Hour of Service of Drivers, NPRM, 2005

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 14 / Monday, January 24, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Office of Management and Budget. For
this reason, this action is also not
subject to Executive Order 13211,
‘‘Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use’’ (66 FR 28355, May
22, 2001). This action merely approves
state law as meeting Federal
requirements and imposes no additional
requirements beyond those imposed by
state law. Accordingly, the
Administrator certifies that this rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). Because this
rule approves pre-existing requirements
under state law and does not impose
any additional enforceable duty beyond
that required by state law, it does not
contain any unfunded mandate or
significantly or uniquely affect small
governments, as described in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Public Law 104–4).
This rule also does not have tribal
implications because it will not have a
substantial direct effect on one or more
Indian tribes, on the relationship
between the Federal Government and
Indian tribes, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities between the
Federal Government and Indian tribes,
as specified by Executive Order 13175
(65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000). This
action also does not have Federalism
implications because it does not have
substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, as specified in
Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255,
August 10, 1999), because it merely
approves a state rule implementing a
federal standard, and does not alter the
relationship or the distribution of power
and responsibilities established in the
Clean Air Act. This rule also is not
subject to Executive Order 13045
‘‘Protection of Children from
Environmental Health Risks and Safety
Risks’’(62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997),
because it is not economically
significant.
In reviewing SIP submissions, EPA’s
role is to approve state choices,
provided that they meet the criteria of
the Clean Air Act. In this context, in the
absence of a prior existing requirement
for the State to use voluntary consensus
standards (VCS), EPA has no authority
to disapprove a SIP submission for
failure to use VCS. It would thus be
inconsistent with applicable law for
EPA, when it reviews a SIP submission,
to use VCS in place of a SIP submission
that otherwise satisfies the provisions of

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the Clean Air Act. Thus, the
requirements of section 12(d) of the
National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C.
272 note) do not apply. This rule does
not impose an information collection
burden under the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52
Environmental protection, Air
pollution control, Carbon monoxide,
Intergovernmental relations, Nitrogen
dioxide, Ozone, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Volatile
organic compounds.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Dated: January 12, 2005.
Robert W. Varney,
Regional Administrator, EPA New England.
[FR Doc. 05–1246 Filed 1–21–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 385, 390 and 395
[Docket No. FMCSA–2004–19608; formerly
FMCSA–1997–2350]
RIN–2126–AA90

Hours of Service of Drivers
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM); request for comments.
AGENCY:

SUMMARY: FMCSA is reviewing and
reconsidering the regulations on hours
of service of drivers published on April
28, 2003 (68 FR 22456) and amended on
September 30, 2003 (68 FR 56208). The
regulations were vacated by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit on July 16, 2004
(Public Citizen et al. v. Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d
1209). Congress subsequently provided
that the 2003 regulations will remain in
effect until the effective date of a new
final rule addressing the issues raised by
the court or September 30, 2005,
whichever occurs first (Section 7(f) of
the Surface Transportation Extension
Act of 2004, Part V). FMCSA is
reconsidering the 2003 regulations to
determine what changes may be
necessary to be consistent with the
holdings and dicta of the Public Citizen
decision. In order to allow effective
public participation in the process
before the statutory deadline, FMCSA is

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publishing this NPRM concurrently
with its ongoing research and analysis
of the issues raised by the court. To
facilitate discussion, the agency is
putting forward the 2003 rule as the
‘‘proposal’’ on which public comments
are sought. This NPRM, however, asks
the public to comment on what changes
to that rule, if any, are necessary to
respond to the concerns raised by the
court, and to provide data or studies
that would support changes to, or
continued use of, the 2003 rule. The
NPRM includes specific information on
a variety of topics and specific questions
for comment. FMCSA is not considering
changes to the hours-of-service
regulations applicable to drivers and
operators of passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles (CMVs).
DATES: Comments must be received by
March 10, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by DOT DMS Docket Number
FMCSA–2004–19608 by any of the
following methods. Do not submit the
same comments by more than one
method. However, in order to allow
effective public participation in this
rulemaking before the statutory
deadline, we encourage use of the web
site that is listed first below. It will
provide the most efficient and timely
method of receiving and processing
your comments.
• Web site: http://dms.dot.gov:
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments on the DOT electronic site.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–
0001.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number (FMCSA–2004–19608) or
Regulatory Identification Number (RIN)
for this rulemaking (RIN–2126–AA90).
Note that all comments received will be
posted without change to http://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information provided. Please see the
Privacy Act heading for further
information. If addressing a specific
request for comments in this NPRM,
please clearly identify the related
‘‘request number(s)’’ for each topic
addressed in your comments. Further

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 14 / Monday, January 24, 2005 / Proposed Rules

important guidance for commenters is
contained within individual sections of
this NPRM.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to http://
dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL–
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search
the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477) or you may visit http://
dms.dot.gov.
Comments received after the comment
closing date will be included in the
docket and we will consider late
comments to the extent practicable.
FMCSA may, however, issue a final rule
at any time after the close of the
comment period.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Tom Yager, Hours-of-Service Team,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, 202–366–1425.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
A. Legal Basis for the Rulemaking
B. Background Information
B.1. History of the Hours-of-Service Rule
B.2. Premise of the 2003 Hours-of-Service
Rule
C. Purpose of This Rulemaking
D. Guidance for Commenters
E. Driver Health and Safety Relationships
E.1. Combined Effects
E.2. Sleep Loss and Deprivation
E.3. Exposure to Environmental Stressors
E.4. Workplace Injuries and Fatalities
E.5. Lifestyle Choices
F. Primary Components
F.1. Driving Time, On-Duty Time, and OffDuty Time
F.2. The 34-Hour Restart and 60/70-Hour
Rules
F.3. Sleeper-Berth Use
F.4. Electronic On-Board Recording
Devices (EOBRs)
F.5. Other Provisions
G. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
G.1. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
G.2. Regulatory Flexibility Act
G.3. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
G.4. National Environmental Policy Act
G.5. Paperwork Reduction Act
G.6. Executive Order 13211 (Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use)

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G.7. Executive Order 12898
(Environmental Justice)
G.8. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of
Children)
G.9. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
G.10. Executive Order 12630 (Taking of
Private Property)
G.11. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
G.12. Executive Order 12372
(Intergovernmental Review)
H. List of Subjects

A. Legal Basis for the Rulemaking
This rulemaking is based on the
authority of the Motor Carrier Act of
1935 and the Motor Carrier Safety Act
of 1984.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as
amended, provides that ‘‘[t]he Secretary
of Transportation may prescribe
requirements for: (1) Qualifications and
maximum hours of service of employees
of, and safety of operation and
equipment of, a motor carrier; and (2)
qualifications and maximum hours of
service of employees of, and standards
of equipment of, a motor private carrier,
when needed to promote safety of
operation’’ (49 U.S.C. 31502(b)).
For reasons explained in more detail
below, this NPRM raises for
reconsideration the hours-of-service
regulations applicable to drivers and
operators of property-carrying CMVs,
which were promulgated by FMCSA on
April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22456) and
amended on September 30, 2003 (68 FR
56208). The agency may ultimately
modify those regulations as a result of
this review. The hours-of-service
regulations deal directly with the
‘‘maximum hours of service of
employees of * * * a motor carrier
(section 31502(b)(1)) and the ‘‘maximum
hours of service of employees of * * *
a motor private carrier’’ (section
31502(b)(2)). The adoption and
enforcement of such rules were
specifically authorized by the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935. This NPRM rests
squarely on that authority.
The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984
provides concurrent authority to
regulate drivers, motor carriers, and
vehicle equipment. It requires the
Secretary of Transportation to
‘‘prescribe regulations on commercial
motor vehicle safety. The regulations
shall prescribe minimum safety
standards for commercial motor
vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations
shall ensure that: (1) Commercial motor
vehicles are maintained, equipped,
loaded, and operated safely; (2) the
responsibilities imposed on operators of
commercial motor vehicles do not
impair their ability to operate the
vehicles safely; (3) the physical
condition of operators of commercial

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motor vehicles is adequate to enable
them to operate the vehicles safely; and
(4) the operation of commercial motor
vehicles does not have a deleterious
effect on the physical condition of the
operators’’ (49 U.S.C. 31136(a)).
This NPRM deals with the hours of
service of drivers. It is based primarily
on the requirements of section
31136(a)(2) and (a)(4), and secondarily
on section 31136(a)(1) and (a)(3). The
fundamental purpose of the hours-ofservice regulations is to ensure that
driving requirements and other
employment obligations imposed on
CMV operators ‘‘do not impair [the
drivers’] ability to operate the vehicles
safely’’ (section 31136(a)(2)). Broadly
speaking, this NPRM is seeking public
comment on whether the April 2003,
final rule achieves that goal through a
combination of three provisions (though
others also play a role) which require
drivers to take 10 consecutive hours off
duty before driving a CMV, limit driving
time after 10 hours off duty to 11 hours,
and prohibit driving after the 14th hour
after coming on duty following 10 hours
off duty.
FMCSA also seeks comment on
whether that same combination of
provisions addresses some of the
requirements of section 31136(a)(4) by
minimizing the ‘‘deleterious effect[s]’’ of
sleep deprivation and cumulative
fatigue on ‘‘the physical condition’’ of
CMV drivers, and thus reducing the risk
of fatigue-related accidents. This NPRM
also requests public comments and
information about other possible
‘‘deleterious effect[s]’’ associated with
hours of service and with the operation
of CMVs, which the agency is
considering in the course of this
rulemaking. While section 31136(a)(1)
deals primarily with vehicle equipment
and loading (now codified at 49 CFR
part 393 and § 392.9), it also requires
that CMVs be ‘‘operated safely,’’ which
encompasses both the vehicle and the
driver. Finally, section 31136(a)(3)
requires regulations which ensure that
‘‘the physical condition’’ of CMV
drivers enables them to drive safely.
Although that subsection requires the
agency to adopt general physical
qualification standards (now codified at
49 CFR 391.41(b)), a CMV driver’s
‘‘physical condition’’ may be affected by
‘‘the responsibilities imposed’’ on him/
her and by ‘‘deleterious effect[s]’’
associated with the operation of large
CMVs. To enable FMCSA to evaluate
the need for any changes to the April
2003, hours-of-service regulations, this
NPRM requests comments and
information on all of these issues as
they relate to the hours-of-service
regulations.

