lives annually
once industry adhered to the proposal
fully.
The ATA repeatedly cited crash
statistics of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration and
FMCSA showing fatigue to be a factor in
no more than five percent of fatal
accidents involving trucks.
The ATA referred to work done by the
Michigan State Police in conjunction
with the University of Michigan to try
to isolate causes of fatal truck crashes in
Michigan. They identified 267 truckinvolved fatal crashes from 1966 to
1999, 72 of which were determined to
be the fault of the truck driver. They
stated only five of those 267 crashes, or
1.8 percent, were attributable to fatigue.
The National Association of Small
Trucking Companies (NASTC)
commented that fatigue is a ‘‘naturally
occurring phenomenon’’ and man has
been provided with naturally occurring
defenses, which he has to manage.
NASTC believes the agency ought to
rely on promoting fatigue management
alternatives rather than trying to
regulate what is probably individual to
each person.
The industry was also critical of the
FMCSA for failing to do enough
research into the safety consequences of
shifting considerable nighttime truck
traffic to the daytime.
Several enforcement agencies
including the New York State Police
applauded FMCSA’s effort to utilize
sleep research data in developing new
rules to combat driver fatigue. It
cautioned the agency, however, against
placing total reliance ‘‘on the data
obtained through this research since this
data is certainly open to interpretation.’’
The American Automobile
Association (AAA) found positive
attributes in the proposal. The AAA
believed the proposal represented a
significant effort to draft science-based
HOS regulations. The NPRM, it said,
provided a workable framework taking
into account science and expert opinion

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in areas of sleep research and traffic
safety.
The AAA, however, believed the
agency had misapplied some of the
scientific findings. The AAA also stated
the proposal should focus on where ‘‘we
know we have a problem.’’ The AAA
believed long haul, over-the-road
drivers face challenges that could
benefit from improved work/rest
practices. The AAA pointed to the
Hanowski, Wierwille, Garness, Dingus
study Impact of Local/Short Haul
Operations on Driver Fatigue (2000),
Report No. DOT–MC–00–203, a study
that had not been completed before the
proposal. This study concluded that
fatigue may be less problematic for
local/short haul drivers, as they are
more like workers in non-driving
professions than long haul drivers. The
AAA strongly recommended that the
agency reconsider those parts of the
proposed rulemaking that would apply
HOS requirements to industries where
there is no demonstrable evidence that
driver fatigue results in accidents.
The American College of
Occupational and Environmental
Medicine (ACOEM) also had a
cautionary message. Noting that fatigue
is an important issue, not only for
safety, but also for productivity, the
ACOEM observed that occupational
medicine’s prime job is matching the
interface of the worker with the
workplace, and then understanding that
interface. There is a tremendous amount
of research in this area, but it is
relatively young, only 20 to 30 years
old. The ACOEM found that taking the
science and making it operational, as in
scheduling, is quite challenging and
questioned the value of regulating
driving schedules as the fatigue problem
is much more complex. The ACOEM
recommended deferring further action
on the proposal until more information
is available.
The National Sleep Foundation (NSF)
was very supportive of the proposal. It
cited the three general principles in its
Policy Statement of February 2000
anticipating the publication of the
proposed rules:
New regulations must be based on current
scientific research and understanding
regarding fatigue and driver performance.
An effective system to manage fatigue
should include prescriptive regulations that
can be monitored and enforced by
compliance officers and, above all, provide
adequate rest periods with reasonable,
responsible limits on driving.
HOS rules alone cannot regulate driver
fatigue and alertness. Ultimately, it is the
shared responsibility of all interested parties
to develop a system that helps promote
proper fatigue management through
education and training.

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The NSF concluded, ‘‘Where science
is clear, we state the proposed rules
conform to the best available science.
Where science is less well developed,
we state the proposed rules represent a
reasonable balance between operational
considerations and broad principals of
sleep practice.’’ (sic) It also noted that
the proposed rules tracked closely the
NSF’s policy statement and the Expert
Panel’s recommendations, and that they
provided significant improvement over
the current rules.
The Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety (IIHS) mentioned several
drawbacks in studies trying to link
fatigue to crashes. IIHS stated that one
cannot calculate fatigue-related crashes
by looking at police reports or National
Automotive Sampling System (NASS)
reports because they will always
understate fatigue. IIHS believes the
correct method, called ‘‘population
percent attributable risk calculations,’’
is to take the increased risk of crashes
from driving longer hours and to put
that into a formula together with the rate
of drivers driving longer hours.
Many commenters urged the use of
pilot studies to test some of the rules
before generally mandating them on the
industry. There was particular interest
in piloting the use of on-board
recorders.
There was also interest in developing
a more holistic approach to the fatigue
problem through the use of education
and training programs, and screening for
sleep apnea and other sleep disorders.
This was usually mentioned in the
context of fatigue management.
FMCSA Response
There was no serious challenge to the
scientific findings that human beings
are subject to a circadian, biological
clock of about 24 hours, which controls
the natural wake/sleep cycles. Nor was
there any serious doubt about the
science concluding that humans require
about eight hours of restorative sleep
daily and that a longer off-duty period
than currently required is necessary so
that the needed sleep can be obtained.
The studies citing police accident
reports for the causal factors
consistently show a lower proportion of
crashes with fatigue/drowsiness as a
causal factor than do detailed studies of
crash causation.
The agency sought to develop rules
that were science-based. It did not
promise rules that were science‘‘controlled’’ to the point of being
completely impractical in operational
environments.
After the agency completed reviewing
the 53,000 comments, including the
hearing and roundtable transcripts, it

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began deliberating whether all the
provisions of the proposal continued to
be feasible.
Discussion of Specific Issues of Concern
to Commenters
The agency will discuss the
comments received in the docket about
each of the following issues: categories
of operations; passenger carrier
operations; NHS exemptions; sleeper
berth requirements; carrier notification
of drivers during their off-duty hours;
daily work/rest cycle; 24-hour work/rest
cycle; daily off-duty time; daily on-duty
time; daily driving time; distinctions in
duty time; weekly or longer cycle;
weekly recovery periods; restarts; short
rest breaks during a work shift;
economic impacts; electronic on-board
recorders; proposed compliance and
enforcement; and regulatory impact
analysis.
Categories of Operations
The FMCSA proposed a
categorization of motor carrier
operations intended to address the
diversity of the industry. The NPRM
proposed five types of operations, into
which most motor carriers subject to
federal jurisdiction would fall. For each
category a separate set of duty
restrictions was proposed for the drivers
in that type of operation. Types 1 and
2 were intended to cover all long-haul
drivers, i.e., national and regional
operations, respectively. The remaining
three types were intended to include the
various practices of local operations.
The agency proposed the additional
requirement of electronic on-board
recording (EOBR) devices to monitor
drivers in Type 1 and 2 operations,
while reducing the paperwork burden
for most local operations. Type 3 was
intended to cover local split shift
drivers who spend most of their on-duty
time driving, but most are local (or
home-based), and their driving shifts are
generally separated by several hours.
Type 4 was intended to cover drivers
who work in the vicinity of their normal
work reporting location, have regular
schedules extending less than 12
consecutive hours from the time they
report in until they check out. Driving
would have been a significant part of
Type 4 drivers’ work, more than half of
their on-duty hours. Drivers currently
operating under the 100 air-mile radius
exception in 49 CFR 395.1(e) would
have been considered Type 4 drivers,
and would have been absorbed into this
category, eliminating the need for that
exception. The FMCSA also intended
that most existing exemptions would be
absorbed into one of the local types of
operations, primarily Type 5, to reduce

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the need and the demand for
individualized exemptions.
The comments from industry on the
categories of carrier operation were
generally unfavorable. While many
comments applauded the agency’s
efforts to remove the ‘‘one size fits all’’
concerns about existing regulations,
most stated the proposal missed the
mark. The National Private Truck
Council’s (NPTC) comments perhaps
best captured the industry perception:
‘‘It’s true that one size does not fit all,
but neither should the agency decide
how many sizes there are nor anticipate
how many sizes there will be in the
future.’’
The most consistent objection from
motor carriers was that the proposed
categories unnecessarily complicated
regulation for both the industry and for
enforcement.
Many carriers expressed concern that
they had trouble finding the type that
best described their operation or that
their operations spanned more than one
type, and sometimes as many as four.
When a driver’s duties changed from
one type to another within a workweek,
there was much confusion about
whether the proposal required a
‘‘weekend’’ to intervene, whether
EOBRs would be required for a single
run, and which daily or weekly
limitations applied. Uniformly,
however, comments stated that some
productive time would be lost in the
transition.
The industry comments did not offer
significant advice as to whether a better
defined classification system was
preferable or workable.
Industry commenters did not seem
uncomfortable with the concept of
‘‘long-haul’’ trucking, as that is a
common term and generally associated
with freight movements over a
considerable distance, as opposed to
local service. Comments, however, did
have difficulty with some of the other
distinctions used in the NPRM.
Nearly all of the local carriers
responding found some problems with
the attempted classification, often
calling it confusing. However, many
found the effort to be supportive of their
persistent attempts to secure broad
exemptions from HOS regulation for
their type of operations.
Types 3, 4, or 5 drew much attention
from the other-than-long-haul sectors,
but a major focus of many comments
was why the rules could not or should
not apply to their particular
circumstances. Many noted that their
operations might fit into Type 4 but for
the occasional trips that take more than
12 hours or may require an overnight
stay by the driver, while others found

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Type 5 more accommodating but could
not fit because of an unexplained
exclusion of for-hire carriers.
Comments from the enforcement
community stated that classification by
type would only create confusion and
make their jobs at the roadside more
difficult and time-consuming.
Public interest groups gave little
attention to the general concept of
classification and focused rather on the
particular restrictions and obligations
that were tied to each of the operations.
FMCSA Response
This final rule establishes a uniform
set of regulations for all cargo-carrying
operations while allowing passengercarrying operations to continue under
the current rules. In addition,
Congressionally-mandated and
historical exemptions and exceptions
are retained. The final rule will not
categorize any segment of the industry
in the manner that the NPRM proposed.
The agency believes the rule strikes a
balance between uniform, consistent
enforcement and the need for
operational flexibility.
The FMCSA developed the
categorization proposal to improve
safety based on calculated risk, to
respond to ‘‘one size fits all’’ criticism,
and to reflect the diversity of the
industry. The primary purpose for the
categories was to address the highest
risk, long-haul operations, so that those
operations with the least risk of serious
crashes would not be required to alter
their operations.
Comments from across a spectrum of
stakeholders found the proposed
categorization did not work for a
multitude of reasons. The comments
have shown that the categories created
confusion, problems for enforcement,
and did not fully meet the objective of
accommodating the diversity of the
industry. The distinction between an
over-the-road truck driver and a local
truck driver, however, had fairly broad
acceptance among the motor carrier
commenters using trucks. The agency’s
own research associated a significant
portion of the fatigued commercial
driver problem with the long-haul
operation of tractor-trailer or tractorsemi-trailer combinations. For these
reasons, FMCSA has decided to drop
the categories proposed in the NPRM.
Passenger Carrier Operations
The proposal made no separate
provisions for operators engaged in the
transportation of passengers. The
current rule also makes no separate
provisions for such operators. The
FMCSA had no basis to conclude that
fatigue affects passenger carrier drivers

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differently than truck drivers. Thus, the
agency believed the same HOS rules
should apply. The NPRM recognized
certain distinct characteristics in
motorcoach operations by proposing
different types of trips for which various
restrictions would apply. The Type 3
category was meant to accommodate
some tour operations and commuter bus
services. Motorcoach industry
associations, individual carriers and the
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU),
representing intercity bus drivers, filed
extensive comments, and participated
actively in the public hearings and
roundtable discussions. The reaction
from the motorcoach industry to the
proposal was disappointment with the
proposed rules in general and more
particularly with the agency’s failure to
recognize the difference between
driving a bus and driving a truck.
The Conference Report for the 2001
DOT Appropriations Act contains the
following reference to this issue:
Motorcoach driver fatigue. The conferees
note that the agency acknowledged in its
NPRM on hours-of-service that little is
known about the operations of over-the-road
buses and motorcoachs. The conferees state
that there should be additional study of the
operations, driver practices and driver fatigue
issues specific to over-the-road buses before
any revisions to the existing trucking hoursof-service rules are finalized, and encourage
the Secretary to conduct such studies to
inform additional regulatory proposals in this
area. See H. Conf. Rept. No. 106–940, 106th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 113 (2000).

The American Bus Association (ABA),
the United Motorcoach Association
(UMA), and other motorcoach,
convention, and tour associations, ATU,
NSC, and CVSA urged the agency to not
subject passenger transportation to the
proposed rules, thus allowing them to
continue to operate under the currently
existing rules. Among the reasons given
for their request taken from the ABA
comment:
(1) There is no scientific, statistical, or
other evidence to support changes for
bus drivers;
(2) Commercial passenger vehicles are
operated in an environment entirely
different from commercial freight
carriers;
(3) The exemplary safety record of the
industry will be compromised by the
proposed rules; and
(4) The economic impact will be
devastating.
The ABA agreed with other critics
questioning the agency’s estimate that
15 percent of truck-involved fatalities
are caused by the fatigue of the
commercial vehicle driver.
However, the ABA asked what part of
that 15 percent was supposed to be

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related to bus transportation. According
to the ABA’s review of the Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS), an
annual average of 42.5 fatalities was
attributable to crashes involving
intercity buses, which the ABA
disputed due to definitional problems.
Even taking these data, ABA stated that
15 percent of 42.5 amounts to less than
7 fatalities per year. The ABA argued
the commercial passenger carrier
industry averaged 0.01 passenger
fatalities per 100 million passenger
miles for 1995 through 1997 and
asserted that this ranked well below the
rate for rail and air passenger
transportation at 0.04 passenger
fatalities per 100 million passenger
miles (from Industry Facts 1999, NSC, p.
122.)
The ABA also pointed out the
significant differences, both operational
and mechanical, between buses and
trucks that would undermine the
agency’s basis for the proposed
revisions.
In its comments, the ABA pointed out
that all intercity bus drivers are paid by
the hour and run on preset schedules,
thereby eliminating any incentives to
violate the present HOS restrictions.
The ABA cited section 408 of the
ICCTA for the proposition that DOT is
required to consider the economic
vitality of the motor carrier industry in
its regulation of motor carriers, drivers,
and CMVs. The ABA claimed that
FMCSA had made no attempt to assess
the cost of this proposal to the
motorcoach industry and asserts
FMCSA had failed to meet its
obligations under controlling law and
policies.
The ABA reiterated most of the ATA
and other commercial freight carrier
associations’ criticisms of the agency’s
cost/benefit analysis. It cited the ATA’s
submission to the docket of the Center
for Regulatory Effectiveness’ (CRE’s)
The CRE Report Card on DOT’s
Proposed Rule on Hours of Service For
The Motor Carrier Industry, listing 62
legal and other procedural requirements
that it believes the FMCSA must use.
The National Tour Association
claimed that never in 20 years have its
members experienced so much as a
minor injury due to a motorcoach
accident. Motorcoach travel, in their
opinion, is the safest form of
commercial passenger travel, and the
NTA argues there is no justification for
regulating bus and truck operations
together. Of the 150 studies cited in the
preamble, NTA argued that none deal
with bus drivers. The NTA stated the
proposal would only cause increased
costs and heartache for the bus industry
with no safety benefit; in fact, they

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stated that the opposite effect is more
probable. The proposal, according to
NTA, was simply unnecessary and
unfair.
The Convention and Visitors
Association, which promotes the
Washington, DC area as a primary
tourism destination, commented that
about one-third of all visitors to the
Washington, DC area arrive by
motorcoach. It estimated that the
Washington area would lose 20 percent
or 1.5 million visitors because of the
inconsistency between the provisions of
the proposal and the way the tour bus
industry actually operates.
National School Transportation
Association (NSTA) members provide
transportation services to public school
districts and private schools
nationwide. Noting the specific
exemption from 49 CFR parts 387 and
390 through 399 for transportation of
pupils from home to school and school
to home, the NSTA observed that school
transportation nearly always includes
school activity transportation as well.
Strict adherence to the proposal would
cause a disruption in current operations
and could result in a shortage of
available drivers. If school bus
companies could use their regular route
drivers to provide activity
transportation, they could not service
their contracts, because more drivers are
simply not available. The NSTA
recommended that all school bus
drivers be held to the same standard,
whether public or private, because they
do the same things. It also
recommended a separate category for
school bus operations, and suggested
that the FMCSA convene a roundtable
discussion devoted to this issue. That
would allow all issues to be worked out
consistent with safety and economic
practicality.
CVSA stated the agency must conduct
medical and performance research on
the bus and motorcoach industry to
validate (or invalidate) the position in
the proposal. It argued that basing such
sweeping rule changes on assumptions
that are not substantiated is not prudent
public policy.
The NSC stated that the intercity
motorcoach industry should be
excluded from the HOS proposal. NSC
asserted that the statement that the
agency has ‘‘assumed that bus drivers
operate in ways similar to truck drivers’’
was questionable for a rule purported to
be based on ‘‘sound science’’ and
underscored the agency’s lack of
understanding of the motorcoach
industry’s unique operating
characteristics. NSC further stated there
is no safety evidence to support

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including the motorcoach industry in
the proposed changes.
FMCSA Response
The FMCSA is persuaded by
comments that it does not have enough
data to indicate a problem in the
motorcoach industry segment and is not
adopting any new rules for motorcoach
drivers in this final rule. The FMCSA
may consider the feasibility of other
alternatives to reduce fatigue-related
incidents and increase motorcoach
driver alertness in the future.
The FMCSA relied on four
motorcoach studies in the NPRM, three
completed by the FMCSA’s predecessor,
the FHWA, and one from Australia. See:
(1) Strategies to Combat Fatigue in the
Long Distance Road Transport Industry,
The Bus and Coach Perspective, 1993,
Australia Transport and
Communications’ Federal Office of Road
Safety;
(2) A Study of the Relationships
Among Fatigue, HOS, and Safety of
Operations of Truck and Bus Drivers,
1972, Harris, et al.;
(3) Effects of HOS Regularity of
Schedules, and Cargo Loading on Truck
and Bus Driver Fatigue, 1978, Mackie,
Robert R., and Miller, James C.; and
(4) Critical Issues Relating to
Acceptance of CVO Services by
Interstate Truck and Bus Drivers, 1995,
Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc.
In addition, the FMCSA is nearing
completion of the study required by the
Conference Report for the 2001 DOT
Appropriations Act. The agency is
reviewing the draft final report. The
FMCSA is not adopting any changes
today because: (1) The agency has not
yet confirmed that the new study had
been designed correctly, that the process
used could meet scientific scrutiny, and
that the conclusions reached are
reasonable; and (2) the public has not
had the opportunity to review and
comment on the study. When the study
is approved, the agency will publish it
and consider whether non-regulatory
actions or regulatory revisions may be
needed.
NHS Act Exemptions
The FMCSA hoped that categorizing
operations would reduce the continuing
demand for exemptions from the HOS
regulations. In the NPRM, the agency
noted that creating the Type 5
operation, Primary work not driving,
would remove the need for special
exemptions. This category was intended
to include the various utility service
workers, construction equipment
operators, environmental remediation
specialists, oilfield service workers,
water well drilling operations, mobile

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medical equipment drivers, driversalespeople, as well as other specialized
driving operations.
Congress became involved in the
consideration of exemptions,
culminating in Sec. 345 of the NHS Act
where it mandated exemptions from all
of the HOS provisions of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
(FMCSR) for those individuals
transporting crops and farm supplies
during planting and harvesting seasons
and partial relief from the 7 or 8 day
HOS limit for groundwater well drilling,
construction, and utility service vehicle
operations of motor carriers. A fifth
provision allowed States to exempt from
the commercial driver’s license (CDL)
regulations employees of towns with a
population of 3,000 or less who are
called to drive snow plows or salting/
sanding vehicles when the regular CDL
holder is unavailable or needs
assistance. With respect to all, except
the groundwater well drilling
exemption, the Secretary was
authorized to prevent, modify, or revoke
each exemption after a rulemaking
proceeding upon a determination that
the exemption was not in the public
interest and would have a significant
adverse impact upon the safety of
commercial motor vehicles. Under the
terms of the statute, two of the
exemptions were to take effect
immediately, and the other three within
180 days of the date of enactment.
On April 3, 1996, the agency
published a final rule codifying the NHS
Act exemptions [61 FR 14677]. This rule
deferred any rulemaking action
concerning whether to modify or revoke
any exemption.
The FHWA received a petition on July
3, 1996, from the Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety (AHAS),
which, citing the statement in the April
3 notice that the agency had ‘‘decided
not to proceed with such a rulemaking
proceeding at this time,’’ sought to have
the agency reconsider the exemptions.
The FMCSA granted the AHAS petition.
The FMCSA noted its intention to
modify 3 of the 4 NHS-legislated HOS
exemptions in the NPRM. In addition,
the FMCSA proposed narrow
definitions for terms used in the
legislation that Congress had not
defined. The FMCSA had been
interpreting the terms narrowly since
April 1996. The NPRM was intended to
assist law enforcement officers by
explaining exactly what the definitions
were for certain terms, such as
‘‘agricultural commodities’’ and ‘‘farm
supplies,’’ based on the agency’s narrow
interpretations of the terms used.
Except for the agricultural exemption,
which was a general exemption from all

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HOS regulations for certain agricultural
operations in a limited geographic area
during planting and harvesting seasons,
the exemptions granted were in the form
of a 24-hour restart of the 60- or 70-hour
restrictions. In creating the Type 5
operational category, the FMCSA’s
intent was to accommodate all existing
24-hour restart exemptions. The ICC
first allowed a 24-hour restart provision
for drivers of specially constructed
oilfield servicing vehicles on April 13,
1962. It did not discuss the safety or
economic impacts in its decision, see 89
M.C.C. 19 and 27 FR 3553. It should be
noted that the FMCSA intended that the
proposed 32-hour period would operate
as a ‘‘restart’’ of a workweek with
respect to Type 5 operations.
However, associations and
individuals representing agricultural
transporters, the construction industry,
utility vehicle operators, oil-well
drillers and other operations that
currently have a 24-hour restart
provision stated that FMCSA’s proposal
to use Type 5 as a catch-all for current
exemptions simply did not work. Each
segment had its own operational
idiosyncrasies, many duty schedules in
split days off, but more often in
unpredictable demand, making it, in
their view, impractical for them to use
not only Type 5, but also any of the
other types proposed.
For-Hire Trucking
The ATA made several arguments
against the NPRM’s treatment of
exemptions or exceptions. First, it
contended that several exceptions (in
addition to those created by Sec. 345)
have been in place for years, and that
carriers have built their businesses
around them. To summarily remove
them without any supporting evidence
would create substantial hardship.
Second, it noted that some of the
exemptions were granted by the NHS
statute with a required procedure for
eliminating or modifying them. The
ATA alleged the FMCSA failed to follow
the required procedures.
Third, it asserted that requiring the
states to adopt the proposed federal
requirements, eliminating even State
exemptions within three years, was
unreasonable and unnecessarily
interfered with State discretion. The
ATA addressed each of the exceptions
or exemptions currently in the
regulations.
Associations and Carriers That May
Have NHS Act Sec. 345 Subject
Operations
The Agricultural Retailers Association
(ARA) stated that although farming and
related supply businesses operate year

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round, their busiest time is during
planting and harvesting seasons. During
those times, which are defined by State
law, many farmers and suppliers are
eligible for an exemption from the HOS
regulations under Sec. 345 of the NHS
Act.
The ARA commented that most
drivers operate locally, on farm roads,
and sleep at home every night. Although
pleased that the agricultural exemption
was to be retained, the ARA commented
that the proposal appeared to negate the
exemption. The ARA recommended that
certain language be deleted.
The ARA also pointed out an
apparent inconsistency between the
proposed regulatory language and the
section-by-section analysis. Both refer to
the ‘‘weekend’’ provision and when it
would apply to drivers, including
agricultural exempt operations. One
said ‘‘more than five consecutive days’’
and the other said ‘‘more than three
consecutive days.’’ ARA stated both
were in error because they would
require a driver and truck to be idled for
up to 56 hours merely because a driver
completed a task at a farm taking three
or five days. It recommended the
number of exempt driving days
requiring a ‘‘weekend’’ rest period be set
at seven.
The Agricultural Transporters
Conference (ATC) stressed the
importance of servicing crops at
appropriate times, a situation ATC
argues is analogous to emergencies. ATC
members have been operating under the
NHS exemption since 1995 and believe
there is no evidence that safety has been
compromised. ATC stated that the
agriculture definitions in the NPRM are
too restrictive and that problems will
inevitably arise. For example, a
supplier’s driver delivers anhydrous
ammonia to the farm, applies it to the
fields, and then stops at a wholesaler to
fill his tank on the way back to the
supplier’s yard. He would be exempt on
the delivery, but not on the pick up.
The Forest Resources Association
(FRA) wanted loggers and other forest
harvesters to be allowed to operate
under the agricultural exemption.
According to FRA, its members’ drivers
deliver 86 percent of all raw forest
products consumed in the United
States. The FRA commented that drivers
typically deliver three loads a day with
an average round trip of 126 miles, well
within a 100 air-mile radius.
The National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association argued that the
NPRM did not meet the statutory
requirement in Sec. 345 for modifying
the exemptions through rulemaking.
The Edison Electric Institute
suggested that the FMCSA look to State

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and local experience for the handling of
small, local emergencies like power
failures.
Qwest, a private motor carrier, claims
that its crash rates are low and that it
has experienced no rise in crashes when
it increases a driver’s time on-duty. In
the past, Qwest claims it has worked
drivers extra hours pursuant to the
emergency exemption of the current
HOS rules. On those occasions, Qwest
claims it has had no increased crash
rate. Qwest also finds no significant
difference in its crash rates in States that
afford it HOS exemptions as opposed to
those that do not. Qwest contends this
is evidence that utility service drivers
do not present a highway safety risk
sufficient to justify HOS regulation.
Qwest sought an exemption for
telephone line repair drivers, who
operate mostly under emergency
conditions.
Special Operations
The basic position of the Associated
General Contractors (AGC) was that
construction industry truck drivers
operate under conditions that do not
lead to fatigue or alertness problems and
that HOS regulations for them are
unnecessary. AGC contends that the
current regulations were designed for
over-the-road drivers, and that Congress
recognized this in 1995 by providing the
construction industry with a 24-hour
restart provision in the NHS Act. AGC
argues the FMCSA is seeking to undo
what Congress had directed it to do.
AGC argues that Congress, in the 1998
reauthorization of the national highway
program, increased funding by 44
percent, recognizing the need for
infrastructure improvements. The
FMCSA’s proposal, by placing
unnecessary restrictions on construction
operations, would threaten to undercut
that mission.
Private Carriers of Freight
The PMAA commented that the
FMCSA treated the agricultural
exemption too narrowly, defining ‘‘farm
supplies’’ to mean only those products
‘‘directly relating to farming activities of
planting, fertilizing, and harvesting
crops that are delivered directly to a
farm.’’ The fuel demands of farmers
during the planting, harvesting and
crop-drying seasons only add to the
constant demands of other consumers.
This places a great strain on the
workday of typical drivers, because of
long delays at the terminal rack.
The PMAA argued that FMCSA: (1)
Need not preempt the ability of States
to manage these matters; (2) should
allow intermediate deliveries to be
covered under the exemption; and (3)

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should permit longer workdays during
critical seasons.
Safety Advocacy Groups
The AHAS determined that it could
not support the agency’s proposal to
eliminate the NHS exemptions through
use of the Type 5 driving category
because the absence of an EOBR
requirement would prevent adequate
monitoring and enforcement. It argued
that the substituted regime of a 78-hour
week with only 32 hours off before the
next week begins was excessive and that
enforcement problems would allow
even these liberal limits to be exceeded.
In effect, AHAS said the agency would
extend NHS-type exemptions to all
construction operations, even beyond 50
miles, without sufficient opportunity for
comment. The agency’s approach to
eliminating NHS exemptions appeared
to deregulate construction and utility
operations. Finally, the elimination of
the Tolerance Guidelines as proposed in
the NPRM would effectively require
States to increase current driving
limitations from 10 hours to 12.
The AHAS recommended that the
agency treat construction and
agricultural exemptions in a separate
rulemaking, which would better
conform to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
FMCSA Response
There are no data on fatigue that
support either the 24-hour restart
provisions for oilfield, construction,
ground water, or utility carriers, or the
total HOS exemption for agriculture
provided by Sec. 345. The NPRM
proposed modifying the 24-hour restart
into a restart provision of between 32
and 56 hours, depending on when the
period began. The agency cited data that
did support a 32-hour restart provision.
The agency’s expert panel verified that
data.
The NPRM gave AHAS the
opportunity to present its case that
modifications for the NHS exemptions
were necessary. AHAS did not provide
any data.
The NPRM treated the agricultural
exemption narrowly, as the agency has
done with all the NHS exemptions in
interpretations and opinion letters since
1996. Congress did not define the terms
for which FMCSA proposed definitions;
the agency believes it must define the
terms narrowly to maintain safety and
prevent abuse. The FMCSA, however,
will take no actions contrary to the
statutes on the matter of NHS
exemptions.

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Sleeper Berth Requirements
The appropriate use of sleeper berths
to obtain required rest and avoid the
accumulation of sleep debt became an
issue because of the NPRM finding that
drivers need about ten consecutive
hours within which to obtain the
necessary seven to eight hours of daily
sleep. The sleeper berth exception in the
current rules allows a driver to
accumulate the required eight
(otherwise consecutive) hours off-duty
in a sleeper berth (that meets the
requirements of 49 CFR 393.76) in two
periods totaling at least eight hours,
neither period being less than two
hours.
Studies on the sleeper berth issue
have generally found that, for a number
of reasons, sleeping in a berth,
particularly when the vehicle is moving,
is less restorative than sleeping in a bed.
The agency has recently released a
study begun after it developed the
NPRM: Dingus, Neale, Garness,
Hanowski, Keisler, Lee, Perez,
Robinson, Belz, Casali, Pace-Schott,
Stickgold, Hobson, (2002), Impact of
Sleeper Berth Usage on Driver Fatigue,
FMCSA Report No. FMCSA–RT–02–
050. This study concludes that sleeping
in a moving vehicle impairs the quality
of rest. Some studies also have
determined that drivers using sleeper
berths had a higher crash risk than
drivers obtaining their sleep in a bed.
The agency’s Expert Panel, who
reviewed the feasible alternatives during
development of the NPRM,
recommended that until there was more
definitive information available on the
relative quality of sleep in a berth,
drivers using sleeper berths should be
afforded a greater opportunity to obtain
additional rest. The FMCSA proposed
that only team drivers be allowed to use
sleeper berths to split their accumulated
required off-duty time, and then only in
periods of not less than five hours each.
Single drivers would use the sleeper
berth during one block of off-duty time.
A study by Abrams C., Shultz, T., &
Wylie, C.D. (1997) Commercial Motor
Vehicle Driver Fatigue, Alertness, and
Countermeasures Survey indicated that
drivers using sleeper berths reported
averaging about six to seven hours at a
stretch in the berths. Other industry
surveys indicated that drivers reported
averaging about four hours at a stretch
in the sleeper berths. An ATA survey
showed that only five percent of team
drivers use the sleeper berth while the
vehicle is in motion. An Owner
Operators Independent Drivers
Association (OOIDA) survey showed
that number to be higher, 11 percent.

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Motor Carriers
The industry proposed that drivers
with conforming sleeper berths be
permitted to split the required ten
consecutive off-duty hours into two
non-consecutive periods, the duration of
each to be determined by the drivers.
The industry believes that given the fact
that the driver must accumulate 10
hours off duty in a 24-hour period,
drivers ought to be able to determine the
length of the two separate periods. The
industry believes drivers are in the best
position to know how much rest they
need at a particular time. For example,
the driver could combine one long sleep
period of six or seven hours with one
separate, shorter extended rest period of
three or four hours to augment the
longer sleep. The industry proposed that
off-duty time taken immediately before
or after a sleeper berth period may also
be counted toward the accumulation of
the required ten hours off duty. They
stated that this merely carries over what
is presently permitted under the
existing rules, and affords the driver the
flexibility to maximize sleep and rest
time. Finally, the industry
recommended that time spent in the
passenger seat, presumably even while
the vehicle is in motion under the
control of a co-driver, be counted as offduty time and be credited toward the
accumulation of the required ten hours.
This passenger-seat time would be
subject to the restriction that it must
immediately precede or follow sleeper
berth time. The rationale is that a driver
may need time merely to relax without
sleeping before or after his sleep period.
Comments from industry were
uniformly in favor of retaining the
sleeper berth provision for all drivers,
solo and team. The carrier associations,
large and small, individual carriers,
owner-operators, drivers and unions all
found the proposal regarding sleeper
berth use unreasonably restrictive. The
larger carriers lined up behind the ATA
recommendation, and the smaller
carriers and the owner-operators
sounded similar themes. In fact, the
OOIDA questioned why sitting in a
jump seat could not be combined with
sleeper berth time to accumulate the
required rest period. What difference is
there, OOIDA asked, between a driver
lying awake in a sleeper berth, who
cannot sleep, and a driver sitting in the
jump seat reading or listening to the
radio?
The ATA argued that the proposed
sleeper berth provision is inconsistent
with available science. It stated that the
FMCSA has acknowledged a gap in the
current research on sleeper berths and
that more research is required. ATA

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argued the proposal even seems to
contradict the recommendation of the
agency’s Expert Panel. The ATA stated
that science indicates that a
combination of a long period with
shorter period is better than the
proposed split of five and five. The ATA
was also critical of the agency’s failure
to gauge the economic impacts of such
a rule change.
Truckload carriers stated that the
nature of the long-haul, irregular-route
business makes the elimination of split
sleeper berth time a major concern
because it removes the needed
flexibility from the driver.
Similar positions were taken by the
LTL sector, noting that drivers must
have the ability to manage their work/
rest times more freely, including sleeper
berth time. Examples were given of
drivers managing sleeper berth time to
get to the shipper location early and
avoid traffic.
Citing research finding that drivers
sleeping in sleeper berths while the
vehicle was in motion obtained less
restorative sleep than those sleeping
while the vehicle was at rest, some
commenters said they could not
understand the agency limiting the
exception to team drivers. Although not
mentioned in the proposed rule, some
found it necessary to ask whether the
exception for team drivers would apply
to sleeper berth time acquired while the
vehicle was in motion. Others found
that even the team driver exception was
confusing. Still others looked for data
supporting a minimum period of five
hours.
Many small carriers and owneroperators stated that drivers using
sleeper berths need less than the ten
consecutive hours proposed in the
NPRM. They do not have to travel any
distances to get to their sleeping
quarters; they just have to climb into the
back. Many also strenuously opposed
the treatment of sleeper berth time in
the proposal, seeing it as discouraging
the use of sleeper berths. In their view,
the berths are a valuable resource,
readily available to the driver to get
necessary rest, and their use should be
encouraged. OOIDA recommended the
agency retain the present sleeper berth
exception to the consecutive-hours
requirement.
The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (IBT) took issue with the
findings of the studies on effectiveness
of sleep in a berth. They argued that the
determinative factor was not the quality
of the accommodations, but rather
environmental conditions, like noise
levels.

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Safety Advocacy Groups
Safety advocates applauded FMCSA
for prohibiting split sleeper berth
periods for solo drivers and
recommended extending the prohibition
to team drivers as well. The NSC,
however, cautioned the FMCSA to await
further scientific data before proceeding
one way or another. The AHAS stated
that some research studies indicate the
restorative benefits of napping are not
entirely clear, but conceded that more
napping is better than less napping.
Law Enforcement
The CVSA stated the regulations
should provide sleeper berth flexibility
for both short-term naps and longer
sleep periods.
FMCSA Response
Because of the comments and the new
studies released after the NPRM’s
publication, the FMCSA has decided to
retain the sleeper berth exception. The
agency, however, will modify the offduty period to align with the new offduty period adopted in this final rule.
In the Impact of Sleeper Berth Usage
on Driver Fatigue study, the team
driving operation highlighted the
benefits of reducing drowsiness. Unlike
extremely tired single drivers who may
have felt compelled to continue to drive
even when it was dangerous to do so,
the individual drivers in a team
operation generally had no similar
compulsion to operate the vehicle when
they were extremely tired. From the
data collected in this study, it was
apparent that the team driving operation
translates into fewer bouts of
drowsiness, fewer critical incidents,
and, in general, safer trucking
operations. Critical incidents are those
incidents that resulted in a crash
because the driver did not perform
evasive maneuvers or that would have
resulted in a crash, if the driver had not
taken evasive maneuvers.
In addition, team drivers appeared to
drive much less aggressively, make
fewer errors, and rely effectively on
their relief drivers to avoid instances of
extreme drowsiness while driving. In
effect, it appeared as though team
drivers undergo a natural ‘‘screening’’
process. This was indicated by a
number of the truck drivers during the
focus groups conducted earlier in this
project. Drivers indicated that team
drivers must be both considerate of their
resting partner and trustworthy with
regard to their driving ability. Thus, the
level of ‘‘acceptance’’ necessary to be a
successful team driver seems to serve as
an effective screening criterion.
On the other hand, single drivers in
the study had many more critical

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incidents at all levels of severity as
compared to team drivers. Single drivers
were involved in four times the number
of ‘‘very/extremely drowsy’’ observer
ratings as were team drivers, and were
more likely to push themselves to drive
on occasions when they were very tired.
Based on the agency’s Commercial
Motor Vehicle Driver Fatigue and
Alertness Study (1996), there were
relatively few instances (about 2.5
percent) of ‘‘extreme drowsiness,’’ with
most of these instances being
experienced by single drivers, again
with a high rate of the occurrence of this
level of fatigue on the second or third
shift after the first day of a multi-day
drive. Thus, it appears that the
combination of long driving times and
multiple days provides the greatest
concern, with several results pointing to
the presence of cumulative fatigue. This
means that the length of shifts in the
later stages of a trip must also be
carefully considered.
Having mentioned this concern, it is
important to point out that critical
incidents and/or driver errors did not
increase directly with the hours beyond
the regulatory limits. In fact, there was
a substantial decrease in the rate of
critical incidents during some of the
more extreme violations. However, one
should exercise great caution when
interpreting these results. For the
following reasons, they do not
necessarily mean that the HOS should
be expanded:
(1) It may be possible that the drivers
were making a point to drive more
carefully and cautiously because they
were operating outside of the regulatory
limits and did not want to get stopped
by law enforcement officials; and
(2) They may have risked driving
outside of the regulations only because
they felt alert and knew that they could
continue to drive safely.
There were a number of findings in
this study indicating that the quality
and depth of sleep was worse on the
road, particularly for team drivers.
Drivers in teams have significantly more
sleep disturbances than do single
drivers. In addition, for team drivers
who sleep while the vehicle is in
motion, factors such as vibration and
noise adversely affected their sleep,
although lighting and temperature
aspects of the environment did not
appear to be much of a factor.
However, it was found that many of
the sleep disturbances that occurred for
single drivers could not be attributed
solely to an environmental factor.
The NPRM estimated that 90 percent
of all long-haul drivers use sleeper
berths. Although the proposed rule
would not have prohibited the use of

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sleeper berths, it would have
diminished their flexibility by requiring
single drivers to have one uninterrupted
rest period of at least ten hours duration
every 24 hours. As pointed out in the
comments, however, the proximity and
convenience of the sleeper berth
reduces the importance of the length of
the uninterrupted period. If a driver
obtained seven consecutive hours of
sleep immediately in the sleeper berth,
it would be unnecessary to require him
to remain in that location for an
additional three hours. The agency
agrees with commenters on these points.
This is especially true when those three
hours of required rest could be used to
better advantage to alleviate fatigue later
in the workday. Of course, drivers are
free under the rules to take rest breaks
at any time, using a sleeper berth or
otherwise.
Use of sleeper berths in long-haul
operations is firmly entrenched in the
practice, culture, and equipment of the
trucking industry. This does not mean
that the use of sleeper berths should not
be reviewed in the interest of safety
where a legitimate problem is identified
and established as such. It does mean,
however, that to do so would require
more documented evidence of a safety
problem than the agency now has. In
light of the agency’s recently completed
research, the very strong opposition and
persuasive arguments presented, the
agency will continue to allow single
drivers to accumulate their required
time off duty in two sleeper berth
periods.
The FMCSA has improved the
regulatory text to ensure a clear
understanding of the sleeper berth rule.
The FMCSA has borrowed from and
modified the Government of Canada’s
1994 Commercial Vehicle Drivers Hours
of Service Regulations version of the
sleeper berth rule (SOR/94–716, s. 5),
because it describes the rule in clearer
terms than the wording adopted by the
ICC in 1938. Although the Canadian
version is clearly better, the FMCSA
found that it may prevent a driver from
eating in a restaurant either (1) after
leaving the sleeper berth and before
going on duty, or (2) after going off duty
and before entering the sleeper berth.
The regulatory text has been modified
from the Canadian version to enable a
driver to have off-duty time in
conjunction with sleeper berth time,
which the agency has allowed over the
years.
Carrier Notification of Drivers During
Their Off-Duty Hours
The NPRM proposed a kind of restart
that would be triggered by employers or
their agents violating a proposed

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prohibition against interrupting drivers’
off-duty periods. The NPRM proposal
was designed to address complaints the
agency has received over the years
regarding unreasonable calls from
dispatchers and other carrier employees
that caused drivers to lose the
opportunity to sleep. As proposed, such
an interruption would start the full
interrupted off-duty period over again
from the time of the interruption.
Therefore, if a driver were contacted at
3 a.m. at the end of the sixth hour of his
10-hour off-duty period, the required
off-duty period would have to be
extended by ten full hours, or until 1
p.m. Similarly, if the proposed 32-hour
weekly recovery period were in force,
and the driver were contacted by the
carrier at the end of the 30th hour, the
entire 32-hour period would have been
required to start over again at that time.
This provision was part of the agency’s
effort to provide a meaningful
opportunity for drivers to obtain rest.
Although some comments recognized
the good intention, most of those
commenting on this part of the proposal
indicated significant practical and
operational problems with such a
restriction on communicating with
drivers.
Motor Carriers
The ATA recommended that FMCSA
retain its current policy allowing brief
contacts with drivers during the off-duty
period. Under that policy, those
contacts are considered de minimis
interruptions that do not cause a break
in the off-duty period.
Con-Way Transportation Services
(Con-Way), a large, non-union LTL
carrier, described typical LTL hub and
spoke operations, i.e. both line haul and
local pick-up and delivery activities.
About 80 percent of all runs are
prescheduled, but 20 percent vary based
on tonnage expected. Carriers maintain
a flex-board for on-call drivers, who
perform loading and unloading. On a
given day, most flex-board drivers
would load/unload, but if a run were
not available, they would be sent home
after three or four hours. If things picked
up, they could be recalled to take a run.
If they could not be called for 10 hours,
Con-Way stated scheduling would
become impossible. It argued there has
to be a way of communicating with
drivers to reflect changes in freight
volume or operating conditions.
The NASTC stated that about 15 to 20
percent of the time, truckload
operations rely on the spot market for
back-hauls and that requires timely
notification to drivers or the day is lost
to the driver, and the load to the
company.