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 14 / Monday, January 24, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Before prescribing any regulations,
however, FMCSA must also consider
the ‘‘costs and benefits’’ of its proposal
(49 U.S.C. 31136(c)(2)(A)). For that
reason, this NPRM seeks comment on
the economic effects of this proposal as
well.
B. Background Information
B.1. History of the Hours-of-Service Rule
The Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) promulgated the first Federal
hours-of-service regulations in the late
1930s. The rules were based on the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The
regulations remained largely unchanged
from 1940 until 2003, except for a
significant amendment in 1962. Prior to
1962, driver hours-of-service regulations
were based on a 24-hour period from
noon to noon or midnight to midnight.
A driver could be on duty no more than
15 hours in a 24-consecutive-hour
period. In 1962, among other rule
changes, the 24-hour cycle was removed
and replaced by minimum off-duty
periods. A driver could ‘‘restart’’ the
calculation of his or her driving and onduty limitations after any period of 8 or
more hours off duty.
Section 408 of the ICC Termination
Act of 1995 (ICCTA) (Pub. L. 104–88,
109 Stat. 803, at 958) required the
Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) to conduct rulemaking
‘‘dealing with a variety of fatigue-related
issues pertaining to commercial motor
vehicle safety.’’ In response, FHWA
published an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on
November 5, 1996 (61 FR 57252).
FMCSA was established as a separate
agency on January 1, 2000. At that time,
responsibility to promulgate CMV
regulations was transferred from FHWA
to FMCSA, which published an hoursof-service NPRM on May 2, 2000 (65 FR
25540) and a final rule on April 28,
2003 (68 FR 22456). Technical
amendments to the final rule were
published on September 30, 2003 (68 FR
56208). Motor carriers and drivers were
required to comply with the final rule
starting on January 4, 2004.
FMCSA’s 2003 final rule did not
change any hours-of-service
requirements for motor carriers and
drivers operating passenger-carrying
vehicles. They are required to continue
complying with the hours-of-service
rules existing before the 2003 final rule
(see 68 FR 22461–22462). Changes in
hours-of-service provisions in the new
rule applied only to motor carriers and
drivers operating property-carrying
vehicles. Compared to the previous
regulations, the new rule: (1) Required
drivers to take 10, instead of 8,

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consecutive hours off duty (except when
using sleeper berths); (2) retained the
prior prohibition on driving after 60
hours on duty in 7 consecutive days or
70 hours in 8 consecutive days; (3)
increased allowable driving time from
10 hours to 11 hours; and (4) replaced
the so-called 15-hour rule (which
prohibited drivers from driving after
being on duty more than 15 hours, not
including intervening off-duty time)
with a 14-hour rule (which prohibited
driving after the 14th hour after the
driver came on duty, with no extensions
for off-duty time). Additionally, FMCSA
allowed drivers to ‘‘restart’’ the
calculations for the 60- and 70-hour
limits by taking 34 consecutive hours off
duty. Based on the data and research
available at the time, FMCSA was
convinced that these new rules
constitute a significant improvement in
the hours-of-service regulations
compared to the rules they replaced, by
providing drivers with better
opportunities to obtain restorative sleep,
thereby reducing the incidence of
crashes wholly or partially attributable
to drowsiness or fatigue.
On June 12, 2003, Public Citizen,
Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways
(CRASH) and Parents Against Tired
Truckers (PATT) filed a petition to
review the new hours-of-service rule
with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C.
Circuit). On July 16, 2004, the D.C.
Circuit issued an opinion holding ‘‘that
the rule is arbitrary and capricious
[under the Administrative Procedure
Act] because the agency failed to
consider the impact of the rules on the
health of drivers, a factor the agency
must consider under its organic statute.
Because the agency has wholly failed to
comply with this specific statutory
requirement [i.e., 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(4)],
this single objection from petitioners is
sufficient to establish an arbitrary-andcapricious decision requiring vacatur 1
of the rule.’’ Public Citizen et al. v.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, 374 F.3d 1209, at 1216.
The court said that ‘‘[t]he FMCSA points
to nothing in the agency’s extensive
deliberations establishing that it
considered the statutorily mandated
factor of drivers’ health in the slightest.’’
Id. Although FMCSA argued that the
effect of driver health on vehicle safety
had ‘‘permeated the entire rulemaking
process,’’ the court said that ‘‘[u]nder
the statute, vehicle safety is a distinct
factor the agency must consider, so
considering the effect of driver health
on safety cannot be equal to considering
1 Vacatur: An order of a court vacating (voiding
or annulling) a legal proceeding.

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3341

the impact on the physical condition of
the operators. * * * It may be the case,
for example, that driving for extended
periods of time and sleep deprivation
cause drivers long-term back problems,
or harm drivers’ immune systems. The
agency may of course think that these
and other effects on drivers are not
problematic (or are outweighed by other
considerations, like cost), but if so it
was incumbent on it to say so in the rule
and to explain why. Its failure to do so,
standing alone, requires us to vacate the
entire rule as arbitrary and capricious
* * *’’ Public Citizen at 1217.
The court also found fault with other
aspects of the final rule and in dicta
stated that (1) FMCSA’s justification for
increasing driving time from 10 to 11
hours (i.e., more off-duty time and a
shorter 14-hour driving window
compensate for the additional driving
time) may be legally insufficient
because the agency failed to adequately
demonstrate that other provisions of the
rule offset the increase and failed to take
into account the fatigue effects of ‘‘time
on task’’ in the context of longer weekly
on-duty periods allowed by the 34-hour
restart; (2) the justification for allowing
drivers of CMVs equipped with sleeper
berths to split their 10-hour off-duty
period into two separate periods was
probably arbitrary and capricious, since
FMCSA itself asserted that drivers need
an opportunity for eight hours of
uninterrupted sleep each night; (3) the
agency’s failure to collect and analyze
data on the costs and benefits of
requiring electronic on-board recording
devices (EOBRs) probably failed to meet
the requirements of section 408 of the
ICC Termination Act, which requires
FMCSA to ‘‘deal with’’ EOBRs; and (4)
the agency’s explanation of the 34-hour
restart provision did not address or
justify increases in the maximum
weekly driver hours permitted by that
provision.
At the end of August 2004, FMCSA
modified an existing contract with the
Transportation Research Board (TRB) of
the National Academy of Sciences. The
modification requires TRB to review,
first, the literature published between
1975 and the present concerning the
health implications of the hours-ofservice regulations for CMV drivers,
and, second, the literature relating to
CMV drivers’ hours of service and
fatigue from 1995 to the present. The
review is expected to be complete by
early 2005. All pertinent information
will be made available in the public
docket for this rulemaking.
On September 1, 2004, FMCSA
published an ANPRM requesting
information about factors the agency
should consider in developing

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 14 / Monday, January 24, 2005 / Proposed Rules

performance specifications for EOBRs.
As the agency said in the preamble to
that document, ‘‘FMCSA is attempting
to evaluate the suitability of EOBRs to
demonstrate compliance with the
enforcement of the hours-of-service
regulations, which in turn will have
major implications for the welfare of
drivers and the safe operation of
commercial motor vehicles.’’ The
ANPRM asked for comments and
information, both on technical questions
relating to EOBRs, and about the
potential costs and benefits of such
devices.
On September 30, 2004, the President
signed the Surface Transportation
Extension Act of 2004, Part V (Public
Law 108–310, 118 Stat. 1144). Section
7(f) of the Act provides that ‘‘[t]he
hours-of-service regulations applicable
to property-carrying commercial drivers
contained in the Final Rule published
on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22456–22517),
as amended on September 30, 2003 (68
FR 56208–56212), and made applicable
to motor carriers and drivers on January
4, 2004, shall be in effect until the
earlier of : (1) the effective date of a new
final rule addressing the issues raised by
the July 16, 2004, decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Public Citizen, et al. v.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (No. 03–1165); or (2)
September 30, 2005.’’ (118 Stat. 1144, at
1154).
B.2. Premise of the 2003 Hours-ofService Rule
The premise of the current hours-ofservice rule is that safety and driver
health related to the operation of a CMV
will be improved by regulations moving
drivers toward a 24-hour work cycle and
providing drivers with sufficient time
off to obtain eight hours sleep, while
allowing carriers flexibilities in meeting
schedule demands. There is general
agreement among sleep researchers and
industry participants that the hours-ofservice rules should build on the
foundation of a 24-hour day. Studies
performed in laboratory settings, as well
as studies assessing operational
situations, have explored the
relationships between the sleep
obtained and subsequent performance.
(Dinges, D.F., & Kribs, N.B., ‘‘Performing
While Sleepy: Effects of ExperimentalInduced Sleepiness’’ (1991); Bonnet,
M.H., & Arrand, D.L., ‘‘We are
Chronically Sleep Deprived’’ (1995);
Belenky, G., et al., ‘‘The Effects of Sleep
Deprivation on Performance During
Continuous Combat Operations’’ (1994);
Dinges, D.F., et al., ‘‘Cumulative
Sleepiness, Mood Disturbances, and
Psychomotor Vigilance Performance

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Decrements During a Week of Sleep
Restricted to 4–5 Hours Per Night’’
(1997); Pilcher, J.J., & Hufcutt, A.I.,
‘‘Effects of Sleep Deprivation on
Performance: A Meta-Analysis’’ (1996);
and Belenky, G., et al., ‘‘Effects of
Continuation Operations on Soldier and
Unit Performance: Review of the
Literature and Strategies for Sustaining
the Soldier’’ (1987)). The results of these
studies can be summarized simply: a
person who is sleepy is more prone to
perform poorly on tasks requiring
vigilance, quick reaction time, and
decision-making than a person who is
alert. The scientific basis for proposing
daily restrictions is that an individual
experiencing multiple periods of
insufficient sleep quantity or quality
incurs a cumulative sleep debt leading
to increased levels of fatigue. The
current rule permits a maximum of 11
hours of cumulative driving time, an
increase of one hour from the previous
rule. This current rule is, however, more
restrictive in that it does not, as did the
previous rule, permit a driver to extend
on-duty time by subtracting breaks and
waiting time from the on-duty time
calculation. The 2003 rule reconsidered
here adopted a number of provisions
that combine to enhance highway safety
and the health of CMV drivers as related
to the operation of a CMV. The rule
increased by two hours (from 8 to 10)
the amount of off-duty time drivers
must take between shifts and reduced
the window in which driving can occur
by one hour (from 15 to 14). Because the
rule also eliminated a loophole in the
previous rule permitting truckers to
extend the 15-hour limit by taking
breaks of any length, the driving
‘‘window’’ was actually shortened by
more than one hour. Since these safety
measures gave drivers substantially
more opportunity to obtain restorative
sleep, the agency concluded that a onehour increase in driving time (from 10
to 11 hours) would not compromise the
safe operation of CMVs or the health of
drivers related to the hours-of-service
regulations. A 14-hour work shift
combined with a 10-hour off-duty
period allows drivers to work in a 24hour cycle, in step with the normal 24hour circadian 2 rhythms. The agency
retained the previous prohibition on
driving after 60 hours on duty in 7
consecutive days, or 70 hours in 8 days,
but it allowed drivers to restart the 60/
70-hour calculation after taking 34
consecutive hours off duty. This gave
drivers an opportunity to take two full
8-hour sleep periods and to return to
2 Circadian rhythms: Biological functions or
activities naturally occurring in approximately 24hour cycles.

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duty close to their previous starting
times, thus helping to maintain their 24hour circadian rhythms. The agency
retained the rule permitting truckers to
split their required off-duty time into
two periods in a sleeper berth, neither
of which could be less than two hours.
Total sleeper-berth time, however, was
increased from 8 to 10 hours. Finally,
the agency declined to adopt a rule that
would have required electronic onboard recording devices in all long-haul
vehicles because both costs and benefits
were unknown at the time.
C. Purpose of This Rulemaking
This rulemaking is necessary to
develop hours-of-service regulations to
replace those vacated by the Court. The
vacated rule remains in effect until
replaced or until September 30, 2005,
whichever occurs first. This NPRM
seeks public comment on what changes,
if any, should be made to the April 2003
final rule to address the concerns raised
by the D.C. Circuit, as outlined below.
FMCSA’s review of the literature on
driver health and the various hours-ofservice issues discussed by the Court
will help the agency determine whether
the 2003 final rule should be changed.
The hours-of-service regulations for
drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs, i.e.,
the rules previously applicable to the
entire motor carrier industry, were not
changed by the 2003 final rule and,
consequently, were not at issue in
Public Citizen. Therefore, the agency is
neither requesting comment on, nor
proposing to change, the motorcoach
regulations at this time.
D. Guidance for Commenters
See the ‘‘Instructions’’ subsection
early in this NPRM for specific methods
of submitting comments. When you are
addressing a specific request for
comments in this NPRM, please clearly
identify the related ‘‘request number(s)’’
for each topic addressed in your
comments.
• FMCSA requests comments on the
alternatives and issues presented in this
NPRM. Commenters are also welcome to
present other alternatives or raise
additional issues directly related to the
hours-of-service regulations.
• Commenters should address the
incremental, direct impact of any
proposed changes in hours-of-service
requirements on driver health, the safe
operation of CMVs, and economic
factors. In other words, for any aspect of
the hours-of-service rule being
commented upon, please address the
impact any change would have or has
had on driver health, the safe operation
of CMVs, and economic factors. Only
issues directly related to the hours-of-

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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 14 / Monday, January 24, 2005 / Proposed Rules
service regulations and the operation of
a CMV are being considered in this
rulemaking.
• Whenever possible, commenters
should address the relationship of the
subject commented upon to other
aspects of hours-of-service
requirements. For example, a
recommendation to change the current
11-hour maximum driving time to some
other driving time should discuss this in
the context of any other changes being
suggested to the 14-hour duty period or
minimum 10-hours off-duty
requirement, and, if so, how the
combination of these factors impacts
driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors.
• Commenters are requested to
include a clear rationale for any
recommendations offered, along with
documentation and data to support the
recommendation.
• Specific references to scientific
studies supporting a recommendation
are also requested.
• For motor carriers and drivers,
please provide information on your
current operations, such as (a) Whether
your primary operations are short-haul
(i.e., operations limited to 150 miles or
less, with drivers typically spending
each night at home) or long haul, (b)
whether you are a private or for-hire
motor carrier (or drive for one), (c)
whether you are a truckload or lessthan-truckload motor carrier (or drive
for one) and (d) the commodity or
commodities you most frequently haul.
E. Driver Health and Safety
Relationships
The D.C. Circuit held in Public
Citizen that FMCSA failed to consider
the possibly deleterious effect of the
2003 hours-of-service rule on the
physical condition of drivers, as
required by 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(4). This
NPRM seeks information on that issue.
The court in dicta also addressed
several safety issues. Health and safety
issues, while treated separately in the
Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, are
inextricably related. Any post-1984
changes to the hours-of-service
regulations must ensure that driving a
CMV does not harm drivers. Conversely,
the physical condition of drivers can
have a direct impact on highway safety,
though all health problems do not have
equally immediate effects. The 2003
final rule addressed the impacts of
changes to the hours-of-service rules,
but FMCSA is again inviting the public
to comment on safety and driver health
issues related to changes in the hoursof-service rule and the operation of a
CMV.

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Since publication of the 2003 final
rule, the literature and studies on driver
safety and health have expanded and
evolved. In addition to any studies and
reports referenced in the May 2000
NPRM, the April 2003 final rule, and in
this NPRM, FMCSA is continuing to
study emerging data and information on
these related issues. The agency will file
in the docket (FMCSA–2004–19608) a
copy or summary of any study or report
that is being considered in this
rulemaking and has not previously been
referenced.
FMCSA requests comments on the
relationships between driver health and
safety generally, but also between the
net effect of the changes produced by
the 2003 hours-of-service rule and
health and safety.
Background
Scientific research has made
important contributions to the
development and assessment of
regulatory proposals. A 1941 empirical
study of human fatigue and stress in a
workplace environment was completed
under the direction of the U.S. Public
Health Service to support the ICC’s
initial activity in hours-of-service
regulations. Legislative and regulatory
history, however, also show many
examples of ‘‘common sense’’ proposals
that are now seen as having had a
scientific basis. One example was the
ICC’s original regulatory proposal. It
limited CMV drivers to 12 hours of onduty time (driving or not driving) in a
15-hour duty period, allowing 3 hours
for breaks. The ICC rule required motor
carriers to provide drivers 9 consecutive
hours off duty—a schedule that would
have maintained circadian rhythms.
This provided a 15-hour duty period
and 9-consecutive-hour minimum offduty period, similar to the 14-hour duty
period and 10-consecutive-hour off-duty
periods of the current rule.
In developing its May 2000 proposed
rulemaking, FMCSA reviewed nearly
150 research studies and other
documents, many of which were
submitted or referred to by docket
commenters. Many of the reviewed
documents reported on research
conducted on motor carriers and CMV
drivers. Others, such as studies on
shiftwork, sleep and performance, and
the physiological nature of sleep, were
relevant to the issue of CMV driver
safety.
The studies underlying this proposed
rule make the point that adverse effects
of sleep deprivation can occur when the
opportunity to take sleep is curtailed,
when people try to obtain sleep during
periods of the day when their systems
are in a more active physiological state

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(such as mid-morning and early
evening), or when environmental
conditions are not conducive to
obtaining sleep. Adverse effects include
slower reaction times, poor and variable
responses, deterioration of judgment,
less vigilance and attention, and loss of
alertness. Lack of sleep can also produce
subjective feelings of tiredness, loss of
motivation, and deterioration of mood.
Many of the studies germane to this
NPRM, as well as to FMCSA’s prior
regulatory activities, are referenced in
An Annotated Literature Review
Relating to Proposed Revisions to the
Hours-of-Service Regulation for
Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers,
Freund, D.M., Office of Motor Carrier
Safety, November 1999, Publication No.
DOT-MC–99–129. That review is
available in DOT Docket No. 2350, entry
#956.
In preparing the 2000 NPRM and the
2003 final rule, FMCSA considered the
effect of sleep quality and quantity, first
and foremost, in the context of safe
driving. Hours-of-service regulations
exist to ensure a safe environment for
the CMV driver, and for the driving
public that shares the nation’s
highways. That said, there exists an
extensive body of scientific literature
that addresses the influences of hours of
work and work schedules on employees’
health and well-being.
Rutenfranz, J., Knauth, P., &
Colquhoun, W. (1976), ‘‘Hours of Work
and Shiftwork,’’ Ergonomics 19(3), pp.
331–340, presents an overview of health
and social concerns arising from long
working hours and shiftwork. The
authors consider elements of a workday
(work, leisure, sleep); they note work by
others indicating that sleep during the
day may have less recuperative value
than sleep during the night, and also
that an insufficient amount of ‘‘genuine
leisure time’’ [i.e., time over and above
that needed for personal needs] could
result in decreased sleeping time.
Although the authors hold that a daily
working time of 8 hours is optimal, they
note that longer or shorter workdays
may be allowed or required, depending
on environmental influences and levels
of mental or emotional stress associated
with the job. The authors cite research
documenting digestive and sleep
disorders among shiftworkers.
Shiftworkers’ sleep is shorter and of
poorer quality and quantity as measured
by quantitative clinical (i.e.,
electroencephalographic) criteria. They
also have considerable difficulties reentraining [reestablishing timing of]
physiological functions after shiftwork.
Finally, shiftwork has adverse impacts
on family and social life.

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Research on CMV driver health issues
generally falls into three categories: (1)
The effects of sleep loss or deprivation;
(2) the effects of exposure to noise,
vibration, and exhaust gases and other
chemicals while operating a CMV; and
(3) workplace injuries and fatalities
while operating a CMV.
E–1. Combined Effects
Request E–1–1. Because the new
hours-of-service rule is a combination of
several elements (longer driving time, a
reduced driving window, more off-duty
time, an optional restart section, etc.),
FMCSA requests studies and other data
on the combined or net effects of these
hours-of-service recommendations on
driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors. The
agency also seeks comments on the
mutual interactions of the various
elements of the rule, e.g., whether they
reinforce or conflict with each other,
how the net effect of the elements could
be improved, etc. The agency further
requests comparison of the combined
effect of the incremental changes in the
2003 rule compared to the rule prior to
2003. Commenters should take into
account the combined effect of any
recommendations they submit on the
daily on- and off-duty periods, circadian
rhythms, accumulated duty time over
multi-day periods, and other relevant
factors.
Request E–1–2. Do the new
regulations provide drivers with
additional time for rest and relaxation,
personal matters, and family activities?
How have the new regulations impacted
the ‘‘quality of life’’ for drivers?
E.2. Sleep Loss and Deprivation
Truck drivers have always worked
long hours. This is especially true for
long-haul drivers. Particularly in the
truckload sector of the industry, drivers
are required to spend many, and in most
cases uncompensated, hours waiting to
pick up and unload goods. This affects
their ability to maintain their driving
schedules and can have an adverse
impact on regular wake-sleep cycles.
From a compliance point of view, it can
affect the driver’s ability to operate
within the bounds of the hours-ofservice regulations while still obtaining
the mandatory minimum off-duty time
for sleep, meals, and attending to
personal needs (see Freund (1999) for
discussions of studies by McCartt, et al.
(1995), Van Ouwerkerk (1988), and
Belzer, M.H., et al., ‘‘Proposed Changes
in Motor Carrier Hours of Service:
Project Report’’ (2002)).
Serious adverse health conditions
appear to be associated with chronic
sleep deprivation. In his review,

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˚ kerstedt (1991) cited findings by other
A
researchers who noted increased sleep
problems, as well as increased
incidence of myocardial infarcts and
cardiovascular disease in general. A
1999 study claimed to find that
restricting sleep in healthy young men
to four hours per night for only six
nights ‘‘is associated with striking
alterations in metabolic and endocrine
function. The effects are similar to those
seen in normal aging and, therefore,
sleep debt may increase the severity of
age-related chronic disorders’’ such as
diabetes and hypertension (Spiegel, K.,
et al., ‘‘Impact of Sleep Debt on
Metabolic and Endocrine Function,’’
The Lancet, Vol. 354, No. 9188, 23
October 1999, pp. 1435–1439).
However, the implications of this study
for this rulemaking appear to be
ambiguous. The amount and duration of
sleep deprivation required to exacerbate
chronic disorders appear unclear, and
the conditions under which the effects
of sleep deprivation can be reversed also
appear to be unclear. Finally, extended
working hours tend to desynchronize
the internal circadian rhythms of longhaul drivers who have work/rest cycles
less than 24 hours (Stoynev, A.G., &
Minkova N.K., ‘‘Circadian Rhythms of
Arterial Pressure, Heart Rate and Oral
Temperature in Truck Drivers,’’
Occupational Medicine (London), Vol.
47, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 151–154).
Request E–2–1. Sleep Loss/
Deprivation. FMCSA requests
information on all adverse and
beneficial effects of the new hours-ofservice rule on the health of CMV
drivers in contrast to the old rule. We
are particularly interested in identifying
any increase or reduction in sleep
deprivation, and any measured changes
in driver health impacts, generated as a
consequence of the 2003 rule. Sleep
deprivation in general: What identifies
the presence or the absence of sleep
deprivation in the CMV driver
population? Is there any differential
evidence of sleep deprivation in the
CMV driver population subject to the
new hours-of-service rule compared to
the previous rule? How much sleep do
drivers operating under the new
regulations average on a daily basis, and
how has this average changed as a result
of the new rule? In other words, are
drivers getting more or less sleep
because of the new rule? Are they
getting the 8 hours of sleep each day
considered necessary to maintain
alertness? Is there any evidence that 10
continuous hours of off-duty time does
not provide adequate opportunity for
drivers to obtain 8 hours of sleep each
day?

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Request E–2–2. Naps/Rest Periods.
Several studies have addressed the
effectiveness of naps and breaks in
alleviating or preventing fatigue and
drowsiness (Wylie, C.D., et al. (1996,
1997, 1998) and other studies referenced
in Freund Annotated Literature Review
(1999)). Do naps or short rest periods
improve driver alertness in the
operation of a CMV? How long should
they be? At what point in the driving or
duty cycle would they provide the
greatest benefit? At what time of day
would they provide the greatest benefit?
If rest or other breaks from driving
improve alertness, is there some
additional amount of operational
flexibility that could be afforded to a
driver who chooses to take certain
minimum breaks that would not
increase safety risks or impair driver
health? Are naps or rest periods
beneficial to driver health? Does
napping in a seated position provide
rest equivalent to napping while lying
flat (as in a sleeper berth)? Please
explain.
E.3. Exposure to Environmental
Stressors
CMV drivers may be exposed to
harmful substances or conditions, such
as diesel engine exhaust emissions and
chemicals. Drivers are also exposed to
vehicle vibration and noise. A number
of research studies are being evaluated
to determine their relationship to CMV
driver hours-of-service regulations.
There has been some research on the
relationship between exposure to diesel
engine exhaust emissions and driver
health. A Danish study claimed that a
group of 14,225 truck drivers had a
higher mortality rate over a ten-year
period from lung cancer and multiple
myeloma than did a group of 43,024
unskilled male laborers in other
occupations (Hansen, E.S., ‘‘A FollowUp Study on the Mortality of Truck
Drivers,’’ American Journal of Industrial
Medicine, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 1993, pp.
811–821). Another study asserted that
male truck drivers faced higher risk of
death than other men did from colon
cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer,
diabetes, ischemic heart disease, nonalcohol cirrhosis, and motor vehicle
crashes (Aronson, K.J., et al.,
‘‘Surveillance of Potential Associations
Between Occupations and Causes of
Death in Canada, 1965–91,’’
Occupational and Environmental
Medicine, Vol. 56, No. 4, April 1999, pp.
265–269). A review of 30
epidemiological studies in North
America and Europe (including 10
studies of truck drivers, two of bus
drivers, and four of all professional
drivers) similarly concluded that