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Large and small freight carriers, both
truckload and LTL, local delivery
operations and construction companies
all agreed the proposed rule was too
restrictive for practical application.
Many offered examples of damaging
outcomes to themselves and drivers if
the ability to communicate during offduty hours were denied them. Utility
companies found that such a
prohibition could not work when
emergency situations arise that need
immediate mobilization of employees.
The general advice offered was: ‘‘Do not
try to micro-manage off-duty time,
particularly where there’s no evidence
of a problem.’’
The IBT saw this not as a driver
protection provision, but rather as a
potential opportunity for mischief by a
dispatcher who is having a problem
with a driver. By calling the driver a
number of times during his off-duty
periods, the dispatcher could
significantly curtail that driver’s
availability to work. The IBT stated that
there is a better way to fix the problem,
agreeing in part with the ATA
suggestion to allow brief contacts. At
least one driver, however, commented
about what he said was a welldocumented unsafe practice of keeping
on-call drivers awake to protect and
preserve the carriers’ irregular work
schedules. That practice results in oncall drivers going to work already
fatigued.
Safety Advocacy Groups
Although commending the agency for
providing a longer daily recovery period
and preventing it from being
interrupted, the AHAS had concerns
that the prohibition would be
unenforceable, except perhaps as a
result of a complaint investigation.
FMCSA Response
The agency is persuaded that practical
enforcement problems preclude moving
forward with this element of the
proposal. However, as suggested in
comments from ATA and AHAS, as well
as drivers who have expressed concern
in the past, there ought to be a way to
deal with unnecessary interruptions.
These interruptions while brief in
duration have a significant impact on
the quality of rest drivers obtain if they
occur while the driver is sleeping.
Enforcement, however, should always
be considered in proposing a
prohibition. Communications between a
carrier and a driver that causes that
driver to lose the opportunity for
restorative sleep is a safety issue that
falls within the purview of the FMCSA
and its state partners. Therefore,
FMCSA will continue to gather data to

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the greatest extent practicable on the
degree to which driver performance is
adversely affected by these interruptions
during the rest period.
Daily Work/Rest Cycle
General Concept
The circadian cycle of a 24-hour
workday was presented in the NPRM’s
definition of workday as ‘‘any fixed
period of 24 consecutive hours,’’ and in
the number of hours required to be offduty combined with allowable on-duty
periods. The comments reflected a fairly
general agreement across the board that
the rules should build on the foundation
of a 24-hour day and that the current
allowance for 8 consecutive hours off
duty was insufficient to assure that
drivers had the opportunity to get 7–8
hours of sleep. For example, nearly all
of the responding motor carriers and
motor carrier associations mentioning
this issue agreed that the science clearly
supports this change. The safety
advocacy groups and the scientific
responders enthusiastically supported
the proposal to revert to a 24-hour work/
rest cycle. The issue of how these onduty and off-duty periods apply to the
proposed five types of operations is
reserved for another section. This is not
to say, however, that there was a total
absence of dissent. As we will see with
many of the proposed restrictions, there
were some problems in the details, and
that the problem usually cited was a
lack of flexibility.
The motorcoach industry had little
interest in this issue, primarily because
it has already absorbed the principle
into operating practices. Its basic
position is that the industry has
adjusted well to the existing rules.
ATA and DLTLCA Recommendations
The DLTLCA filed a petition on
November 29, 2000, on behalf of itself
and nine other trade associations,
including the ATA, which, among other
things, presented The Trucking
Industry’s Hours-of-Service Proposal.
The document was described as the
product of a 2-year effort by the
petitioners’ motor carrier members, who
had it reviewed by Drs. Mark R.
Rosekind and David F. Dinges, noted
experts in sleep science, to ensure
consistency with the latest safety
research. Referring to a 24-hour rest/
work schedule, the petitioners said:
We now know, based on research regarding
the circadian rhythm, our bodies function on
a 24-hour cycle. The rules should mirror this
biological rhythm so that time on and off
duty equals 24 hours. The current rules do
not adhere to this pattern since they require
8 hours off duty and allow 15 hours on duty.

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We recommend a 14-hour on-duty period
and 10-hour off-duty period.

As discussed above, the ATA had
earlier submitted recommendations to
the DOT in December 1999 while the
draft NPRM was being reviewed at OMB
before publication. The ATA
championed the concept of a 24-hour
work/rest cycle but did not describe
their ‘‘14 duty hours’’ as a period
limited to 14 consecutive hours.
Regarding the issue of the 10-hour offduty and 14-hour on-duty components
of the 24-hour cycle, the ATA said in its
recommendations:
This is a decrease in allowable work hours
from the current rules. When combined with
the increased amount of off-duty time (from
8 to 10 hours), a 14-hour on-duty period
promotes driver scheduling which mirrors
more closely the body’s 24-hour clock.

The 1999 ATA recommendations
included a daily ‘‘flex-time’’ option,
which was not mentioned in the
November 2000 DLTLCA multiassociation petition. Flex-time would
allow drivers to add up to 2 hours to the
daily on-duty time no more than twice
in any 7-day period, provided at least 48
hours separated the two extended onduty periods and an amount of extra offduty time equal to the ‘‘extended’’ time
taken within 24 hours. The ATA said it
found the ‘‘flex-time’’ provision
necessary to accommodate ‘‘certain
segments of industry [which] find
themselves in a position where a 14hour workday places the drivers in a
position, on an irregular basis, of not
being able to complete their assigned
tasks.’’ In its docket submittal of
December 15, 2000, the ATA, referring
to the 24-hour work/rest cycle, merely
said: ‘‘Work shifts should not be
required to begin at the same time each
day.’’ It also included the daily flex-time
provision, and suggested regulatory
language to implement this option.
The ATA cited no scientific source for
the following three elements of its
proposals:
(1) Extending the workweek to 70
hours in 7 days, all of which could be,
but probably would not be, driving time;
(2) An averaging provision allowing
drivers to work 140 hours in 14 days by
averaging one 84-hour workweek with
one 56-hour workweek with a minimum
of 34 hours off in between; and
(3) Split off-duty time for sleeper
berth drivers, and a limited allowance
for combining sleeper-berth time with
other off-duty time.
At the second FMCSA ‘‘roundtable’’
discussion on September 28, 2000, the
DLTLCA representative hypothesized
that the ATA recommended eliminating
the distinction between driving and on-

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duty not driving time, ‘‘because as a
practical matter, no driver is going to be
beyond 12 * * * we are never going to
be beyond 12 * * * because we have 3
to 4 hours loading time. We have pretrip inspections. We have all these other
activities built in.’’
Industry Comments
The National Tank Truck Carriers
(NTTC) supported the 24-hour clock as
the basis for work/rest cycles. However,
it refuted any assumptions that the tank
truck industry has operational
predictability and asserted that the
rigidity of the rules unnecessarily
restricted driver flexibility.
Private Carriers of Freight
The NPTC recommended adopting a
24-hour work/rest cycle. The NPTC
believes drivers’ HOS regulations
should be based on a 24-hour clock,
reflecting a significant body of science
that has determined that human beings
have a natural circadian rhythm.
The International Bakers Association
(IBA) favored efforts to promote a 24hour work/rest cycle without requiring
work to start at the same time every day.
Truckload Carriers
Large truckload carriers, such as
Schneider National, J.B. Hunt, and
Landstar, several of which participated
in the formulation of industry’s counterproposal, generally favored a 24-hour
work/rest cycle. The smaller truckload
carriers were a little more reserved in
their support for the 24-hour work/rest
cycle, and that was primarily due to
concern about the lack of flexibility in
the proposal.
The NASTC explained that its
members have to depend upon the spot
market to obtain back-hauls to maximize
earnings. The unpredictable nature of
such commerce may make it difficult to
adhere to a strict 24-hour workday.
Several of its members opposed the
rigidity of a ‘‘fixed period of 24
consecutive hours.’’
LTL Carriers
The reaction of the LTL carriers was
also generally positive on the issue of
the 24-hour work/rest cycle. This may
be because the nature of LTL operations
is more closely in line with a 24-hour
day. Most LTL carriers reported that
runs are generally scheduled so they can
be completed within 12 hours with no
more than 10 hours driving. They need
the flexibility of the extra two hours,
however, to deal with exigencies.
Yellow Freight System (Yellow), one of
the largest LTL carriers and a member
of Motor Freight Carriers Association
(MFCA), recommended that the agency

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withdraw its proposal and reissue its
provisions piecemeal starting with the
most beneficial—the 24-hour cycle.
Overnite Transportation Company
(Overnite), one of the nation’s largest
LTL carriers, strongly objected to the
inference it drew from the proposal that
the 24-hour cycle had to remain
constant throughout the workweek. It
stated the nature of LTL operations
would never conform to a uniform 24hour schedule. If a driver takes a 6-hour
run at 8 a.m. after 10 consecutive hours
off, he should not have to remain off
duty 18 hours until 8 a.m. the next day.
He should be able to go on duty after 10
consecutive hours off, and let the daily
and weekly duty-time maximums
control.
AAA Cooper Transportation found
the 24-hour work/rest cycle as a positive
step to improve drivers’ sleep
possibilities.
Driver Associations
The OOIDA submitted an alternative
proposal that gave due deference to a
24-hour work/rest cycle. The OOIDA,
however, specifically rejected any
notion that its proposal would require
adherence to a fixed starting time each
day.
The IBT and most owner-operators
and other small to medium-sized
truckload carriers comments did not
comment specifically on the 24-hour
work/rest cycle.
Special Operations
The American Road and
Transportation Builders Association
(ARTBA) would use 24 hours as a base.
The ARTBA’s alternative proposal for a
‘‘construction industry driver’’ and the
associated daily driving and on-duty
time limits within a 24-hour period
drew support from the AGC and the
National Ready-Mixed Concrete
Association (NRMCA).
Shippers
The National Industrial
Transportation League supported a 24hour work/rest cycle but did not
provide any detail or statistics.
Safety Advocacy Groups
On the issue of the 24-hour work/rest
cycle, safety advocacy groups joined
with others from the public sector and
scientific community to express strong
support of the agency’s position.
The AHAS, CRASH, and PATT
commended the agency for proposing a
24-hour work/rest cycle, which they
believe is supported by an enormous
body of research over many years.
The NSC commended the DOT for
addressing this contentious issue which

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has not been fundamentally analyzed in
over 60 years, and stated that the agency
had done the fundamental research
necessary to take it on. The NSC
believed the research was strong enough
to make the conclusion about reverting
to a 24-hour cycle, and strongly
supported that part of proposal.
The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) of the Department of Health
and Human Services agreed that most
provisions of the proposed rules would
produce positive safety outcomes. It
recommended limiting driving within a
24-hour work/rest cycle.
FMCSA Response
There is general agreement on the
concept of a 24-hour work/rest cycle
and the scientific support for it. The
FMCSA agrees with the general concept
of ATA’s statement that increasing the
amount of off-duty time (from 8 to 10
hours) and having a 14-hour on-duty
period promotes driver scheduling
which would move the regulations
closer to the body’s 24-hour clock. The
FMCSA believes that the strict 24-hour
work/rest cycle would be ideal from a
scientific viewpoint, but it is simply not
practical and too inflexible to require of
the industry. A strict 24-hour work/rest
cycle would cause unavoidable impacts
to motor carrier operations that the
agency cannot justify from a safety or
economic standpoint.
A requirement that all on-duty time
including driving must occur within the
24-hour period creates the flexibility
problems that carriers identified in their
comments. Each of the options analyzed
in the NPRM prevents the operational
flexibility the industry desired. Most of
the recommendations made by industry
commenters to the NPRM, did not
include a strict 24-hour period;
operational flexibility was given higher
priority.
Moving towards a 24-hour work/rest
cycle without requiring a rigid starting
time could achieve safety benefits while
causing less productivity disruptions to
motor carrier operations than adopting
the strict 24-hour work/rest cycle the
NPRM and PATT proposed.
The PATT and ATA alternatives
incorporated a 24-hour work-rest cycle.
The FMCSA staff also developed an
alternative that incorporated a 24-hour
work-rest cycle to provide a more
operationally feasible alternative for
analysis.
The FMCSA has decided to move
towards a 24-hour work/rest cycle
containing an extended consecutivehour off-duty period within which
drivers can obtain necessary daily sleep.
Logically, off-duty time must always be

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referred to in terms of the minimum,
while on-duty time will continue to be
referred to in terms of the maximum.
The FMCSA is selecting its staff
alternative incorporating a 24-hour
work-rest cycle and a 21-hour drive-rest
cycle for the final rule because it
provides the most favorable
combination of reduced fatigue-related
incidents, increased driver alertness,
and other safety benefits along with
minimal costs to society.
Daily Off-Duty Time
Industry Comments
The proposal provided three different
consecutive off-duty periods to obtain
the same 7 to 8 hours of sleep: 10
consecutive hours off-duty for Types 1
and 2; 9 consecutive hours off-duty for
Types 3 and 5; and 12 consecutive
hours off-duty for Type 4.
As discussed above, the ATA had
earlier submitted recommendations to
the DOT in December 1999 while the
draft NPRM was being reviewed at OMB
before publication. The ATA
championed the concept of a 10-hour
off-duty period and 14-hour on-duty
period of the 24-hour cycle.
The Pennsylvania Motor Truck
Association (PMTA), in supporting
ATA’s alternative proposal for 10 hours
off, commented that there was enough
time in the day for drivers to rest if
necessary while maintaining a
productive schedule. It also observed
that the FMCSA’s proposed rules do not
enable drivers to take advantage of
downtime at loading docks.
The California Trucking Association
(CTA) believes a 10-hour off-duty period
is potentially effective.
Tom Carrigan, the director of
corporate safety for the Martz Group,
testified that in the early days of his
career as a Greyhound driver, he could
recall reporting to work fully rested and
well within legal limits, yet so fatigued
that he wondered how he would
manage to get out of the terminal, let
alone complete his trip. He stated
Greyhound provided its drivers with 10
hours of off-duty time between trips and
faithfully abided by all of the HOS
limitations, yet Mr. Carrigan claimed
Greyhound had no control over its
drivers’ activities while away from
work. There were many other occasions
when Mr. Carrigan was provided 24
hours or more of off-duty time yet
reported for his next trip in a fatigued
state due to faulty time management on
his part.
Private Carriers of Freight
The NPTC recommended an
alternative extending the required daily

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off-duty period to nine hours. The NPTC
believes there is general and
indisputable agreement that truck
drivers need more opportunity for rest.
The IBA supported 10 consecutive
hours daily for rest.
Truckload Carriers
Schneider National recommended a
10 consecutive hour off duty period ‘‘to
implement regulations that make sense
for the industry, drivers, and the
public.’’
J.B. Hunt also supported changing to
10 hours off duty instead of the current
8-hour resting period. It stated drivers
would get ample opportunity for
restorative sleep every day and sleep
deprivation should not be an issue.
LTL Carriers
The reaction of the LTL carriers was
also generally positive on the issue of
off duty time. Overnite submitted a
recommendation of a minimum off-duty
time of 10 consecutive hours, which
could be split for drivers using sleeperberth equipment.
AAA Cooper Transportation believes
the daily 10-consecutive hour period
off-duty as a positive step to improve
drivers’ sleep possibilities.
Con-Way commented that the off-duty
period should be 10 hours off duty
within which to get 7 to 8 hours of
sleep.
Driver Associations
The OOIDA proposed a daily off-duty
period of 10 hours instead of the current
eight hours. It stated: ‘‘Ten hours off
duty will allow drivers more than
sufficient time to get restorative sleep
each day and will help drivers resist
pressure from shippers, brokers, and
motor carriers to drive longer hours.’’
Safety Advocacy Groups
PATT and NIOSH were very
supportive of the proposal’s 12 hours of
rest.
The IIHS supported the agency’s
approach of taking the needed amount
of daily sleep (7 hours) and the time
within which such sleep can be
obtained (10 hours). Together with the
60 hours in 7 days limit, the driver gets
an average of 12 hours off and
accumulation of fatigue would be
avoided.
FMCSA Response
Each driver should have an
opportunity for eight consecutive hours
of uninterrupted sleep every day. The
current rules require a minimum of
eight consecutive hours off. Many motor
carriers do not provide drivers more
than the minimum 8 hours off duty,

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although the present regulations
certainly allow them to do so, and many
drivers accept tight schedules without
objection. These drivers may have to
commute home, eat one or two meals,
care for family members, bathe, get
physical exercise, and conduct other
personal activities, all within their 8hour off-duty period.
To afford the driver an opportunity to
obtain a minimum period of 7 to 8 hours
to sleep, the research shows that the offduty periods need to be increased. Nine
hours off duty was originally required in
1937. For various reasons, organized
labor objected to most of the original
regulations, and upon further
deliberation, the ICC reduced the 9-hour
off-duty period to 8 hours. 6 M.C.C. 557,
July 12, 1938.
The NPRM found that several studies
strongly suggest the FMCSA should
require an even longer consecutive offduty period than the 9 hours the ICC
required in its original 1937 HOS
regulations. To provide additional offduty periods each day for necessary
personal activities and rest, docket
comments and research strongly suggest
the need for total off-duty periods from
10 to 16 hours. Studies in aviation
(Gander, et al. (1991)), rail (Thomas, et
al. (1997), Moore-Ede et al. (1996)), and
maritime environments (U.S. Coast
Guard Report No. CG–D–06–97, U.S.
Coast Guard (1997) (MCS 68/INF.11))
illustrate the same point. Studies of
truck drivers, including Lin et al. (1993)
and McCartt, et al. (1995), point
specifically to increased crash risk and
recollections of increased drowsiness or
sleepiness after fewer than nine hours
off-duty.
Studies performed in laboratory
settings, as well as studies assessing
operational situations, explore the
relationships between the sleep
obtained and subsequent performance
(Dinges, D.F. & Kribbs, N.B. (1991);
Bonnet, M.H. & Arand, D.L. (1995);
Belenky, G. et al. (1994); Dinges, D.F. et
al. (1997); Pilcher, J.J., & Hufcutt, A.I.
(1996); Belenky, G. et al. (1987). The
results of the studies can be summarized
simply: a person who is sleepy is more
prone to perform poorly on tasks
requiring vigilance and decisionmaking
than a person who is alert.
It is virtually impossible for a driver
to get an adequate amount of sleep
when the driver must subtract time for
commuting, meals, personal errands,
and family/social life from an 8-hour off
duty period, as the ICC found in 1937.
Wylie et al. (1996), for example, showed
that drivers in the study obtained nearly
2 hours less sleep per principal sleep
period than their stated ‘‘ideal’’ (5.2
hours versus 7.2 hours). However, many

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of them did not manage their off-duty
time efficiently or effectively to obtain
sufficient sleep. All commuting, meals,
personal hygiene, social interaction
within the study setting, the study
protocol itself, and sleep had to fit into
their off-duty periods. The U.S. and
Canadian drivers participating in that
study operated under schedules set up
to allow driving up to the maximum
time periods permitted under U.S. or
Canadian regulations. The drivers
returned to regular work-reporting
locations at the end of a shift. The
elapsed time between beginning and
ending a shift included many ancillary
duties and other activities in addition to
driving so that time available for sleep
was generally limited to 8 hours.
Participants who drove a regular 10hour daytime schedule every day spent
5.8 hours in bed and 5.4 hours asleep.
Study drivers who ran a regular 13-hour
schedule starting in the daytime spent
5.5 hours in bed and 5.1 hours asleep.
This was about 2 hours less than the
drivers would have preferred to sleep.
The time-in-bed similarities between the
13-hour and 10-hour daytime drivers
was likely due primarily to their
proximity to the sleep center—the 13hour drivers had to commute less than
10 minutes from their home terminal to
the sleep laboratory and 10-hour drivers
had to commute between 20 to 30
minutes. (All times cited are for the
principal sleep periods, and do not
include the naps that some drivers took
during their work shifts.) Also, the
drivers in both of these daytime-driving
groups were able to obtain their
principal sleep during optimal times of
the day, starting in late evening and
ending in the early morning.
Other studies have found that the
amount of sleep obtained by CMV
drivers is variable and often short.
Arnold, P. et al. (1996), interviewed
over 700 CMV drivers in the state of
Western Australia, which has no formal
HOS regulations. Of the drivers
interviewed, about 5 percent reported
having no sleep on one day during the
prior week, 12.5 percent reported
obtaining less than 4 hours of sleep one
or more work days in the prior week,
and about 30 percent reported obtaining
less than 6 hours of sleep on at least one
work day. Prior to commencing their
current trips, about two-thirds of drivers
had between 6 and 10 hours of sleep,
but about 20 percent had less than 6
hours of sleep (pp. 27–28).
VanOuwerkerk, F. (1988) in a study
based on interviews with 650
international European Economic
Community (EEC) drivers, noted that
drivers reported a median sleep time of

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6.7 hours and a median rest period of
7 hours. They reported that the
‘‘minimum rest time [reduction from 11
hours to eight hours not more than two
times per week, as permitted under the
current EEC Council Directive] has
become the rule’’ as far as both drivers
and enforcement officials were
concerned.
In their survey of 511 medium- and
long-distance truck drivers in the
United States, Abrams, C., Shultz, T., &
Wylie, C.D. (1997), found no statistically
significant differences in the stated rest
needs among the categories of drivers
(owner-operator, company driver,
regular route, irregular route, solo,
team): on an average day, a driver
reported needing an average of 7 hours
of sleep. There was a slight difference
between union and non-union drivers;
the former reported needing about 31
minutes less sleep. Just over 90 percent
of the drivers reported that they usually
used a sleeper berth while on the road.
Almost three-fourths of the drivers
reported taking their sleep in a single
period, spending eight to nine hours in
the berth. Just over two-thirds of the
drivers who split their sleeper berth
period reported usually spending 4 to 5
hours in the berth during one period.
After reviewing the research,
comments, and regulatory analysis, the
FMCSA selected three alternatives to
analyze in detail: the PATT and ATA
proposals and its own staff alternative.
The PATT alternative would set off-duty
time at 12 consecutive hours and the
ATA and FMCSA alternatives at 10
consecutive hours.
The FMCSA is convinced that
requiring two additional hours of offduty time to obtain additional sleep and
accommodate commuting, meals,
personal errands, and family/social life
is enough minimum time for the
majority of drivers. A driver may need
additional time, such as for longer than
normal commutes, medical
appointments, and family/social life
needs, but those additional times can be
handled through labor-management
arrangements. The agency’s 10-hour
limit is materially better from a safety
standpoint than the current rule. Under
the current rule a driver who resides
one hour from the normal work
reporting location, could conceivably be
required to return to the wheel within
8 hours after being released from duty
and at most could get only 6 hours of
sleep. This final rule’s requirement,
however, is not so restrictive as to
impose an unreasonable burden on
productivity and generates the most
favorable combination of reduced
fatigue-related incidents, increased
driver alertness, and other safety

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benefits, along with minimal costs to
society.
Daily On-Duty Time
Industry Comments
The PMTA, in supporting ATA’s
alternative proposal for 14 hours on
duty followed by 10 hours off,
commented that there was enough time
in the day for drivers to rest if necessary
while maintaining a productive
schedule. It also observed that the
FMCSA’s proposed rules do not enable
drivers to take advantage of downtime at
loading docks, suggesting that the
agency adopt a more liberal
interpretation of the 14-hour block of
on-duty time.
The CTA observed that the 24-hour
workday should be split into only two
periods, a 14-hour work period and a
10-hour off-duty period.
Private Carriers of Freight
The NPTC recommended a 15-hour
on-duty limit. The NPTC commented:
‘‘Any limit on maximum daily on-duty
time of less than 15 hours would disrupt
many private carriers’ operating
schedules and practices. We do not
believe a limit of less than 15 hours can
be cost-justified.’’
The IBA supported 14 hours of
productive time with flexibility to
extend twice a week by one to two
hours under ‘‘certain’’ (undefined)
circumstances.
Truckload Carriers
Schneider National agreed with the
ATA recommendation to change from
the current 15-hour rule to a 14-hour onduty rule within any 24-hour cycle ‘‘to
implement regulations that make sense
for the industry, drivers, and the
public.’’
J.B. Hunt also supported changing the
work/rest cycle to 14 hours on duty and
10 hours off instead of current 10-hour
driving/15-hour working/8-hour resting
cycle, but also favored the proposed 12hour work limit in 24-hour workday,
preferably with no multi-day
cumulative limit. Hunt observed that
the biggest negative impact comes from
the rigidity of the proposal.
Perfetti Trucking, which actively
participated in the hearings and
roundtable discussions in addition to
submitting written comments, stated
drivers should get credit for rest time
and that rest time should extend the 14hour duty period.
The NASTC pointed out a problem
with the 14-on, 10-off daily cycle in that
all productive time would have to be
condensed into a 14-hour block of time.
If a driver has to take a nap or rest from

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1 to 2 hours, he would pay the price in
productivity and would therefore more
likely disregard his condition and
continue to operate.
LTL Carriers
Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. (Watkins)
reported it has approximately 2,400
drivers engaged in pickup and delivery
operations or short hauls that would
best fit in the Type 4 operations
provided in the proposal. These drivers
work five days a week, begin work about
the same time every day and return to
their home terminal at the end of the
workday. All of these drivers are
scheduled for no more than 12
consecutive hours each day. However,
because of unforeseen circumstances
(breakdowns, weather, traffic, etc.) on
any given day, an average of 4 percent,
or 95 drivers, are required to extend
their scheduled day by an average of
less than 60 minutes.
Overnite recommended a maximum
on-duty time of 14 hours.
Con-Way recommends 14 hours on
duty with no distinction between
driving and non-driving time.
Driver Associations
OOIDA stated: ‘‘The maximum
available time of 14 hours that OOIDA
proposes is very reasonable and more
than sufficient time to allow drivers to
accomplish their work.’’ The OOIDA,
however, specifically rejected any
notion that its proposal would require
adherence to a fixed starting time each
day.
Many other comments from owneroperators and small to medium-sized
truckload carriers focused on those
provisions in the proposal that they
found most troublesome, i.e., failure to
display an understanding of the
flexibility needed in irregular route,
truckload business.
Special Operations
The ARTBA would limit duty time to
16 hours and was supported by the AGC
and the NRMCA.
Safety Advocacy Groups
AHAS cited numerous studies finding
that risk geometrically increases during
the 10th and 11th hours on duty. The
studies cited in the preamble as
showing that performance degrades
dramatically after the 12th hour, AHAS
noted, actually stand for the proposition
that performance starts to degrade after
the 8th hour. The AHAS stated that it
would be more comfortable if the
proposal limited on-duty time to 12
hours, but believes that would not
change the industry’s tendency to
violate the rules.

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PATT, NSC, and NIOSH all concurred
with the proposal limiting duty time to
12 hours in each 24 hours.
FMCSA Response
The environment in which motor
carriers and their drivers operate is
significantly different from the
environment in which they operated in
1938. The CMVs and highways they
operate on are dramatically improved,
making the driving task, while still a
demanding one, considerably less
arduous than was the case then. The
FMCSA believes there can be little
doubt that fatigue directly attributable to
the exertion required to operate the
modern CMV is less of a factor now.
Society has learned a lot about the
science of sleep since 1938 and
understands the more relevant issue is
how long the driver can be awake and
‘‘at work’’, and still be allowed to drive,
before safety is significantly
compromised.
After reviewing the research,
comments, and RIA, the FMCSA is
convinced that 14 hours after the
beginning of a duty tour is long enough
for most drivers, given the significantly
increasing degradation of performance
which occurs in the later stages of a
work shift.
The FMCSA found that restricting
those drivers who return to the normal
work reporting location at the end of
every shift has the unintended
consequence of requiring a significant
increase in new drivers. These new
drivers would increase both costs and
crashes. The analyses showed that by
allowing these short-haul drivers the
flexibility to work up to 16 hours one
day in a week would reduce the number
of additional drivers needed for the staff
alternative. This flexibility would result
in cost savings of nearly $500 million
and safety benefits of nearly $10
million.
The FMCSA believes this 14-hour
limit for most drivers, and 16-hour limit
for short-haul drivers once a week, is
materially better from a safety
standpoint than the current rule. A
driver under the current rule could
conceivably still be allowed to return to
the wheel several hours after the 15hour limit has passed (because ‘‘off
duty’’ breaks that can extend the
workday). The limit, however, is not so
restrictive as to impose an unreasonable
burden on productivity.
In conducting its RIA, the FMCSA
made sure it included analysis of
private carriers’ operating schedules in
view of the NPTC claims. The RIA,
however, has justified the cost to reduce
the number of available off-duty hours
to 14 hours after the driver begins work.

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The FMCSA does not believe 16 hours
every day, as supported by the ARTBA,
AGC, and NRMCA, would reduce
fatigue-related incidents and increase
driver alertness as these commenters
contend.
AHAS correctly cited studies showing
that performance begins to degrade after
the 8th hour on duty and increases
geometrically during the 10th and 11th
hours. The agency’s RIA, however,
demonstrated that the FMCSA staff
alternative produces substantial net
safety benefits compared to the current
rule, despite allowing up to 11 hours of
driving, because it also requires 10
hours off duty, instead of 8, and reduces
the backward rotation of drivers’ sleep/
wake schedules. See the discussion
above under the FMCSA Response to
the Daily Off-Duty Time.
In reviewing the recommendations
made by commenters to the NPRM, the
FMCSA found the PATT, ATA, and its
staff-developed alternatives the most
feasible. The PATT alternative would
set on-duty time at 12 consecutive
hours. The ATA alternative would allow
a driver to be on duty 14 cumulative
hours with up to 16 cumulative hours
twice per 7-day period. The FMCSA
alternative would set on-duty time at 14
consecutive hours once the duty tour
begins for long-haul and short-haul
drivers, while short-haul drivers would
have the opportunity to work up to 16
consecutive hours one day per week.
The FMCSA has chosen to promulgate
its staff alternative because it provides
the best combination of safety and
compliance costs.
Daily Driving Time
Industry Comments
The CTA believes the workday should
include a 14-hour work period and
strongly argued for preservation of
intrastate exemptions allowing drivers
transporting farm products to drive 12
hours in a 16-hour day.
Private Carriers of Freight
The NPTC recommended adopting a
daily driving limit of 12 hours within a
15-hour on-duty limit.
The IBA supported a 14-hour
productivity time with flexibility to
extend it twice a week by one to two
hours under ‘‘certain’’ (undefined)
circumstances.
Truckload Carriers
Schneider National agreed with the
ATA recommendation to change from
the current 10-hour driving rule to a 14hour on-duty rule ‘‘to implement
regulations that make sense for the
industry, drivers, and the public.’’

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J.B. Hunt also supported changing the
work/rest cycle to 14 hours on duty and
10 hours off duty instead of the current
cycle, but it also favored the proposed
12-hour work limit in 24-hour workday.
J.B. Hunt believed this would enable a
driver to average 10 hours of work a
day, extending to 12 hours of work as
circumstance demands. Hunt observed
that the biggest negative impact comes
from the rigidity of the FMCSA
proposal.
LTL Carriers
Overnite recommended a maximum
of up to 10 hours driving.
Con-Way recommended 14 hours on
duty with no distinction between
driving and non-driving time.
Driver Associations
The OOIDA recommended no
restrictions on daily driving time, which
OOIDA believes should be left to the
discretion of the driver.
Special Operations
The ARTBA would limit driving time
to 12 hours in a single 24-hour day and
72 hours in seven days, and it drew
support from the AGC and NRMCA.
Safety Advocacy Groups
AHAS stated that ‘‘[FMCSA] has
reversed its own policy stance of record
on the dangers of driving more than 10
consecutive hours.’’ AHAS pointed to
the FHWA’s November 1990, Report to
Congress On Commercial Driver Hours
of Service, where the agency openly
endorsed research findings about the
adverse effects of longer continuous
driving times and of cumulative fatigue
over several consecutive days of driving.
AHAS argued that this report
acknowledged that ‘‘[t]he risk of
accidents appears to increase with the
number of hours driven.’’ With regard to
the current 10-hour driving limit, AHAS
argued the agency had asserted in 1990
that ‘‘this requirement is consistent with
the research finding that the potential
for accidents rises as the hours of
driving increase and the driver is more
likely to become fatigued.’’ AHAS stated
that the FHWA report also ‘‘favorably
cites the [IIHS’] 1987 study by Jones and
Stein, [Effects of Driver Hours of Service
on Tractor-Trailer Crash Involvement],
showing ‘‘that driving in excess of 8
hours may be associated with a
significantly increased risk of crash
involvement. This reported increase in
relative risk confirmed other findings
[citing Mackie and Miller, Effects of
HOS Regularity of Schedules, and Cargo
Loading on Truck and Bus Driver
Fatigue, 1978]’.’’ AHAS quoted the
FHWA report: ‘‘Research indicates that

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the time spent on-duty may be a more
important factor in driver loss of
alertness [citing Harris and Mackie, A
Study of the Relationships Among
Fatigue, HOS, and Safety of Operations
of Truck and Bus Drivers, 1972].’’ AHAS
argued that ‘‘there has been no research
since this Congressional report,
including research completed for the
OMCS over the past decade, which has
refuted the accuracy of these
observations or of the research on which
they are based.’’
AHAS also extensively quoted a
Federal Register notice from 1980
stating:
The [rationale] for the hours of service
regulations is justified by the concept that the
longer a person drives, the more [fatigued]
that person becomes and consequently, the
more prone to becoming involved in
accidents.

45 FR 82284, at 82286.
Fatigue, however it is defined, appears to
be the chief factor limiting a person’s output.
Various studies have shown that when the
working day is lengthened, productivity goes
down, when the number of hours worked is
reduced, performance increases.
The influence of fatigue in accident
causation has been demonstrated and where
there has been a reduction in hours worked,
there has been a reduction in accidents.
There is some evidence that 8 hours of work
a day, where the work is fairly demanding,
is the maximum that should be permitted for
highest productivity and lowest accident
rate.

45 FR 82284, at 82288.
AHAS also argued that FMCSA’s
predecessor agency in 1987 endorsed
findings that increased consecutive
driving hours and consecutive days of
driving both directly contribute to
driver errors and crashes. See 52 FR
45215. AHAS argued that FHWA made
assertions to the same effect in the
November 29–30, 1988, Symposium on
Truck and Bus Driver Fatigue.
AHAS also argued that ‘‘[n]one of the
research findings showing the increased
safety and productivity of fewer hours
worked and driven than the maximum
10 hours permitted under the current
regulation are cited or discussed
anywhere in the instant proposed rule.’’
AHAS continued that ‘‘no credible
studies in the intervening years have
countermanded the accuracy and
wisdom of these observations. Indeed,
scores of new studies have amply and
repeatedly corroborated the FHWA’s
policy statements over the past 20 years
about the dangers of driving and
working longer hours.’’
Finally, AHAS argued that ‘‘the
FMCSA has categorically altered its
position in this rulemaking on the
merits of driving and working longer

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hours without demonstrating why and
how these prior conclusions are no
longer valid. AHAS does not believe the
agency has countered these documented
policy views with any new facts and
information which moot their
application to the revision of the current
HOS standards to ensure that drivers
work and drive fewer hours to ensure a
reduction in both the relative and
absolute risks of truck crashes. Instead,
the agency, against all the evidence of
record, including their own policy
statements over the years, has offered
amendments to the current regulation
which demonstrably will promote truck
and bus drivers to drive longer
consecutive hours at a greatly increased
risk of crashes due to an increased
prevalence of fatigue among commercial
operators.’’
AHAS believes that nighttime driving
is less safe than daytime driving because
of the circadian effects on the driver. It
rejects, however, as speculative and
unsupported by any evidence, the
potential that displacement of nighttime
operations to daytime could create
additional safety problems due to
increased congestion.
CRASH’s principal objection is that
the proposal increases by two hours the
amount of time a driver can drive in one
day. CRASH cited studies showing that
crash risk nearly doubles after 8 hours
and doubles again after the 9th hour.
PATT joined AHAS and CRASH in
strongly opposing any increase in the
10-hour driving limitation because of
research that shows the risk of crashes
increases after 8 hours and even more
significantly after 9 to 10 hours. PATT
recommended limiting driving to 10
hours out of 12 hours of allowable duty
time each 24 hours, or to put it another
way, no more than 50 hours driving in
60 duty hours per week. On these
issues, the safety advocates were in
harmony with the position of the IBT.
The IIHS commented that there are
‘‘gold standard’’ studies relating crashes
of truck drivers to driving hours
showing that performance degrades
starting after the 5th hour, but the risk
dramatically increases after the 10th
hour.
NIOSH recommended limiting driving
to 10 hours within a 24-hour work/rest
cycle of 12 hours on duty and 12 hours
off duty. NIOSH also said the FMCSA
should consider allowing up to 12 hours
of driving per day on rare occasions as
required by emergencies or other
unusual circumstances where continued
driving would be safer than stopping.
FMCSA Response
Just as industry was inclined to
interpret the science as allowing greater

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productivity without facing greater risk,
the safety advocates cite the science as
requiring the agency to go further to
restrict driving time.
Although AHAS argued that there
have been no credible studies since
1981 and 1990 countermanding the
agency’s previous position, FMCSA
believes recent studies have provided
new information requiring the agency to
reevaluate its former policy statements.
America’s transportation system has
changed significantly since the late
1930’s. Long-haul truckers in the 1930’s
could average only 25 miles per hour
(mph)—the top speed was 40 mph—and
the best daily run was about 250 miles
(11 M.C.C. 203). These truckers used
drafty, noisy, and underpowered trucks
to labor up long hills and other rough,
narrow, and poorly-marked winding
roads. The construction of the Interstate
Highway System has contributed to
significantly higher traffic speeds and
volumes. Trucking, once a relatively
minor adjunct to the railroads, has
become the dominant form of
transportation for most commodities.
Much of the nation’s truck traffic moves
on the Interstates and other high-speed
roads, sometimes for very long distances
using modern, heated/air-conditioned,
air-suspension, sleeper-berth, cruisecontrol equipped tractors for drivers’
comfort and safety.
The high volume and speed of traffic
on the Interstates and many other roads
require a higher level of driver alertness,
for the sheer mass of a truck can make
it deadly when accidents occur. Of
course, trucks also operate in local or
regional environments, often in heavy
traffic, and drivers are required to
perform an ever-wider range of duties.
The results of scientific research into
fatigue causation, sleep, circadian
rhythms, night work, and other matters
were unavailable decades ago when the
HOS rules were formulated. The
FMCSA believes there can be little
doubt that fatigue directly attributable to
the exertion required to operate the
modern CMV is less of a factor now.
By limiting daily duty hours, the
NPRM would have imposed a more
regular work/rest cycle, assuming that
very few, if any, drivers would drive
their entire on-duty period. This is
consistent with testimony from carriers
and drivers alike about customary
practices. The AHAS pointed out,
however, that the degraded performance
in the eleventh and twelfth hours on
duty should not, at least regularly, be
spent behind the wheel. The AHAS
position does create potential issues
with operational practicality. The AHAS
insisted science would require the
agency to include both a reduction in a

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driver’s nighttime operations and an
increase in time off to compensate for
driving at night when the sleep debt
accumulates because daytime sleep is
inferior to nighttime sleep. It dismissed
as purely speculative any impact on
safety from displacing many drivers
from nighttime to daytime operations
and the great number of inexperienced
drivers necessary to replace the drivers
whose availability would be
substantially limited.
The FMCSA initially considered the
proposals submitted in the ATA
comments and in the petition of the
DLTLCA the same; however, when the
agency began considering whether the
ATA recommendation could be
potentially effective and reasonably
feasible, we found significant
differences with the DLTLCA proposal
that raised serious questions about the
effectiveness and reasonableness of
both. The ATA asserted that its proposal
was based upon research showing that
humans function on approximately a
24-hour cycle, and therefore that new
rules should promote rest/work cycles
synchronous with the body’s natural 24hour biological rhythms.
The so-called circadian cycle or
rhythm has two general tendencies on
the wake/sleep cycle of humans. During
daylight hours, the human body tends to
be wakeful, and during nighttime, the
human body tends toward sleepiness.
Therefore, people would not only tend
toward drowsiness during the late night
and early morning hours, they would
also tend to have more difficulty
obtaining restorative sleep during the
daylight hours. The latter situation may
lead to the accumulation of sleep debt,
resulting in increased tendency toward
drowsiness not only in subsequent
nighttime periods of required
wakefulness but at other times as well.
This is not to say there are no safety
benefits to be derived from promoting
regular work/rest cycles, and industry is
to be commended for proposing one. It
should be noted, however, that nothing
in the current rules would preclude
more regular schedules.
The FMCSA believes that allowing
one additional hour of driving activity
can be safely accommodated within the
context of a somewhat reduced overall
tour of duty as discussed above. The
FMCSA staff alternative selected for
evaluation includes no driving after 14
hours from the start of duty tour
notwithstanding intermittent breaks off
duty for meals, naps, and other rest. In
arriving at 14 hours, the agency believes
drivers would realistically take some
breaks during that time and the work
period may well accumulate 12 or 13
hours, with up to 11 hours driving.

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The FMCSA relied upon 12 studies to
select a 10 consecutive hour off-duty
period, a 14-hour tour of duty, and a
maximum of 11 hours of driving. The 12
studies are included within the agency’s
review of all research studies used in
the NPRM. The agency’s review is by
Freund, D.M., November 1999, ‘‘An
Annotated Literature Review Relating to
Proposed Revisions to the Hours-ofService Regulation for Commercial
Motor Vehicle Drivers,’’ that is in the
docket. The FMCSA staff alternative
concluded that, after 14 hours from the
start of the work period, it is time to
stop driving, as the risk of fatigueaffected incidents is increasing rapidly.
The PATT alternative would set
driving time to no more than 10
cumulative hours. The ATA alternative
would allow drivers to drive up to 14
cumulative hours with up to 16
cumulative hours twice per 7-day
period. The FMCSA staff alternative
would allow driving time up to 11
cumulative hours for long-haul and
short-haul drivers. The FMCSA has
decided to allow drivers to drive up to
11 cumulative hours for all long-haul
and short-haul freight drivers.
Although the agency focused on
science in developing the NPRM, it
cannot allow science alone to dictate the
form or content of a rule, as many safety
groups advocate. On the other hand,
while reviewing economic, operational,
and environmental issues with great
care for this final rule, FMCSA has not
allowed itself to be bound by those
considerations either.
Distinctions in Duty Time
General Concept
The expert panel assembled by the
agency to review the options under
consideration before publication of the
NPRM recommended eliminating the
distinction between on-duty time and
driving time. The scientific basis for the
recommendation is the belief that
driving is no more tiring than many of
the other tasks a truck driver would be
called upon to perform.
The agency’s practical basis for the
proposed elimination was to reduce the
paperwork burden. Under the existing
rules, drivers are required to account for
both driving time and non-driving duty
time. Eliminating the distinction,
moreover, would achieve consistency
with the terminology used by the Wage
and Hour Division of the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL), allowing
FMCSA to rely on DOL records in place
of driver records of duty status.

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ATA Recommendation
When developing its
recommendations, the ATA stated it
was aware of the expert panel’s findings
that driving is no more fatiguing than
other work. Therefore, it proposed to
eliminate the distinction between
driving time and other on-duty time as
unnecessary, leaving the possibility of
14 consecutive hours of driving. The
ATA opined that hours of driving time
would always be less than the overall
duty time within which the driving
takes place. The ATA cited its HOS
survey in which commenters reported
driving an average of 9.1 driving hours
in an 11.4-hour day.
The DLTLCA commented that they
‘‘went along with ATA’’ although they
wanted a 12-hour limit on driving. They
stated that the 12-hour driving
limitation was consistent with DOT’s
proposal and its research, and noted
that five states already allow 12 hours
of driving (for intrastate trips). The
industry petitioners ‘‘recognized that
the business, operational and safety
needs of trucking companies and their
customers will continue to consume
several hours of a driver’s time each
day,’’ so that ‘‘a limit of driving time to
12 hours would result.’’
The NPTC alternative was much more
direct. With little explanation, the
private carriers recommended a
maximum of 12 hours driving in a 15hour on-duty period.
Other Industry Comments
The MFCA made no comment
specifically on this issue, because its
constant position is that the present
rules should remain in force. The fact
that the IBT strongly opposed
eliminating the distinction seems to
support the validity of this assumption.
The NTTC supported the elimination
of any distinction between duty-time
and driving-time.
Throughout the public hearings on
the NPRM, notwithstanding vocal
support for the ATA recommendation,
nearly all carriers and most drivers
testified that daily driving rarely
exceeded 10 hours, and then it was only
due to some exigent circumstance. For
example, Con-Way surveyed its linehaul drivers, who were described as
combination drivers and dock-workers.
Most runs are at night and the driver’s
average duty time was 10.88 hours.
Their average driving time, however,
was only 6.22 hours and their average
load time was 4.5 hours. Con-Way also
did a study of all its line-haul
operations on one day, which was the
last workday of the month and
admittedly a worst-case scenario. 3900

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drivers were dispatched and 42 percent
exceeded 12 hours on duty, but none
exceeded ten hours of driving.
The IBT maintained a consistent
position throughout the proceedings,
dating back to its initial response to the
ANPRM in June of 1997. One of the four
elements of a rule that IBT could
support was maintaining the distinction
between driving and non-driving duty.
The IBT observed that the agency’s
proposal failed three of its tests,
including this one. It argued that
eliminating the distinction is what
permits driving time to be extended,
and agreed with the safety advocates
that some drivers would push the
envelope and drive 14 hours a day. The
IBT noted that the union is successful
in getting driving limitations into
contracts because of the DOT rules.
The Snack Food Association, the
National Soft Drink Association, and the
PMAA all reported that drivers in these
segments of the industry are also
salespeople and customer service
representatives. They spend
considerable portions of their daily duty
time in non-driving activities, and
actual driving time would not exceed 10
hours.
The construction industry’s
recommendation to create another
category—‘‘construction industry
driver’’ within a 100 mile radius of
operation—would continue a
distinction between driving time and
on-duty time. Because of the seasonal
and weather-dependent nature of the
industry, the proposal, supported by
AGC and ARTBA, would:
(1) Extend limits to 12 hours of
driving and 16 hours of duty during a
24-hour period;
(2) Extend weekly limits to 72 hours
driving and 80 hours on duty;
(3) Average driving and duty time
over 14 days;
(4) Allow 90 hours of driving during
the first 8 days, a 34-hour restart, and
a 45-hour driving limit over the
remaining 41⁄2 days, followed by a 24hour restart; and
(5) Provide for a 24-hour restart of
time accumulation at any time,
presumably even to avoid the 34-restart.
The need for such increased driving
time is not apparent from testimony and
comments regarding industry practices.
An alternative suggested by the AGC
sheds some light. In construction, most
drivers have no responsibility for
loading and unloading. Mostly, they
wait in line for loads and then wait in
lines at sites to unload. Therefore, AGC
would retain the distinction between
driving and non-driving duties, but
change what is meant by on-duty time

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to exclude time waiting in lines to load
and unload.
The American Moving and Storage
Association (AMSA), which also claims
that its operations are unique, reported
that drivers do not really spend the
majority of their on duty hours behind
the wheel, averaging about 75,000 miles
a year. AMSA claims most of the
driver’s on duty hours are spent loading
and unloading.
The Institute of Makers of Explosives
(IME) complained that the 12-hour onduty restriction for Type 4 drivers will
severely impact on ‘‘shot service,’’
which entails loading ‘‘shot’’ holes with
explosives, setting the charge, and
initiating the shot. The operators for
IME members apparently need at least a
14-hour day to provide the flexibility
needed for that activity, but not to
accommodate more driving.
Small truckload carriers, represented
by NASTC, opposed both reducing daily
on-duty time and removing the
distinction between driving and nondriving time. They stated that, under the
present rules, a driver can drive up to
15 hours in any given 24-hour period,
giving a range of 750 miles. Under the
proposed rule, the range would be
reduced to 600 miles.
The OOIDA’s survey, on the other
hand, found its members spend an
average of 10 hours per day driving and
2.4 hours per day loading and
unloading. An average of 10 hours of
driving per day, of course, would mean
that on some days the 10 hours would
be exceeded.
Private carriers, according to NPTC,
advocated a limit of 12 driving hours
within a maximum of 15 duty hours
daily. The need for this increase in
driving time was unexplained except
that the NPTC stated it was consistent
with safe operating practices. Wal-Mart,
moreover, stated the 12-hour on-duty
limitation within 14 consecutive hours
is more restrictive than the 10-hour
driving limitation and 15 hours on duty.
Under the proposal, drivers would have
to drive more within a smaller window
to maximize earnings.
Safety Advocacy Groups
Safety advocates contended that
failure to distinguish on-duty time from
driving time would increase violations
of HOS regulations.
The AHAS asserted that pay-per-mile
practices would cause drivers to
continue to maximize driving time at
the expense of the required ten
consecutive hours off duty and two
hours of rest periods. It argued that
because drivers can presently use nondriving duty time each day to perform
non-driving tasks, this ‘‘has helped’’ to

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limit even more flagrant abuses that
would occur if there were no nondriving hours available in the
regulations. The principal concern of
the safety advocates was the belief that
allowing 12 hours of unspecified ‘‘duty
time’’ would necessarily translate into
12 consecutive hours of driving. They
cited numerous studies finding that risk
dramatically increased during 10th and
11th hours, and predicted that pressures
from efficiency-minded schedulers
would assure that the industry would
fully exploit this additional driving
time.
CRASH stated that eliminating the
distinction between driving time and
other on-duty time would result in
motor carriers squeezing drivers for
every possible minute of driving time,
and carriers would pressure drivers to
work during rest periods.
The IIHS commented that the safety
community would prefer a driving limit
of eight to nine hours in a 24-hour
period. They are realistic enough to
know that they should be content with
keeping close to the status quo.
The NIOSH, agreeing that most
provisions in the proposal would
produce a beneficial safety outcome,
recommended limiting driving to ten
hours within a 24-hour work/rest cycle
of 12 hours of duty and 12 hours free.
It also stated, however, that the agency
should consider allowing up to 12 hours
of driving per day on rare occasions as
required by emergencies or other
unusual circumstances where continued
driving would be safer than stopping.
FMCSA Response
The FMCSA and PATT alternatives
distinguished between duty and driving
time, the ATA’s did not. The FMCSA
has decided to retain the distinction
between driving and on-duty-notdriving time. Each driver required to
prepare records of duty status must
continue to record all driving time
separately from all time on-duty.
The paperwork reductions sought by
the agency in eliminating the
distinctions in drivers’ work hours
received little support. That objective
even drew some criticism because the
proposed substitute for the paper log,
the EOBR, is incapable of directly
monitoring non-driving duty time. The
ATA opposed the use of DOL records,
as did the MFCA, which contends that
few motor carriers are even aware of
their responsibility under the DOL
regulations.
The ATA recommendation would
eliminate the distinction between
driving and other on-duty time,
ostensibly securing a more favorable
work/rest cycle for drivers. The ATA

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and other sponsors of the industry
alternative stated that their support for
a 14-on duty, 10-off duty work/rest
cycle is a ‘‘substantial positive change’’
for which they should receive some
compensation to offset productivity
losses. That compensation would be in
the form of more daily driving hours,
potentially making 14 consecutive hours
of driving legal. In the context of ‘‘payby-the-mile’’ incentives, that possibility
looms large, although the industry
sponsors were confident that the
exigencies of the working day would
impose a natural 12-hour driving limit.
Support for this alternative from the
rest of the for-hire industry was
fractional. Aside from the small
truckload carriers, there was a fairly
broad consensus in favor of retaining
the current limits on driving time,
subject to greater flexibility in usage.
Imposing a 10-hour driving limit in a
24-hour period would have a substantial
impact on small truckload carriers. They
are presently permitted to drive up to 16
hours in a 24-hour period under a 10hours-on duty/8-hours-off duty rotation.
If limiting actual driving to eleven hours
is a legitimate safety measure, it would
not seem equitable to allow exceptions
simply because drivers could make
more money under more liberal rules.
On the other hand, if most drivers
operate safely under current rules, it
would seem inequitable to subject them
to more stringent regulations that would
cut into their earning capacity or disrupt
their life.
The FMCSA has decided to continue
the distinction between driving time
and on-duty time. The comments,
particularly from safety groups,
adamantly opposed allowing as much as
12 hours of driving time. Because the
FMCSA believes that a reasonable
person could find that the last hour of
a driver’s duty tour would be expected
to be driving time that comes near the
end of a 13- or 14-hour workday, the
FMCSA is persuaded that 11 hours is a
more reasonable limit. Within the limits
of a tour of duty usually lasting no more
than 14 hours, the FMCSA believes
there is little doubt that modern CMVs
can be driven safely up to 11 hours,
particularly because rest breaks can be
expected to naturally occur during the
course of that tour.
Weekly or Longer Cycle
General Concept
The scientific basis for proposing
weekly restrictions is the finding from
research studies that sleep debt from
multiple periods of insufficient (poor
quality or insufficient quantity) sleep is
the major cause of cumulative fatigue.

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The recommended countermeasure is a
recovery period during which
restorative sleep may be obtained and
the ‘‘sleep debt’’ repaid. The concept of
a weekly recovery period was presented
in the NPRM in the definition of
workweek, i.e., ‘‘any fixed and regularly
recurring period of seven consecutive
workdays,’’ and in the number of hours
required to be off-duty before beginning
the next workweek.
The comments raised concerns over
the agency’s proposal for a ‘‘workweek,’’
starting with the definition, which many
thought confusing. In some segments of
the industry the concept of a Monday to
Friday workweek is alien. The language
of the definition (‘‘fixed * * *
workweek’’) did appear to give these
carriers cause for alarm, which the
agency acknowledged during the
hearings and roundtable discussions. A
more logical definition of ‘‘workweek’’
might have been ‘‘the workdays between
extended off-duty periods,’’ although
how the term might be used in
regulatory context is not clear. The
recovery period or ‘‘weekend’’
requirement will be discussed
elsewhere in this document.
ATA Recommendation
The ATA recommendation would
limit drivers to 70 hours on duty in a
7-day period (with no distinction
between driving and other on-duty
time). It would provide a minimum
recovery period of 34 hours, which
would serve as a restart provision. The
ATA recommendation also provides an
averaging option of 140 hours on duty
in 14 days. Under this option, according
to the petitioners, a driver could
accumulate 84 hours on duty in the first
seven days before a 34-hour recovery
period would be required. A driver
taking advantage of this option would
then be limited to 56 hours on duty over
the remaining 51⁄2 days.
Other Industry Comments
The alternative proposal of the NPTC
would simply maintain the present 60hours-in-seven-days or 70-hours-ineight-days limitations.
OOIDA’s proposal would place no
limits on cumulative time beyond the
daily restrictions.
Large truckload carriers generally
supported the industry alternative of
limiting on-duty time to 70 hours in 7
days with provision for a 34-hour
restart. They also supported the 14-day
averaging option.
J.B. Hunt supported the proposed 12hour work limit in a 24-hour workday,
but with no cap on the length of the
workweek, reasoning that drivers would
get ample opportunity for restorative

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sleep every day and sleep deprivation
should not be an issue. If a cap were
necessary, Hunt would implement a
limit of 140 on-duty hours in 14 days
with a 36-hour restart period. The 36hour off-duty break would have to be
taken during or at the conclusion of 14day period, which then would start
another 14-day period. This means a
driver could average 10 hours of work
a day, but could extend to 12 hours of
work, as circumstances required.
Landstar commented that it fully
supports using 24-hour and 7-day work/
rest cycles, but found provisions in the
proposal that do not make sense from
either a safety or practical aspect. It
recommended a limitation of 70 hours
driving in a 7-day period, followed by
24 hours off duty, which would actually
be an 8-day week.
The State trucking associations
collaborated in the ATA alternative and
therefore must be considered to have
supported it.
PMTA noted that the loss of the 70
hours in 8 days provision under the
existing rules will cause major schedule
disruptions and reduce productivity by
15 percent.
CTA commented that a maximum 60hour workweek is too restrictive. It will
aggravate the driver shortage, place
more inexperienced drivers in more
trucks on the road, reduce drivers’
incomes, and severely harm the
economy.
The unionized LTL carriers demurred
on this issue, apparently reflecting the
position of the MFCA that they were
content with the present rules and saw
no reason for change.
Many LTL carriers joined in support
of the ATA recommendation cosponsored by the DLTLCA.
Con-Way promoted the industry
alternative with the averaging option of
140 hours over 14 days and a 34-hour
restart.
Overnite, however, took a more
conventional position: On-duty time
should be limited to 62 hours in a 7-day
period. That would simply be a
conversion of the present restriction of
70 hours in 8 days, or productivity
neutral.
The small truckload carriers
represented by NASTC adhered to a
philosophy that drivers should have the
opportunity to drive during the ‘‘week’’
and be home on weekends with their
families. Therefore, they recommended
the present limit of 70-hours in 8 days
be retained. They further recommended
an exception, which would allow
drivers returning home to continue at a
10-hours-on and 8-hours-off pace until
he reaches his destination. So long as
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their return journey, there could be no
violation of the 70-hours-in-8-day rule.
However, if the drivers exceeded the 70hour limit on the home trip, they would
be required to take a minimum of 56
hours off.
OOIDA took the position that
requiring 10 hours off and limiting
available duty time to 14 hours daily is
sufficient regulation to assure
opportunity to rest for drivers
throughout the industry. Any further
limitations should be entirely at the
driver’s discretion.
The NPTC pointed out a concern in
the proposal’s fixed workweek. Its
reading of the proposal is that it would
force drivers into a ‘‘fixed seven-day
workweek’’ with the two consecutive
days off at the end, regardless of how
many hours they worked during the
week. Therefore, ‘‘a driver could
apparently work 24 hours over three
days, take two days off and then be
required to take another two days off at
the end of the ‘workweek.’ Since the
driver clearly would have adequate rest
by any standard, there is no possible
safety rationale for this requirement.’’
The NPTC recommends retaining the
current cumulative 7- and 8-day on-duty
limits.
Wal-Mart, on the other hand,
preferred the ATA recommendation’s
workweek of 70 hours in 7 days. This
would allow Wal-Mart to maintain the
flexibility of its 7 days on, 7 days off
schedule and actually enhance safety.
The PMAA sought clarification of the
proposal’s ‘‘workweek,’’ and offered an
example. Driver A starts work at 8 a.m.
Sunday and quits at 8 p.m. He continues
this for 5 days, ending at 8 p.m.
Thursday. After the mandatory 56-hour
weekend, he could start a new week at
8 a.m. Saturday, but would he be
violating a ‘‘seven consecutive days’’
provision.
The moving industry and the
construction industry, each contending
for a sixth category that would better
address their unique needs, had
problems with the proposed workweek.
The moving industry comments
indicated it needs more flexibility
because movers could not operate on a
fixed 7-day schedule.
The logging industry also pleaded a
hardship because it can only transport
tree-length loads in daylight hours
under State size and weight laws, which
severely restricts operations in the
winter months. Their problem dealt
more with the fixed nature of a
‘‘workweek’’ as defined in the proposal,
and presented an example of losing the
first two days of a workweek to rain and
the inability to restart a new workweek
as defined.

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The oil and gas drillers stated that
their industry is a 7-day/24-hour
operation, so workweeks have little
meaning. In some cases drivers are
scheduled on rotations of 9 days on and
3 days off to provide full coverage.
Safety Advocacy Groups
Advocates stated that the proposed
workweeks were too long, focusing on
the possibility that an entire 60-hour
workweek could be spent behind the
wheel. It also stated that a 60-hour
workweek would cause a build up of
sleep debt because longer daily shifts
adversely affect the ability to obtain
restorative sleep. The AHAS objected to
the NPRM’s allowance of alternating
long and short workweeks and
weekends, claiming that this only
promotes fatigue, primarily because the
long workweek is followed by the short
weekend under the proposal. They also
objected to the liberal allowances
proposed for long work schedules for
Type 5 drivers (whose driving duties,
limited to five hours a day, are only
incidental to their primary duties).
AHAS recommended extending the
minimum recovery period by 24 hours
to 56 hours, including three periods
from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. and reversing the
alternating weekends so that long
follows long, etc.
CRASH was pleased the agency was
proposing to retain the 60-hours-in-7
day limitation, but stated that allowing
incidental drivers to work up to 78
hours in a week was a grave mistake.
PATT recommended limiting driving
to 10 hours out of allowable 12 hours on
duty each 24 hours, and also put it
another way, no more than 50 hours
driving in 60 duty hours per week.
The NSC recognized the issue of
cumulative fatigue and supported
required time off after 7 days.
FMCSA Response
The agency agrees with industry
commenters’ concerns that the proposed
‘‘fixed and recurring 7-day periods,’’
within which duty limitations would
apply, is simply not practical. The clear
inference to be drawn from the
‘‘workweek’’ definition is that once a
driver begins a workweek, for example,
at 7 a.m. on a Monday, the next
workweek would also have to start at 7
a.m. on the following Monday. When
coupled with the required ‘‘weekend,’’
carriers saw this as a huge infringement
on their ability to maintain productivity.
A driver in a weather-sensitive
occupation could start work on Monday
after a weekend off, then be idle for
Tuesday and Wednesday due to rain,
return on Thursday to resume the

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workweek with no credit for the
Tuesday-Wednesday ‘‘weekend.’’
The flaws and unintended
consequences in the proposed fixed
workweek are undeniable. A strictly
fixed workweek was what the agency
intended, to be consistent with DOL
regulations. Throughout the freight
industry, particularly but not limited to
the truckload sector, established
workweeks are rare. Any attempt to
‘‘shoehorn’’ existing operations into
some concept of what ought to be, as at
least one commenter observed, is
‘‘fraught with peril.’’ The resulting costs
in lost productivity would probably
outweigh benefits.
The NPRM did propose to place limits
on on-duty time over the course of a
seven-day period to prevent
accumulation of sleep debt. Abandoning
the idea of a fixed workweek means that
an alternative must be found, and at
least three are readily available. The
first is to define the workweek in terms
of time between ‘‘weekends.’’ In other
words, the so-called week would start to
run after the accumulation of a stated
period of consecutive off-duty time.
In terms of the NPRM, one alternative
would allow the 32-hour period
containing two periods between
midnight and 6 a.m. to be used as a
restart provision. In seeking
clarification, the representative from the
DLTLCA had pointed out that the
proposal’s ‘‘weekend’’ provision only
made sense if it were treated as a restart.
Whether the proposed ‘‘weekend’’ could
survive as a restart mechanism, or
whether another period would be
preferable, are discussed elsewhere in
this document.
The second alternative is to retain the
limitations in the existing rules with
adjustments, in order to redirect the
restriction toward duty time rather than
driving time. This option is similar to
what private carriers proposed. The
current rules restrict any further driving
after a driver accumulates 60 hours on
duty in a seven-day period or 70 hours
on duty in an eight-day period. If the
focus were to be on duty time, the
restriction would simply limit drivers to
60 hours of any duty in a seven-day
period and 70 hours in an eight-day
period. This is the most neutral
alternative. It would provide a floating
block of time, as in the existing rules.
The availability for duty would be
determined by looking back over the
immediately preceding seven or eight
days, similar to the way availability for
driving is determined under current
rules. Fortunately, potential negative
impacts on productivity did not
materialize. FMCSA found that in the 7day option, for example, an LTL driver

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may routinely end a run at the home
terminal in the 60th hour. The driver’s
routine would include assisting in
unloading, which is permitted under the
existing regulations, and would
continue to be allowed under the
alternative being adopted today.
The third possibility is the ATA
recommendation, which is more
complex and requires some explanation.
The first part of the proposed ‘‘weekly
on-duty period’’ is straightforward. A
driver may not be on duty more than 70
hours in any seven consecutive days.
This would replace the current 60-inseven and 70-in-eight restrictions,
except that the ATA recommendation
refers to duty time and not driving. The
industry’s interpretation of the 14-hour
duty segment could also confuse the
construct of a workweek. Use of the
flex-time provision should eliminate
this confusion. Under the ATA
recommendation, the ‘‘seven-day
period’’ would end with the beginning
of 34 consecutive hours off duty. In
other words, once a driver is off duty for
a minimum of 34 consecutive hours
another seven-day period would begin
to run when the driver resumes work.
FMCSA calculates that if each 14hour block of productive time were
extended by an average of 4 hours to
compensate for meal periods, rest
breaks, and off-duty downtime at
shipper facilities, the result would be
six 18-hour ‘‘workdays’’ in the sevenday period. This example may be
somewhat extreme, but no more so than
some of the examples presented in the
comments to demonstrate lost
productivity.
The second part of the industry’s
‘‘weekly on-duty period,’’ i.e., the 14day averaging option, is a little more
complicated. The industry petition
likened its 140-hours-in-14-days
averaging option to the agency’s
proposed option for two-week
averaging. Under the agency’s proposal,
long-haul drivers could opt to
accumulate 72 duty hours in the first
week, followed by 48 duty hours in the
second week for a weekly average of 60
hours. The purpose of the agency
proposal was to enable long haul drivers
to use a short weekend while on the
road and reserve a longer weekend for
the time when they were in their home
area. It was not well received for several
reasons, particularly because of
confusion about the ‘‘fixed workweek.’’
Invariably, according to commenters,
drivers would be stranded in a remote
location and away from their families
for their long weekend, a new version of
Murphy’s Law, apparently.
The industry averaging option would
purportedly allow drivers to average 10

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duty hours a day over a 14-day period
by accumulating up to 84 on-duty hours
in the first six days (6 days times 14
hours per day). After 34 consecutive
hours off duty, the driver would then be
limited to 56 hours on duty during the
second seven consecutive days. If he
accumulated those 56 hours in the
following slightly more than three and
a half days, he would have to take a
minimum of nearly three full days off
before driving again. If Murphy’s Law
held true, however, those drivers would
still inevitably find themselves in a
remote location for those three days.
And the three days would be mandatory
off-duty time, even under the ATA
recommendation.
This flexibility could present
enforcement problems, as drivers
seeking to use the 14-day option could
be found in violation of the 70-hours-inseven-days restriction before they
demonstrated compliance with the
second week’s limitation. Reversing the
long and short workweeks could solve
the enforcement problem, but it would
become too complicated an issue for
roadside enforcers. It would also require
carrying 14 days worth of logs or using
an on-board recording device capable of
storing 14 days of duty-time records.
Another issue would be the operation of
the 34-hour off-duty provision as a
restart under the ATA recommendation
in the context of the 14-day option.
Drivers and carriers could easily be
confused after the second period and
return to work after a 34-hour break
without fully repaying the time owed
from the first week.
Acute and cumulative sleep debt
arises from sleep deprivation generally,
and particularly loss of sleep during
nighttime hours. The argument over
workweeks places too much reliance on
imperfect science. The comments of the
ACOEM were particularly instructive in
this regard. The ACOEM recognized that
fatigue is an important concern for both
safety and productivity in commercial
driving, but cautioned against placing
too much emphasis on what it considers
incomplete science. Only the ACOEM
recommended deferral of any further
action on the proposal until an adequate
scientific basis is available.
The agency agrees there is not
sufficient scientific or operational
justification for a fixed 7-day week. The
economic impact of such a ‘‘week’’ on
scheduling efficiencies and driver
compensation is simply too great, given
the uncertain benefits in fatigue
reduction.
The agency has concluded that the
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generally acceptable for CMV drivers
operating in the United States.
Weekly Recovery Periods
General Concept
Having already addressed daily offduty periods, two related issues are
dealt with in this section. They are
weekly rest breaks or ‘‘weekends’’ and
restart provisions. These concepts are
related, but could have entirely different
effects depending on how they are
implemented. The mandatory weekend
recovery period was perhaps the single
most criticized element in the proposed
rules.
In the NPRM, the agency introduced
the concept of a weekly off-duty period
or ‘‘weekend,’’ which was intended to
provide a regularly recurring
opportunity to compensate for any
accumulated sleep debt. The NPRM
noted ‘‘the research indicates that to
negate the effect of accumulated weeklong sleep deprivation and restore
alertness to the human body it is
necessary to have at least two
consecutive nights off duty.’’
Several commenters correctly pointed
out that imposing a regulatory
requirement for a weekly off-duty
period containing two midnight to 6
a.m. blocks assumes that every driver is
subject to weeklong sleep deprivation.
The agency may have overreached
trying to prevent the most extreme
abuses by imposing restraints on the
whole driver population. There are
numerous examples in the comments
and testimony to the effect that most
drivers have ample opportunity for
normal sleep every night and
presumably would never be subject to
severe sleep deprivation as a result of
their working conditions.
The most frequent objections to the
agency’s ‘‘weekend’’ proposal, however,
were the economic and safety
implications of restricting nighttime
driving. Comment after comment stated
how requiring two consecutive nights
off would create havoc on the already
overcrowded highways in the daylight
hours. The requirement would also,
according to numerous commenters,
disrupt current and entirely safe
business operations and result in much
greater replacement costs than forecast
in the preliminary regulatory
evaluation.
The proposal did not offer any
opportunity for a restart of the weekly
clock after a certain amount of
consecutive off-duty time had
accumulated. The agency even proposed
to restructure the statutory exceptions in
Sec. 345 of the NHS Act, within the
proposed weekend recovery period. The

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only reason for a restart provision is to
allow increased productive time
notwithstanding the general regulatory
requirements when consecutive off-duty
hours substantially exceed daily
minimums. In other words, restarts are
exceptions to the general rule. The
agency considered a general 24-hour
restart in 1992, but withdrew the
proposal when it determined that there
was insufficient data available to
support the action on safety grounds.
Comments to the NPRM raised the issue
again, both in objecting to the treatment
of the statutory exceptions and in
offering an alternative to the agency’s
1992 proposal.
Industry Comments
The for-hire industry offered no
alternative weekly or other greater-thandaily recovery period, except in the
context of its two-week averaging
alternative to cumulative restrictions
discussed elsewhere in this document.
Its 70-hours-in-7-days cumulative
period would operate as the present
regulations do, i.e., look back over the
past seven days to determine if duty
time is available to a driver. The
DLTLCA petition did, however, request
a cost/benefit analysis on an extended
rest period within the range of 24 to 34
hours, which could then serve as a
restart. The specific recommendation of
the petitioners was for a 34-hour restart
provision that would effectively end a
consecutive seven-day period within
which accumulation of duty time is
taking place. Once the driver had been
off duty for 34 consecutive hours, which
would include a mandatory 10-hour
daily recovery period, the petition
argued that the driver should be
considered fully recovered so that
another seven-day period could start to
run. The 34-hour period was conceived
by combining one 10-hour off-duty
period with one full 24-hour day, which
could return the driver to the same cycle
he was operating when the 34-hour
period started. This could add an extra
14-hour shift every 7 days. It would also
enable short weeks to be restarted. For
example, a flex-board driver could be
called in to work two consecutive days
of 14-hour shifts at the beginning of a
seven-day period and then be idle the
following day. Once his off-duty time
amounted to 34 consecutive hours, a
seven-day period would begin all over
again.
Landstar stated that its review of the
available research and its experience
lead it to believe the NPRM was flawed.
Landstar cited Cabon, Mollard, and
Coblentz, Sleep Deprivations and
Irregular Work Schedules, Proceedings
of the Human Factors Society 35th

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Annual Meeting—1991, Paris, France
and McCartt, Rohrbaugh, Hammer, and
Fuller, Factors Associated with Falling
Asleep at the Wheel Among Long
Distance Truck Drivers, Accident
Analysis and Prevention. Landstar used
these studies to argue that ‘‘the research
shows that a period of sleep, no matter
how long, cannot ‘reset’ or restore the
human body. Sleep, which has been
‘lost’, cannot be ‘made up.’ If an
operator misses sleep, that missed sleep
cannot be restored by a two day off-duty
break. Studies also indicate that rest on
the road is not the same quality of rest
one experiences when at home.’’
Landstar also stated that ‘‘at the same
time, ‘missed’ sleep is important. The
effect of lost sleep is cumulative. The
impact of lost sleep is compounded as
an operator misses more and more
sleep. Yet, when it is time for the
operator to rest,’’ Landstar cited
Coleman, Richard, Wide Awake at 3:00
a.m. by Choice or by Chance, as
showing ‘‘the length of his sleep is
affected most by (1) his body time (i.e.,
where he is in his circadian rhythm)
and (2) the cumulative amount of his
sleep deprivation.’’ Landstar argues that
‘‘when it is time for the operator to rest,
once he sleeps for the length of time
required by his body (as affected by his
body time and amount of sleep
deprivation), he is restored and ready to
resume alert performance of his
activities. In most every instance, the
amount of rest required by an operator
will be substantially less than the
required 32 to 56 hour period set forth
in this proposed rule.’’
Landstar stated that Cabon, Mollard,
and Coblentz further ‘‘show that rest is
affected not by the specific hours (i.e.,
midnight to 6 a.m.) that one rests, but
instead by an operator sleeping
according to his own established regular
schedule of working and resting,
whatever that regular schedule may be
for the individual operator. Studies
show that it is irregular sleeping
schedules that lead to troubles with
biological rhythms. Sleeping according
to the operators’ established schedule
provides rest, but sleeping during
abnormal hours affects the quality of
sleep and can cause sleep deprivation.’’
In the context of earlier starting times,
Landstar also found scientific support
for the notion that regular hours of
sleep, no matter when they occur, are
preferable.
The NPTC alternative for private
carriers contained no greater-than-daily
recovery period, preferring to operate
under the present rule’s restrictions on
cumulative operations. They did note,
however, that ‘‘the flexibility to provide
non-consecutive days off is critical to

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many private fleets and is adequate for
drivers to achieve needed rest.’’
The OOIDA proposal specifically
rejected any mandatory recovery period
beyond the daily 10 hours of rest.
Safety Advocacy Groups
The AHAS believed a minimum
weekly off-duty time block of 32 hours
is too short to counter fatigue and sleep
debt. They contended that drivers
would regularly violate the ‘‘weekend’’
recovery period because of the difficulty
of enforcement. They also concluded
that even two consecutive nights off is
inadequate to compensate for the
accumulated fatigue caused by longer
shifts. Finally, the AHAS recommended
extending the minimum recovery period
by 24 hours to 56 hours, including three
periods from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.
FMCSA Response
The science supports the notion that
drivers should be provided recovery
periods after a sustained period of daily
work to avoid the build-up of
cumulative fatigue and/or sleep
deprivation. This notion was the basis
for the proposed rule that every driver
must have a ‘‘weekend’’ off every seven
days, i.e., a period of time including two
consecutive midnight to 6 a.m. periods.
The agency was attempting to ensure
that drivers had a weekly opportunity to
obtain restorative sleep and avoid a
significant build up of a sleep deficit.
Industry comments criticized what they
considered the lack of scientific
evidence to support the need for an
extended period of rest. Depending
upon the driver’s schedule, a separate
midnight-to-6 a.m. recovery period may
be unnecessary, or it may be necessary
after a period less than 7 days duration
if the driver has been assigned night
work.
The industry’s position is that the
required ‘‘weekend’’ reflects the
agency’s intent to significantly curtail
nighttime driving. That is incorrect. The
agency clearly stated in the NPRM that
it was not acceding to the Expert Panel’s
recommendation on limiting nighttime
driving. However, the NPRM with an
off-duty period including two
midnight–6 a.m. periods (effectively 11
p.m. to 7 a.m.) would have caused some
displacement of drivers from nighttime
duties.
The proposed rules contained a
requirement for a daily recovery period
providing the driver a regular
opportunity to obtain restorative sleep
and hence avoid acute sleep deprivation
in large measure. In many cases, drivers
can sleep every night; others obtain
mostly nighttime sleep; and some rarely
sleep at night. We know the science

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indicates that, because of the circadian
influence, sleep during daylight hours is
generally less restorative than sleep at
nighttime. That in itself can lead to
sleep deprivation and consequent build
up of sleep debt, but not always if
carriers carefully monitor schedules to
avoid too many successive nights of
work and if drivers follow proper sleep
regimen. The alternative would be to
control the cause of sleep deprivation by
limiting the hours that may be worked
in a given period. Although there is
nothing scientific or magical about
seven days, the present rules have been
employing that time period as a baseline
for many years.
The present rules impose restrictions
on driving after 60 duty hours in seven
days for drivers of carriers who operate
only six days per week, or 70 duty hours
in eight days for those who operate
every day of the week. Simply
continuing those limitations in a revised
proposal including a 10-hour daily
recovery period in a flexible day should
satisfy many carriers, particularly LTL
carriers and local delivery operators. As
noted earlier, the restrictions in the
existing rules only apply to further
driving, so that a violation of the rule
occurs only when the driver begins or
continues driving after the prescribed
duty time has accumulated. Therefore, a
driver could easily squeeze in a few
more non-driving duty hours at the end
of the workweek (or after 60 or 70 duty
hours had already accumulated in the
corresponding period).
An alternative would be to target
accumulated duty time and apply the
restrictions accordingly. That would
mean that further on-duty time must
cease when 60 or 70 duty hours within
the corresponding period have accrued.
The loss of those few additional nondriving duty hours would undoubtedly
raise costs in some segments of the
industry.
The ATA recommendation would
combine the 60- and 70-hour limitations
into one 70-hours-in-seven-days limit,
and would apply it to all duty time.
Therefore, the opportunity to squeeze in
extra duty hours after completing
driving responsibilities in the 70th hour
would not be available. At least one
carrier calculated that a limitation of
61.25 hours in seven days is the
mathematical equivalent of 70 hours in
eight days. It did not attempt to factor
in the accrual of any additional duty
time possible under the present
regulations. The DLTLCA alternative
also provided for a 34-hour restart,
which would make it possible to accrue
as many as 84 duty hours in any sevenday period. The ATA recommendation,