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occupational exposure to diesel exhaust
raised the risk of lung cancer (Lipsett,
M., & Campleman, S., ‘‘Occupational
Exposure to Diesel Exhaust and Lung
Cancer: A Meta-Analysis,’’ American
Journal of Public Health, Vol. 89, No. 7,
July 1999, pp. 1009–1017). Another
review of 15 studies of truck drivers and
10 of bus drivers suggested that
exposure to diesel exhaust may also
raise the risk of bladder cancer (Boffetta,
P., & Silverman, D.T., ‘‘A Meta-Analysis
of Bladder Cancer and Diesel Exhaust
Exposure,’’ Epidemiology, Vol. 12, No.
1, January 2001, pp. 125–130). Finally,
CMV drivers can be exposed to
chemicals in liquid or vapor form. One
study, for example, found that drivers
delivering gasoline can experience acute
headaches, dizziness, or nausea after
exposure to vapors during loading and
unloading (Hakkola, M.L., et al.,
‘‘Changes in Neuropsychological
Symptoms and Moods Among Tanker
Drivers Exposed to Gasoline During a
Work Week,’’ Occupational Medicine
(London), Vol. 47, No. 6, August 1997,
pp. 344–348).
Drivers face extended exposure to
highway noise that may lead to hearing
loss (Van Den Heever, D.J., & Roets, F.J.,
‘‘Noise Exposure of Truck Drivers: A
Comparative Study,’’ American
Industrial Hygiene Association Journal,
Vol. 57, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 564–566).
Highway noise can also cause problems
for drivers who are attempting to sleep
in the sleeper berth while their partners
drive, thereby reducing the adequacy of
their restorative sleep (Seshagiri, B.,
‘‘Occupational Noise Exposure of
Operators of Heavy Trucks,’’ American
Industrial Hygiene Association Journal,
Vol. 59, No. 3, March 1998, pp. 205–
213). Additionally, drivers are exposed
to whole body vibration (Palmer, K.,
‘‘Prevalence and Pattern of
Occupational Exposure to Whole Body
Vibration in Great Britain: Findings
from a National Survey,’’ Occupational
and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 57,
No. 4, April 2000, pp. 229–236), which
may lead to lower back pain (Pope M.H.,
et al., ‘‘Low Back Pain and Whole Body
Vibration,’’ Clinical Orthopedics and
Related Research, No. 354, September
1998, pp. 241–248). A Danish study
examining hospital admissions over
several years concluded that truck and
bus drivers had higher age-standardized
admission ratios for prolapsed cervical
or lumbar discs, and also markedly high
admission ratios for back injuries
(Hannerz, H., & Tuchsen, F., ‘‘Hospital
Admissions Among Male Drivers in
Denmark,’’ Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, Vol. 58, No. 4,
1 April 2001, pp. 253–260). Many truck

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drivers must perform heavy lifting, often
after spending hours driving; this may
contribute to injuries to the spine and
ligaments (Jensen, M.V., et al.,
‘‘Prolapsed Cervical Intervertebral Disc
in Male Professional Drivers in
Denmark, 1981–1990: A Longitudinal
Study of Hospitalizations,’’ Spine, Vol.
21, No. 20, 15 October 1996, pp. 2352–
2355).
The implications of these studies are
not always clear. Some of the research
has suggested that the effect of exposure
to diesel exhaust was concentrated
among older drivers—many of whom
drove years ago when few or weaker
emissions standards existed. The
mortalities of drivers who drove in later
time periods did not show a similar
relationship. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has tightened
its standards on vehicle emissions in the
last two decades and will again
beginning in 2006. In the past five years
alone, many of the components of diesel
exhaust that are considered dangerous
to health have been significantly
reduced (Bunn, W.B., et al., ‘‘What is
New in Diesel Emissions?’’ International
Archives of Occupational and
Environmental Health, July 2002, pp
122–132). EPA regulations that will go
into effect in 2007 and 2010 will reduce
these emissions levels even further.
Modern CMVs have also evolved.
Truck manufacturers have improved
ergonomics and driving comfort
considerably. Noise levels in the cab—
whether from the engine, tires, or
outside sources—have been reduced.
Manufacturers have continued to make
great strides in reducing high-frequency
truck vibration through improved cab
suspensions and engine mounts. Airsuspension driver’s seats are also
commonplace. However, the long-term
effects of current emissions, noise
levels, and vibration, even in modern
vehicles, are largely unknown. To this
end, FMCSA requests information on
the impacts of exposure (noise,
vibration, and chemical emissions) on
the health of commercial motor vehicle
drivers as they relate to driver hours of
service.
Request E–3–1. Exposure. In this
request and throughout this NPRM, we
are looking at only injuries or
conditions directly related to the hoursof-service regulations and operating a
CMV, not other workplace injuries,
which are outside the jurisdiction of
FMCSA. What are the current standards
and/or testing data regarding vehicle
noise, vibration, and emissions? How
have these standards changed over
time? Does any research or data assess
the impact on driver health of exposure
to diesel exhaust emissions, exposure

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via respiration or skin contact with
other chemicals, noise, and vibration
during the operation of a CMV or during
rest periods in a sleeper berth? Since the
new hours-of-service rule allows drivers
11, rather than 10, hours of driving time,
what are the consequences to drivers of
one additional hour of such exposure in
the vehicle per day? What are the
exposure effects of the new 14-hour
rule, in contrast to the previous 15-hour
rule? What other exposure factors
relating to the new hours-of-service
regulations adversely or beneficially
affect CMV driver health? Is revision of
the hours-of-service rule the appropriate
answer to adverse exposure impacts?
What are the economic costs of
addressing exposure through hours of
service?
E.4. Workplace Injuries and Fatalities
According to information from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor, transportation
workers suffer more fatalities than any
other occupational group, accounting
for 12 percent of all U.S. worker deaths
annually. Nearly two-thirds of these
fatalities are caused by highway crashes.
Truck drivers also have more nonfatal
injuries than workers in any other
occupation. Half of the nonfatal injuries
were serious sprains and strains.
Request E–4–1. Workplace Injuries
and Fatalities. In this request and
throughout this NPRM, we are looking
at only injuries directly related to the
hours-of-service regulations and
operating a CMV, not other workplace
injuries that are outside the jurisdiction
of FMCSA. What is the impact of fatigue
and loss of alertness on CMV driver
workplace injuries and fatalities? Does
the evidence connect these injuries or
fatalities to specific aspects of the
current or previous hours-of-service
regulations? Please distinguish injuries
and fatalities related to the hours-ofservice regulations and operation of a
CMV from other workplace hazards
such as those related to loading and
unloading.
E.5. Lifestyle Choices
Lifestyle choices, including diet and
exercise, may impact driver health and
safety. Realistically, such choices
cannot be regulated by FMCSA. For
example, while the hours-of-service
regulations prohibit driving during offduty hours, they do not prevent the
driver from engaging in personal
activities, rather than sleeping.
Similarly, an excessive or unhealthy
diet can lead to obesity, which in turn
may predispose a driver to diabetes or
back problems.

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Request E–5–1. Lifestyle Choices.
What effect do certain lifestyle choices,
such as diet, exercise, and the use of offduty time, have on driver safety and
health?
F. Primary Components
F.1. Driving Time, On-Duty Time, and
Off-Duty Time
Sleep researchers and the motor
carrier industry generally agree that the
hours-of-service rules should promote
work schedules built on a 24-hour day.
Studies exploring the relationship
between sleep obtained and subsequent
performance, both in laboratory and
operational settings, generally indicate
that a person who is sleepy is more
prone to perform poorly on tasks
requiring vigilance, quick reaction time,
and decisionmaking than a person who
is alert. The scientific basis for
restricting driving time includes
research findings indicating that
inadequate sleep can lead to fatigue, and
several periods of insufficient sleep
(inadequate in quantity or quality) cause
sleep debt or cumulative fatigue.
The 2003 hours-of-service rule
permits up to 11 hours of driving time
after 10 consecutive hours off duty.
Compared to the previous rule, this
permits up to one additional hour of
driving time, but requires at least 2
additional hours of off-duty time. The
new rule also limits driving to a 14-hour
window after a driver comes on duty.
Unlike the previous 15-hour rule, the
new rule does not permit a driver to
extend his or her on-duty time by
subtracting breaks, waiting, and other
off-duty periods from the calculation of
on-duty time. The new rule addresses
the issue of driver fatigue by providing
drivers a daily opportunity to obtain a
full 8 hours of sleep and still have time
available for other personal activities
within the minimum 10-hour off-duty
period. We believe that the net effect of
these changes is that the driver spends
less time on duty, in most cases, and
usually has the time necessary to
commute and attend to personal
matters, while still obtaining the 8
consecutive hours of sleep
recommended in the scientific literature
to ensure alertness.
The mandatory minimum 10-hour offduty time, combined with a maximum
14-hour window in which driving can
occur, establishes a 24-hour day for the
driver who maximizes on-duty time and
minimizes off-duty time. This routine is
consistent with the well documented,
near-24-hour circadian cycle that
regulates energy and alertness levels.
FMCSA concluded that the advantages
of putting most drivers on a 24-hour, or

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near-24-hour, work cycle, combined
with the opportunity to obtain 8 or more
hours of sleep per night, will result in
a well-rested driver capable of driving
the additional 1 hour per day. The new
rule also provides flexibility for the
motor carrier industry and drivers. If
necessary, a driver can work a 21-hour
‘‘day’’ by driving for 11 hours, taking 10
hours off duty, using no other on-duty
time, and then resuming driving again.
This compressed schedule may be
useful to address operational demands.
We doubt drivers will use it regularly,
however, because their workload
requires on-duty activities such as
loading and unloading, completing
paperwork, fueling, daily vehicle
inspections, and dispatch call-ins
beyond the 11-hour driving period. But
when the 21-hour cycle is used, it is
considerably less disruptive to the
body’s circadian rhythms than the 18hour ‘‘day’’ allowed by the old hours-ofservice rules (10 hours of driving
followed by 8 hours off duty). We invite
comments on the safety and health
effects of the 21-hour cycle, especially
as compared to the 18-hour cycle
allowed under the old rule.
Among other dicta included in its
Public Citizen decision, the D.C. Circuit
questioned whether FMCSA’s argument
that additional off-duty time and a 14hour driving window justified a onehour increase in total driving time. The
court suggested the agency lacked
supportive scientific evidence to
support allowing an additional hour of
driving per ‘‘day.’’
Each driver should have an
opportunity for 8 consecutive hours of
uninterrupted sleep every day. Nine
hours off duty were originally required
in 1937. For various reasons, organized
labor objected to most of the original
regulations, and upon further
deliberation, the ICC reduced the 9-hour
off-duty period to 8 hours in each 24
hours (6 M.C.C. 557, July 12, 1938). In
1962, the hours-of-service rule was
changed to move away from a strict 24hour period, and allow driving to
resume again after 8 hours off-duty
regardless of whether a new ‘‘day’’ (24hour period) had begun. FMCSA’s final
rule of April 2003, required a minimum
of 10 consecutive hours off duty. This
was a result of the concern that many
carriers were not providing drivers more
than the minimum 8 hours off duty
(although the previous regulation
allowed them to do so) and that many
drivers accept tight schedules without
objection. These drivers also had to
commute home, eat one or two meals,
care for family members, bathe, get
physical exercise, and conduct other
personal activities, all within an 8-hour