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therefore, would provide opportunities
for considerable gains in productivity.
After reviewing the research,
comments, and RIA, the FMCSA is
convinced that a minimum 34
consecutive hours of off-duty time can
begin a new 7- or 8-day period, during
which a driver could drive or be on duty
a cumulative total of 60 or 70 hours (i.e.,
the 7- or 8-day ‘‘clock’’ is restarted by
a 34-hour off-duty period). The FMCSA
selected 34 hours based on the
industry’s arguments that it be based on
scientific guidance, operational needs,
common sense, and realistic
assumptions. ATA cited Carskadon and
Dement, ‘‘Effects of Total Sleep Loss on
Sleep Tendency,’’ (1979) which they say
suggests that people who have
experienced total sleep loss, or have
accumulated significant sleep debts over
an extended period, may need 2 nights
of sleep to completely recover. ATA also
argued that ‘‘a recovery and restart
period of 34 hours off-duty will allow a
driver to have two uninterrupted sleep
periods of 7–8 hours * * * Moreover,
compliance with the minimum 34 hours
would result in a driver restarting work
at approximately the same time of day
as his or her prior shift. This will avoid
the shifting of daytime to nighttime
schedules which research indicates can
disturb the circadian rhythm and
decrease alertness.’’ This allows drivers
to get at least two sleep periods, without
restraining the driver by the unworkable
midnight-to-6-a.m. period from the
NPRM.
The PATT alternative did not provide
a ‘‘restart’’ provision. The ATA
alternative provided that drivers who
obtain 34 consecutive hours of off-duty
time could begin a new 7-day period,
during which they could drive or be on
duty a cumulative total of 70 hours (i.e.,
the 7-day ‘‘clock’’ is restarted by a 34hour off-duty period).
The FMCSA is selecting its staff
alternative incorporating a 34
consecutive hour off-duty time can
begin a new 7- or 8-day period for the
final rule because it provides the most
favorable combination of increased
driver alertness and reduced fatiguerelated incidents.
Short Rest Breaks During a Work Shift
General Concept
In proposing a daily work/rest cycle,
the FMCSA stopped short of dividing
the 24-hour period into two blocks (on
and off duty), as was proposed by
industry. The agency sought to place
further restrictions on the 14-hour
block. One of the reasons for the
restriction was to acknowledge
operational differences among motor

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carriers. Another reason was the
proposed elimination of the distinction
between driving time and other on-duty
time. The principal reason, however, for
reserving two hours out of the 14-hour
block for rest periods was to ensure that
road drivers, who spend most of their
time in the driving mode, were afforded
the opportunity to improve safety by
alleviating potential drowsiness through
strategic use of break time. The FMCSA
assumed that drivers would rarely, if
ever, spend an entire 14-hour period
behind the wheel. There are simply too
many naturally occurring personal and
occupational demands that would
require the driver’s presence elsewhere.
The FMCSA stated, therefore, that
regularizing such personal time away
from driving would not be a burden on
productivity and would empower
drivers to insist upon necessary break
time.
ATA’s Recommendation
Behind the ATA’s recommendation in
converting to a 24-hour work/rest cycle
was apparently the understanding that
whereas 10 consecutive hours would
belong to the driver, the remaining 14
hours belonged to the carrier. In the
NPTC proposal, only nine hours would
belong to the driver. As noted earlier, an
aspect of the ATA recommendation that
the FMCSA considered problematic is
that personal breaks taken by the driver
during the 14-hour block would only
extend that block thereby upsetting the
integrity of a recurring 24-hour work/
rest cycle.
Other Industry Comments
Industry was uniformly opposed to
mandatory rest breaks for a variety of
reasons. The theme running through the
comments was that the requirement is
unnecessary.
The ATA advised the agency to
promote, but not mandate, rest breaks
that do not diminish driver’s work time.
The PMTA commented that requiring
rest breaks would cause driver
shortages. PMTA stated there is enough
time in the day for drivers to rest, if
necessary, while maintaining a
productive schedule. It also contended
that the proposed rules do not enable
drivers to take advantage of downtime at
loading docks.
The NPTC asserted that mandating
breaks interferes with the carrier’s
ability to manage distribution
schedules. It also argued that the
paucity of available rest areas would
make it difficult to find a place to take
breaks.
The National Soft Drink Association
stated that required breaks adding up to
two hours for Types 1, 2, and 5 are

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unnecessary and costly. It contended
that breaks occur naturally throughout
the workday.
The IBA also stated that flexible rest
breaks were already being taken at the
driver’s discretion.
ARTBA found that the requirements
for two hours of uninterrupted breaks
and the 5-hour driving limit under Type
5 operations were both too restrictive
and unwarranted intrusions by
government into employer-employee
relationships.
The Institute of Makers of Explosives
observed that the Department’s own
Hazardous Materials Regulations
requiring explosives-laden vehicles to
be attended at all times precludes the
mandatory breaks provided in the
proposal.
Intermodal operators stated that
mandatory breaks, along with the other
proposed requirements, would
adversely impact their operations, and
probably cause many companies to go
out of business.
American Freightways opposed
mandatory breaks, believing that drivers
should determine if, when, and for how
long breaks are necessary.
ABF Freight Systems noted an
inconsistency in the proposal. Although
the proposal stated that Types 1 and 2
drivers are more likely to be involved in
an accident, they are allowed to log
breaks off duty, thus preserving on-duty
time. Type 4 drivers, who go home and
sleep in their own beds every night, are
limited to 12 hours per day, including
lunch and breaks.
Worldwide Van Lines supported the
ATA’s 14–10 breakdown so long as the
14 hours are productive hours. It might
consider a one-hour break that is
currently in vogue in the moving
industry. It would prefer to allow
carriers and owner-operators the
flexibility to schedule rest periods
consistent with safety and operational
requirements.
Safety Advocacy Groups
Although supportive of rest breaks,
AHAS had some reservations. First, It
stated that drivers will abuse them and
spend the time on non-driving duties,
and second, it was concerned with a
driver’s post-nap sleep inertia and how
it might contribute to a crash before the
driver was fully awake after the nap.
FMCSA Response
With a limitation of 11 hours on daily
driving, the FMCSA believes the need
for additional break time diminishes.
Rest breaks are still a significant tool in
combating fatigue and FMCSA will
encourage their use. But the difficulty in
enforcing required breaks reduces the

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likelihood of realizing the benefits
intended.
The ATA and PATT alternatives did
not incorporate any breaks occurring
during a tour of duty. The FMCSA staff
alternative provides that any breaks
occurring during a tour of duty will not
extend the work day.
Economic Impacts
Perhaps the gravest concern expressed
by the motor carrier industry was the
projected cost of the proposed rules.
Virtually all of the industry commenters
took issue with the agency’s cost/benefit
analysis, believing, for the most part,
that the agency exaggerated the benefits
in terms of accident avoidance and
significantly underestimated the
compliance costs.
Proposed Costs
Comments from the industry side
reflected the common theme that the
costs associated with the proposed rule
were prohibitive, much higher than the
costs projected by the agency. Predicted
consequences were not limited to
individual company failure, but
extended to a ruinous impact on the
economy. Other commenters lamented
the economic condition of the motor
freight industry, which they regarded as
critical. Operating as they do on thin
margins, many companies contended
that they could not absorb the
increasing price of fuel, let alone the
regulatory costs proposed by DOT and
OSHA (in its ergonomics rule).
The increased costs were primarily
associated with the number of drivers
and vehicles required to deliver the
same amount of freight with what was
perceived to be substantially reduced
productive time allowable under the
proposal. Estimates varied, but it
appeared that most commenters arrived
at their conclusions by applying a
straight-line comparison of the
maximum amount of productive time
for each driver allowable under the
present rules with the maximum duty
hours stated to be allowable under the
proposal.
Industry Reaction
The position of the motor freight
industry on the economic impact of the
proposal was perhaps best summarized
in the DLTLCA petition filed on
November 29, 2000. This association
represents regional less-than-truckload
(LTL) carriers engaged in transportation
and distribution of LTL freight locally
and regionally. The petitioners found
the preliminary economic evaluation,
particularly the cost/benefit analysis, to
be ‘‘woefully inadequate.’’ They
contrasted this effort with a study

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commissioned by the FHWA in 1980–
1981 to assess the economic and safety
impacts of proposed revisions to the
HOS regulations.
Regarding the proposed rules, the
DLTLCA surveyed 150 LTL carrier
members, which concluded the
proposal would increase costs by 5
percent. The regional LTL market is $10
billion and the national LTL market is
another $10 billion. So that industry’s
estimated costs would be three times
what the FMCSA estimated.
The ATA stated that the trucking
industry employs 9.7 million people,
including three million truck drivers,
has annual revenues of $486 billion
(1998 estimates) and logs 414 billion
miles on the road each year (110 billion
miles by large trucks over 16.5 tons).
The ATA reported the results of a
survey it conducted of members, which
estimated that the average loss of
productivity would be 17 percent. ATA
instructed the commenters to compare
drivers’ logs in actual operation with
‘‘what they think could be done under
proposed rules.’’
The ATA also commissioned the
National Economic Research
Association (NERA) to review the
agency’s preliminary regulatory
evaluation, particularly the cost/benefit
analysis. The entire NERA report was
submitted to the docket by the ATA, but
the primary findings are set forth here
for ease of reference:
(1) The FMCSA’s economic analysis
failed to support the proposed rule.
After corrections for what were
identified as methodological and
mathematical errors and omissions,
NERA’s economic analysis determined
that the cost of the proposed rules were
more than five times as large as the
benefits—for a net loss of $15.4 billion
over ten years;
(2) The FMCSA’s bundling of the
rule’s components obscured the
Administration’s own findings.
Separating the costs and benefits
associated with the paperwork
reduction component of the rule
revealed that the rule’s other
components—a reduction in driver’s
hours and an on-board monitor
requirement—failed a cost-benefit test,
even based on the FMCSA’s own
assumptions;
(3) The FMCSA understated the costs
of compliance by underestimating the
number of new truck drivers required;
by ignoring the cost of non-wage
benefits, recruiting and training,
additional trucks, and supporting
personnel and infrastructure; and by
underestimating the costs of on-board
monitoring equipment. Correcting for
these errors increased the cost of the

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proposed rule by $15.7 billion over the
next 10 years. NERA considered this to
be a conservative estimate, as many
other costs, which are difficult to
quantify but which could be substantial,
were not included;
(4) The FMCSA overstated benefits by
overestimating the number of fatal
crashes attributable to truck driver
fatigue. Once the baseline was adjusted
for crashes from other causes, benefits
fell by $3.1 billion over 10 years. NERA
estimated that the proposed rule would
lead to approximately 19 avoided
fatalities per year, compared to the
FMCSA’s finding of 115 per year;
(5) The FMCSA failed to substantiate
the rule’s potential effectiveness. The
Administration stated the number of
fatigue-related fatalities would fall by 20
percent—without reference to any
specific studies or statistical support. In
fact, available crash statistics indicate
that only 3 percent of fatigue-related
fatalities can be attributed to drivers
driving more than 12 hours; and
(6) The FMCSA failed to recognize the
negative consequences of the rule for
small regional and long haul trucking
companies. Many of these companies
operate on thin profit margins and face
competition from other modes
unaffected by the proposed rule. These
companies also face increased costs
from other proposed regulations, such
as OSHA’s ergonomics rule.
Consequently, they could not readily
absorb additional costs or easily pass
additional costs through to their
customers.
The ATA argued that the agency
ignored numerous factors when
conducting its benefit-cost analysis,
including the number of new drivers,
additional wages, driver non-wage
benefits, recruiting costs, additional
equipment, supporting infrastructure
costs, additional maintenance,
insurance premiums, LTL restructuring,
electronic on-board recorder (EOBR)
purchase and maintenance, and
increased inventory carrying costs. The
ATA did not rely exclusively on the
NERA report for this criticism,
particularized in its comments, and was
even critical of NERA for being too
conservative.
Other Industry Comments
Although many motor carriers
estimated substantial costs arising from
various aspects of the proposal, their
computation methods were not always
clearly articulated.
Covenant Transportation, a truckload
carrier, shed some light on the
methodology used by many carriers to
estimate the costs of the proposal on
their operations. Covenant compared

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the number of productive hours per
month available to a driver under the
existing rules (280) with the number of
productive hours it stated would be
available under the proposed rules (240)
and arrived at a difference of 17 percent.
It did the same comparison for vehicles
and concluded that 17 percent more
trucks would be needed. Covenant
opined that converting to relay
operations would not work. The loads
do not match up. It stated the trucking
‘‘industry is very, very sick.’’ The new
rules would drive the small operators
out of business. The main cause of
sickness, according to Covenant, is
driver pay. The company increased pay
four times in the last four years so that
the average at the time it submitted
comments was about $42,000 per
annum, which it said was not enough.
Whatever enough may be, ‘‘until you
reach that magic number, turnover will
continue to kill you.’’
J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., a carrier
with one of the largest truckload
operations, found that if the proposal
were not amended, productivity would
decrease 2 percent on face value. That
estimate was based on comparing 61.25
hours a week permitted under the
present 70-hours-in-8-days limit with 60
hours in 7 days as proposed, but noted
that this was only the surface. The
biggest negative impact would come
from the rigidity of the proposal. The
loss of flexibility, if not corrected,
would cost Hunt an estimated $250
million per year and increase rates to
customers by an estimated 20 percent.
Contract Freight, Inc. (CFI), a large
truckload carrier, did an analysis by
mile, which it noted is the bottom line
in trucking. Comparing logbooks of
current drivers with what CFI could
project under the proposed rules
showed a 13 percent reduction in miles.
CFI also included logistics costs,
relocating facilities, positioning drivers,
etc. that would add another 7 percent
reduction in miles. To move the same
amount of freight that it does with 2100
tractors, CFI estimated that it would
need 400 more, and with a ratio of 2.9
trailers to each tractor, CFI would need
almost 1200 more trailers. CFI stated
that it used to do the most relays of any
trucking company, but believed that it
would not be possible to do the same
volume of relays under the NPRM. CFI
calculated average driver trips for one of
its ‘‘priority teams,’’ which runs about
18,000–19,000 miles per month. An
average single CFI driver runs about
10,500 miles per month, while a low
producing single CFI driver will run
about 9,000.
Schneider National, Inc. with its
affiliated companies employ in excess of

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15,000 drivers with a fleet of over
13,000 tractors and 34,000 trailers.
Schneider stated that the FMCSA
dramatically underestimated the
financial costs of its proposal and, by
focusing only on fatigue-related crashes,
FMCSA also failed to recognize that the
proposal might result in an increase in
the number and severity of other
accidents if the proposal were
implemented as drafted. The limitation
of 12 hours on duty in any 24-hour
period, together with the ‘‘weekend,’’
will reduce productivity by 25–30
percent and require an additional
100,000 inexperienced drivers and
vehicles to move the same amount of
freight.
Werner Enterprises, Inc. operated
7,425 trucks, 6,225 of which are
company-owned and 1,200 of which are
independent contractors. Werner stated
that the proposal was at best safety
neutral, but extremely costly. It
supported ATA’s analysis of the
proposed rule and did provide some
detailed analysis of the economic
impact of the proposal on Werner and
its drivers. Arriving at a 20 percent
productivity decrease, meaning also that
drivers would lose 20 percent of their
income, Werner projected an annual
operating cost increase of $290 million.
If Werner were to stay in business, these
costs would have to be passed on to
shippers and consumers.
Bestway Express, employing 325
drivers, cited the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s crediting of trucking for the
sustained economic boom through
calendar year 2000, noting that efficient
transportation took 5 percent off the cost
of consumer goods. For the industry as
a whole, Bestway stated that the
proposal would add $100 billion for
inventory costs, $50 billion for
additional trucking services, $25 billion
for inventory carrying costs and that it
would cause U.S. jobs to be lost to
Mexico.
NASTC stated that under current
rules, a driver could drive up to 15
hours in any given 24-hour period,
giving him a range of 750 miles. Under
the proposed rule, his range would be
reduced to 600 miles. Because of a ‘‘payto-wait’’ provision, a requirement in the
proposal to log waiting time as on-duty
time, NASTC predicted the productivity
loss could go to 25 to 33 percent.
The ATC Leasing Company stated that
it represents a majority portion of the
truck transport industry in the country.
It involves the drive-away operation of
newly manufactured trucks from
factories to dealers or to intermediary
facilities for modification. In 1999, ATC
reports that 540,443 Class 5 through
Class 8 vehicles were produced in the

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United States. ATC estimates it
delivered approximately 75 percent of
those vehicles. The vehicles are usually
delivered in saddle-mounted
combinations with a to-be-delivered
truck as the power unit. Upon reaching
his delivery destination, a driver
typically removes the temporary
identification devices and proceeds by
public transportation to his next pick-up
point.
State trucking associations generally
concluded that the proposal did not
account for significant costs.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
believed the FMCSA’s estimate of costs
per driver was unrealisticly low.
The Intermodal Association of North
America’s (IANA) survey reported direct
operating cost increases of 20 to 30
percent, primarily from the reduction of
on-duty time limits from 15 to 12 hours
a day and the mandatory off-duty
periods when shifting from one type to
another.
Advocacy Groups
The Mercatus Center of George Mason
University conducts a Regulatory
Studies Program (RSP) dedicated to
advancing knowledge of the impact of
regulations on society. The proposed
HOS rulemaking for truckers was
chosen for such an assessment, and the
resultant report was submitted as a
comment to the docket. It concluded
‘‘the DOT and FMCSA estimates of the
likely effects of the proposed regulation
are tenuous if not faulty on a number of
bases.’’
The RSP recommended better
enforcement of current rules. Built-in
flexibility and common sense rules
appeared to RSP to present a better field
for improving highway safety.
The National Sleep Foundation
described the NERA study submitted by
ATA as nothing more than an advocacy
piece that failed to look at alternative
scenarios. The NSF considered the
analysis in the report to be a series of
conclusions and self-serving narrative
with no quantification.
Safety advocates and other public
interest groups faulted some of the
methodology used by industry to
compute expenses and were critical of
industry’s lack of foresight in adapting
to change and in confronting the
inefficiencies they state are so prevalent
in dealing with shippers and receivers.
Proposed Benefits
In addition to criticizing the NPRM’s
cost calculations, many commenters
also found fault with the allegedly
overestimated benefits. The industry in
general took issue with the figures used
by the agency in projecting the safety

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benefits to be gained from the proposal.
Although acknowledging that there is a
serious fatigue-related safety problem,
they stated that it does not approach the
magnitude assumed by the agency to
justify the draconian solutions
proposed.
A basic reaction to the proposal was
the issue of problem identification, and
many distanced themselves from what
they said was the core problem group:
long-haul, for-hire freight carriers. The
motorcoach industry was particularly
adamant about the elemental differences
between hauling freight and
transporting passengers. They did not
argue, as others did, for an exemption
from regulation, rather they insisted that
no evidence had been developed or
presented indicating there was any
safety problem arising from bus industry
performance under the existing
regulations. Therefore, in their view
disruptive change was totally
unwarranted.
Short-haul distributors of wholesale
and retail commodities distinguished
themselves from long-haul carriers and
cited the agency’s own studies showing
a lesser safety problem in their
operations. The construction industry,
for example, noted that its truck
operations are short-haul, sporadic, and
incidental to other functions, and
therefore are not at risk to accumulate
fatigue while driving. Construction
industry commenters also stated that the
NPRM would actually impede safety by
extending the time construction zones
remain open and delaying the
completion of safety improvements
being made to the highways.
Utility companies strongly contend
that the nature of their work and
services warranted total exclusion from
HOS regulations. Limiting the ability of
utilities to respond to service
interruptions would be much more
likely to create other safety problems
than to prevent crashes involving
responding vehicles, they stated.
LTL carriers, where union
representation is more prevalent,
commented their drivers’ schedules
conform to the existing rules. The
carriers believe these schedules,
negotiated with the drivers through the
IBT, eliminate many of the fatigueinducing factors while preserving the
needed flexibility that they find so
lacking in the proposal.
The LTL industry believes that if
particular segments of the regulated
community are already performing
safety at or close to the maximum
allowable hours under the existing
rules, there could be no benefits from
changing the rules applicable to them,
only costs.

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As noted above by the NERA and RSP
analyses, as well as other commenters,
most of the benefits cited by the NPRM
involved paperwork savings, which are
not safety improvements. Virtually
every commenter who noted the
understated costs of increased drivers
and equipment needed to implement
the proposed rules also noted that the
NPRM did not account for the safety
impact of more trucks and more
inexperienced drivers on the highway at
more congested hours of the day.
Industry commenters cited studies
done by and for the DOT showing
fatigue to be a factor noted in police
reports in only 1.5 to 3.0 percent of all
truck-involved fatalities. The ATA and
others pointed out what they considered
a basic flaw in the agency’s calculation
of lives saved by the proposal, i.e., 20
percent of the fatalities attributable to
fatigue. Some commenters noted that,
even using what they considered an
inflated attribution, other agency studies
show the truck driver to be at fault in
no more than 30 percent of truckinvolved crashes. Therefore, instead of
using 775 fatalities resulting from
fatigue related crashes as the basis for
arriving at 155 lives saved (20 percent),
the agency should have used only 30
percent of the 775 figure, or 233.
Computing its stated 20 percent
reduction from that figure produces a
maximum of about 47 lives saved.
The ATA pointed out what it
considered additional flaws in the
FMCSA’s computation of projected
benefits, including these four:
(1) FMCSA overestimated the role of
fatigue in truck crashes. The agency
estimated 15 percent of all truckinvolved fatal crashes were ‘‘fatiguerelevant,’’ a new, non-scientific term
coined by FMCSA for this rule. The 15
percent figure combined the 4.5 percent
of those crashes where fatigue was the
primary cause with another 10.5 percent
where fatigue was assumed to have
contributed to mental lapses that caused
the crash. Citing several studies in the
DOT database, the ATA believed the
range is 2.8 to 6.1 percent, 4 percent on
average, but strenuously objects to
inflating that figure by including fatigue
involvement in mental lapses,
inattention and distraction.
(2) FMCSA failed to use the proper
baseline number of fatalities in its cost/
benefit analysis. The agency used 5,035
(average of all truck-involved fatalities
from 1991–96) as the basis for its
estimates of crash elimination benefits.
However, driver error is not the cause of
all fatal crashes (maybe 90 percent), nor
is the truck driver at fault in more than
30 percent of multi-vehicle truckinvolved fatalities. Citing FMCSA and

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UMTRI studies, ATA considered 942 to
be the proper baseline number for multivehicle, fatal-to-non-truck-occupant
crashes and 800 the proper number for
single-vehicle, fatal-to-truck-occupant
crashes. The baseline fatality number
should be between 200 and 240, instead
of FMCSA’s base of 755;
(3) FMCSA used effectiveness
assumptions which ATA contends
could not be viewed as reasonable or
even possible. ATA contended the
agency stated the proposal would be 5
percent effective with Type 3, 4 and 5
drivers. ATA claimed the agency
included no cost figures for this
category, saying that for the majority of
drivers in compliance with existing
rules the costs would be minimal. ATA
objected, finding the two assumptions
inconsistent; and
(4) FMCSA ignored the best available
compliance information. The agency
relied on three different surveys to
support its contention that a ‘‘significant
percentage’’ of drivers violate the HOS
regulations. ATA claimed FMCSA has
data from thousands of compliance
reviews that it totally ignored. Instead of
asking for data and analysis from the
public on an array of issues, FMCSA
ought to analyze the best compliance
data available ‘‘ its own completed
compliance reviews.
Many of the industry comments about
overstated benefits could be summed up
in the comments of the Minnesota
Trucking Association: ‘‘The proposal
will not have the intended safety
benefits because DOT failed to consider
the law of unintended consequences:
(1) DOT failed to account for the
accident exposure from over 48,000 new
trucks needed to move the same amount
of freight;
(2) The proposed rules would cause
greater congestion in urban areas both
from the greater number of trucks, and
more trucks shifted from nighttime
hours due to the mandatory ‘weekends’;
and
(3) The proposed rules would cause a
dramatic increase in the number of
young, inexperienced drivers on the
road creating even greater risks of
accidents.’’
Safety Advocacy Groups
The IIHS disputed the figure of 49,000
new drivers as too many because it does
not account for efficiencies and old
drivers returning for better working
conditions.
AHAS criticized the agency’s
economic analysis because it failed to
measure proposed rules against the
existing rules, ‘‘as most agencies do.’’
AHAS agreed with the FMCSA’s finding
that the contribution of fatigue to

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crashes has been undervalued and cited
the Australian parliament’s massive
report finding that 20 to 30 percent of
road accidents involve driver fatigue.
One cannot rely on police reporting
because police are unable to detect or
infer fatigue as a triggering factor.
CRASH observed: ‘‘Trucking
deregulation, a booming economy and
the concepts of ‘‘just in time deliveries’’
and ‘‘rolling warehouses’’ have
produced a deadly trend in the
commercial trucking industry.’’ Truck
drivers are exploited by pressuring them
to speed and drive over the legal HOS
limits. CRASH stated that NHTSA and
NTSB have documented that driver
fatigue is a major factor in 15 to 40
percent of all big truck crashes.
PATT argued that truck drivers
provide labor for which they are not
adequately remunerated, that such labor
is a major contributor to fatigue and that
such labor practices have continued too
long without resolution. It stated the
basic rule in the industry should be:
‘‘Shippers count, load, and seal—drivers
drive—receivers count and unload.’’
The CVSA stated that the proposal
relied too heavily on relative exposure
rather than on relative risk, which
appeared to them to be the same across
all types of operations.
The NSC claimed that the NHTSA
data attributing 2 to 5 percent of
accidents to driver fatigue is more
reliable, and that the FMCSA’s estimate
of 755 fatalities is inflated. Until the
agency completes fundamental accident
analysis studies, NSC believes the
agency must rely on FARS; therefore, it
must stay with no more than 5 percent
or 250 fatalities. It recommended an
external panel of experts to establish a
lower and upper bound of the fatigue
problem, in which the NSC would be
glad to participate. It also recommended
a cost/benefit analysis similar to the one
prepared by Booz, Allen & Hamilton,
Inc. for the FHWA on May 28, 1981.
FMCSA Response
Although it appears that the agency
underestimated costs in its economic
analysis, it is also clear that industry
overestimated costs in its comments.
The ATA instruction to carriers
responding to its survey was to compare
drivers’ logs in actual operation with
what they think could be done under
proposed rules. The comments from
individual carriers indicated that some
followed the ATA instructions, but
many others merely assumed that every
driver was presently using all available
hours. Other comments make it clear
that this was not the case. Stating that
a reduction in allowable duty hours
from 15 to 12 represents a 20 percent

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loss in productivity when drivers rarely
work the 15 hours, is a clear
overstatement.
The examples offered throughout the
comments, moreover, generally
presented worst case scenarios. In
nearly every case when a carrier stated
it could not complete a run under the
proposed rules, it also stated it would
have to add a truck and driver to
continue that run. Otherwise, it would
lose the business. Rarely was there any
attempt to reconcile operations or
schedules with the proposed rules, or to
suggest minimal changes that could
make them work. For example, an LTL
carrier reported that its drivers double
as dock workers. They normally drive
up to five hours from a hub to a
terminal, load or unload for two to five
hours, and then drive back to the hub
in up to five hours. The carrier believed
it would have to hire twice as many
drivers and make them stay overnight at
the terminal, because it could not
complete those runs under the proposed
rules. No mention was made of relieving
the driver of loading/unloading
responsibilities; shortening the time the
driver has to spend loading or
unloading by providing some help at the
terminal; or otherwise adjusting
operations at the terminal so that the
driver is not detained as long, rather
than literally doubling the number of
drivers.
The case for the truckload segment,
particularly the small, irregular-route
carriers, is more problematic, especially
if the sleeper berth provision in the
proposal were not adjusted. J.B. Hunt
computed the basic productivity loss
from the proposal to be two percent by
comparing the average allowable
workweek (seven days) under the
existing rule (61.25 hours) with that
proposed (60 hours), but it also found a
much greater loss from the lack of
flexibility. Although further
examination of the impact of flexible
alternatives on the operations of large
truckload carriers would have to be
done, much of this greater loss could
apparently be mitigated.
NASTC, representing small carriers,
based its analysis of lost productivity on
a comparison of a daily range of
operation. It stated that under the
present rule a driver could drive up to
15 hours in any given 24-hour period,
giving him a daily range of 750 miles.
This could only be accomplished under
full exploitation of an alternating 10hours-driving, 8-hours-off schedule.
Under the proposed rule, NASTC stated
the same driver’s daily range would be
reduced to 600 miles. Projecting the
NASTC driver’s schedule over longer
periods of time, the average difference

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in the daily range would undoubtedly
come closer to Hunt’s two percent. The
NASTC driver, however, would have to
work more days in the week. The NPRM
may also cause lost opportunities.
NASTC predicted the productivity loss
could go as high as 25 to 33 percent
because of the requirement in the
proposal to log waiting time as on-duty
time. This was not an absolute under
the proposal. A driver could log up to
two hours waiting time as break time,
provided it qualified as off-duty time. If
it did not, it must be logged as duty time
even under the existing rules.
The NPTC offered no explanation for
its position that anything less than a 15hour workday for private carriers could
not survive a cost-benefit analysis. It did
not appear to relate to the lack of
flexibility in the proposal, but rather to
an assumption of inflexibility in private
carrier operations. Drivers for private
carriers could not sustain a 15-hour day
schedule for very long under the present
rules without coming afoul of the sevenor eight-day limitations. This issue
would require additional attention to
learn the particulars of their position.
Although the NERA study made some
valid points about errors in the agency’s
analysis, its own analysis of the costs of
the proposal was not based on any
independent findings regarding industry
practices. Rather, its conclusions
appeared to be based on assumptions
provided by its industry sponsor. It also
cited the results of the ATA survey as
the basis for its estimate of the degree
to which the FMCSA had understated
the costs for additional drivers and
equipment. Similarly, the review
performed by the RSP, which appeared
to misunderstand part of the proposal,
did not rely on independent
examination of industry practices.
Neither the ATA nor any of the other
associations proposing alternative rules
made any attempt to quantify their
related costs or benefits.
On the benefit side, industry severely
criticized the agency’s reliance on
‘‘fatigue relevant crashes’’ to increase
the pool of fatalities from which it could
draw an estimated benefit (fatalities
avoided) from the proposed rules. The
NTSB uses the phrase ‘‘fatigue-related’’
in its reports and recommendations
involving human fatigue. The IIHS and
the safety advocates, although not
supporting the agency’s methodology,
stated the FMCSA arrived at an accurate
number of deaths caused by fatigue
related crashes, and would have done so
had it used the methodology discussed
earlier in this document, namely
‘‘population percent attributable risk
calculations’’ taking the increased risk
of crashes from driving longer hours and

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placing it into a formula together with
the rate of drivers driving longer hours.
Industry, however, also noted that the
agency should have at least reduced the
number of those fatalities by applying a
percentage equal to the ratio of
collisions determined to be the fault of
the truck driver, about 30 percent. The
agency notes there is a big difference
between the ‘‘at fault’’ crashes the
industry uses and the ‘‘contributed to,’’
‘‘fatigue relevant,’’ and ‘‘fatigue-related’’
crashes the agency, safety advocates,
and NTSB use.
Industry was also critical of the
agency’s overreach in stating benefits
from the use of EOBRs by reducing the
level of non-compliance, an estimated
level that industry stated was far too
high. The public interest commenters
observed that the evidence of noncompliance was very strong, and even
drivers and owner-operators agreed that
daily logs are routinely abused.
In conducting the RIA for this final
rule, the FMCSA used a more
conservative approach to estimating
fatigue-related crashes and how benefits
would be reduced if the number of
fatigue-related crashes were smaller. See
the RIA’s Section 8.2 for a discussion of
the estimates of the number of crashes
involving trucks, by severity of crash. In
addition, it discusses methods for
estimating the percentage of crashes
attributable to fatigue, and the results of
applying those methods.
In determining the effects of the HOS
rules on the mode split between truck
and rail (which was not done for the
NPRM), we used the Logistics Cost
Model (LCM) developed by Paul
Roberts. The LCM is a computer model
that determines the total logistics cost of
transporting a product from a vendor to
a receiver. It is an updated variant of
models developed by Mr. Roberts for the
Association of American Railroads
(AAR) and the FHWA. The model
determines the lowest cost for ordering,
loading, transporting, storing, and
holding a product. The model assumes
the shipper selects the alternative that
minimizes total logistics costs. Total
logistics cost in this case may include
the costs occasioned by service
frequency, transit time, reliability, loss
and damage, spoilage and other servicerelated factors occurring during
ordering, transport or storage. By
converting all of these factors into their
quantitative impacts on total logistics
cost, the analysis can address the
tradeoffs among service quality,
inventory carrying and transportation
charges.
The mode shift analysis was limited
to movements of 250 miles or more. The
RIA did this because the probability of

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switching traffic from truck to rail is
effectively zero for moves under 250
miles. Most authorities would assert, in
fact, that this probability is quite low for
shipments under 500 miles. Two
hundred fifty miles was chosen for the
RIA as a minimum, however, to ensure
a thorough analysis.
The RIA exercised the mode shift
model over a range of changes in
trucking rates from a 2.0 percent
decrease to a 2.0 percent increase. From
this analysis, the RIA was able to
estimate a price elasticity of (1.4). This
means that, for a 1.0 percent change in
trucking rates, there is 1.4 percent
change in truck shipments, truck
shipments increasing with a rate
decrease and diminishing with a rate
increase. This measure of elasticity was
used, in turn, to estimate impacts on
truck and rail traffic for each of the HOS
rule alternatives. Details of the
computational method and data used
are presented in the RIA’s Appendix D.
In addition to calculating the social
costs, benefits, and net benefits of the
alternatives, the RIA also considered the
impacts on the carriers, and on the
economy as a whole. The changes in
labor productivity, costs for labor and
other inputs, and changes in the mode
split between truck and rail were
disaggregated to six regions and fed into
the REMI Policy Insight regional
economic model (developed by Regional
Economic Models Incorporated). The
model’s outputs give an approximate
picture of the relative effects of the
alternatives on economic growth and
employment across the country.
The RIA found that the PATT
alternative would be more expensive to
comply with than current rules,
especially for short-haul operations,
while the ATA alternative would be less
expensive. The FMCSA staff alternative
would be more expensive for short-haul
operations, though it would be less
expensive overall due to its savings for
long-haul operations.
The basis of the benefits analysis is
the estimation of the total number of
crashes involving vehicles subject to the
rule, the damages imposed by those
crashes, and the assessment of the
percentage of those crashes and
damages attributable to fatigue. The
FMCSA found an estimated 8.15 percent
of the total crashes and damages result
from fatigue. Thus, the total damages
from fatigue-related crashes have a
value of about 8 percent of $32 billion,
or about $2.5 billion per year. Excluding
a fraction of crashes that occur in
operations that would be little affected
by the changes in the HOS rules, the
fatigue-related crashes subject to the

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alternatives are estimated to impose
costs of about $2.3 billion per year.
The analysis of the effects of the rules
and alternatives on crash risks showed
that these damages could be reduced
substantially. The percentage of fatiguerelated crashes is substantially higher in
long-haul than in short-haul operations.
Similarly, the changes in fatigue-related
crashes attributable to the alternatives
are greater in long-haul than in shorthaul. These differences result from the
more arduous schedules that long-haul
drivers currently have, and from the
effects of the rules and alternatives on
those schedules.
The ATA alternative provides net
benefits in both long-haul and shorthaul operations, though its net benefits
are much greater in long-haul. Similarly,
the PATT alternative has much smaller
net costs in long-haul than in short-haul
operations, and the FMCSA staff
alternative has net benefits in long-haul
that are partially offset by its net shorthaul costs.
The observation that the alternatives
are less cost-effective in short-haul
operations was part of the motivation
for providing more flexibility in the
FMCSA staff alternative for short-haul
drivers, allowing one 16-hour shift per
week. The RIA assessed the effects of
this flexibility by examining the costs
and benefits of the staff alternative
without allowing any 16-hour shifts.
Our analysis showed that, for shorthaul operations, this change would
more than triple the annual costs of the
FMCSA staff alternative relative to the
current rules with full compliance.
Costs would increase from $168 million
to $641 million, or by almost $500
million per year. These additional costs
would translate almost directly into a
reduction in net benefits, because the
effects of the reduced flexibility on
crashes would be very small. The
FMCSA estimates that, because the
increase in the need for new short-haul
drivers would more than offset the
slight reduction in fatigue, prohibiting
any 16-hour shifts would actually
worsen the crash-reduction benefits
slightly: total benefits would fall by
about $10 million per year, and fatalities
would rise by one or two per year.
With this change to the FMCSA staff
alternative, its net benefits compared to
current rules with full compliance
would drop to about half a billion
dollars per year.
The analysis of the economy-wide
changes revealed that, as expected for a
set of rules that has moderate effects on
an industry that itself is only one
component of the economy, the
alternatives would cause changes well
within one tenth of one percent of total

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employment, gross domestic product,
prices, and disposable income. The
impacts on carriers were more
noticeable, with the PATT alternative
imposing net costs and the ATA and
FMCSA staff alternatives having small
positive effects on net income and
profitability.
Electronic On-Board Recorders
(EOBRs)
The FMCSA based the proposal to
require EOBRs for Type 1 and Type 2
operations on two facts:
(1) Data indicated that fatigue-related
crashes are much more likely to involve
long-haul drivers than local or shorthaul drivers; and
(2) Data indicated there is substantial
non-compliance with the hours of
service regulations, particularly among
some segments of long-haul drivers.
The agency assumed that:
(1) EOBR-equipped vehicles used in
long-haul movements would
significantly improve compliance,
which the agency demonstrated in a
pilot project;
(2) Improved compliance by long-haul
drivers with HOS regulations would
help reduce fatigue-related crashes; and
(3) Conforming devices would be
available in a sufficient supply at
reasonable cost.
On-board recording devices have been
in use at least since 1985, when the
agency granted a waiver to Frito-Lay,
Inc. (50 FR 15269, April 17, 1985) to
allow their use as a substitute for
handwritten records of duty status. The
agency is also aware of substantial
investments since the late 1990’s made
by motor carriers in on-board
technology for tracking cargo and
equipment performance. Global
positioning systems are increasingly in
use, and the agency is piloting the
application of such a system to monitor
drivers’ compliance with the HOS rules
in cooperation with a large truckload
carrier. The agency also believed that
once it issued a mandate, market forces
would assure that EOBRs would become
increasingly available. To allow time for
this to happen, the NPRM proposed a
phase-in period within which to
comply.
The FMCSA also believed that the
presence of EOBRs on the vehicles
would facilitate enforcement both by
reducing the time required to inspect
records, and improving the quality of
the evidence upon which compliance
with the rules would be determined
and, when appropriate, violations
charged.

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Industry Comments
The industry was not uniformly
opposed to the EOBR provision. The
ATA raised numerous objections.
Several large carriers, however, and
even an ATA State association,
supported the initiative subject to
certain conditions. The industry
objections primarily revolved around
four concerns:
(1) Many commenters believed that
the NPRM failed to consider or
understated per-unit costs and other
related costs;
(2) Many commenters considered the
ability of the available technology to
track individual drivers to be suspect;
(3) Several commenters noted that the
level of compliance they already
achieved, or the rarity of occasions
when their drivers would be subject to
the requirement, rendered the EOBR
requirement irrelevant or redundant in
their situations; and
(4) Many comments expressed
concern about the use by law
enforcement and others of the
information incidentally obtained
through the EOBRs unrelated to HOS
compliance.
The ATA’s primary position was that
the agency underestimated the costs of
the technology and overestimated the
benefits. The ATA faulted the agency for
proposing the use of devices, while
ignoring the promising applications of
fatigue monitoring devices to prevent
crashes and ‘‘black-box’’ technology to
evaluate crash causation. The ATA
noted that the agency neglected to
include costs of both the ‘‘smart card’’
adaptations, which may be the least
expensive means of maintaining driver
identity in a mobile industry, and the
back-office integration into the carriers’
computer systems.
The ATA claimed that the FMCSA
reversed its position on EOBR
requirements because it first issued a
final rule allowing on-board recorders as
an alternative to records of duty status
on May 19, 1988, 53 FR 18058, and then
denied a petition from the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety to mandate
use of on-board recording devices. The
ATA faulted the FMCSA for failing to
gather any data during compliance
reviews from the thousands of EOBRs
that are presently in use, which might
have supported the agency’s claim that
EOBR use would improve compliance.
The ATA noted that the information
EOBRs would be required to gather
under the NPRM does not even include
an identification of the driver.
The ATA contested the claim that
EOBRs would facilitate enforcement at
roadside. According to ATA, the

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experience reported by enforcement
personnel is that EOBR records are more
difficult to review. The ATA argued that
the FMCSA overlooked the biggest
shortcoming of EOBRs—they do not
track what a driver is doing when the
vehicle is stopped and the engine is
shut off. The ATA was critical of
present methods that do not discover
intentional lawbreakers, who know how
to avoid detection. The ATA noted that
the agency even failed to address the
issue of off-duty driving of the truck, so
that a trip to the diner or to a movie
theater could very well be recorded as
driving time and possibly result in a
violation.
The ATA noted that the phase-in
schedule belied the agency’s contention
that safety benefits will flow from
improved compliance. The proposed
schedule gave small carriers, the least
compliant segment of the industry,
according to an ATA study of FMCSA’s
Motor Carrier Management Information
System (MCMIS) data, more time than
the large carriers, the most compliant.
The ATA criticized the FMCSA for
failing to evaluate potential risks of
requiring drivers to manually enter
location codes when crossing state lines
in spite of NHTSA’s concerns about
driver distractions.
The ATA expressed its
disappointment with the lack of
discussion of privacy concerns or
limitations on the use of data for
purposes unrelated to regulatory
compliance. It also suggested that the
proposal could be subject to legal
challenge based on U.S. Supreme Court
decisions defining the parameters of
lawful, warrantless searches in closely
regulated industries.
The ATA accused the FMCSA of
violating advice from ITS America, an
advisory committee to the DOT, and
particularly Principles 1, 5, 6, and 7 of
the Fair Information Principles for ITS/
CVO.
Other Industry Comments
The State trucking associations were
not unanimous in their opposition to
the EOBR provision in the proposal.
Many did not comment on this issue,
perhaps relying on the ATA, their
national representative, to express their
views.
The Arkansas Trucking Association
unanimously supported the required
use of EOBRs. It was particularly
persuaded by the opportunity to replace
a very expensive and inefficient
paperwork system. It recommended to
its members that EOBRs be installed and
maintained in all CMVs over 26,000
pounds. The members reportedly were
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believed that EOBRs would provide a
level playing field.
CTA supported the use of time
recording devices (not necessarily an
EOBR) for all drivers and trucking
operations only under the following six
conditions:
(1) The implementation of EOBR
devices must be the same for all carriers;
(2) The time recording device must be
readable at roadside inspections by law
enforcement officials;
(3) The data obtained from a recording
device must be used by law enforcement
officials for HOS enforcement purposes
only and not for reconstruction of other
events or operations;
(4) The recording device must identify
individual drivers and include the
option of personal technology devices,
as well as EOBR’s installed in the
vehicle;
(5) There must be an investment tax
credit for purchase and installation
costs associated with the recording
devices, retroactive to existing devices;
and
(6) The mandatory record retention
period for recorded data must not
exceed six months.
CTA opposed the use of additional
information that may be recorded to
enforce other statutes not relative to a
driver’s HOS. CTA believes that due
process and driver privacy require this
consideration.
The PMTA, on the other hand,
reported that many of its carriers
believed EOBRs would be redundant for
their type of operation, under which
drivers’ HOS are already closely
controlled or monitored. The PMTA
recommended assembling a multidisciplinary committee to hammer out
HOS reform regulations.
The large truckload carriers were
somewhat divided over the provision,
but several supported it.
J.B. Hunt believed that EOBRs would
ensure compliance with HOS
regulations, but attached certain
conditions to its support:
(1) They must be required of all
carriers at the same time;
(2) Their use must be limited to
immediate enforcement of compliance;
and
(3) They must have legally
enforceable prohibitions on the use of
EOBR data for other purposes.
J.B. Hunt also suggested that EOBRs
should be phased in based on a motor
carrier’s safety performance, using
Safestat as a reference, so that the worst
performing carriers would be required
to comply earlier, e.g., ‘‘A’’ list first,
then ‘‘B’’ list, etc. It also urged the
FMCSA to set performance standards
that allow for innovative technology.

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M.S. Carriers (M.S.) found the EOBR
proposal to be basically sound, but
believed the FMCSA should require
standard equipment in all CMVs so it
could be used interchangeably. M.S.
also recommended a condition that
information from these devices could
not be used in court.
Schneider National, while not in
outright support of the provision, felt
that if EOBRs were to be required,
implementation should be the same for
all commercial fleets, regardless of size.
U.S. Xpress Enterprises believed it
would be prudent to separate out the
EOBRs from the rest of the proposed
rules because ‘‘black boxes’’ perform a
variety of functions. They suggested it
would be better to combine all functions
in a single device and test them so
everyone could get the ultimate benefits.
They noted, for example, that the NTSB
is very interested in getting black boxes
installed for crash investigation
purposes.
Landstar believed the implementation
schedule for EOBRs would be unfair to
owner-operators leased to larger carriers
because they would have to meet a more
expedited schedule by reason of the size
of the carrier to which they lease.
Landstar also supported requiring
EOBRs on a performance basis, e.g.,
carriers with above average accident
rates should be first to implement.
Great Coastal Express pointed out that
EOBRs are good for monitoring driving
time, but not very good for tracking nondriving on-duty time.
Smaller truckload carriers and owneroperators were more uniform in their
opposition to the mandatory EOBR
provision. Perfetti Trucking, for
instance, was totally opposed to EOBRs,
believing they would cause older
drivers to leave in large numbers. They
believe younger drivers in the 30 to 45
age bracket, who may possess some
degree of computer literacy, might be
more comfortable. The older drivers,
however, view EOBRs as an intrusion
on their liberties, an insult to their
intelligence, and a way of making them
look inferior. Perfetti also believed the
proposal would put many owneroperators and small trucking companies
out of business.
The NASTC found the proposed use
of EOBRs to be intrusive and would
‘‘treat drivers on a par with convicted
felons under house arrest.’’ NASTC
noted, however, that if EOBRs are to be
required, the agency, in conjunction
with CVSA and the industry, should
design specifications that are uniform,
cost-effective, tamper-proof, and can be
incorporated as a mass-manufactured
component.

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Other small truckload carriers and
owner-operators reported the devices
would be too expensive; they could not
afford them; and they would likely have
to go out of business.
The OOIDA believed that dividing the
day into a 10-hour rest period and a 14hour duty period would make
compliance and enforcement so simple
that EOBRs would be redundant.
The less-than-truckload (LTL) sector
was generally opposed to the mandatory
use of EOBRs.
The MFCA claimed its carriers now
achieve virtually 100 percent
compliance with the HOS regulations.
The only possible noncompliance is
failing to keep up the record of duty
status. Therefore, at least as concerns
the MFCA, there is no benefit, only cost.
Yellow recommended that the EOBR
provision simply be removed from rule
until more information is available.
Watkins was concerned about
unproductive costs. Watkins believes
that EOBRs have no direct safety
benefit; that there is no equipment
currently available; and that the cost to
convert to the requirement would be
$2,650 per EOBR. After making a case
for exempting LTL operations from the
EOBR requirement, Watkins projected
its total cost of converting to the
proposed monitoring and recordkeeping system at $15,053,465.
The OOIDA complained that
‘‘[FMCSA leaps] from regulations that
may or may not prevent driver fatigue
to requiring black boxes to assure
compliance with those regulations.’’
OOIDA believes the regulations should
be reasonable and should rely on
voluntary compliance. OOIDA believes
EOBRs would expose carriers to greater
liability, as plaintiffs’ attorneys would
have more ammunition with which to
impress juries, regardless of actual fault.
OOIDA also objected to EOBRs based on
Fourth Amendment privacy protections.
OOIDA participated in a DOT
European safety scan in 1999. OOIDA
stated the mandatory use of EOBR type
devices in Europe had been delayed
four times due to industry objections.
OOIDA also found that drivers did not
embrace the product at the time, they
hated it. The system was too restrictive
and limited their earning capacity.
OOIDA claimed that drivers and
employers worked out unofficial
arrangements so drivers would not plug
in their drivers’ cards until they were a
couple of hundred miles down the road
to enable them to get the overtime the
drivers needed to make a living. OOIDA
believed VDO North America, a vendor
that commented at the hearings and
roundtables, ‘‘took literary license in the
interest of sales.’’ OOIDA acknowledged

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that the United States system is not
foolproof, and drivers would find ways
of beating it. OOIDA believes a truly
foolproof system would be too
expensive.
The IBT commented that it has not
opposed EOBRs in the past, provided
limitations are placed on the use of the
data, because record of duty status
falsification has been a big problem. The
IBT asserted, though, that the
requirement for EOBRs would
contribute nothing to safety without
strong enforcement. The IBT also
doubted whether the information
collected by EOBRs would have much
value for enforcement since they only
directly track driving time.
The ABA cited a General Accounting
Office report to Congress finding in
relation to the agency’s estimate of a 20
percent safety benefit from the use of
EOBRs that the FMCSA ‘‘did not have
an analytic basis to support this
estimate.’’ The ABA concludes that
mandating EOBRs for long-haul buses
would result in a large expense with no
safety benefit.
Commercial Vehicle Training
Associations (CVTA) is a trade
association representing the nation’s
private training programs for CMV
operators. Regarding EOBR training,
CVTA commented that if a uniform set
of specifications were developed and
required, the schools could, and
probably would, include a module on
EOBR use.
The U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) noted the cost of
the required EOBRs and believed that
even four years lead time may not be
sufficient to reduce costs significantly. It
further believed the cost estimates were
understated. The SBA provided no
substantiation for its estimate, except its
concept of ‘‘average,’’ which was to add
the lowest estimate it had heard to the
highest estimate and divide by two,
resulting in a per-unit cost estimate of
$17,000 to $19,000. It recommended
examination of feasible alternatives to
general EOBR use, including one that is
performance-based. If the FMCSA
imposed the requirement on those with
the worst safety records, it would
provide an added incentive to operate
safely. The SBA strongly urged the
FMCSA to consider all information from
small businesses and include full
discussion of costs and assumptions, as
well as feasible alternatives and why
they were not chosen.
Law Enforcement Comments
The CVSA opposed the requirement
for EOBRs as premature and
recommended more study to ensure
standardization. It suggested using the

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DOT’s Intelligent Vehicle Initiative (IVI)
to conduct operational evaluation and
possible pilot tests. In addition to
suspecting the quality of the equipment
presently available, CVSA has concerns
about access, availability and use of the
data. CVSA noted that most tachometertype equipment is used by industry as
asset management tools and not
necessarily for driver management, and
noted, ‘‘The EOBR requirements as
currently written in the proposal offer
no benefit to industry or enforcement in
having the ability to proactively manage
fatigue.’’ In this context, the CVSA was
distinguishing the EOBR from other
developing technologies that measure
and project driver alertness (e.g.,
PerclosTM and ActigraphTM devices).
The California Highway Patrol (CHP)
was not opposed to the use of
automated time record systems for
Types 1 and 2. CHP noted such
equipment has been in use in California
since the mid-1980s. CHP has problems
with Types 3, 4 and 5 drivers because
they may be caught in positions where
they suddenly need an EOBR on a
limited basis, such as a required
overnight stay. CHP suggested the
development of an alternate means of
compliance in those situations. CHP
also believed that with no records
required for Types 3, 4 and 5, roadside
enforcement would be impossible. It
recommended building into the rules a
rebuttable presumption of regularity
with toll receipts and other time-dated
records regularly issued in the course of
business.
Safety Advocacy Groups
Safe Drive America (SDA) described
itself as an organization improving
highway safety by observing and
reporting unsafe practices and
promoting improvements in training
and working conditions for drivers. SDA
supported the NPRM overall as a
positive step in the right direction, in
particular, the requirement for EOBRs. It
recommended a six month phase-in
period for all motor carriers. SDA
claimed it is not unusual under the
current rules for a driver, with three
pickups in a given town, to spend all
night making those pickups and then
record 0.75 hours loading, and 11.25
hours in a sleeper berth. SDA claims the
driver then shows on the record of duty
status as emerging from the sleeper at 6
a.m. with an eligible 10 hours of driving
and 15 hours on duty. SDA claims the
driver could still do this under the
proposal unless there is a device like the
EOBR to keep the driver honest, and
even then, enforcement would be
required.

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The AHAS supported mandating
EOBRs for road drivers, claiming that
current cost estimates run well below
even the lowest estimate used by the
agency. It strongly recommended the
agency consider requiring EOBRs for
Type 3 drivers as well because of added
risks associated with split-shift driving
and tendency of drivers to falsify
records. It would even include Type 4
(local) drivers and was not persuaded by
reliance on DOL timecards, as AHAS
believes there are no independent
means of corroboration. The AHAS
found that requiring EOBRs would at
least protect drivers from being
compelled to exceed hour limitations.
The AHAS disagreed with industry’s
privacy concerns and favored addition
of global positioning system (GPS)
technology, which AHAS believes
would not be very expensive, certainly
not double the quoted $300 base cost.
The AHAS noted that in this age of
automation, in an industry that operates
on razor-thin margins, any carrier that
does not take advantage of technological
advances would be left behind and
would fail to survive.
CRASH supported requiring EOBRs,
but suggested that more safety
technologies already exist and should be
brought into play. PATT also supported
mandatory use of EOBRs, which it
found long overdue. PATT believed the
devices did not cost too much and that
any changes in HOS regulation without
them would be useless.
The NSC supported technology
integration for safety purposes, but
found the NPRM lacked data showing
that the safety benefit would equal the
cost of $1,500 per unit. The NSC
recommended piloting required use on
the poorest performers, e.g., those with
accident rates double the national
average.
Vendors’ Comments
VDO claimed to be the world’s largest
independent manufacturer of
automotive instrumentation. VDO
claimed to have an EOBR meeting the
performance standards listed. VDO
claimed the device, also known as an
electronic tachograph, has become
widely used in the European Union
with strong support from fleet owners,
drivers, unions, and enforcement. VDO
claimed its version of the European
B1TM Tachograph answers all of the
negative comments and concerns of the
motor carrier industry.
VDO had talked to several U.S.
companies and was told by Qualcomm
and Cadec that they believed they could
not meet the requirements for EOBRs as
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VDO contended the opportunities its
digital tachograph affords users go far
beyond merely the time saved on doing
paper logs. The device automatically
recorded everything fed into it, and the
user could decide what to do with the
information. VDO has done studies that
it believes reflect the beneficial results
of what it refers to as a ‘‘driver feedback
loop.’’ VDO claimed that no matter what
device is used, management and society
need feedback to correct the poor driver
behavior detected, e.g., speeding,
tailgating, harsh braking, excessive
hours, etc. The benefits did not come
from the EOBR, but from the attitude of
the carrier that chooses to use it for
safety purposes.
Diversified Auto Technology
(Diversified) claimed it was on the verge
of completing a 13-year project
researching and developing on-board
recording devices. The company
claimed it had been involved primarily
in the EU market and that initial cost of
Diversified’s complete system built to
comply with proposal would be
estimated to be $2,500.
QUALCOMM Incorporated
commented that it offered two primary
products to the transportation industry,
a geo-stationary satellite-based, mobile
communications system and a terrestrial
mobile communications system that
uses a digital, wireless network.
QUALCOMM claimed it was developing
an onboard computer solution that
would fulfill the requirements of the
EOBR requirement. It believed the
regulations on electronic recordkeeping
should be crafted to promote both safety
and productivity in order that carriers
can have a return on investment with
onboard technology. They projected
their device could cost as much as
$1,600 per vehicle with an additional
charge of $15,000 to $25,000 for host
software, plus additional costs for
firmware and GPS upgrades,
installation, downtime on vehicles and
training. These costs would be in
addition to the cost of hardware for
those fleets not already equipped with
mobile communications equipment.
Marconi InfoChain reported that its
company and others, including Bristow
and E-Truck, were offering an
inexpensive alternative to VDO’s
European solution—a personal digital
assistant.
FMCSA Response
The FMCSA has decided not to adopt
regulations on EOBRs at this time.
However, there are several technologies
that offer significant promise for HOS
recordkeeping and enforcement. The
agency plans to continue research on
EOBRs and other technologies, seeking

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to stimulate innovation in this
promising area. There are several
reasons for this decision and the
planned research.
First, neither the costs nor the benefits
of EOBR systems are adequately known.
Cost estimates vary enormously, mainly
because there is no significant market
for such devices at the moment and thus
no hard prices available from competing
vendors. There appear to be only a
limited number of vendors that could
offer a suitable system in the near
future, and no guarantee that they could
satisfy all of initial demand, should
EOBRs be required. Meanwhile, other
technologies offer potential for HOS
record keeping and compliance and
should be evaluated alongside of
EOBRs.
The benefits of EOBRs are easier to
assume than to estimate. Full voluntary
compliance with the HOS rules is
unlikely, but the amount of cheating
that could be deterred by EOBRs is
unknown and the amount that could be
detected depends on the tamperresistance of the design and the ability
of roadside enforcement quickly and
easily to access the information
recorded by the system. FMCSA did not
test the (very few) EOBRs currently
available, so both issues remain
unresolved.
Second, the agency’s EOBR proposal
was drafted as a performance standard,
but enforcement officials generally
argued that a design standard was
necessary to ensure that they did not
have to waste time and effort mastering
incompatible read-out procedures
created by different EOBR vendors. In
retrospect, it might have been better to
propose a partial design standard
governing driver-identification and
information read-out procedures, while
setting a performance standard for all
other features of the device. FMCSA can
neither adopt such far-reaching
requirements without prior notice nor
ignore the concerns of the enforcement
community. The solution, at least for
now, is to adopt a rule that does not
require EOBRs.
Third, FMCSA proposed that longhaul motor carriers with more than 50
power units be required to adopt EOBRs
within 2 years, while those with less
than 20 power units would have up to
4 years to comply with the rule. Many
commenters argued that this phase-in
schedule was irrational because the
smallest motor carriers generally have
higher accident rates than large ones.
Furthermore, the first carriers subject to
a regulatory mandate would probably
pay more, and perhaps substantially
more, for EOBRs than carriers allowed
to defer compliance to a later date.

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Carriers that discussed the phase-in
period generally insisted that, if a
mandate were adopted, all carriers
should be required to begin using
EOBRs at the same time. The Small
Business Administration (SBA), though
critical of the financial burden of onboard recorders for small entities,
suggested that the agency consider
requiring them only for carriers with the
worst safety records. In short, there was
no consensus on the phase-in issue.
Fourth, although the agency proposed
EOBRs only to capture HOS
information, most commenters viewed
these devices in a wider context. Many
drivers regard electronic monitoring as
a direct assault on their dignity and
privacy. Motor carriers, on the other
hand, are deeply concerned that HOS
functions handled by the on-board
electronic systems of modern tractors
would expose all other information
recorded by those systems (e.g., speed,
frequency of brake application, etc.) to
demands for production in lawsuits
resulting from accidents. Many carriers
and trucking organizations expressed
adamant hostility to any EOBR
requirement that did not protect data
generated by recording devices from any
use except HOS enforcement. Although
the commenters may have exaggerated
the impact of EOBRs, they did raise
issues the agency did not consider in
the NPRM and is not prepared to
address in this final rule.
For all of these reasons, FMCSA has
concluded that it has neither the
economic and safety data needed to
justify an EOBR requirement at this
time, nor the support of the
transportation community at large. The
agency, however, does plan to continue
research on EOBRs and other
technologies, including evaluating
alternatives for encouraging or
providing incentives for their use. Key
research factors will include:
(1) Ability to identify the individual
driver;
(2) Tamper resistance;
(3) Ability to produce records for
audit;
(4) Ability of roadside enforcement to
quickly and easily access the HOS
information;
(5) Level of protection afforded other
personal, operational or proprietary
information;
(6) Cost; and
(7) Driver acceptability.
Proposed Compliance and Enforcement
The ATA and a substantial number of
other industry commenters expressed
concern that enforcement would suffer
if the proposed rules were adopted.
Motor carriers, associations, unions, and

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shippers all found the proposed rules
too complex, particularly the provision
for five types of operations. They stated
that roadside inspections would take
much longer as enforcement officers
sorted out what category each driver fit
into so they would know what rules to
apply. Longer times per inspection
would translate into fewer inspections
and a less effective enforcement effort.
Industry Comments
The ATA found that the proposed
shifting among 5 types of operations
would cloud compliance and
enforcement. Although the proposal
allowed ‘‘good faith’’ compliance with
the perceived type of operation, too
many variables made the proposal
unworkable. Customer demands,
weather, loading and unloading delays,
and other unforeseen circumstances
would impact schedules. Inflexible
categories and the subjective
interpretation by law enforcement
personnel would make confusion
unavoidable.
The ATA stated that regulations have
to be clear and concise. The ATA stated
that it has been a consistent supporter
of effective enforcement, but that
reliance on EOBRs is not the answer.
The ATA comments also recommended
removing the link to the DOL
requirements and reverting to the
current record keeping requirements in
49 CFR part 395.
The DLTLCA made no mention of
record keeping in its petition or in its
comments, noting agreement with
ATA’s view on this matter.
Werner Enterprises recommended an
alternative regulatory scheme. It stated
that a better objective would be to
achieve uniform enforcement of existing
rules before attempting any industrywide change. Consideration should be
given to retaining the present HOS
rules, but to implement the proposed
on-board recorder requirement. The
agency could then determine whether
that initiative with adequate training
would achieve desired level of
regulatory compliance and safety
improvement.
J.B. Hunt counseled that rules should
not be difficult for drivers and
enforcement personnel to understand. It
believes effective enforcement and
meaningful sanctions change behavior.
It supported requiring immediate
enforcement against violators at the time
and place of occurrence to reinforce
compliance. Placing the driver out-ofservice until he is in compliance is not
enough. Uniform fines should also be
imposed. J.B. Hunt believes that reliance
on carriers to discipline drivers is
impractical because of the gap between

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the time of the violation and the time
the carrier learns of it, as well as the
mobility of drivers. Finally, J.B. Hunt
urged the government to mandate speed
control devices on all CMVs limiting
truck speeds to a standard national rate
(60 to 65 mph) for everyone.
Landstar believes that the proposed
provision for different types of
operations would make enforcement
difficult. It also stated that reliance on
DOL records is misplaced: historically,
carriers have considered themselves
subject to DOT rules and interpretations
of them. Without any meaningful
explanation, the FMCSA ‘‘would throw
out decades of industry practice.’’ The
complexity of the proposed rules would
have an adverse impact on enforcement.
Landstar believes that both compliance
reviews and roadside inspections would
take longer because the investigator
would have to determine what type of
operation carriers and drivers are
engaged in before they know what rules
to apply.
Overnite was convinced that stricter
enforcement is the key to improved
compliance with HOS regulations and
to safety. Overnite strongly endorses the
use of EOBRs to bolster enforcement. On
the whole, Overnite found the proposal
too complex. It offered comments from
a driver, Thomas Hawks, a 10-year
driver based in Memphis, TN with an
exemplary safety record. Mr. Hawks
stated the NPRM provisions would
confuse drivers and enforcement
people, but more importantly, it would
prevent drivers from doing their jobs in
a professional way. Although he does
not load or unload, he believes
enforcement action should be taken
about time wasted at the docks of
shippers and receivers.
The Minnesota Trucking Association
found that the five categories of drivers
would be very confusing for both
companies and law enforcement to
follow.
The California Trucking Association
agreed that ‘‘typing’’ drivers serves no
useful purpose and only confuses
industry and enforcement. The CTA
would support use of time-recording
devices for enforcement, provided
certain other conditions apply.
Although a vigorous supporter of efforts
to make highways safer, CTA would
stress better drug/alcohol testing and
reporting procedures and more funds for
roadside enforcement.
The NTTC deferred to CVSA
comments regarding enforcement, but
agreed that five types of operations are
unnecessarily confusing and would
hamper uniformity.
The NITL and the NAM also found
the proposed rules overly complex,

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using the five categories of operations as
an example. The complexity would
adversely affect enforcement.
Wal-Mart recommended improving
enforcement activities while waiting for
a new rule.
The IBT said the complexity of the
proposed rule, particularly regarding the
five categories of operations, would be
a challenge for the enforcement
community and a problem for the
regulated community as well.
Law Enforcement Groups
CVSA and the Connecticut
Department of Motor Vehicles argued
that the complexity of the NPRM would
create problems with training and
application at the roadside. They state
that FMCSA’s estimate of four hours
needed to train investigators in the
proposed rules is very much
understated and is likely to be two to
four times as long. One CVSA member
estimated that the time required to
complete a Level 1 inspection at the
roadside would be increased by onethird. Finally, CVSA opposed the
requirement for EOBRs as premature,
and recommended more study to ensure
standardization.
The New York State Police noted that
the proposal, as written, was very
difficult to understand for enforcement
purposes, which is likely to diminish
enforcement actions taken on the
roadside and therefore would minimize
the likelihood of widespread carrier
compliance.
The Wisconsin Department of
Transportation (WisDOT) believed the
five categories would create confusion:
the distinction between types 1 and 2 is
not precise enough, and roadside
enforcement for types 3, 4 and 5 would
be virtually impossible. Substantial
training for both drivers and
enforcement personnel would be
necessary. Enforcement personnel
would need to know how to deal with
both paper and EOBR systems. WisDOT
also believes the removal of the
Tolerance Guidelines is premature
without accurate and extensive crash
data.
The Minnesota Department of
Transportation and the Minnesota
Department of Public Safety filed joint
comments. They performed a sectionby-section critique, noting that
significant modifications and
clarifications that would be needed so
that enforcement could be effective and
consistent.
The Maine Department of
Transportation concluded that requiring
EOBRs would set back enforcement
because of lack of standardization of the
devices.

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PennDOT recommended regulations
that are easily understood by all,
enforceable at the roadside, provide for
safer operations, and meet the needs of
the public, particularly the
uninterrupted continuity of utility
services.
Safety Advocacy Groups
AHAS contended that difficulty in
enforcing the provisions of the NPRM
would provide opportunities for drivers
to violate the ‘‘already inadequate’’
weekend rest period the proposal would
mandate. The AHAS agreed with most
commenters that enforcement must be
improved, and strongly supported the
proposed requirement of EOBRs for
Type 1 and 2 operations. It strongly
recommended the agency consider
requiring them for Types 3 and 4 drivers
as well.
CRASH believes that making a
distinction among the five different
categories of drivers would present
enormous problems for police. CRASH
also believes relaxing the record
carrying requirements by using the DOL
records and supporting documents in all
categories further complicates
enforcement.
PATT, on the other hand, supported
the use of DOL time records, but
recognized need for vigorous
enforcement, and recommended
retention of records for 24 months. The
NSC, however, believes that the use of
the DOL timecard may not be practical
for roadside enforcement.
FMCSA Response
The rule being made final today is
significantly simpler than the NPRM
and should be much easier to
understand and enforce. The agency is
modifying the existing rules and
exemptions to update them with the
appropriate off-duty, on-duty, and
driving times, as well as adding a restart
provision for truck drivers. The agency
is retaining the paper-based record of
duty status system, including retention
of supporting documents and allowing,
but not requiring, continued use of
§ 395.15-compliant automatic on-board
recording devices.
The motor carrier’s responsibility for
compliance with the HOS regulations
remains clear. The motor carrier is
responsible for and must police the
actions of its employees. This obligation
under the FMCSRs was affirmed by the
Associate Administrator for what was
then the Office of Motor Carriers (of the
FHWA) In the Matter of Horizon
Transportation, Inc., 55 FR 43292
(October 26, 1990) (Final Order
February 12, 1990). A motor carriers’
responsibility for the actions of

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independent contractors and owner
operators they use was outlined In re
R.W. Bozel Transfers, Inc., 58 FR 16918
(March 31, 1993) (Final Order August 6,
1992); and more recently In the Matter
of Commodity Carriers, Inc., (Order
Appointing Administrative Law Judge
March 25, 1997). Likewise, each motor
carrier must have a system in place that
allows it to effectively monitor
compliance with the FMCSRs,
especially those aimed at the issue of
this final rule—driver fatigue (See In re
National Retail Transportation, Inc.,
(Final Order: Decision on Review
September 12, 1996.)) The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed in A.D. Transport Express Inc.
v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, 290 F. 3d 761 (6th Cir.
2002) that supporting documents must
be maintained in a common sense
manner so that FMCSA investigators
can ‘‘verify dates, times, and locations
of drivers recorded on the RODS.’’ More
recently, the D.C. Circuit agreed that the
term ‘‘supporting documents’’ in the
current rule encompasses any document
that could be used to support the RODS.
That decision also found an FMCSA
requirement that supporting documents
must be maintained in a fashion that
permits the matching of those records to
the original drivers’ RODS as a
reasonable interpretation of 49 CFR
395.8(k)(1). In fact, the Court concluded
that all the FMCSA is asking is that
carriers refrain from destroying the
agency’s ability to match records with
their associated drivers (Darrell
Andrews Trucking v. Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, 296 F. 3d
1120 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Regulatory Impact Analysis
The NSC, ABA, ATA, and DLTLCA
petitioned FMCSA to retain an
independent consulting firm to study
the safety and economic impacts of any
final rule. The FMCSA selected a large,
well-respected contractor with extensive
experience in transportation and the
regulatory process.
After reading and analyzing the
53,750 written comments, the FMCSA
identified three potentially effective and
reasonably feasible regulatory models
within the scope of the NPRM for
further consideration. The analysis of
these alternatives is entitled Regulatory
Impact Analysis and Small Business
Analysis for HOS Options, December
2002 (RIA) and is in the docket.
The benefits and costs of each
alternative must be measured against a
baseline, as AHAS pointed out in its
comments. The Office of Management
and Budget’s (OMB) guidance to federal
agencies has been that the baseline

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should be the existing regulation. This
baseline can then be compared against
reasonable alternatives.
Thus, the first alternative was to take
no action, keeping the current rules. The
other three alternatives are referred to as
the PATT alternative, the ATA
alternative, and the FMCSA staff
alternative. The RIA, however,
compares the costs and benefits of the
alternatives relative to two distinct
baselines.
Much of the RIA shows the effects of
the PATT, ATA, and FMCSA-staff
alternatives relative to the current rules
under the assumption of 100 percent
compliance with the current regulations
and each alternative. This approach
ensures that the full effects of the
alternatives’ provisions on costs and
benefits are captured. On the other
hand, because there have been studies
that have shown that drivers do not
always comply with the existing rules,
OMB requested that FMCSA also assess
the differences that would appear if
motor carriers and drivers improved
current compliance levels and achieved
100 percent compliance. Thus, the
alternatives are also shown relative to a
baseline in which the current rules are
in effect, but there is a certain degree of
non-compliance. The University of
Michigan Trucking Industry Program
(UMTIP) provided the FMCSA with
customized statistical outputs for
particular subsets of an UMTIP driver
survey that the FMCSA analyzed to
estimate the percent of non-compliance
with the existing regulations. These
subsets were designed to match, as
closely as possible and where
appropriate, the industry segments
reflecting the most relevant profiles in
the RIA. The FMCSA found that
approximately 8 percent of long-haul
driver hours exceed the current daily
and weekly limits of § 395.3.
The FMCSA did not analyze
alternatives for passenger carrier
transportation. As stated above, the
FMCSA was persuaded by the
comments that it does not have enough
data to indicate a problem in the
motorcoach industry segment. This RIA
only analyzes carriers using CMVs to
transport (1) goods or (2) crews and
equipment to places where they are
needed to provide services of one kind
or another. This would include service
trucks belonging to telephone and
electric utility companies; trucks of a
variety of types of service contractors—
plumbers, electricians, roofers,
landscapers, etc.; trucks taking crews
and equipment to construction sites,
including mobile cranes; dump trucks;
trash trucks; beverage, bakery, and

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snack food distributors’ trucks and other
like vehicles.
The FMCSA distinguishes two
distinct baselines by referring to the
current rules with 100 percent
compliance as ‘‘Current-100 percent,’’
and the current rules with existing
estimated compliance levels as the
‘‘Status Quo’’ scenario.
The NPRM analyzed five alternatives,
in many commenters’ view
incompletely, that could have required
comprehensive changes to the motor
carrier industry, with possibly
significant implications for the national
economy. The agency considered all of
the alternatives suggested by
commenters. Some had to be eliminated
to provide a manageable number for
evaluation under Executive Order
12866. The agency chose three
alternatives that were both feasible and
could potentially be effective at
reducing fatigue-related incidents and
increase driver alertness.
The Baseline
The baseline, current rule provides
that no driver may drive:
(1) More than 10 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty;
(2) For any period after having been
on duty 15 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty; and
(3) For any period after—
(a) Having been on duty 60 hours in
any 7 consecutive days if the employing
motor carrier does not operate
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week; or
(b) Having been on duty 70 hours in
any period of 8 consecutive days if the
employing motor carrier operates
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week.
This current rule allows drivers to
have work/rest cycles as short as 18hours, if the drivers maximize driving
time and rest the minimum 8
consecutive hours. The 18-hour cycle
provides a potential 6-hour backward
rotation that inverts drivers’ schedules
on cross county trips. Such schedules
allow a driver to begin driving during
the day on the first day, but on
subsequent days allow the driver to
drive at night, and then during the day,
and then at night again. This alternating
day-and-night driving has been proven
to be detrimental to a driver’s sleep
thereby increasing the risk that the
driver will cause a crash.
PATT Alternative
The first alternative selected by the
FMCSA for detailed safety and
economic analysis was that suggested by
PATT. The PATT alternative provides
that no driver may drive:

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(1) More than 10 cumulative hours
following 12 consecutive hours off duty;
(2) For any period after having been
on duty 12 consecutive hours after first
beginning on-duty status following 12
consecutive hours off duty;
(3) More than 50 cumulative hours
over the last 6 consecutive 24-hour
periods plus the current 24-hour period;
and
(4) For any period after having been
on duty 60 hours over the last 6
consecutive 24-hour periods plus the
current 24-hour period.
The PATT alternative allows drivers
to have regularly recurring work/rest
cycles of 24 hours. The 12-hour on duty,
12-hour off duty cycle would provide
drivers with two more off-duty hours
than the FMCSA staff alternative for
meals, personal errands, and to contact
family and friends. Many long-haul
drivers commented that they do not
need these additional hours during a
trip because commuting, doing personal
errands and socializing are mainly
home-based activities. This type of rule,
like the NPRM, would require drivers to
waste off-duty time (in their view) in a
location where there is little for them to
do.
This alternative had the possibility for
sharply reducing fatigue-related
incidents, but it was also likely to
reduce motor carrier productivity and
increase transportation costs by
increasing the need for more drivers.
ATA Alternative
The second alternative selected by the
FMCSA for detailed analysis was the
ATA proposal. It was not clear whether
this alternative would reduce fatiguerelated incidents, as ATA claimed, but
it would almost certainly increase
productivity and provide cheaper
transportation.
The ATA alternative provides that no
driver may be on-duty:
(1) More than 14 cumulative hours
with up to 16 cumulative hours twice
per 7-day period following 10
consecutive hours off duty;
(2) More than 70 hours over the last
7 24-hour periods (ending with the last
completed 24-hour period); and
(3) More than 140 hours over the last
14 24-hour periods, with no more than
84 hours allowed in one of the 7 24hour periods, if followed by a 34-hour
off-duty period, and no more than 56
hours in the remaining 7 24-hour
periods.
The ATA alternative allows drivers to
have regularly recurring work/rest
cycles of at least 24 hours. The 14-hour
on duty cycle provides drivers with the
opportunity to drive the entire 14 hours.
It also allows the driver to drive after

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the 14th hour after the driver’s shift
began. If the driver takes rest breaks
during the 14 hour period, those breaks
would extend the work day, as the
current rule does. The DLTLCA argued
that drivers would not drive the entire
14 hour period ‘‘because as a practical
matter, no driver is going to be beyond
12 * * * we are never going to be
beyond 12 * * * because we have 3 to
4 hours loading time. We have pre-trip
inspections. We have all these other
activities built in.’’ However, it would
be possible for a cross-country driver
who did no loading enroute and had
pre-trip inspections performed by others
to drive (potentially) 14 hours straight.
This rule could cause safety problems,
including reduced driver alertness and
increased fatigue-related incidents, but
it could provide productivity increases
and could reduce the need for drivers
and the ‘‘shortage’’ experienced by the
industry today.
FMCSA Staff Alternative
The agency’s staff developed the third
alternative. This alternative would
create incremental changes to the
current on-duty, off-duty, and driving
requirements; provide an exception for
‘‘short-haul’’ drivers; and adopt a restart
provision for weekly on-duty time
limits. Exceptions for daily off-duty, onduty, and driving time would be
modified, along with the restart
provision after direct assistance for an
emergency relief effort. The alternative
would retain all exceptions for weekly
restarts provided by the NHS Act as
well as those for oilfield operations. It
would retain all other rules, including
the current methods of notifying drivers
to report for work.
The local/short-haul study has
persuaded the FMCSA that fatigue may
be less problematic for local/short haul
drivers, though the agency does not
believe all regulation should be
removed because these drivers would
continue to be at risk of having fatiguerelated crashes. The staff alternative
could reduce regulatory oversight for
local/short haul drivers that could also
reduce fatigue-related incidents and
fatalities.
The agency considered the
experiences of the governments of
Australia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec
with fatigue management alternatives to
traditional HOS regulations. The
FMCSA is assessing the feasibility of
conducting a pilot project that would
substitute fatigue management for driver
HOS requirements. Although a
possibility in the future, it was not
included in the staff-developed
alternative for this final rule.

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The agency is also considering the use
of education and training programs for
reducing fatigue and increasing driver
alertness, as well as medical alternatives
and countermeasures, including the
feasibility of screening for sleep apnea
and other sleep disorders. These
possibilities are not included in the
staff-developed alternative for this final
rule.
Many commenters argued that the
agency did not do enough research into
the safety consequences of shifting
considerable nighttime truck traffic to
the daytime. The FMCSA agrees and
therefore decided to consider
alternatives that concentrate on
approaches that do not promote shifting
traffic from the nighttime to daytime.
The FMCSA specifically excluded such
options from its staff-developed
alternative.
The agency staff wanted to formulate
an alternative that would be
intermediate between the PATT and
ATA proposals. The staff believed that
the combined effect of the changes it
suggested would reduce fatigue-related
incidents and increase driver alertness
without creating serious safety or
economic costs to society. The FMCSAdeveloped alternative provides that no
driver may drive:
(1) More than 11 hours following 10
consecutive hours off-duty;
(2) For any period after 14
consecutive hours from the start of a
duty tour following 10 consecutive
hours off-duty;
(3) For any period after 16
consecutive hours from the start of a
duty tour following 10 consecutive
hours off-duty once each 7 or 8
consecutive day period, when the driver
returns to the normal work reporting
location and is released from work
within 16 consecutive hours that duty
tour; and
(4) For any period after having been
on duty 60 hours in any 7 consecutive
days if the employing motor carrier does
not operate commercial motor vehicles
every day of the week or any period
after having been on duty 70 hours in
any period of 8 consecutive days if the
employing motor carrier operates
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week. Any period of 7 or 8
consecutive days may end with the
beginning of any off-duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours for drivers
operating vehicles transporting freight
or other property.
There can be little doubt that fatigue
directly attributable to the exertion
required to operate the modern CMV is
less of a factor now than it was when
the 10 hour limit was adopted in 1939,
and the FMCSA believes allowing one

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additional hour of driving activity can
be safely accommodated within the
context of a somewhat reduced overall
tour of duty. The FMCSA also has
learned a lot about the science of sleep
since 1938 and understands that the
more relevant issue is how long the
driver can be awake and ‘‘at work,’’ and
still be allowed to drive, before safety is
significantly compromised.
After the comments, regulatory
analysis, and upon further review of the
research studies by Vespa et al. (1998),
O’Neill et al. (1998), Folkard (1997),
Arnold et al. (1996) Fatigue in the
Western Australian Transport Industry,
Part Two: The Drivers’ Perspective, and
Arnold et al. (1996) Part Three: The
Company Perspective, discussed in
Freund (1999), the FMCSA is convinced
that 14 hours after the beginning of a
duty tour is long enough, given the
significantly increasing degradation of
performance which occurs in the later
stages of a work shift. The FMCSA
believes this limit is materially better
from a safety standpoint than the
current rule, under which a driver could
conceivably still be allowed to return to
the wheel several hours after the 15
hour limit has passed (because ‘‘off
duty’’ breaks can extend the workday).
The limits, however, are not so
restrictive as to impose an unreasonable
burden on productivity.
Safety Impacts
The FMCSA estimated the benefits of
the HOS alternatives using a multi-step
process to relate changes in HOS rules
to changes in crashes. Conceptually, the
FMCSA took the following steps for
each alternative:
(1) Constructed a set of sample
working and driving schedules of
different intensities and degrees of
regularity;
(2) Used the results of the modeling
performed for the cost analysis to
determine the percentages of drivers
following each sample schedule and to
determine the shifts in these
percentages caused by different HOS
alternatives;
(3) Translated the amount of on-duty
time in each schedule into expected
amounts of sleep, using a function based
on Effects of Sleep Schedules on
Commercial Motor Vehicle Driver
Performance, 2000, by Balkin et al.
(Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research) in the docket;
(4) Used a version of the Walter Reed
Sleep Performance Model (WRSPM) to
estimate the effects of different sleep
and driving schedules on a measure of
alertness;
(5) Translated changes in alertness
into relative changes in crash risks on

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations
the basis of a laboratory study of
performance on a driving simulator;
(6) Calibrated the results of the
modeling of simulated crash risks to the
real world using independent estimates
of the total numbers and percentages of
crashes attributable to fatigue; and
(7) Translated the estimated changes
in fatigue-related crashes into dollar
values for avoided crashes using
existing estimates of the damages from
fatal, injury, and property-damage only
crashes.
Safety Benefits
The quantified and monetized
benefits of the options derive from their

effects on truck crashes. Changes in
work and sleep schedules induced by
the HOS alternatives can be translated
into relative changes in modeled
fatigue-related crashes, can be calibrated
to correspond to independent estimates
of numbers of fatigue-related crashes,
and the damages from fatigue-related
crashes can be projected for each of the
alternatives. First, the FMCSA shows
changes for crash damages for long-haul
and short-haul operations. Two other
sources of benefits (or reductions in
benefits) are then described: changes in
damages resulting from the employment
of different numbers of new drivers, and

changes in damages in long-haul
operations resulting from shifts between
truck and rail.
Changes in Crash Damages Due to
Schedule Changes
The FMCSA found the benefits of the
alternatives, in terms of the annual
values of the crash reductions shown in
Table 1 (RIA Exhibit 9–6), by
subtracting the damages under each
alternative from the damages for the
current rules with 100 percent
compliance.