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off-duty period. To afford the driver an
opportunity to obtain a minimum
period of 8 hours of sleep, research
showed that the off-duty period needed
to be increased from 8 hours to 10
hours.
Studies in aviation (Gander, et al.
(1991)), rail (Thomas et al. (1997),
Moore-Ede et al. (1996)), and maritime
environments (U.S. Coast Guard Report
No. CG–D–06–97, U.S. Coast Guard
(1997) (MCS 68/INF.11)) confirmed the
need for additional off-duty time.
Studies of truck drivers, including Lin
et al. (1993) and McCartt et al. (1995),
point specifically to increased crash risk
and recollections of increased
drowsiness or sleepiness after fewer
than nine hours off duty. Studies
performed in laboratory settings, as well
as studies assessing operational
situations, explore the relationships
between the sleep obtained and
subsequent performance (Dinges, D.F., &
Kribbs, N.B. (1991); Bonnet, M.H., &
Arand, D.L. (1995); Belenky, G., et al.
(1994); Dinges, D.F., et al. (1997);
Pilcher, J.J., & Hufcutt, A.I. (1996);
Belenky, G., et al. (1987)). The results of
the studies show that a person who is
sleepy is prone to perform more poorly
on tasks requiring vigilance and
decision-making than a person who is
alert. The time when sleep is taken is
important as well because sleep
fragmentation can be a byproduct of the
timing or the quality of the sleep
environment (Bonnet, M.H. (1994);
Roehrs, T., Zorick, F., & Roth, T. (1994);
Mitler, M.M., et al. (1997)); and Wylie,
D. (1998)). It is virtually impossible to
get an adequate amount of sleep when
time for commuting, meals, personal
errands, and family/social life is
subtracted from an 8-hour off-duty
period, as the ICC found in 1937. Wylie
et al. (1996) also addresses these issues.
Request F–1–1. What are the impacts
on driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors of
incremental increases in maximum
driving time? For example, to what
extent does an increase in maximum
driving time from 10 hours to 11 hours
affect driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors in the CMV
industry?
Request F–1–2. What are the impacts
on driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors of
incremental increases in the minimum
required off-duty period? For example,
to what extent does an increase in
minimum off-duty time from 8 hours to
10 hours affect driver health, the safe
operation of CMVs, and economic
factors in the CMV industry?
Request F–1–3. What are the impacts
on driver health, the safe operation of

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CMVs, and economic factors of
incremental decreases in the ‘‘duty
period’’ from 15 non-consecutive hours
to 14 consecutive hours? For example,
to what extent does a decrease in the
duty period from 15 non-consecutive
hours to 14 consecutive hours affect
driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors in the CMV
industry?
Request F–1–4. To what extent does a
reduction of the ‘‘daily’’ duty-period
from 15 non-consecutive hours to 14
consecutive hours, and the increase in
minimum off-duty time from 8 hours to
10 hours, offset the increase in
allowable driving time from 10 hours to
11 hours in terms of driver health, the
safe operation of CMVs, and economic
factors in the CMV industry? Are there
clinical or other studies examining the
impact on driver health and the safe
operation of CMVs of up to 11 hours of
limited physical activity, such as
driving for up to 11 hours?
Request F–1–5. How has the length of
a driver’s total daily work period
changed under the new rules? How long
was the typical total workday, from start
to finish, under the former rule
compared to the new 14-consecutivehour rule?
F.2. The 34-Hour Restart and 60/70Hour Rules
Few research studies address the
effect of recovery periods between work
periods spanning multiple days. O’Neill
et al. (1999) [referenced in the 1999
Literature Review] assessed the
interactions between several trucking
industry operating practices and driver
fatigue-related performance decrements.
The activities studied were: loading and
unloading freight; the amount of nonduty time (‘‘rest and recovery’’) required
to reestablish baseline fitness for duty at
the end of a multiday series of work
shifts; and a sustained schedule
consisting of 14 hours on duty and
driving time followed by 10 hours off
duty. The study design included two
days of orientation; five 14-hour days (7
a.m. to 9 p.m.) followed by 58 hours off;
five more 14-hour days and a second 58hour period off; and a final 14-hour day.
The 14-hour duty periods included
three scheduled breaks totaling
approximately two hours. The study
participants alternated periods of
driving a high-fidelity fixed base
simulator with performance of a
physical loading task. The researchers
reported the drivers did not appear to
have accumulated significant sleep loss
during the study but their amount of
measured sleep increased and their
sleep latency decreased on their first offduty days. The researchers suggested,

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among other things, that a full two
nights and one day off (that is, ‘‘Friday
night’’ to ‘‘Sunday morning’’—about 32
hours off duty) would be a minimum
safe restart period, under the conditions
tested. They also stated, as a caveat, that
results of this study may not be
generalized to operations that are not
day shifts, have shorter post-shift offduty periods, have few or no breaks
during the duty period, or vary from
what the driver is accustomed to in
terms of circadian disruptions or longerthan-usual on-duty periods.
On the other hand, not all research
studies have reached the same
conclusions. Wylie, C.D., et al. (1997)
[referenced in Freund, 1999] stated the
following in the Abstract of their study
report:
The purpose of the study was to assess the
‘‘recovery’’ effects of zero, one, and two
workdays off on driver fatigue, alertness, and
performance. It involved 25 of the 40 drivers
who participated in the two 13-hour
observational conditions of the DFAS [Driver
Fatigue and Alertness Study]. Drivers had
nominally 12, 36, and 48 hours time off after
the fourth workday.
For one workday off (36 hours), there was:
(1) No objective evidence of driver recovery;
(2) some improvement in drivers subjective
feeling reflected by self-rating, although this
could be a reflection of driver expectation of
recovery; (3) for day-start drivers, some
increase in the amount of sleep obtained
during time off; and (4) for night-start drivers,
interference with work-rest patterns and less
sleep during time off.
For two workdays off (i.e., 48 hours), there
was no objective evidence of driver recovery
although the statistical power of the tests to
detect recovery effects was not high because
of random variation associated with the
smaller number of drivers. (p. iii)

Smiley, A., & Heslegrave, R. (1997)
found only one study (Wylie et al.,
1997) that specifically dealt with an
operational schedule that would be
permitted under a 36-hour reset
scenario. The authors state this is
mainly because such a short reset period
would result in schedules that would
exceed current hours-of-work
regulations in most countries. They note
that Wylie and his co-authors, as well as
the reviewers, considered data from this
study to be more suggestive of trends
because of the small number of subjects
and the fact that sleep during recovery
periods was not recorded using full
polysomnography (as were the sleep
periods during the work periods). They
cited several other scientific studies
dealing with recovery time. The results
of these studies and CMV driver hoursof-service requirements may or may not
be related. For example, a 1967 study by
Lille suggested that a single day off was
insufficient for night workers to recover

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after a sleep debt accumulated over five
days. Other studies indicated a
preference for a three-day rest period
compared to a two-day period after
three 12-hour night shifts; a preference
for two days and three days off over one
day off when comparing automatic
brakings experienced by locomotive
engineers; and a 1994 literature review
indicating two nights of recovery sleep
as usually being sufficient to allow near
full recovery after extended periods of
sleep loss.
Under both the old and new hours-ofservice regulations, most drivers are
prohibited from driving after reaching a
maximum 60 hours of on-duty time in
any consecutive 7-day period, or 70
hours in 8 days. A driver working the
current maximum 14-consecutive-hour
duty period without a break and taking
the minimum 10 hours off duty would
reach the 60-hour on-duty limit in
slightly less than 41⁄2 days (41⁄2 days ×
14 hours = 63 hours), after which he or
she could not drive a CMV until enough
calendar days had passed to bring the
driver within the 60-hours-in-7consecutive-days limitation. In this
example, the driver could only drive 4
hours on the fifth day (60 ¥ (14 × 4) =
4) and would then have to take an
additional 2 full days off duty to fall
within the limit of 60 hours in any 7
consecutive days. This results in nearly
3 days of required off-duty time.
A fairly common misunderstanding is
the belief that the hours-of-service rule
establishes a limit on the number of
hours a driver may work in any time
period. The rule only limits the driver’s
ability to drive a CMV after a certain
number of hours of work or driving. In
other words, the driver may work
unlimited hours, but may not drive a
CMV unless he or she is within hoursof-service limits. For example, on a
Friday night a driver has reached the 60or 70-hour on-duty limit within 7 or 8
consecutive days. On a Friday night,
Saturday, and indefinitely thereafter,
this driver could continue to perform
non-driving duties without being in
violation of the hours-of-service rule.
However, before the driver could
operate a CMV, the driver would have
to be completely off-duty for enough
days to bring the total on-duty hours
within any 7- or 8-consecutive days
under the 60- or 70-hour limits.
As a matter of background, section
345 of the National Highway
Designation Act of 1995 [Pub. L. 104–
50, 109 Stat. 568] created a ‘‘24-hour
restart’’ exemption from the 60- and 70hour rules for drivers of utility service
vehicles, CMVs transporting groundwater well drilling rigs, and

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construction materials and equipment.
This exemption is still in effect.
In 49 CFR 395.3(c) FMCSA added a
‘‘restart provision’’ which allowed any
7- or 8-day period to end with the
beginning of any off-duty period of 34
or more consecutive hours. In other
words, at any point before exceeding the
60/70-hour limit, a driver may restart
the 60/70-hour clock (or calculation)
after taking 34 or more consecutive
hours off duty. Consistent with previous
interpretations of the 60/70-hour rule,
FMCSA interprets this provision to
mean that if the driver exceeded the 60
or 70 hours on duty, he or she could not

start the 34-hour restart period until
enough calendar days had passed to
bring the driver within the 60 hours in
7 consecutive days (or 70 hours in 8
days) limitation. The 34-hour restart
provides an option that permits the
driver to have enough time for two
uninterrupted periods of 8 hours sleep
before returning to work in a new multiday duty period. However, it also allows
a driver to drive more hours and be on
duty more hours before driving is
prohibited in a 7- or 8-day period, as
shown in the table below.
This table is based on two
hypothetical scenarios. The first is a

daily schedule in which the driver
drives continuously for the maximum
allowable time (11 hours). The second is
a daily schedule in which the driver is
on-duty/not-driving continuously for
the maximum allowable time (14 hours
of which 11 are driving). In each case,
the driver takes only the minimum
required off-duty (10 hours) period and,
prior to reaching the 60/70 hour limit,
the driver invokes the 34-hour restart
provision and resumes the scenario of
maximizing driving and on-duty time
for the remainder of the 7/8 day period.

MAXIMUM POSSIBLE DRIVING AND ON-DUTY HOURS
Current (2003) rule
(Assuming minimum 10-hour off-duty periods)

Old rule

Available hours off duty

34-hour restart

Without restart
(note 1)

77

60

60

91

108

84

60

60

84

108

88

70

70

104

122

98

70

70

94

122

Max. Hours Driving Only in 7 consecutive days, before
driving is prohibited ..........................................................
Max. Hours Driving & On-duty in 7 consecutive days, before driving is prohibited ...................................................
Max. Hours Driving Only in 8 consecutive days, before
driving is prohibited ..........................................................
Max. Hours Driving & On-duty in 8 consecutive days, before driving is prohibited ...................................................

60/70 rule
(note 1)

Current rule
(note 2)

Old rule
(note 3)

Note 1: Under the current 2003 rule without imposing the 34-hour restart, and under the old rule, the maximum hours a driver may work and
continue to operate a commercial motor vehicle is capped at 60 hours in 7 consecutive days (70 hours in 8 consecutive days).
Note 2: The ‘‘available hours off duty’’ calculation assumes the driver is maximizing the driving and driving and on-duty not driving hours (11/
14 hours respectively), coupled with taking only the minimum mandatory off-duty periods (10 hours).
Note 3: The old rules prohibited driving after 60 hours in 7 consecutive days (70 hours in 8 consecutive days). Considering the total hours
available within each period, 168 (7 × 24) and 192 (8 × 24) would provide 108 (168 less 60) and 122 (192 less 70) available hours off duty. However, the actual available off-duty hours may vary since the 60/70 hour rule only prohibits driving after the 60- or 70-hour limit, but does not prohibit additional hours on duty, not driving. The figure in the table represents the maximum available hours off duty for a driver not working any
additional hours after reaching the 60/70 hour limit.