TABLE 1.—VALUE OF CRASHES AVOIDED DUE TO OPERATIONAL CHANGES RELATIVE TO CURRENT RULES WITH FULL
COMPLIANCE
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Number in parentheses equal cost of additional crashes)]
PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Benefits of Avoided Long-haul Crashes ..................................................................................................
Benefits of Avoided Short-haul Crashes .................................................................................................

364
36

(267)
(8)

224
10

Total Benefits .......................................................................................................................................

400

(275)

234

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–6.

Overall, the FMCSA predicts fatiguerelated crashes to be significantly more
of a problem in long-haul than shorthaul operations. This fact can be
attributed in part to the somewhat
heavier work schedules of long-haul
drivers, but also to the fact that longhaul operations appear more likely to
subject drivers to irregular and rotating
schedules. The FMCSA projected two of
the alternatives, PATT and FMCSA, to
reduce accidents substantially relative
to the current rules with full
compliance. Much of their effectiveness
stems from the greater likelihood of
moving towards a 24-hour work-rest
cycle with decreased schedule rotation;
they also allowed for increased sleep
during the workweek. Reductions in
short-haul crashes were much smaller
than the reductions in long-haul
crashes, both in relative and absolute
terms.

Changes in Fatigue-related Fatalities
Due to Schedule Changes
Beyond valuing the benefits of the
alternatives, it is useful to present the
changes in fatalities that they cause.
Estimating fatigue-related fatalities and
changes in them under each alternative
can be done most easily by referring to
the total annual number of fatalities in
truck crashes, presented in RIA Exhibit
8–1, splitting that number between longhaul and short-haul operations using the
data presented in RIA Exhibit 8–3, and
then multiplying by the fatigue-related
percentages by alternative shown in RIA
Exhibit 8–14. Changes in fatalities can
then be calculated by comparing the
fatigue-related fatalities for the different
alternatives.
RIA Exhibit 8–1 gives the total annual
fatalities in truck crashes as 5,346; this
is slightly larger than the number of
fatal crashes because some crashes
cause multiple fatalities. Of these, 61.8

percent or 3,304 are estimated to occur
in long-haul operations, with the other
2,042 in short-haul operations. Among
the long-haul fatalities, the FMCSA
concentrated on the 85.4 percent or
2,821 that it estimated to occur in those
portions of the long-haul sector that
would be most affected by the rules (i.e.,
excluding team-driver and LTL
operations).
Multiplying the 2,821 long-haul
fatalities and 2,042 short-haul fatalities
by the fatigue-related percentages
shown in RIA Exhibit 8–15 yields
fatigue-related fatalities. For the Status
Quo, these calculations yielded
estimates of 316 for long-haul and 80 for
short-haul, for a total of 396. For the
alternatives, the estimates are shown
below in Table 2 (RIA Exhibit 9–7). The
table also shows the changes in fatalities
relative to the current rules with full
compliance.

TABLE 2.—ANNUAL FATIGUE-RELATED FATALITIES BY ALTERNATIVE
[Numbers in parentheses are negative]
Current/
100%
Long-haul:
Fatalities in Crashes Attributable to Fatigue ........................................................................
Differences by Alternative Relative to Current/100% ...........................................................
Short-haul:
Fatalities in Crashes Attributable to Fatigue ........................................................................
Differences Relative to Current/100% ..................................................................................

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PATT

ATA

FMCSA

240
NA

176
(64)

287
47

201
(39)

77
NA

71
(5)

78
1

75
(2)

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TABLE 2.—ANNUAL FATIGUE-RELATED FATALITIES BY ALTERNATIVE—Continued
[Numbers in parentheses are negative]
Current/
100%
Total:
Fatalities in Crashes Attributable to Fatigue ..........................................................
Differences by Alternative Relative to Current/100% ............................................

PATT

317
NA

247
(70)

ATA

365
48

FMCSA

276
(41)

Source: RIA Exhibits 8–1 and 9–6. Totals do not add due to rounding.

Adjustments to Benefits Due to
Secondary Effects
The crash reduction benefits shown in
Table 1 (RIA Exhibit 9–6) include only
effects of schedule changes on driver
fatigue. While these are the primary
effects of HOS rules, two secondary
effects need to be considered. First, the
changes in drivers resulting from the
schedule changes and mode shifts,
presented in Tables 5 and 9 (RIA

Exhibits 9–1 and 9–5), will result in
changes in the number of relatively
inexperienced drivers in the industry.
As described in RIA Section 8.7, these
drivers tend to have somewhat higher
accident rates than the average driver,
even over the fairly long time horizon
considered in this analysis. Second, the
changes in long-haul Vehicle Miles
Traveled (VMT) resulting from the mode
shift can be expected to result in

proportionate changes in long-haul
accidents. Both of these secondary
effects are presented in Table 3 (RIA
Exhibit 9–8), which shows the effects in
terms of their impacts on benefits:
increased crashes are shown as negative
impacts on benefits in the exhibit, while
reduced crashes are shown as positive
values. The table also shows the total
benefits of each alternative after the
adjustments for these secondary effects.

TABLE 3.—ADJUSTMENTS TO BENEFITS DUE TO SECONDARY EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES: NEW DRIVERS AND MODE
SHIFT
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT
Change in Benefits due to New Long-haul Drivers .......................................................................................
Change in Benefits due to New Short-haul Drivers ......................................................................................
Change in Benefits due to New Long-haul and Short-haul Drivers ..............................................................
Changes in Benefits due to Increases in Long-haul VMT Due to Mode Shift ..............................................
Change in Benefits due to Both Secondary Effects ......................................................................................
Total Unadjusted Benefits (from Table 1 above) ..........................................................................................
Total Adjusted Benefits ..................................................................................................................................

(51)
(70)
(121)
61
(60)
400
341

ATA
67
4
71
(69)
2
(275)
(272)

FMCSA
49
(6)
42
(48)
(5)
234
228

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–6. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Along with these adjustments to
benefits, there would be small
adjustments to the changes in fatalities.

These adjustments are shown in Table
4 (RIA Exhibit 9–9) below.

TABLE 4.—ADJUSTMENTS TO CHANGES IN FATALITIES DUE TO SECONDARY EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES, RELATIVE TO THE
CURRENT RULES WITH FULL COMPLIANCE
[Values in parentheses are negative]
PATT
Increase in Long-haul Fatalities due to New Drivers ....................................................................................
Increase in Short-haul Fatalities due to New Drivers ...................................................................................
Increase in Total Fatalities due to New Drivers ............................................................................................
Increase in Long-haul Fatalities due to Changes in Long-haul VMT ...........................................................
Net Increase in Fatalities due to Secondary Effects .....................................................................................
Total Unadjusted Change in Fatalities ..........................................................................................................
Total Adjusted Change in Fatalities ..............................................................................................................

9
11
20
(11)
9
(70)
(61)

ATA
(12)
(1)
(13)
12
0
48
48

FMCSA
(9)
1
(8)
8
1
(41)
(40)

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–7. Totals do not add due to rounding.

Costs of the Alternatives
This section presents the results of the
cost analysis. First, the FMCSA
summarizes the required changes in
drivers for long-haul and short-haul
operations. Initially, the changes are
shown under assumptions of constant
demand for trucking services; the
adjustment for mode shifts is presented

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later. The agency later presents the
implications to costs of these changes in
numbers of drivers.
Given the primary changes in drivers
and costs, FMCSA considered two
secondary effects: changes in drivers’
wages, and mode shifts between longhaul truck and rail. Feedback from these
secondary changes would, in theory,

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cause further ramifications, but these
are not analyzed due to their small
magnitude.
Table 5 (RIA Exhibit 9–1) presents the
percentage changes in drivers required
that were calculated in the analysis of
changes in operations, and then shows
their implications for total numbers of
drivers on the basis of the FMCSA’s

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22495

estimates of total long-haul and shorthaul drivers subject to this final rule.

TABLE 5.—CHANGES IN DRIVERS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO HOS LIMITS RELATIVE TO CURRENT RULES WITH FULL
COMPLIANCE
[Values in parentheses are negative]
PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Percentage Change:
Long-haul ......................................................................................................................................
Short-haul .....................................................................................................................................
Numbers:
Long-haul ......................................................................................................................................
Short-haul .....................................................................................................................................

4.0%
7.7%

(5.3)%
(0.4)%

(3.9)%
0.7%

60,000
115,500

(79,500)
(6,000)

(58,500)
10,500

Total .......................................................................................................................................

175,500

(85,500)

(48,000)

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–1.

Table 6 (RIA Exhibit 9–2) shows, for
the long-haul sector, the cost
implications of the changes in drivers
shown in Table 5 (RIA Exhibit 9–1). The
cost changes are divided into directly
driver-related cost changes, and the
costs of non-driver related changes that
are necessary as a result of the changes
in numbers of drivers. For each
alternative, there are costs related to

new driver wages and benefits, which
counteract the changes in wages and
benefits for current drivers whose hours
of work have changed. The net cost (or
cost savings) for the drivers comes about
because the per-hour cost of work that
has been shifted between existing
drivers and newly hired drivers is not
the same for the two groups: average
employment costs for newly hired

drivers tend to be higher than the perhour cost of extra hours for existing
drivers, in part because of fixed payroll
costs (e.g., benefits) per driver. Other
costs include costs for purchasing,
maintaining, insuring, and parking
additional tractors and trailers for the
new drivers, and hiring a larger staff of
non-driving personnel to handle larger
numbers of drivers.

TABLE 6.—DIRECT COST CHANGES—LONG-HAUL
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
Cost category

PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Driver Labor Cost ....................................................................................................................................
Avoided Labor Wages ......................................................................................................................
Avoided Labor Benefits ....................................................................................................................
New Labor Wages ............................................................................................................................
New Labor Benefits ..........................................................................................................................
Other Costs ..............................................................................................................................................
Non-driver Labor ...............................................................................................................................
Trucks ...............................................................................................................................................
Parking ..............................................................................................................................................
Insurance ..........................................................................................................................................
Maintenance .....................................................................................................................................
Recruitment ......................................................................................................................................

287
(1,953)
(117)
1,799
558
478
11
228
54
40
70
75

(792)
2,258
136
(2,433)
(754)
(563)
(32)
(216)
(72)
(52)
(93)
(99)

(636)
1,546
92
(1,736)
(538)
(437)
(25)
(179)
(53)
(39)
(68)
(73)

Total Costs ................................................................................................................................

764

(1,356)

(1,073)

Table 7 (RIA Exhibit 9–3) shows
similar calculations for short-haul

operations, and Table 8 (RIA Exhibit 9–
4) reports total direct cost changes.

TABLE 7.—DIRECT COST CHANGES—SHORT-HAUL
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
Cost category

PATT

Driver Labor Cost ....................................................................................................................................
Avoided Labor Wages ......................................................................................................................
Avoided Labor Benefits ....................................................................................................................
New Labor Wages ............................................................................................................................
New Labor Benefits ..........................................................................................................................
Other Costs ..............................................................................................................................................
Non-driver Labor ...............................................................................................................................
Trucks ...............................................................................................................................................
Parking ..............................................................................................................................................
Insurance ..........................................................................................................................................
Maintenance .....................................................................................................................................

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1,557
(3,655)
(219)
3,798
1,633
1,038
62
517
105
76
134

28APR2

ATA
(38)
165
10
(150)
(64)
(49)
(2)
(23)
(5)
(4)
(7)

FMCSA
90
(298)
(17)
309
96
78
4
33
10
7
12

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TABLE 7.—DIRECT COST CHANGES—SHORT-HAUL—Continued
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
Cost category

PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Recruitment ......................................................................................................................................

144

(7)

13

Total Costs ................................................................................................................................

2,595

(87)

168

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–3. Totals do not add due to rounding.

TABLE 8.—TOTAL DIRECT COST CHANGES
(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Long-haul .................................................................................................................................................
Short-haul ................................................................................................................................................

764
2,595

(1,356)
(87)

(1,073)
168

Total ..................................................................................................................................................

3,360

(1,442)

(905)

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–4. Totals do not add due to rounding.

The FMCSA analyzed two secondary
effects of the need to change the number
of drivers in response to the HOS rule
alternatives: wage rate changes due to
the need to draw new drivers into the
industry, and mode shifts in response to
changes in the costs of long-haul
operations. The changes in drivers
shown in Table 5 (RIA Exhibit 9–1)

were first translated into changes in
market wage rates for drivers using a
driver supply elasticity of 5.0. The
resulting percentage changes in wages
are shown in the second line of Table
9 (RIA Exhibit 9–5). The effects of that
increase on the total costs of the longhaul sector are presented in the next
line, followed by the total increase in

long-haul costs including both the costs
for changes in labor and capital, and the
costs due to the wage increases. This
total cost increase is then compared to
the total costs for all long-haul
operations to yield a percentage increase
in long-haul costs.

TABLE 9.—LONG-HAUL COST CHANGES INCLUDING WAGE INCREASES AND RESULTING MODE SHIFTS
[(Costs in millions of dollars per year) (values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT
Direct HOS-Induced Costs, Long-haul Only ...........................................................................................
Percentage Change in Wages due to Driver Supply Elasticity ...............................................................
Increase in Long-haul Wage Bill due to Wage Increases .......................................................................
Total Increase in Long-haul Costs ..........................................................................................................
Percentage Increase in Long-haul Costs ................................................................................................
Percentage Change in Long-haul VMT due to Mode Shift .....................................................................
Change in Long-haul Drivers due to Mode Shift .....................................................................................

Given this percentage increase in
long-haul costs, the assumption that this
cost increase is passed on to shippers,
a measure of the sensitivity of mode
choice to prices, and an estimate of the
portion of the long-haul sector that is
sensitive to competition from rail, the
FMCSA estimated the percentage
change in long-haul VMT that would
result from changes in the mode split.

Assuming a constant relationship
between drivers and VMT allowed the
agency to estimate the change in longhaul drivers resulting from the projected
mode shift. The long-haul wage
increases and changes in mode shifts are
not included elsewhere in the RIA,
because these represent transfers in
welfare among groups and not net social
costs to society.

ATA

764
1.2%
752
1,517%
0.4%
(0.32)%
(4,875)

FMCSA

(1,356)
(0.6)%
(366)
(1,722)%
(0.4)%
0.37%
5,535

(1,073)
(0.3)%
(206)
(1,279)%
(0.3)%
0.25%
3,820

Net Benefits
The net social benefits of the
alternatives, relative to the current rules
with full compliance, are found by
subtracting the social costs from the
benefits. The results are shown in Table
10 (modified RIA Exhibit 9–10), below.

TABLE 10.—NET BENEFITS RELATIVE TO CURRENT RULES WITH FULL COMPLIANCE
[(Millions of dollars per year) (values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT
Total Benefits .............................................................................................................................
Total Cost ..................................................................................................................................
Net Benefits ...............................................................................................................................

ATA

341
3,360
(3,019)

Source: RIA Exhibits 9–4 and 9–8.

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(272)
(1,442)
1,170

FMCSA
228
(905)
1,133

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Discussion of Net Benefit Results
The analyses presented above show
that both the ATA and FMCSA
alternatives have net benefits compared
to the current rules with full
compliance. Of these two alternatives,
only the FMCSA alternative provides
positive benefits compared to the
current rules with full compliance; the
ATA alternative has negative benefits
that are outweighed by larger cost
savings. The PATT alternative has
somewhat higher benefits than the
FMCSA alternative, but imposes costs
that outweigh the additional benefits.

The relative costs and benefits of the
alternatives differ considerably between
the long-haul and short-haul segments.
Most of the costs of the more protective
alternatives, PATT and FMCSA, arise in
the short-haul segment, but all of their
benefits come from reducing long-haul
crashes. Fatigue and fatigue-related
crashes are considerably less common
in short-haul operations, and the
alternatives that limit hours of work
appear to be unlikely to make
substantial reductions in those crashes.
On the other hand, the need to hire
many more drivers in response to the
restrictions would cause increases in

crashes over the ten-year time horizon
of this study, and those additional
crashes would counterbalance the small
predicted reductions in fatigue-related
crashes.
In long-haul alternatives, though, the
fraction of crashes attributable to fatigue
is considerably larger, and the two
protective alternatives are predicted to
reduce those crashes considerably.
Considering the long-haul segment only,
the FMCSA alternative is superior on
net benefit grounds to the ATA and
PATT alternatives as well as the current
rules with full compliance.

TABLE 11.—NET BENEFITS BY LENGTH OF HAUL RELATIVE TO CURRENT RULES WITH FULL COMPLIANCE
[(Millions of dollars per year) (values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT
Long-haul:
Total Benefits ....................................................................................................................................
Total Cost .........................................................................................................................................

ATA

FMCSA

374
764

(269)
(1,356)

225
(1,073)

Total Net Benefits ......................................................................................................................
Short-haul:
Total Benefits ....................................................................................................................................
Total Cost .........................................................................................................................................

(390)

1,087

1,298

(34)
2,595

(4)
(87)

4
168

Total Net Benefits ......................................................................................................................

(2,629)

83

(164)

Source: RIA Exhibits 9–4, 9–4, and 9–8.

Limitations and Sensitivities
One important source of complete
certainty is the magnitude of the effects
of ‘‘time on task’’ on crash risks. As
discussed in RIA Chapter 8.1.5, there is
likely to be an increase in risk as
continuous hours of driving increase
that is independent of the effects of
circadian rhythms and sleep deficits.
The FMCSA was not able to model this
independent effect, however, due to
uncertainty about its magnitude for very
long hours of driving. If that effect were
actually large, the more protective
alternatives would show relatively
higher benefits. Uncertainty about the
time-on-task effect is particularly great
for very long hours of driving, in part
because very long driving shifts are not
permitted. They are therefore both rare
and difficult to study. In particular, the
16-hour driving shifts that would be
allowed at times under one of the
alternatives (a provision that we did not
model for this analysis) would be very
rare and hard to study under real world
conditions.
Another place where complete
certainty may not be found is in the 8.15
percent estimate of crashes in the status
quo that can be attributed to fatigue. The
NPRM regulatory evaluation included
an estimate that 15 percent of all crashes
were fatigue-relevant. The estimate of 15

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percent was supported in the docket
and at public hearings by some safety
groups, while the ATA and others
argued that the correct value was closer
to 4 to 5 percent. The NPRM’s estimate
was comprised of 2 separate
components: 5 percent fatigue crashes,
and 10 percent fatigue relevant crashes.
The 5 percent figure came from FMCSA
and NHTSA summary of data from
NHTSA databases and other studies.
Most of these databases and studies
estimated fatigue by counting the
number of citations for fatigue from
police accident reports. The 10 percent
fatigue relevant figure was based on
FMCSA’s best estimate at the time about
the percent of inattention crashes that
are at least indirectly related to fatigue.
The agency had no studies to suggest
that 10 percent was correct, but the data
suggested that some percent of
inattention crashes were related to
driver fatigue.
Because of these criticisms, and
because we did not have a specific
reason to pick 10 percent, FMCSA
revisited the NPRM’s estimate in this
regulatory evaluation. The agency only
used data from police reports and
national databases, with no qualitative
adjustments. As explained in Chapter 8
of the RIA, we used FARS data from
1997 through 2000, and found that

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fatigue was cited in an average of 7.25
percent of crashes; 4.33 percent of
crashes were cited for inattention. The
FMCSA sponsored study by Hanowski,
Wierwille, Garness, Dingus, Impact of
Local/Short Haul Operations on Driver
Fatigue, found that fatigue was a factor
in 20.8 percent of inattention crashes.
Therefore, FMCSA added 0.9 percent
(20.8 times 4.33) to 7.25 to obtain our
final estimate of 8.15 percent.
As noted in Discussion of Net Benefit
Results above, reviewing the costs and
benefits by length of haul reveals that
the alternatives have very different cost/
benefit profiles for long-haul compared
to short-haul operations. The FMCSA
alternative, for example, provides net
benefits in long-haul operations, but has
net costs for short-haul.
Although the estimated costs for
imposing new HOS requirements on
short haul motor carrier operations
exceeds the potential benefits for that
specific segment of the industry, the
population of drivers employed by these
carriers and the VMT by them each year
suggests that it is necessary to include
short haul operations in this final rule.
The population of short haul drivers
is approximately equal to the
population of long-haul drivers, about
1.5 million drivers in each of the two
categories. However, the vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) by short-haul drivers is

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about one half that of the long-haul
drivers, with short-haul operations
accounting for 80 billion VMT versus
166 billion VMT for long-haul
operations. When consideration is given
for VMT, short-haul operations
represent a significant risk of accident
involvement that is comparable to, if not
greater than, the risks presented by longhaul operations. While the economic
analyses of the costs and benefits
indicates that most of the costs of
fatigue-related accidents, and the
benefits of this final rule appear to be
associated with long-haul operations,
the obligation of the FMCSA to improve
to the greatest extent practicable the
safety of all CMV operations
necessitates the inclusion of short-haul
operations.
The research studies FMCSA
reviewed as part of the rulemaking
process indicates that the current HOS
rules do not provide drivers with
sufficient opportunities for restorative
sleep. Under the current rules, a driver
operating on a minimally compliant
schedule would only be provided eight
consecutive hours off duty. This eighthour period includes the time for the
driver to leave his/her work-reporting
location, travel to a location for rest,
rest, and return to the work-reporting
location. Generally, this means that
under the current regulations, the driver
would have significantly less than eight
hours to obtain meaningful rest. The
consequences of this type of minimally
compliant schedule are typically most
severe during emergency driving
maneuvers or other high-risk driving
tasks such as driving in inclement
weather or in heavy traffic, as the

driving demands may exceed the
capability of the driver suffering from a
decreased level of alertness. The risks
and potential consequences are present
for both long-haul and short-haul
operations such that excluding shorthaul operations from the final rule
would needlessly subject the motoring
public to an unnecessarily high level of
risk. The risk of an accident that could
be attributable in whole or in part to a
driver’s minimally compliant work-rest
cycle, could be significantly reduced if
short-haul operations are covered by the
final rule.
Since the overall benefits of the
rulemaking exceed the overall costs for
the freight transporters operating at full
compliance, FMCSA believes the
inclusion of short-haul operations in the
final rule is appropriate despite the
seemingly disproportionate costs of
compliance with the rule. There is
clearly a need to ensure better
opportunities for restorative sleep for all
CMV drivers working minimally
compliant schedules. Moving forward
with a final rule that excludes shorthaul drivers would fragment this
initiative in such a manner that it may
prove extremely difficult to complete a
separate rulemaking at a later date that
would provide a better potential safety
outcome at a lower cost than this final
rule. Given the choice between (1)
continuing to allow minimally
compliant work-rest cycles to be used
by approximately half the regulated
drivers for the sake of improving
estimated benefit-to-cost ratios, or (2)
sacrificing a portion of the benefits of
the rulemaking to ensure that all drivers
transporting freight are required to

adhere to work-rest cycles that are more
consistent with sleep research, the
FMCSA has chosen to ensure the
highest practicable level of safety, based
on the data currently available.
The observation that the alternatives
are less cost-effective in short-haul
operations was part of the FMCSA
staff’s motivation for providing more
flexibility in the staff alternative for
short-haul drivers, allowing one 16-hour
shift per week. The FMCSA assessed the
effects of this flexibility by examining
the costs and benefits of the staff
alternative without allowing any 16hour shifts.
As stated above under the FMCSA
Response to the Daily On-Duty Time
section, the FMCSA found that
restricting those drivers who return to
the normal work reporting location at
the end of every shift has the
unintended consequence of requiring a
significant increase in new drivers.
These new drivers would increase both
costs and crashes. The analyses showed
that by allowing these short-haul drivers
the flexibility to work up to 16 hours
one day in a week would reduce the
number of additional drivers needed for
the staff alternative. This flexibility
would result in cost savings of nearly
$500 million and safety benefits of
nearly $10 million.
With this change to the FMCSA staff
alternative, its net benefits compared to
current rules with full compliance
would drop to about one half of one
billion dollars per year. These results
are shown in Table 12 (RIA Exhibit 9–
12).

TABLE 12.—NET BENEFITS BY LENGTH OF HAUL RELATIVE TO CURRENT RULES WITH FULL COMPLIANCE
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
PATT
Long-haul:
Total Benefits ....................................................................................
Total Cost .........................................................................................

ATA

FMCSA

FMCSA, without
short-haul
flexibility

374
764

(269)
(1,356)

225
(1,073)

225
(1,073)

(390)

1,087

1,298

1,298

Total Net Benefits ......................................................................
Short-haul:
Total Benefits ....................................................................................
Total Cost .........................................................................................

(34)
2,595

(4)
(87)

4
168

(5)
641

Total Net Benefits ......................................................................

(2,629)

83

(164)

(646)

Total Net Benefits ......................................................................

(3,019)

1,170

Total:
Source: RIA Exhibit 9–11. Totals may not add due to rounding.

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Costs and Benefits Relative to the Status
Quo
This section reviews the costs and
benefits presented in chapter 9 of the
RIA relative to a baseline representing
the status quo. Table 13 (RIA Exhibit 9–
13) presents the changes in drivers
needed relative to the Status Quo

scenario; because the difference in
drivers needed between the Status Quo
and the Current Rules/100 percent is 8.1
percent for long-haul, that amount was
added to the estimates that were
presented in Table 5 (RIA Exhibit 9–1)
for each of the alternatives. Similarly,
the amount shown in the other rows of
the ‘‘Current/100 percent’’ column in

Table 13 (RIA Exhibit 9–13) was added
to the estimates presented in Table 5
(RIA Exhibit 9–1) for each of the other
alternatives. Because achieving full
compliance with the current rule would
require more drivers, all of the values in
Table 13 are higher than those in Table
5.

TABLE 13.—CHANGES IN DRIVERS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO HOS LIMITS, RELATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO
Current/100
percent

PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Percentage Change:
Long-haul ..................................................................................................
Short-haul .................................................................................................

8.1
0.7

12.1
8.4

2.8
0.3

4.2
1.4

Numbers:
Long-haul ..................................................................................................
Short-haul .................................................................................................

121,500
10,800

181,500
126,300

42,000
4,800

63,000
21,300

Total ...................................................................................................

132,300

307,800

46,800

84,300

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–1.

The direct costs of the alternatives
relative to the Status Quo are shown in
Table 14 (RIA Exhibit 9–14). This
exhibit shows the costs of the current
rules with full compliance in the fourth

column from the right. The other
columns show selected cost data from
Table 6 and 7 with the cost of
compliance with the current rules
added. Because there would be costs for

compliance with the current rules, the
costs of each of the alternatives are
higher relative to the status quo than
relative to the current rule with full
compliance.

TABLE 14.—DIRECT COST CHANGES RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO
[Millions of dollars per year]
Current/100
percent

Cost category
Long-haul:
Driver Labor Cost .....................................................................................................
Other Costs ..............................................................................................................

PATT

ATA

FMCSA

1,185
769

1,472
1,247

393
206

550
332

Total Costs ........................................................................................................
Short-haul:
Driver Labor Cost .....................................................................................................
Other Costs ..............................................................................................................

1,954

2,719

599

882

143
90

1,700
1,128

105
41

233
168

Total Costs ........................................................................................................

232

2,827

146

400

Total Costs, Long-haul and Short-haul .............................................................

2,187

5,546

744

1,282

Source: RIA Exhibits 9–2 and 9–3. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Tables 15 and 16 (RIA Exhibits 9–15
and 9–16) show the benefits and
adjusted benefits of compliance with the
current rule, as well as the alternatives,
relative to the status quo. These tables

are based on Tables 1 and 3, with the
benefits of compliance with the current
rules added to the values in those tables.
Because there would be substantial
benefits to achieving full compliance

with the current rule, the benefits
shown in these tables are higher than
those shown in Tables 1 and 3.

TABLE 15.— VALUE OF CRASHES AVOIDED DUE TO OPERATIONAL CHANGES RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO
[Millions of dollars per year]
Current/100
percent

PATT

ATA

FMCSA

Benefits of Avoided Long-haul Crashes ..........................................................................
Benefits of Avoided Short-haul Crashes .........................................................................

429
22

794
58

162
14

653
32

Total Benefits of Operational Changes ....................................................................

451

852

176

685

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–6.

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TABLE 16.—ADJUSTMENTS TO BENEFITS DUE TO SECONDARY EFFECTS OF OPTIONS RELATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
Current/100
percent
Change in Benefits due to New Long-haul Drivers .........................................................
Change in Benefits due to New Short-haul Drivers ........................................................
Change in Benefits due to New Long-haul and Short-haul Drivers ................................
Change in Benefits due to Change in Long-haul VMT ...................................................
Net Damages (i.e., Reduction in Benefits due to Secondary Effects) ............................
Total Unadjusted Benefits ...............................................................................................
Total Adjusted Benefits ....................................................................................................

PATT

(103)
(7)
(110)
101
(9)
452
443

ATA

(154)
(77)
(230)
162
(68)
851
783

FMCSA
(36)
(3)
(38)
32
(6)
176
170

(54)
(13)
(67)
54
(14)
685
671

Source: RIA Exhibit 9–8. Totals may not sum due to rounding.

Finally, Table 17 (RIA Exhibit 9–17)
shows the net benefits of compliance
with the current rule and of the

alternatives, relative to the Status Quo.
This table presents the total cost and
total benefits lines from Tables 14 and

16, and subtracts costs from benefits to
yield net benefits.

TABLE 17.—NET BENEFITS RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO
[(Millions of dollars per year) (Values in parentheses are negative)]
Current/
100%
Total Benefits ...................................................................................................................
Total Costs .......................................................................................................................
Net Benefits .....................................................................................................................

443
2,187
(1,744)

PATT

ATA

783
5,546
(4,763)

FMCSA

170
744
(574)

671
1,282
(611)

Source: RIA Exhibits 9–12 and 9–14.

Table 18 shows the impact of different
assumed baseline percentages of fatiguerelated crashes. Specifically, it includes
estimates of the benefits and number of
fatalities assuming that 5 percent and 15

percent of all current crashes are
fatigue-related (compared to a baseline
figure of 8.15 percent). These values
were chosen because the majority of the
figures submitted to the docket or in

public hearings fall within this range.
The FMCSA’s interpretation of the crash
literature indicates that it is very
unlikely that the true percent of fatiguerelated crashes falls outside this range.

TABLE 18.—SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF NUMBER OF FATALITIES USING DIFFERENT BASELINE PERCENT FATIGUE-RELATED
CRASHES
[Values in parentheses are negative]
Status
Quo
5% Baseline Fatalities ....................................................................................................................................
Change from Status Quo ................................................................................................................................
Change from 100% .........................................................................................................................................
8.15% Baseline Fatalities ...............................................................................................................................
Change from Status Quo ................................................................................................................................
Change from 100% .........................................................................................................................................
15% Baseline Fatalities ..................................................................................................................................
Change from Status Quo ................................................................................................................................
Change from 100% .........................................................................................................................................

243
0
NA
396
0
NA
729
0
NA

100%
Compliance
196
(47)
0
318
(79)
0
584
(144)
0

FMCSA
171
(71)
(24)
278
(120)
(40)
510
(219)
(75)

Numbers may not add because of rounding.

Based on Table 18, if motor carriers
were adhering fully to the current HOS
regulations, the FMCSA estimates that
between 196 and 585 fatalities would
occur each year on the Nation’s roads
because of drowsy, tired, or fatigued
CMV drivers transporting property. The
FMCSA estimates that this final rule,
when motor carriers adhere to it fully,
would save between 24 and 75 lives
each year as compared to complying
fully with the current rules.

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The RIA shows that both the ATA and
FMCSA alternatives have net benefits
compared to the current rules with full
compliance. Only the FMCSA
alternative, however, provides positive
safety benefits compared to the current
rules with full compliance; the ATA
alternative has large cost savings that
outweigh negative safety benefits. The
PATT alternative has somewhat higher
safety benefits than the FMCSA
alternative, but imposes costs that
outweigh the additional benefits.

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After careful consideration of the
regulatory impacts of the alternatives
analyzed, the FMCSA has decided to
make final the alternative proposed by
the agency staff. All of the changes are
within the range of changes proposed in
the NPRM. The FMCSA has also chosen
to maintain most existing rules for
passenger carriers, including carriers of
migrant workers.
The FMCSA believes these
requirements will increase driver
alertness and reduce fatigue problems, if

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drivers and motor carriers adhere to
them. The FMCSA has no control over
the manner in which a driver may
spend his time off duty, although some
of his spare time activities may tire him
as much as any work would do. The
FMCSA can only emphasize the driver’s
responsibility to assure himself of
adequate rest and sleep, in the time
available for this purpose, to insure
safety of his driving, and, similarly, the
motor carrier’s responsibility to see that
its drivers report for work in fit
condition.
Drivers must manage their off-duty
time intelligently if this final rule is to
be effective. Some drivers may continue
to drive more hours than this final rule
allows in order to earn more money.
Others may perform non-driving jobs
during their off-duty time; commute
long distances to and from home; or
engage in other pursuits that interfere
with their obligation to obtain proper
sleep and be prepared to drive safely.
Under this final rule, all time spent in
any work must be counted as on-duty
time, since all work can either induce
fatigue or deprive the driver of sleep.
The FMCSA believes this
economically significant and major final
rule is a reasonable balance of factors
because it provides the best
combination of increased driver
alertness and reduced numbers of
fatigue-related incidents, while
providing cost effective safety benefits
to society.
Changes Compared to May 2, 2000
NPRM
Categories of Operations
The NPRM proposed five types of
operation. As explained above, the
FMCSA has chosen to drop
categorization based on comments
showing categories created confusion,
problems for enforcement, and did not
fully meet the objective of
accommodating the diversity of the
industry.
Passenger Carrier Operations
The NPRM proposed regulating
passenger carriers the same as property
carriers. As explained in the discussion
of the comments, the FMCSA has
decided to retain the existing rules for
passenger carriers; those operators will
continue to be subject to the rules in
effect before this final rule was adopted.
NHS Act Exemptions
The NPRM proposed to maintain the
HOS exemption for groundwater well
drillers without change. It would have
narrowed the exemptions for
agricultural commodities and farmers by

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defining certain terms narrowly. Finally,
the NPRM would have subjected the
construction and utility-service-vehicle
exemptions to the proposed off-duty
time periods (56 to 32 hours) every
seven consecutive days. As explained in
the discussion of comments about NHS
Act exemptions, the FMCSA has chosen
to withdraw these proposals.
The agricultural exemption in effect
before this final rule was published will
remain in effect. The 24-hour restart
provisions applicable to drivers of
ground water well drilling rigs and
utility service vehicles, and to drivers
who transport construction materials
and equipment, will also remain in
effect. Eligible drivers, however, will
now be subject to the new 11-hour
driving limit, with no driving after the
end of the 14th hour after coming on
duty, and will be required to take 10
consecutive hours off duty. Such drivers
will also be eligible to take the
exemption in § 395.1(o) allowing up to
a 16-hour work day, when they meet the
conditions in that paragraph.

this provision, the FMCSA has decided
to withdraw the proposal.

Sleeper Berth Provision
The NPRM proposed to eliminate the
use of sleeper berths for solo drivers to
comply with the HOS rules. It would
have allowed team drivers to
accumulate 10 hours off duty in two
periods in a sleeper berth, one of which
would have to be at least 5 hours long.
As explained in the discussion of
comments on this issue, the FMCSA
will maintain the split off-duty period of
the current sleeper berth provision.
However, the agency is increasing the
requirement for cumulative off-duty
time to 10 hours for property carriers.
Thus, property-carrying drivers who use
sleeper berths may take their minimum
10 hours off-duty in two periods, the
shorter period must be at least 2 hours.
Passenger-carrying drivers who use
sleeper berths may take their minimum
8 hours off-duty in two periods, the
shorter period must be at least 2 hours.

Daily On-Duty Time
The NPRM proposed that drivers
could accumulate no more than 12
hours of driving and non-driving duty
time (15 hours for ‘‘Type 5’’ drivers) in
any 24-hour period. The FMCSA has
decided to retain the current HOS rule
for passenger-carrying drivers. Propertycarrying drivers will have an on-duty
limit of 14 hours from the start of each
tour of duty to do all work, naps, and
meal breaks. Property-carrying drivers
must not drive after 11 cumulative
hours of driving after starting each tour
of duty. Property-carrying drivers who
have returned to their normal work
reporting location each of the last five
work days (short-haul), may be on duty,
one day out of each 7-day period, for up
to 16 consecutive hours after starting the
tour of duty.

Carrier Notification of Drivers During
Their Off-Duty Hours
The NPRM proposed a kind of restart
that would be triggered by employers or
their agents violating the proposed
prohibitions against interrupting
drivers’ off-duty periods. The proposal
was designed to address complaints the
agency has received over the years
regarding unreasonable calls from
dispatchers and other carrier employees
that caused drivers to lose the
opportunity to sleep. As proposed, such
an interruption would start the full
interrupted off-duty period over again
from the time of the interruption. As
explained above in the discussion of

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Daily Work-Rest Cycle
The NPRM proposed duty and offduty periods that would have added up
to a regularly recurring 24-hour work
day. As explained in the discussion of
the relevant comments above, the
FMCSA will maintain the current rules
for passenger carriers. The rules for
property carriers are being modified to
reduce the allowable amount of
backward rotation of the ‘‘daily’’
schedule.
Daily Off-Duty Time
The NPRM proposed consecutive
daily off-duty periods for obtaining
sleep from 9 to 12 hours depending on
the category of operation. As explained
earlier in this document, the FMCSA
has chosen to maintain the rule
requiring 8 consecutive hours off-duty
for passenger carriers and to increase
the minimum daily off-duty period to 10
consecutive hours for property carriers.

Distinctions in Duty Time
The expert panel assembled by the
agency to review the options under
consideration before publication of the
NPRM recommended eliminating the
distinction between on-duty time and
driving time. The scientific basis for the
recommendation was the conclusion
that driving is no more tiring than many
of the other tasks a truck driver would
be called upon to perform.
In addition to striving for a
productivity-neutral outcome, the
agency’s practical basis for proposing
the elimination was to reduce the
paperwork burden. Under the existing
rules, drivers are required to account for
both driving time and non-driving duty
time. Eliminating the distinction,

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moreover, would have achieved
consistency with the terminology used
by the DOL, allowing FMCSA to rely on
DOL records in place of driver records
of duty status.
The agency has decided to continue
the distinction between driving time
and on-duty time. Within the limits of
a tour of duty usually lasting no more
than 14 hours, the FMCSA believes
there is little doubt that modern CMVs
can be driven safely up to 11 hours,
particularly because rest breaks can be
expected to naturally occur during the
course of that tour. The FMCSA believes
that the last hour of a driver’s duty tour
would be expected to be driving time
that comes near the end of a 13- or 14hour workday and is persuaded that 11
hours is a more reasonable limit.
FMCSA will continue to rely on the
driver-prepared records of duty status
and the documents that support those
records.
Weekly or Longer Cycle
The scientific basis for proposing
weekly restrictions is the finding from
research studies that sleep debt from
multiple periods of insufficient (poor
quality or insufficient quantity) sleep is
the major cause of cumulative fatigue.
The recommended countermeasure is a
recovery period during which
restorative sleep may be obtained and
the sleep debt repaid. The concept of a
weekly recovery period was presented
in the NPRM in the definition of
workweek, i.e., ‘‘any fixed and regularly
recurring period of seven consecutive
workdays,’’ and in the number of hours
required to be off-duty before beginning
the next workweek.
The FMCSA has concluded that the
current 60-hour in 7-day and 70-hour in
8-day limitations continue to be
generally acceptable for CMV drivers
and will retain those limits.

Weekly Recovery Periods
The NPRM proposed to require
between 32 and 56 consecutive hours
off duty every seven consecutive days.
As explained previously in this
document, the FMCSA has decided to
retain the current requirement for
passenger-carrying drivers, i.e., these
drivers may not drive passengercarrying vehicles after accumulating 60
hours on-duty in any 7 consecutive days
or 70 hours in any 8 consecutive days.
If the driver accumulated duty time at
the maximum rate he/she would reach
the limit in 41⁄4 days and would have to
take three consecutive days off-duty
before he/she could drive CMVs again.
The FMCSA is modifying the rule for
property-carrying drivers to include a
restart provision. A property-carrying
driver may not drive CMVs after
accumulating 60 hours on-duty in any 7
consecutive days or 70 hours in any 8
consecutive days. If the driver
accumulated duty time at the maximum
rate, he/she would reach the limit in
approximately 5 days and would have
to take at least 34 consecutive hours offduty before he/she could drive CMVs
again. However, the driver could start a
new seven- or eight-day period anytime
he/she took 34 consecutive hours off
duty.
Short Rest Breaks During a Work Shift
The NPRM proposed that additional
off-duty time for personal reasons such
as mid-shift meals, naps, and rest break
periods would be allowed, but would
result in no extension of the workday.
As explained in the discussion of the
comments on this provision, the
FMCSA has decided to continue
allowing off-duty periods for passengercarrying drivers that may result in
extension of the workday. The FMCSA
will allow property-carrying drivers to
take off-duty mid-shift meal, nap, and

other rest break periods, but those
breaks will not extend the workday.
Electronic On-Board Recording Devices
The NPRM proposed to require
EOBRs for Type 1 and 2, i.e., long-haul
and regional operations, that would
have replaced driver-prepared paper
records of duty status. The FMCSA has
decided to maintain the current
requirement for driver-prepared paper
records of duty status, while allowing
automatic recording devices to be used
in lieu of the driver-prepared paper
records of duty status at the motor
carrier’s option.
Use of Department of Labor Time
Records
The NPRM proposed to use U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) time records
for Types 3, 4, and 5 drivers (i.e., localsplit shift, local and primary work not
driving) and to remove the distancebased limitation on use of such time
records. As explained in the discussion
of comments about the compliance and
enforcement provisions of the NPRM,
the FMCSA has chosen to maintain the
current requirement for driver-prepared
records of duty status and timecard
records for 100 air-mile radius drivers.
Conclusion
This final rule incorporates the
FMCSA staff alternative because it
provides the best combination of
increased driver alertness and reduced
numbers of fatigue-related incidents,
while providing cost effective safety
benefits to society.
Section-by-Section Analysis
The FMCSA’s jurisdiction over the
HOS regulations for motor carriers and
drivers is shown in Table 19. Motor
carriers and drivers are also subject to
applicable State motor vehicle and
highway safety laws and regulations.

TABLE 19.—APPLICABILITY OF FMCSA HOURS OF SERVICE (HOS) OF DRIVERS RULEMAKING
If you operate a:

In interstate commerce

CMV, i.e., a motor vehicle(s) that has any of the following four characteristics:
1. A gross vehicle weight, gross vehicle weight rating or gross combination weight rating of at least
4,537 kilograms (10,001 pounds) whichever is
greater; or

You must comply with all
FMCSA HOS regulations.2

In intrastate commerce

You are not subject to the FMCSA HOS regulations.
You may currently be subject to similar State rules
and may be subject to the final rule in this document,
if your State or local government adopts final rules in
order to participate in the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, 49 CFR part 350.

2. Is designed or used to transport more than 8
passengers, including the driver, for compensation; or
3. Is designed or used to transport more than 15
passengers, including the driver, and is not used
to transport passengers for compensation; or

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TABLE 19.—APPLICABILITY OF FMCSA HOURS OF SERVICE (HOS) OF DRIVERS RULEMAKING—Continued
If you operate a:

In interstate commerce

In intrastate commerce

4. Is used to transport hazardous materials in quantities requiring the vehicle to be marked or placarded under the Hazardous Materials Regulations
(49 CFR part 172, subparts D & F).
2 Most motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. The FLSA exemption from the
overtime pay requirement applies only to certain employees of interstate motor carrier employers subject to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (Pub.
L. 74–255, 49 Stat. 543, August 9, 1935), but not to those subject only to the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98–554, October 30,
1984) (98 Stat. 2829). The only substantial group of interstate carrier employers subject to the 1984 Act that are not also subject to the 1935
MCA are private motor carriers of passengers (e.g., churches, musicians, civil and charitable organizations, scouts, companies transporting their
own employees, etc.). See 29 CFR 782.2(b)(1).

Appendix B to Part 385 Explanation of
Safety Rating Process
Section VII of appendix B to part 385
lists acute and critical regulations,
which play an important role in
assigning a safety rating. The
descriptions of some of the HOS
regulations listed there are being
updated to conform to the requirements
of this final rule. For example,
§ 395.3(a)(1), a critical rule, is now
summarized as ‘‘requiring or permitting
a driver to drive more than 10 hours.’’
While § 395.3(a)(1) remains critical, the
new summary will say: ‘‘requiring or
permitting a property-carrying
commercial motor vehicle driver to
drive more than 11 hours.’’ Updating
and adding appropriate citations allows
the agency to accurately update the
safety rating process on the compliance
date of the rule. The citations being
updated and added include
§§ 395.1(h)(1)(i), 395.1(h)(1)(ii),
395.1(h)(1)(iii), 395.1(h)(1)(iv),
395.1(h)(2)(i), 395.1(h)(2)(ii),
395.1(h)(2)(iii), 395.1(h)(2)(iv), 395.1(o),
395.3(a)(1), 395.3(a)(2) 395.3(a)(2),
395.3(b)(1), 395.3(b)(2), 395.3(c)(1),
395.3(c)(2), 395.5(a)(1), 395.5(a)(1),
395.5(a)(2), 395.5(b)(1), and 395.5(b)(2).
Section 390.23
Regulations

Relief From

Paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 390.23
address the restart provisions the agency
provided in the emergency relief
exemption of July 30, 1992 (57 FR
33638, at 33647). This rule amends the
daily and weekly restart provisions for
normal duty in interstate commerce and
the agency believes it must conform the
emergency relief exemption to the
standard being adopted today. This
amendment requires that drivers who
provide direct assistance, as defined by
§ 390.5, to emergency relief efforts must,
before returning to normal duty in
interstate commerce, (1) take at least 10
consecutive hours off-duty, if they have
driven more than 11 hours or have been
on duty more than 14 hours, and (2)
take at least 34 consecutive hours off

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duty, if they have been on duty more
than 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in
8 days.
Section 395.0 Compliance Date for
Certain Requirements for Hours of
Service of Drivers.
The agency is adding § 395.0 to
specify when motor carriers and drivers
must comply with this final rule. The
effective date cited in the DATES:
heading at the top of this document is
the date that this final rule’s
amendments affect the current Code of
Federal Regulations published by the
Government Printing Office. Motor
carriers of property and drivers of
property-carrying commercial motor
vehicles may not begin to comply with
this final rule on that date.
The compliance date is the date that
motor carriers of property and drivers
must begin to comply with this final
rule. Motor carriers of property, drivers
of property-carrying commercial motor
vehicles, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement officers, and the FMCSA
must do many necessary things before
the rules can be enforced. The FMCSA
must update motor carrier information,
compliance, and enforcement computer
systems and manuals. The FMCSA has
eight computer software packages where
it must find the correct code, write new
code, test the new software, and
distribute it to its division offices and
State and local partners.
The agency must develop training,
distribute training materials, and ensure
training materials are read, taught, and
understood by approximately 8,000
Federal, State, and local law
enforcement officers. The agency also
plans to provide training and
presentations to the public about the
new rules.
Motor carriers must develop training
or use FMCSA’s training materials,
distribute training materials, and ensure
training materials are read, taught, and
understood by the millions of drivers
engaged in interstate commerce who
transport freight and other types of
property. The FMCSA must also ensure

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the CVSA updates its Out-Of-Service
criteria. The FMCSA cannot do its part,
and cannot expect motor carriers to do
their part, within 60 days after today.
The agency believes a compliance
date on a Sunday will be the least
burdensome to all carriers and
enforcement officials. Most affected
carriers subject to this final rule operate
on a Sunday to Saturday basis and most
affected carriers would suffer less
disruption to their operations if the rule
took effect at the beginning of a new
week. Therefore, the agency is providing
a compliance date when all carriers,
drivers, and enforcement officials will
switch from the current rule to the new
rule: Sunday, January 4, 2004.
Finally, this section is only necessary
for a few months until all affected motor
carriers learn about the new rule and
begin complying with it. Therefore, the
FMCSA has added language to the
DATES section that will only make this
section effective in the Code of Federal
Regulations temporarily from June 27,
2003, through June 30, 2004. After June
30, 2004, the Government Printing
Office will remove this section from the
Code of Federal Regulations. Thus, the
October, 1, 2004, edition and all
subsequent editions of the Code of
Federal Regulations will not contain
§ 395.0.
Section 395.1 Scope of Rules in This
Part
Section 395.1 is amended by revising
paragraphs (b), (e)(3), (e)(4), (g), (h), and
(j) to use the new off-duty, on-duty, and
driving limits for drivers of propertycarrying vehicles, while maintaining the
current off-duty, on-duty, and driving
limits for drivers of passenger-carrying
vehicles.
Paragraph (b) is the adverse driving
condition exception. It is being revised
to update the daily limits. The adverse
driving condition exception applies
only to the driving time limitation of 11
hours for property-carrying vehicles or
10 hours for passenger-carrying
vehicles. The adverse driving condition
exception cannot be used if the driver

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has accumulated driving time and onduty (not driving) time, that would put
the driver over on duty hour limit or
over the 60 hour in 7 day or 70 hours
in 8 consecutive day limits. In addition,
the adverse driving condition exception
cannot be used for loading and
unloading delays. An absolute
prerequisite for claiming the adverse
driving condition exception is that the
trip involved is one which could
normally and reasonably have been
completed without a violation and that
the unforeseen event occurred after the
driver began the trip.
Drivers who are dispatched after the
motor carrier has been notified or
should have known of adverse driving
conditions are not eligible for the two
hours additional driving time.
Paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4) are being
revised to update the 100-air mile radius
exception to the record of duty status
requirement. When all five of the
conditions in paragraph (e) are met, a
carrier may maintain time records for
the driver.
Paragraph (g) is being revised to
update the off-duty, on-duty, and
driving limits of the sleeper berth
exception. The FMCSA is improving the
regulatory text for the sleeper berth
provision to ensure a clear
understanding of the rule. The agency
has borrowed, but modified, the
Government of Canada’s 1994 version of
the sleeper berth rule (SOR/94–716, s. 5)
because its language is clearer than the
wording adopted by the ICC in 1938.
This change will not affect the way the
FMCSA now enforces the sleeper berth
exception.
The provisions requiring the
summation of the driving and on-duty
hours immediately before and after each
rest period are necessary to ensure that
drivers on irregular schedules do not
accumulate significant amounts of
fatigue. These provisions, which reflect
many decades of enforcement practice,
are well understood in the motor carrier
industry. Paragraphs (g)(1)(iv), (g)(2)(iv),
and (g)(3)(iv), requiring at least 10
consecutive hours off duty or in a
sleeper berth, or a combination of at
least 10 consecutive hours of sleeperberth and off-duty time before returning
to regular driving, has also been part of
the agency’s traditional enforcement
practice for sleeper berth operations.
For example, a driver can stretch out
her driving and on-duty time by using
sleeper berth equipment, although she
will continue to be limited by the
driving time and on-duty time limits. A
driver does not have to take her sleeper
berth time all at once. She can get her
10 hours off duty by splitting it into two
periods. A sleeper berth period of less

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than 2 hours does not count towards the
10 hour total, but the driver must record
a period of less than 2 hours as sleeper
berth time. This is an example of how
the rule works for drivers of propertycarrying vehicles:
1. Drive for part of your 11 hours;
2. Rest in the sleeper berth for at least
2 hours;
3. Drive the remaining part of your 11
hours; and
4. Rest in the sleeper berth again to
finish your 10 hours off duty before
driving again.
After the second sleeper-berth period,
the driver cannot drive 11 hours. The
driver must count the time she was
driving between the two sleeper berth
periods, so she must subtract the
previous driving time in between the
two sleeper-berth periods from the
allowed 11 hours to figure her hours left
to drive.
Paragraph (h) and (j) are being revised
to update the daily off-duty limit in the
exceptions for drivers operating in the
State of Alaska and for travel time.
Paragraph (k) is being revised to
modify the reference to § 395.3 in the
exception for drivers transporting
agricultural commodities or farm
supplies for agricultural purposes in
certain States and during certain times
of the year. The wording of the
agricultural exemption in the NHS Act
is not entirely clear. The FHWA initially
interpreted the exemption as limited to
§ 395.3, a conclusion reflected in the
interim final rule published on April 3,
1996 [61 FR 14677]. Subsequent
consideration of the legislative history,
however, made it clear that Congress
intended farmers who qualified to be
exempt from all of the HOS regulations.
The agency therefore issued an
interpretation to its field staff clarifying
the reach of the regulation. This revision
simply conforms the language of the
exemption to the interpretation and the
intent of the statute.
Paragraph (o) adds an exception/
exemption for certain drivers of
property-carrying vehicles. Drivers who
meet all three of the conditions in this
paragraph (o) are eligible for the
exception/exemption. First, a propertycarrying driver must have returned to
the normal work reporting location and
the carrier must have released the driver
from duty at that location for the
previous five days that the driver has
worked. Second, the driver must return
to the normal work reporting location
and the carrier must release the driver
from duty within 16 hours after coming
on duty. Finally, the driver must not
have used this paragraph’s exception/
exemption within the previous 7
consecutive days, unless the property-

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carrying driver has begun a new 7-or 8consecutive day period. Such a driver
will have had 34 or more consecutive
hours off-duty thereby restarting the
driver’s week, which is allowed by new
§ 395.3(c). Thus, the driver could take
the next 16-hour day on the first,
second, or third day immediately
following the 34 or more consecutivehour off-duty period.
Section 395.3 Maximum Driving Time
for Property-Carrying Vehicles
The section heading and text of
§ 395.3 are being revised to use the new
off-duty, on-duty, and driving limits for
drivers of property-carrying vehicles.
A driver of a property-carrying
vehicle that does not use a sleeper berth
must not drive more than 11 cumulative
hours following 10 consecutive hours
off duty. Such a driver also must not
drive after the end of the 14th hour after
coming on duty following 10
consecutive hours off duty. This means
that once the driver begins a tour of
duty, the driver’s driving duties must
end within 14 consecutive hours. The
current 15 hour rule allows drivers to
extend the work day by taking off-duty
time, including meal stops and other
rest breaks, of less than 8 hours duration
other than sleeper berth time. This rule
requires that taking off-duty time,
including meal stops and other rest
breaks, of less than 10 hours duration,
other than sleeper berth time, will not
extend the work day.
The new rule, like the current rule,
does not limit the length of time a
person can be on duty. The current rule
states that a driver cannot drive after
being on duty for 15 hours, but the
driver could remain on duty
indefinitely. This final rule states that a
driver cannot drive after being on duty
after the end of the 14th hour after
coming on duty, but the driver also can
remain on duty indefinitely. That time,
however, would apply towards the
maximum 60 or 70 hours on duty over
7 or 8 consecutive days. Because there
will be a requirement for 10 consecutive
hours off duty, most drivers will usually
go off duty after 14 hours (at worst)
under the new rule, not after 15 hours,
as often happens under the current rule.
But drivers will be allowed to drive up
to 11 hours, not the 10 hours of the
current rule. Shorter on-duty time,
generally, but longer driving time.
This rule retains the current 60 hours
on duty in any period of 7 consecutive
days and 70 hours on duty in any period
of 8 consecutive day rules.
The new rule will allow any period of
7 or 8 consecutive days to end with the
beginning of any off duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours.

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Thus, the new rules in § 395.3 would
allow a driver of a property-carrying
vehicle, who is working under the 70hour-in-8-day rule, to start an 8-day
period at 7 a.m. on Monday and remain
on duty for 14 hours each day (11 hours
of which could be driving time). If the
driver reached the 70-hour limit at 9
p.m. Friday (14 hours/day × 5 days = 70
hours), he would not be able to drive
again until 7 a.m. on the following
Tuesday (8 days after the start of the
period) unless he immediately began an
off-duty period of 34 consecutive hours,
in which case he could begin driving
again at 7 a.m. Sunday, which would be
the start of a new 70-hour-in-8-day
period.
Likewise, a short-haul driver of a
property-carrying vehicle who is
working under the 60-hour-in-7-day rule
could start a 7-day period at 6 a.m. on
Monday and remain on duty for 14
hours per day (11 hours of which could
be driving time) Monday through
Wednesday, for a total of 42 on-duty
hours. If the driver invoked the 16-hour
exception in § 395.1(o) on Thursday and
returned to his work reporting location
at 10 p.m., having been on duty for 15
of those 16 hours, he would have 3 onduty hours left (42 hours + 15 hours =
57 hours). In addition, the driver could
not return to duty for 10 consecutive
hours, i.e., until 8 a.m. Friday morning.
The driver could then drive from 8 a.m.
until 11 a.m. on Friday, but could not
drive again until 6 a.m. the following
Monday (7 days after the start of the
period) unless he took 34 consecutive
hours off duty starting at 11 a.m., in
which case he could begin a new 60hour-in-7-day period at 9 p.m. Saturday.
Section 395.5 Maximum Driving Time
for Passenger-Carrying Vehicles
Section 395.5 moves the current rules
in § 395.3 to this new section
exclusively for drivers of, and carriers
using, passenger-carrying vehicles. The
current rules in § 395.3 have been
moved here verbatim, though the agency
has added the qualifying phrase of ‘‘a
driver of a passenger-carrying vehicle’’
since only these drivers may use the
current rules after this rule’s effective
date.
A driver of a passenger-carrying
vehicle that does not use a sleeper berth
must not drive more than 10 hours
following 8 hours off duty. Such a
driver also must not drive after having
been on duty 15 hours following 8 hours
off duty. This rule allows drivers to
extend the work day by taking off-duty
time, including meal stops and other
rest breaks, of less than 8 hours duration
other than sleeper berth time. This rule
retains the current 60 hours in 7

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consecutive day and 70 hours in any
period of 8 consecutive day rules.
Section 395.13
Service

Drivers Declared Out of

The agency is revising § 395.13
paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (d)(2) to use the
new off-duty, on-duty, and driving
limits for drivers of property-carrying
vehicles, while maintaining the current
off-duty, on-duty, and driving limits for
drivers of passenger-carrying vehicles.
Section 395.15 Automatic on-Board
Recording Devices
The agency is revising § 395.15
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) to also use the new
off-duty, on-duty, and driving limits for
drivers of property-carrying vehicles,
while maintaining the current off-duty,
on-duty, and driving limits for drivers of
passenger-carrying vehicles.
Rulemaking Analysis and Notices
Executive Order 12866
(Regulatory Planning and Review) and
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
The FMCSA has determined that this
document contains an economically
significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866 because the
FMCSA estimates this action will have
an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more. The agency completed
an RIA for this final rule that projects
net benefits of $1.1 billion per year to
society relative to the current rules with
full compliance.
The FMCSA has also determined that
this regulatory action is significant
under the regulatory policies and
procedures of the DOT because of the
high level of interest concerning motor
carrier safety issues expressed by
Congress, motor carriers, their drivers
and other employees, State
governments, safety advocates, and
members of the traveling public.
Finally, the FMCSA has determined
that this regulatory action is a major rule
under the Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 801 et seq. The FMCSA
discussed the RIA earlier in this
document under the heading Regulatory
Impact Analysis.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The ICCTA requirement for an
ANPRM also began a review in
compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act’s requirement under 5
U.S.C. 610 to determine whether the
HOS rules should be continued without
change, should be amended, or should
be rescinded, consistent with the stated
objectives of the applicable statutes, to
minimize any significant economic

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22505

impact of the rules upon a substantial
number of small entities.
In compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601–612), the
FMCSA has evaluated the effects of this
proposed rule on small entities,
including small businesses, small nonprofit organizations, and small
governmental entities with populations
under 50,000. Many of these small
entities operate as motor carriers of
passengers or property in interstate or
intrastate commerce.
Of the three alternatives evaluated in
the RIA, only the PATT alternative
would result in significant, adverse
financial impacts (reduced profits) on
most carriers. Although both the ATA
alternative and the FMCSA alternative
affect carrier finances, the resulting
impacts generally would be favorable to
carriers—that is, most carriers could
experience reduced costs under either
alternative. Also, all carriers would be
impacted more favorably under the ATA
alternative than under the FMCSA
alternative. These findings are
consistent with the cost results
presented in Section 9 of the RIA. (See
section 10.2 of the RIA for further
discussion of the results by alternative.)
In general, smaller firms are hurt more
(under the PATT alternative) or helped
less (under either the ATA alternative or
the FMCSA alternative) than are larger
firms. Nevertheless, the RIA finds that
the FMCSA alternative will result in
favorable impacts on all carriers
(including owner/operators with one
tractor) except for firms in the 2–9
tractor size category. Firms in the 2–9
tractor size category are initially
expected to lose approximately 8
percent of their net income, compared
to the current rules with full
compliance. For the median firm in this
category, this results from a loss of
approximately 0.5 of revenue per
carrier, about $2,700. Revenue will fall
from about $534,000 to about $531,000.
This reduction is based on industrywide adjustments, as the wage rate and
price of trucking are both expected to
drop when compared to the current
rules with full compliance. Wages will
decline somewhat less than trucking
rates. The analysis used several
conservative assumptions in estimating
the impact on these small carriers.
Specifically, the agency assumed that
shipping prices drop immediately
(lowering revenue to carriers), while
shipments grow more slowly (delaying
carriers revenue growth). Realistically,
both these adjustments are likely to take
some time, so that the overall impact on
these carriers is likely to be smaller than
estimated in our analysis. As soon as
carriers increase shipments to take

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advantage of these extra hours, carrier
revenue and net income will return to,
or surpass, their current levels. (See RIA
section 10.3 for further information
addressing differential impacts on
carriers in different size categories.)
The entities affected by the HOS rules
include long-haul and short-haul
operations. Chapter 10 of the RIA
presents detailed analyses of the effects
of the rules on long-haul operations, and
shows that any adverse effects of the
FMCSA option on small entities would
be slight and of very limited duration.
That chapter did not examine firms
engaged in short-haul trucking due to
the small magnitude of the rule’s effects
on short-haul operations. The FMCSA,
however, offers a fuller explanation of
the reasons for expecting minimal shorthaul impacts here.
The FMCSA has divided this analysis
into five sections, covering the affected
entities; the definitions of ‘‘small’’ used
for the analysis; the number of small
entities; the thresholds used for the
analysis; the costs of the HOS rules, on
average and for the most affected firms;
and the factual determination of the
numbers of small entities significantly
affected.

The basic findings of this analysis are
that, although large numbers of small
entities are affected by the HOS rules
regarding short-haul operation, no
significant impacts are projected for
substantial numbers of these small
entities. The FMCSA finds that among
trucking companies, the most heavily
affected 7.5 percent of small firms bear
costs that average less than 0.8 percent
of revenues. Among non-trucking
companies that have short-haul
operations incidental to their main
business, the impacts are even smaller:
the most affected small firms bear costs
no higher than 0.03 percent of revenues.
Affected Entities
Short-haul operations include three
basic types of firms:
1. For-hire LTL firms;
2. For-hire TL firms with short
average hauls, including local hauls;
and
3. Firms in industries other than
trucking that operate fleets in short-haul
operations for their own purposes (i.e.,
private carriage).
The LTL firms engage both long-haul
and short-haul operations. Their longhaul operations are generally scheduled
terminal-to-terminal runs, which are

unlikely to be affected by the HOS rules.
Their short-haul operations involve runs
from shippers to the terminals to collect
freight for the long-haul runs, and then
from the terminals to the ultimate
destinations for the freight. LTL firms
tend to be large, with 35 companies
accounting for 85 percent of revenue.
The rest of the for-hire firms include
both firms that provide local pick-up
and delivery services for LTL firms and
firms that deliver cargos locally or
within a short range. Firms involved in
private carriage span a very wide range
of industries, including construction;
stone, clay, glass, and concrete;
groceries and related products; eating
and drinking places; and repair services.
One common type of operation is the
delivery of product along a route to
numerous retail outlets.
Definition of Small Firms
To determine how many small
affected firms there are, we first
identified industries in which at least
one percent of all employees are truck
drivers, using data from the Current
Population Survey for 2000. These
industries are shown in Table 20, along
with SBA’s size thresholds
distinguishing small and large firms.

TABLE 20.—SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S SIZE STANDARD FOR SMALL BUSINESSES BY NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (NAICS)
Size standard in number of
employees

Industry

NAICS

Size standard in millions of dollars

Trucking or For-Hire ..........................
Private ...............................................
Ag, forest, fisheries ...........................
Groceries and related products ........
Stone, clay, glass, concrete ..............
Mining ................................................
Eating and Drinking Places ..............
Wholesale trade (excludes Groceries).
Petroleum + coal products ................
Construction ......................................
Food and kindred products ...............
Lumber, wood products, furniture .....
Transportation, communications, utilities, except trucking.
Retail trade (excludes Eating and
Drinking Places).
Pulp, Paper, Printing .........................

484110, 484210, 484220 .................
...........................................................
11 .....................................................
4224 .................................................
327 ...................................................
21 .....................................................
445 ...................................................
42 .....................................................

$21.50 ..............................................
Not Applicable.
0.75–6.0 ...........................................
Not Applicable ..................................
Not Applicable ..................................
6.0 ....................................................
6.0–23.0 ...........................................
Not Applicable ..................................

500.
500.
500–1000.
500.
Not Applicable.
500.

324 ...................................................
23 .....................................................
311, 312 ...........................................
321, 337 ...........................................
22, 492, 51 .......................................

Not Applicable ..................................
12.0–28.5 .........................................
Not Applicable ..................................
Not Applicable ..................................
6.0–25.0 ...........................................

500–1500.
Not Applicable.
500–1000.
500.
500–1,500.

44, 451, 452, 453, 454 .....................

6.0–24.5 ...........................................

Not Applicable.

322, 323 ...........................................

Not Applicable ..................................

500–750.

These thresholds tend to be at least at
the level of 500 employees, or (where
the thresholds are not based on
employment) in the range of $6 to $25
million in revenues.

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Size Distributions and Numbers of
Firms
Table 21 shows the breakdown of
firms in these industries in terms of
employment. An estimate of the
numbers of small firms is shown in the

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Not Applicable.

column at the right, using the size
distribution and the approximate size
cutoffs developed by SBA. In all
affected industries, the large majority of
firms are small. In all, over two million
affected firms fall into the category of
small firms.

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22507

TABLE 21.—DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY SIZE, IN YEAR 2000
Number of firms
Industry: 1

Employment
less than 20

Employment
20–500

Employment
500+

Approximate
number of
small firms 2

Short-haul Trucking or For-Hire .......................................................................
Non-Trucking:
Agriculture, forest, fisheries ......................................................................
Groceries and related products ................................................................
Stone, clay, glass, concrete .....................................................................
Mining .......................................................................................................
Eating and Drinking Places ......................................................................
Wholesale trade (excludes Groceries) .....................................................
Petroleum + coal products .......................................................................
Construction ..............................................................................................
Food and kindred products ......................................................................
Lumber, wood products, furniture .............................................................
Transportation, communications, utilities, except trucking .......................
Retail trade (excludes Eating & Drinking) ................................................
Pulp, Paper, Printing ................................................................................

54,281

4,943

227

56,752

23,814
27,074
7,784
15,880
105,595
301,595
633
639,129
17,876
25,414
79,844
841,109
31,899

1,539
5,515
3,319
2,541
11,455
49,258
363
61,812
5,842
8,460
13,302
83,204
8,363

97
451
352
335
447
3,300
140
1,006
672
499
1,351
3,385
574

25,353
32,589
11,103
18,421
111,323
350,853
996
670,035
23,718
33,874
93,146
882,711
40,262

Total ...................................................................................................

2,171,927

259,916

12,836

2,351,136

1 Industries

in which drivers represent less than 1% of the labor force are not presented in the table.
small firms are those with 500 or fewer employees for industries with employment-based cutoffs. For other industries, the number of
small firms was assumed to be all of those with employment below 20, and half of those with employment between 20 and 500.
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), developed by U.S. Census Bureau for SBA, retrieved from SBA Office of Advocacy Web site
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/us88l00.pdf.
2 Assumes

Thresholds Used for This Analysis
To construct a factual basis for
certifying that the rules will not impose
significant costs on substantial numbers
of small entities, the FMCSA must select
thresholds for significant costs and
substantial numbers. Selecting these
thresholds is complicated, but not
rendered impossible, by the lack of an
accepted definition for either significant
or substantial. The FMCSA started by
considering the standard practices in
other federal agencies. In general, a test
of costs to revenues is more common
than a test of costs to profit or other
measures. The FMCSA believes that,
because profit levels are harder to
measure, comparing costs to revenues is
more appropriate for this analysis. In
the HOS case, the FMCSA considers a
profit test to be misleading because
typical profit levels are not likely to be
reflective of the profitability of the most
affected entities. The FMCSA bases this
observation on the specific way that the
rules affect firms. Because the rules
limit maximum working and driving
hours, they will affect only operations
in which drivers and equipment are
intensely utilized—those in which
drivers habitually work more than 13
hours per day. These operations will
tend to bring in the most revenues per
driver, will have the greatest ability to
spread out their overhead, capital, and
fringe benefit costs, and are likely to
have the most stable and predictable
operations (given the frequency of highutilization days). Furthermore, they will

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tend to have the lowest wage costs per
hour (as explained in Chapter 6 of the
RIA). Thus, the FMCSA can expect that
the most efficient and profitable firms
are over-represented among the most
heavily affected operations. Firms that
are among the most affected by the HOS
rules can still operate more efficiently
(in terms of the intensity of work by
their drivers) than large majorities of
their competitors, and can therefore still
be competitive. These observations
minimized the need to compare large
impacts to average profit rates as a way
to judge whether the rules would have
significant impacts.
In setting the threshold for
ascertaining no significant impacts, the
FMCSA selected a threshold of costs
equal to one percent of revenues
because a low threshold would
minimize the chance of inappropriately
certifying the rules. The FMCSA notes
that this threshold is only one third as
high as the 3 percent cut-off used by: the
Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Office of Air and Radiation; EPA’s
Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and
Toxic Substances; EPA’s Office of
Water; and EPA’s Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response. It is only one
fifth of that used by Department of
Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries
Service, at the low end of the range used
by DOT’s Federal Aviation
Administration, and no higher than that
used by the Department of Health and
Human Service’s Food and Drug
Administration or Department of

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Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Though the use
of these thresholds by other agencies
does not prove that a threshold of costs
equal to 1 percent of revenues is not
significant, it does show that it is not
out of line with other estimates.
For setting the threshold for
substantial numbers, we have selected
10 percent of the small entities. This
value, which is an order of magnitude
smaller than the population as a whole,
is considerably below the 20 percent
selected by several EPA offices. These
thresholds are not intended to set
precedents for other regulations, and are
not intended to imply that any cost
above 1 percent revenues is a significant
impact, nor that more than 10 percent
is a substantial number.
Estimation of Cost Impacts
The FMCSA’s method for estimating
the costs imposed by the FMCSA option
on short-haul operations is described in
detail in Chapters 5 and 6 of the RIA.
Here, the agency provides a brief
summary of that approach.
The two main parts of the method are,
first, the estimation of the change in
labor productivity resulting from the
HOS rules, and second, the estimation
of the costs of that change in
productivity. To estimate the change in
labor productivity on short-haul
operations, the agency first determined
that the daily limits on work are more
important constraints to short-haul
operations than the weekly limits.
Second, the agency constructed a

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations
revenue. Table 22 shows the breakdown
of the cost increases for these two
scenarios.
The labor cost changes are calculated
based on the wage-hours worked
relationship estimated for truck drivers
from the Current Population Survey
data. The details of the estimated wage
equation are explained in Chapter 6,
Sections 2 and 3 in the RIA. Under the
worst-case scenario, a 4.3 percent
increase in labor demand means that the
short-haul segment would have to hire
the equivalent of 64,500 new drivers
(though smaller firms are assumed to be
able to increase their use of part-time
drivers rather than adding a whole
employee) at 0.67 percent increase in
their costs as a share of revenue. The
percentage increase in costs is smaller
than the drop in productivity by the
existing drivers because the pay for the
new drivers (or additional part-time
labor) is offset by reductions in the pay
for the existing drivers whose hours are
limited. Under this scenario, firms incur
$2.7 billion in driver labor costs for the
new drivers or part-time drivers used to
make up for the hours that existing
drivers cannot work, but save $1.9
billion in avoided labor costs, giving a
net labor cost of $786 million.
Corresponding increases in the other
cost categories are for new equipment
and facilities for the 64,500 new drivers,
as well as for hiring other types of
workers related to the hiring of new
drivers (‘‘non-driver labor’’—see
explanation in RIA Chapter 6).

short-haul total revenue of $198
billion ($76 billion + $122 billion). See Exhibit
3–1 in the RIA.

Under the FMCSA option for the
short-haul segment discussed in the
RIA, the agency showed an increase in
labor demand by about 0.7 percent. That
translated to a cost increase of about
$168 million for the short-haul/local
segment (see Exhibit 9–3 in the RIA).
The FMCSA also estimated short-haul
total revenue of $198 billion (see Exhibit
3–1 in RIA), implying a 0.08 percent
increase in costs in terms of their
revenue. Under the worst-case scenario
analyzed as part of the impact on small
businesses, a 4.3 percent increase in
labor demand translates to a
corresponding cost increase for shorthaul of about $1.32 billion or a 0.67
percent increase as a share of short-haul

These estimated changes in costs
apply to all firms, not to small entities
in particular. Some types of regulation
tend to hit small firms harder than large
firms, generally because they impose
costs that are the same for all firms, or
require equipment that exhibits
substantial economies of scale. Small
firms tend to have higher per-unit costs
of compliance with these kinds of
regulations because they have fewer
units of output over which to spread the
regulatory costs. The FMCSA does not
consider the HOS rules to fall into that
category of regulations, however,
because the costs they impose affect
TABLE 22.—DIRECT COST CHANGES individual drivers, not firms. Thus, total
FOR
THE
SHORT-HAUL UNDER cost impacts are likely to be roughly
proportional to the number of drivers,
FMCSA OPTION
and costs for small firms will not tend
[(Million of Dollars) (Values in parentheses are
to be out of proportion with costs for
negative)]
large firms.
In recognition of the SBA’s finding
Proposed
Scenario modeled
Worst-case
option
that small businesses shoulder costs 60
percent greater that large businesses, the
Change in Labor
FMCSA conducted a sensitivity analysis
Demand (perthat assumed costs were higher for small
cent) ..................
0.7
4.3
firms. See page 24 of ‘‘The Regulatory
Change in Number
of Drivers ...........
10,500
64,500 Flexibility Act: an Implementation
Driver Labor Cost:
90
786 Guide for Federal Agencies,’’ The Office
Avoided Labor
of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business
Wages ...........
(298)
(1,774) Administration, November 2002, http://
Avoided Labor
www.sba.gov/advo/laws/rfaguide.pdf.
Benefits ..........
(17)
(106) To calculate a more conservative cost
New Labor
impact for small firms using SBA’s
Wages ...........
309
2,034
finding, the agency started with the
New Labor Benefits ................
96
631 distribution of employment by number
Other Costs:
78
536 of employees across all for-hire trucking
Non-driver Labor
4
31 firms. This distribution is shown in
Trucks ...............
33
249 Table 23.

3 These estimates could somewhat overstate the
impacts of the HOS rules, because they considered
only the effects of the daily rules: very intense daily

schedules could cause drivers to be limited by the
weekly HOS rules. Working 13 hours per day for
5 days, for example, results in 65 hours of work,

which would exceed the 60 hours allowed per 7
days.

distribution of desired hours of daily
work for short-haul drivers. This was
based on two sets of data: the Hanowski,
Wierwille, Garness, and Dingus focus
group study of short-haul work patterns
for determining the distribution of
average hours of work per day; and
Balkin et al. (Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research) Field Study,
which provided an estimate of the dayto-day variability in hours worked.
Using the distribution of desired hours
of daily work, the agency was able to
estimate the number of times when the
FMCSA option would limit a driver’s
work. The agency found that, compared
to the current rules, the FMCSA option
would reduce the hours that short-haul
drivers could work by an average of 0.7
percent.
For some drivers, the rules would
limit their working hours more
frequently. Six out of 81 short-haul
drivers (or about 7.5 percent) reported
working an average of 13 hours per day
or more, and the estimated impact on
their work amounted to a reduction of
4.3 percent.3 The impact on a firm
employing one of the most affected
drivers would depend on whether the
firm also has other drivers who are less
severely affected by the rules. In the
extreme, a firm whose drivers were all
among the hardest-working 7.5 percent
of the industry would have the
productivity of its entire staff of drivers
reduced by 4.3 percent.
These changes in productivity are
translated into changes in costs using
the method described in Chapter 6 of
the RIA. The results of that analysis, and
a brief summary of how it was
conducted, is presented below.
Translation of Productivity Changes Into
Cost Impacts

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TABLE 22.—DIRECT COST CHANGES
FOR
THE
SHORT-HAUL UNDER
FMCSA OPTION—Continued
[(Million of Dollars) (Values in parentheses are
negative)]
Scenario modeled

Proposed
option

Worst-case

Parking ..............
Insurance ..........
Maintenance ......
Recruitment .......

10
7
12
13

58
43
75
80

Total .......

168

1,322

0.08

0.67

Cost Increase as
Share of ShortHaul Revenue 1
1 Assuming

Sensitivity Analysis for Higher Impacts
on Smaller Firms

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations

22509

TABLE 23.—CALCULATION FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Trucking or For-Hire

Employment
less than 20

Employment
20–500

Employment
500+

Total

Number of Short-Haul Firms ...........................................................................................
Number of Employees .....................................................................................................
Distribution of Employees (percent) ................................................................................
Average Impact per Firm (percent) .................................................................................
Magnitude of Impact by Firm Size ..................................................................................
Adjusted Average Impact per Firm (percent) ..................................................................

54,281
202,116
41
....................
1.6 ×
0.775

4,943
225,180
46
....................
1.3 ×
0.629

227
64,493
13
....................
×
0.484

59,451
491,789
100
0.67
....................
0.670

Source: Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB), developed by U.S. Census Bureau for SBA and FMCSA calculations.

Under the worst-case scenario, the
agency estimates that, on average, a
short-haul firm will bear a burden equal
to a 0.67 percent increase in its costs as
a share of revenue. An SBA study
completed in 2001 shows that the
economic impact on a firm with less
than 20 employees may be up to 60
percent greater per employee than on
firms with more than 500 employees,
see ‘‘The Regulatory Flexibility Act,
Implementation Guide for Federal
Agencies,’’ November 2002, which cites
W. Mark Crain and Thomas D. Hopkins,
‘‘The Impact of Regulatory Costs on
Small Firms’’ (Springfield, Va.: National
Technical Information Service, 2001).
As a result, the FMCSA adjusts the
‘‘worst-case’’ impact estimate to account
for the possible disparity of the
regulatory impact across firms. The
adjustment is based on firms’ size and
employees’ distribution. As no
information is available on the
magnitude of economic impact on firms
with 20 to 500 employees relative to the
firms in other size categories, we
assume that the impact on firms in this
category is equal to the average of
impacts on firms in the other two size
categories (i.e., that the impact is 30
percent greater for the mid-size firms as
for the large firms, and an equivalent
amount less than the impacts on the
smallest firms). The adjusted average

impact per firm was found by setting up
the following equation for X, the average
impact per firm with more than 500
employees:
41 percent * 1.6 * X + 46 percent *
1.3 * X + 13 percent * X = 0.67 percent
Rearranging terms and solving, the
FMCSA finds that X= 0.484 percent.
The agency second multiplies X by 1.6
to calculate the average economic
impact on firms with less than 20
employees. The agency’s results show
that economic impact on firms with less
than 20 employees is 0.775 percent of
revenues, which is below the threshold
of significance chosen for this analysis.
Estimation of Costs for Non-Trucking
Companies
The cost impact for non-trucking
companies is calculated on the basis of
the cost increases per existing driver.
Assuming there are 1.5 million existing
short-haul/local drivers (see Exhibit 6.7
in RIA), a $1.32 billion cost increase
means that firms face an increase of
$881 per existing driver. Given the
distribution of drivers from the Current
Population Survey, the agency chose
industries that employed a substantial
number of drivers, and calculated the
increase in their operating costs due to
the FMCSA option. Table 24 shows
these selected sectors and the estimated

number of drivers they employed in
2000.
Among non-trucking industries that
use drivers, construction (NAICS 23)
bears the largest dollar impact, followed
by the eating and drinking places
(NAICS 445), under the retail industry.
Another industry segment that has a
relatively large impact is the groceries
and related products sector (NAICS
4224). However, for all these and the
others in Table 24, the increase in cost
as share of their labor cost is very small
(second from last column). In these
terms, the highest impact is for the
agriculture sector (0.35 percent),
probably because labor costs are not so
well-defined for mostly family-owned
farms. For all the other sectors, impacts
are significantly lower than 1 percent of
labor costs, since driver labor is a
relatively small fraction of their total
labor costs.
The cost impacts are even lower when
the agency calculates them in terms of
their total revenue (last column in Table
24). Similar to the reasoning given
above, since labor costs are only a small
portion of most industries’ total costs (or
total revenue), the impact of the worstcase scenario is significantly smaller
than one percent, with the highest
impact shown for the stone, clay, glass,
and concrete industry (NAICS 327) at
0.03 percent.