The 60/70-hour limitation helps
prevent a driver from developing severe,
cumulative fatigue and sleep
deprivation when working and driving
the maximum ‘‘daily’’ limits for an
extended period. However, at times this
provision may require the driver to
remain off duty for longer periods of
time than necessary to gain adequate
restorative sleep. This occurs because
the rule refers to the maximum hours on
duty in a certain number of ‘‘days.’’ The
hours worked in the prior 7 or 8
consecutive days and the hours
available to work in a future 7-or 8consecutive-day period are re-calculated
at midnight when a new ‘‘day’’ begins.
As noted previously, the restart
provision avoids this limitation by
permitting the driver to ‘‘restart the 60/
70 hour clock’’ after having 34 or more
consecutive hours off duty, which
would afford two uninterrupted periods
of 8 hours sleep before returning to
work in a new multi-day duty period.
The D.C. Circuit criticized FMCSA for
not even acknowledging, much less
justifying, that the new rule
‘‘dramatically increases the maximum

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permissible hours drivers may work
each week’’ Public Citizen, at 1222–
1223. As shown in the table above, the
restart increases the total hours of
permissible on-duty time in a 7-day
period, after which a driver may not
drive a CMV, from 60 hours to 84 hours.
It also increases the maximum driving
time permitted in a 7-consecutive-day
period (from 60 hours to 77 hours). Also
as shown in the table above, the restart
increases the total hours of permissible
on-duty time in an 8-day period, after
which a driver may not drive a CMV,
from 70 hours to 98 hours. It also
increases the maximum driving time
permitted in an 8-consecutive-day
period (from 70 hours to 88 hours).
In the 2003 final rule, the agency
explained its rationale for the adoption
of the 34-hour restart period. In essence,
studies indicated that cumulative
fatigue and sleep debt can develop over
a weekly period, and at least two full
periods of sleep are needed to ‘‘restore’’
a driver to full alertness. The agency
determined that the 34-hour restart
period, based on a full 24-hour period
plus an additional 10-hour period

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available for sleep, was the minimum
restart which would provide adequate
restorative rest.
The 34-hour restart was also seen in
the 2003 final rule as a flexible
alternative to the ‘‘mandatory weekend’’
proposed in the 2000 NPRM. Not all
motor carrier operations work on a
‘‘fixed and recurring 7-day period,’’
instead having intense days of work
followed by slack times. Other
operations can be disrupted by weather.
The 34-hour restart allows motor
carriers and drivers the option of
restorative rest during the times work is
not available or is interrupted.
The agency is seeking research and
other data to further ascertain the effects
of a 34-hour restart period on safety and
driver health, and whether 34 hours is
the appropriate length of time for a
restart, compared to periods ranging
from 24 hours (as in the NHS Act) to
more than 34 hours. The agency is also
reviewing the alternative of eliminating
the restart provision, or of implementing
it in a different way, such as limiting its
use within a given time period, so as to
preclude a driver accumulating an

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excessive amount of on-duty time before
driving.
Request F–2–1. What effect has the 34hour restart had on driver fatigue and
the ability to obtain restorative sleep? Is
a 34-consecutive-hour off-duty period
long enough to provide sufficient
restorative sleep regardless of the
number of hours worked prior to the
restart? Is it different for a driver
working a night or irregular schedule?
What length of continuous off-duty time
provides adequate opportunity for most
drivers to obtain 8 hours of sleep per
day?
Request F–2–2. How many drivers (or
what percentage of the current driver
population) are currently using the 34hour restart option to accumulate more
than 60 or 70 hours of driving time in
any consecutive 7-or 8-day period? How
consistently are they using this option?
On the average, how many hours of
driving are they accumulating in 7 or 8
consecutive days? How many drivers, or
what percentage of the current driver
population, are currently logging 11
hours of daily driving on a consistent
basis; i.e., the drivers consistently
driving the maximum permissible
driving time?
Request F–2–3. If a driver has already
exceeded 60 hours on duty in 7 days, or
70 hours in 8 days, should the driver be
permitted to utilize the 34-hour restart
at any time, or should the driver be
required to take enough days off duty to
be in compliance with the 60/70 hour
provision before starting the restart
period?
Request F–2–4. What would be the
impact on the industry of eliminating
the 34-hour restart option relative to
productivity, annual revenues, and
operational costs such as labor, capital,
and other? How many additional drivers
does the industry anticipate it would
need to hire to absorb the loss in weekly
driving hours incurred if the 34-hour
restart period was increased?
Eliminated?
Request F–2–5. What would be the
safety impact of eliminating the 34-hour
restart option in terms of crashes,
fatalities, and injuries?
Request F–2–6. What would be the
impact on driver health of modifying or
eliminating the 34-hour restart option?
How would the modification or
elimination of the 34-hour restart period
affect driver health and the safe
operation of CMVs, as a result of its
effect on the 24-hour cycle (circadian
rhythms)?
F.3. Sleeper-Berth Use
Historically, the sleeper berth is
widely used by commercial vehicle
operators to obtain rest and restore

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available hours, making it legal to drive
without having to take 10 consecutive
hours off duty. The regulation of sleeper
berth use was first considered by the
ICC under the Motor Carrier Act of
1935. At that time and since, the
economic and operational advantages of
sleeper berths in some segments of the
trucking industry have been recognized.
In one of its first hours-of-service
decisions, the ICC in 1937 discussed the
economic need for sleeper-berth use, but
stated, ‘‘We shall watch this matter
closely and if we see any tendency on
the part of the carriers to use sleeper
cabs where such use does not appear to
be reasonably necessary, steps will be
taken to put limits upon this practice’’
(3 M.C.C. 689).
Under the 2003 final rule, drivers are
permitted to accumulate the mandatory
off-duty period in four ways: (1) A
minimum of 10 consecutive hours off
duty, (2) a minimum of 10 consecutive
hours in a sleeper berth, (3) a minimum
of 10 consecutive hours in any
combination of off-duty and sleeperberth periods, or (4) two sleeper-berth
periods totaling 10 or more hours, with
neither period being less than 2 hours.
The split-sleeper-berth provision of
the 2003 final rule only permits a
combination of two sleeper-berth
periods for the purpose of accumulating
the required 10 hours off duty. A
sleeper-berth period may only be
excluded in calculating compliance
with the 14-hour rule when it is
combined with a second qualifying
sleeper-berth period. Another way of
stating this is that a single sleeper-berth
period of less than 10 consecutive hours
is included in calculating the 14-hour
tour-of-duty provision. Thus, for a
driver who starts the day at 5 a.m., and
later takes one sleeper-berth break for a
few hours around noon, the 14-hour
duty period would still end at 7 p.m.
The single sleeper-berth period cannot
be excluded from calculation of the 14hour limitation.
Informal communications with
drivers and carriers indicate that this
limitation may create a hardship on
drivers and may encourage them to
avoid taking rest breaks during the duty
period. Under the previous rule, drivers
could exclude off-duty periods, such as
‘‘breaks’’ during the day, from the 15hour on-duty maximum. Under the
current rule, the 14-hour duty period
represents consecutive hours, meaning
that drivers may avoid breaks and meals
in an attempt to accomplish as much
work or travel as far as possible in the
14 hours allowed. This is in contrast to
the indefinite period allowed under the
old rule, because there was no
maximum amount of off-duty breaks

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which could be taken during the duty
‘‘day.’’
The use of a split-sleeper-berth period
affects calculation of the maximum 11hour driving time, 14-hour limitation,
and the 60/70-hour limitation. Because
sleeper-berth periods may be taken by a
driver at any time, the calculations to
determine whether a driver is in
compliance may be very difficult. In
other words, a ‘‘real world’’ series of
logbook pages may reflect that the driver
has taken a variety of sleeper-berth
periods, as well as other on-duty and
off-duty periods. The way in which
these periods interact to determine the
hours available for driving, or hours
available under the 14-hour limitation,
can be very complex, and has required
the agency to issue extensive
interpretations. Training of drivers and
enforcement personnel regarding the
new rule has reportedly been very
difficult due to the complexities
involved. Vendors of computer software
for monitoring hours-of-service
compliance have reported difficulty in
programming their software to
consistently calculate compliance. They
have advised the agency that the current
regulatory language, even with
extensive interpretations and guidance,
does not necessarily provide answers to
every scenario that may develop.
Enforcement personnel have also
reported difficulty in calculating
compliance during a roadside
inspection when split-sleeper-berth
periods are used. For example, at the
time of inspection a driver may have
only taken one sleeper-berth period and
could appear to be in violation of one
or more limitations. However,
compliance would depend on whether
the driver later takes a second
combinable sleeper-berth period.
Determining compliance based on
potential future actions of the driver
may create confusion and inconsistency,
and needs to be addressed in this
rulemaking.
FMCSA will consider a variety of
possible changes to the sleeper-berth
provisions, including but not limited to:
(1) Not permitting any split sleeperberth use to count toward the minimum
10-hours off duty, (2) allowing one
continuous sleeper-berth period of less
than 10-hours, such as 8 hours, to
substitute for the otherwise minimum
10 hours, (3) eliminating split-sleeperberth periods or establishing a
minimum time for one of the two
‘‘splits,’’ such as 5 hours, 8 hours, or
some other appropriate level, (4)
revising the manner in which sleeperberth periods affect the calculation of
the 14-consecutive-hour period, and (5)

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restricting variations on permissible
sleeper-berth use to team drivers only.
On November 3, 2003, the American
Trucking Associations (ATA) submitted
a petition for rulemaking to FMCSA,
requesting that the hours-of-service rule
be modified to permit a driver to extend
the 14-hour on-duty period by the use
of one sleeper-berth period of a
minimum 2 hours duration, provided
the on-duty period is followed by a
minimum 10-consecutive-hour off-duty
period. A copy of the ATA petition is
filed in the docket for this rulemaking,
and the subject matter of the ATA
petition will be addressed in this
rulemaking.
Request F–3–1. Does sleeping in a
sleeper berth, either in a moving or
stationary vehicle, have a detrimental
effect on driver health and the safe
operation of CMVs? What are the
obstacles to getting adequate sleep in a
sleeper berth? Does using a sleeper berth
in a moving or stationary CMV yield
less restorative sleep (qualitatively or
quantitatively) than sleeping in a bed at
home or at a motel? How do in-vehicle
temperature fluctuations due to ‘‘noidling’’ laws, and other environmental
issues, impact sleeper-berth use?
Request F–3–2. What is the minimum
time in each of two split-sleeper-berth
periods necessary to provide restorative
sleep? What is the impact of splitsleeper-berth periods on driver health
and his or her ability to obtain
restorative sleep and manage fatigue?
How often is a single, continuous 10hour sleeper-berth period used? How
often are consecutive off-duty time and
a single sleeper-berth period (i.e., no
split-sleeper-berth use) combined to
meet the minimum 10-hour off-duty
requirement?
Request F–3–3. How often are splitsleeper-berth periods used to obtain the
required 10 or more hours of off-duty
time? In a split-sleeper-berth operation,
how much time is usually spent in the
sleeper berth during a typical period?
How are split-sleeper-berth periods
managed (i.e., number of hours in each
of the two periods)? Why? How does
this provide restorative sleep or prevent
sleep deprivation?
Request F–3–4. What impact does
team drivers’ use of sleeper berths have
on driver health, safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors and how
do such impacts differ from impacts on
single drivers?
Request F–3–5. If the agency were to
eliminate the split-sleeper-berth
exception and require a driver to take 10
consecutive hours off duty (in a sleeper
berth, or in combination with off-duty
time), what impact would this have
upon driver health, the safe operation of

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CMVs, and business operating
practices?
Request F–3–6. If the agency were to
retain the split-sleeper-berth provision,
but require that one of the two periods
be at least 7, 8, or 9 hours in length,
what impact would this action have on
driver health, the safe operation of
CMVs, and economic factors? If one
period is 7 or more hours in length, is
that equivalent to 10 consecutive hours
of non-sleeper-berth off-duty time (since
little commuting and personal time
would be needed, allowing a greater
percentage of the off-duty period for
sleep), or would a second sleeper-berth
period still be required?
Request F–3–7. What time and costs
are saved by utilizing a sleeper berth
rather than commuting to other sleep
locations such as home or a motel, and
what portion of the time saved is
actually spent sleeping?
Request F–3–8. How does prohibiting
extension of the 14-hour tour of duty
through the use of a single sleeper-berth
period affect driver health, safe
operation of CMVs, and economic
factors? How could allowing the use of
a limited sleeper-berth period to extend
the 14-hour limitation be accomplished
without having a detrimental effect on
highway safety? What would be the
appropriate length of such a limited
sleeper-berth rest period?
Request F–3–9. If the current hours-ofservice rules are generally retained ‘‘as
is,’’ do you have any suggestions to
simplify the sleeper-berth calculations,
yet provide the same or better levels of
driver health, safety, and operational
flexibility? How could the sleeper-berth
provisions be modified or more clearly
stated to simplify calculations but not
have a negative impact on driver health,
safety, and operational considerations?
Request F–3–10. Should the rule
allow sleeper-berth periods to be
combined with off-duty periods when
calculating a continuous off-duty
period? Should a sleeper-berth period
that is part of a period of 10 or more
consecutive hours off duty also be
combinable with a later sleeper-berth
period to allow a split-sleeper-berth
calculation?
F.4. Electronic On-Board Recording
Devices (EOBRs)
As indicated above, on September 1,
2004 (69 FR 53386), FMCSA published
an ANPRM requesting information
about the use of electronic on-board
recording devices as a substitute for
paper copies of driver records of duty
status (‘‘logbooks’’). As the agency said
in the preamble to that document,
‘‘FMCSA is attempting to evaluate the
suitability of EOBRs to demonstrate

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compliance with the enforcement of the
hours-of-service regulations, which in
turn will have major implications for
the welfare of drivers and the safe
operation of commercial motor
vehicles.’’ The ANPRM requested
comments and information on EOBR
performance specifications and the
potential costs and benefits of such
devices.
F.5. Other Provisions
General Requests
Request F–5–1. Please provide
supplemental information or data on
any topic discussed in this NPRM that
could augment existing information for
a final rule or other agency action
regarding hours of service in the future.
Are there ‘‘gaps’’ in available data?
Describe the substantive nature of any
data or information that you believe is
necessary to support a particular
requirement but does not exist. Explain
what the ideal data or information set
would contain. Include a discussion not
only of the individual requirements of
the current rule, but also of the
interrelationships among those
requirements and their impact on driver
health, the safe operation of CMVs, and
economic factors. In addition, suggest
processes, methodologies, and sources
that would facilitate the collection and
analysis of data on the topic or topics.
In responding here, commenters are
requested to provide data and other
information in the context of driver
hours-of-service requirements and the
incremental changes from the old rule to
the new rule.
Request F–5–2. What has been the
effect of the new hours-of-service
regulations upon CMV-related crashes?
Please provide detailed information, if
available.
Request F–5–3. What has been and
will be the effect of CMV improved or
reduced driver compliance as a result of
the changes made by the new hours-ofservice rules? Have CMV drivers
become more or less compliant with the
regulations?
Short-Haul Exemption
For local short-haul drivers, driving is
only part of their daily work routine.
These drivers perform a variety of tasks
including, but may not be limited to,
receiving the day’s driving schedule,
driving, loading and unloading the
vehicle, getting in and out of the vehicle
numerous times, lifting and carrying
packages, and engaging in customer
relations. The research on local shorthaul operations has suggested that
fatigue is less of a problem than for
long-haul drivers (‘‘Impact of the Local

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Short Operations on Driver Fatigue,’’
Hanowski, R., et al. (2000) and ‘‘ShortHaul Trucks and Driver Fatigue,’’
Massie, D.L., et al. (1997)). Since local
short-haul drivers typically work
daytime hours, they are much more
likely to maintain regular schedules that
are less intense than many long-haul
drivers. Short-haul drivers are
significantly less likely to be working 13
or more hours or to have irregular
circadian patterns. Also, local shorthaul drivers typically sleep at home
every night in their own beds. Thus,
local short-haul drivers are much more
likely to be getting the daily restorative
sleep necessary to maintain vigilance.
As a result, the 2003 hours-of-service
rule provided a special exemption for
local short-haul operations, which
included those drivers who return to
their normal work-reporting location on
a regular daily basis. The exemption
provided greater flexibility with regard
to on-duty hours for local short-haul
drivers. The rule provided an exception
to the 14-hour limit once a week (or
after a 34-hour restart period), which
allows two additional non-driving
hours.
Based on the data and research
available at the time, FMCSA was
convinced that the 14-hour limit for
most drivers, with a 16-hour limit for
short-haul drivers once a week, is
materially better from a safety
standpoint than the earlier hours-ofservice rule. Drivers under the old rule
could extend their daily working well
beyond the allowed 15-hour limit,
because of ‘‘off-duty’’ breaks, meals, and
weather-related conditions. The added
two hours of work time once a week
could be productively used by the shorthaul segment to meet peak demands,
accommodate training, and complete
required recordkeeping.
For these reasons, FMCSA is
proposing to continue the local shorthaul exemption.
G. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Because FMCSA is reexamining the
hours-of-service regulations for drivers
and operators of property-carrying
CMVs that were published on April 28,
2003 (68 FR 22456) and amended on
September 30, 2004 (68 FR 56208), the
rulemaking analyses and notices, and
regulatory language accompanying that
final rule (see 68 FR 22505–22513)
remain applicable to this NPRM and are
not being fully reprinted in this notice.
In the Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) to the 2003 final rule, FMCSA
evaluated three alternative proposals for
the hours-of-service rule. The
alternative that was adopted and
became the 2003 final rule was referred

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to in the RIA as the ‘‘FMCSA Proposal.’’
The full text of the RIA that was
prepared for the 2003 final rule is
located in that docket (FMCSA–1997–
2350–23302) and the docket to this
rulemaking.
G.1. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
FMCSA has determined that this
rulemaking constitutes an economically
significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866 because the
agency estimates this action will have
an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more. This is the effect of the
change from the hours-of-service rule
prior to 2003, compared to the current
rule published in 2003, which is being
reexamined in this NPRM. FMCSA has
also determined that this regulatory
action is significant under the regulatory
policies and procedures of DOT because
of the high level of interest concerning
motor carrier safety issues expressed by
Congress, motor carriers, their drivers
and other employees, State
governments, safety advocates, and
members of the traveling public.
Finally, FMCSA has determined that
this regulatory action is a major rule
under the Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 801 et seq.
The RIA for the final rule published
on April 28, 2003 (Docket FMCSA–
1997–2350–23302), estimated net social
benefits to be $1.1 billion annually,
when compared to the previous hoursof-service rules with full compliance.
Alternatively, when compared to the
previous rules under an assumption of
less than full compliance, the current
rule results in annual net social benefits
of -$611 million. When assuming less
than full compliance by industry with
the previous hours-of-service rules, total
annual costs of the new rules equal
approximately $1.3 billion. For major
rules involving annual economic effects
of $1 billion or more, the Office of
Management and Budget requires
several new issues to be considered as
part of the RIA (OMB Circular A–4,
published September 17, 2003). Most
notably, the RIA must present a formal
quantitative analysis of the relative
uncertainties concerning particularly
important benefit and cost elements of
the rule. Additionally, a costeffectiveness analysis is required for all
major rulemakings for which the
primary benefits are improved public
health and safety, where valid
effectiveness measures can be
developed. As such, FMCSA has
prepared these two supplemental
analyses to the RIA and will include
them in the docket to this rulemaking.

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The original RIA that accompanied
the 2003 final rule has not been changed
or reprinted, but answers to the
following questions would help FMCSA
to prepare the new RIA that will be
required when the agency adopts a final
rule.
Request G–1–1. What changes have
been made by shippers and carriers to
adjust to the 14-hour rule? What was the
cost of those changes? What would be
the additional costs if the 14-hour rule
were changed again? Has the loading
and unloading of CMVs become more or
less efficient as a result of the 14-hour
rule? What has been the economic
impact of this change?
Request G–1–2. What has been the
economic impact of the new regulations
on all segments of the motor carrier
industry? For example, have motor
carrier revenues and shipping costs
increased or decreased as a result of the
new hours-of-service regulations?
Request G–1–3. What costs have been
incurred in re-training personnel to
understand the new hours-of-service
rule?
Request G–1–4. What is the impact of
the driver wage structure (either per
mile or per hour) on the hours driven
and/or health and safety of drivers
under the new rule?
Request G–1–5. How many, or what
percentage of, motor carriers provide
health insurance for their drivers? If not
covered by their employer, how many
drivers currently purchase their own
health insurance? How many are
uncovered? If the agency reduced the
driving time allowed by the 2003 rule,
or shortened the daily or weekly onduty period during which driving is
allowed, would motor carrier revenues
and/or profits be sufficient to sustain
employer-provided health insurance? At
what point, in terms of regulatory limits,
would employers curtail or end such
health insurance? At what point would
shorter driving times or on-duty
windows reduce driver income enough
to make health insurance unaffordable?
G.2. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
as amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA), requires Federal agencies to
analyze the impact of rulemakings on
small entities, unless the agency
certifies that the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. In
its analysis for the April 28, 2003, final
rule, FMCSA determined that while
large numbers of small entities would be
affected with regard to their short-haul
operations, no significant economic

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impacts were projected for a substantial
number of small entities.
Although the RFA section of the 2003
final rule is not being changed or
reprinted, answers to the following
questions would help FMCSA to
prepare the small-business impact
analysis that will be required when the
agency adopts a final rule.
Request G–2–1. Since implementation
of the 2003 final rule starting in January
2004, what has been the impact on
small motor carriers (those with less
than $21.5 million in annual revenues)
with short-haul operations, specifically
with regard to your revenues and costs
(labor, capital, and other)? In
responding to this question, please be
specific as to the period for which the
revenue and cost impacts are being
measured (e.g., monthly, biannual, or
six months). In addition, please indicate
whether you are a truckload or lessthan-truckload (LTL) carrier (or drive for
one), a private or for-hire motor carrier
(or drive for one), and those
commodities you haul most frequently.
Request G–2–2. Since implementation
of the 2003 final rule, what has been the
impact on small motor carriers (those
with less than $21.5 million in annual
revenues) with long-haul operations,
specifically with regard to your
revenues and costs (labor, capital, and
other)? In responding to this question,
please be specific as to the period for
which the revenue and cost impacts are
being measured (e.g., monthly,
biannual, or six months). Please indicate
whether you are a truckload or LTL
carrier (or drive for one), a private or
for-hire motor carrier (or drive for one),
and those commodities you haul most
frequently.
Request G–2–3. For small motor
carriers with short-haul operations,
please provide a breakdown of the cost
changes resulting from implementation
of the 2003 final rule. For example,
please separate cost increases or
decreases by changes in labor costs (e.g.,
driver salaries and fringe benefits),
capital or equipment costs (e.g., recent
purchase or sale of tractors and trailers),
and other capital (i.e., infrastructure) or
operating costs. Please indicate whether
you are a truckload or LTL carrier (or
drive for one), a private or for-hire
motor carrier (or drive for one), and
those commodities you haul most
frequently.
Request G–2–4. For small motor
carriers with long-haul operations,
please provide a breakdown of the cost
changes resulting from implementation
of the 2003 final rule. For example,
please separate cost increases or
decreases by changes in labor costs (e.g.,
driver salaries and fringe benefits),