TABLE 24.—WORST-CASE SCENARIO IMPACT ON DIFFERENT INDUSTRY SEGMENTS
Short-haul
drivers in
total labor
(%)

Private industry classification

Agriculture, Forest, Fisheries ...................................................................
Groceries & Related Products .................................................................
Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete ..................................................................
Mining ......................................................................................................
Eating & Drinking Places .........................................................................
Petroleum & Coal Products .....................................................................
Construction .............................................................................................
Food & Kindred Products ........................................................................
Lumber, Wood Products, Furniture .........................................................
Transportation, communications, utilities, (excludes For-Hire Trucking)
Pulp, Paper, Printing ................................................................................
Wholesale Trade, (excludes Groceries & Related Prod) ........................

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11.2
7.3
6.6
4.6
2.7
2.0
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.0
2.5

Sfmt 4700

Number of
short-haul
drivers in
2000
18,375
64,233
34,793
20,965
82,076
2,230
103,487
26,318
17,843
68,694
14,274
134,265

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Cost increase due
to worstcase option
(millions of
dollars)
17
57
31
18
72
2
91
23
16
61
13
118

28APR2

Cost increase as
share of
labor costs
(%)
0.35
0.18
0.16
0.08
0.15
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.05

Cost increase as
share of
revenue (%)
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.001
0.01
0.004
0.01
0.01
0.005
0.003

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TABLE 24.—WORST-CASE SCENARIO IMPACT ON DIFFERENT INDUSTRY SEGMENTS—Continued
Short-haul
drivers in
total labor
(%)

Private industry classification

Retail Trade, (excludes Eating & Drinking Places) .................................

Given that the estimated impacts,
expressed both in terms of labor cost
shares and revenue shares, are well
below 1 percent of their revenue, the
FMCSA does not expect this rule to
have any significant impact on small
businesses in the short-haul private
sector.
Therefore, the FMCSA, in compliance
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601–612), has considered the
economic impacts of these requirements
on small entities and certifies that this
final rule does not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 requires each agency to assess
the effects of its regulatory actions on
State, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector. Any agency
promulgating a final rule resulting in a
Federal mandate requiring expenditure
by a State, local or tribal government or
by the private sector of $100,000,000 or
more in any one year must prepare a
written statement incorporating various
assessments, estimates, and descriptions
that are delineated in the Act. In light
of the fact that revisions to the HOS
regulations is a major rule that would
cost motor carriers more than
$100,000,000 in a given year, the
FMCSA has prepared the following
statement which addresses each of the
elements required by the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Most of
these required elements have already
been covered in the regulatory impact
analysis, and the sections of that
evaluation containing the preexisting
analyses are referenced in this
statement. Any elements not included
in the final regulatory evaluation have
been addressed directly in this
statement.
Qualitative and Quantitative
Assessment of Costs and Benefits
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
requires a qualitative and quantitative
assessment of the anticipated costs and
benefits of this Federal mandate. The
options discussed in this final rule
would cost between $744 million and
$5.5 billion per year, relative to the

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1.1

Number of
short-haul
drivers in
2000
179,317

Status Quo. The FMCSA option would
cost an estimated $1.3 billion per year.
Relative to the status quo with full
compliance, the options will cost
between positive $3.4 billion and
negative $1.4 billion per year (meaning
that they will result in cost savings).
The FMCSA option would result in
savings of about $900 million per year.
Cost estimates are discussed in chapter
9 of the RIA. The cost applies only to
motor carriers subject to the FMCSRs.
The final rule does not impose any cost
on State, local, or tribal governments.
The FMCSA estimates that the annual
monetary value of the benefits ranges
from $170 million to $780 million,
relative to the status quo. The FMCSA
staff alternative has a benefit of $670
million. Relative to the status quo with
full compliance, the alternatives yield
net benefits of $1.2 billion to negative
$3 billion. The FMCSA staff alternative
yields a net benefit of $1.1 billion
relative to the current rules with full
compliance. The development of these
estimates is discussed in the RIA
chapter 9.
Effect on Health, Safety, and the Natural
Environment
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
also states that the FMCSA must discuss
the effect of the Federal mandate on
health, safety, and the natural
environment. The FMCSA prepared an
environmental assessment, which has
been placed in the docket, which shows
that this proposal would not have a
significant impact on the natural
environment.
The effects of this rule on health and
safety will be much more significant:
the primary benefit of this proposal
would be a reduction in accidents. The
FMCSA estimates that this final rule,
when motor carriers adhere to it fully,
would save between 24 and 75 lives
each year as compared to complying
fully with the current rules. Injuries will
experience a commensurate fall. The
RIA explains these estimates in detail in
Chapters 8 and 9.
Federal Financial Assistance
Section 202(a)(2)(A) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act requires that this
qualitative and quantitative assessment

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Cost increase due
to worstcase option
(millions of
dollars)
158

Cost increase as
share of
labor costs
(%)
0.05

Cost increase as
share of
revenue (%)
0.01

of costs and benefits include an analysis
of the extent to which costs to State,
local, and tribal governments may be
paid with Federal financial assistance or
otherwise paid for by the Federal
Government. Since this rule is
applicable only to motor carriers subject
to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, there is no cost to State,
local, and tribal governments. Therefore,
no Federal funds for these entities will
be necessary for motor carriers to
comply with the proposed
requirements.
Future Compliance Costs
To the extent feasible, section
202(a)(3) of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act requires estimates of the
future compliance costs of this Federal
mandate and any disproportionate
budgetary effects upon particular
regions, or upon urban, rural, or other
types of communities, or upon
particular segments of the private sector.
There are no disproportionate budgetary
effects upon particular regions, or upon
urban, rural, or other types of
communities. The RIA included an
analysis of the impact of the option on
various regions, using the REMI Policy
Insight TM Model. The model showed no
significant disparate impact on any
region. These impacts are discussed in
chapter 11 of the RIA.
Effect on the National Economy
Section 202(a)(4) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act requires estimates
of the effect on the national economy,
such as the effect on economic growth,
full employment, creation of productive
jobs, and international competitiveness.
The REMI model mentioned above also
yielded an estimate of the
macroeconomic costs of the options.
Relative to the status quo with 100
percent compliance, FMCSA estimates
that the impact on gross regional
product (GRP) will be minimal, less
than 0.1 percent of GRP for all the
alternatives. One alternative would
reduce GRP by almost $12 billion per
year, while all other alternatives would
result in a small increase in GRP.
Because the overall driving time for
most CMV drivers would not change,
the FMCSA does not believe the

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alternatives would have a significant
impact on full employment or the
creation of productive jobs. The FMCSA
also does not believe that the proposal
would have any significant impact on
international competitiveness.
Prior Consultations With Elected
Representatives of Any Affected State,
Local, or Tribal Governments
This rule does not require action by
State, local, or tribal governments.
Therefore, no prior consultations with
elected representatives of these
governments were initiated.
Decision To Impose an Unfunded
Mandate
When Congress created FMCSA, it
provided that, ‘‘[i]n carrying out its
duties the Administration shall consider
the assignment and maintenance of
safety as the highest priority * * * ’’ [49
U.S.C. 113(b)]. As indicated above, Sec.
408 of the ICCTA directed the agency—
then part of the FHWA—to begin
rulemaking dealing with a variety of
fatigue-related safety issues, including
‘‘8 hours of continuous sleep after 10
hours of driving, loading and unloading
operations, automated and tamper-proof
recording devices, rest and recovery
cycles, fatigue and stress in longer
combination vehicles, fitness for duty,
and other appropriate regulatory and
enforcement countermeasures for
reducing fatigue-related incidents and
increasing driver alertness) * * * ’’ [109
Stat. 958]. The agency’s statutory focus
on safety and the specific mandate of
Sec. 408 both demand that this
rulemaking improve CMV safety.
The FMCSA analyzed three
alternative regulatory proposals in
depth. Compared to the status quo,
which includes a degree of noncompliance with the current HOS rules,
the option proposed by the ATA would
have marginally reduced fatigue-related
fatalities and somewhat increased the
cost of regulatory compliance. This
results in a negative cost/benefit ratio.
The option suggested by PATT would
have reduced fatalities far more than the
ATA option, but would have generated
significant increases in compliance and
operational expenses. This results in a
cost/benefit ratio far more negative than
the ATA option.
The third alternative was proposed by
the FMCSA staff. The analysis shows
that this option would save many more
lives than the ATA alternative, though
not quite as many as the PATT option.
While it would cost more than the ATA
option, it would be much cheaper than
the PATT alternative. The net result is
a cost/benefit ratio slightly more

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negative than the ATA option but not
nearly as negative as the PATT option.
The FMCSA has adopted the third
alternative for this final rule. The rule
represents a substantial improvement in
addressing driver fatigue over the
current regulation. Among other things,
it increases required time off duty from
8 to 10 consecutive hours; prohibits
driving after the end of the 14th hour
after the driver began work; allows an
increase in driving time from 10 to 11
hours; and allows drivers to restart the
60-or 70-hour clock after taking 34
hours off duty. Together, these
provisions (and others discussed in
detail below) are expected to reduce the
effect of cumulative fatigue and prevent
many of the accidents and fatalities to
which fatigue is a contributing factor.
Because the agency’s statutory priority
is safety, we have adopted a rule that is
marginally more expensive than the
ATA option but which will reduce
fatigue-related accidents and fatalities
more substantially than that option. The
FMCSA believes that the rule represents
the best combination of safety
improvements and cost containment
that can realistically be achieved, even
though it imposes an unfunded
mandate.
Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.),
Federal agencies must obtain approval
from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for each collection of
information (IC) they conduct, sponsor,
or require through regulations. The
FMCSA has determined that this final
rule will affect a currently approved
information clearance for OMB Control
Number 2126–0001, titled ‘‘Record of
Duty Status (RODS).’’ The OMB
approved this information collection on
March 4, 2002, at a revised total of
161,364,492 burden hours, with an
expiration date of March 31, 2005.
Comments received on the
information collection proposed in the
NPRM are discussed above under the
heading ‘‘Electronic On-board Recorders
(EOBRs).’’ The NPRM proposed that the
title of this information collection be
changed to ‘‘Hours of Service of Drivers
Regulations.’’ The FMCSA believes that
this title is more appropriate. The
FMCSA did not receive any comments
on the change of title for this IC.
Therefore, today the supporting
statement sent to OMB will bear the
revised title change.
The PRA requires agencies to provide
a specific, objectively supported
estimate of burden that will be imposed
by the information collection. See 5 CFR
1320.8. The paperwork burden imposed

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22511

by the FMCSA’s RODS requirement is
set forth at 49 CFR 395.8. Paragraph
(a)(1) requires drivers to record their
duty status. Paragraph (f)(8)(i) requires
them to submit the RODS to their motor
carrier. Paragraph (k) requires motor
carriers to maintain the RODS and all
supporting documents for each driver it
employs for a period of six months from
the date of receipt. The currentlyapproved information collection for
RODS does not include time and cost
burdens associated with the collection
and retention of supporting documents
because these costs were calculated into
past paperwork burdens (See 47 FR
53383, 53389 (Nov. 26, 1982) and 63 FR
19464).
As noted in the preamble to this rule,
under the above heading ‘‘Compliance
and Enforcement,’’ the FMCSA collects
this information to ensure motor carriers
comply with the HOS regulations. The
HOS regulations require motor carriers
be responsible for and police the actions
of its employees, including the actions
of independent contractors and owner
operators they use. Likewise, each
motor carrier must have a system in
place that allows it to effectively
monitor compliance with the FMCSRs,
especially those aimed at the issue of
this final rule—HOS to increase driver
alertness and reduce fatigue-related
incidents.
This final rule does not amend the
language of section 395.8. The new HOS
rule, like the current rule, does not limit
the length of time a person can be on
duty. The current rule states that a
driver cannot drive after being on duty
for 15 hours, but the driver could
remain on duty indefinitely. This aspect
of the current rule will continue to be
applicable to drivers of passengercarrying CMVs. This final rule,
however, will not enable a driver of a
property-carrying CMV to drive after
being on duty after the end of the 14th
hour after coming on duty, but such a
driver also can remain on duty
indefinitely. Because there will be a
requirement for 10 consecutive hours off
duty, most property-carrying CMV
drivers will usually go off duty after 14
hours (at worst) under this final rule,
not after 15 hours, as often happened
under the current rule and will continue
to happen for drivers of passengercarrying CMVs. But property-carrying
CMV drivers will now be allowed to
drive up to 11 hours, not the 10 hours
of the current rule that will be
applicable to passenger-carrying CMV
drivers only. Thus, this final rule will
allow property-carrying CMV drivers
shorter on-duty time, generally, but
longer driving time.

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The agency believes that the industry
will respond to this HOS requirement
for property-carrying CMV drivers by
employing, over a period of time, an
estimated 48,000 fewer propertycarrying CMV drivers, compared to the
current rules with full compliance.
Thus, this final rule will bring about a
small decrease in the estimated 4.2
million drivers required to complete
and maintain the RODS. This final rule
and a supporting statement reflecting
this small decrease in burden hours
have been submitted to OMB.
You may submit comments on this
adjustment in the information collection
burden directly to OMB. The OMB must
receive your comments by July 28, 2003.

You must mail or hand deliver your
comments to: Attention: Desk Officer for
the Department of Transportation,
Docket Library, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, Room 10102,
725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC
20503.
National Environmental Policy Act
The FMCSA analyzed the three
alternatives in the RIA as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and
DOT Order 5610.1C. The FMCSA
evaluated impacts in terms of the
percent change from the status quo (No
Action Alternative). ‘‘Minor’’ is defined

here as a 0 to 1 percent change from the
status quo (0 plus/minus 1 percent),
while ‘‘Moderate’’ is defined as a plus/
minus 10 percent or greater change.
Note that the FMCSA measured these
impacts as change from the No Action
Alternative (i.e. not from the Full
Compliance Alternative). As shown in
Table 25 (Environmental Assessment
Table 22), none of the Alternatives
would have a significant adverse impact
on the human environment and all of
the Alternatives would have beneficial
impacts in some impact areas. None of
the Alternatives stands out as
environmentally preferable, when
compared to the other Alternatives.

TABLE 25.—COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
Impact area

No action

Full compliance

PATT alternative

ATA alternative

Air Pollutant Emissions
from Affected CMVs.
Air Pollutant Emissions
from Transportation.

No Change ................

Minor Benefit (0.5
percent decrease).
Minor Benefit (0.02
percent decrease).

Minor Benefit (1 percent decrease).
Minor Benefit (0.01
percent decrease).

Minor Impact (0.6
percent increase).
Minor Impact (0.03
percent increase).

Land Use ....................

No Change ................

No Impact .................

No Impact.

Sensitive Resources ..

No Change ................

No Impact .................

No Impact.

Noise ..........................

No Change ................

Safety .........................

No Change ................

Socioeconomic Effects

No Change ................

Transportation Energy
Consumption.

No Change ................

Moderate Impact (2
percent increase).
Moderate Impact
(0.09 percent increase).
Minor Induced Impact
(3,408 acres).
Minor Potential Impact.
Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Major Benefit ($783
million per year).
Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Minor Impact (0.1
percent increase).

Minor Benefit
(unquantifiable).
Major Benefit ($170
million per year).
Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Minor Benefit (0.1
percent decrease).

Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Major Benefit ($671
million per year).
Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Minor Impact (0.1
percent increase).

Environmental Justice

No Impact .................

No Impact .................

No Impact .................

No Impact.

No Change ................

Minor Induced Impact
(2,350 acres).
Minor Potential Impact.
No Change ................
Major Benefit ($443
million per year).
Minor Impact
(unquantifiable).
Minor Benefit (less
than 0.1 percent
decrease).
No Impact .................

FMCSA alternative

Source: Environmental Assessment for Hours of Service (HOS) Rule, Table 22.

This final rule’s environmental
assessment and finding of no significant
impact (FONSI) are in the docket.
Executive Order 13211 (Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use)
We have analyzed this action under
Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use. As a part of the
environmental assessment, the FMCSA
analyzed the three alternatives
discussed earlier in this final rule.
The greatest reduction in energy
consumption would occur under the

ATA alternative and the greatest
increase would occur under the PATT
alternative. The FMCSA alternative
would increase consumption, but to a
lesser degree than the PATT alternative.
Energy consumption would decrease
under the Full Compliance alternative,
but to a lesser degree than the ATA
alternative. Table 26 shows that the
energy consumption effects of the
alternatives would range from a
reduction of 1 percent to an increase of
2 percent in energy consumption for the
affected CMV operations. Effects on
energy consumption by all medium and

heavy-duty trucks would range from a
0.3 percent reduction to a 1.2 percent
increase. Effects of the alternatives on
energy consumption from all
transportation sources would range from
a 0.1 percent reduction to a 0.2 percent
increase. From a national energy
consumption perspective, the PATT
alternative has a net increase in energy
consumption of about one tenth of one
percent. All other alternatives have
essentially a zero effect on national
energy consumption. The FMCSA does
not consider these effects to be
significant.

TABLE 26.—NET CHANGE IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY CONSUMER BY ALTERNATIVE
No action
alternative

Energy consumer
Affected CMV Operations ......................
Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks ............
Total Transportation ...............................

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0
0
0

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Full compliance
baseline

PATT alternative

ATA alternative

(0.05 percent) ........
(0.03 percent) ........
(0.01 percent) ........

2.0 percent .............
1.2 percent .............
0.2 percent .............

(1.0 percent) ..........
(0.6 percent) ..........
(0.1 percent) ..........

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28APR2

FMCSA alternative
0.6 percent.
0.4 percent.
0.1 percent.

Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations

22513

TABLE 26.—NET CHANGE IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY CONSUMER BY ALTERNATIVE—Continued
No action
alternative

Energy consumer
Total U.S. ...............................................

0

Full compliance
baseline

PATT alternative

ATA alternative

(0.00 percent) ........

0.10 percent ...........

(0.00 percent) ........

FMCSA alternative
0.00 percent.

Source: Environmental Assessment for Hours of Service (HOS) Rule, Table 21.

In accordance with Executive Order
13211, the agency prepared a Statement
of Energy Effects for this final rule. A
copy of this statement is in Appendix D
to the environmental assessment.
Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions
to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low Income
Populations)
The FMCSA evaluated the
environmental effects of the Proposed
Action and alternatives in accordance
with Executive Order 12898 and
determined that there were no
environmental justice issues associated
with revising the hours of service
regulations. Environmental justice
issues would be raised if there were
‘‘disproportionate’’ and ‘‘high and
adverse impact’’ on minority or lowincome populations. The FMCSA
determined through the analyses
documented in the Environmental
Assessment in the docket prepared for
this final rule that there were no high
and adverse impacts associated with
any of the alternatives. In addition,
FMCSA analyzed the demographic
makeup of the trucking industry
potentially affected by the alternatives
and determined that there was no
disproportionate impact on minority or
low-income populations. This is based
on the finding that low-income and
minority populations are generally
underrepresented in the trucking
occupation. In addition, the most
impacted trucking sectors do not have
disproportionate representation of
minority and low-income drivers
relative to the trucking occupation as a
whole. Appendix E of the
Environmental Assessment provides a
detailed analysis that was used to reach
this conclusion.
Executive Order 13045 (Protection of
Children)
Executive Order 13045, ‘‘Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks’’ (April 23, 1997,
62 FR 19885), requires that agencies
issuing ‘‘economically significant’’ rules
that also concern an environmental
health or safety risk that an agency has
reason to state may disproportionately
affect children must include an
evaluation of the environmental health
and safety effects of the regulation on

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children. Section 5 of Executive Order
13045 directs an agency to submit for a
‘‘covered regulatory action’’ an
evaluation of its environmental health
or safety effects on children.
The FMCSA evaluated the projected
effects of the proposed action and
alternatives and determined that they
would not create disproportionate
environmental health risks or safety
risks to children. The only adverse
environmental effect with potential
human health consequences is the
projected increase in emissions of air
pollutants. The FMCSA has projected
that the PATT alternative and the
FMCSA alternative would result in a
minor increase in emissions on a
national scale. The FMCSA projects no
adverse human health consequences to
either children or adults because the
magnitude of emission increases is
small. The proposed action and
alternatives, however, would reduce the
safety risk posed by tired, drowsy, or
fatigued drivers of CMVs. These safety
risk improvements would accrue to
children and adults equally.

27, 2003, will be deemed to have
incompatible regulations and will not be
eligible for Basic Program nor Incentive
Funds in accordance with 49 CFR
350.335(b).

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This action meets applicable
standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice
Reform, to minimize litigation,
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce
burden.

49 CFR Part 395

Executive Order 12630 (Taking of
Private Property)
This rule will not effect a taking of
private property or otherwise have
taking implications under E. O. 12630,
Governmental Actions and Interference
with Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights.
Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
This action has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132. The FMCSA has determined this
rule does not have a substantial direct
effect on States, nor would it limit the
policymaking discretion of the States.
Nothing in this document preempts any
State law or regulation.
A State that fails to adopt the new
amendments in this final rule within
three years of the effective date of June

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Executive Order 12372
(Intergovernmental Review)
Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance Program Number or 20.217,
Motor Carrier Safety. The regulations
implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental
consultation on Federal programs and
activities do not apply to this program.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 385
Administrative practice and
procedure, Highway safety, Motor
carriers, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 390
Highway safety, Intermodal
transportation, Motor carriers, Motor
vehicle safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
Highway safety, Motor carriers,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
■ In consideration of the foregoing, the
FMCSA is amending Title 49, CFR,
chapter III, parts 385, 390, and 395 as set
forth below:
PART 385—SAFETY FITNESS
PROCEDURES [AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 385
continues to read as follows.

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 113, 504, 521(b),
5113, 31136, 31144, 31148, and 31502; and
49 CFR 1.73.

2. Amend appendix B to part 385 as
follows:
■ a. Revise section II.(c) as follows;
■ b. Amend section VII as follows:
(i) Revise the citations and text for
§§ 395.1(h)(1)(i) through (h)(1)(iv) and
395.3(a)(1) through 395.3(b)(2) as
follows; and
(ii) Add the citations and text for
§§ 395.1(h)(2)(i) through (h)(2)(iv),
395.1(o), and 395.3(c)(1) through
395.5(b)(2) in numerical order as
follows:
■

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Appendix B to Part 385 Explanation of
Safety Rating Process
*

*

*

*

*

II. Converting CR Information Into a Safety
Rating

*

*

*

*

*

(c) Critical regulations are those identified
as such where noncompliance relates to
management and/or operational controls.
These are indicative of breakdowns in a
carrier’s management controls. An example
of a critical regulation is § 395.3(a)(1),
requiring or permitting a property-carrying
commercial motor vehicle driver to drive
more than 11 hours.

*

*

*

*

*

VII. List of Acute and Critical Regulations.

*

*

*

*

*

§ 395.1(h)(1)(i) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive more than 15 hours (Driving
in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(1)(ii) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty 20
hours (Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(1)(iii) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 70 hours in 7 consecutive days
(Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(1)(iv) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 80 hours in 8 consecutive days
(Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(2)(i) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive more than 15 hours (Driving
in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(2)(ii) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty 20
hours (Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(2)(iii) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 70 hours in 7 consecutive days
(Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(h)(2)(iv) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 80 hours in 8 consecutive days
(Driving in Alaska) (critical).
§ 395.1(o) Requiring or permitting a shorthaul property-carrying commercial motor
vehicle driver to drive after having been on
duty 16 consecutive hours (critical).
§ 395.3(a)(1) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive more than 11 hours (critical).
§ 395.3(a)(2) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after the end of the 14th hour
after coming on duty (critical).
§ 395.3(b)(1) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 60 hours in 7 consecutive days
(critical).
§ 395.3(b)(2) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty

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more than 70 hours in 8 consecutive days
(critical).
§ 395.3(c)(1) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to restart a period of 7 consecutive
days without taking an off-duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours (critical).
§ 395.3(c)(2) Requiring or permitting a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to restart a period of 8 consecutive
days without taking an off-duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours (critical).
§ 395.5(a)(1) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive more than 10 hours (critical).
§ 395.5(a)(2) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty 15
hours (critical).
§ 395.5(b)(1) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 60 hours in 7 consecutive days
(critical).
§ 395.5(b)(2) Requiring or permitting a
passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle
driver to drive after having been on duty
more than 70 hours in 8 consecutive days
(critical).

*

*

*

*

*

PART 390—FEDERAL MOTOR
CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS;
GENERAL
3. The authority citation for part 390 is
revised to read as follows:

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 13301, 13902, 31132,
31133, 31136, 31502, and 31504; sec. 204,
Pub. L. 104–88, 109 Stat. 803, 941 (49 U.S.C.
701 note); sec. 217, Pub. L. 106–159, 113 Stat.
1748, 1767; and 49 CFR 1.73.

3a. Revise paragraphs (b) and (c) of
§ 390.23 to read as follows:

■

§ 390.23

Relief from regulations.

*

*
*
*
*
(b) Upon termination of direct
assistance to the regional or local
emergency relief effort, the motor carrier
or driver is subject to the requirements
of parts 390 through 399 of this chapter,
with the following exception: A driver
may return empty to the motor carrier’s
terminal or the driver’s normal work
reporting location without complying
with parts 390 through 399 of this
chapter. However, a driver who informs
the motor carrier that he or she needs
immediate rest must be permitted at
least 10 consecutive hours off duty
before the driver is required to return to
such terminal or location. Having
returned to the terminal or other
location, the driver must be relieved of
all duty and responsibilities. Direct
assistance terminates when a driver or
commercial motor vehicle is used in
interstate commerce to transport cargo
not destined for the emergency relief
effort, or when the motor carrier
dispatches such driver or commercial

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motor vehicle to another location to
begin operations in commerce.
(c) When the driver has been relieved
of all duty and responsibilities upon
termination of direct assistance to a
regional or local emergency relief effort,
no motor carrier shall permit or require
any driver used by it to drive nor shall
any such driver drive in commerce
until:
(1) The driver has met the
requirements of §§ 395.3(a) and 395.5(a)
of this chapter; and
(2) The driver has had at least 34
consecutive hours off-duty when:
(i) The driver has been on duty for
more than 60 hours in any 7 consecutive
days at the time the driver is relieved of
all duty if the employing motor carrier
does not operate every day in the week,
or
(ii) The driver has been on duty for
more than 70 hours in any 8 consecutive
days at the time the driver is relieved of
all duty if the employing motor carrier
operates every day in the week.
PART 395—HOURS OF SERVICE OF
DRIVERS
4. The authority citation for part 395 is
revised to read as follows:

■

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 504, 14122, 31133,
31136, and 31502; sec. 113, Pub. L. 103–311,
108 Stat. 1673, 1676; and 49 CFR 1.73.
■

5. Add § 395.0 to read as follows:

§ 395.0 Compliance date for certain
requirements for hours of service of
drivers.

(a) Motor carriers and drivers must
comply with the following requirements
of this chapter through January 3, 2004,
that were in effect before June 27, 2003,
and are contained in 49 CFR Chapter III
revised as of October 1, 2002:
(1) §§ 395.1(b), (e)(3), (e)(4), (g), (h),
and (j) of this part;
(2) § 395.3 of this part;
(3) § 390.23(b) and (c) of this
subchapter; and
(4) The citations and text for
§§ 395.1(h)(1)(i) through 395.3(b)(2) in
section VII. List of Acute and Critical
Regulations in appendix B to part 385
of this subchapter.
(b) Motor carriers and drivers must
comply beginning on January 4, 2004
with the amendments made to the
following sections that took effect on
June 27, 2003, and are contained in 49
CFR chapter III revised as of October 1,
2003:
(1) §§ 395.1(b), (e)(3), (e)(4), (g), (h),
(j), and (o) of this part;
(2) § 395.3 of this part;
(3) § 395.5 of this part;
(4) §§ 390.23(b) and (c) of this
subchapter; and

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations
(5) The citations and text for
§§ 395.1(h)(1)(i) through 395.5(b)(2) in
section VII. List of Acute and Critical
Regulations in appendix B to part 385
of this subchapter.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 6. Section 395.1 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(1), (e)(3), (e)(4),
(g), (h), (j), (k), and adding paragraph (o)
to read as follows:
§ 395.1

Scope of rules in this part.

*

*
*
*
*
(b) Adverse driving conditions. (1)
Except as provided in paragraph (h)(2)
of this section, a driver who encounters
adverse driving conditions, as defined
in § 395.2, and cannot, because of those
conditions, safely complete the run
within the maximum driving time
permitted by §§ 395.3(a) or 395.5(a) may
drive and be permitted or required to
drive a commercial motor vehicle for
not more than 2 additional hours in
order to complete that run or to reach
a place offering safety for the occupants
of the commercial motor vehicle and
security for the commercial motor
vehicle and its cargo. However, that
driver may not drive or be permitted to
drive—
(i) For more than 13 hours in the
aggregate following 10 consecutive
hours off duty for drivers of propertycarrying commercial motor vehicles;
(ii) After he/she has been on duty
after the end of the 14th hour after
coming on duty following 10
consecutive hours off duty for drivers of
property-carrying commercial motor
vehicles;
(iii) For more than 12 hours in the
aggregate following 8 consecutive hours
off duty for drivers of passengercarrying commercial motor vehicles; or
(iv) After he/she has been on duty 15
hours following 8 consecutive hours off
duty for drivers of passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(3)(i) A property-carrying commercial
motor vehicle driver has at least 10
consecutive hours off duty separating
each 12 hours on duty;
(ii) A passenger-carrying commercial
motor vehicle driver has at least 8
consecutive hours off duty separating
each 12 hours on duty;
(4)(i) A property-carrying commercial
motor vehicle driver does not exceed 11
hours maximum driving time following
10 consecutive hours off duty; or
(ii) A passenger-carrying commercial
motor vehicle driver does not exceed 10
hours maximum driving time following
8 consecutive hours off duty; and
*
*
*
*
*

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(g) Sleeper berths. (1) General
property-carrying commercial motor
vehicle. A driver who is driving a
property-carrying commercial motor
vehicle that is equipped with a sleeper
berth, as defined in §§ 395.2 and 393.76
of this subchapter, may accumulate the
equivalent of 10 consecutive hours of
off-duty time by taking two periods of
rest in the sleeper berth, providing:
(i) Neither rest period is shorter than
two hours;
(ii) The driving time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
exceed 11 hours;
(iii) The on-duty time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
include any driving time after the 14th
hour; and
(iv) The driver may not return to
driving subject to the normal limits
under § 395.3 without taking at least 10
consecutive hours off duty, at least 10
consecutive hours in the sleeper berth,
or a combination of at least 10
consecutive hours off duty and sleeper
berth time.
(2) Specially trained driver of a
specially constructed oil well servicing
commercial motor vehicle at a natural
gas or oil well location. A specially
trained driver of a specially constructed
oil well servicing commercial motor
vehicle who is off duty at a natural gas
or oil well location in a commercial
motor vehicle that is equipped with a
sleeper berth, as defined in §§ 395.2 and
393.76 of this subchapter, or other
sleeping accommodations, may
accumulate the equivalent of 10
consecutive hours of off-duty time by
taking two periods of rest in the sleeper
berth or other sleeping
accommodations, providing:
(i) Neither rest period is shorter than
two hours;
(ii) The driving time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
exceed 11 hours;
(iii) The on-duty time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
include any driving time after the 14th
hour; and
(iv) The driver may not return to
driving subject to the normal limits
under § 395.3 without taking at least 10
consecutive hours off duty, at least 10
consecutive hours in the sleeper berth,
or a combination of at least 10
consecutive hours off duty and sleeper
berth time.
(3) Passenger-carrying commercial
motor vehicles. A driver who is driving
a passenger-carrying commercial motor
vehicle that is equipped with a sleeper

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berth, as defined in §§ 395.2 and 393.76
of this subchapter, may accumulate the
equivalent of 8 consecutive hours of offduty time by taking two periods of rest
in the sleeper berth, providing:
(i) Neither rest period is shorter than
two hours;
(ii) The driving time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
exceed 10 hours;
(iii) The on-duty time in the period
immediately before and after each rest
period, when added together, does not
include any driving time after the 15th
hour; and
(iv) The driver may not return to
driving subject to the normal limits
under § 395.5 without taking at least 8
consecutive hours off duty, at least 8
consecutive hours in the sleeper berth,
or a combination of at least 8
consecutive hours off duty and sleeper
berth time.
(h) State of Alaska. (1) Propertycarrying commercial motor vehicle. The
provisions of § 395.3(a) do not apply to
any driver who is driving a commercial
motor vehicle in the State of Alaska. A
driver who is driving a propertycarrying commercial motor vehicle in
the State of Alaska must not drive or be
required or permitted to drive—
(i) More than 15 hours following 10
consecutive hours off duty; or
(ii) After being on duty for 20 hours
or more following 10 consecutive hours
off duty.
(iii) After having been on duty for 70
hours in any period of 7 consecutive
days, if the motor carrier for which the
driver drives does not operate every day
in the week; or
(iv) After having been on duty for 80
hours in any period of 8 consecutive
days, if the motor carrier for which the
driver drives operates every day in the
week.
(2) Passenger-carrying commercial
motor vehicle. The provisions of § 395.5
do not apply to any driver who is
driving a passenger-carrying commercial
motor vehicle in the State of Alaska. A
driver who is driving a passengercarrying commercial motor vehicle in
the State of Alaska must not drive or be
required or permitted to drive—
(i) More than 15 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty;
(ii) After being on duty for 20 hours
or more following 8 consecutive hours
off duty;
(iii) After having been on duty for 70
hours in any period of 7 consecutive
days, if the motor carrier for which the
driver drives does not operate every day
in the week; or
(iv) After having been on duty for 80
hours in any period of 8 consecutive

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Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Rules and Regulations

days, if the motor carrier for which the
driver drives operates every day in the
week.
(3) A driver who is driving a
commercial motor vehicle in the State of
Alaska and who encounters adverse
driving conditions (as defined in
§ 395.2) may drive and be permitted or
required to drive a commercial motor
vehicle for the period of time needed to
complete the run.
(i) After a property-carrying
commercial motor vehicle driver
completes the run, that driver must be
off duty for at least 10 consecutive hours
before he/she drives again; and
(ii) After a passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicle driver
completes the run, that driver must be
off duty for at least 8 consecutive hours
before he/she drives again.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) Travel time. (1) When a propertycarrying commercial motor vehicle
driver at the direction of the motor
carrier is traveling, but not driving or
assuming any other responsibility to the
carrier, such time must be counted as
on-duty time unless the driver is
afforded at least 10 consecutive hours
off duty when arriving at destination, in
which case he/she must be considered
off duty for the entire period.
(2) When a passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicle driver at the
direction of the motor carrier is
traveling, but not driving or assuming
any other responsibility to the carrier,
such time must be counted as on-duty
time unless the driver is afforded at
least 8 consecutive hours off duty when
arriving at destination, in which case
he/she must be considered off duty for
the entire period.
(k) Agricultural operations. The
provisions of this part shall not apply to
drivers transporting agricultural
commodities or farm supplies for
agricultural purposes in a State if such
transportation:
(1) Is limited to an area within a 100
air mile radius from the source of the
commodities or the distribution point
for the farm supplies, and
(2) Is conducted during the planting
and harvesting seasons within such
State, as determined by the State.
*
*
*
*
*
(o) Property-carrying driver. A
property-carrying driver is exempt from
the requirements of § 395.3(a)(2) if:
(1) The driver has returned to the
driver’s normal work reporting location
and the carrier released the driver from
duty at that location for the previous
five duty tours the driver has worked;
(2) The driver has returned to the
normal work reporting location and the

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carrier releases the driver from duty
within 16 hours after coming on duty
following 10 consecutive hours off duty;
and
(3) The driver has not taken this
exemption within the previous 7
consecutive days, except when the
driver has begun a new 7- or 8consecutive day period with the
beginning of any off duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours as allowed
by § 395.3(c).
■ 7. The section heading and text of
§ 395.3 is revised to read as follows.
§ 395.3 Maximum driving time for
property-carrying vehicles.

Subject to the exceptions and
exemptions in § 395.1:
(a) No motor carrier shall permit or
require any driver used by it to drive a
property-carrying commercial motor
vehicle, nor shall any such driver drive
a property-carrying commercial motor
vehicle:
(1) More than 11 cumulative hours
following 10 consecutive hours off duty;
or
(2) For any period after the end of the
14th hour after coming on duty
following 10 consecutive hours off duty,
except when a property-carrying driver
complies with the provisions of
§ 395.1(o).
(b) No motor carrier shall permit or
require a driver of a property-carrying
commercial motor vehicle to drive, nor
shall any driver drive a propertycarrying commercial motor vehicle,
regardless of the number of motor
carriers using the driver’s services, for
any period after—
(1) Having been on duty 60 hours in
any 7 consecutive days if the employing
motor carrier does not operate
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week; or
(2) Having been on duty 70 hours in
any period of 8 consecutive days if the
employing motor carrier operates
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week.
(c)(1) Any period of 7 consecutive
days may end with the beginning of any
off duty period of 34 or more
consecutive hours; or
(2) Any period of 8 consecutive days
may end with the beginning of any off
duty period of 34 or more consecutive
hours.
■ 8. Section 395.5 is added to read as follows.
§ 395.5 Maximum driving time for
passenger-carrying vehicles.

Subject to the exceptions and
exemptions in § 395.1:
(a) No motor carrier shall permit or
require any driver used by it to drive a

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passenger-carrying commercial motor
vehicle, nor shall any such driver drive
a passenger-carrying commercial motor
vehicle:
(1) More than 10 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty; or
(2) For any period after having been
on duty 15 hours following 8
consecutive hours off duty.
(b) No motor carrier shall permit or
require a driver of a passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicle to drive, nor
shall any driver drive a passengercarrying commercial motor vehicle,
regardless of the number of motor
carriers using the driver’s services, for
any period after—
(1) Having been on duty 60 hours in
any 7 consecutive days if the employing
motor carrier does not operate
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week; or
(2) Having been on duty 70 hours in
any period of 8 consecutive days if the
employing motor carrier operates
commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week.
■ 9. Section 395.13 paragraphs (c)(1)(ii)
and (d)(2) are revised to read as follows:
§ 395.13

Drivers declared out of service.

*

*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) * * *
(ii) Require a driver who has been
declared out of service for failure to
prepare a record of duty status to
operate a commercial motor vehicle
until that driver has been off duty for
the appropriate number of consecutive
hours required by this part and is in
compliance with this section. The
appropriate consecutive hours off-duty
period may include sleeper berth time.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(2) No driver who has been declared
out of service, for failing to prepare a
record of duty status, shall operate a
commercial motor vehicle until the
driver has been off duty for the
appropriate number of consecutive
hours required by this part and is in
compliance with this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. Section 395.15(j)(2)(ii) is revised to
read as follows:
§ 395.15 Automatic on-board recording
devices.

*

*
*
*
*
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
(ii) The motor carrier has required or
permitted a driver to establish, or the
driver has established, a pattern of

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exceeding the hours of service
limitations of this part;
*
*
*
*
*

Issued on: April 16, 2003.
Annette M. Sandberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 03–9971 Filed 4–24–03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P

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