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capital or equipment costs (e.g., recent
purchase or sale of tractors and trailers),
and other capital (i.e., infrastructure) or
operating costs. Please indicate whether
you are a truckload or LTL carrier (or
drive for one), a private or for-hire
motor carrier (or drive for one), and
those commodities you haul most
frequently.
G.3. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 requires each agency to assess
the effects of its regulatory actions on
State, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector. Any agency
promulgating a final rule resulting in a
Federal mandate requiring expenditure
by a State, local, or tribal government or
by the private sector of $120.7 million
or more in any one year must prepare
a written statement incorporating
various assessments, estimates, and
descriptions that are delineated in the
Act. The hours-of-service final rule
published in 2003 and being
reexamined in this NPRM is a major
rule that costs motor carriers more than
$120.7 million in a given year. FMCSA
has prepared the following statement
which addresses each of the elements
required by the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).
Qualitative and Quantitative
Assessment of Costs and Benefits
The UMRA requires a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of the
anticipated costs and benefits of this
Federal mandate. The 2003 final rule
evaluated several proposals, including
an ‘‘FMCSA Staff’’ option. Relative to
the previous rules with full compliance,
the FMCSA option was estimated to
result in a cost savings of approximately
$900 million per year. Benefits under
this ‘‘full compliance’’ scenario were
estimated to be approximately $200
million per year, resulting in net
benefits of $1.1 billion per year. The
final rule does not impose any cost on
State, local, or tribal governments.
Effect on Health, Safety, and the Natural
Environment
The UMRA also requires FMCSA to
discuss the effect of the Federal
mandate on health, safety, and the
natural environment. FMCSA prepared
an environmental assessment for the
2003 final rule, which was placed in the
docket (FMCSA–1997–2350–23303),
and is also in the docket to this
rulemaking, showing that the rule
would not have a significant impact on
the natural environment. The effects of
the rule on health and safety are much
more significant: the primary benefit of

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the 2003 final rule (and thus of this
reexamination) was a reduction in
accidents. The RIA that accompanied
the 2003 final rule explains these
estimates in detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
Federal Financial Assistance
Section 202(a)(2)(A) of the UMRA
requires that this qualitative and
quantitative assessment of costs and
benefits include an analysis of the
extent to which costs to State, local, and
tribal governments may be paid with
Federal financial assistance or otherwise
paid for by the Federal Government.
Since this rulemaking action is
applicable only to motor carriers subject
to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs), there would be
no cost to State, local, and tribal
governments. Therefore, no Federal
funds for these entities would be
necessary for motor carriers to comply
with the requirements. All States,
however, receive Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP) grants
requiring them to adopt and enforce
most of the FMCSRs or compatible State
regulations, including the 2003 hoursof-service rule.
Future Compliance Costs
To the extent feasible, section
202(a)(3) of the UMRA requires
estimates of the future compliance costs
of this rulemaking action, and any
disproportionate budgetary effects upon
particular regions, or upon urban, rural,
or other types of communities, or upon
particular segments of the private sector.
The 2003 final rule, which is being
reexamined here, has no
disproportionate budgetary effects upon
particular regions, or upon urban, rural,
or other types of communities. The RIA
accompanying the 2003 final rule
includes an analysis of the impact of the
‘‘FMCSA Proposal’’ on various regions,
using the REMI Policy InsightTM Model.
The model showed no significant
disparate impact on any region. These
impacts are discussed in chapter 11 of
the RIA.
Effect on the National Economy
Section 202(a)(4) of the UMRA
requires estimates of the effect on the
national economy, such as the effect on
economic growth, full employment,
creation of productive jobs, and
international competitiveness. The
REMI model mentioned above also
yielded an estimate of the
macroeconomic 3 costs of the options.
Relative to the previous rule with 100
3 Macroeconomics: concerned with the behavior
of the entire national economy, or major segments
of it.

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percent compliance, FMCSA estimated
that the impact on gross regional
product 4 (GRP) would be minimal, less
than 0.1 percent of GRP for all the
alternatives. One alternative would have
reduced GRP by almost $12 billion per
year, while all other alternatives would
have resulted in a small increase in
GRP.
Because FMCSA believed the overall
driving time for most CMV drivers
would not change, the agency
concluded the alternatives would not
have a significant impact on full
employment or the creation of
productive jobs. The agency also did not
believe that the ‘‘FMCSA Proposal’’
would have any significant impact on
international competitiveness.
Prior Consultations With Elected
Representatives of Any Affected State,
Local, or Tribal Governments
This reexamined rule does not require
action by State, local, or tribal
governments. Therefore, no prior
consultations with elected
representatives of these governments
were initiated.
Decision To Impose an Unfunded
Mandate
When Congress created FMCSA, it
provided that, ‘‘[i]n carrying out its
duties the Administration shall consider
the assignment and maintenance of
safety as the highest priority * * *’’ [49
U.S.C. 113(b)]. As indicated above,
section 408 of the ICCTA directed the
agency—then part of FHWA—to begin a
rulemaking dealing with a variety of
fatigue-related safety issues, including
‘‘8 hours of continuous sleep after 10
hours of driving, loading and unloading
operations, automated and tamper-proof
recording devices, rest and recovery
cycles, fatigue and stress in longer
combination vehicles, fitness for duty,
and other appropriate regulatory and
enforcement countermeasures for
reducing fatigue-related incidents and
increasing driver alertness * * *’’ [109
Stat. 958]. The agency’s statutory focus
on safety and the specific mandate of
section 408 both demanded that the
2003 final rule improve CMV safety.
The 2003 final rule, which is being
reexamined, represents a substantial
improvement in addressing driver
fatigue over the previous rule. Together,
the provisions are expected to reduce
the effect of cumulative fatigue and
prevent many of the accidents and
4 Gross Regional Product (GRP): the market value
of all goods and services produced by a regional
(i.e., multi-State) economy. The REMI model used
in this analysis included six multi-state regions
that, when aggregated, comprise the entire U.S.
economy.

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fatalities to which fatigue is a
contributing factor. Because the
agency’s statutory priority is safety,
FMCSA adopted a rule that was
marginally more expensive than other
alternatives but would reduce fatiguerelated accidents and fatalities more
substantially, even though it imposes an
unfunded mandate.
G.4. National Environmental Policy Act
FMCSA analyzed the alternatives
discussed in the RIA accompanying the
2003 final rule as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and DOT
Order 5610.1C. As shown in Table 25 of
the 2003 final rule preamble
(Environmental Assessment), none of
the alternatives had a significant
adverse impact on the human
environment and all of the alternatives
had beneficial impacts in some areas.
None of the alternatives stood out as
environmentally preferable, when
compared to the other alternatives. This
environmental assessment and finding
of no significant impact (FONSI) for the
2003 final rule are in the docket for that
rule (FMCSA–1997–2350–23303), as
well as in the docket to this rulemaking.
The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) section of the 2003 final rule
preamble is not being changed or
reprinted here. However, to assist the
agency in preparing the NEPA analysis
that will be required when the agency
adopts a final rule, FMCSA requests
comments.
Request G–4–1. What impact would
the possible changes to the 2003 final
rule discussed in this NPRM have on
the environment?
G.5. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.),
Federal agencies must obtain approval
from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for each collection of
information they conduct, sponsor, or
require through regulations. FMCSA
determined that this NPRM will affect a
currently approved information
clearance for OMB Control Number
2126–0001, titled ‘‘Hours of Service of
Drivers Regulation.’’ OMB approved this
information collection on April 29,
2003, at a revised total of 160,376,492
burden hours, with an expiration date of
April 30, 2006. The PRA requires
agencies to provide a specific,
objectively supported estimate of
burden that will be imposed by the
information collection. See 5 CFR
1320.8. The paperwork burden imposed
by FMCSA’s record-of-duty-status
(RODS) requirement is set forth at 49
CFR 395.8.

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The agency believes that the possible
revisions to the 2003 final rule
discussed in this NPRM will not bring
about an appreciable change in the
paperwork burden to the estimated 4.2
million drivers required to complete
and maintain the RODS, which is
commonly referred to as a ‘‘logbook.’’
This NPRM and a supporting statement
reflecting this assessment have been
submitted to OMB. You may submit
comments on this directly to OMB.
OMB must receive your comments by
March 10, 2005. You must mail or hand
deliver your comments to: Attention:
Desk Officer for the Department of
Transportation, Docket Library, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Room 10102, 725 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20503.
G.6. Executive Order 13211 (Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use)
FMCSA analyzed the 2003 final rule
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use. As a part of the
Environmental Assessment, FMCSA
analyzed the alternatives discussed in
the preamble to the 2003 final rule.
Table 26 of that final rule preamble
showed the energy consumption effects
of the alternatives. From a national
energy consumption perspective, the
FMCSA alternative, which was adopted
and is being reexamined in this NPRM,
had essentially a net zero effect on
national energy consumption. FMCSA
does not consider this effect to be
significant.
In accordance with Executive Order
13211, the agency prepared a
‘‘Statement of Energy Effects’’ for the
2003 final rule. A copy of this statement
is in Appendix D to the Environmental
Assessment of the 2003 final rule
(Docket FMCSA–1997–2350–23303).
G.7. Executive Order 12898
(Environmental Justice)
FMCSA evaluated the environmental
effects of the alternatives discussed in
the 2003 final rule in accordance with
Executive Order 12898 and determined
that there were no environmental justice
issues associated with revising the
hours-of-service regulations.
Environmental justice issues would be
raised if there were ‘‘disproportionate’’
and ‘‘high and adverse impact’’ on
minority or low-income populations.
FMCSA determined through the
Environmental Assessment that there
were no high and adverse impacts
associated with any of the alternatives.
In addition, FMCSA analyzed the
demographic makeup of the trucking

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industry potentially affected by the
alternatives and determined that there
was no disproportionate impact on
minority or low-income populations.
This is based on the finding that lowincome and minority populations are
generally underrepresented in the
trucking occupation. In addition, the
most impacted trucking sectors do not
have disproportionate representation of
minority and low-income drivers
relative to the trucking occupation as a
whole. Appendix E of the
Environmental Assessment provides a
detailed analysis used to reach this
conclusion.
G.8. Executive Order 13045 (Protection
of Children)
Executive Order 13045, Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks (April 23, 1997,
62 FR 19885), requires agencies issuing
‘‘economically significant’’ rules to
include an evaluation of their
environmental health and safety effects
on children, providing the agency has
reason to believe the rule may
disproportionately affect children.
FMCSA evaluated the projected effects
of the 2003 final rule and the various
alternatives and determined that they
would not create disproportionate
environmental health or safety risks to
children. The only adverse
environmental effect with potential
human health consequences is the
projected increase in emissions of air
pollutants. The final rule resulted in a
minor increase in emissions on a
national scale. FMCSA projects no
adverse human health consequences to
either children or adults because the
magnitude of emission increases is
small. The 2003 final rule and

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alternatives, however, reduced the
safety risk posed by tired, drowsy, or
fatigued drivers of CMVs. These safety
risk improvements accrued to children
and adults equally.
G.9. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This action meets applicable
standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice
Reform, to minimize litigation,
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce
burden.
G.10. Executive Order 12630 (Taking of
Private Property)
This reexamined rule will not effect a
taking of private property or otherwise
have ‘‘taking implications’’ under
Executive Order 12630, Governmental
Actions and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights.
G.11. Executive Order 13132
(Federalism)
This action has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132. FMCSA has determined the 2003
final rule, which is being reexamined
here, does not have a substantial direct
effect on States, nor would it limit the
policymaking discretion of the States.
Nothing in this document preempts any
State law or regulation.
A State participating in the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program
(MCSAP) that fails to adopt the 2003
final rule three years after its effective
date (June 27, 2003) will be deemed to
have incompatible regulations and will
not be eligible for MCSAP Basic
Program or Incentive Funds in
accordance with 49 CFR 350.335(b).

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MCSAP has no federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132.
G.12. Executive Order 12372
(Intergovernmental Review)
Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance Program Number 20.217,
Motor Carrier Safety. The regulations
implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental
consultation on Federal programs and
activities do not apply to this NPRM.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 385
Administrative practice and
procedure, Highway safety, Motor
carriers, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 390
Highway safety, Intermodal
transportation, Motor carriers, Motor
vehicle safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 395
Highway safety, Motor carriers,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing,
FMCSA is reexamining the amendments
to 49 CFR chapter III, parts 385, 390,
and 395 as set forth in the final rule on
hours of service of drivers published on
April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22456) and
amended on September 30, 2003 (68 FR
56208). Those amendments are not
being reprinted here.
Issued on: January 18, 2005.
Annette M. Sandberg,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 05–1248 Filed 1–18–05; 4:20 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P

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